New candy apple mixture hardens to concrete, creating an innocent-looking trap for little old ladies.
Posted: November 19, 2026 Filed under: Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Amusement Park, concert, Negligence, Slip and Fall, Venue Leave a commentIn this Georgia case, a family had spent the day at a theme park, and that evening went to the theme park’s concert venue. The venue held approximately 2000 in seats and more in a grassy area in front. The plaintiff testified that the venue had a few hundred people in it, while the venue stated it was full. After the concert, the family members went down front to get autographs while the grandmother walked to the exit. She walked up the aisle and then traversed another row, not the one she was sitting in, and fell down. She did not see anything before her fall, but afterwards saw a candy apple stuck to the ground, stick in the air.
She sued, claiming the defendant breached its duty of ordinary care in maintaining its premises. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing Georgia’s law does not require the removal of trash or cleaning of the area while the guests exit the venue.
The Federal District Court hearing the case first looked at the definition of negligence under Georgia’s law: “duty, breach of the duty, proximate cause, and damages.” Under Georgia’s law, a landowner owes a duty to its invitees to exercise ordinary care in keeping its premises safe. That duty requires landowners to protect invitees from unreasonable risk of harm of which the landowner has superior knowledge and a duty to inspect the premises to discover possible conditions of which the landowner may not have any knowledge.
The plaintiff would have to prove that the landowner has actual or constructive knowledge of the candy apple, while the plaintiff, exercising ordinary care, lacked knowledge of the candy apple due to conditions within the landowner’s control. Meaning the plaintiff argued the venue, through its cleaning and inspection procedures, should have discovered and removed the candy apple. By failing to either have the proper procedures to discover the candy apple or to remove it, the venue is liable.
The plaintiff argued the venue should have had constructive knowledge of the candy apple. Constructive knowledge may be inferred when there is evidence that the owner lacked an inspection procedure. The burden to prove that inspection procedure rests with the landowner. Once the landowner shows there is an inspection procedure, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove the hazard existed long enough that the landowners should have discovered it. The failure by the landowner to discover the hazard after that length of time is a breach of duty of ordinary care. The actual length of time is not stated in minutes or hours, but in the process.
The plaintiff argued that length of time had occurred. The landowner should have inspected the venue after the concert ended and before the plaintiff traversed the row. However, the court found Daniels v. Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc., 240 Ga. App. 751 (1999), held there was no duty to examine a venue immediately after the event. The Georgia Appellate Court found it would be unduly burdensome to keep Atlanta Braves fans in their seats while the stadium was cleaned after a game. Nor could the inspection be accomplished while the fans were exciting the stadium. The Georgia Appellate Court also ruled that fans of a baseball game should expect to find trash in the aisles after a game.
[A] fan should reasonably expect and assume that trash will be dropped on the premises by the thousands of other fans exiting the stadium at the end of a game. The risk of a cup sitting on the aisle steps is not an ‘unreasonable risk of harm’ for one exiting a baseball stadium at the end of a game. Id
Georgia does not require a landowner to warrant the safety of all persons from all things. Only to exercise diligence in making the premises safe in a way that business customers are used to. Requiring a venue to clean or just to inspect before the fans moved from their seats exceeded the bounds of ordinary care.
The defendant argued that during an event, they empty trash containers when they become full and clean the aisles leading to the rows. They have a policy of keeping the general areas free of debris and trash. However, they did not have a policy of cleaning the rows with people in their seats because it would not be possible. (Cue Seinfeld episode leaving a theater from the middle seat, “excuse me excuse me excuse me,” then add a broom or at least the patron’s response of “sit down I can’t see!”)
Finding that the burden of inspection after an event had ended was excessive, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to prove how long the candy apple had been on the floor.
No food was sold inside the venue by the defendant. However, people were free to bring food into the venue from the outside. Candy apples were sold by the defendant at their food court area. The plaintiff admitted that the plaintiff and her family shared refreshments during the concert, which they had brought into the venue, and observed numerous people eating and drinking. The plaintiff was therefore on notice that food could be found in the rows, aisles, and floor of the venue.
The plaintiff argued the candy apple had been on the ground a long time because it had “fused” to the concrete. Removing the candy apple required an employee to pry it up with a spoon. (Makes you salivate in anticipation of your next candy apple; you can feel your teeth getting stuck now!) People responding to the scene to assist who saw the apple said it appeared to be intact and not trashed, indicating it was not on the concrete in the hot Georgia weather for long. The concert venue doors opened at 7:00 PM, and the concert ended at 10:00 PM. From 5:00 PM to when the venue opened at 7:00 PM, the venue was cleaned and washed by the defendant.
How long the candy apple had been on the floor was only subject to speculation and, as such, that estimate of the time the apple had been on the floor could not be used by the court. Since the plaintiff could not prove the candy apple had been on the floor earlier than when the venue opened, speculation was not going to be introduced into the court.
The court held for the defendant, finding the plaintiff could not produce sufficient evidence that the defendant breached its duty of care in its maintenance of the venue. Thank heavens, could you imagine the damage done to a cleaning crew as they tried to sweep rows at a football game after the game ended? Or cleaning up whatever lands on the floor after the Rolling Stones have ended their performance? (How do you deal with unconscious patrons? A trash grabber won’t work.
Originally published in Sport Facilities and the Law a Hackney Publication
Daniels v. Atlanta Natl League Baseball Club, 240 Ga. App. 751; 524 S.E.2d 801; 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 4255
Posted: November 19, 2026 Filed under: Georgia | Tags: amusement, concert, Slip and Fall, Venue Leave a commentDaniels v. Atlanta Natl League Baseball Club, 240 Ga. App. 751; 524 S.E.2d 801; 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 4255
New candy apple mixture hardens to concrete, creating an innocent-looking trap for little old ladies.
Daniels v. Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club
Court of Appeals of Georgia
November 10, 1999, Decided
A99A1183.
Reporter
240 Ga. App. 751 *; 524 S.E.2d 801 **; 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 4255
DANIELS v. ATLANTA NATIONAL LEAGUE BASEBALL CLUB, INC.
Prior History: Slip and fall. Fulton State Court. Before Judge Carnes, Senior Judge.
Disposition: Judgment affirmed.
Counsel: G. Samuel Burnette, for appellant.
Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Bradley S. Wolff, Michael H. Friedman, for appellee.
Judges: PHIPPS, Judge. Blackburn, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur.
Opinion by: PHIPPS
Opinion
[**802] [*751] PHIPPS, Judge.
Geraldine Daniels, a slip and fall plaintiff, has the burden of proving negligence by showing initially that the defendant, the Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. (the Atlanta Braves), had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance that caused her to fall while exiting Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium at the end of a baseball game. The trial court granted the Atlanta Braves’ motion for summary judgment because Daniels did not come forward with evidence that the Atlanta Braves had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard. Daniels appeals that order. Because we find that it would be unduly burdensome, if not impossible, for the Atlanta Braves to implement inspection procedures to address this particular situation, we affirm.
On July 8, 1994, Daniels attended an Atlanta Braves baseball game at Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium. She was an invitee of the Atlanta Braves. While exiting the stadium at the end of the game, Daniels slipped and fell on either a cup or liquid from the cup as she was walking down the stairs. Daniels contends the Atlanta Braves are liable for her injuries from the fall because they failed to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe as required by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. 1
[*752] At deposition, Daniels testified she did not know who dropped the cup on the stairs or how long it was there before she fell. She also testified that, at the time she fell, there were no employees of the Atlanta Braves or of the stadium in the immediate area.
We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo to determine if the evidence demonstrates any genuine issue of material fact. 2 To prevail, the moving party must demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of any material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, support judgment as a matter of law. 3 “A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff’s case.” 4
To prove negligence in a slip and fall premises liability case, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance, and (2) the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from [**803] discovering it. 5 Daniels does not claim the Atlanta Braves had actual knowledge of the hazard which caused her fall. To establish constructive knowledge, Daniels must show that (1) an employee of the Atlanta Braves was in the immediate area of the hazard and could have easily seen the substance, or (2) the foreign substance remained long enough that ordinary diligence by the Atlanta Braves should have discovered it. 6
Because no employees of the Atlanta Braves or of the stadium were in the immediate area when Daniels fell, she must use the second method of proving constructive knowledge.
Constructive knowledge may be inferred when there is evidence that the owner lacked a reasonable inspection procedure. In order to prevail at summary judgment based on lack of constructive knowledge, the owner must demonstrate not only that it had a reasonable inspection program in place, but that such program was actually carried out at the time of the incident. 7
[*753] Generally, on a motion for summary judgment, the owner must demonstrate its inspection procedures before the plaintiff must show how long the hazard has been present. 8 But it would be unduly burdensome, if not impossible, for the Atlanta Braves to perform an inspection for trash on the stairs while tens of thousands of spectators are exiting the stadium.
While not an insurer of the invitee’s safety, the owner/occupier is required to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee from unreasonable risks of harm of which the owner/occupier has superior knowledge. The owner/occupier owes persons invited to enter the premises a duty of ordinary care to have the premises in a reasonably safe condition and not to expose the invitees to unreasonable risk or to lead them into a dangerous trap. 9
The cup on the steps was not an unexpected hazard at the end of the game. Just as a fan expects and assumes the risk of wild pitches, foul balls, and unintentionally thrown bats, a fan should reasonably expect and assume that trash will be dropped on the premises by the thousands of other fans exiting the stadium at the end of a game. The risk of a cup sitting on the aisle steps is not an “unreasonable risk of harm” for one exiting a baseball stadium at the end of a game.
Furthermore, requiring the Atlanta Braves to remove every article left by its fans, especially in the circumstances here when thousands of fans are in the aisles and on the steps, would effectively make the Atlanta Braves the insurer of the safety of all fans. And, accomplishment of this task would place too great a burden on the proprietor and the fans. Thousands of fans would be detained in their seats, long after the game was over, waiting for the aisles to be inspected.
Because we have found that inspection procedures under the specific circumstances presented here would be unduly burdensome, if not impossible, the burden now shifts to Daniels to come forward with some evidence of how long the cup and liquid were on the steps before her fall. Daniels admits that she cannot meet this burden. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Atlanta Braves.
Judgment affirmed. Blackburn, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur.
1 O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 provides that an owner or occupier of land is liable to an invitee for injuries caused by his negligent failure to keep the premises safe.
2 Howell v. Styles, 221 Ga. App. 781, 784 (4) (472 S.E.2d 548) (1996).
3 Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 S.E.2d 474) (1991).
4 (Emphasis omitted.) Id.
5 Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 736 (1) (493 S.E.2d 403) (1997).
6 Brown v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 228 Ga. App. 629, 631 (3) (b) (493 S.E.2d 196) (1997).
7 Avery v. Cleveland Avenue Motel, 239 Ga. App. 644, 645-646 (2) (521 S.E.2d 668) (1999); see Ingles Markets v. Martin, 236 Ga. App. 810, 811 (513 S.E.2d 536) (1999); Straughter v. J. H. Harvey Co., 232 Ga. App. 29, 30 (1) (500 S.E.2d 353) (1998).
8 Id.
9 (Citations omitted.) Robinson, supra at 740.
Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 2022 COA 57; 516 P.3d 946
Posted: November 1, 2026 Filed under: Colorado, Contract | Tags: Bridge of Contract, College, Contract, Freshman, Students, University Leave a commentDoe v. Univ. of Denver, 2022 COA 57; 516 P.3d 946
To read an analysis of this case, see: Freshman Gets Close; University Gets Stung
Doe v. Univ. of Denver
Court of Appeals of Colorado, Division Seven
May 26, 2022, Decided
Court of Appeals No. 20CA1545
Reporter
2022 COA 57 *; 516 P.3d 946 **
John Doe, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. University of Denver; University of Denver Board of Trustees; Rebecca Chopp, individually and as an agent for University of Denver; Kristin Olson, individually and as an agent for University of Denver; Jean McAllister, individually and as an agent for University of Denver; Siri Slater, individually and as an agent for University of Denver; Eric Butler, individually and as an agent for University of Denver, Defendants-Appellees.
Subsequent History: Writ of certiorari granted, in part, Writ of certiorari denied, in part Univ. of Denver v. Doe, 2023 Colo. LEXIS 209, 2023 WL 2372557 (Colo., Mar. 6, 2023)
Reversed by, in part, Affirmed by, in part, Remanded by Univ. of Denv. v. Doe, 2024 CO 27, 2024 Colo. LEXIS 368 (May 6, 2024)
Prior History: City and County of Denver District Court No. 19CV33640. Honorable Morris B. Hoffman, Judge.
Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141523, 2019 WL 3943858 (D. Colo., Aug. 20, 2019)
Disposition: JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Counsel: Campbell Killin Brittan & Ray, LLC, Michael Mirabella, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Jimmy Goh, Erin Mangum, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Opinion by JUDGE BERGER. Brown and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Opinion by: BERGER
Opinion
[**949] [*P1] John Doe appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the University of Denver (DU), its board of trustees, and the individuals responsible for the investigation and adjudication that culminated in John’s expulsion for non-consensual sexual contact with Jane Roe.1
[*P2] This case requires us to decide two questions of first impression in Colorado. First, are DU’s Office of Equal Opportunity Procedures 2015-2016 (Aug. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/6TDL-4M6S (OEO Procedures), regarding student sexual misconduct investigations sufficiently definite to be enforceable in contract? Second, what tort duties, if any, does a private educational institution owe its students when investigating and adjudicating claims of sexual misconduct by its students?
[*P3] We hold that DU’s OEO Procedures regarding student sexual misconduct investigations are sufficiently certain to be enforced under Colorado contract law. We also hold that a private educational institution owes a duty, independent of any contractual promises, to adopt fair procedures and to implement those procedures with reasonable care when investigating and adjudicating claims of sexual misconduct by one student against another. We also hold, however, that a university’s trustees, employees, and agents do not owe this tort duty.
[*P4] Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
- Relevant Facts and Procedural History
[*P5] We glean the following facts from multiple sources, including John’s, Jane’s, and other witnesses’ written submissions to DU, the correspondence between John and DU’s investigators, and the facts found in the final investigation report. No evidentiary [**950] hearing on the disputed facts was ever held. We recite these facts solely to guide our legal analysis; none of the stated facts is binding on the district court on remand.
- John and Jane’s Relationship
[*P6] In fall 2015, John and Jane enrolled as undergraduate students at DU. In January 2016, they began a romantic relationship in which they sometimes spent the night with each other but did not engage in sexual intercourse. In February 2016, the relationship cooled, and they interacted with each other less often.
[*P7] On a Friday in early March 2016, Jane was drinking alcohol with friends in a dorm and later at a bar. Jane wanted to talk to John, so after Jane returned to the dorm where both she and John lived, she attempted to locate John. After finding John in his friend’s dormroom, where he had also been drinking alcohol, Jane brought him to her dormroom. They began kissing and engaging in sexual contact but did not engage in sexual intercourse that night.
[*P8] John and Jane dispute the events that occurred the following morning. John claimed that he awoke to find Jane on top of him attempting to engage in intercourse. They then engaged in consensual sexual intercourse “for a very brief time.” At some point, Jane abruptly left the room. About ten minutes later, she returned and wanted to talk about their relationship. John was unwilling to discuss their relationship and returned to his room.
[*P9] Jane’s version of the Saturday morning events differed materially. She said that she woke up naked to find John fondling her genitals and kissing her. She claimed that John then had sexual intercourse with her without her consent.
[*P10] After hearing John discuss the incident with others at a party and after returning from spring break to discover that John had told additional people about their sexual encounter, Jane filed a complaint with DU’s Office of Equal Opportunity (OEO).2
- The OEO Procedures
[*P11] As part of the enrollment process, John received a copy of the OEO Procedures. The OEO Procedures provide that DU will make an initial assessment when a report alleges a violation of a DU policy. OEO Procedures at XI.A. “Where the initial assessment concludes that Corrective Action and/or Outcomes may be appropriate, [DU] will initiate an investigation.” Id. at XI.E.
[*P12] The OEO Procedures require DU to designate either an employee of DU or an external investigator to conduct the investigation. Id. They require that “[a]ny investigator chosen to conduct the investigation must be impartial and free of any actual conflict of interest.” Id. The OEO Procedures contain various provisions designed to ensure that an investigation is “thorough, impartial and fair.” Id.
[*P13] At the conclusion of the investigation, the investigator must prepare a “written report that summarizes the information gathered and synthesizes the areas of agreement and disagreement between the parties.” Id. at XI.F. In preparing the report, “the investigator will review all facts gathered to determine whether the information is material to the determination of responsibility given the nature of the allegation. In general, the investigator may exclude information that is immaterial.” Id. Before the report is finalized, the complainant and respondent are given an opportunity to review the preliminary report and offer oral and written comments. Id.
[*P14] Upon receipt of additional information from the complainant or respondent, “the investigator will make a finding as to whether there is sufficient information to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a policy violation occurred. The final written report will include the determination of responsibility and the rationale for the determination.” Id.
[*P15] “When there is a determination of responsibility for a policy violation[,] the [**951] [OEO] will refer the matter to the appropriate administrator for Corrective Action or Outcomes.” Id. at XI.H.1. If the respondent is a student, the matter is then referred to the Outcome Council. Id. at XI.I. The OEO Procedures direct the Outcome Council to “mak[e] a neutral and impartial review of investigations and findings, and impos[e] outcomes (sanctions).” Id. at XIII.B.1. “In general[,] violations of the non-consensual sexual contact provision of [the OEO] Procedures typically result in a dismissal . . . .” Id. at XIII.D. Once the Outcome Council renders a finding, it issues a letter describing the outcome and appeal options. Id. at XIII.E. The OEO Procedures provide that “[a]ppeal decisions are final.” Id. at XIII.F.
- The Investigation
[*P16] On March 24, 2016, the OEO received Jane’s complaint. The Title IX Coordinator reached out to Jane that same day and held an informational meeting with her in early April. On April 12, Jane requested a formal investigation.
[*P17] In late April, the Title IX Coordinator gave John notice of Jane’s allegations and issued a “no contact order” to John.3 John submitted to a formal interview with the investigators in early May. John provided the names of five people he wanted the investigators to interview: his mother, his legal counsel, his therapist, and two students. In addition to Jane and John, the investigators interviewed eleven witnesses whom Jane had identified.
[*P18] Before submitting her complaint to the OEO, Jane underwent a sexual assault nurse examination (SANE). During the investigation, she submitted portions of the SANE report. The portions she submitted described a dozen observable abrasions and contusions on her body. Jane did not submit, however, (1) photographs of her abrasions and contusions; (2) summaries by the SANE nurse or the attending physician; or (3) her written statement to the SANE nurse regarding the source of her injuries. The portions of the SANE report that Jane submitted did not include any medical analysis as to the possible cause or age of her injuries.
[*P19] Though the preliminary report is not in the record, the final report states that John and Jane “were given the opportunity to review the preliminary report and offer any factual clarifications and additional relevant information related to the statements.” After he reviewed the investigators’ preliminary report, John realized that the investigators had not interviewed any of his witnesses and again requested that the investigators interview them. The investigators then interviewed one of John’s witnesses — his therapist.
[*P20] The investigators declined to interview the other witnesses John identified even though some of those witnesses — students — were in the dormroom with him when Jane came and brought him back to her dormroom on the night in question. The final report stated that interviews of John’s witnesses were unnecessary because “the [i]nvestigators had already interviewed witnesses [who] could corroborate the information that [John] expected them to provide.”
[*P21] The final report further acknowledged that Jane had not produced the complete SANE report but nevertheless concluded that the portions of the report she had submitted corroborated Jane’s version of events.
[*P22] The final report concluded, “it is more likely than not that [John] engaged in non-consensual sexual contact with [Jane] on the morning in question.”
[*P23] Shortly after the final report was issued, John was informed that the Outcome Council “determined that dismissal is the only reasonable outcome” and that his dismissal from DU was effective immediately.
[*P24] John appealed, alleging that the investigators’ “strong bias” affected their ability to conduct a “fair and equal investigation.” He also alleged that the outcome was “disproportionate to the violation.” John’s appeal was denied, constituting “a final decision, with no further route of appeal.”
[**952] D. The Federal and State Lawsuits
[*P25] Following his expulsion, John sued DU, its trustees, and the individuals responsible for the investigation and adjudication in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. He pleaded federal claims, including a violation of his rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. See Doe v. Univ. of Denver, Civ. A. No. 17-cv-01962, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141523, 2019 WL 3943858, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 20, 2019) (unpublished opinion), rev’d and remanded, 1 F.4th 822 (10th Cir. 2021). He also pleaded state law claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and negligence. Id.
[*P26] After the federal district court granted summary judgment on the federal claims in favor of all defendants and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice, John filed the lawsuit underlying this appeal in Denver District Court, raising the same four state law claims he originally brought in federal court.
[*P27] The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, which the district court granted. As to John’s contract claim (including his claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing), the court concluded that DU’s promise of a “thorough, impartial and fair” investigation was too vague to be enforced. The district court also rejected John’s negligence claim, holding that DU did not owe John an “extra-contractual duty to non-negligently investigate claims of sexual assault by one student against another.”4 John appeals.
[*P28] After completion of briefing in this court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the federal district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on John’s Title IX claim against DU. Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 1 F.4th 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2021). The Tenth Circuit’s opinion identified several inconsistencies and deficiencies in DU’s investigation of John and concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether DU’s investigation discriminated against John based on sex in violation of Title IX. Id. at 832-34.5
- Standard of Review
[*P29] We review summary judgments de novo. Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 347 P.3d 606, 2015 CO 25, ¶ 19. Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” C.R.C.P. 56(c); see also Mullen v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co., 2021 COA 149, ¶ 14, 507 P.3d 73.
III. The OEO Procedures are Sufficiently Definite and Certain to be Enforced Under Colorado Contract Law
[*P30] John claims that DU violated its OEO Procedures and thereby breached its contract with him by failing to conduct a “thorough, impartial and fair” investigation. See OEO Procedures at XI.E. He also claims that DU violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
[*P31] The fundamental question presented to us is whether the term in the OEO Procedures providing for a “thorough, impartial and fair” investigation is sufficiently definite to be enforceable in contract.
[*P32] While no Colorado appellate court has addressed this question, other courts have. Some courts have concluded that contractual terms like “fundamental fairness” and “basic fairness” are sufficiently definite and certain to be enforced under contract law. See Goodman v. President & Trs. of Bowdoin Coll., [**953] 135 F. Supp. 2d 40, 57 (D. Me. 2001); see also Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 572 (D. Mass. 2016).
[*P33] Other courts have concluded that general statements promising a safe and healthy workplace or that dissertation committee members would be involved in a “very active manner” are insufficiently certain to be enforced under contract law. See Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1465 (10th Cir. 1994); Borwick v. Univ. of Denver Bd. of Trs., Civ. A. No. 11-cv-01216, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37763, 2013 WL 1149543, at *8 (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2013) (unpublished opinion), aff’d, 569 F. App’x 602 (10th Cir. 2014).
[*P34] The district court in this case reasoned that the term “thorough, impartial and fair” was not sufficiently definite to create an enforceable contract under Colorado law. Based on the specific investigation and adjudication procedures contained in the OEO Procedures, including the words “thorough, impartial and fair,” we disagree.
- Contract Law
[*P35] To recover for breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the plaintiff’s performance or some justification for nonperformance; (3) the defendant’s failure to perform; and (4) damages to the plaintiff.6 W. Distrib. Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Colo. 1992).
[*P36] Colorado appellate courts have recognized that “[t]he basic relationship between a student and an educational institution is contractual in nature.” CenCor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 398 (Colo. 1994); see also Davis v. Regis Coll., Inc., 830 P.2d 1098, 1100 (Colo. App. 1991). “Materials actually provided to a student, including enrollment agreements and catalogs, may become part of the agreement.” CenCor, 868 P.2d at 398. But contract claims regarding “the general quality of educational experiences provided to students have generally been rejected.” Id.
[*P37] “If the parties fail to agree to sufficiently definite and certain terms, there is no meeting of the minds and, hence, no valid contract.” Schmidt v. Frankewich, 819 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Colo. App. 1991). On the other hand, contract terms that are “sufficiently definite to enable the court to determine whether the contract has been performed or not” are enforceable. Stice v. Peterson, 144 Colo. 219, 224, 355 P.2d 948, 952 (1960) (quoting Newton Oil. Co. v. Bockhold, 115 Colo. 510, 518, 176 P.2d 904, 908 (1946)).
[*P38] Contract interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Ad Two, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 9 P.3d 373, 376 (Colo. 2000). “The primary goal of contract interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the parties. The intent of the parties to a contract is to be determined primarily from the language of the instrument itself.” Id. (citation omitted). When interpreting a contract, all terms must be viewed in the context of the contract as a whole. Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 108 P.3d 288, 293 (Colo. 2005). Contract language “must be examined and construed in harmony with the plain and generally accepted meaning of the words employed.” AdTwo, Inc., 9 P.3d at 376. “The meaning of a contract is found by examination of the entire instrument and not by viewing clauses or phrases in isolation.” U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 842 P.2d 208, 213 (Colo. 1992).
- The OEO Procedures on Investigations
[*P39] Section XI.E of the OEO Procedures provides as follows:
The investigation is designed to provide a fair and reliable gathering of the facts. The investigation will be thorough, impartial and fair, and all individuals will be treated with appropriate sensitivity and respect. . . .
[**954] The investigator will conduct interviews as necessary, review documents, and any other relevant information concerning the alleged discriminatory acts. The parties may provide any relevant information to the investigator, including the names of witnesses to contact and/or documents to review at any time before the investigation is closed. The Complainant and Respondent will have an equal opportunity to be heard, to submit information, and to identify witnesses who may have relevant information. Witnesses must have observed the acts in question or have information relevant to the incident and cannot be participating solely to speak about an individual’s character. Investigators will review and determine the weight and materiality of all submitted information and including the necessity of interviewing potential witnesses.
. . . .
After [DU] decides to move forward with an investigation and the complainant’s initial interview is completed, the Respondent will be notified by Title IX or Equal Opportunity staff that an investigation has been initiated. They will be notified in writing and invited to an informational meeting to review the process and the resources available to them throughout the process. . . .
After the respondent has completed the informational meeting or the initial ten (10) business days from receiving notice have passed, the respondent will be invited to complete an initial interview with an investigator. . . .
In most cases, investigators will have follow-up questions for the complainant and respondent after their respective initial interviews. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
- Application
[*P40] The words “thorough,” “impartial,” and “fair” are not defined in the OEO Procedures’ definitional section. But that does not end our inquiry. Instead, when we examine the entire document, rather than view the words “thorough, impartial and fair” in isolation, we are able to ascertain the parties’ intent. The specific investigation requirements give meaning to the words “thorough, impartial and fair” and are sufficiently definite to determine whether the contractual terms have been performed or breached.
[*P41] Consider the following provision in the OEO Procedures: “The Complainant and Respondent will have an equal opportunity to be heard, to submit information, and to identify witnesses who may have relevant information.” OEO Procedures at XI.E. Evidence that the investigators interviewed eleven of the witnesses Jane identified but only one of the five witnesses John identified might allow a fact finder to conclude that DU breached its contractual promise of a “thorough, impartial and fair” investigation.
[*P42] The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania engaged in a similar analysis. Doe v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 270 F. Supp. 3d 799, 813-14 (E.D. Pa. 2017). The University of Pennsylvania’s disciplinary procedures promised a “thorough and fair investigation” and a “fair and impartial” hearing. Id. at 813. Because the promise of a “thorough and fair investigation” was “immediately followed by a description of the precise procedures that the investigating officer and his team w[ould] follow,” the court concluded that the investigation the parties contemplated was that set forth in the procedures immediately following the promise of such an investigation, even though the promise of a “thorough and fair investigation” and a “fair and impartial” hearing may not have been, by themselves, sufficiently certain to support a breach of contract claim. Id. at 813-14.
[*P43] Applying principles of Colorado contract law to construe DU’s promise of a “thorough, impartial and fair” investigation with reference to the entirety of the OEO Procedures related to investigations, we conclude that the contractual term providing for a “thorough, impartial and fair” investigation is sufficiently definite and certain to be enforced.
[*P44] In resolving this question, we need not decide, and therefore express no opinion, whether the terms “thorough,” “impartial,” and “fair,” standing by themselves, would be [**955] sufficiently certain and definite to be enforceable under Colorado contract law. See Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 217-18 (D. Mass. 2017) (denying the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings because the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts from which the court could plausibly infer that the investigation was inadequate under policies that promised a “thorough, impartial and fair” investigation).
[*P45] We also do not identify which specific investigation procedures inform the contractual term providing for a “thorough, impartial and fair” investigation. Our holding is limited to concluding that the contractual term providing for a “thorough, impartial and fair” investigation, coupled with the prescribed investigation requirements, is sufficiently definite and certain to be enforced under Colorado contract law.
- Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluded Summary Judgment on John’s Contract Claim Against DU
[*P46] Having concluded that the OEO Procedures are sufficiently definite to be enforced in contract, we turn to whether the record permitted summary judgment in favor of DU on John’s contract claim. We hold that it did not.
[*P47] At the outset, we note that the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Doe held that summary judgment was improperly granted on John’s Title IX claim; neither the federal district court nor the Tenth Circuit addressed John’s state law claims. 1 F.4th at 825.
[*P48] Nevertheless, at least some of the factual questions relevant to John’s Title IX claim are equally relevant to his state law claims, as he argued on appeal to us. And although we are not bound by the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Doe, either under the law of the case doctrine or otherwise, we conclude that its analysis is persuasive and relevant to our consideration of whether genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in this case. See Monez v. Reinertson, 140 P.3d 242, 245 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[W]e are not bound by decisions of lower federal courts.”); Kuhn v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 897 P.2d 792, 795 (Colo. 1995) (explaining the law of the case doctrine).
[*P49] First, John alleges (and the record supports the allegation) that the investigators did not consider Jane’s possible improper motivations for filing the complaint against John. As the Tenth Circuit noted, Jane admitted to investigators that she filed her complaint only after learning that John had allegedly told other classmates about their sexual encounter. Doe, 1 F.4th at 833. Jane initially did not tell her classmates she thought the encounter was a sexual assault or nonconsensual; “[i]t was not until later — after Jane saw John talking to another young woman at a party — that she began telling people the encounter was not consensual.” Id. So far as the record reveals, the investigators apparently did not consider or address in the preliminary or final reports any of these motivations for a sexual assault charge.
[*P50] Second, John points to the eleven witnesses whom the investigators interviewed at Jane’s request. Through the preparation of the preliminary report, DU rejected John’s request to interview any of his proposed witnesses. Only after issuance of the preliminary report and John’s second request that his supporting witnesses be interviewed did the investigators interview one of his five requested witnesses: his therapist. The OEO Procedures state that the “Complainant and Respondent will have an equal opportunity to be heard, to submit information, and to identify witnesses who may have relevant information.” OEO Procedures at XI.E.
[*P51] As the Tenth Circuit persuasively explained, two of the witnesses whom John requested be interviewed were his roommate and one of his close friends, both of whom he told about the sexual encounter “very shortly after it happened.” Doe, 1 F.4th at 832. Perhaps more importantly, these same witnesses also had “witnessed interactions between John and Jane in the hours surrounding the alleged assault.” Id. The potential relevance of information provided by such witnesses is obvious.
[*P52] The investigators’ final report dismissed out of hand the potential significance of these witnesses’ knowledge, stating that [**956] John’s roommate and friend would likely only provide “duplicative” information and the investigators wanted to limit those interviewed given the private nature of the issues. But, again, as the Tenth Circuit reasoned, “the same could be said for Jane’s eleven witnesses [whom] investigators opted to interview.” Id. We therefore conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether John received an “equal opportunity to be heard, to submit information, and to identify witnesses who may have relevant information.” See OEO Procedures at XI.E.
[*P53] The failure of the investigators to consider Jane’s entire SANE report also gave the Tenth Circuit pause. We acknowledge that DU may not have had legal authority to compel production of the full SANE report. But the fact that the investigators relied on selective portions of the SANE report (chosen by Jane) to reach the conclusions in the final report has obvious consequences regarding the reliability of the findings made in reliance on the incomplete SANE report. As the Tenth Circuit observed, a complete SANE report includes “summaries by the SANE nurse, the attending physician, and the patient’s written statement regarding the source of the injuries.” Id. at 833. The investigators did not consider any of this information because Jane elected not to provide it.
[*P54] Although the final report acknowledged that Jane had not provided the complete SANE report, it nevertheless relied on the self-selected portions of the SANE report, stating that it “seem[ed] to corroborate [Jane’s] assertion that [John] was ‘manipulating’ her body by ‘grabbing and pushing’ her legs aside before forcibly putting his penis inside her.” The final report concluded that the information from the SANE that Jane provided corroborated her version of events but discounted other SANE information that might have been included as speculative. But without the other information not produced — specifically a medical cause for her injuries and a date of injury — it is at least open to question by a fact finder whether the investigators and DU thoroughly, impartially, and fairly “review[ed] and determine[d] the weight and materiality of all submitted information” as section XI.E of the OEO Procedures required.
[*P55] We reject DU’s argument that John has presented no facts, other than his mere disagreement with the result of the investigation, to support his breach of contract claim. Instead, we hold that the arguable deficiencies in DU’s investigation identified above and in Doe create genuine issues of material fact as to whether DU abided by its contractual commitments to provide a “thorough, impartial and fair” investigation as provided in the OEO Procedures before it expelled John based on its finding that he had engaged in non-consensual sexual contact.7
- Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluded Summary Judgment on John’s Contract Claim Against DU Premised on a Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
[*P56] A breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is one way that a party can breach a contract. See City of Golden v. Parker, 138 P.3d 285, 292 (Colo. 2006). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to every contract in Colorado. Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 462, 466 (Colo. 2003). The duty of good faith and fair dealing applies “when the manner of performance under a specific contract term allows for discretion on the part of either party.” Parker, 138 P.3d at 292 (quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 498 (Colo. 1995)). “Whether a party acted in good faith is a question of fact which must be determined on a case by case basis.” Amoco Oil Co., 908 P.2d at 499.
[*P57] As illustrated above, many of the OEO Procedures allow for DU’s investigators to act with discretion. For example: “Investigators will review and determine the weight and materiality of all submitted information [**957] and including the necessity of interviewing potential witnesses.” OEO Procedures XI.E.
[*P58] For the same reasons identified above, see supra Part III.D, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on John’s breach of contract claim premised on a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
[*P59] We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment dismissing John’s contract claim (including his claim based on breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing) and remand for further proceedings, including, if necessary, a jury trial.
- Colorado Law Recognizes a Tort Duty of Care Owed by DU
[*P60] John asserts, as he did in the district court, that DU owed him a tort duty of care, independent of DU’s contractual obligations, to adopt fair procedures and to implement those procedures with reasonable care when it investigated and adjudicated the allegations against him. The district court held that no such duty exists under Colorado law and granted summary judgment to all defendants on that basis.
[*P61] We disagree with the district court as to DU and hold that it owed John that duty of care. We also conclude that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on his negligence claim. But, because we agree with the district court that the trustees, employees, and agents owed no tort duty of care, we affirm the summary judgment as to them.
- Applicable Law
[*P62] As discussed above, we review summary judgments de novo. Westin, ¶ 19.
[*P63] To prevail on a claim that a person breached a duty of care, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered an injury; and (4) the cause of the injury was the defendant’s conduct. Id. at ¶ 23. “Whether a defendant owes a legal duty to a plaintiff is a question of law.” Id. at ¶ 18.
[*P64] In a series of cases, the Colorado Supreme Court has identified a nonexhaustive list of public policy factors that bear on whether Colorado law recognizes a duty of care in tort. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 33; HealthONE v. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879, 888 (Colo. 2002); Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530, 536 (Colo. 1993); Taco Bell v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 46 (Colo. 1987); Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54. 57 (Colo. 1987).8
[*P65] To determine whether a duty should be recognized, we assess (1) the risk involved in the defendant’s conduct; (2) the foreseeability and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the defendant’s conduct; (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury; and (4) the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant. Westin, ¶ 33; HealthONE, 50 P.3d at 888. As the supreme court has said, no one single factor is dispositive, as “the question of whether a duty should be imposed in a particular case is essentially one of fairness under contemporary standards — whether reasonable persons would recognize a duty and agree that it exists.” Taco Bell, 744 P.2d at 46. We address each factor in turn.
- DU Owed John a Duty of Care in Investigating and Adjudicating the Allegations of Non-Consensual Sexual Contact9
- Application of the Westin Factors
- The Risk Involved in DU’s Conduct
[*P66] The risks involved in investigating and adjudicating claims of non-consensual [**958] sexual contact are palpable and severe. A mere allegation of sexual misconduct can be devastating to the accused. A determination that a person engaged in non-consensual sexual contact can potentially destroy the accused’s educational, employment, and other future prospects. Here, DU found John responsible for non-consensual sexual contact.
[*P67] The OEO Procedures outline the range of possible outcomes when a policy violation is found, stating that “violations of the non-consensual sexual contact provision of these Procedures typically result in a dismissal.” OEO Procedures at XIII.D. A student who is dismissed “is permanently prohibited from participating in any University activities, academic or otherwise, and will be restricted from all University Premises and activities.” Id. Additionally, “Student Conduct files of students who have been dismissed from the University will be kept indefinitely” and may be provided to educational institutions, employers, or others. Id. at XIII.H.
[*P68] We are hard pressed to find another activity by a private educational institution that can be so devastating and long-lasting in the life of a student.
- The Foreseeability and Likelihood of Injury Weighed Against the Social Utility of DU’s Conduct
[*P69] Injuries resulting from procedurally faulty investigations and adjudications of allegations of non-consensual sexual contact are foreseeable and likely. Under the foreseeability factor, “it is not necessary that the tortfeasor be able to foresee the exact nature and extent of the injuries or the precise manner in which the injuries occur, but only that some injury will likely result in some manner as a consequence of his negligent acts.” HealthONE, 50 P.3d at 889. Indeed, here, such injury to a student resulting from a negligently handled investigation is foreseeable. “When a university levies charges against a student without proper investigation or allows a biased committee to decide the student’s guilt, the foreseeability of harm to the student is great.” Scott R. Sinson, Note, Judicial Intervention of Private University Expulsions: Traditional Remedies and a Solution Sounding in Tort, 46 Drake L. Rev. 195, 226 (1997).
[*P70] A student who is dismissed after the culmination of a partial or unfair investigation will likely suffer a diminished earning capacity and stigma from the expulsion, and may be prevented from engaging in their chosen profession. See Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (“Since his dismissal, the plaintiff has applied to and been rejected by every dental school in the United States, Canada and Puerto Rico.”), aff’d, 579 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1978).
[*P71] On the other hand, the social utility of investigations and adjudications of allegations of non-consensual sexual contact is significant. Private educational institutions have a substantial interest in protecting their students and preventing those who engage in non-consensual sexual contact from using their facilities or interacting with other students.
[*P72] Congress enacted Title IX with the express goal that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Title IX’s implementing regulations provide a grievance process for formal complaints of sexual harassment. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45 (2021).
[*P73] When we weigh the significant foreseeability and likelihood of injury against the significant social utility, we conclude on balance that “the seriousness of the potential harm militates in favor of imposing a duty.” Westin, ¶ 35.
- The Magnitude of the Burden of Guarding Against the Injury
[*P74] The magnitude of the burden imposed on DU of guarding against the injury [**959] is significant. Training employees to use fair procedures in investigating and adjudicating allegations of non-consensual sexual contact and overseeing such investigations and adjudications demands both economic and personnel resources.
[*P75] Accordingly, this factor weighs against recognizing a duty of care.
- The Consequences of Placing the Burden on DU
[*P76] In applying this factor, the Taco Bell court explained that the consequences of placing the burden of taking reasonable measures to protect restaurant patrons from criminal acts of third persons “would result in some economic burden on Taco Bell and a predictable corresponding increase to customers in the cost of Taco Bell’s food products.” 744 P.2d at 49. The reasonable measures in Taco Bell included “making sure the restaurant is well illuminated, installing highly visible video cameras, keeping small amounts of cash in the registers, posting signs,” training employees, and locking doors at night. Id. The court concluded it was equitable for the costs of these reasonable measures to “be borne by the owner, operator, and, indirectly, the customers of the restaurant.” Id.
[*P77] Likewise, here, the burden of imposing a duty to use fair procedures when investigating and adjudicating claims of improper sexual conduct by students will undoubtedly result in an economic and personnel burden on DU. For example, DU might be required to provide additional training and resources to, and maintain oversight over, its employees, particularly because the investigations may be lengthy and the persons conducting them must exercise discretion in the performance of their duties. As in Taco Bell, it is equitable for these costs to be borne by DU and, indirectly, DU’s students. Just as Taco Bell was the only actor able to take reasonable measures to protect patrons from the criminal acts of third persons, DU is the only actor able to ensure that its investigation and adjudication of a student are fair and impartial.
[*P78] The consequences of placing the burden on DU weigh in favor of recognizing a duty to adopt fair procedures and to implement those procedures with reasonable care in the investigation and adjudication of allegations of non-consensual sexual contact.
- Weighing of the Relevant Factors
[*P79] Although the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury is significant, it does not outweigh the severe risk of harm inherent in DU’s conduct, the foreseeability and likelihood of injury to a student weighed against the social utility of DU’s conduct, and the consequences of placing the burden on DU. Accordingly, we apply supreme court case law on this question and conclude that DU had a duty to adopt fair procedures and to implement those procedures with reasonable care in the investigation and adjudication of allegations that John committed non-consensual sexual contact.10
- Cases from Other Jurisdictions Support our Conclusion and Those that Don’t are Distinguishable
[*P80] No Colorado appellate court has previously addressed whether a duty of care arises in these circumstances. But courts in other jurisdictions have. Those courts have found the consequences of adjudications of far less serious misconduct sufficient to support the imposition of a tort duty of care.
[**960] [*P81] In the academic misconduct context, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim, holding that the gravity of the harm posed by the professor’s grading system was severe and that “a wrongful conviction by a disciplinary committee could ruin a student’s chances of admittance to graduate school.” Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App’x 246, 252 (6th Cir. 2005). The risks involved in investigating and adjudicating claims of non-consensual sexual contact are far more severe than the risks posed by the professor’s grading system in Atria.
[*P82] Apparently applying factors similar to those set forth by the Colorado Supreme Court in Westin, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligence claim because “a jury could find that the harm caused by the University’s allegedly and arguably haphazard implementation of its own Sexual Assault Policies was foreseeable, especially where . . . the harm was severe: a wrongful conviction by a disciplinary committee.” See Doe v. Univ. of S., No. 4:09-CV-62, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35166, 2011 WL 1258104, at *21 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2011) (unpublished opinion).
[*P83] Other courts have dismissed tort claims by students claiming they were wrongly disciplined for sexual misconduct and that the educational institutions did not properly apply their policies, concluding that the defendants owed the students no duty of care. Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 299 F. Supp. 3d 939, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff’d, 933 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2019); Jackson v. Liberty Univ., No. 6:17-CV-00041, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122104, 2017 WL 3326972, at *9 (W.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2017) (unpublished opinion); Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d at 228.
[*P84] Those courts largely rely on the common law principle that, absent a special relationship, a party owes no duty of care to protect another from the harmful or criminal acts of third persons. Columbia Coll. Chi., 299 F. Supp. 3d at 962; Jackson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122104, 2017 WL 3326972, at *9; Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d at 228.
[*P85] Those cases are inapposite because John does not allege that DU had a duty to protect him from the harmful or criminal acts of third persons. Instead, he alleges that DU itself harmed him by negligently conducting the investigation and determining that he engaged in non-consensual sexual contact.
[*P86] Even assuming these cases rejected the imposition of a duty owed to a student being disciplined due to a negligent investigation, the supreme court has provided binding guidance on the relevant factors to be applied to ascertain whether such a tort duty exists. Westin, ¶ 25.
- DU’s Arguments Do Not Support the District Court’s Dismissal of the Tort Claim Against DU
[*P87] We reject DU’s argument that a duty of care should not be recognized because “tort obligations generally arise from duties imposed by law to protect citizens from risk of physical harm or damage to their personal property.” BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 72 (Colo. 2004). DU ignores the word “generally” in that quote. It is indisputable that certain types of nonphysical harm (like reputational harm) may be as devastating or serious as physical harm. See, e.g., Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that an allegation of an extramarital affair is an allegation of serious sexual misconduct and, therefore, defamatory per se). This is such a situation, and the “general” rule does not prohibit the recognition of a tort duty in these circumstances.
[*P88] DU also relies on Williams v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 943 P.2d 10, 15-16 (Colo. App. 1996), for the proposition that Colorado does not recognize the tort of negligent investigation. Williams was an employment case; it did not address a duty that an educational institution may owe its students. Moreover, the Williams division did not consider the factors the Colorado Supreme Court articulated to determine the existence of a duty in tort. We are bound by opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court, not opinions of another division of this court. See In re Estate of Ramstetter, 411 P.3d 1043, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 40; Campbell v. People, 2020 CO 49, ¶ 41, 464 P.3d 759. We must apply the Westin factors.
[**961] [*P89] We also reject DU’s argument that “[t]he sole purpose of DU’s investigation into Jane’s allegations against John was for the benefit of either [DU] or Jane.” See Columbia Coll. Chi., 299 F. Supp. 3d at 963. This view of the investigation and adjudication misses the relevant point entirely. When a university adjudicates allegations of non-consensual sexual contact, the consequences of that determination rest almost entirely on the student found responsible. We acknowledge that the purpose of the investigation can also be for the benefit of either DU or Jane (or both). But the burden and detriment of an unfair investigation and adjudication is borne almost entirely by John.
[*P90] Nor are we prohibited from recognizing a duty of care in non-consensual sexual contact investigations and adjudications because of the courts’ uniform rejection of educational malpractice claims. See, e.g., Tolman v. CenCor Career Colls., Inc., Div. of CenCor, Inc., 851 P.2d 203, 205 (Colo. App. 1992) (holding that there is no cause of action for educational malpractice), aff’d sub nom. CenCor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1994). Requiring procedural fairness in the investigation and adjudication of allegations of non-consensual sexual contact has little or nothing to do with an amorphous claim of educational malpractice.
[*P91] In this case, we determine as a matter of law that DU owed John a duty in that his “interest that has been infringed by the conduct of the defendant is entitled to legal protection.” HealthONE, 50 P.3d at 888 (quoting Metro. Gas Repair Serv., Inc. v. Kulik, 621 P.2d 313, 317 (Colo. 1980)).
[*P92] For all of these reasons, we conclude that DU had a duty to adopt fair procedures and to implement those procedures with reasonable care in the investigation and adjudication of the allegations against John.11 If DU adopts fair procedures and implements those procedures with reasonable care, the outcome of the investigation and adjudication is not open to question.
- The Individual Defendants Did Not Owe John a Duty of Care in Investigating and Adjudicating the Allegations of Non-Consensual Sexual Contact
- Application of the Westin Factors
[*P93] In considering the first three Westin factors as to DU’s trustees, employees, and agents, we come to the same conclusion that we did with respect to DU. But, unlike our conclusion that the consequences of placing the burden on DU weighed in favor of recognizing a duty, we conclude that the consequences of placing the burden on the individual defendants strongly weighs against recognizing a tort duty.
[*P94] Unlike DU (or Taco Bell), the individual defendants have no opportunity to pass on the costs of this significant burden. See Taco Bell, 744 P.2d at 49; see also Skillett v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2022 CO 12, ¶ 16 (noting, in interpreting a statute, that it would be odd to impose liability on insurance adjusters to insureds where such adjusters are not party to the insurance policy). Additionally, the consequences of placing the burden on the individual defendants would only be of slight benefit because, as we have already concluded, that burden already lies with DU.
[*P95] Accordingly, we conclude that this factor weighs against recognizing a duty of care.
- Weighing the Relevant Factors
[*P96] With respect to the individual defendants, although the risk and the foreseeability and likelihood of injury from an unfair investigation and adjudication remain high, the magnitude of the burden and the [**962] consequences of placing that burden on the individual defendants outweigh the other two factors. So, we conclude that the individual defendants did not owe John a duty of care.
[*P97] Because the individual defendants did not owe John a duty of care, John’s tort claim against the individual defendants necessarily fails and the district court correctly granted summary judgment to those defendants. See Westin, ¶ 23.
- Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluded Summary Judgment on John’s Tort Claim Against DU
[*P98] Having concluded that DU owed a duty of care in the course of its investigations and adjudications of allegations of non-consensual sexual contact, we turn to whether the record permitted summary judgment in favor of DU. We hold that it did not.
[*P99] For many of the same reasons articulated above regarding genuine issues of material fact relating to the contract claim, including the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of genuine issues of material fact related to John’s Title IX claim, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on John’s tort claim against DU.
- Disposition
[*P100] The district court’s summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The district court’s summary judgment dismissing John’s contract claim against DU is reversed, as is the summary judgment dismissing John’s tort claim against DU. The district court’s summary judgment in favor of DU’s trustees, employees, and agents is affirmed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.
1 John Doe and Jane Roe are pseudonyms used to preserve these persons’ privacy. None of the parties challenges the propriety of using pseudonyms in litigation of this type. Respecting the party presentation principle, neither do we. See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45, 476 P.3d 746.
2 This is the DU office that addresses claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688, including claims by students that another student engaged in sexual misconduct.
3 None of the parties addresses whether a private educational institution has legal authority to impose a “no contact order,” so we do not further address this question. See Galvan, ¶ 45.
4 The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on John’s promissory estoppel claim, but John does not appeal that portion of the court’s order. Accordingly, we do not further address John’s promissory estoppel claim.
5 Because the briefing in this court was completed before the Tenth Circuit announced its opinion in Doe v. University of Denver, 1 F.4th 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2021), we requested that the parties address at oral argument the effects, if any, of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion on our analysis and disposition of this appeal. They did so.
6 Under Colorado contract law, “[n]ominal damages are recoverable for a breach of contract even if no actual damages resulted or if the amount of actual damages has not been proved.” City of Westminster v. Centric-Jones Constructors, 100 P.3d 472, 481 (Colo. App. 2003). This is in contrast to a tort claim, where damages are an essential element of the claim; if a plaintiff fails to prove damages in a tort case, judgment enters in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., Nunn v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 244 P.3d 116, 121 (Colo. 2010) (“[A]s with most tort claims, proof of actual damages is an essential element of a bad faith breach of an insurance contract claim.”).
7 We emphasize that we are not resolving any of these factual issues. We have identified factual questions regarding whether DU complied with its contractual commitments that require further proceedings. But it is for the district court or a jury, as appropriate, to resolve these factual questions on remand. We express no opinion on the ultimate resolution of these questions.
8 The General Assembly may, by legislation, establish an actor’s duty of care and enact a statutory cause of action for breach of such a duty. See, e.g., § 13-20-804, C.R.S. 2021; A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass’n, 114 P.3d 862, 868 (Colo. 2005) (“[T]he General Assembly has explicitly recognized that subcontractors are under an independent duty of care.”). The Westin factors come into play only when the General Assembly has not addressed the subject matter. Neither party claims that the General Assembly has enacted relevant legislation on this subject.
9 This case requires us to decide if DU owed a tort duty to John. We are not presented with a claim by Jane that DU owed any tort duty to her. Therefore, we express no opinion on whether DU owed a similar tort duty of care to an alleged victim of non-consensual sexual contact. Nevertheless, we recognize the substantial risks to both the alleged victim and the accused of an unfair investigation and adjudication.
10 In Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 347 P.3d 606, 2015 CO 25, ¶¶ 32, 37, the supreme court relied both on the similarity of the innkeeper-guest special relationship to the hotel-guest relationship and the duty factors to conclude that “the Westin had a duty to exercise reasonable care while evicting Groh.” In the context of rejecting a duty of care in a case involving a fraternity member using a trampoline at a fraternity house, which leased the property from DU, the Colorado Supreme Court held that “the student-university relationship is not a special relationship.” Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 58, 61 (Colo. 1987) (quoting Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 160 (Colo. 1986)). But, even absent a special relationship, we conclude that the duty factors weigh in favor of recognizing a duty of care by DU. See Westin, ¶ 25 (a duty can arise from the nature of the relationship between the parties, or application of public policy factors, or both); see also HealthONE v. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879, 888-90 (Colo. 2002) (finding a duty of care notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff and physician did not have a physician-patient relationship).
11 In concluding that DU had a duty to adopt fair procedures and implement those procedures with reasonable care in the investigation and adjudication of allegations that John committed non-consensual sexual contact, we express no opinion on the applicability of the economic loss rule. Though the defendants cite Town of Alma v. AZCO Construction, Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000), in their answer brief for the proposition that “[a] breach of a duty which arises under the provisions of a contract between the parties must be redressed under contract, and a tort action will not lie,” they do not argue on appeal that the economic loss rule applies in this case. We do not address underdeveloped arguments. Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007).
Foreseeability
Posted: September 9, 2026 Filed under: Product Liability, Risk Management | Tags: Foreseeability, foreseeable Leave a commentIf it is foreseeable, then you need to understand and know it because that is part of the proof that might help you lose a lawsuit.
Accident Databases and Foreseeability
Often, in the United States, a group of people wants to build a database of accidents. The UIAA is also working on this.
In the United States, this is a bad idea; it would actually lead to more lawsuits.
Over time, it might reduce the number of injuries. However, the American Alpine Club has been producing Accidents in North American Mountaineering for decades, and the book is getting thicker, not smaller.
From a manufacturing perspective, for the database to be effective, you would have to gather much more information than a spreadsheet might provide. Photographs, weights, distances, mass, etc.
Consequently, it sounds like a great idea; however, in reality, I doubt it would have much value, except to plaintiffs wanting to sue.
From a guide and outfitter perspective, these are issues you need to add to your safety or daily briefing. You have seen your clients do or try this in the future, so you need to warn your clients about it now.
Negligence and Foreseeability
The basic lawsuit in the United States against manufacturers is a claim for negligence. There are generally four steps the plaintiff must prove to establish negligence:
1. Duty
Did the manufacturer of the product have a duty to make a product that was free from defects?
Did the manufacturer have a duty to inform the consumer of any defects or of any ways the product has or could fail?
2. Breach of Duty
Did the manufacturer fail to make a safe product?
Was it foreseeable that the product could fail in this way?
3. Injury
The plaintiff must have suffered an injury.
4. Damages
The plaintiff must have suffered damages arising from the injury.
One issue that is used to prove there was a breach of the duty is whether or not the injury was foreseeable.
Did the defendant know, or should have known, that the injury the plaintiff received was foreseeable?
Most of the time, this is the hardest issue to prove for the plaintiff and how we win lawsuits for the defendants.
However, a list of accidents would eliminate this issue in many cases. If the plaintiff can search the list and find a similar accident, then the accident was obviously foreseeable.
How Accident Information Can Become Evidence
Currently, a plaintiff’s attorney can do Google searches for similar accidents, and social media has been a big place to search for similar accidents.
Plaintiff’s attorneys can also search a database the plaintiff’s attorneys keep.
However, these searches are time-consuming and do not necessarily pull up enough information to prove foreseeability.
If foreseeability is not proved that way, and the manufacturer knew similar accidents had occurred with their product, then the plaintiff’s bar has to find an expert witness to give an opinion on foreseeability.
This is expensive and slows or stops a lot of litigation.
Foreseeability is not dependent upon a specific product, place, or time.
Meaning, if another ascender failed mountaineering three years ago because it slipped on an icy rope, it would be foreseeable that a Petzl ascender failed last month in the same situation—slipping on an icy rope.
Different manufacturers, but enough similar facts to prove foreseeability.
If another outfitter took a group of clients on a hike and several took off to see a view and a side trail, the outfitter knows that having clients leave the group is now foreseeable on this hike.
You Cannot Assume Accident Information Will Remain Private
There is also no way to protect the information from anyone.
Even if you send the information to the reporting group anonymously, the group cannot hide your information if the court issues a subpoena to compel the disclosure of the information.
The court could hold the keeper of the information in contempt for not disclosing who provided the information.
Contempt means the court could fine the keeper for each day the name of the manufacturer is not provided or even put the keeper of the information in jail.
Also, the court could compel the manufacturer to disclose whether the manufacturer ever sent information to the keeper of the information and compel the manufacturer to disclose every account that they disclosed.
So once the plaintiff can prove the manufacturer knew or should have known of the problem, the issue of foreseeability is moot.
At the same time, the plaintiff’s bar is keeping track of all lawsuits that are successful.
So, once you settle or lose a lawsuit, that information is kept in a data system that members of the plaintiff’s bar can access and use in their lawsuit.
Even if the settlement agreement says you cannot disclose the amount of the settlement, etc., all of the information that was learned prior to the settlement is placed in the repository so a quick search can dig up the issue and how to win.
So once a company and a product end up in the system, the issue of foreseeability might be moot, but we don’t need to hand over the information to begin with.
Warnings Can Help Address Foreseeability
If the knowledge is out there that it is foreseeable that a product can fail or should not be used in a specific way, another way to beat the plaintiff is to warn the consumer.
Immediately place information on the website that says:
Do not use the product this way; it may fail.
Be specific. Show examples, etc.
Manufacturers cringe when they think they need to do this, but most consumers will actually appreciate the knowledge, and courts love it.
Unexpected Uses of Products
The hardest way to look at foreseeability is in using the product in ways the manufacturer never envisioned.
A product is designed to do something. The engineers, workers, and marketing team focus on making the product a success in the thing the product was designed to do.
There are two things a manufacturer has to do to stay on top of uses of the product in ways the manufacturer never thought of or intended.
First, constantly keep testing, reviewing, and having third parties examine the product to see who would use or could use the product.
Second, constantly scan social media and athletes for information about the product and how it is being used.
Once a use is discovered that was not intended, then the manufacturer must examine all of the consequences of using the product in that new way.
Will it fail?
Can it cause an injury?
What are the effects on the product and on the other interfaces the product has?
Does this require new warnings, modification of the product manual, or getting information to the public on what this use might do?
Consider the Downstream Effects
The next step is to understand all of the downstream effects of using the product in a different way.
Will this cause harm to the user, to the interface, to anyone?
A great example of this is guides descending fixed ropes with clients who will attach an ascender to the fixed ropes.
Their clients would be roped together, with the guide being the last in line. The clients would not be attached in any way to the fixed ropes; the ascender would be on the fixed ropes facing downhill, and the guide would hold the ascender open with their thumb.
If a client or the guide fell, the guide would release the gate, and the ascender would catch the guide and clients.
The issue was that ropes, usually partially frozen, might not be able to sustain the shock loading of the ropes holding three to five people.
This, in many cases, has caused the rope to break when the ascender grabs the rope and places such a large load instantly on the ropes.
In this case, the ascender did not fail.
However, using the ascender improperly did result in injuries to people.
Consequently, notices should go out to guide companies, climbers, and the public that using the ascender in this manner is not allowed and, if done so, can result in injuries.
The Bottom Line
Foreseeability is a complicated legal issue, and this just brushes the surface of the definition and how foreseeability works.
The important part is that if you can think about a product your manufacturer made, or you hear about someone using your product in a way you did not intend, you need to respond.
About the Author
Jim Moss is an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the outdoor recreation community. He represents guides, guide services, and outfitters, both as businesses and individuals, and the products they use for their business.
He has defended Mt. Everest guide services, summer camps, climbing rope manufacturers, avalanche beacon manufacturers, and many more manufacturers and outdoor industries.
Contact Jim at Jim@Rec-Law.us.
Jim is the author or co-author of six books about legal issues in the outdoor recreation world; the latest is Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law.
To see Jim’s complete bio, visit the Jim Moss Bio page. To see his CV, visit the Curriculum Vitae page.
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New Colorado law you might want to know about if you are visiting – BEARS!
Posted: August 14, 2026 Filed under: Colorado | Tags: Bears, Colorado, Knowing Luring Bears, Luring Bears Leave a commentNegligently Luring Bears – Colorado
C.R.S. § 33-6-131
Colorado law regulates the intentional placement of food or edible waste in the open when the purpose is to lure a wild bear.
The statute in the uploaded source is C.R.S. § 33-6-131, “Knowingly luring bears.” The source identifies the statute as current through July 1, 2026, while also noting that the text was not yet final pending comparison with the Colorado Office of Legislative Legal Services.
Knowingly Luring Bears
Under the version of the statute contained in the source document:
Unless otherwise permitted by commission rule, it is unlawful for any person to place food or edible waste in the open with the intent of luring a wild bear to such food or edible waste.
The statute contains exceptions for agriculture and provides that “food or edible waste” does not include live animals or food grown in the open before the food is harvested.
Penalties Under the Prior Version
The source document states that a person violating the section would be given a warning. Upon a second or subsequent violation, the person would be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, subject to a fine not exceeding:
- $200 for a first offense;
- $1,000 for a second offense; or
- $2,000 for a third or subsequent offense.
The statutory history in the source states that the section was added in 2003 and that subsection (3) was amended in 2019.
2026 Legislative Update
Important: The law changed after the version reproduced in the uploaded document.
Colorado enacted HB 26-1342, “Negligently Luring Bears,” during the 2026 legislative session. The Colorado General Assembly reports that the bill was signed by the Governor on May 27, 2026, and that the resulting session law became effective August 12, 2026.
The legislation changes the legal standard from conduct undertaken with the intent to lure a wild bear to a standard involving knowingly placing food or edible waste in the open under circumstances where there is a reasonable probability of luring a wild bear. It also removes the prior requirement that a first offense receive a warning and increases the maximum fine for a third or subsequent offense from $2,000 to $5,000.
Consequently, the statutory language reproduced above should not be treated as the current version of Colorado law after August 12, 2026. The uploaded document reflects the earlier version of C.R.S. § 33-6-131.
Source
Colorado Revised Statutes, § 33-6-131.
Colorado General Assembly, HB 26-1342 – Negligently Luring Bears, 2026 Regular Session.
This article is provided for informational purposes and is not legal advice.
Mississippi Rep Agreements – Contracts Between Out-of-State Principals and Commissioned Sales Representatives (§§ 75-87-1 — 75-87-7)
Posted: May 26, 2026 Filed under: Contract, Mississippi | Tags: Commissions, Independent Rep, Independent Representative, Rep, statute Leave a commentMississippi Rep Agreements – Contracts Between Out-of-State Principals and Commissioned Sales Representatives (§§ 75-87-1 — 75-87-7)
Chapter 87. Contracts Between Out-of-State Principals and Commissioned Sales Representatives (§§ 75-87-1 — 75-87-7)
Table of Contents
- 75-87-1. Definitions. 1
- 75-87-3. Sales representative contract to set forth means by which commissions shall be computed and paid. 1
- 75-87-7. Action to recover commissions; triple commissions; attorney fees. 2
- 75-89-1. Short Title. 2
As used in this chapter:
(a) “Commission” means compensation accruing to a sales representative for payment by a principal, the rate of which is expressed as a percentage of the dollar amount of certain orders or sales.
(b) “Principal” means any person who does not have a permanent or fixed place of business in this state and who:
(i) Engages in the business of manufacturing, producing, importing or distributing a product or products for sale to customers who purchase such product or products for resale;
(ii) Utilizes sales representatives to solicit orders for such product or products; and
(iii) Compensates the sales representatives, in whole or in part, by commission.
(c) “Sales representative” means any person who engages in the business of soliciting, on behalf of a principal, orders for the purchase at wholesale of the product or products of the principal. The term “sales representative” shall not include a person who places orders or purchases for such person’s own account for resale or is engaged in home solicitation sales regulated pursuant to Section 75-66-1 et seq., Mississippi Code of 1972.
History
Laws, 1988, ch. 588, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1988, and it shall be applicable to contracts entered into after July 1, 1988.
75-87-3. Sales representative contract to set forth means by which commissions shall be computed and paid.
Whenever any principal enters into an oral or written contract with a sales representative for services to be rendered within this state and the contemplated method of compensation of the sales representative involves a commission, the contract shall set forth the means by which the commission shall be computed and paid.
History
Laws, 1988, ch. 588, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1988, and it shall be applicable to contracts entered into after July 1, 1988.
75-87-7. Action to recover commissions; triple commissions; attorney fees.
Any principal who fails to timely pay the sales representative as provided in Section 75-87-5, shall be liable to the sales representative in a civil action for up to triple the commissions due to the sales representative, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
History
Laws, 1988, ch. 588, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1988, and it shall be applicable to contracts entered into after July 1, 1988.
This chapter shall be know and may be cited as the “Mississippi Commodities Enforcement Act.”
History
Laws, 1993, ch. 319, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1993.
Kansas Independent Sales Rep Laws
Posted: May 11, 2026 Filed under: Contract, Kansas | Tags: Commission, Commission Owed, Independent Rep, Kansas, Rep Leave a commentKansas Rep Law – Commission Salespersons (§§ 44-341 — 44-347)
44-342. Same; termination of contractual relationship; penalty and interest for nonpayment, when. 1
44-343. Same; payment of undisputed commissions; effect of acceptance. 2
44-344. Same; deceased salesperson. 2
44-345. Same; corporate employees; liability for violation. 2
44-346. Same; proceedings to enforce act. 3
44-347. Same; collection of commissions not covered by act. 3
44-341. Payment of commissions; definitions.
As used in this act:
(a) “Commission salesperson” means a person who contracts with and is authorized by a principal to solicit within this state wholesale orders for that principal for merchandise to be shipped into this state or services to be performed within this state and who is compensated therefor by commission. Commission salesperson does not include a person who: (1) Places orders or purchases for the person’s own account for resale; (2) is an employee subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 44-313 et seq., and amendments thereto; (3) is a person licensed under the real estate brokers’ and salespersons’ license act; or (4) is engaged in door-to-door sales regulated by K.S.A. 50-640, and amendments thereto.
(b) “Commissions earned through the last day of the contractual relationship” or “earned commissions” means commissions with respect to services or merchandise which actually has been delivered or furnished to, accepted by and paid for by the customer by the last day of the commission salesperson’s contractual relationship.
(c) “Contractual relationship” means the relationship between a principal and a commission salesperson based on a contract between them providing for the commission salesperson to solicit and make sales within this state of merchandise to be shipped into or services to be performed within this state.
(d) “Principal” means any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, corporation or administrator or executor of the estate of a deceased individual, or the receiver, trustee or successor thereof, contracting with a commission salesperson to solicit and make sales within this state for merchandise to be shipped into this state or services to be performed within this state.
44-342. Same; termination of contractual relationship; penalty and interest for nonpayment, when.
(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (d), whenever a principal discharges a commission salesperson or whenever a commission salesperson quits or resigns, the principal shall pay, at the usual place of payment, the commission salesperson’s commissions earned through the last day of the contractual relationship not later than 30 days after the last day of the contractual relationship or by mail postmarked within that period.
(b) If a principal knowingly fails to pay a commission salesperson any earned commission as required by subsection (a), such principal shall be liable therefor and shall be additionally liable for damages in the fixed amount of 1% of the unpaid earned commissions for each day, except Sunday and legal holidays, upon which such failure continues after the day upon which payment is required by subsection (a) or in an amount equal to the unpaid earned commissions, whichever is less. For the purpose of such additional damages, the failure to pay shall not be deemed to continue after the date of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy with respect to the principal if such principal is adjudicated bankrupt upon such petition.
(c) If a principal fails to pay a commission salesperson any earned commission as required by subsection (a), such principal may be assessed interest as provided under K.S.A. 16-201, and amendments thereto, on such commissions from the date such commissions are required to be paid pursuant to subsection (a).
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), if the terminated or resigning commission salesperson was entrusted with the collection, disbursement or handling of money or property during the contractual relationship, such person has 10 days after the termination of the contractual relationship to audit and adjust the accounts of such commission salesperson before the 30-day period required for payment of commissions earned through the last day of the contractual relationship begins. In such cases, the penalty provided in subsection (b) shall apply only after the expiration of the 10-day audit period and the 30-day period required under this subsection.
History: 1987, ch. 185, § 2; July 1.
44-343. Same; payment of undisputed commissions; effect of acceptance.
(a) In case of a dispute over the amount of earned commissions due, the principal shall pay, without conditions and within the 30-day period provided by K.S.A. 44-342, all earned commissions, or parts thereof, believed in good faith by the principal to be due, leaving to the salesperson all remedies that the salesperson might otherwise be entitled to, including those provided under this act, as to any balance claimed.
(b) Unless payment is made by binding settlement agreement, the acceptance by a commission salesperson of a payment under this section shall not constitute a release as to the balance of the salesperson’s claim and any release required by a principal as a condition to payment shall be in violation of this act and shall be null and void.
History: 1987, ch. 185, § 3; July 1.
44-344. Same; deceased salesperson.
In the absence of actual notice of probate proceedings, the principal may pay, upon proper demand, wages due a deceased commission salesperson. Any such payment or payments shall be in the following order of preference: Spouse, children 18 years of age and over in equal shares, father, mother, sisters and brothers in equal shares, or the person to whom funeral expenses are due.
History: 1987, ch. 185, § 4; July 1.
44-345. Same; corporate employees; liability for violation.
In case of violation of K.S.A. 44-342 by a corporate employer, either the corporation or any officer thereof or any agent having the management of the corporation who knowingly permits the corporation to engage in such violation shall be deemed the principal for purposes of this act.
History: 1987, ch. 185, § 5; July 1.
44-346. Same; proceedings to enforce act.
Any proceeding by one or more commission salespersons to assert any claim arising under or pursuant to this act may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction.
History: 1987, ch. 185, § 6; July 1.
44-347. Same; collection of commissions not covered by act.
Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent a commission salesperson from collecting commissions on merchandise ordered prior to the last day of the contractual relationship but delivered, accepted or paid for after termination of the contractual relationship but the penalty prescribed in K.S.A. 44-342 shall apply only with respect to the payment of commissions earned through the last day of the contractual relationship.
HistoryL: 1987, ch. 185, § 7; July 1.
Georgia Sales Rep Statutes
Posted: May 7, 2026 Filed under: Contract, Georgia | Tags: Independent Contractor, Independent Rep, Rep, Sales Rep Leave a comment10-1-700 Definitions.
As used in this article, the term:
(1) ‘Commission’ means compensation accruing to a sales representative for payment by a principal, the rate of which is expressed as a percentage of the dollar amount of orders or sales or as a specified amount per order or per sale.
(2) ‘Principal’ means a person who does business in this state and who:
(A) Manufactures, produces, imports, or distributes a tangible product for wholesale;
(B) Contracts with a sales representative to solicit orders for the product; and
(C) Compensates the sales representative in whole or in part by commission.
(3) ‘Sales representative’ means a person who contracts with a principal to solicit wholesale orders and who is compensated in whole or in part by a commission, but such term does not include one who places orders or purchases for his or her own account for resale.
10-1-701 Contract for Services In State.
Reserved. Repealed 1992.
10-1-702 Rights of Sales Representatives; Frivolous Actions.
(a) When a contract between a principal and a sales representative is terminated the principal shall within 30 days after the termination of the contract pay all commissions due to the sales representative.
(b) A principal who fails to make timely payment of commissions as required by subsection (a) of this code section shall be liable to the sales representative in a civil action for:
(1) All amounts due to the sales representative according to the terms of the contract;
(2) Exemplary damages in an amount not to exceed double the amount not timely paid as required by subsection (a) of this Code section; and
(3) Reasonable attorney’ fees actually and reasonably incurred by the sales representative in the action.
(c) A person who brings an action under this Code section shall, if the court determines that the action is frivolous, be liable to the defendant for attorney’ fees actually and reasonably incurred by the defendant in defending against such an action.
10-1-703 Waiver of Law Prohibited.
The provisions of this article may not be waived; and, in applying the provisions of this article, the courts of this state shall not recognize any purported waiver of the provisions of this article, whether by expressed waiver or by attempt to make a contract or agreement subject to the laws of another state.
10-1-704 Jurisdiction of Court.
A principal who is not a resident of this state and who enters into a contract subject to this article is declared to be doing business in this state for purposes of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents under Code Section 9-10-91.
Hlad v. Hirsch, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 267967, 2025 LX 611567
Posted: April 6, 2026 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Legal Case, Pennsylvania | Tags: Airbnb, Negligence, Premises Liability, renter, Trespasser Leave a commentTo See a Review of this case go to: Plaintiff assumed the risk walking behind an Airbnb and not following the trail.
Hlad v. Hirsch, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 267967 *; 2025 LX 611567
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
December 31, 2025, Decided; December 31, 2025, Filed
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-00785
Reporter
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 267967 *; 2025 LX 611567
TERESA HLAD and STEVEN HLAD, Plaintiffs, v. YOEL HIRSCH, SARAH HIRSCH, AIRBNB, INC., JOHN DOE 1-10 and ABC CO. 1-10, XYZ CORPORATIONS 1-10, Defendants.
Prior History: Hlad v. Hirsch, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49743, 2024 WL 1197516 (Mar. 20, 2024)
Counsel:[*1] For Teresa Hlad, Steven Hlad, Plaintiffs: Christopher Bradley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Brandon J. Broderick, Attorney at Law, LLC, Ewing, NJ; Sami Zeka, LEAD ATTORNEY, Brandon J. Broderick, LLC, Ewing, NJ.
For Yoel Hirsch, Defendant: Kamela Devole, Sarah E Connor, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Wood Smith Henning & Berman LLP, Philadelphia, PA.
For Airbnb, Defendant: Emily Wasserman, PRO HAC VICE, Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP, Denver, CO; Kelly J. Fox, Gerolamo, McNulty, Divis & Lewbart, Philadelphia, PA.
For Sarah Hirsch, Defendant: Kamela Devole, Sarah E Connor, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Wood Smith Henning & Berman LLP, Philadelphia, PA.
Judges: KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, United States District Judge.
Opinion by: KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiffs Teresa Hlad and Steven Hlad initiated this action by filing a complaint against Defendants Sarah Hirsch, Yoel Hirsch, and Airbnb, Inc. (“Airbnb”) (together “Defendants”) on April 13, 2023. (Doc. 35-3). Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Sarah and Yoel Hirsch and a motion for summary judgment filed by Airbnb. (Doc. 35; Doc. 39). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment will be GRANTED.
- Factual Background and Procedural History
The following background[*2] is taken from Defendants’ statements of material facts and exhibits.1 Teresa and Steven Hlad were visiting Lackawaxen, PA to spend Christmas with their family and friends from December 22, 2022 to December 28, 2022. (Doc. 37, ¶ 2). Nicole Gignac, a friend of the Hlads’ daughter, rented the subject property (the “Property”) on Airbnb’s platform. (Doc. 37, ¶ 3). Sarah and Yoel Hirsch own the Property and listed it for rent on Airbnb. (Doc. 37, ¶ 4). Airbnb did not operate, own, control, offer, manage, inspect or even have the right to access the Property. (Doc. 41, ¶ 7-8).
On the morning of December 25, 2022, Teresa Hlad and her son decided to go for a walk and take pictures. (Doc. 37, ¶ 5). Teresa Hlad exited out the back door of the house on the Property and saw a bridge in the woods in the distance. (Doc. 37, ¶ 7). Assuming a trail was near the bridge, she started walking towards the bridge. (Doc. 37, ¶ 7). However, as Teresa Hlad entered the woods, she knew she was not walking on a trail and appreciated that the ground was “uneven” and had “leaves, snow, logs, and. . . was hilly.” (Doc. 37, ¶ 8, 9). Before walking over the bridge, Teresa Hlad noticed that there was no trail and[*3] that the ground was uneven, choppy, and leafy. (Doc. 37 ¶¶ 10-11). Teresa Hlad testified that she walked carefully in the woods because “it was pretty lumpy out there,” but the lighting was sufficient, and nothing was obstructing her ability to see where she was walking. (Doc. 37. ¶¶ 12-14).
Teresa Hlad testified that she crossed the bridge and decided to turn around when she realized there was no trail over the bridge. (Doc. 35-4, at 17). When she turned around, she was on a “little bit of a hill” and her left foot “kind of went into the ground” causing her to fall. (Doc. 35-4, at 9). Teresa Hlad testified that the hill was “dingy” and the “dirt was all uneven,” which caused her to fall. (Doc. 35-4, at 18). The fall happened between 11:15 and 11:30 a.m., and the weather was clear and sunny. (Doc. 37, at ¶ 6). Teresa Hlad was unable to provide the location of her fall, stating that if she marked the location, it would be a guess. (Doc. 35-4, at 20).
Teresa Hlad’s daughter, testified that there was a trail opening near the rear of the house on the Property with signs indicating where the trail was. (Doc. 37, ¶ 16). Teresa Hlad never asked her daughter where the trails were on the Property,[*4] and she failed to follow the signs which clearly indicated where the trail was. (Doc. 37, ¶ 17). Teresa Hlad never contacted her Airbnb host to ask where the trail was located. (Doc. 37, ¶ 18).
Airbnb is an online marketplace that provides an opportunity for individuals who wish to offer accommodations to connect with individuals seeking to book accommodations. (Doc. 41, ¶ 2). Airbnb is not a party to or a participant in the agreements for booking entered between hosts and guests. (Doc. 41, ¶ 4). Hosts are solely responsible for listing their accommodations and determining on what material terms they will offer for their accommodations. (Doc. 41, ¶ 5). Airbnb had no notice of any prior incidents involving a fall at the subject property. (Doc. 41, ¶ 11). Regardless, Airbnb does not “guarantee. . . the existence, quality, safety, sustainability, or legality of any Listings or Host Services.” (Doc. 41, ¶ 10).
Teresa and Steven Hlad initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas on April 13, 2023. Therein Teresa Hlad alleged Count I — Negligence against Defendants, and Steven Hlad alleged Count II — Loss of Consortium against Defendants. (Doc. 35-5,[*5] at 7-9). On May 11, 2023, Sarah and Yoel Hirsch removed the matter to this Court. (Doc. 1). On April 1, 2025, Sarah and Yoel Hirsch filed a motion for summary judgment, brief in support, and statement of facts. (Doc. 35; Doc. 36; Doc. 37). On April 2, 2025, Airbnb filed a motion for summary judgment, brief in support, and statement of the facts. (Doc. 39; Doc. 40; Doc. 41). On May 19, 2025, Teresa and Steven Hlad filed their brief in opposition. (Doc. 43). On June 2, 2025, Defendants filed their respective reply briefs. (Doc 45; Doc. 46). Accordingly, the motions for summary judgment are ripe for disposition.
- Legal Standards
- Motion for Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party’s[*6] evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a party opposing a summary judgment motion must comply with Local Rule 56.1, which specifically directs the oppositional party to submit a “statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required[to be filed by the movant], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried”; if the nonmovant fails to do so, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.
A federal court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the court must simply “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility[*7] of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits or declarations, answers to interrogatories, or the like to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case, which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Furthermore, mere conclusory allegations and self-serving testimony, whether made in the complaint or a sworn statement, cannot be used to obtain or avoid summary judgment when uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence of record. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990); see also Thomas v. Delaware State Univ., 626 F. App’x 384, 389 n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential) (“[U]nsupported deposition testimony, which is contradicted by the record, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); NLRB v. FES, 301 F.3d 83, 95 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[The plaintiff’s] testimony . . . amounts to an unsupported, conclusory assertion, which we have held is inadequate to satisfy the movant’s[*8] burden of proof on summary judgment.”).
III. Discussion
- Summary Judgment is Warranted on Teresa Hlad’s Negligence Claim Against Sarah and Yoel Hirsch.
Sarah and Yoel Hirsch contend that they owed no duty to Teresa Hlad, who voluntarily assumed the risk of her actions, arguing that Teresa Hlad should have noticed the risks of walking off-trail in snow, which were open and obvious with an exercise of normal perception, intelligence, and judgment. (Doc. 36, 11-12). Additionally, Sarah and Yoel Hirsch submit that because Teresa Hlad provided no evidence of the location of the fall, Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of showing a viable claim for negligence. (Doc. 36, at 12-13). Teresa Hlad counters that Sarah and Yoel Hirsch’s motion specifically points to genuine issues of fact in this case to be decided by a jury. (Doc. 43, ¶ 16).
To survive summary judgment on a negligence claim under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must demonstrate genuine dispute of material fact regarding “(1) the existence of a duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) a breach of the duty; (3) causal connection between the breach of duty and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.” Pace v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 337 F. Supp. 3d 513, 519 (E.D. Pa. 2018). The parties dispute[*9] whether Sarah and Yoel Hirsch owed a duty to Teresa Hlad. (Doc. 36, at 11; Doc. 43, at 6). The standard of care owed by an owner or occupier depends on whether the person on the premises is a trespasser, licensee, or business invitee. See McDowell v. Moran Foods, LLC, 680 F. App’x 72, 72 (3d Cir. 2017). Business invitees are owed the highest standard of care. Falcone v, Speedway LLC, No. 14-2188, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7324, 2017 WL 220326, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan 19, 2017) (citing Truax v. Roulhac, 2015 PA Super 217, 126 A.3d 991, 997 (Pa. Super Ct. 2015)); Pusateri v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 646 F. Supp. 3d 650, 653 (W.D. Pa. 2022) (citing Campisi v. Acme Markets, Inc., 2006 PA Super 368, 915 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa. Super Ct. 2006). A business invitee is “a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land.” Falcone, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7324, 2017 WL 220326, at *2 (quoting Charlie v. Erie Ins. Exch., 2014 PA Super 188, 100 A.3d 244, 253 (Pa. Super Ct. 2014)). An Airbnb guest is considered a business invitee. See Parsons v. Drake, 347 Pa. 247, 32 A.2d 27 (1943) (citing Restatement Second, Torts § 332) (finding guests of inns, hotels, motels, and similar establishments are business invitees); see Montaperto v. Split Rock Resort, 765 F. Supp. 852, 853-54 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (identifying a guest at a resort as a business invitee). A possessor of land must protect a business invitee not only from known dangers, but also from “dangers that might be discoverable with reasonable care.” Truax, 126 A.3d at 997. A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land only if he:
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not[*10] discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
Neve v. Insalaco’s, 2001 PA Super 71, 771 A.2d 786, 790 (Pa. Super. 2001) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343).
Furthermore, a possessor of land will not owe a duty to a business invitee if the business invitee assumed the risk of their actions. Kaplan v. Exxon Corp., 126 F.3d 221, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1997); Dalton v. Little Lion, No. 19-5358, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67100, 2021 WL 1293424, at *4 (E.D. Pa. April 7, 2021); Carrender v. Fitterer, 503 Pa. 178, 188, 469 A.2d 120 (Pa. 1983) (“to say that the invitee assumed the risk of injury from a known and avoidable danger is simply another way of expressing the lack of any duty on the part of the possessor to protect the invitee against such dangers”). A defendant is relieved of their duty of care when the plaintiff has voluntarily and deliberately proceeded to take a known and obvious risk. Barrett v. Fredavid Builders, Inc., 454 Pa. Super. 162, 685 A.2d 129, 131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343. A danger is obvious when both the condition and the risk are apparent and would be recognized by a reasonable person, exercising normal perception intelligence and judgment. DeMolick v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 3d 165, 171 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (citing Carrender, 469 A.2d at 123).
Assumption of the risk is analyzed in the context of determining whether a defendant owed a plaintiff a duty. Kaplan, 126 F.3d at 224-25. As such, assumption of the risk is a question for the jury “unless reasonable minds could not disagree.” Kaplan, 126 F.3d, at 225. To grant summary judgment on assumption of the risk, the Court must find—conclusively and beyond question—that: “(1)[the plaintiff][*11] consciously appreciated the risks attending her action; (2) she assumed the risk of injury by engaging in the action despite appreciating its risks; and (3) the injury she sustained was the same as that which she appreciated and assumed.” Dalton, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67100, 2021 WL 1293424, at *4; see Bullman v. Giuntoli, 2000 PA Super 284, 761 A.2d 566, 573 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); see also Murphy v. Excel Site Rentals, LLC, No. 4:17-CV-02353, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125048, 2019 WL 3387661, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate “[o]nly where the evidence reveals a scenario so clear as to void all questions of material fact concerning the plaintiff’s own conduct. . .” Montagazzi v. Crisci, 2010 PA Super 78, 994 A.2d 626, 636 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).
For the first element, the evidence must “conclusively[establish] that the plaintiff was subjectively aware of the risk.” Roessing v. United States, No. 3:19-cv-161, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81479, 2021 WL 1663590, at *6 (W.D. Pa. April 28, 2021) (citing Barrett, 685 A.2d at 131); Barillari v. Ski Shawnee, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 555, 563 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Handschuh v. Albert Dev., 393 Pa. Super. 444, 574 A.2d 693, 695 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)). “The plaintiff must be aware of the ‘particular danger’ from which she is subsequently injured in order to voluntarily assume that risk as a matter of law.” Roessing, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81479, 2021 WL 1663590, at *6 (citing Barillari v. Ski Shawnee, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 555, 563 (M.D. Pa. 2013)). For the second element, the plaintiff must voluntarily assume the risk. Kaplan, 126 F.3d at 226 (citing Howell v. Clyde, 533 Pa. 151, 620 A.2d 1107, 1112 (Pa. 1993)). There is no assumption of risk when a plaintiff has no reasonable alternative to encountering the risk. Kaplan, 126 F.3d at 226-27 (citing Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 68 at 490-91); see also Roessing, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81479, 2021 WL 16635900, at *7 (citing Howell, 620 A.2d at 1112).
Here, there is no dispute of fact that Teresa Hlad consciously and subjectively appreciated the risks of walking off-trail in the snowy woods. Teresa Hlad knew that she was not walking on a[*12] trail when she entered the woods. (Doc. 37, ¶ 8; Doc. 43-1, at 17). She was aware that the ground was “uneven” and had “leaves, snow, logs, and was hilly. . .” (Doc. 37, ¶ 9, Doc. 43-1, at 17). Teresa Hlad testified that she was walking carefully because “it was pretty lumpy out there” (Doc. 37, ¶ 12; Doc. 43-1, at 27) and that when she was walking, the lighting was sufficient to see where she was going and nothing was obstructing her view. (Doc. 37, ¶¶ 13-14; Doc. 43-1, at 14). Accordingly, reasonable minds could not disagree that Teresa Hlad consciously appreciated the risks attending her action. See Roessing, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81479, 2021 WL 1663590, at *6 (finding plaintiff consciously appreciated the risk of slipping and falling when she saw the snow heap prior to stepping on it and affirmatively considered where to cross before stepping on it); see also Kaplan, 126 F.3d at 226 (finding a snow mound was a known and obvious risk).
It is also undisputed that Teresa Hlad voluntarily walked off-trail in the snowy woods despite appreciating the risks. Teresa Hlad’s daughter testified that there were signs marking the trails on the premises. (Doc. 37, ¶ 16). Despite the availability of marked trails, Teresa Hlad voluntarily chose to walk on a path that did not contain[*13] a walking trail. As such, reasonable minds could not disagree that Teresa Hlad’s assumption of risk was voluntary. See Kaplan, 126 F.3d 221, 226 (finding a plaintiff assumes a risk voluntarily she elects to encounter the risk despite the existence of safe alternatives); see also Roessing, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81479, 2021 WL 1663590, at *7 (“the question under this factor is whether there was a safe alternative to encountering the risk, not whether the plaintiff was subjectively aware of a safe alternative”).
Finally, it is undisputed that Teresa Hlad’s injury was the result of her assuming the risk of walking off-trail in the snowy woods.2 Teresa Hlad testified that while on her walk she turned around, her left foot went into the ground causing her to fall and injure her ankle. (Doc. 35-4, at 9). The risk of walking off-trail in the snowy woods is the possibility of slipping and falling. See Roessing, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81479, 2021 WL 1663590, at *8. As there are no disputes of fact regarding Teresa Hlad’s assumption of risk, Sarah and Yoel Hirsch’s motion for summary judgment on Teresa Hlad’s claim of negligence is GRANTED. (Doc. 35).
- Summary Judgment is Warranted on Teresa Hlad’s Negligence Claim Against Airbnb.
Airbnb contends it is entitled to summary judgment on Teresa Hlad’s negligence claim against[*14] it because there is no evidence that Airbnb owed Teresa Hlad any duty of care regarding the condition of the property. (Doc. 40, at 5). Airbnb asserts that it does not own, possess, or control the Property, nor did it have notice of the allegedly dangerous condition on the property (Doc. 40, at 6-7). Teresa Hlad counters that the jury must determine what duty, if any, Airbnb owes to prospective renters to insure the properties they rent are suitable for their purpose and pose no unreasonable hazards. (Doc. 43, at 4).
Under Pennsylvania law, “the duty to protect against known dangerous conditions falls upon the possessor of the land.” Estate of Zimmerman v. SEPTA, 168 F.3d 680, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1999). One is a possessor of land if they occupy the land with the intent to control it. Estate of Zimmerman, 168 F.3d at 684 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328). Liability is primarily based on possession and control, rather than ownership of land. Brown v. End Zone, Inc., 2021 PA Super 135, 259 A.3d 473, 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021). A possessor of land is only liable if they know or should have known of a dangerous condition on the premises. Gutteridge v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 2002 PA Super 198, 804 A.2d 643, 656 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). Other jurisdictions find that Airbnb’s enforcement of certain policies and guidelines for property owners on its marketplace does not amount to possession or control over their hosts’ properties. Matthew-Ajayi Airbnb, Inc., No. ADC-23-3035, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26653, 2025 WL 487572, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 13, 2025) (finding Airbnb had no liability for slip in fall that occurred[*15] in host’s property because Airbnb did not have possession or control over the property); Carroll v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 3d 767, 775 (E.D. La. 2017) (finding Airbnb does not have custody or control over host’s property because they do not have the right to alienate the property, authorize repairs, or access the property at will; comparing Airbnb’s general duty to that of a travel agency); see Hofer v. Gap, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 2d 161, 176-78 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding online travel agents are generally not liable for the negligence or dangerous conditions of third-party hotel or travel operators).
Here, Airbnb provides an affidavit from its legal investigations associate stating that “Airbnb does not own, control, or possess any of the accommodations listed on its marketplace, and does not have the right to access the property where[Teresa] Hlad allegedly sustained injuries.” (Doc. 39-3, at 3; Doc. 41, ¶ 7). Airbnb also provides their terms and conditions, which state that Airbnb “do[es] not and cannot control the conduct of Guests and Hosts.” (Doc. 39-4, at 15). Teresa Hlad failed to respond to Airbnb’s statement of the facts or to provide any evidence controverting Airbnb’s evidence that they do not own, control, or possess the subject property. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1 (“[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required[*16] to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted.”). Teresa Hlad merely provides unsupported, conclusory statements arguing that Airbnb does have control over the subject property and notice of the hazardous conditions that caused Teresa Hlad’s injuries. (Doc. 43, at 8). See Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd., 301 F.3d at 95. (“[The plaintiff’s] testimony . . . amounts to an unsupported, conclusory assertion, which we have held is inadequate to satisfy the movant’s burden of proof on summary judgment.”). Nevertheless, the court need not address whether Airbnb had possession or control over the subject property creating a duty of care because even if Airbnb did owe Teresa Hlad a duty of care, as explained fully in supra Section III.A, it is undisputed that Teresa Hlad assumed the risk of her actions, negating the duty of care owed by the possessors of the subject property. Accordingly, Airbnb’s motion for summary judgment on Teresa Hlad’s claim of negligence is GRANTED.3 (Doc. 35).
- Conclusion
Based on the forgoing, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are GRANTED. (Doc. 35; Doc. 39). Teresa and Steven Hlad’s claims of negligence and loss of consortium are DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to[*17] CLOSE this case. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: December 31, 2025
/s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 31st day of December, 2025, for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion concurrently filed herewith, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
- Sarah and Yoel Hirsch’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 35) is GRANTED;
- Airbnb Inc.’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 39) is GRANTED;
- Count I and Count II of Teresa and Steven Hlad’s complaint (Doc. 15) are to be DISMISSED; and
- The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
End of Document
1 Teresa and Steven Hlad have not filed a response to Defendants’ statements of material facts, as required by Local Rule 56.1. Accordingly, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement[s] required to be served by the moving part[ies] will be deemed to be admitted.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); United States v. Alberto, No. 3:18-CV-1014, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25049, 2020 WL 730316, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2020) (concluding that the “[f]ailure to file this [responsive statement of material facts] results in admission of the moving party’s statement of facts”).
2 Sarah and Yoel Hirsch assert that because Teresa Hlad was unable to identify exactly where the slip and fall occurred, she cannot meet her burden of showing negligence. (Doc. 36, at 13). Teresa Hlad counters that she identified the location of her fall to the best of her ability, providing a photograph marking where she fell. (Doc. 43, at 8; Doc. 43-3). The exact location of Teresa Hlad’s fall is not a material fact because, as explained fully in supra Section III.A, it is undisputed that Teresa Hlad consciously and subjectively appreciated the risks of walking on uneven, hilly ground covered in logs, leaves, and snow. See Kaplan, 126 F.3d at 227 n.5 (considering exact location of fall in proximate cause analysis of negligence claim; omitting consideration of exact location of fall in assumption of the risk analysis); see also Dalton, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67100, 2021 WL 1293424, at *2-*3, *5 (finding parties’ disagreement on the exact location of the fall was immaterial to the assumption of the risk analysis).
3 Steven Hlad’s loss of consortium claim is a derivate claim, based upon the outcome of Teresa Hlad’s negligence claim. Sprague v. Kaplan, 392 Pa. Super. 257, 572 A.2d 789, 790 (Pa. Super. 1990) (“Loss of consortium has been recognized [Pennsylvania] as a right evolving out of the marriage relationship and is grounded on the loss of a spouse’s service after injury.”); Suniaga v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 504 F. Supp. 3d 430, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (finding a claim for loss of consortium is a derivative claim, meaning it is based upon the outcome of other claims in the suit). As Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Teresa Hlad’s negligence claims are GRANTED, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Steven Hlad’s derivate loss of consortium claim are likewise GRANTED. (Doc. 35; Doc. 39).
Plaintiff assumed the risk walking behind an Airbnb and not following the trail.
Posted: April 6, 2026 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Pennsylvania | Tags: Airbnb, assumption of the risk, Land Owner, Negligence, Pennsylvania, Trespasser Leave a commentAirbnb did not possess the land
Hlad v. Hirsch, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 267967, 2025 LX 611567
State: Pennsylvania, United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
Plaintiff: Teresa Hlad and Steven Hlad
Defendants: SarahHirsch,YoelHirsch,andAirbnb,Inc.
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence against Defendants, and Steven Hlad, Loss of Consortium
Defendant Defenses: Assumption of the Risk
Holding: For the Defendants
Year: 2025
Summary
Plaintiffs were visiting Pennsylvania for the holidays and staying at an Airbnb rented for them. During the state, one of the plaintiffs went out the back door of the home and proceeded to walk towards a breach and across. She knew she was not walking on a trail and turned to go back when she fell, suffering injuries.
The plaintiff knew she was not on the trail. As such, by proceeding, she assumed the risk of her injuries, relieving the defendants of any duty under Pennsylvania law.
