Do Releases Work? Should I be using a Release in my Business? Will my customers be upset if I make them sign a release?

These and many other questions are answered in my book Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Insurance and Law.

Releases, (or as some people incorrectly call them waivers) are a legal agreement that in advance of any possible injury identifies who will pay for what. Releases can and to stop lawsuits.

This book will explain releases and other defenses you can use to put yourself in a position to stop lawsuits and claims.

This book can help you understand why people sue and how you can and should deal with injured, angry or upset guests of your business.

This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you keep your business afloat and moving forward.

You did not get into the outdoor recreation business to worry or spend nights staying awake. Get prepared and learn how and why so you can sleep and quit worrying.

                                              Table of Contents

Chapter 1    Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2    U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3    Risk 25

Chapter 4    Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5    Law 57

Chapter 6    Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7    Pre-injury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8    Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9    Minors

Chapter 10    Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11    Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12    Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13    Rental Programs

Chapter 14    Insurance

         $130.00 plus shipping

 

 

 

 

Artwork by Don Long donaldoelong@earthlink.net

 


New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students

“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry

Cover of Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law

Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law

Denver based James H. Moss, JD, an attorney who specializes in the legal issues of outdoor recreation and adventure travel companies, guides, outfitters, and manufacturers, has written a comprehensive legal guidebook titled, “Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law”. Sagamore Publishing, a well-known Illinois-based educational publisher, distributes the book.

Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.

“There was nothing out there that looked at case law and applied it to legal problems in outdoor recreation,” Moss explained. “The goal of this book is to provide sound advice based on past law and experience.”

The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

While written as a college-level textbook, the guide also serves as a legal primer for executives, managers, and business owners in the field of outdoor recreation. It discusses how to tackle, prevent, and overcome legal issues in all areas of the industry.

The book is organized into 14 chapters that are easily accessed as standalone topics, or read through comprehensively. Specific topics include rental programs, statues that affect outdoor recreation, skiing and ski areas, and defenses to claims. Mr. Moss also incorporated listings of legal definitions, cases, and statutes, making the book easy for laypeople to understand.

PURCHASE

 

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Cases

Introduction

Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview

Risk

    Risk

        Perception versus Actual Risk

        Risk v. Reward

        Risk Evaluation

    Risk Management Strategies

        Humans & Risk

        Risk = Accidents

        Accidents may/may not lead to litigation

    How Do You Deal with Risk?

    How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?

    Negative Feelings against the Business

Risk, Accidents & Litigation

        No Real Acceptance of the Risk

        No Money to Pay Injury Bills

        No Health Insurance

        Insurance Company Subrogation

        Negative Feelings

Litigation

    Dealing with Different People

    Dealing with Victims

        Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit

        Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits

    Emergency Medical Services

    Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation

        Employees

        How Do You Handle A Victim?

        Dealing with Different People

        Dealing with Victims

Legal System in the United States

    Courts

        State Court System

        Federal Court System

        Other Court Systems

    Laws

    Statutes

    Parties to a Lawsuit

    Attorneys

    Trials

Law

    Torts

        Negligence

            Duty

            Breach of the Duty

            Injury

            Proximate Causation

            Damages

        Determination of Duty Owed

        Duty of an Outfitter

        Duty of a Guide

        Duty of Livery Owner

        Duty of Rental Agent

        Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader

        In Loco Parentis

    Intentional Torts

    Gross Negligence

    Willful & Wanton Negligence

    Intentional Negligence

    Negligence Per Se

    Strict Liability

    Attractive Nuisance

    Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence

    Product Liability

    Contracts

        Breach of Contract

        Breach of Warranty

        Express Warranty

        Implied Warranty

            Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose

            Warranty of Merchantability

            Warranty of Statute

    Detrimental Reliance

    Unjust Enrichment

    Liquor Liability

    Food Service Liability

    Damages

        Compensatory Damages

        Special Damages

        Punitive Damages

Statutory Defenses

    Skier Safety Acts

    Whitewater Guides & Outfitters

    Equine Liability Acts

 

Legal Defenses

    Assumption of Risk

        Express Assumption of Risk

        Implied Assumption of Risk

        Primary Assumption of Risk

        Secondary Assumption of Risk

    Contributory Negligence

    Assumption of Risk & Minors

    Inherent Dangers

    Assumption of Risk Documents.

        Assumption of Risk as a Defense.

        Statutory Assumption of Risk

        Express Assumption of Risk

    Contributory Negligence

    Joint and Several Liability

Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue

    Why do you need them

    Exculpatory Agreements

        Releases

        Waivers

        Covenants Not to sue

    Who should be covered

    What should be included

        Negligence Clause

        Jurisdiction & Venue Clause

        Assumption of Risk

        Other Clauses

        Indemnification

            Hold Harmless Agreement

        Liquidated Damages

        Previous Experience

        Misc

            Photography release

            Video Disclaimer

            Drug and/or Alcohol clause

            Medical Transportation & Release

                HIPAA

        Problem Areas

    What the Courts do not want to see

Statute of Limitations

        Minors

        Adults

Defenses Myths

    Agreements to Participate

    Parental Consent Agreements

    Informed Consent Agreements

    Certification

    Accreditation

    Standards, Guidelines & Protocols

    License

Specific Occupational Risks

    Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators

        College & University Issues

    Animal Operations, Packers

        Equine Activities

    Canoe Livery Operations

        Tube rentals

Downhill Skiing

Ski Rental Programs

Indoor Climbing Walls

Instructional Programs

Mountaineering

Retail Rental Programs

Rock Climbing

Tubing Hills

Whitewater Rafting

Risk Management Plan

    Introduction for Risk Management Plans

    What Is A Risk Management Plan?

    What should be in a Risk Management Plan

    Risk Management Plan Template

    Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan

    Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters

    Building Fire & Evacuation

Dealing with an Emergency

 

Insurance

    Theory of Insurance

    Insurance Companies

    Deductibles

    Self-Insured Retention

    Personal v. Commercial Policies

    Types of Policies

        Automobile

            Comprehension

            Collision

            Bodily Injury

            Property Damage

            Uninsured Motorist

            Personal Injury Protection

            Non-Owned Automobile

            Hired Car

    Fire Policy

        Coverage

        Liability

        Named Peril v. All Risk

    Commercial Policies

    Underwriting

    Exclusions

    Special Endorsements

    Rescue Reimbursement

    Policy Procedures

    Coverage’s

    Agents

    Brokers

        General Agents

        Captive Agents

    Types of Policies

        Claims Made

        Occurrence

    Claims

    Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements

Bibliography

Index

The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

 


What is a Risk Management Plan and What do You Need in Yours?

Everyone has told you, that you need a risk management plan. A plan to follow if you have

Cover of Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law

Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law

a crisis. You‘ve seen several and they look burdensome and difficult to write. Need help writing a risk management plan? Need to know what should be in your risk management plan? Need Help?

This book can help you understand and write your plan. This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure your plan is a workable plan, not one that will create liability for you.

 

                                             Table of Contents

Chapter 1    Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2    U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3    Risk 25

Chapter 4    Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5    Law 57

Chapter 6    Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7    PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8    Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9    Minors

Chapter 10    Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11    Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12    Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13    Rental Programs

Chapter 14    Insurance

               $130.00 plus shipping


Can’t Sleep? Guest was injured, and you don’t know what to do? This book can answer those questions for you.

An injured guest is everyone’s business owner’s nightmare. What happened, how do you make sure it does not happen again, what can you do to help the guest, can you help the guests are just some of the questions that might be keeping you up at night.

This book can help you understand why people sue and how you can and should deal with injured, angry or upset guests of your business.

This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you keep your business afloat and moving forward.

You did not get into the outdoor recreation business to worry or spend nights staying awake. Get prepared and learn how and why so you can sleep and quit worrying.

                                      Table of Contents

Chapter 1    Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2    U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3    Risk 25

Chapter 4    Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5    Law 57

Chapter 6    Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7    Pre-injury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8    Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9    Minors

Chapter 10    Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11    Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12    Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13    Rental Programs

Chapter 14    Insurance

             $130.00 plus shipping


Do Releases Work? Should I be using a Release in my Business? Will my customers be upset if I make them sign a release?

These and many other questions are answered in my book Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Insurance and Law.

Releases, (or as some people incorrectly call them waivers) are a legal agreement that in advance of any possible injury identifies who will pay for what. Releases can and to stop lawsuits.

This book will explain releases and other defenses you can use to put yourself in a position to stop lawsuits and claims.

This book can help you understand why people sue and how you can and should deal with injured, angry or upset guests of your business.

This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you keep your business afloat and moving forward.

You did not get into the outdoor recreation business to worry or spend nights staying awake. Get prepared and learn how and why so you can sleep and quit worrying.

                                              Table of Contents

Chapter 1    Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2    U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3    Risk 25

Chapter 4    Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5    Law 57

Chapter 6    Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7    Pre-injury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8    Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9    Minors

Chapter 10    Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11    Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12    Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13    Rental Programs

Chapter 14    Insurance

         $99.00 plus shipping

 

 

 

 

Artwork by Don Long donaldoelong@earthlink.net

 


Can’t Sleep? Guest was injured, and you don’t know what to do? This book can answer those questions for you.

An injured guest is everyone’s business owner’s nightmare. What happened, how do you make sure it does not happen again, what can you do to help the guest, can you help the guests are just some of the questions that might be keeping you up at night.

This book can help you understand why people sue and how you can and should deal with injured, angry or upset guests of your business.

This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you keep your business afloat and moving forward.

You did not get into the outdoor recreation business to worry or spend nights staying awake. Get prepared and learn how and why so you can sleep and quit worrying.

                                      Table of Contents

Chapter 1    Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2    U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3    Risk 25

Chapter 4    Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5    Law 57

Chapter 6    Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7    Pre-injury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8    Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9    Minors

Chapter 10    Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11    Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12    Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13    Rental Programs

Chapter 14    Insurance

             $130.00 plus shipping


What is a Risk Management Plan and What do You Need in Yours?

Everyone has told you, you need a risk management plan. A plan to follow if you have a crisis. You‘ve seen several and they look burdensome and difficult to write. Need help writing a risk management plan? Need to know what should be in your risk management plan? Need Help?

This book can help you understand and write your plan. This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you plan is a workable plan, not one that will create liability for you.

 

                                             Table of Contents

Chapter 1    Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2    U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3    Risk 25

Chapter 4    Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5    Law 57

Chapter 6    Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7    PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8    Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9    Minors

Chapter 10    Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11    Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12    Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13    Rental Programs

Chapter 14    Insurance

               $99.00 plus shipping


The title says it all! Wrongful death suit filed by parent of man who drowned on Kings Canyon National Forest trip

The sub-title will be hikers only go out alone after this lawsuit, too afraid of being sued by companions. Search and Rescues sky rocket.

Here is the article.

Wrongful death suit filed by parent of man who drowned on Kings Canyon National Forest trip

 

https://norcalrecord.com/stories/511528521-wrongful-death-suit-filed-by-parent-of-man-who-drowned-on-kings-canyon-national-forest-trip

The parent of a man who drowned while on an expedition in Kings Canyon National Forest has filed a wrongful death suit against one of man’s companions.

Dante Chiarabini, as personal representative of the estate of Luca Chiarabini, filed a complaint on July 27 in the Fresno County Superior Court against Richard Ianniello and Does 1-10 alleging wrongful death.

According to the complaint, on Aug. 3, 2017, Luca Chiarabini was on a wilderness canyoneering expedition with Ianniello and another companion, William Hunt.

The suit states as the decedent attempted to cross the Kings River in the Kings Canyon National Forest, he explicitly instructed defendant Ianniello to properly anchor the rope so that he did not drift into the rapids, which were located downstream. The suit states Ianniello failed to execute this, causing the decedent to be swept downstream.

The plaintiff holds Ianniello and Does 1-10 responsible because the defendants allegedly allowed the rope to extend past the knot connected the ropes against instruction, failed to properly anchor the rope and failed to keep Chiarabini in sight.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks judgment against defendants for general and special damages, interest, funeral and burial expenses, costs of suit, and further relief as the court deems just. The plaintiff is represented by Grant G. Teeple, Frederick M. Reich and Christine T. Levu of Teeple Hall LLP in San Diego.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

Copyright 2018 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn

If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.

Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

To Purchase Go Here:

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com

Google+: +Recreation

Twitter: RecreationLaw

Facebook: Rec.Law.Now

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Blog:
www.recreation-law.com

Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com

By Recreation Law    Rec-law@recreation-law.com    James H. Moss

#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer,



The title says it all! Wrongful death suit filed by parent of man who drowned on Kings Canyon National Forest trip

The sub-title will be hikers only go out alone after this lawsuit, too afraid of being sued by companions. Search and Rescues sky rocket.

Here is the article.

Wrongful death suit filed by parent of man who drowned on Kings Canyon National Forest trip

https://norcalrecord.com/stories/511528521-wrongful-death-suit-filed-by-parent-of-man-who-drowned-on-kings-canyon-national-forest-trip

The parent of a man who drowned while on an expedition in Kings Canyon National Forest has filed a wrongful death suit against one of man’s companions.

Dante Chiarabini, as personal representative of the estate of Luca Chiarabini, filed a complaint on July 27 in the Fresno County Superior Court against Richard Ianniello and Does 1-10 alleging wrongful death.

According to the complaint, on Aug. 3, 2017, Luca Chiarabini was on a wilderness canyoneering expedition with Ianniello and another companion, William Hunt.

The suit states as the decedent attempted to cross the Kings River in the Kings Canyon National Forest, he explicitly instructed defendant Ianniello to properly anchor the rope so that he did not drift into the rapids, which were located downstream. The suit states Ianniello failed to execute this, causing the decedent to be swept downstream.

The plaintiff holds Ianniello and Does 1-10 responsible because the defendants allegedly allowed the rope to extend past the knot connected the ropes against instruction, failed to properly anchor the rope and failed to keep Chiarabini in sight.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks judgment against defendants for general and special damages, interest, funeral and burial expenses, costs of suit, and further relief as the court deems just. The plaintiff is represented by Grant G. Teeple, Frederick M. Reich and Christine T. Levu of Teeple Hall LLP in San Diego.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

Copyright 2018 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn




If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.

Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

To Purchase Go Here:

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com

Google+: +Recreation

Twitter: RecreationLaw

Facebook: Rec.Law.Now

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Blog:
www.recreation-law.com

Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com

By Recreation Law    Rec-law@recreation-law.com    James H. Moss

#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer,



Philmont Scout Ranch Cancels all Trips, Treks and Backcountry Programs for Summer of 2018

PHILMONT SCOUT RANCH ANNOUNCES CLOSURE FOR 2018 SUMMER SEASON – 7/5/18

After careful consideration of the situation and available options, the difficult but prudent decision has been made that the Philmont backcountry will remain closed for treks and individual programs for the remainder of the 2018 summer season. This means that the following programs scheduled for this summer are canceled: 7- and 12-day treks; and individual backcountry programs, including Rayado, ROCS, Trail Crew, STEM and Ranch Hands.

Refund Checks for all affected crews will be sent to the lead contact advisor on Monday, July 9, 2018. Over the next few days, our staff will be contacting the lead advisor or contingent leader of these crews confirming the refund, offering a trek at Philmont for the 2020 season, and answering any questions. Please wait and allow the Philmont team to contact your crew – your assistance will help make sure that Philmont phone lines remain open. Your cooperation will be most appreciated. While High Adventure opportunities are at capacity at Northern Tier and the Florida Sea Base, there are opportunities at The Summit and they would be happy to accommodate your crew.

This has been a difficult and at the same time inspiring summer at Philmont. For the first time in its history, Philmont is closing its backcountry. As difficult as this situation has been for our Philmont family and for Scouts across our country, we have been truly inspired by the incredible enthusiasm and perseverance shown by our staff, the resourcefulness displayed by displaced crews to find other summer adventures, and the understanding and good wishes from thousands of Scouts and Scouters from around the world. For all of these blessings, we are truly grateful.

Fire danger in northern New Mexico is currently classified as “extreme.”

The fire danger has led to closure of most public lands near Philmont. The Carson National Forest’s nearby Questa and Camino Real Ranger Districts, including the Valle Vidal area that Philmont utilizes, have been closed to public access. The New Mexico Game and Fish Department has similarly closed all of its properties that border Philmont, including the Colin Neblett Wildlife Management Area on our western border and the Elliott S.

Barker Wildlife Management Area adjacent to our North Country. Links to these closure notices are included at the end of this release.

On Friday, June 29, 2018, the Morris (Moras) Creek fire started south of the Philmont property line on private neighboring property near the Rayado River Canyon. This fire is currently more than 1500 acres and is burning on Philmont property.

Our ranch managers, volunteer leaders, and national staff have monitored the situation since the Ute Park fire began and attempted to plan alternate trek routes and procedures required by Philmont to manage backcountry emergencies. Because of the Morris (Moras) Creek fire, these alternate trek routes have now been eliminated. The safety of our youth participants, volunteers and staff is the priority at Philmont Scout Ranch and for the Boy Scouts of America.

This decision applies only to Philmont’s backcountry programs. Philmont’s Camping Headquarters and Base Camp area, the Philmont Training Center, the new National Scouting Museum, the Chase Ranch, and the Kit Carson Museum at Rayado will remain open all summer. Training courses at the Philmont Training Center and the National Advanced Youth Leadership Experience

(NAYLE) will proceed as scheduled. This decision does not affect Philmont’s fall programs, including Autumn Adventure and fall PTC training conferences.

The Philmont ranger motto is “scramble – be flexible.” That’s what we at Philmont have been doing all summer as we deal with these unexpected and unfortunate circumstances. Our terrific summer staff has embraced challenges that they didn’t anticipate when they signed on. They expected to be delivering awesome backcountry programs and inspiring high adventure experiences to thousands of Scouts and Scouters. Instead, they have enthusiastically taken on difficult and physically taxing timber stand improvement projects, backcountry fire abatement work, community service projects, and staff jobs at other camps. They are making sure we will be ready to re-open next year! Their willingness to roll up their sleeves, pitch in and meet the challenges we have faced reflects the very best on Scouting and our nation’s youth. They have our sincere thanks!

Our National BSA leadership has been working with airlines to assist crews with refunds, changes, and credits. Please refer to the following contacts for support.

American Airlines—-1-800-221-2255

Southwest Airlines—1-800-435-9792

Alaska Airlines


Texas Campground not liable for wind, rain and rising rivers.

Campground on river sued when river rose, flooding the campground and washing plaintiff’s downstream.

Walker v. UME, Inc. d/b/a Camp Huaco Springs, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 5934

State: Texas, Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin

Plaintiff: Cynthia Walker, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Norman Walker; Stephen Walker; Stephanie Walker Hatton; Jordan Walker; and Caren Ann Johnson

Defendant: UME, Inc. d/b/a Camp Huaco Springs; WWGAF, Inc. d/b/a Rockin ‘R’ River Rides; William George Rivers; and Richard Duane Rivers

Plaintiff Claims: negligence, premises liability, and gross negligence

Defendant Defenses: No Duty and Texas Recreational Use Statute

Holding: For the defendants

Year: 2016

Facts

Two couples took their RV’s to the defendant’s campground for the weekend. The first day the plaintiff’s took a canoe trip past the campground and took some cave tours. It was not raining when they went to bed. Around 6:00 AM, the surviving plaintiff woke up to a rainstorm and their RV’s floating.

The RV’s floated down the river. One plaintiff did not survive. The surviving plaintiffs sued the campground, campgrounds alleged owner and several employees. The plaintiff’s claims were based on alleging negligence, premise’s liability, and gross negligence. Overall, their claims were based on numerous claims that the campground had a duty to warn them of the flood.

Appellants asserted that appellees knew that the campground was prone to flooding and failed: to warn appellants of that fact; to warn of the approaching storm; to prepare a plan for flood awareness, communication, and evacuation; to have and use speakers or sirens to warn of flooding; to employ someone to monitor the weather and warn and evacuate guests; to have an employee on site during severe weather; and to make reasonable modifications, have emergency communications, or educate guests about severe-weather risks.

The defendants filed numerous motions for summary judgment arguing they were protected by the Texas Recreational Use Statute, and they owed no duty to the plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims without comment. The appeal followed.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The appellate court started its analysis by stating the trial court was right and there was no duty owed to the plaintiffs.

Even if we assume that the recreational use statute does not apply, we hold, as a matter of law, that appellees did not owe the Walkers and Johnsons a duty to warn of or ensure against rising river waters.

Texas Premises Liability Act requires landowners with liability for actual or constructive notice of a condition that poses an unreasonable risk of harm and did nothing to reduce or eliminate the risk.

When an injured invitee asserts a premises-liability claim, she must show that the owner or occupier had actual or constructive knowledge about a condition that posed an unreasonable risk of harm and did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk and that such failure proximately caused her injury.

Rain swollen rivers were described by the court as a condition that came to the land, rather than a condition on the land. Even so, in Texas, rain, mud and ice are natural conditions that do not create an unreasonable risk of harm.

Regardless of that fact, Texas courts have consistently held as a matter of law that naturally occurring or accumulating conditions such as rain, mud, and ice do not create conditions posing an unreasonable risk of harm.

The basis for those rulings is that rain, dirt, and mud are naturally occurring conditions beyond a landowner’s control. (“rain is beyond the control of landowners” and “accidents involving naturally accumulating mud and dirt are bound to happen, regardless of the precautions taken by landowners”). Requiring a landowner to protect an invitee from precipitation or other acts of nature would place an enormous burden on the landowner.

Additionally, the court held the plaintiffs were aware of the issues because they could see the river from their campground and had canoed past the campground earlier in the day.

Further, an invitee is or should be “at least as aware” as the landowner of visible conditions that have “accumulated naturally outdoors” and thus “will often be in a better position to take immediate pre-cautions against injury.“

Landowners in Texas cannot be insurers of people on the land for those acts which the landowner has no control, those things we used to call “acts of God.”

Texas courts have repeatedly observed that a landowner “‘is not an insurer'” of an invitee’s safety and generally “has no duty to warn of hazards that are open and obvious or known to the invitee.” Texas courts have held in various contexts that flooding due to heavy rains is an open and obvious hazard. “[T]he owner may assume that the recreational user needs no warning to appreciate the dangers of natural conditions, such as a sheer cliff, a rushing river, or even a concealed rattlesnake.

A landowner can be guilty of gross negligence by creating a condition that a recreational user would not reasonably expect to encounter. However, there was no gross negligence nor negligence because the harm was not created by the landowner.

We see no useful distinction to be drawn between ice and mud, which are natural conditions caused by rain and freezing temperatures, and rising river waters, caused by a natural weather event over which appellees could exercise no control. The June 2010 flood was not a condition inherent in or on the land in question. Instead, the flooding was a condition that came to the campground as the adjacent river, the same river that made the land an attractive place to camp, rose due to heavy rains.

The court then summed up its ruling.

We hold that as a matter of law appellees had no duty to warn the Walkers and Johnsons of the possibility that the river, they were camping beside might rise in the event of heavy rain, posing a risk to the campground.

Because appellees did not owe a duty to warn of or attempt to make the campground safe against flooding of the adjacent river due to torrential rain, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in their favor. We affirm the trial court’s orders.

So Now What?

This is a good ruling. Acts of God have always been outside the control, by their definition and act, of man. Consequently, you should not be able to hold someone liable for such an act.

This may not be true for all situations, or in all states, but for Texas campground owners and landowners don’t need to worry about the rain.

If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

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Walker v. UME, Inc. d/b/a Camp Huaco Springs, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 5934

Walker v. UME, Inc. d/b/a Camp Huaco Springs, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 5934

Cynthia Walker, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Norman Walker; Stephen Walker; Stephanie Walker Hatton; Jordan Walker; and Caren Ann Johnson, Appellants v. UME, Inc. d/b/a Camp Huaco Springs; WWGAF, Inc. d/b/a Rockin ‘R’ River Rides; William George Rivers; and Richard Duane Rivers, Appellees

  1. 03-15-00271-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin

2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 5934

June 3, 2016, Filed

PRIOR HISTORY:  [*1] FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY, 433RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT. NO. C2012-0796D, HONORABLE DIB WALDRIP, JUDGE PRESIDING.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

JUDGES: Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Field.

OPINION BY: David Puryear

OPINION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Cynthia Walker, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Norman Walker; Stephen Walker; Stephanie Walker Hatton; Jordan Walker; and Caren Ann Johnson1 filed suit against appellees UME, Inc. d/b/a Camp Huaco Springs; WWGAF, Inc. d/b/a Rockin ‘R’ River Rides; William George Rivers; and Richard Duane Rivers for injuries sustained when the Guadalupe River overran its banks during a flash flood in June 2010.2 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. We affirm the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment.

1 Cynthia Walker was married to Norman Walker, and Stephen Walker, Stephanie Walker Hatton, and Jordan Walker are their children. Caren Johnson is married to Terry Johnson, Cynthia’s brother. Cynthia, Norman, Caren, and Terry were camping together at Camp Huaco Springs when they were caught in the flood. Norman died, while Cynthia, Terry, and Caren were injured. Caren and Cynthia sued for their own injuries. Cynthia also sued as a representative of [*2]  Norman’s estate and, along with her children, as a wrongful death beneficiary.
2 UME, Inc. operates Camp Huaco Springs, WWGAF operates Rockin ‘R’ River Rides, a river-tubing and recreation outfitter, and William and Richard Rivers own the two businesses.

Factual Summary

In June 2010, Cynthia and Norman Walker and Terry and Caren Johnson went to Camp Huaco Springs in their RV campers for a weekend of camping and river rafting. When they arrived at the campground, they were assigned two parking spaces. The Walkers and the Johnsons parked their campers as directed. On Saturday, the Walkers and the Johnsons took a canoe trip on the river and went to tour nearby caverns. When they returned to the campsite and went to bed, it was not raining. They had not heard any weather reports and did not know heavy rain was forecast for that night. Cynthia woke at about 6:00 a.m. to thunder and lightning. She looked out the window and saw Terry was screaming that they had to leave. Cynthia looked down and noticed that the river had risen to surround the two campers, causing them to begin floating. The Walkers and Johnsons were all swept downstream in the flood. Norman died in the flood. Cynthia, Terry, and [*3]  Caren were rescued miles downstream from the campsite and all required medical attention.

Appellants filed suit alleging negligence, premises liability, and gross negligence. They asserted that WWGAF was liable because it was a joint enterprise with UME and that the Rivers brothers were liable under a theory of alter ego. Appellants asserted that appellees knew that the campground was prone to flooding and failed: to warn appellants of that fact; to warn of the approaching storm; to prepare a plan for flood awareness, communication, and evacuation; to have and use speakers or sirens to warn of flooding; to employ someone to monitor the weather and warn and evacuate guests; to have an employee on site during severe weather; and to make reasonable modifications, have emergency communications, or educate guests about severe-weather risks.

UME and the Rivers brothers filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment, asserting that the Texas Recreational Use Statute3 limited appellants to asserting a gross-negligence claim and that appellants could not show various elements of gross negligence; that there was no evidence that they had a duty to warn that the campground was in [*4]  a flood zone, to warn that severe weather was approaching, or to plan and prepare for flooding; that there was no evidence they had a duty to have and use speakers or sirens to warn guests; and that there was no evidence that appellants’ injuries were caused by any negligence on the part of UME or the Rivers brothers. UME and the Rivers brothers filed a separate motion for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment addressing appellants’ theories of alter ego and joint enterprise. WWGAF filed its own motion for summary judgment, asserting that it did not own or operate Camp Huaco, that it did not owe a duty to the Walkers and the Johnsons, and that it was a separate entity from Camp Huaco and could not be held liable under theories of joint enterprise or vicarious liability. The trial court signed several orders granting appellees’ motions for summary judgment without specifying the grounds.

3 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 75.002 (owner, lessee, or occupant of agricultural land who invites another onto premises for recreation owes invitee same duty that would be owed to trespasser and only owes duty not to injure invitee wilfully, wantonly, or through gross negligence); see generally id. §§ 75.001-.007 (chapter 75, titled [*5]  “Limitation of Landowners’ Liability”).

Discussion

The first question to be addressed, the answer to which is dispositive of this appeal, is whether appellees owed any duty to the Walkers and the Johnsons. Even if we assume that the recreational use statute does not apply, we hold, as a matter of law, that appellees did not owe the Walkers and Johnsons a duty to warn of or ensure against rising river waters. Without such a duty, appellants’ premises-liability claims must fail.4

4 Although appellants alleged both negligence and premises-defect claims, “negligent activity encompasses a malfeasance theory based on affirmative, contemporaneous conduct bythe owner that caused the injury, while premises liability encompasses a nonfeasance theory based on the owner’s failure to take measures to make the property safe.” Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 776 (Tex. 2010); see Scurlock v. Pennell, 177 S.W.3d 222, 224-25 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. 1998)) (“Recovery for a negligent activity requires that a person have been injured by the activity itself, rather than by a condition created by the activity; in contrast, recovery for premises liability depends upon a failure to use ordinary care to reduce or to eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a premises condition about which the owner or occupier [of [*6]  land] knows or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should know.”). The claims raised by appellants clearly alleged that appellees had failed to take various measures that would have made the campsite safe; they did not allege “contemporaneous conduct . . . that caused the injur[ies].” See Smith, 307 S.W.3d at 776. We therefore consider appellants’ claims under a theory of premises liability. Regardless of the theory under which they are analyzed, appellants’ claims would fail because, as we explain below, appellees did not owe the duty that appellants claim was breached. See General Elec. Co. v. Moritz, 257 S.W.3d 211, 217 (Tex. 2008) (“Like any other negligence action, a defendant in a premises case is liable only to the extent it owes the plaintiff a legal duty.”).

When an injured invitee asserts a premises-liability claim, she must show that the owner or occupier had actual or constructive knowledge of a condition that posed an unreasonable risk of harm and did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk and that such failure proximately caused her injury. CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 99 (Tex. 2000). We initially note that appellants do not assert that a condition on the premises caused the tragedy and thus was the basis for liability. Instead, the injuries suffered by appellants were caused by a rain-swollen [*7]  river that inundated the campground, a condition that came to the premises.

Regardless of that fact, Texas courts have consistently held as a matter of law that naturally occurring or accumulating conditions such as rain, mud, and ice do not create conditions posing an unreasonable risk of harm. M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 675-76 (Tex. 2004); see Scott & White Mem. Hosp. v. Fair, 310 S.W.3d 411, 412-14 (Tex. 2010) (“Because we find no reason to distinguish between the mud in M.O. Dental and the ice in this case, we hold that naturally occurring ice that accumulates without the assistance or involvement of unnatural contact is not an unreasonably dangerous condition sufficient to support a premises liability claim.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Surratt, 102 S.W.3d 437, 445 (Tex. App.–Eastland 2003, pet. denied) (landowner “does not have a duty to protect its invitees from conditions caused by a natural accumulation of frozen precipitation on its parking lot because such an accumulation does not constitute an unreasonably dangerous condition”).5 The basis for those rulings is that rain, dirt, and mud are naturally occurring conditions beyond a landowner’s control. See, e.g., M.O. Dental Lab, 139 S.W.3d at 676 (“rain is beyond the control of landowners” and “accidents involving naturally accumulating mud and dirt are bound to happen, regardless of the precautions taken by landowners”). Requiring a landowner to protect an invitee [*8]  from precipitation or other acts of nature would place an enormous burden on the landowner. See id.; see also Fair, 310 S.W.3d at 414 (requiring landowners “to guard against wintery conditions would inflict a heavy burden because of the limited resources landowners likely have on hand to combat occasional ice accumulations”).

5 See also State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (in premises defect case under Texas Tort Claims Act, supreme court held that “[w]hen there is precipitation accompanied by near-freezing temperatures, . . . an icy bridge is neither unexpected nor unusual, but rather, entirely predictable [and] is something motorists can and should anticipate when the weather is conducive to such a condition”); Brownsville Navigation Dist. v. Izaguirre, 829 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex. 1992) (“Plain dirt which ordinarily becomes soft and muddy when wet is not a dangerous condition of property for which a landlord may be liable.”); Lee v. K&N Mgmt., Inc., No. 03-15-00243-CV, 2015 WL 8594163, at *3-4 (Tex. App.–Austin Dec. 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (plant that extended over edge of flowerbed was not unreasonably dangerous condition; “The Texas Supreme Court has held that certain naturally occurring substances generally do not pose an unreasonable risk of harm. . . . Under the facts of this case, the plant, like mud and dirt, may have formed a condition that posed a risk of harm, [*9]  but on this record, we cannot conclude that it was an unreasonable risk of harm.”); City of Houston v. Cogburn, No. 01-11-00318-CV, 2014 WL 1778279, at *4 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] May 1, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“as a matter of law, naturally occurring conditions that are open and obvious do not create an unreasonable risk of harm for purposes of premises liability”; tree roots over which plaintiff tripped were “open and obvious and were a naturally occurring condition”).

Further, an invitee is or should be “at least as aware” as the landowner of visible conditions that have “accumulated naturally outdoors” and thus “will often be in a better position to take immediate precautions against injury.” M.O. Dental Lab, 139 S.W.3d at 676. In other words, as the supreme court has explained:

When the condition is open and obvious or known to the invitee, however, the landowner is not in a better position to discover it. When invitees are aware of dangerous premises conditions–whether because the danger is obvious or because the landowner provided an adequate warning–the condition will, in most cases, no longer pose an unreasonable risk because the law presumes that invitees will take reasonable measures to protect themselves against known risks, which may include a decision not to accept the invitation to enter onto the landowner’s premises. [*10]  This is why the Court has typically characterized the landowner’s duty as a duty to make safe or warn of unreasonably dangerous conditions that are not open and obvious or otherwise known to the invitee

Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 203 (Tex. 2015) (citations omitted). Texas courts have repeatedly observed that a landowner “‘is not an insurer'” of an invitee’s safety and generally “has no duty to warn of hazards that are open and obvious or known to the invitee.” Id. at 203-04 (quoting Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 769 (Tex. 2010)). Texas courts have held in various contexts that flooding due to heavy rains is an open and obvious hazard. See, e.g., State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 288 (Tex. 2006) (“[T]he owner may assume that the recreational user needs no warning to appreciate the dangers of natural conditions, such as a sheer cliff, a rushing river, or even a concealed rattlesnake. But a landowner can be liable for gross negligence in creating a condition that a recreational user would not reasonably expect to encounter on the property in the course of the permitted use.”); City of Austin v. Leggett, 257 S.W.3d 456, 475 (Tex. App.–Austin 2008, pet. denied) (flooded intersection was readily apparent and presented obstacle that would be open and obvious to ordinary motorists).

We see no useful distinction to be drawn between ice and mud, which are natural conditions caused by rain and freezing temperatures, and rising [*11]  river waters, caused by a natural weather event over which appellees could exercise no control. See Fair, 310 S.W.3d at 414. The June 2010 flood was not a condition inherent in or on the land in question. Instead, the flooding was a condition that came to the campground as the adjacent river, the same river that made the land an attractive place to camp, rose due to heavy rains. The Walkers and the Johnsons had gone canoeing on the river the day before the flooding occurred, and thus they were obviously aware of the river’s proximity to their campsite. This situation is indeed a tragic one, but it is not one for which appellees can be held to bear legal responsibility. We hold that as a matter of law appellees had no duty to warn the Walkers and Johnsons of the possibility that the river they were camping beside might rise in the event of heavy rain, posing a risk to the campground.6

6 We further note that, even if the campground had posted warnings or issued flood cautions when the Walkers and Johnsons checked into the campsite, there is nothing in this record to indicate that events would have turned out any differently. The Walkers and Johnsons went to bed not having heard that heavy rains would approach [*12]  and slept heavily enough that none of them woke up during the storm or to warnings by the local sheriff’s officers, who drove through the campsite at about 4:00 a.m., blowing an airhorn and flashing their car’s lights as they announced over their PA system that the river was rising.

Conclusion

Because appellees did not owe a duty to warn of or attempt to make the campground safe against flooding of the adjacent river due to torrential rain, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in their favor. We affirm the trial court’s orders.

David Puryear, Justice

Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Field

Affirmed

Filed: June 3, 2016

 


Elliott, v. Carter, 2016 Va. LEXIS 151

Chancy M. Elliott, Administrator of the Estate of Caleb Mckinley Smith, Deceased v. Trevor Carter

Record No. 160224

SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

October 27, 2016, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RICHMOND COUNTY. Harry T. Taliaferro, III, Judge.

Elliott v. Carter, 2016 Va. LEXIS 49 (Va., Apr. 12, 2016)

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

COUNSEL: David R. Simonsen, Jr. (Keith B. Marcus; ParisBlank, on briefs), for appellant.

W.F. Drewry Gallalee (Harold E. Johnson; Williams Mullen, on brief), for appellee.

JUDGES: OPINION BY JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN. JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, with whom JUSTICE MIMS joins, dissenting.

OPINION BY: S. BERNARD GOODWYN

OPINION

PRESENT: All the Justices.

OPINION BY JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN

In this appeal, we consider the evidence required to submit a question of gross negligence to a jury.

Background

This matter arises from a wrongful death suit brought by Chancy M. Elliott (Elliott) on behalf of the estate of Caleb McKinley Smith (Caleb), alleging gross negligence on the part of Trevor Carter (Carter), the peer leader of Caleb’s Boy Scout troop, after Caleb drowned on a Scout camping trip. The material facts are not in dispute.

On June 25, 2011, Caleb was a 13-year-old Boy Scout on an overnight camping trip with his troop along the Rappahannock River near Sharps, Virginia. Carter, then 16 years old, was the Senior Patrol Leader, the troop’s peer leader. Caleb had been taking lessons to learn how to swim–he had had one from Carter that morning–but he could [*2] not yet swim.

At about 11:00 a.m., Carter led Caleb and two other Boy Scouts into the river along a partially submerged sandbar. One of the other two Scouts could swim (Scott), and the other could not (Elijah).

When they were approximately 150 yards into the river, Carter and Scott decided to swim back to shore. Carter told Caleb and Elijah to walk back to shore the way they had come, along the sandbar. As Caleb and Elijah walked back to shore along the sandbar, they both fell into deeper water. Caleb yelled to Carter for help and Carter attempted to swim back and rescue him. Although Elijah was rescued, neither Carter nor three adult Scout leaders, who attempted to assist, were able to save Caleb.

Elliott filed a wrongful death action in the Circuit Court of Richmond County against Carter, four adult Scout leaders, the Boy Scouts of America, and the affiliated Heart of Virginia Council, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), alleging that they had failed to adequately supervise Caleb. The court granted the Defendants’ demurrer asserting charitable immunity.

Elliott amended her complaint to allege both gross and willful and wanton negligence by Carter and gross negligence by the four adult Scout [*3] leaders, and demanded a jury trial.* Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that, based upon undisputed material facts, there was no gross negligence because there was no complete lack of care alleged and the danger of drowning was open and obvious. Defendants relied upon Elliott’s responses to requests for admission and allegations in the amended complaint in establishing the undisputed material facts.

* Elliott non-suited the actions against the Boy Scouts of America and the Heart of Virginia Council, Inc.

Following a hearing and supplemental briefing, the court granted the motion for summary judgment as to all Defendants. It found that, while the undisputed material facts would be sufficient to submit the question regarding a claim of simple negligence to a jury, the facts did not support a claim for gross negligence, because in Virginia, “there is not gross negligence as a matter of law where there is even the slightest bit of care regardless of how insufficient or ineffective it may have been,” and there was evidence that Carter did try to save Caleb.

Elliott appeals the ruling of the circuit court only as to Carter. On appeal, she argues that the circuit court erred [*4] in granting summary judgment and in concluding that, as a matter of law, a jury could not find Carter’s actions constituted gross negligence.

Analysis

[HN1] “In an appeal from a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny summary judgment, this Court reviews the application of law to undisputed facts de novo.” St. Joe Co. v. Norfolk Redev’t & Hous. Auth., 283 Va. 403, 407, 722 S.E.2d 622, 625 (2012).

[HN2] Gross negligence is “a degree of negligence showing indifference to another and an utter disregard of prudence that amounts to a complete neglect of the safety of such other person.” Cowan v. Hospice Support Care, Inc., 268 Va. 482, 487, 603 S.E.2d 916, 918 (2004).

It is a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the rights of others which amounts to the absence of slight diligence, or the want of even scant care. Several acts of negligence which separately may not amount to gross negligence, when combined may have a cumulative effect showing a form of reckless or total disregard for another’s safety. Deliberate conduct is important evidence on the question of gross negligence.

Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach, 252 Va. 186, 190, 475 S.E.2d 798, 800-01 (1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [HN3] Gross negligence “requires a degree of negligence that would shock fair-minded persons, although demonstrating something less than willful recklessness.” Cowan, 268 Va. at 487, 603 S.E.2d at 918; see also Thomas v. Snow, 162 Va. 654, 661, 174 S.E. 837, 839 (1934) (“Ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention”; [*5] while “[g]ross negligence is a manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence,” “it is something less than . . . willful, wanton, and reckless conduct.”).

[HN4] “Ordinarily, the question whether gross negligence has been established is a matter of fact to be decided by a jury. Nevertheless, when persons of reasonable minds could not differ upon the conclusion that such negligence has not been established, it is the court’s duty to so rule.” Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 388, 393, 362 S.E.2d 688, 691, 4 Va. Law Rep. 1220 (1987). Because “the standard for gross negligence [in Virginia] is one of indifference, not inadequacy,” a claim for gross negligence must fail as a matter of law when the evidence shows that the defendants exercised some degree of care. Kuykendall v. Young Life, 261 Fed. Appx. 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2008) (relying on Frazier, 234 Va. at 392, 362 S.E.2d at 690-91, Chapman, 252 Va. at 190, 475 S.E.2d at 801, and Cowan, 268 Va. at 486-87, 603 S.E.2d at 918 to interpret Virginia law); see, e.g., Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 133, 400 S.E.2d 184, 189, 7 Va. Law Rep. 1368 (1991) (affirming the circuit court’s ruling that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of gross negligence when the evidence showed that the defendant “‘did exercise some degree of diligence and care’ and, therefore, as a matter of law, his acts could not show ‘utter disregard of prudence amounting to complete neglect of the safety of another'”).

