A Call for Presentation Proposals for the 2019 Grand Canyon History Symposium
A Celebration of 100 Years of Grand Canyon National Park
The Grand Canyon Historical Society is pleased to announce the 5th Grand Canyon History Symposium, to be held February 20-24, 2019 at Grand Canyon’s South Rim. We encourage everyone who has done research on, or been a part of, Grand Canyon regional history to consider presenting. Proposals must be received by Friday, May 4, 2018.
Since January 2002, there have been four history symposia, bringing together historians, witnesses to history, park employees, and others with a passion for Grand Canyon history. The presentations from each symposium were assembled into a collection of essays. It is the Grand Canyon Historical Society’s intent to publish the proceedings from this symposium as well.
Grand Canyon National Park Focus
The 2019 Symposium Selection Committee will be reviewing presentation proposals with preference in selection given to those that tie into Grand Canyon National Park’s 100 years of history. Presentations concerning the history of the greater Grand Canyon and its adjacent areas within the Colorado Plateau will also be considered. Dates of the 2019 History Symposium presentations will be Thursday Feb. 21st, Friday Feb. 22nd and Saturday Feb 23rd.
Since the 2016 Symposium had a limited number of presenters, many who submitted were not selected. Candidates who were not chosen are encouraged to re-submit their proposals for the 2019 Symposium. Those who have presented or submitted proposals for the previous four Symposia are also encouraged to submit a new proposal.
Submitting a Proposal
To be considered, please submit the following information by Friday, May 4, 2018:
__ Name __ Mailing address __ Phone number(s) __ Email address
__ Presentation title with a 150-300 word abstract or summary of your presentation
__ 75 word bio
__ Audio-visual requirements
__ Acknowledgment that, if selected, you agree to submit your complete PowerPoint presentation, not to exceed 20 minutes, and up to 3,000 word presentation in essay form by Friday, January 11, 2019
or Grand Canyon Historical Society, PO Box 1667, Grand Canyon, AZ 86023
Notification of Proposals Selected
All individuals who submitted a proposal will be notified, regardless of selection, via email by Friday, May 25, 2018
Complete details and updates on the Symposium are available at http://www.GrandCanyonHistory.org.
Questions may be directed to:
Richard Quartaroli, Presenters Chair, at email@example.com or
Dave Mortenson, President, Grand Canyon Historical Society, at firstname.lastname@example.org.
Well Colorado created a great chart so you can understand it.
Yulissa Rodriguez v. Brownstone Exploration & Discover Park, LLC
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF FAIRFIELD AT BRIDGEPORT
2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 844
May 4, 2017, Decided
May 4, 2017, Filed
NOTICE: THIS DECISION IS UNREPORTED AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW. COUNSEL IS CAUTIONED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION OF THE STATUS OF THIS CASE.
CORE TERMS: special defenses, assumption of risk, inherent risks, abolished, own negligence, contractual, legal sufficiency, risks inherent, relieve, legal doctrine, legally insufficient, duty of care, present case, statutory prohibition, legislatively, conceptually, exculpatory, sustaining, pre-injury, favorable, releasing, struck, admit, risky, participating
JUDGES: [*1] Edward T., Krumeich, J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Plaintiff Yulissa Rodriguez has moved to strike the First and Second Special Defenses in the answer of defendant Brownstone Exploration & Discovery Park, LLC, arguing that they are barred under C.G.S. §52-572h(l), which provides: “[t]he legal doctrine . . . of . . . assumption of risk in actions to which this section is applicable [is] abolished.” Plaintiff asserts that the special defenses that are labeled “Waiver” and “Release” are, in actuality, based on assumption of risk because they purport to relieve defendant of liability for risks inherent in the activity, which by statute is not a valid defense in this negligence action. For the reasons stated below, the motion to strike the First and Second Special Defenses is denied.
Standards for Deciding a Motion to Strike Special Defenses
“‘A party wanting to contest the legal sufficiency of a special defense may do so by filing a motion to strike.’ Barasso v. Rear Still Hill Road, LLC, 64 Conn.App. 9, 13, 779 A.2d 198 (2001); Practice Book §10-39(a).2 ‘A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.’ . . . Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). ‘In ruling on a motion to strike, the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the special defenses and [*2] construe them in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency.’ . . . Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 398, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). ‘On the other hand, the total absence of any factual allegations specific to the dispute renders [a special defense] legally insufficient.’ . . . Smith v. Jackson, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-14-6024411-S (August 21, 2015, Roraback, J.) (59 Conn. L. Rptr. 864, 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2191). Finally, ‘the trial court is limited to considering the grounds specified in the motion [to strike].’ Meredith v. Police Commission, 182 Conn. 138, 140, 438 A.2d 27 (1980).” Pritsker v. Bowman, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 190, 2017 WL 811609 *2 (Conn.Super. 2017) (Bellis, J.).
