Robinette v. Aspen Skiing Company, L.L.C., 363 Fed. Appx. 547; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 1543Posted: November 4, 2010
To see an analysis of this case see: Aspen Skiing Company Release stops claim by injured guest hit by an employee on snowmobile.
Robinette v. Aspen Skiing Company, L.L.C., 363 Fed. Appx. 547; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 1543
CHRIS ROBINETTE, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. ASPEN SKIING COMPANY, L.L.C., a Colorado limited liability company. Defendant – Appellee.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
363 Fed. Appx. 547; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 1543
January 25, 2010, Filed
NOTICE: PLEASE REFER TO FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE RULE 32.1 GOVERNING THE CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1]
(D. Ct. No. 1:08-CV-00052-MSK-MJW). (D. Colo).
Robinette v. Aspen Skiing Co., L.L.C., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34873 (D. Colo., Apr. 23, 2009)
COUNSEL: For CHRIS ROBINETTE, Plaintiff – Appellant: Heather R. Hanneman, Esq., Recht & Kornfeld, P.C., Denver, CO; Scott R. Larson, Esq., Scott R. Larson, P.C., Denver, CO.
For ASPEN SKIING COMPANY, L.L.C., a Colorado limited liability company, Defendant – Appellee: Michael S. Beaver, Rachel A. Yates, Holland & Hart LLP, Greenwood Village, CO.
JUDGES: Before TACHA, ALARCON, ** and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
** The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
OPINION BY: Deanell Reece Tacha
[*548] ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Plaintiff-appellant Chris Robinette brought this action against Aspen Skiing Company, L.L.C. (“Aspen“) seeking damages for injuries he sustained in a snowboarding accident involving a snowmobile that was operated by an Aspen employee. The district court granted Aspen’s motion for summary judgment because Mr. Robinette had entered into an exculpatory [**2] agreement with Aspen and had assumed “all risks of skiing/riding.” Mr. Robinette now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment, contending that the exculpatory agreement is unenforceable because: (1) it purports to cover reckless conduct; (2) it violates public policy; and (3) its terms are unclear and ambiguous.
Mr. Robinette did not raise a claim of recklessness in the district court; therefore, he cannot do so on appeal absent extraordinary circumstances not present here. McDonald v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, our review of the record, the parties’ appellate materials, and the relevant legal authority compels us to agree with the decision reached by the district court on Mr. Robinette’s remaining claims. Accordingly, for the reasons articulated by the district court in its order dated April 23, 2009, we AFFIRM.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha