Admiralty law did not stop a release from barring a claim for negligence for a parasailing injury.

Aramark sued for parasailing accident when it booked the trip with an “affiliate.”

Cobb v. Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1295; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20139; 2013 AMC 2563

State: Nevada, United States District Court for the District of Nevada

Plaintiff: Jaclyn Cobb

Defendant: Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC

Plaintiff Claims: Negligence

Defendant Defenses: Release

Holding: For the defendant

Year: 2013

The plaintiff signed up to go parasailing on Lake Tahoe with Zephyr Cove Resort. Zephyr Cove Resort is described by the court as being an “affiliate of the defendant Aramark. Aramark is well known as a large concessionaire operating hotel and services in National Parks.

After signing up the plaintiff signed a release (waiver). The plaintiff went parasailing and was sailing when the weather turned bad. She was being reeled back to the boat when she struck her knee causing injury.

The plaintiff filed this claim against Aramark. (It is not stated what the relationship is between Aramark and Zephyr Cove Resort or why the plaintiff did not sue Zephyr Cove Resort.)

The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment which the court granted with this opinion.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

Most legal decisions based where a motion for summary judgment is filed to review the requirements on what must be proved by the defendant (generally), for the motion to be granted. Generally, that occupies one to five paragraphs in the order. Most are either too succinct to explain the process or too wordy to make deciphering the process worth the effort. This court did a great job of explaining what the defendant must prove to succeed in its motion for summary judgment. The court then reviewed what the plaintiff must do to rebut the motion for summary judgment.

The party filing a motion for summary judgment must argue the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the opposing party when applied to the law show there is no genuine issue of material fact. Those facts must show that no reasonable trier of fact (a jury normally), could find any other way.

The moving party bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, along with evidence showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. On those issues for which it bears the burden of proof, the moving party must make a showing that is “sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.

To rebut the motion for summary judgment the non-moving party must point to facts in the record which so issues. The record is the evidence, depositions, responses to interrogatories and information that met the rules of evidence to be presented to the court.

To successfully rebut a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must point to facts supported by the record which demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.

If a reasonable mind could see the facts in a different way, then a motion for summary judgment is not appropriate. The issues must go to trial and be presented to a jury. The evidence presented in the motion must be genuine that means a reasonable jury can only see the evidence as pointing in one direction, saying one thing. The evidence that is not proved must be more than a scintilla; it must show there is a real dispute in how the facts can be seen.

Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not appropriate. A dispute regarding a material fact is considered genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient to establish a genuine dispute; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.

Consequently, when a court grants a motion for summary judgment, the evidence presented is such the court can see that evidence only proving one view of the issue and there is no other evidence that refutes that evidence sufficient to change the mind, or even make the person waiver in his or her thoughts on how the evidence is viewed.

In this case, the court found that admiralty law did apply in this case. Admiralty law is federal law that controls the seas or waters moving between two states. Lake Tahoe has shores on both Nevada and California so admiralty law was the law to be applied to the case.

The action giving rise to the admiralty law claim must be based on maritime activity. The Supreme Court and other federal courts have a very broad definition of maritime activity, and paragliding has been found to be a maritime activity.

An action falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) when: (1) the underlying tort occurred on navigable waters; and (2) the actions giving rise to the tort claim bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.

Where, as here, a body of water forms a border between two states and is capable of supporting maritime commerce, it is considered navigable for the purpose of establishing admiralty jurisdiction. Second, parasailing bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities sufficient to establish admiralty jurisdiction. (“Careful and safe navigation of vessels in navigable waters have always been a fundamental admiralty concern. Navigation is an essential component in the parasailing activity.”)

Assumption of the risk is not a defense that can be used in a case covered by admiralty law. However, release is a valid defense.

In her opposition, Cobb argues that the liability waiver is unenforceable because under federal maritime law assumption of the risk is not a valid defense. Cobb is correct that assumption of the risk is not an available defense in maritime cases involving personal injury. However, this does not preclude Aramark from raising the defense of express waiver in this case. Waiver and assumption of the risk are two distinct affirmative defenses and are addressed separately under federal admiralty law.