Facts
On the morning of December 25, 2022, Teresa Hlad and her son decided to go for a walk and take pictures. Teresa Hlad exited out the back door of the house on the Property and saw a bridge in the woods in the distance. Assuming a trail was near the bridge, she started walking towards the bridge. However, as Teresa Hlad entered the woods, she knew she was not walking on a trail and appreciated that the ground was “uneven” and had “leaves, snow, logs, and. . . was hilly.” Before walking over the bridge, Teresa Hlad noticed that there was no trail and that the ground was uneven, choppy, and leafy. Teresa Hlad testified that she walked carefully in the woods because “it was pretty lumpy out there,” but the lighting was sufficient, and nothing was obstructing her ability to see where she was walking.
Teresa Hlad testified that she crossed the bridge and decided to turn around when she realized there was no trail over the bridge. When she turned around, she was on a “little bit of a hill” and her left foot “kind of went into the ground” causing her to fall. Teresa Hlad testified that the hill was “dingy” and the “dirt was all uneven,” which caused her to fall. The fall happened between 11:15 and 11:30 a.m., and the weather was clear and sunny. Teresa Hlad was unable to provide the location of her fall, stating that if she marked the location, it would be a guess.
Teresa Hlad’s daughter, testified that there was a trail opening near the rear of the house on the Property with signs indicating where the trail was. Teresa Hlad never asked her daughter where the trails were on the Property,[*4] and she failed to follow the signs which clearly indicated where the trail was. Teresa Hlad never contacted her Airbnb host to ask where the trail was located.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The defense argued that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs because the plaintiff knew or should have known that she was not walking on a trail. The fact that the plaintiff was not on a trial was open and obvious. The plaintiff’s own testimony indicated she knew she was not on a trail, which is why she turned back.
The plaintiffs, under Pennsylvania law and the law of the majority of states, were business invitees. As business invitees, the defendants owed them the highest degree of care.
A business invitee is “a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land.”
The defendant owner of the Airbnb’s degree of care to the plaintiff is to protect the plaintiff from known dangers and from dangers that might be discoverable with reasonable care. To be liable, the possessor of land, not necessarily the land owner, must inform the business invitee of the risks that it knows of or could identify by a reasonable inspection.
A possessor of land must protect a business invitee not only from known dangers, but also from “dangers that might be discoverable with reasonable care.” A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land only if he:
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
However, no duty is owed if the plaintiff assumed the risk presented by the dangers. “Furthermore, a possessor of land will not owe a duty to a business invitee if the business invitee assumed the risk of their actions.”
A defendant is relieved of their duty of care when the plaintiff has voluntarily and deliberately proceeded to take a known and obvious risk. A danger is obvious when both the condition and the risk are apparent and would be recognized by a reasonable person, exercising normal perception intelligence and judgment.
Normally, whether or not the plaintiff assumed the risk is a question for the trier of fact, the jury. If the court feels that there was no other way a jury could decide, then the court may rule on the issue.
Here, the court found:
(1)[the plaintiff] consciously appreciated the risks attending her action; (2) she assumed the risk of injury by engaging in the action despite appreciating its risks; and (3) the injury she sustained was the same as that which she appreciated and assumed….
The court found the plaintiff’s statements about where she was walking proved she knew and appreciated the risks, relieving the possessor of any liability because she assumed the risk.
Possessor of land is a distinction only a lawyer could love. A possessor of land is not necessarily the landowner. A tenant occupying an apartment does not own the apartment or apartment building, but is the possessor of land. The definition is based on liability and control of the land, not ownership. So an owner of land cannot be liable if he has no control of the land. In most cases, this occurs through a contract with a third party who wants to do something with the land, and the landowner gives up most rights in the land when doing so.
Here, Airbnb was not the possessor of the land. Airbnb did not exercise control over the land. The owner of the land gave that control to the person who rented the Airbnb.
Airbnb does not own, control, or possess any of the accommodations listed on its marketplace, and does not have the right to access the property where[Teresa] Hlad allegedly sustained injuries
So Now What?
The defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff’s lawsuit was dismissed. IF you open your land to others, you need to make sure that any dangers on the land are identified to someone on the land. How they are on the land determines how much you, as the possessor, have to notify that person of the risks.
Consequently, most people feel that not allowing access to their land is the safest way to be. The duty owed to a trespasser is much lower than the duty owed to someone you invite on your land.
The sole issue for a possessor of land then becomes whether that duty is abrogated by some law or statute which might afford protection to them. In most cases, the best protection is the state Recreational Use Act. Generally, these acts say that if you allow someone on your land for recreational purposes and do NOT charge them for that access, then you are not liable for their injuries. However, each state has its own act, and the courts in each state have interpreted that act in numerous ways. If you are the possessor of land and want to have people on the land, you should find out what your duty to those people might be in advance.
More Articles on
In Ohio, Primary Assumption of the Risk is a complete bar to claims for injuries from hiking at night. https://rec-law.us/ms45krj3
Most references in case law to assumption of the risk are to this California decision. The basis for understanding Assumption of the Risk is this decision based on an injured finger during a pickup football game. https://rec-law.us/2p8p4p32
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upholds use of an express assumption of the risk agreement to bar a claim for wrongful death during a triathlon https://rec-law.us/ubfbtt6
Release fails under Florida’s law because it is only an assumption of risk form, not a release in a Go-Kart case. https://rec-law.us/3stuw6t2
The assumption of risk defense is still available when the claim is based on a condition of the land. This defense is called the open and obvious doctrine. https://rec-law.us/4huk6hkc
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I’m Proud to Serve on the Board of Directors of the Greater Colorado Council, Scouting America.
Posted: October 17, 2025 Filed under: Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: character-building, Eagle Scout, greater-colorado-council, leadership-development, Scouting, scouting-america Leave a commentJoe’s acceptance speech was awesome. He thanked the board for helping him through Scouting as a youth. I know that no board members at that breakfast were on the board when Joe was a young scout, but the meaning, the value, was very true, as it was fifty years ago.
I’m extremely proud and honored to serve on the Greater Colorado Council executive board. I am proud and honored to serve on all the boards I serve on. I believe if given that honor, I need to uphold my and the organization’s values. I don’t miss meetings. If they ask me to serve, then my duty is to serve, to attend, listen, follow, and lead. I carry those issues, values, and goals with me everywhere I go. I want to uphold the values and traditions of Scouting and the board, and I want my fellow board members to understand and appreciate my efforts. I truly appreciate theirs!
Joe Black, a friend of mine through Scouting, was awarded the Vale la Pena award this week at the Greater Colorado Council, Scouting America executive board meeting. Joe could not make the award ceremony next week, so he was given the award at the board meeting.
What struck me about Joe’s speech was how it still held value today, based on facts that occurred fifty years ago. Joe did not grow up in a household that had money to send him on scouting adventures or training. Yet, when someone thought he should go, the money appeared. That was what he was thanking the board for, the board leads by its decisions, actions, and with their wallets. The board refers to this as their treasures. The board leadership today, the same as it was fifty years ago, is to make sure all youth have the opportunity, in whatever opportunity that may be.
The Greater Colorado Council board of directors, from their own pockets, raises one million dollars each year. I’m embarrassed because I have the smallest wallet in the group, yet I’m so proud to be part of that group.
Money is not the only thing the members of the board lead with; their time is given freely. Not only time to attend board meetings, trustee meetings and key 6 meetings, but they can be found at our dinners thanking volunteers, at any meeting promoting the values of Scouting, wearing a Scout pin on their suits, at camp working on property issues, raising money from their friends and putting their efforts in, whether by action, wallet or with a shovel in their hand.
The board has made the commitment that no scout will ever be denied the opportunity if they want to take it for any reason. Wallets are opened, and the youth in our council advance.
That is what Joe was talking about in his poignant message. This board is continuing a long tradition of helping the youth of America in whatever way they can. With their time, their talent, and their treasures.
Joe’s speech made one unsaleable point: it is with the time, talent, and treasures of the Executive Boards of Scouting America Councils in the US that we are moving our country forward. In Colorado, we have been doing that for 115 years; the last fifty, we were reminded about this week.
Thank you, Joe. Thank you, members of the Greater Colorado Council, Scouting America Board of Directors. You are making Scouting happen, reaching every scout, to make sure they have every opportunity Scouting presents to them. I’m extremely honored and proud to be a member of the Greater Colorado Council board of directors. I’m proud to have Joe as a friend. I’m a member of the Greater Colorado Council board of directors.

Surfboarder who cut off another Surfboarder already in the wave is protected by the defense of Primary Assumption of the Risk
Posted: May 20, 2024 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Paddlesports | Tags: assumption of the risk, Etiquette, Long Board, Surfer, Surfing Leave a commentUnwritten rules of surfing etiquette are not rules of surfing. When you see other surfers breaking those rules all the time, you can’t complain when you are injured by someone breaking the rules.
Olson v. Saville, 2d Civ. B324465 (Cal. App. Jan 17, 2024)
State: California; California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Plaintiff: Mark Olson
Defendant: Patrick Saville
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Primary Assumption of the risk
Holding: for the defendant
Year: 2024
Summary
The court found the plaintiff assumed the risk in surfing when the plaintiff admitted seeing other surfers do the things the defendant alleged did to the plaintiff which the plaintiff complained about in his lawsuit. In California, assumption of the risk can be decided by the court and stop a negligence claim.
Facts
Appellant and respondent were surfing in a group at Miramar Beach in Montecito. Respondent was riding a custom longboard without a leash. Appellant caught a wave. Respondent then “appeared out of nowhere” and “dropped in” on the wave without looking in appellant’s direction. This forced appellant “to make a fast turn correction to his left toward the beach” and to “exit into the white water to his left.” Appellant “grabbed both [of] his board rails (aka sides) and pushed himself and the nose of the board slightly down and into the foam pile of whitewater toward the deeper water and away from respondent.” Respondent was still standing on his board heading toward the shore. As appellant made his exit and ducked into the wave, respondent’s board propelled backward and struck appellant’s torso and back.
Appellant sued respondent for negligence. He alleged that respondent “intentionally entered the wave and intentionally cut off appellant’s path of travel, thereby forcing appellant to exit the wave.” He further alleged that respondent’s “failure to use a leash to control [his] longboard” and his use of a “sharpened and deadly fin” was “reckless and displayed a w[a]nton disregard for the safety of others.” Respondent moved for summary judgment on the ground that appellant’s cause of action was barred under the primary assumption of risk doctrine. The trial court granted the motion, finding “the inherent risks of the sport of surfing include surfers ‘dropping in’ on other surfers, not wearing leashes while riding longboards of the type used by respondent, and using surfboards that have sharp fins.”
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
This was a simple analysis of the risk of Surfing. It was also an argument between two experts and ended being about who did the better job of explaining their position. To some extent, there was also the issue of the plaintiff’s arguments was tenuous at best.
Since the 1992 decision in Knight v. Jewell, 3 Cal. 4th 296; 834 P.2d 696; 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2; 1992 Cal. LEXIS 3969; 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 7261; 92 Daily Journal DAR 11765; 92 Daily Journal DAR 11870 California has maintained that sports and recreational activities have risks and removing those inherent risks from the sport destroys the sport. Thus, you assume the risk of the sport when you engage in the sport or activity.
Here, the plaintiff argued the defendant was negligent in his surfing and those actions gave rise to the plaintiff’s injuries. The defense argued the Plaintiff assumed the risk.
Under California law for a defendant to prove the Plaintiff assumed the risk the defendant must:
A defendant seeking summary judgment on the basis of primary assumption of the risk must establish ‘that the defendant owed no legal duty to the plaintiff to prevent the harm of which the plaintiff complains.’ If the defendant meets this burden, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.”
During a trial, there is a burden on one or the other parties. Usually, the burden starts with the plaintiff who must prove the elements of their claim. If the plaintiff is arguing negligence, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove there was a Duty, the defendant breached that Duty, the Plaintiff was injured and that injury can be reduced to damages the court can award. If the plaintiff proves those four elements of negligence, then the burden shifts to the defendant. The defendant’s burden is either to prove the Plaintiff was wrong about the negligence claim or there was a defense such as assumption of the risk so the defendant had no duty to the plaintiff.
In this case, a motion is being argued and there is still a burden on both parties. Here the court defined assumption of the risk and when the burden shifted from one party to the other. the defendant met its duty and proved the plaintiff assumed the risk. If the defendant proved assumption of the risk, the burden then shifted to the plaintiff because there were facts still in dispute to the case would go to trial.
The burden on the plaintiff was to prove a triable issue of fact. Something in dispute that cannot be decided in a motion, but only by the jury.
There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof
The court then explored assumption of the risk under California law.
The primary assumption of risk doctrine “precludes liability for injuries arising from those risks deemed inherent in a sport.” It “rests on a straightforward policy foundation: the need to avoid chilling vigorous participation in or sponsorship of recreational activities by imposing a tort duty to eliminate or reduce the risks of harm inherent in those activities. It operates on the premise that imposing such a legal duty ‘would work a basic alteration-or cause abandonment’ of the activity.” The doctrine applies both to sports and recreational activities “‘involving an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants . . . where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity.
If the plaintiff assumes the risk, there is no duty on the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the risks, the plaintiff assumes.
[D]efendants generally do not have a duty to protect the plaintiff from the risks inherent in the sport, or to eliminate risk from the sport, although they generally do have a duty not to increase the risk of harm beyond what is inherent in the sport.
The removal of the duty goes so far that there is no duty short of intentionally injuring or the defendant’s conduct is so reckless to be outside the ordinary risks of the activity.
A coparticipant breaches this duty only if he “intentionally injures another player or engages in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.
What defines risk in a sport or activity. According to the court:
“[C]onduct is within the range of ordinary activity involved in a sport if that conduct cannot be prohibited without deterring vigorous participation in the sport or otherwise fundamentally altering the nature of the sport.” Determining the nature of a defendant’s legal duty (and the inherent risks that flow from the activity) “depends heavily on the nature of the sport itself.
Under California law, for a judge to decide that the plaintiff assumed the risk based on both case law and their own experience as well as any expert witness opinions.
Judges deciding inherent risk questions under Knight may consider not only their own or common experience with the recreational activity involved but may also consult case law, other published materials, and documentary evidence introduced by the parties on a motion for summary judgment.” Courts generally do not consider the legal conclusions of expert declarations but can receive “expert testimony on the customary practices in an arena of esoteric activity for purposes of weighing whether the inherent risks of the activity were increased by the defendant’s conduct.’
Rarely is a judge’s personal experience allowed to influence an opinion.
In this case, the court compared the risks of surfing to the risks of snow skiing. Skiing had been declared a sport where the plaintiff assumed the risk of the sport so the comparison was valid based on the prior case law.
California courts have applied the doctrine to coparticipants in a variety of sports, such as snow skiing and other non-contact sports, but not yet to surfing [holding the doctrine barred a skier’s negligence claim against another skier who unintentionally injured him in a collision]; [extending the doctrine to apply to the non-contact sport of golf].) We note that snow skiing and surfing have much in common: (1) “both sports involve individual participants that use nature, either a mountain slope or wave, as a propulsion mechanism”; “[b]oth require similar equipment in the form of skis, snowboard, or surfboard to participate”; and (3) “the most important similarity between skiing and surfing is the use of the right-of-way custom to promote safety and order among participants.
In this case, the opinions of the plaintiff’s expert witness and the defendant’s expert witness had similar opinions about the risks of surfing, which did not bode well for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s expert brought in the phrase “surfing etiquette” which are “unwritten safety customs and practices“. However, the expert went on to say that surfers violated the rules all the time. Longboard surfers, of which the defendant was one, regularly surfed without a leash.
…[t]hese rules encompass such things as priority, right-of-way, and sharing waves.” Nonetheless, “violating this surfing etiquette is common among surfers.” He further opined it is “not uncommon for surfers to surf without a leash” and “[m]any longboard surfers particularly enjoy the challenge and freedom of surfing without a leash” which otherwise could interfere with their footwork and speed.
It was easy to find the plaintiff’s injuries arose from the risks of surfing.
The court then examined the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant acted “Recklessly or Increased the Inherent Risks of Surfing’” Proving this would shift the burden to the defendant to prove his actions were not reckless or increased the risk, which would eliminate the defense of assumption of the risk.
However, that failed. Proving the defendant did not meet some unwritten rules, did not prove the defendant acted recklessly or increased the risk to the plaintiff.
Showing respondent could have acted with more caution does not establish he acted recklessly. Reckless conduct is more than “‘”inadvertence”‘” or “‘”a failure to take precautions.”‘ It requires a “‘”deliberate disregard” of the “high degree of probability”‘” that an injury will occur. Although both experts acknowledged respondent may not have followed the rules of etiquette, we are wary of relying too heavily on such guidelines when defining the scope of an activity’s inherent risks.
The plaintiff had admitted that he had seen other surfers do all the things that he claimed the plaintiff had done to bar the defense of assumption of risk. Consequently, the court held the plaintiff had assumed the risk.
The undisputed evidence here showed that failure to follow the rules of etiquette is common in the surfing community. Appellant admitted: (1) he has witnessed other surfers riding a longboard without a leash; (2) a leash could obstruct some movement of an advanced surfer; (3) he has witnessed prior collisions between surfers; (4) he has witnessed another surfer failing to maintain control of their board; and (5) he personally has had surfers “drop-in” or “shoulder-hop” on his wave. Respondent’s similar conduct, it follows, was not reckless or outside the range of the ordinary activity in surfing.
If you see others taking risky actions, that is proof you know the risks. If you then go surfing, that is proof you assumed the risks. The plaintiff assumed the risks of surfing and the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty.
So Now What?
In most states, assumption of the risk is a valid defense to a negligence claim. In a few states, assumption of the risk is still merged with contributory negligence and only reduces the damages and does not preclude a claim.
In a few states, the courts are allowed to make decisions on assumption of the risk, which is usually reserved for the jury, the trier of fact, if either the jury could not find anything but assumption of the risk or the experience of the court and case law show the actions of the plaintiff proved he or she assumed the risk.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Jim Moss is an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the outdoor recreation community. He represents guides, guide services, and outfitters both as businesses and individuals and the products they use for their business. He has defended Mt. Everest guide services, summer camps, climbing rope manufacturers; avalanche beacon manufacturers, and many more manufacturers and outdoor industries. Contact Jim at Jim@Rec-Law.us |
Jim is the author or co-author of six books about the legal issues in the outdoor recreation world; the latest is

Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law
Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law.
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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
@2024 Summit Magic Publishing, LLC
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Olson v. Saville, 2d Civ. B324465 (Cal. App. Jan 17, 2024)
Posted: May 20, 2024 Filed under: California, Legal Case, Paddlesports, Product Liability, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: assumption of the risk, Etiquette, Increased the Risk, Inherent Risk, Inherent Risk of Surfing, recklessly, Surfer, Surfing, Surfing Etiquette Leave a commentFor a review of this decision see: Surfboarder who cut off another Surfboarder already in the wave is protected by the defense of Primary Assumption of the Risk
Olson v. Saville, 2d Civ. B324465 (Cal. App. Jan 17, 2024)
MARK OLSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
PATRICK SAVILLE, Defendant and Respondent.
2d Civ. No. B324465
California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
January 17, 2024
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara, No. 20CV02207 Hon. Donna D. Geck, Judge
Law Office of Eric A. Woosley, Eric A. Woosley; The Law Offices of Bradford D. Brown, Bradford D. Brown, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Freeman Mathis &Gary, Albert K. Alikin, Christian E. Foy Nagy, and Christopher J. Fleissner, for Defendant and Respondent.
CODY, J.
In this personal injury case, we hold the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk bars liability for injuries caused by a negligent surfer to a fellow surfer because those injuries were caused by risks inherent in the sport of surfing.
Mark Olson appeals from the order granting summary judgment for respondent Patrick Saville. Appellant contends that triable issues of material fact exist as to whether respondent is protected by the primary assumption of risk doctrine. We disagree and will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant and respondent were surfing in a group at Miramar Beach in Montecito. Respondent was riding a custom longboard without a leash.[2] Appellant caught a wave. Respondent then “appeared out of nowhere” and “dropped in” on the wave without looking in appellant’s direction.[3] This forced appellant “to make a fast turn correction to his left toward the beach” and to “exit into the white water to his left.” Appellant “grabbed both [of] his board rails (aka sides) and pushed himself and the nose of the board slightly down and into the foam pile of whitewater toward the deeper water and away from respondent.” Respondent was still standing on his board heading toward the shore. As appellant made his exit and ducked into the wave, respondent’s board propelled backward and struck appellant’s torso and back.
Appellant sued respondent for negligence. He alleged that respondent “intentionally entered the wave and intentionally cut off appellant’s path of travel, thereby forcing appellant to exit the wave.” He further alleged that respondent’s “failure to use a leash to control [his] longboard” and his use of a “sharpened and deadly fin” was “reckless and displayed a w[a]nton disregard for the safety of others.” Respondent moved for summary judgment on the ground that appellant’s cause of action was barred under the primary assumption of risk doctrine. The trial court granted the motion, finding “the inherent risks of the sport of surfing include surfers ‘dropping in’ on other surfers, not wearing leashes while riding longboards of the type used by respondent, and using surfboards that have sharp fins.”
DISCUSSION
Appellant does not dispute that the primary assumption of the risk doctrine applies to surfing. He contends, however, that summary judgment is not appropriate because triable issues of material fact exist as to whether respondent acted recklessly or increased the sport’s inherent risks.
Standard of Review
“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)[4] A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that ‘one or more elements of’ the ’cause of action’ in question ‘cannot be established,’ or that ‘there is a complete defense’ thereto. [Citation.]” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar); § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
“A defendant seeking summary judgment on the basis of primary assumption of the risk must establish ‘that the defendant owed no legal duty to the plaintiff to prevent the harm of which the plaintiff complains.’ [Citation.]” (Capri v. L.A. Fitness International, LLC (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087.) If the defendant meets this burden, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, at p. 850, fn. omitted.)
“On appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment, we examine the record de novo, liberally construing the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolving doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460.)
Primary Assumption of Risk
The primary assumption of risk doctrine “precludes liability for injuries arising from those risks deemed inherent in a sport.” (Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 148, 161.) It “rests on a straightforward policy foundation: the need to avoid chilling vigorous participation in or sponsorship of recreational activities by imposing a tort duty to eliminate or reduce the risks of harm inherent in those activities. It operates on the premise that imposing such a legal duty ‘would work a basic alteration-or cause abandonment’ of the activity.” (Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1148, 1156 (Nalwa), quoting Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003 (Kahn).) The doctrine applies both to sports and recreational activities “‘involving an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants . . . where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity.'” (Nalwa, at p. 1156, quoting Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 650, 658.)
“[D]efendants generally do not have a duty to protect the plaintiff from the risks inherent in the sport, or to eliminate risk from the sport, although they generally do have a duty not to increase the risk of harm beyond what is inherent in the sport.” (Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1004, citing Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 315-316 (Knight), italics added.) A coparticipant breaches this duty only if he “intentionally injures another player or engages in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.” (Knight, at p. 320.) “[C]onduct is within the range of ordinary activity involved in a sport if that conduct cannot be prohibited without deterring vigorous participation in the sport or otherwise fundamentally altering the nature of the sport.” (Freeman v. Hale (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1396.) Determining the nature of a defendant’s legal duty (and the inherent risks that flow from the activity) “depends heavily on the nature of the sport itself.” (Knight, at p. 317.)
Appellant’s Injuries Resulted from the Inherent Risks of Surfing
“Judges deciding inherent risk questions under Knight may consider not only their own or common experience with the recreational activity involved but may also consult case law, other published materials, and documentary evidence introduced by the parties on a motion for summary judgment.” (Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1158.) Courts generally do not consider the legal conclusions of expert declarations but can receive “expert testimony on the customary practices in an arena of esoteric activity for purposes of weighing whether the inherent risks of the activity were increased by the defendant’s conduct.’ [Citation.]” (Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1017.) Our de novo review includes such declarations to the extent they help us understand the sport of surfing. (Towns v. Davidson (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 461, 472-473, italics omitted [“A court in its discretion could receive expert factual opinion to inform its decision on these issues, particularly on the nature of an unknown or esoteric activity, but in no event may it receive expert evidence on the ultimate legal issues of inherent risk and duty.”]; Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1017 [same].)