The Court May Not Review Material Outside the Pleading in Deciding a Motion to Strike
Plaintiff urged the court to consider the quoted excerpts from the contract alleged in the special defenses in the context of the entire contract, which plaintiff appended to her brief. In ruling on a motion to strike a court is required “to take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 536, 606 A.2d 684 (1992). The Court is not free to consider those portions of the contract that are not alleged nor attached as an exhibit to the answer. See generally Mercer v. Cosley, 110 Conn.App. 283, 292, 955 A.2d 550 (2008) (speaking motion to strike is improper).
The First Special Defense States the Defense of Waiver
In this action plaintiff claimed she was injured while using [*3] a rope swing at defendant’s park. Both sides referred the Court to Segal v. Brownstone Exploration and Discovery Park, LLC, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1183, 2014 WL 2696775 *2 (Conn.Super. 2014) (Roche, J.), a similar case brought against the same defendant in which Judge Roche struck a special defense based on assumption of risk: “‘[T]he doctrine [of assumption of risk] was a product of the industrial revolution, designed to insulate employers to the greatest possible extent by defeating the claims of their injured workers.’ Donahue v. S.J. Fish & Sons, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-539920-S (September 18, 1995, Blue, J.) (15 Conn. L. Rptr. 569, 570, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2618) [1995 WL 562216]. ‘Traditionally, the doctrine provided a defendant with a complete defense to a claim of negligence that centered on the conduct of the plaintiff . . . [T]he assumption of risk variants fall generally into two separate categories: (1) a negligence defense that the plaintiff’s conduct operated so as to relieve the defendant of a duty of care with regard to the plaintiff; and (2) a negligence defense that, while conceding that the defendant owed a duty of care and breached that duty, precludes recovery by the plaintiff because the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s negligence and the risk thereby created, but nevertheless chose to confront such risk.’ . . . Blondin v. Meshack, Superior Court, [*4] judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-08-5018828-S (October 2, 2008, Lager, J.) [46 Conn. L. Rptr. 396, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2512] [2008 WL 4635882]. However, “[t]he harsh doctrine . . . is plainly `morally unacceptable’ in modern times . . . The majority of states have altered or abolished it, either legislatively or by judicial decision . . . [T]he Connecticut legislature has statutorily abolished the doctrine in negligence cases.” Donahue v. S.J. Fish & Sons, Inc., supra, 15 Conn. L. Rptr. at 570, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2618. General Statutes §52-572h(l) states: “The legal doctrines of last clear chance and assumption of risk in actions to which this section is applicable are abolished.” In the present case, accordingly, the defendant’s second special defense is legally insufficient because the doctrine of assumption of the risk has been legislatively abolished with regard to negligence claims. The plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defendant’s second special defense is, therefore, granted.”
Defendant has not asserted a defense of assumption of risk, but rather alleged that plaintiff signed a document entitled “Assumption of Risk, Release of Liability, Waiver of Claims & Arbitration Agreement” in which “the plaintiff agreed to waive all claims against [defendant] . . . arising out of the inherent risks of participating in programs and events operated by [defendant] . . .”1 The First Special Defense alleged [*5] “[a]ny injuries sustained by the plaintiff while using the ‘Blob’ activity at [defendant] . . . arose out of the inherent risks of this activity.”
1 This is a classic contract of adhesion that is not bargained for but accepted by the consumer as a condition for his or her participation in the activity. Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 328-29, 333, 885 A.2d 734 (2005).
“Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Brown v. City of Hartford, 160 Conn.App. 677, 698, 127 A.3d 278 (2015). See also Benedetto v. Proprietors of the Commons at Mill River, Inc., 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2322, 2014 WL 5356665 *8 (Conn.Super. 2014) (Vitale, J.), contractual waiver as special defense).