Under Admiralty law, a release must meet a two-part test.

First, Cobb concedes that she knowingly and voluntarily signed the liability waiver. Second, the court finds that the express waiver in this action is clear and unambiguous as it contains specific language releasing Zephyr and its affiliates, including defendant Aramark, for injuries sustained in carrying out the parasailing activities as a result of Zephyr’s negligence

An unambiguous waiver is one that specifically bars the claims of the plaintiff and protects all the defendants. “A waiver is clear and unambiguous if it specifically bars the plaintiff’s negligence claim and explicitly exonerates all defendants in the lawsuit.”

The court then specifically pointed out that the injury the plaintiff is complaining of was specifically listed in the release. “Further, the very injuries Cobb is suing for are specifically precluded by the waiver including “drowning, sprained or broken bones.

Nor does the release violate public policy. Voluntary recreational activities do not violate public policy under admiralty law.

Third, the underlying express waiver is not inconsistent with public policy because waivers of liability on navigable waters do not contravene federal public policy.

The waiver is also not an adhesion contract because again, it is for a voluntary recreational activity.

Finally, the court finds that the express waiver signed by Cobb is not an adhesion contract because it concerns a voluntary recreational activity. Under federal admiralty law, liability waivers for recreational sporting activities like parasailing are not contracts of adhesion because they are not essential services.

Finding that Admiralty law was the law to be applied, finding that admiralty law allowed the use of a release to stop claims for negligence and finding the release in this matter was valid, the court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment.

Therefore, the court finds that the underlying pre-accident waiver is valid and enforceable and absolves the defendant Aramark of any liability arising from the recreational parasailing activity. Accordingly, the court shall grant Aramark’s motion for summary judgment.

So Now What? 

This is another decision that you should keep handy if your recreational activity could be viewed as subject to admiralty law. Scuba diving, whitewater rafting, and as here parasailing, dependent on the location of the activity, can all be subject to admiralty law.

The decision is also good because its explanation of the law is simple and succinct. You want nothing better than to point to a sentence in a case to support your position that is easy to read and easily understood; no matter how intelligent the judges and attorneys are that may be reading it.

Of major importance for everyone is the court specifically pointed out that the injury the plaintiff was complaining about was one the release specifically pointed out as one that could occur in the release.

Whenever those two issues occur, the injury the plaintiff received was in writing in the release courts point it out. That should be a major flag to anyone writing a release that you need to list the risks of the activity in your release. You must list the major accidents that can occur like death and the common accidents that can occur, like sprains and strains for the activity, you are running.

clip_image002What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn

Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

To Purchase Go Here:

Copyright 2016 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law

Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com

Google+: +Recreation

Twitter: RecreationLaw

Facebook: Rec.Law.Now

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Blog: www.recreation-law.com

Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com

By Recreation Law           Rec-law@recreation-law.com     James H. Moss

 

 

#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Parasailing, Release, Admiralty and Maritime Law, Admiralty Law, Nevada, Lake Tahoe, Aramark,

 

Advertisements

Cobb v. Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1295; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20139; 2013 AMC 2563

Cobb v. Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1295; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20139; 2013 AMC 2563

Jaclyn Cobb, Plaintiff, v. Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC, Defendant.

3:11-cv-0840-LRH-WGC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA

933 F. Supp. 2d 1295; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20139; 2013 AMC 2563

February 13, 2013, Decided

February 14, 2013, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As Amended March 18, 2013.

COUNSEL: [**1] For Jaclyn Cobb, Plaintiff: Angela D. Bullentini, Charles M Kilpatrick, Kilpatrick, Johnston & Adler, Carson City, NV.

For Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC, Defendant: Rachel K McLendon-Kent, Graeme A. Reid, Bauman Loewe Witt & Maxwell, Reno, NV; Terence Cox, Cox, Wootton, Griffin, Hansen & Poulos, LLP, San Francisco, CA.