California courts have applied the doctrine to coparticipants in a variety of sports, such as snow skiing and other non-contact sports, but not yet to surfing. (See, Cheong v. Antablin (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1063, 1066 (Cheong) [holding the doctrine barred a skier’s negligence claim against another skier who unintentionally injured him in a collision]; Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 486 (Shin) [extending the doctrine to apply to the non-contact sport of golf].) We note that snow skiing and surfing have much in common: (1) “both sports involve individual participants that use nature, either a mountain slope or wave, as a propulsion mechanism”; (2) “[b]oth require similar equipment in the form of skis, snowboard, or surfboard to participate”; and (3) “the most important similarity between skiing and surfing is the use of the right-of-way custom to promote safety and order among participants.” (Caprara, supra, 44 Cal. Western L.Rev. at p. 562.)
Respondent submitted the declaration of Ian Cairns, a champion surfer and coach, who opined that surfing is an “extreme sport” with “many inherent risks.” Cairns stated it is “extremely common for surfers to ‘wipe out'” and lose control of their board given the variability of ocean conditions. “Because ‘wipeouts’ are so common, it is a known risk that a surfer may collide with another surfer, or another surfer’s board.” He explained the sport is largely regulated by unwritten safety customs and practices he referred to as “‘surfing etiquette.'” (citing Caprara, supra, 44 Cal. Western L.Rev. at p. 571.) He stated, “[t]hese rules encompass such things as priority, right-of-way, and sharing waves.” Nonetheless, “violating this surfing etiquette is common among surfers.” He further opined it is “not uncommon for surfers to surf without a leash” and “[m]any longboard surfers particularly enjoy the challenge and freedom of surfing without a leash” which otherwise could interfere with their footwork and speed. Lastly, Cairns noted that surfboards “contain between one and four fins, which assist the board with speed and stability” and that the fins are “very sharp and can inflict significant injury.”
Appellant’s expert did not oppose the core components of Cairn’s opinion. He did not dispute that surfers often violate well-established rules of etiquette. The experts appear to agree that surfers commonly collide and lose control of their boards; that boards have sharp fins that can cause injury; and that some surfers choose to forego leashes because they can inhibit speed and agility. The undisputed evidence shows that appellant’s injuries resulted from these risks. We agree with the trial court that the primary assumption of the risk doctrine bars appellant’s negligence claim absent evidence that respondent recklessly or increased the sport’s inherent risks.
There Is No Evidence Respondent Acted Recklessly or Increased the Inherent Risks of Surfing
Appellant relies primarily upon surfing expert Shaun Tomson to support his contention that respondent’s conduct was reckless. Tomson explained that “[o]ver time, the sport of surfing has adopted the Surfing Code and Rules of Etiquette.” According to Tomson, “surfers have a self-managed obligation to observe the Surfers Code and Rules of Etiquette and not increase the risk of harm to others in the water.” He described the rules of etiquette as follows: (1) observe the right of way of others; (2) look for other surfers before entering the wave; (3) do not interfere with, “drop in” or cut off surfers already riding a wave; (4) hold onto and do not let go of your board; (5) wear a surf leash so you do not lose control of your board; and (6) be aware and communicate with others around you. Tomson opined that respondent’s blatant disregard of these rules constituted a “conscious and wanton reckless disregard” for the safety of fellow surfers, especially considering his experience in the sport.
Tomson supported his conclusions by citing the “Leash/Legrope Policy” found in the International Surfing Association Rule Book (ISA), which he described as “the World Governing Body for [s]urfing and all related activities.” The policy reads: “As a risk management precaution . . . the ISA has a mandatory leash/legrope policy at events, due to the potential risk to other participants.” (ISA Rule Book &Contest Administration Manual, September 2023 Section D Competition Rules, subsection xvii (a), p.34.) The policy further states, “[f]ree surfing with or without a leash is at the rider’s discretion however the ISA recommends the use of a leash if there is a possible danger to third parties.” (Id., subsection xvii (b).)
Appellant analogizes respondent’s failure to use a leash to the snowboarder’s failure to use a retention strap in Campbell v. Derylo (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 823. Campbell reversed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment for plaintiff on the grounds of primary assumption of risk, finding defendant’s failure to use a retention strap “increased the inherent risk of injury to coparticipants from a runaway snowboard.” (Id., at p. 829.) It noted that a local ordinance as well as a “Skier Responsibility Code” posted at the ski resort required their use. (Ibid.) The court also found that using a strap “would not impede or alter the sport of snowboarding” or “chill or deter vigorous participation.” (Id., at p. 830.) We do not consider Campbell analogous. No law governs the use of surfboard leashes. No signs were posted requiring their use at Miramar Beach. More significantly, appellant does not dispute Cairns’ opinion that a leash can alter the nature of the sport by interfering with a longboard surfer’s “footwork and speed” and by posing a tripping hazard to surfers who “walk” on their board. (Cf. Szarowicz v. Birenbaum (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 146, 166 [ice hockey expert’s testimony that “open ice check[ing]” in a “no-check” game increased the sport’s inherent risks raised triable issues of fact to defeat summary judgment].)
Appellant’s expert merely described what could be done to reduce the risks inherent in surfing. Showing respondent could have acted with more caution does not establish he acted recklessly. Reckless conduct is more than “‘”inadvertence”‘” or “‘”a failure to take precautions.”‘” (Towns v. Davidson, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 470, citing Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 31-32.) It requires a “‘”deliberate disregard” of the “high degree of probability”‘” that an injury will occur. (Ibid.) Although both experts acknowledged respondent may not have followed the rules of etiquette, we are wary of relying too heavily on such guidelines when defining the scope of an activity’s inherent risks. (See, e.g., Shin, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 497, fn. 9 [failure to follow golf etiquette of yelling “fore” to minimize chance of hitting other golfers with ball does not justify imposing liability].)
The undisputed evidence here showed that failure to follow the rules of etiquette is common in the surfing community. Appellant admitted: (1) he has witnessed other surfers riding a longboard without a leash; (2) a leash could obstruct some movement of an advanced surfer; (3) he has witnessed prior collisions between surfers; (4) he has witnessed another surfer failing to maintain control of their board; and (5) he personally has had surfers “drop-in” or “shoulder-hop” on his wave. Respondent’s similar conduct, it follows, was not reckless or outside the range of the ordinary activity in surfing.
“‘By eliminating liability for unintended accidents, the doctrine [of primary assumption of the risk] ensures that the fervor of athletic competition will not be chilled by the constant threat of litigation from every misstep, sharp turn and sudden stop.’ [Citation].” (Cheong, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp.1071-1072.) No trier of fact could reasonably find that respondent’s conduct fell outside of the protection of the primary assumption of risk doctrine. Vigorous participation in surfing “likely would be chilled if legal liability were to be imposed” in these circumstances. (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 318.)
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal.
We concur: GILBERT, P. J., YEGAN, J.
———
Notes:
[1] We rely on undisputed facts and allegations in the complaint.
[2] A longboard is a board that is “typically longer than nine feet in length.” (Paul Caprara, Surf’s Up: The Implications of Tort Liability in the Unregulated Sport of Surfing (2008) 44 Cal. Western L.Rev. 557, 573, fn. 90 (Caprara).) Respondent’s longboard was 10 feet 4 inches long. A leash is a cord that attaches the ankle of the surfer to the tail end of the board.
[3] “Dropping in” or “shoulder-hopping” describes a surfer getting in the right of way of another surfer who is surfing the same wave.” (Caprara, supra, 44 Cal. Western L.Rev. at p. 571.)
[4] All unlabeled statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.
———
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Manufactures Continuing Obligations about the Products they Create and Sell
Posted: May 15, 2024 Filed under: Product Liability | Tags: Continuing Duty to Warn, Manufacturer, Product liability Leave a comment1. You must constantly keep your manual and your website up to date. Any changes in how your product is used or any warnings about the product must be communicated as quickly as possible to all past, present, and future buyers and users of your product.
2. In some states, this duty extends to information you find out about how your product is being used or ways it should not be used after the product has been sold. In the past once the product was sold the duty to warn of the ways to be hurt using a product ended. However, many states are extending this duty to all users and how the product may be used or misused now or in the future.
3. You should maintain a list of your purchasers of your product to notify them of changes to the product, new warnings, etc. This is not a marketing list. This is a list to CYA. You may modify your customer agreements to make this possible and to differentiate between legally required notifications and marketing and the difference in opting out of these emails.
4. If you find out your product is being used in a way that it should not be used, you need to notify anyone using the product incorrectly as a group and owners of the product.
5. Product liable manuals and warnings NEVER stop being created or changed. Always be thinking about how a “stupid human” could create a new way to use your product to get on TV, either as a stunt or a news story.
Information to Remember when Creating Warnings and Warning Labels
.
A. Using a larger, bold, or different front always helps have the warnings noticed.
B. Warnings on the Product or in the manual must be easily identified as such by the use of color, size, type of font, or a symbol.
C. Using Bright Colors like Yellow and Orange helps your customers locate the warnings. If your manual is only going to be in black and white, use bold fonts, symbols, and boxes to catch your customer’s eye.
a. The Black Triangle with a yellow or orange fill with an exclamation point in the triangle is a well-known way to identify a warning.
D. At the same time, make sure the warnings are necessary. Too many warnings and the warnings might be overlooked.
E. Make sure the warnings are located where the information that triggers the warning is located in the manual. Listing warnings at the end of the manual is not sufficient.
After this decision, I’m not sure you could prove assumption of the risk without a written document and a video or more.
Posted: April 22, 2024 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Challenge or Ropes Course, Pennsylvania | Tags: assumption of the risk, Balance Beam, Challenge Couse, Corporate Team Building, Low Challenge Course, Team Building, Woodloch Pines Resort 3 CommentsPlaintiff was part of a team-building group for her school/employer, she fell off the balance beam and sued for her injuries.
Hazen v. Woodloch Pines Resort, Civil Action 3:21-cv-00174 (M.D. Pa. Feb 16, 2024)
State: Pennsylvania, United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Plaintiff: Erin Hazen
Defendant: Woodloch Pines Resort d/b/a Woodloch Pines, et al
Plaintiff Claims:
Defendant Defenses: Assumption of the Risk
Holding: For the Plaintiff
Year: 2024
Summary
A middle school assistant principal fell off a low rope’s balance beam, 12″ high, into wood chips suffering injuries to her leg, ankle, and foot. However, under the interpretation of the defense of assumption of the risk by this court, she did not assume the risk of her injuries.
This has got to be appealed!
Facts
Woodloch Pines Resort (“Woodloch”) is an all-inclusive family resort located in Pike County, Pennsylvania. Since the 1990s, it has offered corporate team building activities on an outdoor low ropes challenge course. One of the elements of this challenge course was a “balance beam” or “teeter-totter” device made up of a fulcrum with a plank on top of it. The plank or “beam” is 10-feet long and 10%-inches wide. The fulcrum is 12-inches high and, when at its highest point, the end of the plank or beam is 3 feet above the surface below. The area below and around the balance beam device was covered with wooden mulch, presumably to, cushion the fall of any participants.
In June 2019, the plaintiff, Erin Hazen, was an assistant principal at KIPP TEAM Academy, a public charter school in Newark, New Jersey. She had been working there for about a year. On Saturday, June 22, 2019, Hazen and ten of her colleagues from the “leadership team” at KIPP TEAM Academy were on the third day of a leadership retreat at Woodloch. That morning, they participated in the outdoor challenge course activities as a team. After completing several other activities, they attempted the “balance beam” activity, where Hazen was injured.
The team was instructed by Eric Ranner, Woodloch’s corporate activities director, that the goal of the balance beam activity was to get the entire 11-person leadership team onto the plank without breaking either of two eggs that had been placed under each end of the plank. The parties dispute whether Ranner gave any additional verbal instructions or warnings to the participants. Ranner was the only Woodloch employee present at the time.
After two unsuccessful attempts to complete the activity, the team was able to get ten members on the plank at once during its third attempt. When the eleventh team member mounted the plank, it became unbalanced and Hazen fell off, along with other participants. At least one other participant landed on top of Hazen.
As a result of her fall, Hazen suffered a gruesome ankle injury, including left ankle dislocation, a displaced left ankle trimalleolar fracture with transverse medial malleolar fracture, a transverse distal one-third fibula shaft fracture, syndesmotic rupture, and a minimally displaced proximal fracture in the metaphysis. Her medical treatment included three surgeries and ongoing physical therapy. Due to her injuries, resultant physical limitations, and her course of treatment, Hazen was forced to resign from her job at KIPP TEAM Academy.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The only defense raised in this motion was Assumption of the Risk. Under Pennsylvania law assumption of the risk is defined as:
…assumption of the risk is established by showing that the injured party fully appreciated the nature of the risk it faced and voluntarily assumed it. In addition, the injured party must not have had a meaningful and reasonable alternative path to avoid the risk.
Pennsylvania has an additional requirement to prove assumption of the risk from the majority of other states. Most states require that the plaintiff understood and knowingly assumed the risk. In Pennsylvania, the defendant must also prove that the plaintiff had a reasonable alternative way to avoid the risk.
This court then went on to define the components of the assumption of the risk under Pennsylvania law.
Voluntary assumption of the risk involves a subjective awareness of the risk inherent in an activity and a willingness – to accept it. A plaintiff has voluntarily assumed the risk where he fully understands it and Voluntarily chooses to encounter it.
If the plaintiff assumes the risk, like many states, this removes from the defendant the duty to protect the plaintiff.
Under the doctrine of assumption of the risk, a defendant is relieved of its duty to protect a plaintiff where the plaintiff has voluntarily and deliberately proceeded to face a known arid obvious risk and therefore is considered to have assumed liability for his own injuries.”
The court then went on to define what a risk, or danger as this court defined it, is:
A danger is deemed “obvious” when “both the condition and the risk are apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable man, in the position of the visitor, exercising normal perception, intelligence, and judgment.” For a danger to be “known,” it must “not only be known to exist, but. . . also be recognized that it is dangerous and the probability and gravity of the threatened harm must be appreciated.”
In all states, the trier of fact, the jury, must determine if the plaintiff assumed the risk. In some states, the court can make that decision in a motion if there is prior case law with similar facts or if the court determines that a jury would find for the defendant.
It is for that reason that Assumption of the Risk as a defense is second to use a release. A properly written release allows the defendant to motion for a summary judgment and the court, the trial judge can decide, there is no need to spend the money to go to trial.
Here the court went further to define the risk working hard to find a definition that would put an increased burden on the defendant, effectively removing the defense of assumption of the risk.
“Whether the plaintiff knows of the existence of the risk, or whether he understands and appreciates its magnitude and its unreasonable character, is a question of fact, usually to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court. The court may itself determine the issue only where reasonable men could not differ as to the conclusion.”.
In defining assumption of risk most courts say the plaintiff must knowingly understand the risk. Here the court stated the plaintiff must not only understand the risk but also the “magnitude and its unreasonable character.”
Going deeper into this extensive black hole to support the plaintiff the court stated.
The defendant’s burden to establish assumption of the risk is a tall order, because assumption of the risk requires knowledge of a specific risk, “It is not enough that the plaintiff was generally aware that the activity in which he was engaged had accompanying risks. Rather, the plaintiff must be aware of ‘the particular danger’ from which he is subsequently injured in order to voluntarily assume that risk as a matter of law.
The plaintiff under this ruling must not only know the risk, but the defendant must also prove the plaintiff knew of the particular danger that injured him or her.
The judge is requiring the plaintiff to have a crystal ball to understand every possible injury that could come from assuming the risk.
You are standing on a beam, elevated above the ground 12 inches on a beam that is 10″ wide with 11 other people, and not only must you know that you can fall off, but you must know that you will receive a severe leg, ankle, and foot injury.
Hazen suffered a gruesome ankle injury, including left ankle dislocation, a displaced left ankle trimalleolar fracture with transverse medial malleolar fracture, a transverse distal one-third fibula shaft fracture, syndesmotic rupture, and a minimally displaced proximal fracture in the metaphysis
You need to make a mental note when reading a case when the judge describes the injury as gruesome and then specifically identifies each injury the plaintiff suffered.
The court found the plaintiff understood and assumed that she could fall off the beam and suffer an injury. However, the court went on to say “But “awareness of a general risk does not amount to awareness of a specific risk.””
The judge continued on this track:
Awareness of the specific risk presented by the balance beam activity here includes not just an appreciation of the general possibility that she might fall, but also an appreciation of the likelihood of a fall and the potential for serious injury such as the complex multiple ankle fractures and other injuries that our plaintiff, in fact, suffered.
The next issue the court brought up was whether or not the plaintiff had a real choice to participate or not participate in any part of the team-building exercise.
Here, the parties dispute whether Hazen’s participation in the balance beam activity was voluntary. In her affidavit, Hazen has stated that she felt her participation in this team building activity was required rather than voluntary, noting that she had just finished her first year as an assistant principal at the charter school, she was required in that role to lead by example and thus participate fully in team-building activities, and the purpose of this particular activity was to get the entire team of eleven onto the plank at one time.
At what point in life can you not stop and say I don’t want to do this?
The court proceeded to dismiss the motion by the defendants.
Accordingly, based on the facts and evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving plaintiff, we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff was not subjectively. aware of the specific risk of serious injury posed by her participation in the balance beam activity that resulted in her injuries, or that she did not voluntarily accept that risk.
So Now What?
I have no idea what a trimalleolar fracture is. Nor does Word or Grammarly recognize trimalleolar as a word. Yet, this court expected a middle school assistant principal to understand the word, and the risk associated with it.
Let alone the ability, as a leader in a school, or assistant principal, that she does not want to participate in an activity because of the risk. If you don’t learn that in middle school, where are you going to learn it?
Here the court went out of its way to find requirements for the defense to prove that were outlandish and impossible. The only way to win anything like this in Pennsylvania in the future is to have the participants sit down and watch a video describing all the possible ways to get hurt, record the participants watching the video, and then sign an agreement, assumption of the risk or release which says the know and understand the risks and the particular dangers of each risk and that the person signing watched the video.
This decision is a little shocking.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Hazen v. Woodloch Pines Resort, Civil Action 3:21-cv-00174 (M.D. Pa. Feb 16, 2024)
Posted: April 22, 2024 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Challenge or Ropes Course, Pennsylvania | Tags: Balance Beam, challenge course, Corporate Team Building, Low Challenge Course, Low Course, Ropes course, Team Building, Woodloch Pines Resort Leave a commentTo Read an Analysis of this decision see: After this decision, I’m not sure you could prove assumption of the risk without a written document and a video or more.
ERIN HAZEN, Plaintiff,
v.
WOODLOCH PINES RESORT d/b/a WOODLOCH PINES, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-00174
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
February 16, 2024
MEMORANDUM
(SAPORITO, M. J.)
Woodloch Pines Resort (“Woodloch”) is an all-inclusive family resort located in Pike County, Pennsylvania. Since the 1990s, it has offered corporate team building activities on an outdoor low ropes challenge course. One of the elements of this challenge course was a “balance beam” or “teeter-totter” device made up of a fulcrum with a plank on top of it. The plank or “beam” is 10-feet long and 10%-inches wide. The fulcrum is 12%-inches high and, when at its highest point, the end of the plank or beam is 3%4eet above the surface below. The area below and around the balance beam device was covered with wooden mulch, presumably to, cushion the fall of any participants.
In June 2019, the plaintiff, Erin Hazen, was an assistant principal at KIPP TEAM Academy, a public charter school in Newark, New Jersey. She had been working there for about a year. On Saturday, June 22, 2019, Hazen and ten of her colleagues from the “leadership team” at KIPP TEAM Academy were on the third day of a leadership retreat at Woodloch. That morning, they participated in the outdoor challenge course activities as a team. After completing several other activities, they attempted the “balance beam” activity, where Hazen was injured.
The team was instructed by Eric Ranner, Woodloch’s corporate activities director, that the goal of the balance beam activity was to get the entire 11-person leadership team onto the plank without breaking either of two eggs that had been placed under each end of the plank.[1] The parties dispute whether Ranner gave any additional verbal instructions or warnings to the participants. Ranner was the only Woodloch employee present at the time.
After two unsuccessful attempts to complete the activity, the team was able to get ten members on the plank at once during its third attempt. When the eleventh team member mounted the plank, it became unbalanced and Hazen fell off, along with other participants.[2] At least one other participant landed on top of Hazen.
As a result of her fall, Hazen suffered a gruesome ankle injury, including left ankle dislocation, a displaced left ankle trimalleolar fracture with transverse medial malleolar fracture, a transverse distal one-third fibula shaft fracture, syndesmotic rupture, and a minimally displaced proximal fracture in the metaphysis. Her medical treatment included three surgeries and ongoing physical therapy. Due to her injuries, resultant physical limitations, and her course of treatment, Hazen was forced to resign from her job at KIPP TEAM Academy[3]
Hazen brought this federal diversity action asserting state-law negligence claims against each of the defendants. The defendants have answered the complaint, and, following the completion of discovery, they have moved for summary judgment. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue that Hazen is barred from all recovery by the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk.
Because this is a diversity action, we must apply Pennsylvania’s substantive law and federal procedural law. See Gasperini v. Cir. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). “Under Pennsylvania law, assumption of the risk is established by showing that the injured party fully appreciated the nature of the risk it faced and voluntarily assumed it. In addition, the injured party must not have had a meaningful and reasonable alternative path to avoid the risk.” Kirschbaum v WRGSB Assocs., 243 F.3d 145, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also . Mucowski v Clark, 590 A.2d 348, 350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (“Voluntary assumption of the risk involves a subjective awareness of the risk inherent in an activity and a willingness – to accept it. A plaintiff has voluntarily assumed the risk where he fully understands it and Voluntarily chooses to encounter it.”) (citation omitted and emphasis added). “Under the doctrine of assumption of the risk, a defendant is relieved of its duty to protect a plaintiff where the plaintiff has voluntarily and deliberately proceeded to face a known arid obvious risk arid therefore is considered to have assumed liability for his own injuries.” Barrett v. FredavidBuilders, Inc., 685 A.2d 129,130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); see also Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 125 (Pa. 1983) (holding that, when an invitee assumes the risk of injury from a dangerous condition, the landowner no longer owes the invitee a duty of care).
As the Carrender court explained:
A danger is deemed “obvious” when “both the condition and the risk are apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable man, in the position of the visitor, exercising normal perception, intelligence, and judgment.” For a danger to be “known,” it must “not only be known to exist, but. . . also be recognized that it is dangerous and the probability arid gravity of the threatened harm must be appreciated.”
Carrender, 469 A.2d at 123-24 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343Acmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1965)) (citations omitted, ellipsis in original).
“Whether the plaintiff knows of the existence of the risk, or whether he understands and appreciates its magnitude and its unreasonable character, is a question of fact, usually to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court. The court may itself determine the issue only where reasonable men could not differ as to the conclusion.”. Staymates E ITT Holub Indus., 527 A.2d 140, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §496D cmt.e); see also Kaplan v. Exxon Corp., 126 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1997); Mucowski,
:590.A.2d at 350 (quoting Staymatesf Carrender, 469 A.2d at 124. As this court has previously explained:
Given that its application is a “drastic measure” barring a plaintiffs recovery, to grant summary judgment on assumption of the risk as a matter of law the court must-conclusively and beyond question- find that the plaintiff was subjectively aware of a specific risk, voluntarily accepted it and acted in spite of that risk, and suffered harm contemplated by that specific risk. The defendant’s burden to establish assumption of the risk is a tall order, because . assumption of the risk requires knowledge of a specific risk, “It is not enough that the plaintiff was generally aware that the activity in which he was engaged had accompanying risks. Rather, the plaintiff must be aware of ‘the particular danger’ from which he is subsequently injured in order to voluntarily assume that risk as a matter of law.”