Connecticut courts have recognized that pre-injury waiver as a defense to a claim based on inherent risks from an activity is not the same as a waiver of a claim of defendant’s own negligence. See e.g., Hanks, 276 Conn. at 326, 335; Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., 265 Conn. 636, 643-44, 829 A.2d 827 (2003). In Hyson, the Supreme Court distinguished between release of liability for risks inherent in an activity and exculpation of a party’s own negligence:
In keeping with the well-established principle, however, that `[t]he law does not favor contract provisions which relieve a person from his own negligence’ . . . we conclude that the better rule is that a party cannot be released from liability for injuries resulting from its future negligence in the absence of language that expressly so provides. The release signed in the present case illustrates the need for such a rule. A person of ordinary intelligence reasonably could believe that, by signing this release, he or she was releasing the defendant only [*6] from liability for damages caused by dangers inherent in the activity of snow tubing. A requirement of express language releasing the defendant from liability for its negligence prevents individuals from inadvertently relinquishing valuable legal rights.
In Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 269 Conn. 672, 687-88, 849 A.2d 813 & nn. 17-22 (2004), the Supreme Court differentiated between pre-injury release from inherent risks of an activity, defined by reference to a dictionary definition of “inherent” as “structural or involved in the constitution or essential character of something,” from release of negligence that involves the exercise of some control over the activity and/or conditions by defendant. In Hanks, 276 Conn. at 741, the Supreme Court cited the definition of inherent risk in Jagger, 269 Conn. at 692: “inherent risks . . . are innate to the activity, [and] ‘are beyond the control of the [recreational] operator’s exercise of reasonable care.'”
In Segal, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1183, 2014 WL 2696775 *8, the same court that had struck the assumption of risk special defense, declined to strike the waiver special defense; the court assumed the allegation that plaintiff had waived risks inherent in the activity was true as alleged, and concluded that the provision was exculpatory because it expressly included defendant’s negligence. [*7]
The language of the waiver provision here is limited to “the inherent risks of this activity” and is not broad enough to exculpate defendant for its own negligence. A contractual waiver of liability for inherent risks from an activity is not conceptually the same thing as assumption of risk from participation in a risky activity. Defendant has failed to show that the waiver special defense is the same as the assumption of risk defense abolished by C.G.S. §52-572h(l). Stated otherwise, defendant has failed to show the statutory prohibition extended to waiver by contract. The motion to strike the First Special Defense is denied.
The Second Special Defense States the Defense of Release
The Segal Court also refused to strike the release defense for the same reasons it did not strike the waiver special defense. 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1183, 2014 WL 2696775 *8. The release special defense here also alleges the contractual release “arising out of the inherent risks of participation in the Programs . . .”2 A contractual release of liability for inherent risks from an activity is not conceptually the same thing as assumption of risk from participation in a risky activity. Defendant has failed to show that the release special defense is the same as the assumption [*8] of risk defense abolished by C.G.S. §52-572h(l). Stated otherwise, defendant has failed to show the statutory prohibition extended to releases by contract. The motion to strike the Second Special Defense is denied.
2 This may be an exculpatory provision since it includes “the instruction received while participating in the Programs,” which is subject to control of the operator. Plaintiff has not moved to strike on this ground.
Renee Kopesky v. Connecticut American Water Company
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF STAMFORD – NORWALK, AT STAMFORD
1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2166
August 2, 1999, Decided
August 2, 1999, Filed
NOTICE: [*1] THIS DECISION IS UNREPORTED AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW. COUNSEL IS CAUTIONED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION OF THE STATUS OF THIS CASE.
DISPOSITION: Defendant’s motion to strike second count of plaintiff’s amended complaint, and that portion of the prayer for relief claiming punitive damages, denied.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant brought a motion to strike the second count of plaintiff’s amended complaint and that portion of the prayer for relief claiming punitive damages in an action alleging that decedent sustained fatal injuries on defendant’s property because of defendant’s negligence and reckless conduct.
OVERVIEW: Decedent died when she fell from a swing on defendant’s property. Plaintiff brought an action against defendant, alleging that defendant was aware that the public entered their property to go swimming. The second count of plaintiff’s complaint alleged that defendant’s acts or omissions were done recklessly, wantonly, carelessly, and with a reckless disregard for the consequences of its acts or omissions. Defendant brought a motion to strike count two of plaintiff’s complaint and that portion of the prayer for relief claiming punitive damages. The court ruled that a motion to strike could be used to contest the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief. Further, the court held that an action sounding in reckless conduct required an allegation of an intentional act that resulted in injury. Also, the court found that in order to rise to the level of recklessness, the action producing the injury must be intentional and characterized by highly unreasonable conduct which amounted to an extreme departure from ordinary care. The court, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, denied the motion, concluding that the allegations did rise to the level of recklessness.