JUDGES: LARRY R. HICKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

OPINION BY: LARRY R. HICKS

OPINION

[*1296] AMENDED ORDER

Before the court is defendant Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC’s (“Aramark”) motion for summary judgment. Doc. #28. 1 Plaintiff Jaclyn Cobb (“Cobb”) filed an opposition (Doc. #33) to which Aramark replied (Doc. #38). This Order amends Order #39. 2

1 Refers to the court’s docket number.

2 This Order is identical to Order #39, but with needed edits for punctuation and citation accuracy.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff Cobb is seeking recovery for a knee injury allegedly sustained while parasailing with an affiliate of defendant Aramark.

On June 15, 2010, Cobb paid to go parasailing on Lake Tahoe through an operation ran by Zephyr Cove Resort (“Zephyr”). Before going on the boat for parasailing, Cobb signed a waiver of liability entitled Acknowledgment and Assumption of Risk and Waiver of Liability (“Waiver”). The waiver stated in relevant part:

In consideration of my being allowed to participate in the parasailing [**2] activities operated and conducted by [Zephyr], I hereby RELEASE and WAIVE . . . any and all claims that I may have . . . against [Zephyr], and any of [its] affiliates . . . I specifically RELEASE [Zephyr], and any of [its] affiliates . . . from . . . all claims for . . . injury or death to persons caused by negligence of any one of them arising out of my participation in the parasailing activities. I AGREE NOT TO SUE . . . the aforementioned parties for any injuries or damages that I might hereby receive from my participation in the parasailing activities, whether or not such injury, loss or damage results from the aforementioned [*1297] parties’ negligence or from any other cause.

Doc. #28, Exhibit A.

After signing the waiver, Cobb boarded the parasailing vessel and, along with another family member, went parasailing in a tandem harness. At some point during the trip, adverse weather conditions, including high winds, caused the parasailing trip to be called short. As she was being reeled back into the boat Cobb struck her knee on the boat causing significant injury.

Subsequently, Cobb filed a complaint for negligence against Aramark. Doc. #1, Exhibit A. Thereafter, Aramark filed the present motion [**3] for summary judgment contending that Cobb expressly waived her right to sue. Doc. #28.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the evidence, together with all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001).

The moving party bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, along with evidence showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). On those issues for which it bears the burden of proof, the moving party must make a showing that is “sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” [**4] Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2001).

To successfully rebut a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must point to facts supported by the record which demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2000). A “material fact” is a fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not appropriate. See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983). A dispute regarding a material fact is considered genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient to establish a genuine dispute; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. See id. at 252.

III. Discussion

A. Applicable Law

In its motion, Aramark argues that this action, and thereby [**5] the express waiver, is governed by federal admiralty law. See Doc. #28. An action falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) when: (1) the underlying tort occurred on navigable waters; and (2) the actions giving rise to the tort claim bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. Charnis v. Watersport Pro, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76022, *5-6 [*1298] (D. Nev. 2009) (citing Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 365-66, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 111 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1990)).

The court has reviewed the documents and pleadings on file in this matter and finds that this action falls within the court’s exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. First, the alleged injury occurred on Lake Tahoe, a navigable waterway that lies within the borders of Nevada and California. Where, as here, a body of water forms a border between two states and is capable of supporting maritime commerce, it is considered navigable for the purpose of establishing admiralty jurisdiction. Charnis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76022, *6. Second, parasailing bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities sufficient to establish admiralty jurisdiction. See e.g., In the Matter of Skyrider, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16510, *10 (D. Haw. 1990) [**6] (“Careful and safe navigation of vessels in navigable waters have always been a fundamental admiralty concern. Navigation is an essential component in the parasailing activity.”); UFO Chuting of Hawaii Inc. v. Smith, 508 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that parasailing is an activity bearing a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities); Charnis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76022, *6 (“The operation of recreational boats, including pulling skiers or wakeboarders, bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.”). Therefore, this action arises under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction and, as such, the court must apply substantive federal admiralty law to this action. Charnis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76022, *6 (“With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”) (citing E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S 858, 864, 106 S. Ct. 2295, 90 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1986)).