Smerdon v. GEICO Cas. Co., 342 F.Supp.3d 582, 587 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Bullman v Giuntoli, 761 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000), :and Barillari v. Ski Sha wnee, Inc., 986 F.Supp.2d 555, 562-63 (M.D. Pa. 2013)) (footnotes omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that Hazen was generally aware of the risk that she might fall from the balance beam during this activity. But “awareness of a general risk does not amount to awareness of a specific risk.” Smerdon, 342 F.Supp.3d at 588 (citing Barillari, 986 F.Supp.2d at 562-63). Awareness of the specific risk presented by the balance beam activity here includes not just an appreciation of the general possibility that she might fall, but also an appreciation of the likelihood of a fall and the potential for serious injury such as the complex multiple ankle fractures and other injuries that our plaintiff in fact suffered.[4]
See Kirschbaum, 243 F.3d at 157 (finding evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that office building tenant, who was aware of a broken handrail and that it would not aid him if he were to trip while on the stairs, lacked the necessary appreciation of the likelihood that he could fall and need to rely on the handrail); Rice v. Skytop Lodge Corp., No. 00-2243, 2002 WL 775484, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2002) (finding evidence Sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that a sledder, who was aware of general risks of sledding and who had observed the placement of a plastic fence at the bottom of the sledding hill, did not understand the specific risk of serious injury that might be caused by colliding with the fence); Mucowski, 590 A.2d at 350 (finding evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that a senior engineering student, who was familiar with a pool and the depth of the water therein, was not subjectively aware of the specific risk that he could Strike his head on the bottom of the pool when diving into 4 feet of water from a railing around the pool). Hazen’s failure to fully appreciate the specific risk of serious injury posed by the balance beam activity is further underscored by the fact that, between herself and all ten of her leadership team colleagues that day, none believed the balance beam activity was so unsafe that they should decline to participate. See Smerdon, 342 F.Supp.3d at 589. “Under Carrender, this issue goes to the jury unless reasonable minds could not disagree.” Kaplan, 126 F.3d at 225.
In addition, We note that, “[a]mong the circumstances to consider in evaluating the voluntariness of the plaintiff’s action is whether the plaintiff had a real ‘choice.'” Kaplan, 126 F.3d at 226 (quoting Howell E Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107 (Pa. 1993) (plurality opinion)). Here, the parties dispute whether Hazen’s participation in the balance beam activity was voluntary. In her affidavit, Hazen has stated that she felt her participation in this team building activity was required rather than voluntary, noting that she had just finished her first year as an assistant principal at the charter school, she was required in that role to lead by example and thus participate fully in team-building activities, and the purpose of this particular activity was to get the entire team of eleven onto the plank at one time. Hazen Aff., Doc. 36’7.[5] Thus, this element of the defendants’ assumption of the risk defense is also subject to a genuine dispute of material fact.
Accordingly, based on the facts and evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving plaintiff, we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff was not subjectively . aware of the specific risk of serious injury posed by her participation in the balance beam activity that resulted in her injuries, or that she did not voluntarily accept that risk. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.
———
Notes:
[1] In addition to multiple Woodloch corporate entities, Ranner is a named defendant in this action, along with Robert Filarsky, an assistant social director at Woodloch and Ranner’s supervisor that day.
[2] The evidence suggests that some of the participants may have jumped off the plank, but it is undisputed that Hazen fell.
[3] After a period of unemployment, Hazen is currently employed in a lower-paying position as a teacher at a different charter school in Morristown, New Jersey.
[4] We note that, while Hazen could have visually observed the particular dimensions of the balance beam device and ascertained that it was made of wood, she had no experience performing this or similar activities in the past, and she had no knowledge of the device’s particular construction, including its weight capacity or the fact that the plank was not itself secured to the fulcrum.
[5] In addition to deposition testimony by the parties themselves, deposition testimony by various nonparty witnesses, documentary and photographic evidence, arid expert witness reports, the plaintiff has relied on her owri testimonial affidavit, which is offered as a supplement to her deposition testimony and the other evidence. In their reply brief, the defendants have objected to consideration of this affidavit, arguing that it should be disregarded by the court under the “sham affidavit” doctrine. See generally Daubert E NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (“When a nonmovant’s affidavit contradicts earlier deposition testiiriony without a satisfactory or plausible explanation, a district court -iriay disregard it at summary judgment in deciding if a genuine, material factual dispute exists. This is the sham-affidavit doctrine. In applying it we adhere to a ‘flexible approach,’ giving due regard to the ‘surrounding circumstances.”‘) (citations omitted); Perma Res. & Dev’p Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1969) (seminal case on the sham affidavit doctrine). But “the principle does not apply if the deposition and the later sworn statement are not actually contradictory.” Palazzo ex rel. Deimage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 2000). “To be covered by the sham affidavit doctrine, the affidavit testimony must actually contradict previous deposition testimony, not merely differ from it or be in tension With it.” Ramirez v. Lora, No. 18-11230, 2022 WL 1539176, at *8 (D.N.J. May 16, 2022). Here, the defendants have characterized the plaintiff’s affidavit as “self-serving and boot strapping” and “incredulous,” but they have failed to identify any contradictory testimony whatsoever. See Defs.’ Reply Br. 5-8, Doc. 37. Thus, we decline to disregard the Hazen affidavit as evidence on summary judgment.
———
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Great Colorado Sun article about skiing and board injuries over the past five years
Posted: April 15, 2024 Filed under: Colorado, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Collisions, Law Enforcement, Ski Patrol, Skier Collisions, skier v. skier Leave a commentHowever, there is an inference from the interviews that is incorrect. The ski patrol is not trained, licensed, or allowed to chase down people in skier v. skier collisions.
Analyzing 5 years of injuries, crashes and hit-and-runs at Colorado ski areas by Jason Blevins
Skier v. Skier collision is the term used to describe any collision between a skier, snowboarder, ski bike, or any other form of sliding down the slopes at a ski area. That term has grown in use over the past twenty years because there are more skier v. skier collisions.
It has also taken on more prominence in our lives and the media because the plaintiff’s lawyers who used to sue ski areas for injuries now sue the negligent party in a skier v. skier collision. Most ski areas are protected by some form of ski area safety statute and most use a release. Those attorneys who used to sue ski areas are now suing skiers. You can tell from the billboards on, I-70 leaving the mountains. They used to say if you had been injured at a ski area to call an 800 number. Now they ask if you were hit at a ski area.
There is a quote in the article that can be misleading if you do not understand the entire legal complex around collision injuries occurring on the mountain.
The woman was describing what happened when she went to the ski patrol after her friend had been hit by a snowboarder.
She snapped a photo and brought it into the ski patrol headquarters at the top of the lift, wondering if maybe they would want to find the man and talk to him about the accident.
“They were completely indifferent,” she says. “I was like the weird old lady.”
I can tell you they were not indifferent. They just did not want to go to jail or be sued for helping. Probably they have been told to record the information at the scene from the witnesses, including the skier causing the collision if that person is still around.
Why don’t they do more?
- They are not law enforcement. They do not have the authority, without seeing the collision, to do anything else.
- If they did find the alleged perpetrator, and they held that person for law enforcement to arrive, they could be charged with false imprisonment or sued for it. False imprisonment does not require bars and a door; it only means you restricted someone’s movement without the right to do so.
- And who would you detain someone? If you touch the person, you are committing a battery—both a civil and criminal act.
Everything the patroller, does that could result in a lawsuit against the patroller will result in a lawsuit against the ski resort he was working or volunteering at.
The article also looked into why people who are injured or more specifically their friends or family members can’t get that information from the ski patrol if they collect it.
The police are required to get a subpoena to collect information from non-parties in a criminal investigation. Just watch any cop show on TV, and you’ll learn that. Friends and family are no different from law enforcement to some extent. There must also be a nexus between the person asking and the information they want to the victim.
And those are not the only legal issues involved. HIPPA and medical confidentially laws control who has access to medical information. Just because your son or daughter was injured in a collision, if they are over the age of 18 you as a sibling, parent or friend cannot legally access that information without written consent from the person whose information you are requesting; The injured party.
There are also limits on how much information you can find on ski area injuries. If the incident is not reported to the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment — or CDPHE or U.S. National Trauma Data Bank can’t be found to research. Twenty years ago, broken wrists were not reported. Yet snowboarders at one resort were suffering a broken wrist for every 1000 skiers and boarders at the resort. So, unless the injury falls into the class that is reported, any article is going to lack a total look at what is happening.
The article is good, but it is limited in what can be collected, more by circumstances than anything else.
What is the problem is this belief that the Ski Patrol is the sheriff on the mountain. They are not; they are not trained, and they do not have the legal authority to do anything except collect information in a skier v. skier collision.
They do have the authority to take your pass away for violating ski area rules. However, if you read your season pass or lift ticket, the ski area owns both the pass and ticket and you are using them with their permission. The ski patrol is just the lucky one to yank the permission.
Think about it, you are injured and lying in the snow. Who do you want to show up, a friendly ski patroller trained in first aid and how to get you off the slopes or a deputy asking you questions about who hit you? Later, after you are home and feeling better you might wish it had been a deputy, but right then you are looking for that cross on the back of a jacket and a reassuring look from a patroller.
What can you do?
Skiing and boarding have changed. No longer are you able to take off from the lift and bomb the slope? Ski Areas are two crowded; few skiers take lessons anymore, and the equipment has evolved so that learning to ski takes less time and patience than ever before.
That lack of time in learning to ski, or great instruction from ski instructors also means a lack of experience for a lot of people on the slopes. The old saying was it skiing was easier to learn, usually in one day. Snowboarding was harder to learn, but by day three, you could be headed to the Olympics.
At the same time, as a skier or boarder, you are responsible for yourself. Skiing and Boarding means knowing where you are and who is around you. If you are skiing on the edge of a run, you better include the trees as part of your scan area.
Always stop in a safe place, which nowadays is harder to find. Never stop under a rise, lip, or jump. Make sure you can be seen when you stop and stop so you can look uphill for any problems. If you see someone coming, be prepared to get out of the way.
Take a half-day lesson to make sure you know what you are doing, where you should be doing it, what to do if you screw up, and how to survive on the slopes.
Resorts are worried about the issues, finally, and are trying to figure out what that means to them and how they can deal with it.
![]() Jim Moss |
Jim Moss is an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the outdoor recreation community. He represents guides, guide services, and outfitters both as businesses and individuals and the products they use for their business. He has defended Mt. Everest guide services, summer camps, climbing rope manufacturers, avalanche beacon manufacturers, and many more manufacturers and outdoor industries. Contact Jim at Jim@Rec-Law.us |

Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law
Jim is the author or co-author of six books about legal issues in the outdoor recreation world; the latest is
Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law.
To see Jim’s complete bio go here and to see his CV you can find it here. To find out the purpose of this website go here.
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Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law To Purchase Go Here:
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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
@2008-2024 Summit Magic Publishing, LLC
By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
@2024 Summit Magic Publishing, LLC
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer,
States that allow a parent to sign away a minor’s right to sue.
Posted: March 25, 2024 Filed under: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin | Tags: Exculpatory Agreement, guardian, Minor, parent, Parents right to waive minor's right to sue, releases, waivers Leave a commentUnless listed here, your state does not allow a parent or guardian to sign away a minor’s right to sue.
Check with your local attorney before relying on any information on this website.
![]() Jim Moss |
Jim Moss is an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the outdoor recreation community. He represents guides, guide services, and outfitters both as businesses and individuals and the products they use for their business. He has defended Mt. Everest guide services, summer camps, climbing rope manufacturers, avalanche beacon manufacturers, and many more manufacturers and outdoor industries. Contact Jim at Jim@Rec-Law.us |

Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law
Jim is the author or co-author of six books about legal issues in the outdoor recreation world; the latest is Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law.
To see Jim’s complete bio go here and to see his CV you can find it here. To find out the purpose of this website go here.
G-YQ06K3L262
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
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Blue Sky |
If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.
Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law To Purchase Go Here:
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Email: Jim@Rec-Law.US
By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
@2008-2024 Summit Magic Publishing, LLC
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, minor, release, Parent Signature, NC, North Carolina, Alaska, AK, AZ, Arizona, CO, Colorado, Florida, FL, CA, California, MA, Massachusetts, Minnesota, MN, ND, North Dakota, OH, Ohio, WI, Wisconsin, Hohe, San Diego, San Diego Unified School District, Global Travel Marketing, Shea, Gonzalez, City Of Coral Gables, Sharon, City of Newton, Moore, Minnesota Baseball Instructional School, McPhail, Bismark Park District, Zivich, Mentor Soccer Club, Osborn, Cascade Mountain, Atkins, Swimwest Family Fitness Center, Minor, Minors, Right to Sue, Utah, UT, Equine, Equine Safety Act, North Carolina, New York,
Make sure the person signing the release is the person you have on your trip.
Posted: February 15, 2024 Filed under: Paddlesports, Pennsylvania, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Rivers and Waterways, Whitewater Rafting | Tags: fatality, Foot Entrapment, Forum selection clause, Lehigh River, Ltd., Pennsylvania, Pocono Whitewater, Release, Unguided Raft, Whitewater Rafting Leave a commentMother signed her son up for a trip and claimed she signed the release. This invalidated a change of venue because the forum selection clause was not at issue.
Bonnen v. Pocono Whitewater, Ltd., Civil Action 3:20-cv-01532 (M.D. Pa. Sep 17, 2021)
State: Pennsylvania; United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Plaintiff: CAROLINE BONNEN, et al
Defendant: POCONO WHITEWATER, LTD
Plaintiff Claims: negligent, grossly negligent, and reckless in its conduct
Defendant Defenses: Release containing a forum selection clause
Holding: for the plaintiff
Year: 2021
Summary
The forum selection clause in the release was not upheld because the mother of the deceased claimed she signed the release. Since the deceased did not sign the release the forum selection clause was not valid.
Facts
On September 1, 2019, Christopher Santana was one of nine occupants in an eight-person raft, none of whom were guides, who were Whitewater rafting on the Lehigh River in Jim Thorpe, Carbon County, Pennsylvania. After the raft hit a rock, Santana was thrown from the raft into turbulent and rocky waters. His foot became lodged between rocks causing him to become submerged underwater, which resulted in his death by drowning. The plaintiff, Caroline Bonnen, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Christopher Santana, brings this wrongful death and survival action against the defendant, Pocono Whitewater, Ltd.
The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss seeking dismissal on the ground that a forum selection provision contained in a release of liability purportedly signed by the decedent sets the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County as the appropriate and agreed-upon venue for any dispute “aris[ing] out of th[e] agreement or otherwise between the parties.”
A review of the amended complaint reflects that the plaintiff did not plead whether the release of liability has any relevance to the incident. Rather, the plaintiff has pled that the defendant was negligent, grossly negligent, and reckless in its conduct in a variety of several itemized instances. In her opposition papers, the plaintiff contends that the release of liability, which includes the forum selection clause contained therein, is invalid because the decedent did not execute the release. The plaintiff maintains that it was she who signed the decedent’s name, without authority to contract on behalf of the decedent..
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The decision in this case was two paragraphs long. Since the mother claimed she signed the release for the deceased, the validity of the release and the forum selection clause it contained were at issue.
Turning to the motion to dismiss based on enforcement of a forum selection provision under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), when the parties’ agreement contains a valid forum selection clause designating a particular forum for settling disputes arising out of their contract, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a permissible means of enforcing that forum selection clause.
Here, the plaintiff disputes the validity of the release containing a forum selection clause because it was allegedly signed in the decedent’s name by his mother, the plaintiff, without authorization or consent by the decedent. Based on the factual allegations by the parties, we are unable to conclude that the decedent unambiguously manifested his assent to the forum selection clause, and thus we are unable to find that the forum selection clause is valid. Because the validity of the form selection clause remains in doubt, the defendant’s preferred forum-the Carbon County state courts-is not controlling. Moreover, Pennsylvania law holds that such a release agreement cannot bind non-signatories.
Since there was a dispute as to who signed the release containing the forum selection clause, the issue of the validity of the release and the clause were not something the court could ignore.
So Now What?
Signing releases electronically makes paperwork non-existent and allows the guests to see and sign the release in advance of any trip. This makes sign up or check in at day trips a breeze.
At the same time, it allows for people to argue they did not sign the release. Consequently, you need to modify your release to catch these issues and prevent them.
One way is to verify that the name signing the release is the name on the credit card used to pay for the trip or activity. If not flag the release and have a paper or new electronic version signed at check in.
You can also use the language in the credit card agreement to verify the fact that the person signing the release is the person who owns the credit card.
Another issue is one spouse signing a release online for both spouses and minor children. Dependent upon the state, you make have one spouse sign up online, the second spouse and if eligible minor children sign a paper copy at check in.
No matter what make sure the number of people signing up for your trip or activity are the ones in front of you checking in and you have the correct name on a release for each person checking in.
G-YQ06K3L262
| Jim Moss is an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the outdoor recreation community. He represents guides, guide services, outfitters both as businesses and individuals and the products they use for their business. He has defended Mt. Everest guide services, summer camps, climbing rope manufacturers, avalanche beacon manufactures and many more manufacturers and outdoor industries. Contact Jim at Jim@Rec-Law.us |
Jim is the author or co-author of six books about the legal issues in the outdoor recreation world; the latest is Outdoor
Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law.
To see Jim’s complete bio go here and to see his CV you can find it here. To find out the purpose of this website go here.
G-YQ06K3L262
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.
Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Email: Jim@Rec-Law.US
By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
@2024 Summit Magic Publishing, LLC
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #SkiLaw,
Bonnen v. Pocono Whitewater, Ltd., Civil Action 3:20-cv-01532 (M.D. Pa. Sep 17, 2021)
Posted: February 15, 2024 Filed under: Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Paddlesports, Pennsylvania, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Rivers and Waterways, Whitewater Rafting | Tags: fatality, Foot Entrapment, Forum selection clause, Lehigh River, Ltd., Pennsylvania, Pocono Whitewater, Release, Unguided Raft, Whitewater Rafting Leave a commentBonnen v. Pocono Whitewater, Ltd., Civil Action 3:20-cv-01532 (M.D. Pa. Sep 17, 2021)
CAROLINE BONNEN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
POCONO WHITEWATER, LTD., Defendant.
Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-01532
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
September 17, 2021
MEMORANDUM
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR., U.S. Magistrate Judge.
This diversity action is before the court on the defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) based on enforcement of a forum selection provision. (Doc. 15). The action arises out of an incident where the plaintiffs decedent died as a result of being thrown from a raft while Whitewater rafting on the Lehigh River in Carbon County, Pennsylvania. For the reasons set forth herein, we will deny the motion.
I. Statement of Facts
On September 1, 2019, Christopher Santana was one of nine occupants in an eight-person raft, none of whom were guides, who were Whitewater rafting on the Lehigh River in Jim Thorpe, Carbon County, Pennsylvania. After the raft hit a rock, Santana was thrown from the raft into turbulent and rocky waters. His foot became lodged between rocks causing him to become submerged underwater, which resulted in his death by drowning. The plaintiff, Caroline Bonnen, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Christopher Santana, brings this wrongful death and survival action against the defendant, Pocono Whitewater, Ltd.
The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 15), seeking dismissal on the ground that a forum selection provision contained in a release of liability purportedly signed by the decedent sets the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County as the appropriate and agreed-upon venue for any dispute “aris[ing] out of th[e] agreement or otherwise between the parties.” (Doc. 14-5).
A review of the amended complaint reflects that the plaintiff did not plead whether the release of liability has any relevance to the incident. Rather, the plaintiff has pled that the defendant was negligent, grossly negligent, and reckless in its conduct in a variety of several itemized instances. (Doc. 9 ¶ 31). In her opposition papers, the plaintiff contends that the release of liability, which includes the forum selection clause contained therein, is invalid because the decedent did not execute the release. (Doc. 20 passim; Doc. 21, at 3-5). The plaintiff maintains that it was she who signed the decedent’s name, without authority to contract on behalf of the decedent. (Id.).
The motion has been fully briefed by the parties and is ripe for disposition. (Doc. 16; Doc. 21).
II. Legal Standard
Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief is granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiffs claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). In deciding the motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellab, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegations.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevy, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007). Nor is it required to credit factual allegations contradicted by indisputably authentic documents on which the complaint relies or matters of public record of which we may take judicial notice. In re Washington Mut. Inc., 741 Fed.Appx. 88, 91 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018); Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 246 F.Supp.3d 1058, 1075 (E.D. Pa. 2017); Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 588-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
III. Discussion
Turning to the motion to dismiss based on enforcement of a forum selection provision under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), when the parties’ agreement contains a valid forum selection clause designating a particular forum for settling disputes arising out of their contract, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a permissible means of enforcing that forum selection clause. Salovaara v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 289, 298 (3d Cir. 2001). Podesta v. Hanzel, 684 Fed.Appx. 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Eureka Res., LLC v. Hoden Roots LLC, ___F.Supp.3d.___, 2021 WL 3545068, at * 1 & n.5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2021).
Here, the plaintiff disputes the validity of the release containing a forum selection clause because it was allegedly signed in the decedent’s name by his mother, the plaintiff, without authorization or consent by the decedent. Based on the factual allegations by the parties, we are unable to conclude that the decedent unambiguously manifested his assent to the forum selection clause, and thus we are unable to find that the forum selection clause is valid. See Oak Street Printery LLC v. Fujifilm N. Am. Corp., 895 F.Supp.2d 613, 619 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Because the validity of the form selection clause remains in doubt, the defendant’s preferred forum-the Carbon County state courts-is not controlling. See Id. Moreover, Pennsylvania law holds that such a release agreement cannot bind non-signatories. See Valentino v. Philadelphia Triathlon, LLC, 150 A.3d 483, 497 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (noting that a statutory “wrongful death claimant possesses an independent, non-derivative right of action” that cannot be subjected to a forum selection clause, signed by the decedent, without the claimant’s consent); cf. Buttermore v. Aliquippa Hospital, 561 A.2d 733, 736 (Pa. l989)(holding that a wife’s consortium claim was an independent cause of action, and thus not barred by a settlement agreement to which she was not a signatory). Therefore, construing all well-pleaded facts as true, as we must, we are constrained to deny the motion to dismiss.
An appropriate order follows.
Defendant found criminal guilty for failing to have a federal permit to operate on a lake owned by United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
Posted: February 5, 2024 Filed under: Criminal Liability, Kentucky, Paddlesports, Rivers and Waterways | Tags: Criminal, Federal District Court, Grayson Lake, Kentucky, permit, Stand Up Paddleboarding, SUP, Trespassing, US Army Corp of Engineers Leave a commentIf you are on Federal land or Federal water making money you have to have a Federal Permit
United States v. Warman, 23-MJ-02-EBA, Violation 1062808 (E.D. Ky. Mar 15, 2023)
State: Kentucky; United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Northern Division
Plaintiff: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant: HEATHER WARMAN
Plaintiff Claims:
Defendant Defenses: She did not own the business and she was out of the country on the day the ticket was issued.
Holding: Defendant was found guilty
Year: 2023
Summary
Defendant Heather Warman is a self-attested “CEO,” “Owner,” “Representative,” and “Manager” of SUP Kentucky. On its website, SUP Kentucky advertises kayak rentals and tours on-site at Grayson Grotto, which is situated on Grayson Lake in Olive, Kentucky. Critically, Grayson Lake is federal property, so a commercial business license issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is required to lawfully solicit or conduct business on the lake. See 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a). Warman was advised of the requirement multiple times over the course of several months by USACE Project and Resource Manager Francis Jeffrey. Nonetheless, she never applied for a commercial business license nor ceased her operations on the lake. So, on July 23, 2022, Warman was issued a notice for violating 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a).