Here, even viewing the evidence in the [*6] light most favorable to Elliott, the non-moving party, as required in considering a motion for summary judgment, Commercial Business Systems v. Bellsouth Services, 249 Va. 39, 41-42, 453 S.E.2d 261, 264 (1995), the undisputed material facts support the conclusion that Carter exercised some degree of care in supervising Caleb. Therefore, his conduct did not constitute gross negligence.

First, it is not alleged that Caleb had any difficulty walking out along the sandbar with Carter. Second, there is no allegation that Carter was aware of any hidden danger posed by the sandbar, the river or its current. Third, Carter instructed Caleb to walk back to shore along the same route he had taken out into the river, and there was no evidence that conditions changed such that doing so would have been different or more dangerous than initially walking out, which was done without difficulty. Finally, Carter tried to swim back and assist Caleb once Caleb slipped off the sandbar, which is indicative that Carter was close enough to attempt to render assistance when Caleb fell into the water, and that Carter did attempt to render such assistance. Thus, although Carter’s efforts may have been inadequate or ineffectual, they were not so insufficient as to constitute the indifference and utter disregard [*7] of prudence that would amount to a complete neglect for Caleb’s safety, which is required to establish gross negligence.

Because a claim of gross negligence must fail as a matter of law when there is evidence that the defendant exercised some degree of diligence and care, the circuit court did not err in finding that no reasonable jurist could find that Carter did nothing at all for Caleb’s care. As such, there was no question for the jury, and the circuit court properly granted Carter’s motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.

Affirmed.

DISSENT BY: McCULLOUGH

DISSENT

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, with whom JUSTICE MIMS joins, dissenting.

Ordinarily, whether gross negligence has been established is a matter of fact to be decided by a jury. Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 388, 393, 362 S.E.2d 688, 691, 4 Va. Law Rep. 1220 (1987). Of course, when “persons of reasonable minds could not differ upon the conclusion that such negligence has not been established, it is the court’s duty to so rule.” Id. In my view, the facts presented in this tragic case were sufficient to present a jury question. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Here, Caleb could not swim, a fact that was known to the defendants. He did not walk out on his own into the river. Rather, he was [*8] led, without a life jacket or other safety equipment, over a partially submerged sandbar far into the river. The complaint alleges that “the Rappahannock River . . . is a major river with a strong current.” Caleb was then abandoned on a sandbar in the middle of the river and told to walk back. A partially submerged sandbar in the middle of a river with a strong current is a very dangerous place to be, particularly for a non-swimmer without a life vest. Ever-shifting sandbars, obviously, are not stable structures. They can easily dissipate. A major river with strong currents like the Rappahannock presents a different situation than a tranquil pond. Carter then swam away too far to effectuate a rescue should Caleb slip and fall into the river. In my view, “reasonable persons could differ upon whether the cumulative effect of these circumstances constitutes a form of recklessness or a total disregard of all precautions, an absence of diligence, or lack of even slight care.” Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach, 252 Va. 186, 191, 475 S.E.2d 798, 801 (1996).

I would also find that the purported acts of slight care, separated in time and place from the gross negligence at issue, do not take the issue away from the jury. The only two acts of slight care the defendants identify [*9] are the fact that Caleb was given a swimming lesson before he drowned — but there is no indication that Caleb could swim — and that Carter, after swimming too far away to make any rescue effectual, tried to swim back to save Caleb after he had fallen into the river. Significantly, Carter led Caleb into danger in the first place. When the defendant has led the plaintiff into danger, an ineffectual and doomed to fail rescue attempt does not in my judgment take away from the jury the question of gross negligence. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand the case for a trial by jury.


Summer 2016 Commercial Fatalities

This list is not guaranteed to be accurate. The information is found from web searches and news dispatches. Those references are part of the chart. If you have a source for information on any fatality please leave a comment or contact me. Thank you.

If this information is incorrect or incomplete please let me know.  This is up to date as of July 20, 2016. Thanks.

Rafting, Mountaineering, Skiing out of bounds and other sports are probably still safer than your kitchen or bathroom. This information is not to scare you away from any activity but to help you understand the risks and to study.

Red is a probable death due to medical issues unrelated to the activity

Blue is an employee fatality

Dark blue is a death of an employee while working

Date

Activity

State

Location

What

Age

Sex

Location 2

Reference

Ref 2

Company

3/22

Cat Skiing

OR

Mt. Bailey

Avalanche hit tree

 

M

 

http://rec-law.us/1XSFbT7

 

Cat Ski Mount Bailey

5/4

Whitewater Rafting

WA

Wenatchee River

Raft Flipped

53

M

Dryden

http://rec-law.us/1TuBuzC

 

Orion River

 

Whitewater Rafting

ME

Dead River

Fell out

52

M

 

http://rec-law.us/22B3zeY

http://rec-law.us/1U0HrbU

North Country Rivers

5/22

Whitewater Rafting

CO

Arkansas River

Fell out

61

F

Parkdale

http://rec-law.us/1r4zOp3

http://rec-law.us/1O75mWC

Echo Canyon River Expeditions

6/4

Whitewater Rafting

AK

Lowe River

Fell out

48

F

 

http://rec-law.us/1Yemxbd

 

 

6/15

Whitewater Rafting

CO

Roaring Fork

Flip

50

M

Slaughterhouse section

http://rec-law.us/1WOcnyo

http://rec-law.us/1UkzCwI

Aspen Whitewater Rafting

6/15

Whitewater Rafting

AK

Kongakut River

Flip

69

F

 

http://rec-law.us/1UU3Ma6

http://rec-law.us/1UC2MZv

Alaska Alpine Adventures

6/15

Whitewater Rafting

AK

Kongakut River

Flip

67

F

 

http://rec-law.us/1UU3Ma6

http://rec-law.us/1UC2MZv

Alaska Alpine Adventures

6/22

Sea Kayaking

ME

Downeast Maine

High Seas

63

M

Corea Harbor

http://rec-law.us/28RNpuw

 

SeaScape Kayaks

6/22

Sea Kayaking

ME

Downeast Maine

High Seas

 

M

Corea Harbor

http://rec-law.us/28RNpuw

 

SeaScape Kayaks

6/24/16

Whitewater Rafting

CO

Green River

 

63

F

Disaster Falls

http://rec-law.us/295dJ7a

http://rec-law.us/290uTwS

Adrift Adventures

7/2/16

Whitewater Rafting

CO

Arkansas River

Fell out

51

F

Zoom Flume

http://rec-law.us/29h5oxj

http://rec-law.us/29hYin3

River Runners

7/17

Inflatable Kayak

OR

Rogue River

Fell out & trapped unwater

57

M

Wildcat Rapid

http://rec-law.us/2a9iiKF

 

 

7/21

Canoe Trip

MN

Boundary Waters

Lighting Strike

39

F

Basswood Lake

http://rec-law.us/29X5ve3

http://rec-law.us/2a1jHUx

BSA Northern Tier High Adventure Base

7/21

Canoe Trip

MN

Boundary Waters

Lighting Strike

13

M

Basswood Lake

http://rec-law.us/29X5ve3

http://rec-law.us/2a1jHUx

BSA Northern Tier High Adventure Base

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If you would like a PDF of this chart please click here.

Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the areas who have to deal with these tragedies.

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New York Summer Camp cases are examples of helicopter parenting; I gave you a perfect child, and no injuries shall occur to my child in your care, if one occurs, I will sue.

A minor at a Scout camp runs out of a shower house and falls down. The parents sue for his injuries claiming he was not supervised. At the same time, the BSA Youth Protection Training prevented adults in showers with youth. The court in this case realized the absurdity of the plaintiff’s claims and held for the defendants.

Gomes v. Boy Scouts of America, et al., 51 Misc. 3d 1206(A); 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1088; 2016 NY Slip Op 50444(U)

State: New York, Supreme Court of New York, New York County

Plaintiff: Davide E. Gomes

Defendant: Northern New Jersey Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America (Council) and Boy Scout Troop 141 (troop)

Plaintiff Claims: negligent supervision

Defendant Defenses: assumption of the risk, no duty

Holding: for the defendants

Year: 2016

The thirteen-year-old  plaintiff was a Boy Scout. He and his troop from New Jersey were at a Scout Camp in the Adirondacks of New York for a canoe trip. While at the camp, the youth walked a few minutes to a bath house. While in the bath house, the plaintiff was fooling around and ran out of the bath house and fell suffering a head injury.

According to plaintiff, the main purpose of the trip to Floodwood was to take a 15-mile canoe trip. On the day of the accident, the scouts and the Troop leaders spent time outside in their campsite within the camp, where “there was a little bit of horsing around,” “a little bit of pushing, playing around,” and all of the scouts were pushing and shoving each other during and after a game of touch football, which the leaders told them to stop. As he walked to the shower house the night of his accident, plaintiff wore a functioning headlamp; the area around the shower house was dark. He does not recall what happened from the time the group walked to the shower house to when he regained consciousness on the ground, bleeding from his head.

The plaintiff does not remember the incidence.

Other Scouts at the shower house reported the incident this way.

It is undisputed that other scouts reported that while they were in the shower house, plaintiff took a water pump from the wall and squirted water on them. When one of the scouts told him to stop, plaintiff ran out of the shower house and fell to the ground. None of the scouts knew what had caused the fall.

The plaintiff had been in Scouting since he was 9. He participated  in monthly camp outs with his scout troop.

The plaintiffs brought claims against the troop, the New Jersey Boy Scout council where the troop was chartered and who owned the camp and the Boy Scouts of America and the individual unit leaders.

The claims where the youth were not properly supervised, and the area around the shower house were full of roots, sticks, rocks, etc.

One issue that runs throughout the decision which is not explained is the BSA Youth Protection Program. The program requires youth to always do things in groups or at least two and prohibit adults from actively being in a position where they can observe the youth in the shower.  Even if an adult was with the youth, there would have to be two adults.

This program was put in place to protect both the youth and the adults in the Scouting program.

Another issue in this case is the camp was located in New York. The New York State Department of Health (DOH) had massive and strict rules for children’s camps and substantial ability to issue sanctions for violations of those rules. Some of those rules violate or make conforming to the BSA Youth Protection Program difficult.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The court first looked at the New York State Department of Health (DOH) rules concerning this case.

As pertinent here, the regulations require adequate supervision, and that “as a minimum . . . there shall exist visual or verbal communications capabilities between camper and counselor during activities and a method of accounting for the camper’s whereabouts at all times.”

The council had a written plan to confirm to the DOH rules.

Council’s written plan for Floodwood requires that supervision of campers “be maintained for the duration (24/7) of their stay at the camp.” Council’s Leaders Guide for Floodwood provides that “running and horseplay have no place at Scout Camps,” and all scout units must have two adult leaders with the unit at all times.

DOH did find issues with the camp’s plan. The Camp and DOH reached a settlement on those issues. However, by law the information and the settlement cannot be entered into evidence in court.

DOH investigated the incident, after which it and Council entered into a stipulation providing that DOH had alleged that Council had violated various camp regulations, including those relating to the supervision of scouts, and that the parties were thereby settling the matter by Council agreeing not to contest it, paying a fine, and submitting a revised camp safety plan. Additionally, by its terms, the stipulation is

not intended for use in any other forum, tribunal or court, including any civil or criminal proceeding in which the issues or burden of proof may differ, and is made without prejudice to [Council’s] rights, defenses and/or claims in any other matter, proceeding, action, hearing or litigation not involving [DOH] [and] is not intended to be dispositive of any allegations of negligence that may be made in a civil action for monetary damages.

The DOH requires that after any incident, a form be completed. In this case, the form was completed by a camp staffer who had no training in completing the form and had never completed a form before. DOH requires that after any incident a form be completed. In this case the form was completed by a camp staffer who had no training in completing the form and had never completed a form before.

Richard Saunders testified at an EBT that at the time of plaintiff’s accident, he was 18 years old and employed at Floodwood as a camp health officer. He described Floodwood as a “high-adventure base” for scouts older than 13 to do back-country exploring. After the accident, he completed a form as required by the DOH, on which he noted, under the category “Supervision During Incident,” that the “activity was inadequately addressed in the written plan,” by which he intended to convey that he had reviewed the scout’s written plan for the trip and saw nothing therein related to super-vision of the scouts while in the shower house. He also wrote that no camp staff was present when the accident occurred. Although Saunders had first written that the supervision was “adequate,” he changed it to “inadequate” based on the absence of an adult when plaintiff was injured. Saunders had never before filled out such a form, nor was it part of his job.

The plaintiff argued that because he was unable to remember the accident, a relaxed standard of care applied to the plaintiff’s case.

Plaintiff argues that his inability to remember the accident permits a relaxed standard of proof on summary judgment, and contends that there are two possible explanations for his accident: (1) that he was struck over the head with a blunt object by a fellow scout, or (2) that he tripped and fell while running over the uneven and non-illuminated area around the shower house, and that in either scenario, the accident would not have happened if defendants had adequately supervised that night.

The court found issues with this.

A plaintiff who, due to a failure of memory, cannot describe what led to his injury is not held to as high a degree of proof on his or her cause of action.

However, even when a plaintiff suffers from amnesia, he is not relieved of the obligation to provide “some proof from which negligence can be reasonably inferred.”

The court then looked at the duty owed by the defendants.

A “summer camp is duty-bound to supervise its campers as would a parent of ordinary prudence in comparable circumstances” And, while the degree of supervision required depends on the surrounding circumstances, “constant supervision in a camp setting is neither feasible nor desirable.”

The New York requirement for supervision allowed for reality in not requiring constant supervision. The court then looked at the applicable standard of care.

The standard for determining whether a duty to supervise a minor has been breached is “whether a parent of ordinary prudence placed in the identical situation and armed with the same information would invariably have provided greater supervision.”

Moreover, this standard requires prior knowledge on the part of the camp of dangerous conduct.

Moreover, “in determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow [campers], it must be established that [camp] authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the injury, that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated.”

Lack of supervision alone is not enough to create a cause of action. The court found the supervision was adequate. The scouts walked to the shower house as a group without incident. Until the plaintiff started horsing around, there were no supervision issues.

The court then looked at why kids go to camps and how parents should deal with those issues.

Moreover, a parent who permits his or her child to attend an overnight camping trip in the woods where the child will be taught skills related to understanding and surviving outdoor conditions, is presumably aware of the hazards and risks of injury associated with such conditions, and it would be illogical for that same parent to require or believe it necessary for the child to be escorted personally to and from every area within the camp. Such a degree of supervision “in a camp setting is neither feasible nor desirable” and camps “cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all of [the campers] movements and activities”

Quoting another case the court stated:

The Court observed that ” [r]emembering that this is a Summer camp, it will be seen that constant supervision is not feasible . . . Nor is it desirable. One of the benefits of such an institution is to inculcate self-reliance in the campers which an overly protective supervision would destroy.”

The DOH report was also dismissed by the court because the person who had completed the report:

…because he had no authority to bind defendants to his conclusion, but also based on the circumstances that he was an 18-year old who had never before filled out or even seen a DOH report, and who had received no training or guidance as to how it should be filled out or the meanings of the terms therein.

The court reasoned. The DOH report also had failures because it stated there lacked supervision just because an adult was not present. Supervision is not only based on an adult’s presence.

Reliance on the DOH requirement of “visual or verbal communication” between campers and counselors and Council’s plan for Floodwood which required the supervision of campers “24/7” is misplaced as neither requires that the Troop leaders be constantly present with the scouts

At the same time, the supervision issue was irrelevant if the accident was not foreseeable. There was no evidence presented that the scouts would engage in dangerous conduct or misbehave. Even if some of the misbehavior was foreseeable, there was no evidence that, and it was not foreseeable that the plaintiff would bolt from the shower house, trip and fall and receive an injury.

As it is undisputed that defendants had no notice of the possibility of misbehavior among the scouts, they have established that plaintiff’s accident was not foreseeable.

Even if the Troop leaders had escorted the scouts to the shower house and stood outside while they showered, the alleged misbehavior occurred inside the shower house, and thus the leaders would neither have observed it nor been in a position to stop it. And unless the leaders blocked the entrance, they would not have been able to stop plaintiff from running out of the shower house and falling down.

On top of all of that, even if leaders were present the accident happened too quickly for anyone to have stopped it. Besides, the acts leading to the injury were solely done by the plaintiff, without interference or prodding from anyone other youth or leader. “Moreover, it was plaintiff’s own impulsive and reckless conduct in squirting the other scouts with the water pump and then running out of the shower house, that led to his injury.”

Thus, as the accident occurred in a very short time span and as plaintiff’s own impulsive conduct led to his injury, defendants have demonstrated that there is no proximate cause between their allegedly inadequate supervision and plaintiff’s accident.

The final issue tackled by the courts was the lighting and conditions of the area where the shower house was located. Because the plaintiff could not identify what caused him to fall, it could not be said the fall was caused by inadequate lighting.

Thus, as the accident occurred in a very short time span and as plaintiff’s own impulsive conduct led to his injury, defendants have demonstrated that there is no proximate cause between their allegedly inadequate supervision and plaintiff’s accident.

On top of that, the plaintiff was wearing a headlamp at the time of the accident so even if lighting were to blame the plaintiff had brought his own. Identifying the area around the shower house without being able to identify which of those conditions caused his injury is not enough to argue a legal claim.

Plaintiff was able, however, to recall the conditions outside of the shower house, which consisted of typical conditions in any wooded or camp area, i.e., rocks, dirt, branches, etc., and having been on several camp trips, was presumably aware of the existence and risks of such conditions. He did not identify or recall any unusual, unexpected, or dangerous conditions, nor have any such conditions been alleged.

The decision of the trial court was upheld, and the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed.

So Now What?

First, more information needs to be given to parents to try to educate them of the risks of any youth activity. On top of this, programs designed to protect kids need to be explained both to why they are used and what the adults can and cannot do, like the BSA YPT program.

On top of that, you need to develop proof that your parents knew the risks of the activity. New York does not allow a parent to sign away a minor’s right to sue. (See States that allow a parent to sign away a minor’s right to sue.) As such the only real defense you would have would be assumption of the risk. (See Assumption of the Risk and Assumption of Risk — Checklist)

I would include in that assumption of the risk form statements about the kid’s age and prior camping/outdoor experience as in this case. Ask the parents to relate or checkbox their outdoor experience.

You can use the form to determine who else can help your unit or program, and you can use the form to prove the parents knew and assumed the risk.

clip_image002[4]What do you think? Leave a comment.

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By Recreation Law           Rec-law@recreation-law.com     James H. Moss

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Gomes v. Boy Scouts of America, et al., 51 Misc. 3d 1206(A); 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1088; 2016 NY Slip Op 50444(U)

Gomes v. Boy Scouts of America, et al., 51 Misc. 3d 1206(A); 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1088; 2016 NY Slip Op 50444(U)

Davide E. Gomes, Plaintiff, against Boy Scouts of America, et al., Defendants.

115435/10

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY

51 Misc. 3d 1206(A); 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1088; 2016 NY Slip Op 50444(U)

March 10, 2016, Decided

NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE PRINTED OFFICIAL REPORTS.

PRIOR HISTORY: Gomes v. Boy Scouts of America, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4622 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Oct. 9, 2013)

COUNSEL: [*1] For plaintiff: Scott W. Epstein, Esq., Antich, Erlich & Epstein, LLP, New York, NY.

For Council and Troop 141: Brian P. Morrissey, Esq., Connell Foley, LLP, New York, NY.

JUDGES: Barbara Jaffe, JSC.

OPINION BY: Barbara Jaffe

OPINION

Barbara Jaffe, J.

By notice of motion, defendants Northern New Jersey Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America (Council) and Boy Scout Troop 141 (troop) (collectively, defendants) move pursuant to CPLR 3212 for an order granting them summary dismissal of the complaint against them. Plaintiff opposes.

I. PERTINENT BACKGROUND

By decision and order dated October 8, 2013 (NYSCEF 110), I granted defendant Boy Scouts of America’s (BSA) motion for an order summarily dismissing the complaint against it. As set forth therein, the background of the case is as follows:

On July 24, 2005, plaintiff, then a 13-year-old Boy Scout, was participating in a Boy Scout excursion at Floodwood Mountain Scout Reservation in the Adirondacks. Plaintiff was a member of Boy Scout Troop 141. He and other scouts were accompanied by volunteer [**2] adult leaders. Near or in the shower house at the Reservation, plaintiff sustained head injuries.

In accident and witness reports created after the accident, the other scouts who were at the showers [*2] at the time of plaintiff’s accident stated that they saw plaintiff run from the shower area and discovered him lying prone on the ground and bleeding. None of them saw him fall.

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that as he was walking along the common area and/or grassy area at or near the showers, he fell due to defendants’ failure to keep the area safe, in good repair, well-lit and free from obstruction or defect and supervise him and the other scouts.

In plaintiff’s supplemental verified bill of particulars, he describes the dangerous condition which caused his fall as follows: “that the area in front of the showers where the [ ] accident occurred was not lit, and/or was poorly lit, and/or was inadequately lit; was raised and un-leveled, and had rocks and/or tree limbs/branches strewn about it,” all of which defendants had constructive notice.