B. Assumption of the Risk

In her opposition, Cobb argues that the liability waiver is unenforceable because under federal maritime law assumption of the risk is not a valid defense. Cobb is correct that assumption of the risk is not an available defense in maritime cases involving [**7] personal injury. See e.g., De Sole v. United States, 947 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1991); Skidmore v. Grueninger, 506 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1975). However, this does not preclude Aramark from raising the defense of express waiver in this case. Waiver and assumption of the risk are two distinct affirmative defenses and are addressed separately under federal admiralty law. See Charnis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76022, *10-11. Therefore, Aramark may raise the affirmative defense of express waiver in this action.

C. Express Waiver

In its motion, Aramark argues that the signed express waiver precludes the present action. See Doc. #28. Specifically, Aramark argues that under federal maritime law, pre-accident liability waivers are enforceable and may properly dispose of this action on summary judgment.

Under federal admiralty law, owners of recreational vessels may, through written waivers, disclaim liability for their own negligence. Charnis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76022, *11. A pre-accident waiver absolves a defendant of liability for recreational activities on navigable waters if the exculpatory clause is (1) clear and unambiguous; (2) is not inconsistent with public policy; and (3) is not an adhesion contract. [**8] Id. at 13.

The court has reviewed the documents and pleadings on file in this matter and finds that the signed waiver of liability is [*1299] enforceable. First, Cobb concedes that she knowingly and voluntarily signed the liability waiver. See Doc. #33. Second, the court finds that the express waiver in this action is clear and unambiguous as it contains specific language releasing Zephyr and its affiliates, including defendant Aramark, for injuries sustained in carrying out the parasailing activities as a result of Zephyr’s negligence.

A waiver is clear and unambiguous if it specifically bars the plaintiff’s negligence claim and explicitly exonerates all defendants in the lawsuit. See Charnis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76022. Here, the waiver specifically bars plaintiff from suing for her injuries. Doc. #28, Exhibit A (“I AGREE NOT TO SUE . . . the aforementioned parties for any injuries or damages that I might hereby receive from my participation in the parasailing activities, whether or not such injury, loss or damage results from the aforementioned parties’ negligence or from any other cause.”). Further, the very injuries Cobb is suing for are specifically precluded by the waiver including “drowning, [**9] sprained or broken bones.” Doc. #28, Exhibit A. Therefore, the court finds that the express waiver is sufficiently clear and unambiguous to cover Cobb’s injuries sustained while parasailing.

Third, the underlying express waiver is not inconsistent with public policy because waivers of liability on navigable waters do not contravene federal public policy. Charnis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76022, *13-14; In re Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123786, *21 (C.D. Utah 2012) (holding that maritime exculpatory clauses are enforceable when a party clearly absolves itself from liability for its own negligence).

Finally, the court finds that the express waiver signed by Cobb is not an adhesion contract because it concerns a voluntary recreational activity. Under federal admiralty law, liability waivers for recreational sporting activities like parasailing are not contracts of adhesion because they are not essential services. See e.g., Charnis, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76022, *14-15; In re Aramark, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123789, *15. Therefore, the court finds that the underlying pre-accident waiver is valid and enforceable and absolves defendant Aramark of any liability [**10] arising from the recreational parasailing activity. Accordingly, the court shall grant Aramark’s motion for summary judgment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. #28) is GRANTED. The clerk of court shall enter judgment in favor of defendant Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC and against plaintiff Jaclyn Cobb.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 18th day of March, 2013.

/s/ Larry R. Hicks

LARRY R. HICKS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


Douglas County, Nevada, Skier Responsibility Code

Douglas County, Nevada Criminal Code 9.08 Skier Responsibility Code

Title 9 Criminal Code

9.08 Skier Responsibility Code

9.08.010 Definitions

9.08.020 Assumption of risks

9.08.030 Skier duties

9.08.040 Operator’s notice to skiers of duty

9.08.050 Skiers in competition

9.08.055 Prohibition against intoxication and use of controlled substances; penalty

9.08.060 Penalties for violations

9.08.010 Definitions

A.     “The inherent risks of skiing”: Those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport of skiing, snowboarding, snowshoeing, sledding, or any other winter sporting activities including, but not limited to, changing weather conditions, variation or steepness of terrain, snow or ice conditions, surface or subsurface conditions, whether man-modified or not, bare spots, creeks, gullies, rocks, forest growth or stumps, lift towers and other structures and their components, collision with other skiers and a skier’s failure to ski within the skier’s own ability.