OUTCOME: Motion to strike the second count of plaintiff’s complaint and that portion of the prayer for relief claiming punitive damages was denied where, viewing the complaint in the light most favorably to plaintiff, plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to state causes of action sounding in negligence and recklessness.
CORE TERMS: recklessness, quotation marks omitted, reckless, sounding, reckless disregard, judicial district, favorably, prayer, decedent, common law, reckless conduct, legal sufficiency, cause of action, contest, viewing, fatal injuries, punitive damages, carelessness, recklessly, omissions, wantonly, swing
JUDGES: D’ANDREA, J.
OPINION BY: D’ANDREA
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION TO STRIKE
The plaintiff, Renee Kopesky, the administratrix for the estate of Tiffany Jean Kopesky, brought this action against the defendant, Connecticut American Water Company, for damages sustained by the plaintiff’s decedent. The plaintiff alleges that the plaintiff’s decedent sustained fatal injuries on the defendant’s property, when she fell from a rope swing as she attempted to swing out into the water. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant was aware that the public entered their private property to go swimming, hiking, camping and fishing. In the first count of the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the plaintiff’s decedent suffered severe painful and fatal injuries as a result of the defendant’s negligence and carelessness. In the second count, the plaintiff alleges that [*2] the defendant’s “acts and/or omissions . . . were done recklessly, wantonly, carelessly and with a reckless disregard for the consequences of its acts and/or omissions.”
The defendant moves to strike count two of the plaintiff’s amended complaint and that portion of the prayer for relief claiming punitive damages. The defendant argues that “count two is legally insufficient because a claim for recklessness cannot be established by relying upon the same set of facts used to establish negligence. The second count of plaintiff’s amended complaint simply restates the facts underlying the plaintiff’s claim for negligence. Reiterating the same underlying facts of a negligence claim and renaming the claim as one for recklessness does not transform ordinary negligence into recklessness.”
” [HN1] The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). ” [HN2] For purposes of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded.” RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 383 n.2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994); [*3] see also Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138, 142, 561 A.2d 432 (1989). “The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
The motion to strike may also be used to contest the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief. See Kavarco v. T.J.E., Inc., 2 Conn. App. 294, 298 n.4, 478 A.2d 257 (1984); Central New Haven Development Corp. v. Potpourri, Inc., 39 Conn. Supp. 132, 133, 471 A.2d 681 (1993); Practice Book 10-39(a)(2).
” [HN3] Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts. . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid a danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 532, 542 A.2d 711 (1988). [*4]
This court has previously held that “the allegations of one count of a complaint based on a common law reckless conduct must be separate and distinct from the allegations of a second count sounding in negligence . . . There is a wide difference between negligence and reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others . . . A specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made . . . In other words, it is clearly necessary to plead a [common law] cause of action grounded in recklessness separate and distinct from a negligence action.” (Alterations in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thompson v. Buckler, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 199, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 153798 (Jan. 27, 1999) ( D’Andrea, J.), Epner v. Theratx, Inc., 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 603, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 161989 (Mar. 10, 1998) (D’Andrea, J.). “In short, [HN4] an action sounding in reckless conduct requires an allegation of an intentional act that results in injury.” Id.
” [HN5] In order to rise to the level of recklessness, [the] action producing the injury must be intentional and characterized [*5] by highly unreasonable conduct which amounts to an extreme departure from ordinary care . . .” (Alterations in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Epner v. Theratx, Inc., supra, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 603, Superior Court, Docket No. 161989, citing Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 532, 542 A.2d 711 (1988). In the present case, viewing the allegations in the light most favorably to the plaintiff, the allegations do rise to the level of recklessness.
“If the alleged facts constitute recklessness . . . using the same facts in the negligence count does not prevent them from also being reckless. The test is whether the alleged facts amount to recklessness.” Walters v. Turrisi, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1011, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 541162 (Apr. 15, 1997) ( Hurley, J.). “The mere fact that the allegations and factual assertions in a reckless count are the same or similar to one in a negligence count shouldn’t ipso facto mean the reckless count cannot be brought. The test is whether the facts alleged establish a reckless count. If they do all it would mean is that the plaintiff is pleading in the alternative.” Cancisco v. Hartford, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1885, Superior Court, judicial [*6] district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 519929 (June 26, 1995) (Corradino, J.).