At an examination before trial held on December 16, 2011, plaintiff testified that he did not recall his accident or what had caused his fall, and that his last memory before falling was of walking to the showers. At the time of his accident, it was dark outside and there was no lighting outside the showers, although it was lit inside, [*3] and he noticed that there were many rocks on the ground around the shower house. He was wearing a working head lamp as he approached the showers.

(NYSCEF 110).

On this motion, the following relevant facts are undisputed:

(1)Council owns and operates Floodwood and Troop made reservations to attend camp there;

(2)plaintiff had been a scout for several years and had attended previous camping trips;

(3)defendants Lopes and Figueiredo were the two adult Troop leaders in charge of plaintiff’s troop at Floodwood;

(4)the night of plaintiff’s accident, he and the other Troop members were told to put equipment into the Troop’s van and take showers at the camp’s shower house;

(5)of the five other Troop members that accompanied plaintiff to the shower house that night, one was 14 years old, one was 15 years old, and three were 16 years [**3] old;

(6)the adult leaders did not accompany them to the van or the shower house;

(7)the shower house was used by both female and males at alternating hours, and the Troop members had to wait until 10 pm to use it; and

(8)there had been no prior incidents of misbehavior during the trip or among the Troop members.

(NYSCEF 151).

The New York State Department of Health (DOH) promulgates [*4] specific rules for children’s camps. (10 NYCRR § 7-2 et al.). As pertinent here, the regulations require adequate supervision, and that “as a minimum . . . there shall exist visual or verbal communications capabilities between camper and counselor during activities and a method of accounting for the camper’s whereabouts at all times.” (10 NYCRR § 7-2.5[o]).

Council’s written plan for Floodwood requires that supervision of campers “be maintained for the duration (24/7) of their stay at the camp.” (NYSCEF 174). Council’s Leaders Guide for Floodwood provides that “running and horseplay have no place at Scout Camps,” and all scout units must have two adult leaders with the unit at all times. (NYSCEF 175).

At a deposition held on December 16, 2011, plaintiff testified that he had been a scout since age nine, and that while a scout he participated in monthly weekend scout camping trips. During the trips, the Troop leaders would show the scouts how to use tools, and gather firewood; when gathering firewood, the scouts would go into the woods using the buddy system, which requires that scouts be accompanied by at least one other scout. When the scouts went to the bathroom, they also used the buddy system. At a camp attended [*5] by the Troop the week before the one at Floodwood, plaintiff visited the shower facilities using the buddy system or with several scouts. At Floodwood too, the buddy system was used. (NYSCEF 162).

According to plaintiff, the main purpose of the trip to Floodwood was to take a 15-mile canoe trip. On the day of the accident, the scouts and the Troop leaders spent time outside in their campsite within the camp, where “there was a little bit of horsing around,” “a little bit of pushing, playing around,” and all of the scouts were pushing and shoving each other during and after a game of touch football, which the leaders told them to stop. As he walked to the shower house the night of his accident, plaintiff wore a functioning headlamp; the area around the shower house was dark. He does not recall what happened from the time the group walked to the shower house to when he regained consciousness on the ground, bleeding from his head. (NYSCEF 162).

It is undisputed that other scouts reported that while they were in the shower house, plaintiff took a water pump from the wall and squirted water on them. When one of the scouts told him to stop, plaintiff ran out of the shower house and fell to [*6] the ground. None of the scouts knew what had caused the fall. (NYSCEF 167-171, 176).

Pictures taken by the parties at Floodwood after the accident depict the shower house as a building stationed in a large clearing or space in front of a wooded area. (NYSCEF 161; 192).

According to the Troop leaders present that day, it was not scouts’ practice to have adult leaders accompany scouts to camp showers. Both leaders testified that they had known plaintiff and the other scouts for several years, had been with them at another camp the week before they went to Floodwood, and had had no disciplinary issues or previous incidents of misbehavior between them. The leaders testified that Scout protocol differentiated between active activities, such as swimming or rock climbing, and passive activities, such as going to shower or the bathroom or retrieving firewood, and that active activities required adults to be present while passive activities did not necessarily require an adult presence. (NYSCEF 163, 164).

Lopes testified that they defined supervision as permitting the scouts to travel throughout the camp as long as the leaders knew their whereabouts, and that he believed that Scout guidelines [*7] prohibited the leaders from walking the scouts to the shower house and waiting outside while they showered in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety. He testified that it was a three to five-minute walk from the Troop’s campsite to the shower house. (NYSCEF 164).

Figueiredo testified that the Troop’s campsite was located approximately a three-minute walk from the parking lot, that the shower house was located in the general camp, and that it was a three to four-minute walk from the Troop’s campsite to the shower house. He found out about plaintiff’s accident when two of the scouts found him at their campsite, and when he arrived at the shower house, he found plaintiff sitting on the ground in front of the shower house. He investigated the incident by interviewing the other scouts, and concluded that the other scouts were inside the shower house when plaintiff fell outside the shower house. (NYSCEF 163).

Figueiredo testified that although they did not accompany the scouts to the bathroom or shower, they had them use the buddy system and knew their whereabouts and when to expect them to return, which he defined as their supervision of the scouts:

[t]hey were not in a vast wilderness, they [*8] were in a camp. So there are other people in camp, so they’re within earshot of a number of people that are in camp. It is not like . . . I sent them out into the African plains; there were other people around. They were reasonably within earshot to a bunch of people and I knew their whereabouts.

(NYSCEF 163).

At an examination before trial held on March 16, 2012, Grey Rolland, Council’s director of support services, testified, as pertinent here, that he was unaware of any other injuries to scouts at Floodwood before or after plaintiff’s accident, and that plaintiff and the other scouts used the buddy system, which Rolland considers adequate. He did not believe that the adult Troop leaders should have accompanied the scouts to the shower house given the BSA prohibition against permitting adults and youths in shower houses together, and he asserted that it would not be considered “appropriate” for the adults to escort the scouts to the shower house. He acknowledged that if a Troop leader observed scouts running around or engaging in horseplay, it was incumbent upon the leader to tell them to stop. (NYSCEF 165).

Richard Saunders testified at an EBT that at the time of plaintiff’s accident, [*9] he was 18 years old and employed at Floodwood as a camp health officer. He described Floodwood as a “high-adventure base” for scouts older than 13 to do back-country exploring. After the accident, he completed a form as required by the DOH, on which he noted, under the category “Supervision During Incident,” that the “activity was inadequately addressed in the written plan,” by which he intended to convey that he had reviewed the scout’s written plan for the trip and saw [**4] nothing therein related to supervision of the scouts while in the shower house. He also wrote that no camp staff was present when the accident occurred. Although Saunders had first written that the supervision was “adequate,” he changed it to “inadequate” based on the absence of an adult when plaintiff was injured. Saunders had never before filled out such a form, nor was it part of his job.

Saunders described Floodwood as consisting of a main camp area, which includes the buildings where food is organized and meetings occur, and the individual campsites which are approximately a five-minute walk away. The shower house was located between the campsites and the camp buildings. He estimated that the shower house was [*10] a two-minute walk from the Troop’s campsite and in “an area where boys don’t want to have adults and it would be illegal to have them being watched while showering.” As a scout and troop member attending camps like Floodwood, Saunders recalled that adult leaders did not escort scouts to the showers or stand outside while the scouts showered. (NYSCEF 166).

DOH investigated the incident, after which it and Council entered into a stipulation providing that DOH had alleged that Council had violated various camp regulations, including those relating to the supervision of scouts, and that the parties were thereby settling the matter by Council agreeing not to contest it, paying a fine, and submitting a revised camp safety plan. Additionally, by its terms, the stipulation is

not intended for use in any other forum, tribunal or court, including any civil or criminal proceeding in which the issues or burden of proof may differ, and is made without prejudice to [Council’s] rights, defenses and/or claims in any other matter, proceeding, action, hearing or litigation not involving [DOH] [and] is not intended to be dispositive of any allegations of negligence that may be made in a civil action for [*11] monetary damages.

(NYSCEF 177).

By affidavit dated August 3, 2015, Michael J. Peterson states that he is an expert on camp and conference center management, and opines, based on his experience and review of relevant documentation in this case, that defendants violated the DOH regulation which requires, at a minimum, visual or verbal communications capabilities between a camper and a counselor, and that plaintiff’s accident was reasonably foreseeable as the scouts were allowed to remain “totally unsupervised and unregulated for a lengthy period of time in a potentially dangerous/hazardous environment.” He also posits that if the Troop leaders had accompanied the scouts to the shower house, “the level of horse play outside the shower house would have been minimal to non-existent, the boys would have taken their showers without incident, and safely returned to their camp site.” He also states that the defendants should have provided adequate lighting around the shower house. (NYSCEF 193).

II. CONTENTIONS

Defendants deny that they were negligent in any manner related to the physical conditions outside the shower house as they were the ordinary and expected conditions present in a wooded camp. [*12] Troop denies having had any obligation to maintain the area. Defendants also deny having breached a duty to supervise plaintiff absent any prior incidents between plaintiff and any [**5] other Troop member that would have put them on notice of the need to supervise them more closely, and argue that plaintiff’s injury or misbehavior was not reasonably foreseeable. They observe that plaintiff cannot remember how he was injured or whether his injuries were caused by a premises condition or an assault by another scout, and deny having had notice of any prior incidents or accidents around the shower house. (NYSCEF 151).

Plaintiff argues that his inability to remember the accident permits a relaxed standard of proof on summary judgment, and contends that there are two possible explanations for his accident: (1) that he was struck over the head with a blunt object by a fellow scout, or (2) that he tripped and fell while running over the uneven and non-illuminated area around the shower house, and that in either scenario, the accident would not have happened if defendants had adequately supervised that night. He asserts that a jury could conclude that a reasonably prudent parent would not permit [*13] six minors “to wander around the woods at 10:00 pm, for an indefinite period of time, without any adult supervision whatsoever,” and maintains that any “horseplay” should have and would have been discouraged by the Troop leaders. He also observes that defendants violated their own policies by failing to have a troop leader with the troop “at all times” or “for the duration (24/7)” of their trip. (NYSCEF 190).

Plaintiff relies on the stipulation entered into between defendants and DOH, Saunders’s conclusion that factors contributing to the incident included inadequate supervision, and Peterson’s opinion, to demonstrate the lack of adequate supervision. He also argues that Council had a duty to illuminate the area around the shower house, which he characterizes as a “rugged” and “uneven and unpaved camp area containing, inter alia, grass, dirt, rocks, trees, and tree roots.” (Id.).

In reply, defendants maintain that they established, prima facie, their lack of prior knowledge or notice of any scout misbehavior at the camp or any dangerous condition around the shower house. They deny that plaintiff offers evidence that he suffers from any medical condition causing a failure of memory, and [*14] assert that his inability to remember the incident does not warrant relieving him of his burden of proof. They also dispute that the scouts were “traipsing or wandering” through the woods, observing that both Troop leaders testified that they were within the camp, not the woods, where they were within earshot, and were directed to go to the shower house, which they did. (NYSCEF 200).

Defendants also contend that Peterson’s expert affidavit is based on speculation, and that his reliance on the DOH requirement of visual or verbal communication capabilities during “activities” is inapplicable as showering or walking to the shower house is not an activity within the meaning of the rule. They observe that Peterson cites no regulations that defendants allegedly violated relating to the lighting around the shower house, that Peterson never inspected the area, and that in any event, the conditions alleged are ordinary elements of a wooded area. They also deny that Saunders’s statements in the DOH form constitute party admissions, as his completion of the form was not within the scope of his authority at Floodwood. (Id.).

III. ANALYSIS

“The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima [*15] facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact.” (Ayotte v Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062, 1062, 619 N.E.2d 400, 601 N.Y.S.2d 463 [1993] [citation [**6] omitted]; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 476 N.E.2d 642, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316 [1985]). “Failure to make such showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers.” (Winegrad, 64 NY2d at 853; see also Lesocovich v 180 Madison Ave. Corp., 81 NY2d 982, 985, 615 N.E.2d 1010, 599 N.Y.S.2d 526 [1993]).

Once the proponent’s prima facie burden is satisfied, the opposing party bears the burden of presenting evidentiary facts sufficient to raise triable issues of fact. (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562, 404 N.E.2d 718, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595 [1980]; CitiFinancial Co. [DE] v McKinney, 27 AD3d 224, 226, 811 N.Y.S.2d 359 [1st Dept 2006]). Summary judgment may be granted only when it is clear that no triable issues of fact exist (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324, 501 N.E.2d 572, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923 [1986]), and “should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue” of fact (Am. Home Assur. Co. v Amerford Intl. Corp., 200 AD2d 472, 473, 606 N.Y.S.2d 229 [1st Dept 1994]; see also Color by Pergament, Inc. v Pergament, 241 AD2d 418, 420, 660 N.Y.S.2d 431 [1st Dept 1997] [“Summary judgment is an exercise in issue-finding, not issue determination, and may not be granted when material and triable issues of fact are presented”]). The court must examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Martin v Briggs, 235 AD2d 192, 196, 663 N.Y.S.2d 184 [1st Dept 1997]).

A plaintiff who, due to a failure of memory, cannot describe what led to his injury is not held to as high a degree of proof on his or her cause of action. (Noseworthy v City of New York, 298 NY 76, 80 N.E.2d 744 [1948]; see Bah v Benton, 92 AD3d 133, 936 N.Y.S.2d 181 [1st Dept 2012] [plaintiff who presented medical evidence establishing loss of memory due [*16] to accident at issue entitled to lesser standard of proof applicable to party unable to present party’s version of facts]). However, even when a plaintiff suffers from amnesia, he is not relieved of the obligation to provide “some proof from which negligence can be reasonably inferred.” (Alotta v Diaz, 130 AD3d 660, 11 N.Y.S.3d 868 [2d Dept 2015]; see Schechter v Klanfer, 28 NY2d 228, 269 N.E.2d 812, 321 N.Y.S.2d 99 [1971] [even if amnesiac plaintiff is held to lesser degree of proof, it does not “shift the burden of proof or eliminate the need for plaintiffs to introduce evidence of a prima facie case”]; Santiago v Quattrociocchi, 91 AD3d 747, 937 N.Y.S.2d 119 [2d Dept 2012] [same]).

A. Did defendants breach their duty to supervise plaintiff?

A person, other than a parent, who undertakes to control, care for, or supervise an infant, is required to use reasonable care to protect the infant . . . Such a person may be liable for any injury sustained by the infant which was proximately caused by his or her negligence. While a person caring for entrusted children is not cast in the role of an insurer, such an individual is obligated to provide adequate supervision and may be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately resulting from the negligent failure to do so.

(Alotta v Diaz, 130 AD3d 660, 11 N.Y.S.3d 868 [2d Dept 2015], quoting Appell v Mandel, 296 AD2d 514, 745 N.Y.S.2d 491 [2d Dept 2002]).

A “summer camp is duty-bound to supervise its campers as would a parent of ordinary prudence in comparable [*17] circumstances.” (Phelps v Boy Scouts of Am., 305 AD2d 335, 762 N.Y.S.2d 32 [1st Dept 2003]). And, while the degree of supervision required depends on the surrounding circumstances, “constant supervision in a camp setting is neither feasible nor desirable.” (Id. at 335-6).

The standard for determining whether a duty to supervise a minor has been breached is “whether a parent of ordinary prudence placed in the identical situation and armed with the same [**7] information would invariably have provided greater supervision.” (Mayo v New York City Tr. Auth., 124 AD3d 606, 3 N.Y.S.3d 36 [2d Dept 2015], quoting Mary KK v Jack LL, 203 AD2d 840, 611 N.Y.S.2d 347 [3d Dept 1994]).

Moreover, “in determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow [campers], it must be established that [camp] authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the injury, that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated.” (Ragusa v Town of Huntington, 54 AD3d 743, 864 N.Y.S.2d 441 [2d Dept 2008], quoting Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 637 N.E.2d 263, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372 [1994]). Although if an accident occurs in “so short a span in time that even the most intense supervision could not have prevented it, any lack of supervision is not the proximate cause of the injury and summary judgment in favor of the . . . defendants is warranted.'” (Atehortua v Lewin, 90 AD3d 794, 935 N.Y.S.2d 102 [2d Dept 2011], quoting Nash v Port Wash. Union Free School Dist., 83 AD3d 136, 922 N.Y.S.2d 408 [2d Dept 2011]).

1. Was the supervision adequate?

Even though plaintiff does not remember the accident, the [*18] other boys’ versions of it are consistent and uniform, and present the following picture: Plaintiff and the other scouts walked to the shower house and went inside without incident, whereupon plaintiff obtained a water pump and started spraying water on them. When one of the scouts told plaintiff to stop, he ran out of the shower house, and fell.

Plaintiff’s contention is that for defendants’ supervision to have been adequate that night, the Troop leaders should have escorted or walked the scouts to the shower house, waited outside while they showered, and then walked them back to their campsite. As it is undisputed that the scouts ranged in age from 13 to 16, that they were at Floodwood to learn skills related to survival in the woods and to partake in a 15-mile canoe trip, that the scouts utilized a buddy system when at various camps and that Troop leaders never escorted them to the bathrooms or showers, that the shower house was approximately a three to five-minute walk from their campsite, and that the shower house was located within the camp area where other campers and adults were present and within earshot, defendants have demonstrated that a parent of ordinary prudence placed [*19] in the identical situation and armed with the same information would not have provided greater supervision than that provided by defendants.

Moreover, a parent who permits his or her child to attend an overnight camping trip in the woods where the child will be taught skills related to understanding and surviving outdoor conditions, is presumably aware of the hazards and risks of injury associated with such conditions, and it would be illogical for that same parent to require or believe it necessary for the child to be escorted personally to and from every area within the camp. Such a degree of supervision “in a camp setting is neither feasible nor desirable” (Phelps v Boy Scouts of Am., 305 AD2d 335, 762 N.Y.S.2d 32 [1st Dept 2003]), and camps “cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all of [the campers] movements and activities” (Harris v Five Point Mission – Camp Olmstedt, 73 AD3d 1127, 901 N.Y.S.2d 678 [2d Dept 2010]).

On point is Kosok v Young Men’s Christian Assn. of Greater New York, where a group of boys at a summer camp injured the plaintiff while playing a prank involving attaching a pail to a fishing rod and letting it descend onto the heads of other unsuspecting boys. The group of boys, ranging in age from 12 to 15, occupied a cabin by themselves; the camp counselor did not stay [*20] in [**8] the cabin with them during the midday break. The Court dismissed the case, finding that there was no negligence by defendants in failing to supervise “the rest period of boys of high-school age for a short period.” (24 AD2d 113, 264 N.Y.S.2d 123 [1st Dept 1965], affd 19 NY2d 935, 228 N.E.2d 398, 281 N.Y.S.2d 341 [1967]). The Court observed that ” [r]emembering that this is a Summer camp, it will be seen that constant supervision is not feasible . . . Nor is it desirable. One of the benefits of such an institution is to inculcate self-reliance in the campers which an overly protective supervision would destroy.” (24 AD2d at 115; see also Gustin v Assn. of Camps Farthest Out, Inc., 267 AD2d 1001, 700 N.Y.S.2d 327 [4th Dept 1999] [same]).

Plaintiff’s reliance on Phelps v Boy Scouts of Am. is misplaced. As I held in granting summary judgment to Boy Scouts of America:

In Phelps . . . “very young campers” were placed in bunks at a camp with “much older campers,” who allegedly assaulted the young campers . . . The court also allowed that very young campers often require closer supervision than older campers, and that placing the younger campers in the bunks with the older campers was an apparent violation of camp policy.

Here, there is no issue of very young campers being unsupervised or placed in risky circumstances as plaintiff and his fellow scouts were all teenagers and there is no evidence that [*21] any camp policy was violated . . .

(305 AD2d 335, 762 N.Y.S.2d 32 [1st Dept 2003]).

Moreover, plaintiff’s reliance on Saunders’s conclusion or opinion in the DOH report that the accident was caused by inadequate supervision is not conclusive here, not only because he had no authority to bind defendants to his conclusion, but also based on the circumstances that he was an 18-year old who had never before filled out or even seen a DOH report, and who had received no training or guidance as to how it should be filled out or the meanings of the terms therein. In any event, Saunders testified that he wrote that there was inadequate supervision based only on the fact that the Troop leaders were not physically present at the time of the accident, which is an insufficient basis for the conclusion.

Plaintiff’s submission of the stipulation between DOH and defendants to establish that there was inadequate supervision is barred by the stipulation’s own terms.