B.     “Injury”: Any personal injury or property damage or loss suffered by a skier, ski area operator or ski area.

C.     “Skier”: Any person who is within the boundaries of a ski area for the purpose of engaging in the sport of skiing, alpine or Nordic, snowboarding, snowshoeing, sledding, or any other winter sporting activities where a person travels the slopes of a ski area with the aid of a device, or any person who is within the boundaries of the ski area for the purpose of observing any skiing activity.

D.     “Ski area”: Any area designated and maintained by a ski area operator for the purpose of skiing, or for the observance of any skiing activity.

E.     “Ski-area operator”: Any corporation, person, or their agent, officer, employee or representative, who operates a ski area within Douglas County. (Ord. 1102, 2005; Ord. 693, 1995; Ord. 410, 1983)

9.08.020 Assumption of risks

A.     Any skier, or person who engages in the sport of skiing, snowboarding, snowshoeing, sledding, or any other winter sporting activities, or any person who is within the boundaries of a ski area for the purpose of observing any skiing activity, accepts and assumes the inherent risks of activity as they are reasonably obvious, expected or necessary.

B.     Any skier or person who skis or snowboards in any area designated closed for skiing within the ski area assumes the inherent risks of the activity.

C.     Any person who skis or snowboards outside of a ski area boundary assumes the inherent risks of the activity, and is responsible for all costs arising out of search and rescue efforts made on their behalf. (Ord. 1102, 2005; Ord. 410, 1983)

9.08.030 Skier duties

A.     Skiers have the following duties:

1.     Skiers are the sole judges of the limits of their skills and their abilities to meet and overcome the inherent risks of skiing, and must maintain control of their speed and course to avoid injury to persons or property.

2.     Skiers must familiarize themselves with the posted information supplied by the ski-area operator on location and degree of difficulty of trails and slopes to the extent reasonably possible before skiing on any slope or trail.

3.     Skiers must not cross the uphill track of any surface lift except at points clearly designated by the ski area operator.

4.     Skiers must not overtake any other skier except in a manner to avoid contact with the overtaken skier, and must grant the right-of-way to the overtaken skier.

5.     Skiers must yield to other skiers when entering a trail or starting downhill.

6.     Skiers must use retention straps or other devices to prevent runaway skis or snowboards.

7.     Skiers must not board rope tows, wire rope tows, J-bars, T-bars, ski lifts or other similar devices unless they have sufficient ability to use the devices, and skiers must follow any written or verbal instructions that are given by the ski-area operator or representative regarding the use of the devices delineated in this section.

8.     Skiers, when involved in a skiing collision with another skier which results in bodily injury to the other skier, must not depart from the ski area without first leaving their names and addresses with the ski patrol or ski-area operator of the ski area where the injury occurred, or its designated agent. Any skier that violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor.

9.     A skier who is bodily injured, if reasonably possible, must give notice of the injury to the ski-area operator before leaving the ski area.

10.    Skiers must not embark or disembark from a ski lift except at designated areas, or by the authority of the ski-lift operator.

11.    A skier, having used a ski lift or surface lift of a ski area, must no ski under a manmade barrier that is designed to prohibit a skier from entering a closed portion of the ski area or from leaving any part of the ski area. For the purpose of this section, a barrier may be designated by roping off an area. Any skier that violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor.

B.     Any violation of the duties delineated in this section creates a presumption that the person violating the duty intended all the foreseeable consequences of the violation.