In this case, viewing the complaint in the light most favorably to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state causes of action sounding in negligence and recklessness. The first count of the plaintiff’s amended complaint contains twenty-five paragraphs of allegations relating to the defendant’s conduct regarding the incident in question. In the first count, the plaintiff alleges that that conduct amounts to the defendant’s negligence and/or carelessness.
In the second count, the plaintiff realleges and incorporates those twenty-five paragraphs from the first count and then alleges, in paragraph twenty-six, that the aforementioned conduct indicates that the defendant acted recklessly, wantonly and with a reckless disregard for the consequences. The allegations in the second count do rise to the level of recklessness. Accordingly, the plaintiff has pled an alternative cause of action sounding in recklessness, separate and distinct from the negligence count. Therefore, the defendant’s motion to strike the second count of the plaintiff’s amended complaint, [*7] and that portion of the prayer for relief claiming punitive damages, is hereby denied.
The heel piece on the ski binding can come loose, posing a fall hazard to the skier.
Name of Product: LOOK Pivot Ski Bindings
Recall Number: 18-139
Remedy: Replace. Consumers should immediately stop using the recalled ski bindings and contact LOOK to arrange for a free inspection and replacement.
Consumer Contact: LOOK toll-free at 888-243-6722 from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. MT Monday through Friday, email at email@example.com or online at https://m.rossignol.com/US and click on “Look Bindings Safety Recall” or http://www.look-bindings.com and click on “Recall” for more information.
Pictures available here: https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2018/Group-Rossignol-Recalls-LOOK-Pivot-Ski-Bindings-Due-to-Fall-Hazard
Units: About 6,900 (In addition, 590 were sold in Canada)
Description: This recall involves 2017-2018 model year LOOK Pivot brand ski bindings. The heel piece can loosen and allow the boot to detach from the ski. The LOOK Pivot ski bindings were sold in black, white and yellow. LOOK is written on the front of the binding and Pivot is written on the side of the heel piece. Only date codes of H7, I7 or J7, without the letter ‘V” stamped on the black plastic piece behind the turntable heel unit are included in the recall. Date codes can be found on the bottom of the heel piece and can be viewed by rotating the turntable heel unit 90 degrees.
Model Number Model Name
FCFA002 0000TU PIVOT 18 B115 WHITE ICON
FCFA003 0000TU PIVOT 18 B95 WHITE ICON
FCFA004 0000TU PIVOT 18 B75 WHITE ICON
FCFA006 0000TU PIVOT 14 DUAL WTR B115 W. ICON
FCFA008 0000TU PIVOT 14 DUAL WTR B75 W. ICON
FCFA013 0000TU PIVOT 14 DUAL WTR B115 BLACK
FCFA014 0000TU PIVOT 14 DUAL WTR B95 BLACK
FCFA016 0000TU PIVOT 12 DUAL WTR B95 Y/BK
FCFA017 0000TU PIVOT 12 DUAL WTR B115 BLACK
FCFA018 0000TU PIVOT 12 DUAL WTR B95 BLACK
Incidents/Injuries: None reported
Sold At: Specialty ski stores including Christy Sports, REI, Retail Concepts and Vail Resorts nationwide and online at Backcountry.com and Evo.com from September 2017 through November 2017 for between $375 to $475.
Manufacturer(s): Look Fixations S.A.S., of France
Importer(s): Group Rossignol USA Inc., of Park City, Utah
Distributor(s): Group Rossignol USA Inc., of Park City, Utah
Manufactured In: France
Retailers: If you are a retailer of a recalled product you have a duty to notify your customers of a recall. If you can, email your clients or include the recall information in your next marketing communication to your clients. Post any Recall Poster at your stores and contact the manufacturer to determine how you will handle any recalls.
For more information on this see:
Combination of a Products Liability statute, an Expert Witness Report that was just not direct enough and odd facts holds a retailer liable as manufacture for product defect.
Summary Judgment granted for bicycle manufacturer and retailer on a breach of warranty and product liability claim.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2017 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
By Recreation Law Recfirstname.lastname@example.org James H. Moss
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Recall, CPSC, Consumer Product Safety Council,