Peterson’s expert opinion is based on speculation and is conclusory, and he cites no regulation or requirement that specifies that adequate supervision in this context means that the Troop leaders were required to escort the scouts to the shower house and wait outside until they finished [*22] showering. Indeed, any claim that such supervision is required in camps is undermined by the undisputed fact that at the camp that the scouts attended a week before going to Floodwood, the scouts went to the shower house unescorted and used only the buddy system. Reliance on the DOH requirement of “visual or verbal communication” between campers and counselors and Council’s plan for Floodwood which required the supervision of campers “24/7” is misplaced as neither requires that the Troop leaders be constantly present with the scouts. (See eg, Harris v Five Point Mission – Camp Olmstedt, 73 AD3d 1127, 901 N.Y.S.2d 678 [2d Dept 2010] [while expert concluded that camp was negligent in failing to provide plaintiff with shin guards during soccer game in which he was injured, he failed to allege that camps generally provide shin guards during games or that rules requiring use of shin guards in soccer leagues have been implemented by or [**9] accepted as accepted practice at camps]; Cherry v State of New York, 42 AD2d 671, 344 N.Y.S.2d 545 [4th Dept 1973], affd 34 NY2d 872, 316 N.E.2d 713, 359 N.Y.S.2d 276 [1974] [where camper was injured when nail he struck with hammer while building tent platform struck him, expert’s opinion that the camp was required to provide campers with safety goggles was expert’s personal opinion and neither statute nor regulations required goggles]). [*23]

References to the “traipsing” or “wandering” in the woods unsupervised have no basis in the record; the scouts remained in the camp and never went into the woods. Moreover, the accident did not occur in the woods, and there is no correlation between the woods and plaintiff’s accident.

In any event, whether or not defendants’ supervision of plaintiff was adequate is irrelevant if the accident was not foreseeable or was not proximately caused by the allegedly inadequate supervision.

2. Was plaintiff’s accident foreseeable?

As it is reasonably inferred that the accident occurred as described by the other scouts, there is no evidence suggesting that defendants were on notice that plaintiff and/or the scouts would engage in any dangerous conduct or misbehavior at the shower house. Moreover, even if some of the behavior was foreseeable, plaintiff’s bolting from the shower house, and subsequent fall, was not a foreseeable consequence of any misbehavior.

Kosok is again on point here, with the Court finding that “[a]ssuming that the boys were reasonably quiet – and there is no indication that they were not – no occasion for looking in on them was presented.” The Court also observed that:

[a] certain amount [*24] of horseplay is almost always to be found in gatherings of young people, and is generally associated with children’s camps. It is only to be discouraged when it becomes dangerous. Nothing in the incident itself or surrounding circumstances indicates any notice to defendant that such was likely to result here.

(24 AD2d at 115; see also Gibbud v Camp Shane, Inc., 30 AD3d 865, 817 N.Y.S.2d 435 [3d Dept 2006] [same]).

Even if plaintiff had been assaulted by a fellow scout rather than having tripped and fallen, there is no evidence that defendants were on notice of the possibility of an assault. (See eg Alvero v Allen, 262 AD2d 434, 692 N.Y.S.2d 116 [2d Dept 1999] [boy scout sued troop leader for injury caused by snowball fight; absent proof that leader had notice of ongoing and dangerous snowball fight, plaintiff could not prevail on inadequate supervision claim]; see also Osmanzai v Sports and Arts in Schools Foundation, Inc., 116 AD3d 937, 983 N.Y.S.2d 848 [2d Dept 2014] [injury caused by impulsive, unanticipated act of fellow camper ordinarily will not give rise to negligence claim absent proof of prior conduct that would have given notice to protect against injury-causing act]).

As it is undisputed that defendants had no notice of the possibility of misbehavior among the scouts, they have established that plaintiff’s accident was not foreseeable.

3. Was plaintiff’s accident proximately caused by defendants’ allegedly inadequate [*25] supervision?

Even if the Troop leaders had escorted the scouts to the shower house and stood outside while they showered, the alleged misbehavior occurred inside the shower house, and thus the leaders would neither have observed it nor been in a position to stop it. And unless the leaders blocked the entrance, they would not have been able to stop plaintiff from running out of the shower house and falling down.

Plaintiff’s and Peterson’s belief that the mere presence of the Troop leaders outside the shower house would have been sufficient to stop any horseplay from taking place inside is not only speculative, but unwarranted as the scouts had engaged in horseplay earlier that day while the leaders were with them. (See eg, Stephenson v City of New York, 85 AD3d 523, 925 N.Y.S.2d 71 [1st Dept 2011], affd 19 NY3d 1031, 978 N.E.2d 1251, 954 N.Y.S.2d 782 [2012] [suggestion that student’s assault on plaintiff would have been prevented by his mother accompanying her almost 14-year-old son to school every day did not rise above speculation]; see also Lizardo v Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 77 AD3d 437, 908 N.Y.S.2d 395 [1st Dept 2010] [rejecting plaintiff’s expert’s assertion that collision between children would have been preventable by teacher watching play more closely, and opinion that incident might have been prevented by closer supervision valid only in retrospect]; Walsh v City School Dist. of Albany, 237 AD2d 811, 654 N.Y.S.2d 859 [3d Dept 1997] [finding unpersuasive allegation [*26] that presence of supervisor could have kept plaintiff and fellow student attentive and injury would have been prevented]).

In any event, the accident occurred too quickly to enable the Troop leaders to prevent it had they been outside the shower house. As in Kosok, “[e]ven if the cabin counsellor had been within earshot of the cabin, it is difficult to see how the accident would have been prevented.” (24 AD2d at 115; see Harris v Five Point Mission – Camp Olmstedt, 73 AD3d 1127, 901 N.Y.S.2d 678 [2d Dept 2010] [as plaintiff was injured at camp during 15-second time span, camp established that it did not negligently supervise him]; see also Jorge C. v City of New York, 128 AD3d 410, 8 N.Y.S.3d 307 [1st Dept 2015] [defendant established that student’s injury did not arise from inadequate supervision, but from impulsive and unanticipated acts of fellow student of finding balloon, filling it with water, and attempting to throw it at plaintiff, and plaintiff running away and looking backwards rather than ahead]).

Moreover, it was plaintiff’s own impulsive and reckless conduct in squirting the other scouts with the water pump and then running out of the shower house, that led to his injury. (See Gibbud v Camp Shane, Inc., 30 AD3d 865, 817 N.Y.S.2d 435 [3d Dept 2006] [plaintiff’s own impulsive and reckless act in grabbing camp counselor from behind, causing counselor to drop plaintiff and fracture plaintiff’s [*27] ankle, led to his injury]).

Thus, as the accident occurred in a very short time span and as plaintiff’s own impulsive conduct led to his injury, defendants have demonstrated that there is no proximate cause between their allegedly inadequate supervision and plaintiff’s accident.

B. Did Council breach their duty to illuminate adequately the area around the shower house?

Plaintiff has not identified what caused him to fall, whether it was part of the shower house or something on the ground, either a rock or tree branch or uneven patch of dirt. Absent any such evidence and even if plaintiff is unable to recall, there is no basis on which it may be found that plaintiff’s injury was proximately caused by the lack of lighting around the area. (See Lynn v Lynn, 216 AD2d 194, 628 N.Y.S.2d 667 [1st Dept 1995] [plaintiff’s amnesia did not reduce her burden of proving that allegedly defective condition of stairway was proximate cause of fall]).

Moreover, plaintiff was wearing a working headlamp at the time of the incident, and neither plaintiff nor his expert identified a regulation or rule requiring defendants to light the area around the shower house at all or in any particular manner.

Plaintiff was able, however, to recall the conditions outside of the [*28] shower house, which consisted of typical conditions in any wooded or camp area, i.e., rocks, dirt, branches, etc., and [**10] having been on several camp trips, was presumably aware of the existence and risks of such conditions. He did not identify or recall any unusual, unexpected, or dangerous conditions, nor have any such conditions been alleged.

In Kimbar v Estis, a young camper had wandered off a camp path at night and hit a tree. The Court found that the camp owners had no duty to illuminate the path in the absence of any particular danger on the path, finding:

We have before us a simple camper-camp relationship and the rustic, outdoor camp life that is the very raison d’e tre [sic] of summer establishments such as defendants’. There are certain risks incidental to camping, but these are part of an adventurous summer camp life, and are necessarily assumed by those who would participate therein . . .

Indeed, it is expected that a camp will have trees, that paths will lead through woods and that woods will be dark at night. It is not to be anticipated that floodlights will be supplied for campers through woodland paths. One naturally assumes many ordinary risks when in the woods and in [*29] the country trails are not smooth sidewalks, paths are not paved, trees, brush and insects are to be expected, and even snakes may appear occasionally. These and more are all a part of accepted camp life.

To hold summer camps to a duty of floodlighting woods would not only impose upon them a condition almost impracticable under many circumstances but would be unfair, as well, to the youth who seek the adventure of living closer to nature, participating in outdoor astronomical study at night or bird study before dawn, or when overnight hikes take them for study and adventure far from any source of electrical power. Such a duty, in short, would frequently compel camps to keep boys confined after dark and thereby effectively spell the end of some of the most desirable activities of real camping life.

1 NY2d 399, 135 N.E.2d 708, 153 N.Y.S.2d 197 [1956]).

Defendants thus establish that they breached no duty to illuminate the area around the shower house and that, in any event, the area did not constitute a dangerous condition for which they may be held liable. (See Torres v State of New York, 18 AD3d 739, 795 N.Y.S.2d 710 [2d Dept 2005] [park owner not liable for injury sustained when plaintiff tripped over tree stump in park; “landowners will not be held liable for injuries arising from a condition on the property [*30] that is inherent or incidental to the nature of the property, and that could be reasonably anticipated by those using it”]; Mazzola v Mazzola, 16 AD3d 629, 793 N.Y.S.2d 59 [2d Dept 2005] [dismissing claim by infant plaintiff who tripped and fell over exposed tree roots in backyard as alleged defect was inherent to nature of land]; Moriello v Stormville Airport Antique Show & Flea Market, Inc., 271 AD2d 664, 706 N.Y.S.2d 463 [2d Dept 2000] [owner of field not liable for injuries to plaintiff who tripped on flat rock while walking on unpaved roadway; rock was inherent to nature of unpaved roadway]; Csukardi v Bishop McDonnell Camp, 148 AD2d 657, 539 N.Y.S.2d 408 [2d Dept 1989] [campground owner not liable to person who tripped over grass-covered stump in wooded area, as stump was incidental to nature of campground and could be reasonably anticipated by persons traversing wooded area]; Alcantara v Fed. Girl Scout Councils of Nassau County, Inc., 24 AD2d 585, 262 N.Y.S.2d 190 [2d Dept 1965] [plaintiff could not recover for injury sustained at camp when she tripped over tree stump; [**11] defendant conducted rustic outdoor camp and paths were unpaved, and condition of premises was thus incidental to nature of camp and to be ordinarily expected by plaintiff]).

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the motion of defendants Northern New Jersey Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America and Boy Scout Troop 141 for summary judgment dismissing the action against them is granted, and the complaint is dismissed as against them, [*31] with costs and disbursements to said defendants as taxed by the Clerk upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs, and is further

ORDERED, that the clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

ENTER:

Barbara Jaffe, JSC

DATED: March 10, 2016

New York, New York


De Castro v. Odetah Camping Resort, Inc., 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2297

De Castro v. Odetah Camping Resort, Inc., 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2297

Adelson Luiz De Castro, Administrator of the Estate of Jose Luiz De Castro v. Odetah Camping Resort, Inc.

FBTCV126026625

SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF FAIRFIELD AT BRIDGEPORT

2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2297

September 2, 2015, Decided

September 2, 2015, Filed

NOTICE: THIS DECISION IS UNREPORTED AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW. COUNSEL IS CAUTIONED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION OF THE STATUS OF THIS CASE.

JUDGES: [*1] Michael P. Kamp, J.

OPINION BY: Michael P. Kamp

OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The defendant, Odetah Camping Resort, Inc., has filed a renewal of its motion for directed verdict and a motion to set aside the jury’s verdict.1 The trial commenced on April 28, 2015, and evidence concluded on May 6, 2015, when the defense rested its case. The jury received the charge on the law on May 6, 2015. On May 6, 2015, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, Adelson Luiz DeCastro, Administrator of the Estate of Jose Luiz DeCastro, and awarded total damages of $229,155.96. Regarding the question of comparative negligence, the jury found the plaintiff’s decedent, Jose DeCastro, was 49% responsible for his own injuries.

1 The defendant originally moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s case in chief. At that time, the court reserved decision, and the defendant commenced its defense. On close of the defendant’s case, the matter was submitted to the jury.

The defendant filed its motion to set aside the verdict on May 15, 2015. The plaintiff filed its objection to the defendant’s motion [*2] on May 19, 2015. On June 22, 2015, the court heard the matter at short calendar and took the papers.

The defendant argues in its motion that the plaintiff failed to prove beyond the realm of surmise and speculation that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the death of the decedent. This argument is based upon a lack of evidence as to what actually caused the decedent to drown.

II

FACTS

After a trial, the jury could have found as follows. On July 7, 2011, the decedent and a group of friends went to the defendant resort located in Bozrah, Connecticut. In order to gain entrance, the decedent paid an entrance fee. The defendant is an approximately 100-acre campground that offers multiple recreational activities. In addition to facilities to accommodate overnight camping, the defendant offers sporting facilities, which include a pool as well as volleyball, tennis, and basketball courts. The defendant abuts a large, thirty-two-acre freshwater lake, which includes a small beach, and offers swimming and boating activities. A portion of the lake that is adjacent to the beach has a designated swim area. The boundaries of the swim area are designated by a rope line and buoys. Just [*3] beyond the roped off swimming area are two inflatable platforms. One was described as a platform or trampoline, and the other was described as an “iceberg.” Both inflatable devices were attractions to be used by the resort guests. The defendant did not provide lifeguards at the pool or lake swim area. A single sign was posted at one end of the beach area, indicating: “No Lifeguard on Duty. Swim at Your Own Risk.” No employees of the defendant directly supervised the lake swimming area.

On July 9, 2011, the decedent and his friend, Saulo Sousa, entered the designated swimming area for the purpose of swimming out to the trampoline just beyond the buoy line. When Sousa reached the rope line, he observed the decedent immediately behind him in the water. The depth of the water at this location was approximately six feet. As Sousa lifted the rope line to duck under it, he observed the decedent diving forward and under the rope. When Sousa reached the trampoline, he climbed on it but did not observe the decedent. After spending a few minutes on the trampoline, Sousa reentered the water and swam to the shore. After unsuccessfully attempting to locate the decedent, employees of the defendant [*4] were notified that he was missing. After a brief search, 911 emergency services were dispatched, and Bozrah firefighters and rescue personnel responded to the scene. When notified that the decedent was last seen in the designated swim area near the buoy line, firefighter Colin Laffey entered the water and located the decedent floating unresponsive just below the surface of the water just inside the buoy line. Laffey testified that he located the decedent in an area where the depth of the water was less than six feet. The decedent was brought to shore, and CPR was administered. The decedent was then transported by ambulance to Backus Hospital, but never regained consciousness and was pronounced dead. A postmortem autopsy determined the cause of death to be asphyxia due to submersion. The postmortem examination was negative for any signs of illness, traumatic injury, or any preexisting medical condition or disease. A toxicology examination was negative for the presence of any drugs, alcohol, or medication.

The decedent’s drowning was unwitnessed despite the fact that there were numerous people in the water and on the beach. Although other members of the decedent’s group, including his [*5] girlfriend, were on the beach adjacent to the swimming area, no one saw him in distress or struggling in the water. He was identified by his friends as a good or strong swimmer.

III

DISCUSSION

Practice Book §16-37 provides, in relevant part: “Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at any time after the close of the plaintiff’s case in chief is denied or for any reason is not granted, the judicial authority is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion.” “Directed verdicts are not favored . . . A trial court should direct a verdict only when a jury could not reasonably and legally have reached any other conclusion . . . In reviewing the trial court’s decision to direct a verdict in favor of a defendant we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . . Although it is the jury’s right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts proven . . . it may not resort to mere conjecture and speculation . . . A directed verdict is justified if . . . the evidence is so weak that it would be proper for the court to set aside a verdict rendered for the other party.” (Internal [*6] quotation marks omitted.) Riccio v. Harbour Village Condominium Assn., Inc., 281 Conn. 160, 163, 914 A.2d 529 (2007). “A verdict may be directed . . . where the claim is that there is insufficient evidence to sustain a favorable verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beale v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 89 Conn.App. 556, 565-66, 874 A.2d 259 (2005).

Likewise, “[a] trial court may set aside a verdict on a finding that the verdict is manifestly unjust because, given the evidence presented, the jury mistakenly applied a legal principle or because there is no evidence to which the legal principles of the case could be applied . . . A verdict should not be set aside, however, where it is apparent that there was some evidence on which the jury might reasonably have reached its conclusion . . . This limitation on a trial court’s discretion results from the constitutional right of litigants to have issues of fact determined by a jury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deas v. Diaz, 121 Conn.App. 826, 841, 998 A.2d 200, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 905, 3 A.3d 69 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 303 Conn. 276, 32 A.3d 318 (2011).

“[T]o establish a prima facie case, the proponent must submit evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove . . . [T]he evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the plaintiff’s] [*7] favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Co. v. Errato, 71 Conn.App. 447, 455-56, 802 A.2d 887, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 918, 812 A.2d 861 (2002). “The credibility and weight to be attributed to any evidence offered [at trial] is solely within the province of the jury.” Murteza v. State, 7 Conn.App. 196, 208-09, 508 A.2d 449, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 803, 510 A.2d 191 (1986). “[I]t is not the function of [the trial] court to sit as the seventh juror when [it] review[s] the sufficiency of the evidence . . . rather, [it] must determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the [trier’s] verdict . . . In making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which it is reasonably capable . . . In other words, [i]f the [trier] could reasonably have reached its conclusion, the verdict must stand, even if [the trial] court disagrees with it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Connor v. Larocque, 302 Conn. 562, 612, 31 A.3d 1 (2011).

“In order to make out a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must submit evidence that, if credited, is sufficient to establish duty, breach of duty, causation, and actual injury . . . A defendant’s duty and breach of duty is measured by a reasonable care standard, which is the care [that] a reasonably prudent person would use under [*8] the circumstances . . . After the plaintiff establishes that the defendant did not exercise reasonable care, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injuries. To do so, the plaintiff must first establish causation in fact, that is, that the injury would not have occurred but for the actor’s conduct . . . The plaintiff then must show proximate cause . . . Proximate cause requires that the defendant’s conduct [was] a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s injuries and that there was an unbroken sequence of events that tied [the plaintiff’s] injuries to the [defendant’s conduct] . . . Proximate cause does not require the plaintiff to remove from the realm of possibility all other potential causes of the accident . . . Instead, the plaintiff must establish that it is more likely than not that the cause on which the plaintiff relies was in fact a proximate cause of the accident. The more likely than not standard ensures that the causal connection . . . [is] based [on] more than conjecture or surmise.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rawls v. Progressive Northern Insurance Company, 310 Conn. 768, 776-77, 83 A.3d 576 (2014).

The defendant’s primary argument is that no one [*9] witnessed the decedent’s drowning, and there was no evidence offered as to what caused him to drown. The defendant relies on Wu v. Fairfield, 204 Conn. 435, 528 A.2d 364 (1987). In Wu, the plaintiff’s decedent who was fifteen years old, went to Lake Mohegan, a freshwater lake, with her mother and two brothers for an afternoon of swimming. Id., 437. There was a designated swim area marked by a buoy line. At the time of the occurrence, there were four lifeguards on duty. Id. Those lifeguards had observed that the plaintiff’s decedent was a poor swimmer and had warned her twice to return to the shallow portion of the designated swim area. Id. When an approaching storm prompted the lifeguards to clear the water, the plaintiff’s decedent did not return to shore. Id. After a search, one of the lifeguards found the decedent’s body at the bottom of the lake in the designated swim area but beyond the shallow portion. Id., 437-38. The plaintiff alleged that the town and several of its employees, the lifeguards, were negligent in the performance of their duties. Id., 436. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Id. The plaintiff then filed a motion to set aside the verdict, which motion was denied. Id. In affirming the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s [*10] motion to set aside the verdict, the court held that “[w]hile it is undisputed that the decedent drowned, there was no evidence tying any negligence on the defendant lifeguards’ part to her death . . . Here, the plaintiff presented no evidence other than that the victim perished in an unwitnessed drowning. The plaintiff failed to establish an unbroken sequence of events causally flowing from the defendant lifeguards’ arguably negligent supervision to the decedent’s drowning.” Id., 440.

In this case, the plaintiff’s May 4, 2015 amended complaint contained two specifications of negligence as to the conduct of the defendant. The first allegation was that the defendant was negligent in failing to provide lifeguards. The second allegation was that the defendant was negligent when it knew or should have known of the danger associated with encouraging its guests to swim to its recreational flotation devices, yet failed to take reasonable steps to secure their safety in doing so. In response to jury interrogatories submitted by the court the jury found that the defendant was negligent with regard to the second specification but not the first. With regard to the claim of negligence concerning encouraging [*11] swimmers to use the flotation devices, the plaintiff relied on testimony that the owner’s manual for the two devices contained warnings that recommended users wear life vests. Although life vests were available in a shed adjacent to the lake swim area, the defendant did not require guests entering the lake or using any of the flotation devices to wear them. In addition, the plaintiff argued that the defendant failed to properly supervise and monitor the swimming area and had an inadequate emergency rescue plan.