C.     A ski area operator may revoke the license or privilege of a person to ski or snowboard in a ski area who violates any of the provisions of this chapter. (Ord. 1102, 2005; Ord. 410, 1983)

9.08.040 Operator’s notice to skiers of duty

Ski-area operators must give notice to skiers of their duties as listed in section 9.18.030 in a manner reasonably calculated to inform skiers of those duties. (Ord. 1102, 2005; Ord. 410, 1983)

9.08.050 Skiers in competition

The ski area operator must, prior to the beginning of any skiing or snowboarding competition, allow each competitor a reasonable visual inspection of the course or area within which the competition is to be held. (Ord. 1102, 2005; Ord. 410, 1983)

9.08.055 Prohibition against intoxication and use of controlled substances; penalty

A.     A skier must not ski, snowboard, or embark on a ski lift while intoxicated from alcohol or under the influence of a controlled substance as defined in chapter 453 of NRS, unless in accordance with a prescription issued to the person by a physician, podiatric physician or dentist.

B.     A person who violates a provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Ord. 1102, 2005; Ord. 693, 1995)

9.08.060 Penalties for violations

A.     Misdemeanor. Any person convicted of violating the provisions of subsections 9.08.030(A) (8), 9.08.030(A) (11) is guilty of a misdemeanor.

B.     Infraction. Any person convicted of violating the provisions of sections 9.08.030(A) (3), 9.08.030(A) (4), 9.08.030(A) (5), 9.08.030(A) (7), 9.08.030(A) (9) or 9.08.030(A) (10), is guilty of an infraction. (Ord. 1102, 2005; Ord. 693, 1995; Ord. 645, 1994; Ord. 410 §1, 1983)

 

clip_image002What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn

 

Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

To Purchase Go Here:

Copyright 2015 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law

Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com

Google+: +Recreation

Twitter: RecreationLaw

Facebook: Rec.Law.Now

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Blog: www.recreation-law.com

Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com

By Recreation Law    Rec-law@recreation-law.com         James H. Moss

 

 

#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Douglas County, Nevada, Skier Responsibility Code, Douglas County Nevada,

 


Nevada Skier Safety Act

Nevada Skier Safety Act

1.1 NEVADA REVISED STATUTES ANNOTATED

TITLE 40. Public Health And Safety.

CHAPTER 455A. Safety of Participants in Outdoor Sports.

Skiers and Snowboarders

GO TO NEVADA STATUTES ARCHIVE DIRECTORY

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 455A.023 (2012)

Table of Contents

Nevada Skier Safety Act 1

Table of Contents. 1

455A.010. Short title. 2

455A.020. Definitions. 2

455A.023. “Chair lift” defined. 3

455A.027. “Operator” defined. 3

455A.030. “Passenger” defined. 3

455A.035. “Patrol” defined. 3

455A.040. Transferred. 4

455A.050. Transferred. 4

455A.060. Transferred. 4

455A.070. “Skier” defined. 4

455A.075. “Skiing” defined. 4

455A.080. Transferred. 4

455A.083. “Snow recreation area” defined. 4

455A.085. “Snowboarder” defined. 5

455A.087. “Snowboarding” defined. 5

455A.090. “Surface lift” defined. 5

455A.100. Prohibited acts while on chair lift; skiing or snowboarding in area posted as closed prohibited. 5

455A.110. Duties of skiers and snowboarders. 6

455A.120. Prohibited acts. 7

455A.130. Signs at chair lifts: Requirements; inspection. 7

455A.140. Slopes, runs and trails: System of signs required; vehicles used by operator to be equipped with light. 8

455A.150. Illumination of signs at night. 8

455A.160. Skiers and snowboarders to notify operator or patrol of injury; limitation on liability of operator; duty of operator to minimize dangers. 9

455A.170. Prohibition against intoxication and use of controlled substances; duty to provide name and address to person injured in collision; penalty. 9

455A.180. Revocation of license or privilege to engage in skiing or snowboarding. 10

455A.190. County, city or unincorporated town may enact ordinance not in conflict with chapter. 10

455A.010. Short title.

NRS 455A.010 to 455A.190, inclusive, may be cited as the Skier and Snowboarder Safety Act.

455A.020. Definitions.

As used in NRS 455A.010 to 455A.190, inclusive, unless the context otherwise requires, the words and terms defined in NRS 455A.023 to 455A.090, inclusive, have the meanings ascribed to them in those sections.

455A.023. “Chair lift” defined.

“Chair lift” means a device, except for an elevator, that carries, pulls or pushes a person along a level or inclined path to, from or within a snow recreation area by means of a rope, cable or other flexible element that is driven by an essentially stationary source of power.

455A.027. “Operator” defined.

“Operator” means a person, or a governmental agency or political subdivision of this State, who controls or operates an area where persons engage in skiing or snowboarding.

455A.030. “Passenger” defined.

“Passenger” means a person who utilizes a chair lift for transportation.

455A.035. “Patrol” defined.

“Patrol” means agents or employees of an operator who patrol the snow recreation area.

455A.040. Transferred.

NOTES: Editor’s note. This section is now compiled as 455A.083.

455A.050. Transferred.

NOTES: Editor’s note. This section is now compiled as 455A.023.

455A.060. Transferred.

NOTES: Editor’s note. This section is now compiled as 455A.035.

455A.070. “Skier” defined.

“Skier” means a person who engages in skiing in a snow recreation area.

455A.075. “Skiing” defined.

“Skiing” means the act of using skis to move across snow-covered ground.

455A.080. Transferred.

NOTES: Editor’s note. This section is now compiled as 455A.027.

455A.083. “Snow recreation area” defined.

“Snow recreation area” means the slopes, trails, runs and other areas under the control of an operator that are intended to be used for skiing, snowboarding or for the observation of the sports.

455A.085. “Snowboarder” defined.

“Snowboarder” means a person who engages in snowboarding in a snow recreation area.

455A.087. “Snowboarding” defined.

“Snowboarding” means the act of using a snowboard to move across snow-covered ground.

455A.090. “Surface lift” defined.

“Surface lift” means a chair lift designed for skiers or snowboarders to remain in contact with the ground or snowy surface during transportation.

455A.100. Prohibited acts while on chair lift; skiing or snowboarding in area posted as closed prohibited.

A skier or snowboarder shall not:

1. Embark upon a chair lift:

(a) When the skier or snowboarder knows that he or she has insufficient knowledge or physical ability to use the chair lift safely; or

(b) That is posted as closed or not in operation;

2. Purposefully embark upon or disembark from a chair lift except at an area designated for such a purpose or at the direction and under the direct supervision of an authorized agent or employee of an operator;

3. Toss, throw or cast or intentionally drop, expel or eject an object from a chair lift;

4. Toss, throw or cast an object in the direction of a chair lift;

5. Fail or refuse to comply with:

(a) Reasonable instructions given to the skier or snowboarder by an authorized agent or employee of an operator regarding the use of a chair lift; or

(b) A sign posted pursuant to NRS 455A.130 or 455A.140;

6. Place any object in the uphill path of a surface lift;

7. Conduct himself or herself in a manner that interferes with the safe operation of a chair lift or with the safety of a passenger, skier or snowboarder; or

8. Engage in skiing or snowboarding in an area within the snow recreation area which is posted, as provided in NRS 207.200, as closed.

455A.110. Duties of skiers and snowboarders.

A skier or snowboarder shall, to the extent that the matter is within his or her control:

1. Locate and ascertain the meaning of signs in the vicinity of the skier or snowboarder posted pursuant to NRS 455A.130 and 455A.140;

2. Heed warnings and other information posted by an operator;

3. Remain a safe distance from vehicles, signs and equipment for grooming snow or for transportation;

4. Avoid skiers or snowboarders in motion when entering a slope, run or trail, and when commencing to engage in skiing or snowboarding from a stationary position;

5. Maintain a proper lookout and control of his or her speed to avoid downhill objects, skiers and snowboarders to the best of his or her ability; and

6. Conduct himself or herself in such a manner as to avoid injury to persons and property in a snow recreation area.

455A.120. Prohibited acts.

A skier or snowboarder shall not:

1. Use a ski or snowboard unless it is attached to the skier or snowboarder by a strap or equipped with a device capable of stopping the movement of the ski or snowboard when not attached to the skier or snowboarder;

2. Cross the uphill path of a surface lift except at locations designated by an operator; or

3. Willfully stop where the skier or snowboarder obstructs a slope, run or trail, or where he or she is not safely visible to uphill skiers or snowboarders.