The plaintiff offered the testimony of Gerald Dworkin, an aquatic safety expert. Dworkin offered opinion testimony regarding the defendant’s lack of safety measures including its failure to have lifeguards monitoring the swim area. Dworkin was also critical of the defendant’s lack of an emergency safety plan. Dworkin did not, however, offer any opinion testimony as to what actually caused the decedent to drown. He affirmed that it was an unwitnessed drowning. In addition, although the owner’s manuals for the flotation devices recommended the use of life vests, the decedent was not using either device when he drowned; the little evidence there is indicates he never left the designated [*12] swim area. The flotation devices were located outside that designated area.

Here, as in Wu, the plaintiff presented no evidence other than that the decedent died in an unwitnessed drowning. There was no evidence as to what caused the decedent to drown. In the absence of any such evidence, any number of factual possibilities could explain this accident. Without any evidence as to what caused this unfortunate incident, only speculation and conjecture could link the plaintiff’s drowning to the negligent conduct of the defendant. The plaintiff failed to present any evidence to establish an unbroken sequence of events causally flowing from the defendant’s conduct that the jury found negligent to the decedent’s drowning. “The establishment of proximate cause is an essential element of a negligence claim and the parties recognize that if proximate cause is lacking, the plaintiff cannot prevail.” Wu v. Town Of Fairfield, supra, 204 Conn. 441.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, based on the evidence presented by the plaintiff, no reasonable juror could find that the negligence of the defendant caused or was a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s death by drowning. The lack of any evidence as to what [*13] caused this drowning is fatal to the plaintiff’s case.

IV

CONCLUSION

Because the plaintiff failed to establish that the negligent conduct of the defendant was the proximate cause of the decedent’s drowning, the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict is granted. Judgment may enter for the defendant.

KAMP, J.


Clean Trails

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Amanda Wallander Roberts is on a mission to bring some organization to the Clean Trails organization-if that makes any sense! Amanda is the pulse of the organizational and program development for Clean Trails. She works on the systems and processes that allow individuals to get involved with Clean Trails and determine what they do once they are on board.

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LIONSHARES (Lionsgate Entertainment)

Who says cleaning up can’t be fun and productive? Another great collaboration this weekend with LIONSHARES (Lionsgate Entertainment’s volunteer program) at Solstice Canyon in the Malibu National Recreation area. A crew of 25 collected a 55 gallon bag of roughly 500 pieces of litter comprised of water bottles, labels, lids, and security seals at the regularly maintained trail.LIONSHARES is a volunteer program that seeks to provide opportunities for employees within the Lionsgate Entertainment family to partner with a diverse range of charitable organizations. The program not only enriches the Lionsgate work experience through cultural and educational outreach, but also positively interacts and invests in the local and global community.

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Order a free catalog, read a review or two and give us a call if you have any questions. Whether you’re into crawling canyons, climbing mountains, wheeling a tough trail, exploring the off-road, or just cruising the open highway give us a call to chat about your next modification-we’ll be happy to help recommend the right Wrangler parts for your project and your budget!

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Dear JIM,Clean Trails is on the move! We hope you enjoy this month’s newsletter. Along with a bit about what we’ve been up to, we’ve selected some interesting content we hope you will appreciate . Let us know what you think…
15 Best Day Hikes

Here they are: GP’s best day hikes, as told by our readers. All of the words and images below are straight from your submissions to our GP best hikes competition. We edited and condensed as necessary (some of you really like to type) and shot for widest possible range of locations and types of stories. What we were left with is a diverse hodgepodge of outdoor activity, organized from west to east, starting with Hawaii in the Pacific and ending with St. John in the Atlantic. Without further ado: 15 favorite hiking destinations, as told by GP readers, for GP readers.

Postcard From the Trail
The Grand Canyon

Introducing our new blog series, Postcards from the Trail. It gives our readers, supporters, and volunteers the opportunity to share their outdoor adventures, experiences, and memories with the Clean Trails community.

This post in our series is from Chris Fortunato. Chris is a Clean Trails volunteer in San Diego, CA. He recently spent some time at the Grand Canyon. Here’s an excerpt:

“Often times it’s the little details that make an adventure special and add a personal element to a trip. It could be the unexpected memories you create after taking that wrong turn and getting lost. Or maybe that morning cup of coffee while overlooking the view outside your tent. Even the smell of dusty gear when you get home, jolting you back to the trail for just a moment. These little gems make a huge impact, even when visiting overwhelming locations like Yosemite or the Grand Canyon. They may not make the trip, considering the world class sights to be seen, but they add another level of satisfaction.”

If you have something that you would like to contribute, Please contact our Web/Blog Editor Tim Brown.

Wildlife Photo Tips

We bet everyone has tried to get that perfect wildlife shot on one of their hikes. We found these great tips at Backpacker Magazine that should help you improve your photography.

“Practice at home, zoom in, and follow these other simple rules to score an intimate shot that captures an animal’s character.”

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Richard L. P. Solosky
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Wilson v. United States of America, 989 F.2d 953; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6165

Wilson v. United States of America, 989 F.2d 953; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6165

Mark D. Wilson; Janet L. Wilson, Appellants, v. United States of America; The Boy Scouts of America, Appellees. Mark D. Wilson; Janet L. Wilson, Plaintiffs, v. The Boy Scouts of America, Defendants. Jason S. Harbian; Michael Harbian; Sharon Harbian; Daniel R. Winfrey, a Minor, by Susan Crump, his Mother and Next Friend, and; Susan Crump, Appellants, v. United States of America; The Boy Scouts of America, Appellees.

No. 92-1438, No. 92-3363

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

989 F.2d 953; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6165

September 18, 1992, Submitted

March 29, 1993, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] Rehearing Denied May 10, 1993, Reported at: 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 10903.

PRIOR HISTORY: Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. District No. 89-1696-C-7. Jean C. Hamilton, U.S. District Judge.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed

CASE SUMMARY:

COUNSEL: For MARK D. WILSON, JANET L. WILSON, Plaintiffs – Appellants: Alan E. DeWoskin, 314-727-6330, Suite 426, 225 S. Meramec Avenue, St. Louis, MO 63105.

For UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant – Appellee: Joseph Moore, Asst. U.S. Attorney, 314-539-3280, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 1114 Market Street, St. Louis, MO 63101. Robert William Cockerham, BROWN & JAMES, 705 Olive Street, Suite 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101, 314-421-3400. For BOY SCOUTS, OF AMERICA, Defendants – Appellees: Russell F. Watters, Robert William Cockerham, Thomas Michael Ward, BROWN & JAMES, 705 Olive Street, Suite 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101, 314-421-3400.

JUDGES: Before HANSEN, Circuit Judge, and HEANEY and ROSS, Senior Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: ROSS

OPINION

[*954] ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellants Mark Wilson and Janet Wilson, the parents of Anthony Wilson, and [*955] Jason Harbian and Daniel Winfrey, and their parents, appeal from the trial court’s 1 grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees United States of America and the Boy Scouts of America, in an action arising out of the death of Anthony Wilson and the injuries sustained by Jason Harbian and Daniel Winfrey.

1 The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

On April 22, 1988, Anthony Wilson, Daniel Winfrey and Jason Harbian, members of Troop 392 of the Boy Scouts of America, St. Louis Area Council, along with other boy scouts and five adult leaders, went to Fort Leonard Wood, a United States Army military post, on a boy scout trip as part of the Army’s Youth Tour Program. A pile of lightweight aluminum [**2] alloy irrigation pipes, approximately thirty feet in length, were stacked outside Building 1614, where the troop was billeted for the weekend. The pipes had been used for irrigation of the athletic field adjacent to the building, and when not in use, were stored alongside the building. The pipes had been stacked in this manner for approximately six years.

On the second night of their weekend stay, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Anthony, age thirteen, and five or six other scouts, ages twelve to sixteen, were outside Building 1614, while the leaders were inside the building. Anthony, Daniel and Jason picked up one of the aluminum pipes, carried it approximately twenty feet west of the building, and raised it to a near vertical position, causing the pipe to come in contact with a 7,200 volt power line which ran over the building. All three scouts received electric shocks; Anthony died as a result of the injuries he sustained.

Mark and Janet Wilson brought a wrongful death action against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and against the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) pursuant to Missouri state law, for negligent supervision and failure to train the adult supervisors. [**3] Sometime later the Harbian/Winfrey plaintiffs filed personal injury actions against both the United States and the BSA, and eventually these cases were consolidated with the Wilson case for trial. Motions for summary judgment filed by the United States and the BSA were eventually granted as against all appellants. 2

2 On December 4, 1992, following oral argument of the Wilson appeal before this court, the Harbian and Winfrey cases were consolidated with the Wilson appeal. All parties agree that these cases arose from the same occurrence and are identical in material fact and law. The Harbians and the Winfreys rely on the briefs and oral argument submitted in the Wilson appeal. The Wilsons, Harbians and Winfreys will be collectively referred to as “appellants.”

The appellants’ theory of recovery against the BSA is based on an alleged agency relationship between the BSA and the adult volunteers supervising the scouts. The district court granted the BSA’s motion for summary judgment, concluding [**4] that appellants failed to produce any evidence that the national organization of the BSA had a duty to control, supervise or train volunteer leaders for the Fort Leonard Wood activity. The district court also granted the United States’ motion for summary judgment based on its finding that the United States owed no duty of care to the scouts because they were recreational users of the property under Missouri’s Recreational Land Use Statute. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.346. After careful consideration of each allegation raised by the appellants, we affirm the decision of the district court.

I. United States of America

The action against the United States arises [HN1] under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, thus, the “United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” Id. at § 2674. Further, the United States is “entitled to assert any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the United States . . . as well as any other defenses to which the United States is entitled.” [**5] Id. Therefore, the United States is entitled to [*956] the benefit of state recreational use statutes, if applicable, when it is sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Hegg v. United States, 817 F.2d 1328, 1329 (8th Cir. 1987) (construing the Iowa Recreational Use Statute); Umpleby v. United States, 806 F.2d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying North Dakota’s Recreational Use Statute).

[HN2] The Missouri Recreational Land Use Statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.345 – 537.348 immunizes landowners who make their property available for the recreational use of others without an entry charge. The statute specifically provides:

[HN3] Except as provided in sections 537.345 to 537.348, an owner of land owes no duty of care to any person who enters on the land without charge to keep his land safe for recreational use or to give any general or specific warning with respect to any natural or artificial condition, structure, or personal property thereon.

Id. at § 537.346. “Charge” is defined in the statute as:

[HN4] the admission price or fee asked by an owner of land or an invitation or permission without price or fee to use land for recreational [**6] purposes when such invitation or permission is given for the purpose of sales promotion, advertising or public goodwill in fostering business purposes.

Id. at § 537.345(1). “Recreational use” as defined in the statute includes outdoor activities, such as “hunting, fishing, camping, picnicking, biking, nature study [and] winter sports. Id. at § 537.345(4).

[HN5] While providing for a general immunity against liability, a landowner may nonetheless be liable if found to have been either maliciously or grossly negligent in failing to guard or warn against a dangerous condition which the owner knew or should have known to be dangerous, or if the landowner negligently failed to warn or guard against an ultrahazardous condition. Id. at § 537.348(1). Other exceptions to the nonliability of the statute include injuries occurring on or in any “noncovered land,” which is defined as land used primarily for commercial, industrial or manufacturing purposes. Id. at § 537.348(3)(d).

The appellants contend that the Missouri Recreational Land Use Statute does not apply to the United States because (1) the Army charged $ 2.00 per person to be billeted in Building 1614; (2) the United States [**7] receives an economic benefit from offering its land; (3) the Boy Scouts were not members of the “general public,” and thus were not covered by the Act; (4) the injury occurred on “noncovered land;” and (5) the United States negligently failed to protect against an ultrahazardous condition.

A.

Fort Leonard Wood is an open military post, where members of the public can freely enter without being stopped or questioned by guards or military police. Specified areas are open to the public for fishing, hunting, hiking, camping, picnicking or canoeing. Many tours are given to various groups, such as senior citizens and church and school groups, free of charge. The Fort also offers a Youth Tour Program which is open only to national youth organizations, such as the Boy Scouts of America. The program includes activities which are not available to the general public, such as visits to the Fort’s museum, an indoor rifle range, an obstacle course and a cannon range.

If a troop in the Youth Tour Program chooses to stay overnight in Building 1614, a $ 2.00 per person/per night lodging fee is charged. This fee covers the cost of maintaining and equipping the facility with mattresses, toilet paper, [**8] soap, and other supplies. If a troop chooses to stay overnight but no beds are available, the lodging fee is reduced to $ 1.00 per person/per night. Significantly, the lodging fee is charged on a per person/per night basis, while there is no charge for the tour itself, which is offered only on Saturdays.

The interpretation of the various recreational use statutes is controlled by the precise language of each statute. Courts that have construed recreational land use statutes with language similar to the Missouri statute have interpreted “charge” as ” [*957] an admission fee to enter the land.” For example, in Genco v. Connecticut Light and Power Co., 7 Conn. App. 164, 508 A.2d 58, 62 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986), noting that the Connecticut General Statute § 52-557f defines “charge” as “the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land,” the court held that “the only way to avoid inconsistent application of the Act . . . is to interpret the word ‘charge’ as an actual admission price paid for permission to enter the land at the time of its use for recreational purposes.” Id. (emphasis added).

Furthermore, a parking fee paid by [**9] a camper is not a charge within the meaning of the Nebraska Recreational Use Statute, which defines “charge” as “the amount of money asked in return for an invitation to enter or go upon the land.” Garreans v. City of Omaha, 216 Neb. 487, 345 N.W.2d 309, 313 (Neb. 1984) (emphasis added). In Garreans, the court noted that the

charges were made for the right to park a camper on a pad, for the right to pitch a tent in a tent camping area, and for the use of camper dumping facilities. Payment of the fee . . . did not entitle . . . [the person paying the fee] to a greater right to use any of the park’s other facilities than that had by the general public.

Id.

As in Jones v. United States, 693 F.2d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir. 1982), where a one dollar fee was charged the injured plaintiff to rent an inner tube for snow sliding, the fee paid by the scouts to bunk in Building 1614 was not “charged to members of the public for entry on to the land or for use of the land.” Id. Rather, the scouts paid the $ 2.00 fee to bunk in Building 1614, but entered the park without paying a fee. The Jones court held that the plaintiff [**10] “could have used . . . the Park without making any payment if she had brought her own tube.” Id. Similarly, the appellants could have used Fort Leonard Wood without making this $ 2.00 payment if they had chosen not to stay overnight. The Missouri statute does not provide that the immunity for an entire parcel should be nullified if a landowner charges for admission to a different portion of the parcel, nor would such a rule be consistent with the statute’s purpose. “Consideration should not be deemed given . . . unless it is a charge necessary to utilize the overall benefits of a recreational area so that it may be regarded as an entrance or admission fee.” Moss v. Department of Natural Resources, 62 Ohio St. 2d 138, 404 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ohio 1980) (emphasis added).

The appellants herein paid $ 2.00 per night for the right to stay overnight in Building 1614. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that this fee would have been charged to either participate in the Youth Tour Program, or to enter Fort Leonard Wood, if the scouts had elected not to stay overnight. In fact, all of the Fort Leonard Wood documents relating to this fee provide that it is a “lodging” [**11] fee and that it is assessed on a per person/per night basis. The appellants have failed to present any evidence that the fee was required in order to enter Fort Leonard Wood.

B.

The remainder of appellants’ arguments with regard to the liability of the United States are also without merit. The appellants contend that the United States is outside the protection of the Missouri Recreational Land Use Statute because the scouts are not “members of the general public.” They contend that because only members of national youth organizations are eligible to participate in the Youth Tour Program, the scouts should be treated as guests or invitees. Appellants’ argument, however, relies upon a distinction not made within the language of the Missouri Recreational Land Use Statute. The plain language of the statute indicates that a landowner owes no duty of care “to any person who enters on the land without charge” for recreational purposes. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.346 (emphasis added).

We also reject the appellants’ argument that the United States is outside the protection of the Missouri statute because the Army’s purpose in allowing admission to Fort Leonard Wood is to develop public [*958] goodwill [**12] in fostering a business purpose. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.345(1). When Boy Scout troops visit the Fort, they are not recruited or encouraged in any way to join the Army, nor are any records kept of scouts who have participated in the Youth Tour Program. Further, appellants have failed to establish that the Army operates as a business within the intended meaning of the statute.

Finally, appellants’ argument that Building 1614 was essentially a commercial “hotel” located in a “populated, residential area,” and therefore falls within the “noncovered land” exception of section 537.348(3)(d) is without merit. The record does not support appellants’ contention that the Fort was “predominately used for residential purposes,” nor that Building 1614 was operated as a commercial enterprise. Nor can we accept appellants’ argument that the United States acted with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of the troops or negligently failed to protect them against an ultrahazardous condition. There simply has been no evidence presented to establish either of these theories.

The judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the United States is affirmed.

II. Boy [**13] Scouts of America

The appellants also challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts of America. The appellants contend there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an agency relationship existed between the BSA and the adult volunteers of Troop 392 so as to provide for vicarious liability for any negligence on the part of the adult leaders. The appellants claim the BSA had the right to control and supervise Troop 392’s adults, that the BSA is liable for the negligent acts of the troop’s adult leaders which were committed within the scope and course of their agency relationship, and further that the troop’s adult leaders were clothed with implied and apparent authority to act on behalf of the BSA when they were present at Fort Leonard Wood.

The appellants first argue that the district court improperly considered the affidavit of Lloyd Roitstein, Area Director in the North Central Region of the Boy Scouts of America, in considering the relationship between the national organization and the individual troops because the affidavit was not based on personal knowledge. We agree with the district court that Roitstein’s role as an Area Director [**14] establishes his personal familiarity with the Boy Scout organization and conclude that the affidavit was properly considered.

The Boy Scouts of America is a congressionally chartered benevolent national organization, which is divided into geographic areas known as local councils. Three hundred ninety-eight local councils are chartered in the United States. Local sponsors, such as schools, churches or civic organizations apply for charters from the BSA through their local council. Local volunteers form a patrol leaders’ council to plan troop activities. BSA does not conduct or require any training for these adult volunteers. Troops do not need permission from BSA before participating in activities, with the exception of tours outside the United States or five hundred miles or more from the local council. The BSA had no advanced notice of Troop 392’s trip to Fort Leonard Wood. The troop was not required, nor did it receive, permission from the BSA to go to Fort Leonard Wood.

[HN6] Under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer is liable for the negligent acts or omissions of his employee which are committed within the scope of his employment. Light v. Lang, 539 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. App. Ct. 1976). [**15] Liability based on respondeat superior requires some evidence that a master-servant relationship existed between the parties. Usrey v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., 385 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). The test to determine if respondeat superior applies is whether the person sought to be charged as a master had “the right or power to control and direct the physical conduct of the other in the performance of the act.” Id. at 339. If there is no right to control, there is no liability.

Courts of other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue now before this court have rejected the imposition of liability against the BSA or the local councils, [*959] noting the lack of control these entities exercise over individual troops and their sponsoring organizations. For example, in Mauch v. Kissling, 56 Wash. App. 312, 783 P.2d 601 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989), the court found there was no basis for the doctrine of apparent authority because the plaintiff had not presented evidence that BSA consented to or had control of the scoutmaster’s activities. Id. at 605.

Similarly, in Anderson v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 226 Ill. App. 3d 440, 589 N.E.2d 892, 168 Ill. Dec. 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), [**16] the court found the plaintiffs had failed to establish that an agency relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the local council or the BSA:

We find no provisions in the charter, bylaws, rules and regulations promulgated by the BSA, nor can plaintiffs cite to any provisions within these documents, which specifically grant BSA or its district councils direct supervisory powers over the method or manner in which adult volunteer scout leaders accomplish their tasks.

Id. at 894-95.

Recently, the Missouri Court of Appeals considered the Wilson’s cause of action against the St. Louis Area Council of the Boy Scouts of America, arising from the same circumstances of the instant case. The Missouri court dismissed the suit against the local council, finding that “Council neither controlled the actions of the troop leaders nor ran the program at Fort Leonard Wood.” While the Missouri state court decision involved the local council, it is instructional here because the relationship between the national organization and the individual troop leaders is even more remote.

Appellants also contend that sufficient facts establish a jury question as [**17] to whether a principal/agent relationship existed under a theory of implied agency or apparent authority. Implied agency and apparent authority, however, are based on manifestations by the principal which causes a third person reasonably to believe that an agent of the principal is authorized to do certain acts. Barton v. Snellson, 735 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). Appellants contend the use of common uniforms, emblems, books and awards in the scouting program, a national insurance program, issuance of the national membership card and other printed materials locally, as well as other indicia of a relationship between BSA and the local council, create a manifestation of authority upon which an innocent third party might reasonably rely.

Appellants fail, however, to produce any evidence that BSA manifested that it had direct control over the specific activities of individual troops or that it had a duty to control, supervise or train volunteer leaders for the Fort Leonard Wood activity. On the contrary, the Boy Scout Handbook clearly provides, “what the troop does is planned by the patrol leaders’ council.” The organizational structure of the BSA [**18] leaves the control of the specific activities at the level closest to the individual troop. Appellants have produced no direct or circumstantial evidence to suggest that in this case BSA manifested control.

In summary, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts of America and the United States. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.


Duty of care for a Massachusetts campground is to warn of dangerous conditions.

Plaintiff assumes the risk of his injury at a commercial campground if there is not dangerous condition and/or he knows about the condition because he walks the trail during the day.

Monaco v. Vacation Camp Resorts International, Inc., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 1125; 21 N.E.3d 187; 2014 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1272

State: Massachusetts, Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Plaintiff: Anthony Monaco

Defendant: Vacation Camp Resorts International, Inc.’s (VCRI’s) Yogi Bear’s Jellystone Park Campground

Plaintiff Claims: negligent in failing to light the “pathway”3 and maintain it in a safe condition, to warn against its use, or to construct a graded path in its place

Defendant Defenses: Assumption of the Risk

Holding: for the defendant

Year: 2014

This case involves a commercial campground. The plaintiff was walking up to the restroom at night and fell on the path. He sued for his injuries. The plaintiff sued the campground and others who were never clearly identified in the appellate decision.

The lower court stated the plaintiff assumed the risk based upon the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The court first reviewed the requirements for a negligence suit to succeed under Massachusetts law and condensed the four steps to one sentence. “To succeed in an action for negligence, the plaintiff must establish duty, breach, causation, and damages.” The duty of care is only owed to those who are foreseeably endangered by the contact with the defendant.

Not every risk that might be foreseen gives rise to a duty to avoid a course of conduct; a duty arises because the likelihood and magnitude of the risk perceived is such that the conduct is unreasonably dangerous.

The duty of a land owner in Massachusetts is that of reasonable care “under all the circumstances in the maintenance and operation of their property.”

Although landowners should anticipate and take measures to avoid the risks that their property poses to invitees, they are not obligated to “consistently and constantly” check for dangerous conditions. The law does not impose a duty on landowners to exercise precautions, unless the dangers are “readily observable” by landowners and imperceptible to invitees. That is, an open and obvious danger negates the existence of a duty of care.

The fact that the plaintiff was injured does not create a legal obligation or duty on the part of the defendant. Evidence is needed to support the lack of care or proof the landowner k of the dangerous condition.

…evidence, other than “the obviousness of the steep slope,” that the pathway posed an apparent danger. To support his claim, the plaintiff submitted expert testimony that the pathway was “rutted,” “uneven,” and “unlit,” and did not comport with International Building Code standards.

The plaintiff had descended the hill earlier and had not seen a dangerous condition. In fact, the plaintiff had been using the campground for eighteen years and had used the path three times the day he fell.

Nor had a dangerous condition on the hillside been identified or spotted during the camps annual inspection.

Both parties had ample opportunities to observe the campground, yet neither noticed any unreasonable dangers. The only risk associated with the pathway was the open and obvious nature of its slope and uneven terrain, which did not impose any duty on the defendants to light or otherwise improve the path.

The court held the defendants owed not duty to protect the plaintiff from the conditions on the pathway.

So Now What?

The requirement that a landowner is not obligated to consistently and constantly check for dangerous conditions is not found in all states. In most states if the dangerous condition exists, the landowner must fix it or warn of it.

The obligations or duties owed to people on your land are usually based upon the reasons why the injured person was originally upon your land. In Massachusetts that issue is not discussed.

Here the obligation was to warn or correct dangerous conditions. It did not matter why the person was on the land.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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Monaco v. Vacation Camp Resorts International, Inc., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 1125; 21 N.E.3d 187; 2014 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1272

Monaco v. Vacation Camp Resorts International, Inc., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 1125; 21 N.E.3d 187; 2014 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1272

Anthony Monaco vs. Vacation Camp Resorts International, Inc., & another.1

1 Jayne Cohen.

14-P-141

APPEALS COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

86 Mass. App. Ct. 1125; 21 N.E.3d 187; 2014 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1272

December 18, 2014, Entered

NOTICE: DECISIONS ISSUED BY THE APPEALS COURT PURSUANT TO ITS RULE 1:28 ARE PRIMARILY ADDRESSED TO THE PARTIES AND, THEREFORE, MAY NOT FULLY ADDRESS THE FACTS OF THE CASE OR THE PANEL’S DECISIONAL RATIONALE. MOREOVER, RULE 1:28 DECISIONS ARE NOT CIRCULATED TO THE ENTIRE COURT AND, THEREFORE, REPRESENT ONLY THE VIEWS OF THE PANEL THAT DECIDED THE CASE. A SUMMARY DECISION PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28, ISSUED AFTER FEBRUARY 25, 2008, MAY BE CITED FOR ITS PERSUASIVE VALUE BUT, BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS NOTED ABOVE, NOT AS BINDING PRECEDENT.

PUBLISHED IN TABLE FORMAT IN THE MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT REPORTS.

PUBLISHED IN TABLE FORMAT IN THE NORTH EASTERN REPORTER.

DISPOSITION: [*1] Judgment affirmed.

CORE TERMS: pathway, campground, landowners, summary judgment, favorable, allowance, obvious danger, duty of care, citation omitted, unreasonably dangerous, obstructions, deposition, anticipate, precautions, unexpected, invitees, uneven, slope, fault, owe, shower, paved, path, owed

JUDGES: Cypher, Fecteau & Massing, JJ.

OPINION

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

Anthony Monaco seeks to recover for serious injuries he sustained when he fell down a grassy hill that campers used to reach a shower building located on Vacation Camp Resorts International, Inc.’s (VCRI’s) Yogi Bear’s Jellystone Park Campground in New Hampton, New Hampshire. The plaintiff alleges that VCRI and Jayne Cohen2 were negligent in failing to light the “pathway”3 and maintain it in a safe condition, to warn against its use, or to construct a graded path in its place. A Superior Court judge allowed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning that traversing the shortcut in lieu of existing paved pathways, and in darkness, is an “obvious baseline danger,” and that the defendants therefore owed no duty. We affirm.

2 Cohen served as president of Vacation Camp Resorts International, Inc., during the time of the incident in question.

3 Construing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and noting that the shower building was marked with a “restroom” sign visible from the paved road above, we accept the plaintiff’s characterization [*2] of the route between the road and the building as a pathway.

In reviewing the trial court judge’s allowance of a motion for summary judgment, we consider the evidence submitted with the motion, which may include “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits.” Highlands Ins. Co. v. Aerovox, Inc., 424 Mass. 226, 232, 676 N.E.2d 801 (1997) (citation omitted). See Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). We construe inferences drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and review de novo the trial court judge’s application of the law to the facts. LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture, 463 Mass. 316, 318, 974 N.E.2d 34 (2012). Allowance of the motion will survive appellate review so long as there is “no genuine issue” of “material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 325-326. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

To succeed in an action for negligence, the plaintiff must establish duty, breach, causation, and damages. Ronayne v. State, 137 N.H. 281, 284, 632 A.2d 1210 (1993).4 “[P]ersons owe a duty of care ‘only to those who they foreseeably endanger by their conduct.'” Manchenton v. Auto Leasing Corp., 135 N.H. 298, 304, 605 A.2d 208 (1992) [*3] (citation omitted). “Not every risk that might be foreseen gives rise to a duty to avoid a course of conduct; a duty arises because the likelihood and magnitude of the risk perceived is such that the conduct is unreasonably dangerous.” Id. at 305.

4 The trial court judge determined that New Hampshire’s substantive law governed this action. The parties do not dispute that the choice of New Hampshire law is appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

“[O]wners and occupiers of land owe plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care under all the circumstances in the maintenance and operation of their property.” Werne v. Exec. Women’s Golf Assn., 158 N.H. 373, 376, 969 A.2d 346 (2009). Although landowners should anticipate and take measures to avoid the risks that their property poses to invitees, they are not obligated to “consistently and constantly” check for dangerous conditions. See Pesaturo v. Kinne, 161 N.H. 550, 555, 20 A.3d 284 (2011). The law does not impose a duty on landowners to exercise precautions, unless the dangers are “readily observable” by landowners and imperceptible to invitees. Ibid. Lawrence v. Hollerich, 394 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Minn. App. Ct. 1986). That is, an open and obvious danger negates the [*4] existence of a duty of care. Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 422, 807 A.2d 1274 (2002).

The mere fact that the plaintiff was injured does not trigger a legal duty on the defendants. He must produce some evidence, other than “the obviousness of the steep slope,” that the pathway posed an apparent danger. Lawrence, 394 N.W.2d at 856. To support his claim, the plaintiff submitted expert testimony that the pathway was “rutted,” “uneven,” and “unlit,” and did not comport with International Building Code standards. However, other evidence revealed that the condition of the pathway, as it appeared to both parties, posed no greater risk than walkways maintained by landowners in their ordinary exercise of care. Cf. Paquette v. Joyce, 117 N.H. 832, 835, 379 A.2d 207 (1977). Monaco testified at his deposition that he was not aware of any treacherous condition as he was descending the hill, and Cohen never observed any “unexpected,” unreasonably dangerous condition, Ahern v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 75 N.H. 99, 101, 102, 71 A. 213 (1908), during her annual visual inspections of the campground. Thus, Monaco’s inattention to obvious dangers on the pathway was the only risk presented, which did not impose on the [*5] defendants a duty to exercise precautions. Contrast Hacking v. Belmont, 143 N.H. 546, 553, 736 A.2d 1229 (1999) (defendant liable for “unreasonably increased or concealed” risks not inherent in the game of basketball).

Moreover, “[t]here is nothing unfamiliar about the inability to perceive in the dark obstructions to the course of one who walks without light.” Ahern, supra at 101. That is, “[i]f there may be obstructions whose presence cannot be ascertained by the eye, due care requires the use of some other sense to detect them.” Ibid. When the evidence is “uncontradicted” that the plaintiff was familiar with the area where the accident occurred and that the injury occurred because of an “unexpected” condition, the defendant is not at fault for failing to anticipate it. Ibid. Unless the defendant had superior knowledge of the danger, “[i]t cannot reasonably be found that of two persons of equal knowledge and of equal ability to appreciate and understand a danger, one is in fault for not apprehending the danger and the other is not.” Id. at 102.

In this case, Monaco’s knowledge and appreciation of the condition of the pathway was equal to the defendants’. Monaco had camped on the campground once per [*6] year for eighteen years and had used the pathway three times without incident on the day of his fall. Likewise, VCRI had been operating the campground for over two decades, and Cohen was VCRI’s president for approximately six years. Both parties had ample opportunities to observe the campground, yet neither noticed any unreasonable dangers. The only risk associated with the pathway was the open and obvious nature of its slope and uneven terrain, which did not impose any duty on the defendants to light or otherwise improve the path.

Conclusion. Drawing all inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that the defendants owed no duty to protect him against the injury-causing condition of the pathway. The allowance of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was proper.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Cypher, Fecteau & Massing, JJ.5),

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

Entered: December 18, 2014.


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Herberchuk v. Essex County 4H Club Camp, Inc. et al., 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 99

To Read an Analysis of this decision see: Zip line put away for the season still found and plaintiff gets injured on rigged system.

Herberchuk v. Essex County 4H Club Camp, Inc. et al., 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 99

Alicia Herberchuk v. Essex County 4H Club Camp, Inc. et al.

96-4863

SUPERIOR COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT MIDDLESEX

1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 99

March 11, 1999, Decided

JUDGES: [*1] Raymond J. Brassard, Justice of the Superior Court.

OPINION BY: RAYMOND J. BRASSARD

OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff, Alicia Herberchuk (“Ms. Herberchuk”), brought this action for recovery of damages for injuries sustained while on land owned by defendant, Essex County 4H Club Camp, Inc. (“4H”), while attending an outing accompanied by co-workers employed by defendant, Teleglobe Communications, Inc. (“Teleglobe”). The plaintiff alleges that the injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants and that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the entry of summary judgment on the issue of liability. For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED.

BACKGROUND

Viewing the facts available at this summary judgment stage in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Ms. Herberchuk, the undisputed facts are as follows.

On August 28, 1993, Ms. Herberchuk attended an employee outing at a campground owned by 4-H. The campground had been rented through a third party under the name of Teleglobe by certain of its employees, but not by Teleglobe itself. At the cookout [*2] Ms. Herberchuk observed other guests using an apparatus known as a zipwire. The zipwire was used by children who attended the 4H’s camp during the summer months. Using the zipwire involved climbing up a ladder which reached to a platform mounted on a tree, and then leaving the platform to traverse the entire length of the wire. Proper use of the zipwire required a safety helmet, a safety harness, a drag line, and several people assisting the rider. The zipwire also included an 8 inch square 2,000 pound-test pulley to which the safety harness was attached. At the end of the camping season all removable equipment, including the safety equipment, was required to be removed from the zipwire, leaving only the cable and the platform.

On the date in question, a ladder found on or near the campground was propped against the tree upon which the platform was mounted by unidentified parties allowing guests to access the zipwire. Hanging from the zipwire was a nylon rope described as green in color which other guests were using to slide down the wire. No rules or instructions on how to use the zipwire were posted on or near the apparatus on the day in question. After watching several other [*3] people use the zipwire, Ms. Herberchuk decided she wanted to use the apparatus. In order to reach the zipwire, the plaintiff climbed the ladder. Although the ladder did not reach the platform at the end of the wire, Ms. Herberchuk was able to reach the platform by pulling herself up by her hands. Once on the platform Ms. Herberchuk wrapped the rope around her hands as she had seen others do and pushed herself off. Instead of traveling down the wire, however, Ms. Herberchuk fell to the ground sustaining serious injuries, including two elbow fractures and a fractured jaw. As result of these events Ms. Herberchuk commenced this lawsuit against 4H and Teleglobe. Both 4H and Teleglobe have moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

DISCUSSION

[HN1] Summary judgment shall be granted where there are no issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to as a matter of law. Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991); Cassesso v. Comm’r of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 422, 456 N.E.2d 1123 (1983); Community Nat’l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553, 340 N.E.2d 877 (1976); Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the [*4] absence of a triable issue and that, therefore, she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17, 532 N.E.2d 1211 (1989). If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must respond and allege facts which would establish the existence of disputed material facts. Id.

[HN2] A judge, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment must consider “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate.” Flesner v. Technical Communications Corporation et al., 410 Mass. 805, 807, 575 N.E.2d 1107 (1991). Where no genuine issue of material fact exists, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.” Id. citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).

1. The Claim Against 4-H.

[HN3] A property owner has a duty to maintain its property [*5] “in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk.” Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 708, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973). A defendant is not required to “supply a place of maximum safety, but only one which would be safe to a person who exercises such minimum care as the circumstances reasonably indicate.” Toubiana v. Priestly, 402 Mass. 84, 88, 520 N.E.2d 1307 (1988). “A landowner has no duty to protect lawful visitors on his property from risks that would be obvious to persons of average intelligence.” Id. at 89.

In the present case, Ms. Herberchuk claims there are genuine issues of fact concerning the condition in which the zipwire was kept, as well as, what actions 4-H took to prevent unauthorized use of the apparatus. The evidence on the record, for the purposes of this motion, includes affidavits from both Ms. Herberchuk and Mr. Charles G. Ingersoll, a member of the 4-H Board of Trustees, as well as exhibits, including photographs of the area immediately before the accident.

In his affidavit, Mr. Ingersoll states that, while not having [*6] a specific memory of doing so the summer during which Ms. Herberchuk was injured, it was his practice to remove and put away for the winter all those removable parts and safety equipment associated with the zipwire at the end of each camping season (before the outing). Mr. Ingersol also stated that the ladder used by the plaintiff to get to the platform was not one of those presently used by the camp and that the pulley was not on the line the day of the outing. Ms. Herberchuk admitted in her affidavit that when she first arrived at the outing there was no ladder attached to the tree and that when she attempted to make her way to the platform she had to pull herself up because the wooden ladder placed there did not reach the platform. Ms. Herberchuk stated further that she did not know if the pulley was attached to the wire or where the strap had come from.

[HN4] “The question to be decided is whether the jury reasonably could have concluded that, in view of all the circumstances, an ordinarily prudent person in the defendant’s position would have taken steps, not taken by the defendant, to prevent the accident that occurred.” Id. at 89. In this case the evidence shows that 4-H [*7] had removed both the ladder and the safety equipment used with the zipwire during the camping season. Upon arriving at the outing Ms. Herberchuk saw no ladder allowing entry to the platform rendering the zipwire inaccessible, it being twenty feet above the ground. Ms. Herberchuk chose to use the zipwire without the benefit of safety equipment or instructions on the use of the device. Ms. Herberchuk also admitted in her deposition that she knew there was a chance she could be injured but decided to use the apparatus. Further, 4-H did not have a duty to warn Ms. Herberchuk of the obvious dangers involved with using the zipwire without safety equipment or instruction. “There is no duty to warn of dangers obvious to persons of average intelligence.” Thorson v. Mandell, 402 Mass. 744, 749, 525 N.E.2d 375 (1988). On this evidence, a fair minded jury could not return a verdict for the plaintiff.

2. The Claim Against Teleglobe.

[HN5] “Before liability for negligence can be imposed there must first be a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, and a breach of that duty proximately resulting in the injury.” Davis v. Westwood Group, 420 Mass. 739, 743, 652 N.E.2d 567 (1995). [*8] Ms. Herberchuk urges that Teleglobe played a part in the organization and funding of the outing at which the plaintiff was injured. The evidence, however, is to the contrary. First, the outing was organized by Teleglobe employees because the company no longer sponsored such events. Second, the money to pay for the outing was raised by a group of employees independent of Teleglobe through the use of a raffle. Finally, Ms. Herberchuk’s attendance was not required by her employment and she received no compensation for attending. On this evidence a reasonable jury could not find that Teleglobe owed any duty to Ms. Herberchuk.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants’, 4-H and Teleglobe, motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED.

Raymond J, Brassard

Justice of the Superior Court

Dated: March 11, 1999

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Morgan v. State of Tennessee, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 62

Morgan v. State of Tennessee, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 62

Evelean Morgan v. State of Tennessee

No. M2002-02496-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE, AT NASHVILLE

2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 62

November 3, 2003, Session

January 27, 2004, Filed

PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Claims Commission Affirmed. Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission No. 99000125 W. R. Baker, Commissioner.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed and remanded.

COUNSEL: David H. Dunaway, LaFollette, Tennessee, for the appellant, Evelean Morgan.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Christopher Michael Fancher, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

JUDGES: WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM B. CAIN and PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JJ., joined.

OPINION BY: WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., P.J., M.S.

OPINION

This appeal involves a fatal accident at the Colditz Cove State Natural Area in Fentress County. The mother of a woman who fell to her death from the bluff surrounding Northrup Falls filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission. The State of Tennessee denied liability based on (1) the recreational use defense in Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 (1995), (2) its lack of actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, and (3) its assertion that the decedent’s fault exceeded its own. The commissioner granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. [*2] While he did not rely on the statutory recreational use defense, the commissioner determined that the State had no notice of a dangerous condition at the natural area, it was not reasonably foreseeable that intoxicated persons who were unfamiliar with the natural area would hike into the area of the falls in the middle of the night, and the decedent’s actions were the sole proximate cause of her death. The decedent’s mother has appealed. We have determined that the commissioner properly granted the summary judgment because, as a matter of law, (1) the State established a defense under Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102, (2) the decedent’s estate presented no evidence that the State had actual or constructive notice of an allegedly dangerous condition on the trail in the natural area, and (3) the decedent’s fault far exceeded whatever fault could be attributed to the State.

I.

Rochelle Copeland Zegilla and her two small children were living with her mother in mid-1997 following a separation from her husband. On Saturday evening, July 26, 1997, she told her mother that she was “going to go out for awhile,” and then she drove to the Top of the Mountain Lounge in [*3] Jamestown, Tennessee. After the lounge closed at midnight, Ms. Zegilla and four companions 1 decided to drive to a nearby VFW club. When they arrived at the club, however, they discovered that it had closed earlier than usual. After a brief discussion in the club parking lot, the group decided to continue their drinking and talking in the parking lot of the Colditz Cove State Natural Area.

1 Ms. Zegilla’s companions at the Top of the Mountain Lounge were Chris Smith, Loretta Johnson, Edward Raines, and Larry King.

The Colditz Cove State Natural Area is a 165-acre Class II natural-scientific area in Fentress County owned by the State of Tennessee. It is heavily wooded and contains the 75-foot Northrup Falls and a scenic gorge with interesting rock formations. 2 The area has been designated by statute as “worthy of perpetual preservation,” 3 and accordingly, improvements to the area are limited to foot trails, foot bridges, and primitive campgrounds 4 and “facilities as may be reasonably necessary . . .for [*4] the safe and proper management and protection of the area.” 5 In addition to a parking lot, the State had erected several signs and a gate and had constructed a 1.5 mile foot trail along the bluff overlooking Northrup Falls, as well as a scenic overlook. The State had not installed lights in the parking lot or along the foot trail.