455A.130. Signs at chair lifts: Requirements; inspection.

1. An operator shall prominently post and maintain signs in simple and concise language:

(a) By each chair lift, with information for the protection and instruction of passengers; and

(b) At or near the points where passengers are loaded on a chair lift, directing persons who are not familiar with the operation of the chair lift to ask an authorized agent or employee of the operator for assistance and instruction.

2. An operator shall prominently post and maintain signs with the following inscriptions at all chair lifts in the locations indicated:

(a) “Remove pole straps from wrists” at an area for loading skiers;

(b) “Safety gate” where applicable;

(c) “Stay on tracks” where applicable;

(d) “Keep ski tips or snowboard up” ahead of any point where a ski or snowboard can regain contact with the ground or snowy surface after a passenger departs from an area for loading skiers or snowboarders;

(e) “Prepare to unload” and “check for loose clothing and equipment” not less than 50 feet from an area for unloading skiers or snowboarders; and

(f) “Unload here” at an area for unloading skiers or snowboarders.

3. An operator shall inspect a snow recreation area for the presence and visibility of the signs required to be posted by this section each day before opening the snow recreation area for business.

455A.140. Slopes, runs and trails: System of signs required; vehicles used by operator to be equipped with light.

1. An operator shall post and maintain a system of signs:

(a) At the entrances to an established slope, run or trail to indicate:

(1) Whether any portion of the slope, run or trail is closed; and

(2) The relative degree of difficulty of the slope, run or trail;

(b) To indicate the boundary of the snow recreation area, except in heavily wooded areas or other terrain that cannot be skied or snowboarded readily; and

(c) To warn of each area within the boundary of the snow recreation area where there is a danger of avalanche by posting signs stating “Warning: Avalanche Danger Area.”

2. An operator shall equip vehicles it uses on or in the vicinity of a slope, run or trail with a light visible to skiers or snowboarders when the vehicle is in motion.

455A.150. Illumination of signs at night.

A sign required to be posted pursuant to NRS 455A.130; and 455A.140 must be adequately illuminated at night, if the snow recreation area is open to the public at night, and be readable and recognizable under ordinary conditions of visibility.

455A.160. Skiers and snowboarders to notify operator or patrol of injury; limitation on liability of operator; duty of operator to minimize dangers.

1. A skier or snowboarder who sustains a personal injury shall notify the operator or a member of the patrol of the injury as soon as reasonably possible after discovery of the injury.

2. An operator is not liable for the death or injury of a person or damages to property caused or sustained by a skier or snowboarder who knowingly enters an area which is not designated for skiing or snowboarding or which is outside the boundary of a snow recreation area.

3. An operator shall take reasonable steps to minimize dangers and conditions within the operator’s control.

455A.170. Prohibition against intoxication and use of controlled substances; duty to provide name and address to person injured in collision; penalty.

1. A skier or snowboarder shall not engage in skiing or snowboarding, or embark on a chair lift that is proceeding predominantly uphill, while intoxicated or under the influence of a controlled substance as defined in chapter 453 of NRS unless in accordance with a lawfully issued prescription.

2. A skier or snowboarder who is involved in a collision in which another person is injured shall provide his or her name and current address to the injured person, the operator or a member of the patrol:

(a) Before the skier or snowboarder leaves the vicinity of the collision; or

(b) As soon as reasonably possible after leaving the vicinity of the collision to secure aid for the injured person.

3. A person who violates a provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.

455A.180. Revocation of license or privilege to engage in skiing or snowboarding.

An operator may revoke the license or privilege of a person to engage in skiing or snowboarding in a snow recreation area if the person violates any provision of NRS 455A.100, 455A.110, 455A.120 or 455A.170.

455A.190. County, city or unincorporated town may enact ordinance not in conflict with chapter.

The provisions of NRS 455A.010 to 455A.190, inclusive, do not prohibit a county, city or unincorporated town from enacting an ordinance, not in conflict with the provisions of NRS 455A.010 to 455A.190, inclusive, regulating skiers, snowboarders or operators.