2 Tenn. Code Ann. § 11-14-108(b)(2)(F) (Supp. 2003).

3 Tenn. Code Ann. § 11-14-105(2) (1999).

4 Tenn. Code Ann. § 11-14-106(a)(1)(B) (1999).

5 Tenn. Code Ann. § 11-14-106(a)(2).

All of the group except Mr. Raines had been drinking throughout the evening, and they continued drinking in the parking lot because Messrs. Smith and King had brought along a cooler of beer purchased earlier in the evening at Midway Qwick Stop. After talking for several minutes, the group decided to walk down the foot trail toward Northrup Falls in the pitch dark even though [*5] three of them, including Ms. Zegilla, had never been to Colditz Cove before. The only illumination they had was Mr. King’s flashlight.

When the group reached a fork in the trail, Mr. Raines and Ms. Johnson decided to walk no further and sat near a trash container to talk and drink. Ms. Zegilla and Messrs. Smith and King kept walking along the trail toward Northrup Falls. After they stopped to drink and talk, Mr. King asked Mr. Smith to shine the flashlight into the bushes to enable him to find a place to urinate. Mr. King walked into the bushes and, on his return, he fell over the bluff into the gorge below.

Mr. Smith yelled, “Larry has fallen off,” and called to Mr. Raines for assistance. Mr. Raines made his way down the trail to Mr. Smith and Ms. Zegilla. After they all called out to Mr. King to no avail, Mr. Raines decided to go for help and took the flashlight to help make his way back up the foot path to the parking lot. Ms. Zegilla and Mr. Smith, now joined by Ms. Johnson, continued to call for Mr. King. Mr. Smith decided to start a fire with his shirt to make some light. After his shirt went out, Ms. Zegilla somehow fell over the bluff. The rescue workers who arrived at the [*6] scene at approximately 1:30 a.m. on Sunday, July 27, 1997, found the lifeless bodies of both Mr. King and Ms. Zegilla in the water at the bottom of the falls. An autopsy revealed that Ms. Zegilla’s blood alcohol level was .18%.

On July 23, 1998, Evelean Morgan, Ms. Zegilla’s mother and her personal representative, filed a claim for $ 500,000 with the Tennessee Claims Commission asserting that the State had violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 2003) by negligently creating or maintaining a dangerous condition at Colditz Cove State Natural Area. 6 The State moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that it was shielded from liability by the recreational use statute [Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 70-7-101, -105 (1995)]. After the claims commissioner denied its motion, the State filed an answer denying Ms. Morgan’s negligence claims. The State asserted, as affirmative defenses, (1) that Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 shielded it from liability, (2) that it had no actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition at Colditz Cove State Natural Area and that it was not reasonably foreseeable that intoxicated [*7] persons who were unfamiliar with the natural area would hike into the area of the falls in the middle of the night, and (3) that Ms. Zegilla’s own negligence “contributed in excess of 50% to the cause of her death.”

6 Ms. Morgan also filed a civil damage action in the Circuit Court for Fentress County against Ms. Johnson, Messrs. Smith and Raines, and the estate of Mr. King.

In February 2002, following lengthy and somewhat contentious discovery, the State moved for a summary judgment on two grounds – Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 and its assertion that Ms. Zegilla’s “negligence was equal to or greater than [the] negligence of the State, if any.” 7 In April 2002, Ms. Morgan responded by asserting that the State was not entitled to a judgment on either ground because the State was grossly negligent and because its negligence was greater than Ms. Zegilla’s. The claims commissioner held a hearing on the State’s motion for summary judgment after conducting his own personal inspection of [*8] the Colditz Cove State Natural Area without the lawyers or parties present. On June 5, 2002, the commissioner filed an order granting the State’s motion for summary judgment. While the commissioner declined to base his decision on Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102, he determined that the undisputed evidence demonstrated as a matter of law that Ms. Morgan had not shown that she could prove notice and foreseeability as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C) and that Ms. Zegilla was “preponderantly negligent in her own death.” 8 The commissioner later denied Ms. Morgan’s request for a hearing before the entire claims commission. Ms. Morgan has appealed.

7 The State based the latter assertion on what it called the “step in the dark” rule, i.e., that stepping into an unfamiliar dark area constitutes the proximate cause of injuries sustained by falling down stairs hidden in the darkness. Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587, 594 (Tenn. 1994); Goodman v. Memphis Park Comm’n, 851 S.W.2d 165, 171 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

[*9]

8 We construe this finding to be that Ms. Zegilla’s fault exceeded the fault of the State, if any. The claims commissioner stated later in its order that “the sole proximate cause of Ms. Zegilla’s death was her own actions.”

II.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standards for reviewing summary judgments on appeal are well-settled. [HN1] Summary judgments are proper in virtually any civil case that can be resolved on the basis of legal issues alone. Fruge v. Doe, 952 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1997); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993); Pendleton v. Mills, 73 S.W.3d 115, 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). They are not, however, appropriate when genuine disputes regarding material facts exist. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Thus, a summary judgment should be granted only when the undisputed facts, and the inferences reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts, support one conclusion – that the party seeking the summary judgment is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Pero’s Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tenn. 2002); [*10] Webber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 49 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tenn. 2001).

[HN2] The party seeking a summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn. 1998). To be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the moving party must either affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or establish an affirmative defense that conclusively defeats the non-moving party’s claim. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n. 5; Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 82-83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

[HN3] Once the moving party demonstrates that it has satisfied Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56’s requirements, the non-moving party must demonstrate how these requirements have not been satisfied. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). Mere conclusory generalizations will not suffice. Cawood v. Davis, 680 S.W.2d 795, 796-97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). The non-moving party must convince the [*11] trial court that there are sufficient factual disputes to warrant a trial (1) by pointing to evidence either overlooked or ignored by the moving party that creates a factual dispute, (2) by rehabilitating evidence challenged by the moving party, (3) by producing additional evidence that creates a material factual dispute, or (4) by submitting an affidavit in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07 requesting additional time for discovery. McCarley v. West Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n. 6. A non-moving party who fails to carry its burden faces summary dismissal of the challenged claim because, as our courts have repeatedly observed, the “failure of proof concerning an essential element of the cause of action necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Alexander v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass’n, 870 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn. 1993).

[HN4] A summary judgment is not appropriate when a case’s determinative facts are in dispute. However, for a question of fact to exist, reasonable minds must be able to differ over whether some alleged occurrence or event did or did not happen. Conatser v. Clarksville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 920 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tenn. 1995); [*12] Harrison v. Southern Ry. Co., 31 Tenn. App. 377, 387, 215 S.W.2d 31, 35 (1948). If reasonable minds could justifiably reach different conclusions based on the evidence at hand, then a genuine question of fact exists. Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Austin Co., 868 S.W.2d 649, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). If, on the other hand, the evidence and the inferences to be reasonably drawn from the evidence would permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion, then there are no material factual disputes and the question can be disposed of as a matter of law. Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d at 695; Seavers v. Methodist Med. Ctr., 9 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Tenn. 1999); Beaudreau v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 118 S.W.3d 700, 703 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

[HN5] Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal. BellSouth Advertising & Publ’g Co. v. Johnson, 100 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tenn. 2003); Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Tenn. 2001). Accordingly, appellate courts must make a fresh determination that the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. [*13] Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997). We must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and we must resolve all inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d at 695; Doe v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tenn. 2001). When reviewing the evidence, we must determine first whether factual disputes exist. If a factual dispute exists, we must then determine whether the fact is material to the claim or defense upon which the summary judgment is predicated and whether the disputed fact creates a genuine issue for trial. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 214; Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trailer, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

III.

THE APPLICATION OF TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-7-102

The State’s defense predicated on Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 figures prominently in this appeal even though the claims commissioner expressly declined to base his decision on this defense. 9 For her part, Ms. Morgan asserts that the commissioner erred by “failing and refusing” [*14] to rule on this defense. While the State does not specifically assert that the commissioner erred by not addressing this defense, 10 it asserts that it did not owe a duty to Ms. Zegilla by virtue of Tenn. Code Ann. § 70- 7-102. Accordingly, we have decided to address the applicability of Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 to this case head on.

9 The commissioner’s cryptic rulings regarding Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 are not easy to reconcile. He stated:

The Commission renders its ruling without considering the applicability of the state Recreational Use Immunity Statute. The individuals involved in this incident were using the State property for recreation, thus the Recreational Use Statute applies.

As for gross negligence, if the facts involved the Recreational Use statute alone, in absence of the other three factors discussed heretofore, then this claim should probably proceed to trial. Although the Commission believes there was not any gross negligence, it does not base its conclusion on the Recreational Use Immunity statute.

Because the commissioner stated twice that he was not basing his decision on Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102, we will take him at his word.

[*15]

10 The State could have raised this issue pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 13(a).

A.

At common law, property owners could be held liable for injuries to persons who were using their property, with or without their permission, for recreational purposes. Beginning in the 1950s, state legislatures began to enact statutes to limit property owners’ liability when persons were using their property for recreational purposes. 11 The Tennessee General Assembly enacted one of these statutes in 1963. 12 As originally enacted, the statute was applicable only to private landowners and excluded from its coverage the “willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.”

11 James C. Becker, Landowner or Occupier Liability for Personal Injuries and Recreational Use Statutes: How Effective Is the Protection?, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 1587, 1587-88 (1991).

12 Act of Mar. 15, 1963, ch. 177, 1963 Tenn. Pub. Acts 784, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 70-7-101, -105 (1995).

[*16] In 1987, the Tennessee General Assembly amended the recreational use statute in two significant ways that are directly applicable to this case. First, it amended the statute to explicitly apply to real property owned by governmental entities. 13 Second, it broadened the exemption to cover “gross negligence, willful or wanton conduct.” 14

13 Act of May 7, 1987, ch. 448, § 8, 1987 Tenn. Pub. Acts 897, 899, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101(2)(B).

14 Act of May 7, 1987, ch. 448, § 5, 1987 Tenn. Pub. Acts 897, 898, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104(1).

The operation of the recreational use statutes is straightforward. Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 [HN6] is an affirmative defense available to persons who fit within the definition of “landowner” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101(2). Parent v. State, 991 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tenn. 1999); Bishop v. Beckner, 109 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). [*17] Landowners may assert a Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 defense if they prove that the injured person was engaged in a recreational activity 15 at the time of the injury. Plaintiffs may defeat this affirmative defense in essentially three ways: (1) prove that the defendant is not a “landowner,” (2) prove that the injured party was not engaged in a recreational activity, or (3) prove that the landowner’s conduct fits within one of the three exceptions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104. The exceptions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104 do not create new independent causes of action against the landowner. Rather, they enable a plaintiff to pursue its negligence claim by negating a landowner’s Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 defense. Parent v. State, 991 S.W.2d at 242-43.

15 The applicable recreational activities are identified in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 70-7-102, -103.

[HN7] Applying Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 70-7-101 [*18] , -105 to a particular case requires a three-step analysis. First, the court must determine whether the party asserting the Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 defense is a landowner. Second, the court must determine whether the activity in which the injured party was engaged at the time of the injury is a recreational activity. Third, the court must determine whether any of the exceptions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104 are applicable to the case. See Parent v. State, 991 S.W.2d at 243. If the activity is recreational and no Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104 exceptions apply, the landowner is shielded from liability by Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. If, however, the activity is recreational, but one of the exceptions applies, the landowner may be liable.

B.

Based on the undisputed facts, there can be no dispute (1) that the State, as a governmental entity, is a “landowner” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101(2)(B), (2) that Ms. Zegilla was engaged in a recreational activity because she was “hiking” or “sightseeing” when she fell to her death, [*19] and (3) that the land on which Ms. Zegilla was killed was not exempt from coverage of the statute. 16 Thus, the only remaining question with regard to the application of the recreational use statute is whether one of Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104’s exceptions applies to this case. Ms. Morgan insists that the exception for gross negligence in Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104(1) applies.

16 Ms. Morgan argued before the claims commissioner that improvements in state natural areas and parks were somehow exempt from Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 70-7-101, -105. However, both the Tennessee Supreme Court and this court have recognized that [HN8] the recreational use statute may apply to state parks and wildlife management areas. Parent v. State, 991 S.W.2d at 241; Rewcastle v. State, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 943, No. E2002-00506-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31926848, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

[HN9] Gross negligence [*20] is negligent conduct reflecting a reckless disregard for the safety of others. Davidson v. Power Bd., 686 S.W.2d 581, 586 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Odum v. Haynes, 494 S.W.2d 795, 807 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). It does not require a particular state of mind as long as it creates an extremely unjustified risk to others. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 147, at 351 (2001). It differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, not in kind. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984). Thus, gross negligence is a negligent act or failure to act that reflects more than lack of ordinary care (simple negligence) but less than intentional misconduct. Inter-City Trucking Co. v. Daniels, 181 Tenn. 126, 129-30, 178 S.W.2d 756, 757 (1944); Bennett v. Woodard, 60 Tenn. App. 20, 31-32, 444 S.W.2d 89, 94 (1969).

[HN10] Determining whether particular conduct rises to the level of gross negligence is ordinarily a question of fact. 3 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 10:05, at 368 (1986) (“SPEISER”); see also Adams v. Roark, 686 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tenn. 1985) (gross negligence [*21] determined from the facts alleged in the complaint). However, it may be decided as a matter of law when the material facts are not in dispute and when these facts, and the conclusions reasonably drawn from them, would permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion. Leatherwood v. Wadley, 121 S.W.3d 682, ___, 2003 WL 327517, at *8-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming summary judgment dismissing gross negligence claim); Buckner v. Varner, 793 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming summary judgment dismissing gross negligence claim); Fellows v. Sexton, 46 Tenn. App. 274, 282, 327 S.W.2d 391, 394 (1959) (granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on a gross negligence claim).

We find no evidence in this record upon which a reasonable person would conclude that the State was grossly negligent with regard to the construction or maintenance of the Colditz Cove State Natural Area. The State had a statutory obligation to maintain this area in a pristine, natural condition. Erecting warning signs, installing lighting along the trails, fencing the entire area, or installing guard rails, barriers, or other sorts of buffers, [*22] while perhaps appropriate at Dollywood, would have been entirely unwarranted and unnecessary at a natural area such as Colditz Cove. Accordingly, we have determined that the record, as a matter of law, supports the claims commissioner’s conclusion that “there was not any gross negligence.” 17 The State was simply not acting recklessly with disregard of the safety of persons entering the natural area.

17 Ms. Morgan asserts in her brief that “the State of Tennessee knew that at Northrop [sic] Falls . . . there was a cliff that eroded into a commonly used path which suddenly dropped at a ninety degree angle approximately one hundred feet and that it posed a deadly, dangerous condition.” This is the only assertion in her papers that approaches an allegation of gross negligence. We have searched the record for substantiation of this claim and have found none. There is no evidence that any of the trails in Colditz Cove had dangerously eroded on July 26, 1997. There is no evidence that the State had actual or constructive notice of any dangerous erosion along any of the trails in the natural area. There is likewise no evidence that either Ms. Zegilla or Mr. King fell to their deaths at a spot on the trail that had eroded.

[*23] Because the State was not grossly negligent, it was entitled to assert a defense predicated on Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. Therefore, we have concluded, based on the undisputed facts, that the recreational use statute shields the State from liability for Ms. Zegilla’s death and that the State was entitled to a summary judgment dismissing her claims on this ground alone.

IV.

THE STATE’S LIABILITY UNDER TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C)

Despite our conclusion that the State has established an affirmative defense under Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 as a matter of law, we will also address Ms. Morgan’s assertion that the claims commissioner erred by concluding that she had failed to demonstrate that she would be able to prove that the State was liable for her daughter’s death under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C). We have concluded that the undisputed facts also support the commissioner’s conclusion that the State was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because Ms. Morgan had not demonstrated that she would be able to prove the essential elements of her claim.

[*24] [HN11] The State is not the insurer of the safety of persons on its property. Byrd v. State, 905 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). It is, however, liable to these persons to the same extent that private owners and occupiers of land are liable, Sanders v. State, 783 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), because Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C) has imposed this common-law duty on the State. Parent v. State, 991 S.W.2d at 242. Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C) provides that the State may be held monetarily liable for

Negligently created or maintained dangerous conditions on state controlled real property. The claimant under this subsection must establish the foreseeability of the risks and notice given to the proper state officials at a time sufficiently prior to the injury for the state to have taken appropriate measures.

Based on this statute, the State, like a private landowner, has a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent foreseeable injuries to persons on the premises. Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d at 593-94. This duty is [*25] grounded on the foreseeability of the risk involved. To recover, a claimant must prove that the injury was a reasonably foreseeable probability. Dobson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 324, 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C) required Ms. Morgan to prove that Ms. Zegilla was injured in a manner that was reasonably foreseeable and that the State had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused Ms. Zegilla’s death in time to take “appropriate measures.” The claims commissioner properly concluded that she failed on both counts.

The record contains no factual, legal, or policy basis for concluding that the State should have foreseen that intoxicated persons who were unfamiliar with the Colditz Cove State Natural Area would hike down the trail to Northrup Falls in the middle of the night without adequate illumination.

Likewise, the record contains no evidence meeting the standards in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06 that the improvements to Colditz Cove are either inherently dangerous 18 or, as we have already pointed out, that the State had actual or constructive notice of any particular [*26] dangerous condition in the natural area that caused Ms. Zegilla’s death.

18 Ms. Morgan’s lawyer asserted in the proceeding below that he had consulted an architect who “felt” that the Colditz Cove State Natural Area was “unduly dangerous” and that “the majority of the defects were certainly foreseeable and could have been rectified at a relatively modest capital investment.” While the record contains an unauthenticated letter from this architect summarizing his impressions of the improvements in the natural area, it does not contain the architect’s affidavit or deposition stating these conclusions. The architect’s letter does not meet the requirements in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06 for evidentiary materials that may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment.

V.

COMPARISON OF MS. ZEGILLA’S FAULT WITH THE STATE’S FAULT

As a final issue, Ms. Morgan asserts that the claims commissioner erred by determining that Ms. Zegilla’s fault exceeded the State’s fault. [*27] She bases her argument on the assertion that the State’s “gross negligence” should somehow count for more in a comparative fault analysis. We have determined that this argument has no merit for two reasons. First, we have already concluded that the undisputed facts demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the State was not grossly negligent. Second, even if the States could somehow be considered grossly negligent, its fault would still be compared with Ms. Zegilla’s fault. Conroy v. City of Dickson, 49 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). A majority of the courts in comparative fault jurisdictions permit gross negligence to be compared to ordinary negligence. 3 SPEISER, § 13:25, at 764; 1 ARTHUR BEST, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4.40[3] (1999); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Fault § 7 cmt. b (1999).

[HN12] The allocation of fault is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury or the trial court sitting without a jury. Brown v. Wal-Mart Discount Cities, 12 S.W.3d 785, 789 (Tenn. 2000). The task of allocating fault should be taken from the fact-finder only when it can be determined beyond question (or alternatively, when reasonable [*28] minds cannot differ) that the plaintiff’s fault is equal to or greater than the defendant’s. Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 91-92 (Tenn. 2000); Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d at 589; Kim v. Boucher, 55 S.W.3d 551, 556-57 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The procedural avenues for obtaining a decision that the plaintiff’s fault exceeds the defendant’s as a matter of law are governed by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The question may be raised using (1) a motion for summary judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56, (2) a motion for directed verdict governed by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 50.01, and (3) a post-trial motion for a judgment as a matter of law governed by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 50.02. Henley v. Amacher, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 72, No. M1999-02799-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 100402, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

Ms. Zegilla’s voluntary intoxication on the evening of July 26, 1997 does not relieve her from the responsibility of her own negligence. Kirksey v. Overton Pub, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 230, 235 (Tenn. 1987); Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 592, 280 S.W. 32, 33 (1926). [*29] She was required to use reasonable care under the circumstances, and her conduct must be measured against the conduct of an ordinary, reasonable person rather than an ordinary and reasonable intoxicated person. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Hall, 5 Tenn. Civ. App. 491, 502 (1915). Accordingly, if her conduct while intoxicated was a proximate cause of her death, it may be compared with the fault of the other parties whose fault was also a proximate cause. Worley v. State, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 755, No. 02A01-9312-BC-00267, 1995 WL 702792, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 1995) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

It cannot be reasonably disputed that Ms. Zegilla was intoxicated when she arrived at Colditz Cove State Natural Area after midnight on July 26, 1997. Even though she had never visited the natural area before, she decided to venture into a wooded area down an unfamiliar, rough foot path in the dark. After one of her companions fell to his death, she continued to walk around in the darkness even though she must have known that danger was close at hand. As tragic as her death is, the only conclusion that reasonable persons can draw from these facts is that her fault [*30] far exceeded any fault that may reasonably be attributed to the State. Accordingly, the claims commissioner properly concluded the State was not liable to Ms. Zegilla’s estate because her fault exceeded any fault that could be attributed to the State.

VI.

We affirm the order dismissing the Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C) claim of Ms. Zegilla’s estate against the State and remand the case to the Tennessee Claims Commission for whatever further proceedings may be required. We tax the costs of this appeal to Evelean Morgan for which execution, if necessary, may issue.