Facts
The United States accuses Warman of engaging in or soliciting business activities on Grayson Lake without authorization from the USACE in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a). The regulation prohibits the “engaging in or solicitation of business on project land or waters without the express written permission of the District Commander.” Id. A violator “may be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than six months or both[.]” 36 C.F.R. § 327.25. For Warman to be adjudged guilty by this Court, the United States must show beyond a reasonable doubt that Warman knowingly engaged in or solicited business on federal project land or waters, such as Grayson Lake, without the express written permission of the District Commander.
On March 28, 2022, Warman called Jeffrey to inquire about expanding certain mountain bike trails onto federal project land surrounding Grayson Lake. These bike trails were associated with her business, Grayson Getaways. During the conversation, Warman advised Jeffrey that she was also “the owner and CEO of SUP Kentucky, a guided kayak company” which seeks to expand its operations “on Grayson Lake[.]”Jeffrey informed Warman that it is illegal to operate a commercial business on federal project lands or waters without express consent from the District Commander in the form of a written permit. Warman, however, contended that a permit from the District Commander was unnecessary because she already held a permit from the Commonwealth of Kentucky which allowed her to operate a guided kayak business on “any lake in the state.” Jeffrey assured Warman, though, that she needed a permit from the District Commander and explained to her the difference between federal and state lands.
On May 13, 2022, Warman again contacted Jeffrey about expanding Grayson Getaways’ bike trails onto federal project land surrounding Grayson Lake. [Id.]. During the conversation, Jeffrey “reminded her . . . that a permit is needed to continue” her kayak rental and touring operations on Grayson Lake. This constituted her second verbal warning. Once again, Warman “disagreed.”
Five days later, on May 17, 2022, the USACE’s Real Estate Division served a cease-and-desist letter on Warman. The letter advised Warman that she was in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 327.18 for “advertising for and performing guided kayak and standup paddleboard tours on Grayson Lake . . . without the expressed written permission of the District Commander[.]”Warman acknowledged receipt via email, writing “Thank You.”
Thereafter, Warman communicated with the USACE’s Real Estate Division concerning the permit requirements. An in-person meeting was scheduled for May 27, 2022, but was later cancelled. [Id.]. On May 27, 2022, Jeffrey was contacted by Warman’s attorney about the permit requirements and application process.
On July 5, 2022, the USACE’s Real Estate Division informed Jeffrey that Warman’s company continued to operate and advertise tours on Grayson Lake. After investigating, Jeffrey concluded that Warman was, in fact, engaging in or soliciting business on project lands without a permit, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a). So, Jeffrey and Natural Resource Specialist Justine Smith cited Warman for violating the regulation. On September 7, 2022, Jeffrey chronicled his investigation into a Memorandum for Record, which the United States offered as an exhibit at trial.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
This is a criminal case, meaning a State or the Federal Government has charged the defendant with committing a crime. If you are found guilty of a crime you can be forced to pay a fine or spend time in jail. In this case, it is a crime to operate a business on Federal Land without a Federal Permit.
Each of the Federal Agencies that have land available to use for recreation has similar requirements for obtaining a permit to operate on federal land. Those agencies include the US Forest Service which is part of the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service which is part of the Department of the Interior. And as in this case the Army Corps of Engineers, part of the Department of the Army. Each agency has different rules and regulations on how to obtain permits, how you must operate under the permit, and what the charges and fees are for the permit.
You have to have permission to “be” on proper, real estate, that you don’t own. If you are attempting to make money by using that property, you not only have to have permission to be on the real estate, but if owned by the Federal Government, you must have additional paperwork saying you have the right to make money using the Federal Government’s property.
Here the defendant was operating a SUP (Stand Up Paddleboard) business on a lake owned and controlled by the Army Corporation of Engineers. The defendant first claimed that since she had a permit to operate in Kentucky she did not need an Army Corp of Engineers Permit.
She did not use this argument in court. An analogy would be you can’t stand on your neighbor’s land without their permission and argue that the neighbor across the street told you it was OK to be there.
The Federal Regulation in question is:
§ 327.18 Commercial activities.
(a) The engaging in or solicitation of business on project land or waters without the express written permission of the District Commander is prohibited.
(b) It shall be a violation of this part to refuse to or fail to comply with any terms, clauses or conditions of any lease, license or agreements issued by the District Commander.
At trial the defendant attempted two different legal arguments.
Warman’s defense is two-fold. First, she says she doesn’t “own” SUP Kentucky, so she argues it’s impossible for her to have operated a business on federal project lands or waters without a permit in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a). (“Warman did not and has not ever owned the Web-Site presented as evidence by the United States of America and as detailed on the Kentucky Secretary of State official records Mrs. Warman does not and has never owned Sup Kentucky.”). Second, because the citation was issued on July 23, 2022-when she was out of the country, at sea, on her way to Grenada-it was impossible for her to “solicit business or even communicate with anyone other than those physically on board her ship.”
The court went through the first defense quickly noticing all of the times she had told the Army Corp of Engineers that she was operating a SUP business on the lake.
Given Warman’s admissions, Jeffrey’s detailed chronology of his conversations with Warman, and the fact that only Jeffrey’s account has evidentiary support, the Court concludes that Jeffrey’s account of the facts is inherently more credible than Warman’s.
The second argument went down in a similar fashion. The citation was not for operating a business without a permit on one day, but multiple days. Again, the records of the Corp of Engineers and statements made by the defendant shot this argument down.
Through the testimony of Jeffrey, the United States proved that Warman is interested in the success of SUP Kentucky. See Also through the testimony of Jeffrey, and implicitly through the testimony of Warman herself, the United States proved that Warman solicited and conducted guided kayak and standup paddle tours on Grayson Lake without a commercial business license.
The judge found the defendant guilty of violating the federal statute.
Heather Warman was cited with violating 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a) for soliciting for and operating her guided tour and kayak rental business on Grayson Lake without written permission from the District Commander. Warman pled not guilty. However, the Court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that Warman violated 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a). That is, she knowingly engaged in or solicited business on Grayson Lake without the express written permission of the District Commander, despite receiving two prior oral warnings and a formal, written cease-and-desist letter. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Heather Warman is GUILTY of violating 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Heather Warman shall appear for SENTENCING on April 13, 2023 at 10:00 A.M. in the United States District Courthouse at Ashland, Kentucky. On or before Monday, April 10, 2023, the parties shall file memoranda presenting matters that should be considered by the court in calculating an appropriate sentence.
So Now What?
In most of the US this would be called a trespassing case. Someone was on someone’s land without the landowner’s permission. However, when messing with Federal Land Owners the types of cases, damages and jail time escalate.
No matter whose land you are on, if the land is not yours, you need a lease or a permit to be there.
And remember, this is a Federal Criminal Case. It is going to effect the rest of her life.
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What do you think? Leave a comment.
| Jim Moss is an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the outdoor recreation community. He represents guides, guide services, outfitters both as businesses and individuals and the products they use for their business. He has defended Mt. Everest guide services, summer camps, climbing rope manufacturers, avalanche beacon manufactures and many more manufacturers and outdoor industries. Contact Jim at Jim@Rec-Law.us |
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United States v. Warman, 23-MJ-02-EBA, Violation 1062808 (E.D. Ky. Mar 15, 2023)
Posted: February 5, 2024 Filed under: Criminal Liability, Kentucky, Paddlesports | Tags: Commercial Operation, Criminal, criminal liability, Federal Permit, Stand Up Paddleboarding, SUP, US Army Corp of Engineers Leave a commentTo Read an Analysis of this decision see: Defendant found criminal guilty for failing to have a federal permit to operate on a lake owned by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
v.
HEATHER WARMAN, DEFENDANT.
No. 23-MJ-02-EBA
Violation No. 1062808
United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Northern Division
March 15, 2023
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
EDWARD B. ATKINS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Heather Warman is a self-attested “CEO,” “Owner,” “Representative,” and “Manager” of SUP Kentucky.[1] [R. 7 at pg. 4]. On its website, SUP Kentucky advertises kayak rentals and tours on-site at Grayson Grotto, which is situated on Grayson Lake in Olive, Kentucky. [R. 6-1 at pg. 3].[2] Critically, Grayson Lake is federal property, so a commercial business license issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is required to lawfully solicit or conduct business on the lake. See 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a). Warman was advised of the requirement multiple times over the course of several months by USACE Project and Resource Manager Francis Jeffrey. Nonetheless, she never applied for a commercial business license nor ceased her operations on the lake. So, on July 23, 2022, Warman was issued a notice for violating 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a).[3] [R. 1].
Warman appeared before the Court on February 23, 2023 for her initial appearance and arraignment. [R. 3]. Warman pled not guilty to the violation. [Id.]. Thereafter, the Court heard testimony from Jeffrey and Warman. After the taking of proof, the Court directed the parties to submit briefing on the matter no later than March 2, 2023. [Id.]. The United States and Warman tendered their briefs, so the matter is ripe for adjudication. [R. 6; R. 7].
ANALYSIS
A
The United States accuses Warman of engaging in or soliciting business activities on Grayson Lake without authorization from the USACE in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a). The regulation prohibits the “engaging in or solicitation of business on project land or waters without the express written permission of the District Commander.” Id. A violator “may be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than six months or both[.]” 36 C.F.R. § 327.25. For Warman to be adjudged guilty by this Court, the United States must show beyond a reasonable doubt that Warman knowingly engaged in or solicited business on federal project land or waters, such as Grayson Lake, without the express written permission of the District Commander.
B
On March 28, 2022, Warman called Jeffrey to inquire about expanding certain mountain bike trails onto federal project land surrounding Grayson Lake. [Gov. Ex. 1 at pg. 1]. These bike trails were associated with her business, Grayson Getaways. During the conversation, Warman advised Jeffrey that she was also “the owner and CEO of SUP Kentucky, a guided kayak company” which seeks to expand its operations “on Grayson Lake[.]” [Id.]. Jeffrey informed Warman that it is illegal to operate a commercial business on federal project lands or waters without express consent from the District Commander in the form of a written permit. [Id.]. Warman, however, contended that a permit from the District Commander was unnecessary because she already held a permit from the Commonwealth of Kentucky which allowed her to operate a guided kayak business on “any lake in the state.”[4] [Id.]. Jeffrey assured Warman, though, that she needed a permit from the District Commander and explained to her the difference between federal and state lands. [Id.].
On May 13, 2022, Warman again contacted Jeffrey about expanding Grayson Getaways’ bike trails onto federal project land surrounding Grayson Lake. [Id.]. During the conversation, Jeffrey “reminded her . . . that a permit is needed to continue” her kayak rental and touring operations on Grayson Lake. [Id.]. This constituted her second verbal warning. Once again, Warman “disagreed.” [Id.].
Five days later, on May 17, 2022, the USACE’s Real Estate Division served a cease-and-desist letter on Warman. [Id.]; [Gov. Ex. 2]. The letter advised Warman that she was in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 327.18 for “advertising for and performing guided kayak and standup paddleboard tours on Grayson Lake . . . without the expressed written permission of the District Commander[.]” [Id.]. Warman acknowledged receipt via email, writing “Thank You.” [Gov. Ex. 1 at pg. 1].
Thereafter, Warman communicated with the USACE’s Real Estate Division concerning the permit requirements. [Id.] An in-person meeting was scheduled for May 27, 2022, but was later cancelled. [Id.]. On May 27, 2022, Jeffrey was contacted by Warman’s attorney about the permit requirements and application process. [Id. at pg. 2].
On July 5, 2022, the USACE’s Real Estate Division informed Jeffrey that Warman’s company continued to operate and advertise tours on Grayson Lake. [Id.]. After investigating, Jeffrey concluded that Warman was, in fact, engaging in or soliciting business on project lands without a permit, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a).[5] [Id.]. So, Jeffrey and Natural Resource Specialist Justine Smith cited Warman for violating the regulation. [Id.]. On September 7, 2022, Jeffrey chronicled his investigation into a Memorandum for Record, which the United States offered as an exhibit at trial. [Id.].
C
Warman’s defense is two-fold. First, she says she doesn’t “own” SUP Kentucky, so she argues it’s impossible for her to have operated a business on federal project lands or waters without a permit in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a). [R. 6 at pg. 2] (“Warman did not and has not ever owned the Web-Site presented as evidence by the United States of America and as detailed on the Kentucky Secretary of State official records Mrs. Warman does not and has never owned Sup Kentucky.”).[6]
Second, because the citation was issued on July 23, 2022-when she was out of the country, at sea, on her way to Grenada-it was impossible for her to “solicit business or even communicate with anyone other than those physically on board her ship.” [Id.].
Warman’s first defense calls for the Court to make a credibility determination. See United States v. Vance, 956 F.3d 846, 853 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that during a bench trial, where the district court sits as “the finder of fact,” the district court “is best placed to determine witness credibility”). Is Jeffrey or Warman’s account of the facts most credible?
Jeffrey, as discussed above, documented his interactions with Warman on numerous occasions spanning a period of several months.[7] During these interactions, Warman held herself out as the owner and/or CEO of SUP Kentucky (and admitted that SUP Kentucky was conducting and soliciting business on Grayson Lake). [Gov. Ex. 1 at pg. 1] (noting that Jeffrey explained orally, at least twice, that “she could not continue to guide on Grayson until a permit is issued,” but that Warman “disagreed”). During trial, however, Warman claimed that she never represented to Jeffrey that she owned, operated, or served as CEO of SUP Kentucky.[8] Yet, Warman testified to holding herself out as a “Representative” of SUP Kentucky, that she serves as a “Manager” for SUP Kentucky, and that her husband owns SUP Kentucky. This aligns with her tendency to use personal possessive pronouns on the stand when referring to SUP Kentucky, such as “we” and “our.” Given Warman’s admissions, Jeffrey’s detailed chronology of his conversations with Warman, and the fact that only Jeffrey’s account has evidentiary support, the Court concludes that Jeffrey’s account of the facts is inherently more credible than Warman’s. So, Warman’s defense that it was impossible for her to violate 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a) for lack of an ownership interest in SUP Kentucky is unavailing.[9]
Warman’s second defense asserts a conclusion of law without reference to any legal authority: that it was legally impossible for Warman to solicit business from a website while at sea without access to the internet. [R. 6 at pg. 2]. Yet, Jeffrey testified that he issued a citation for Warman because of her ongoing, continuous wrongful conduct-conduct that Jeffrey first became aware of by Warman’s voluntary admission, no less. [Gov. Ex. 1 at pg. 1]. It is a coincidence, at best, that Warman happened to be out of the country on the date that Jeffrey and Smith wrote Warman’s citation. This “defense” would be unavailable if Jeffrey or Smith wrote Warman’s citation on any one of the other 116 days that Warman unlawfully solicited and conducted business on Grayson Lake without permission. And it is illogical to argue that Warman’s travel to another country, alone, precludes her from using a website to passively solicit business.
Although neither of Warman’s defenses persuade the Court, the United States must still carry its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Warman violated 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a). Here, the United States did so.
Through the testimony of Jeffrey, the United States proved that Warman is interested in the success of SUP Kentucky.[10]
See [Gov. Ex. 1 at pg. 1]. Also through the testimony of Jeffrey, and implicitly through the testimony of Warman herself, the United States proved that Warman solicited and conducted guided kayak and standup paddle tours on Grayson Lake without a commercial business license. See [Id.]; [Gov. Ex. 6; R. 6-1 at pg. 3] (“All Stand Up Paddle Kentucky adventures meet on-site where your trip will take place…. To help you plan your travels: . . . Grayson Grotto is in Grayson Lake State Park in Olive Hill, Kentucky.”) (emphasis added).
Finally, also through the testimony of Jeffrey and Warman, the United States proved that Warman conducted these activities knowingly. See United States v. Davis, 339 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that receiving “verbal warnings and correspondence from the Corps of Engineers . . . make clear that [Defendant] had actual knowledge of the regulations and that lake management officials considered his actions to be illegal”). Warman was orally warned by Jeffrey twice that she would need to obtain a commercial business license before operating or soliciting business on Grayson Lake and, when she failed to comply with Jeffrey’s oral warnings, Warman was warned again in writing by the USACE’s Real Estate Division that she was in violation of 36 C.F.R § 327.18(a). [Gov. Ex. 1 at pg. 1]. Warman is guilty beyond any reasonable doubt.[11]
CONCLUSION
Heather Warman was cited with violating 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a) for soliciting for and operating her guided tour and kayak rental business on Grayson Lake without written permission from the District Commander. Warman pled not guilty. However, the Court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that Warman violated 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a). That is, she knowingly engaged in or solicited business on Grayson Lake without the express written permission of the District Commander, despite receiving two prior oral warnings and a formal, written cease-and-desist letter. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Heather Warman is GUILTY of violating 36 C.F.R. § 327.18(a).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Heather Warman shall appear for SENTENCING on April 13, 2023 at 10:00 A.M. in the United States District Courthouse at Ashland, Kentucky. On or before Monday, April 10, 2023, the parties shall file memoranda presenting matters that should be considered by the court in calculating an appropriate sentence.
Signed.
———
Notes:
[1] When interacting with USACE Project and Resource Manager Francis Jeffrey, Warman introduced herself as the “owner” and “CEO” of SUP Kentucky. But on cross-examination, Warman said that she doesn’t own SUP Kentucky or serve as its CEO, but instead serves as a “Manager” who holds herself out as a “Representative” of SUP Kentucky.
[2] [Gov. Ex. 6; R. 6-1 at pg. 3] (“All Stand Up Paddle Kentucky adventures meet on-site where your trip will take place. . . . To help you plan your travels: . . . Grayson Grotto is in Grayson Lake State Park in Olive Hill, Kentucky.”) (emphasis added).
[3] The notice was served on Warman via USPS Certified Mail at 2478 Glen Cairn Road, Roger, Kentucky 41365. Jeffrey obtained this address directly from SUP Kentucky’s website, and Warman obviously received the notice given her participation in this action.
[4] This alleged permit was never presented to Jeffrey, or anyone else with the USACE, nor was it offered as evidence at trial.
[5] Jeffrey’s investigation included soliciting a guided kayak tour on Grayson Lake from SUP Kentucky.
[6] Warman asserted at trial and in her trial brief that the Kentucky Secretary of State’s official business registry proves that she’s not an owner of SUP Kentucky. [R. 6 at pg. 2]. However, Warman never offered these records into evidence for the Court’s consideration. So, her claim is without factual support.
[7] Warman, on the other hand, did not.
[8] In a footnote, the United States suggests that Warman’s testimony that she “never informed Resource Manager Francis Jeffrey, the Real Estate Division of the USACE, or her SUP Kentucky clientele that she owned this company or that she represented she was one of the owners of the company” might constitute “perjury and obstruction of justice.” [R. 7 at pg. 7 n.1]. The United States bases its claim off a statement located on the SUP Kentucky website. [Id.]. The USACE is investigating the matter.
[9] Again, Warman’s reliance on evidence outside the record-the Kentucky Secretary of State’s official business registry to argue that she’s not an owner of SUP Kentucky fails to rebut evidence within the record that indicates the opposite. See, supra note 6.
[10] Warman’s precise title seems to be something that not even she can discern. See supra note 1 (highlighting that Warman has held herself out as the “CEO,” “Owner,” “Manager,” and “Representative” of SUP Kentucky at various times to different target audiences).
[11] It’s unclear from the record what type of business association SUP Kentucky is. However, even if SUP Kentucky is a Limited Liability Corporation-the most protective of business associations-“under Kentucky law, a member or manager of an LLC can be held personally liable for [her] own wrongful acts or misconduct even if [she] was acting on behalf of the LLC.” 5ifth Element Creative, LLC v. Kirsch, No. 5:10-cv-255-KKC, 2010 WL 5139235, at *2 (E.D Ky. Dec. 9, 2010); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.150(3); see also 4A Ky. Prac. Methods of Prac. § 18.33 (Nov. 2022) (“In fact, KRS 275.150(3) specifically provides that KRS 275.150(1) shall not affect the liability of a member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability company for his or her own negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct.”). Warman never made this argument at trial or in briefing. But even if Warman had advanced such an argument, she remains liable for her wrongful criminal acts.
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US Army Corp or Engineers Land Use Regulations
Posted: February 5, 2024 Filed under: Kentucky | Tags: Commercial Permit, permit, Regulations, US Army Corp of Engineers, US Army Corp of Engineers Land Use Regulations, US Army Corp of Engineers Land Use Regulations: Outfitters Leave a commentUS Army Corp of Engineers Land Use Regulations
§ 327.8 Hunting, fishing, and trapping. 6
§ 327.11 Control of animals. 7
§ 327.13 Explosives, firearms, other weapons and fireworks. 8
§ 327.15 Abandonment and impoundment of personal property. 8
§ 327.16 Lost and found articles. 9
§ 327.18 Commercial activities. 10
§ 327.20 Unauthorized structures. 11
§ 327.22 Unauthorized occupation. 12
§ 327.23 Recreation use fees. 12
§ 327.24 Interference with Government employees. 12
§ 327.25 Violations of rules and regulations. 13
§ 327.26 State and local laws. 13
§ 327.30 Shoreline Management on Civil Works Projects. 13
Appendix A to § 327.30—Guidelines for Granting Shoreline Use Permits 18
Appendix B to § 327.30—Application for Shoreline Use Permit [Reserved] 21
Appendix C to § 327.30—Shoreline Use Permit Conditions 21
Appendix D to § 327.30—Permit [Reserved] 23
§ 327.30 Shoreline Management on Civil Works Projects. 23
§ 327.31 Shoreline management fee schedule. 23
§ 327.0 Applicability.
The regulations covered in this part 327 shall be applicable to water resources development projects, completed or under construction, administered by the Chief of Engineers, and to those portions of jointly administered water resources development projects which are under the administrative jurisdiction of the Chief of Engineers. All other Federal, state and local laws and regulations remain in full force and effect where applicable to those water resources development projects.
[65 FR 6898, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.1 Policy.
(a) It is the policy of the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, to manage the natural, cultural and developed resources of each project in the public interest, providing the public with safe and healthful recreational opportunities while protecting and enhancing these resources.
(b) Unless otherwise indicated in this part, the term “District Commander” shall include the authorized representatives of the District Commander.
(c) The term “project” or “water resources development project” refers to the water areas of any water resources development project administered by the Chief of Engineers, without regard to ownership of underlying land, to all lands owned in fee by the Federal Government and to all facilities therein or thereon of any such water resources development project.
(d) All water resources development projects open for public use shall be available to the public without regard to sex, race, color, creed, age, nationality or place of origin. No lessee, licensee, or concessionaire providing a service to the public shall discriminate against any person because of sex, race, creed, color, age, nationality or place of origin in the conduct of the operations under the lease, license or concession contract.
(e) In addition to the regulations in this part 327, all applicable Federal, state and local laws and regulations remain in full force and effect on project lands or waters which are outgranted by the District Commander by lease, license or other written agreement.
(f) The regulations in this part 327 shall be deemed to apply to those lands and waters which are subject to treaties and Federal laws and regulations concerning the rights of Indian Nations and which lands and waters are incorporated, in whole or in part, within water resources development projects administered by the Chief of Engineers, to the extent that the regulations in this part 327 are not inconsistent with such treaties and Federal laws and regulations.
(g) Any violation of any section of this part 327 shall constitute a separate violation for each calendar day in which it occurs.
(h) For the purposes of this part 327, the operator of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft as described in this part, shall be presumed to be responsible for its use on project property. In the event where an operator cannot be determined, the owner of the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, whether attended or unattended, will be presumed responsible. Unless proven otherwise, such presumption will be sufficient to issue a citation for the violation of regulations applicable to the use of such vehicle, vessel or aircraft as provided for in § 327.25.
(i) For the purposes of this part 327, the registered user of a campsite, picnic area, or other facility shall be presumed to be responsible for its use. Unless proven otherwise, such presumption will be sufficient to issue a citation for the violation of regulations applicable to the use of such facilities as provided for in § 327.25.
[65 FR 6898, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.2 Vehicles.
(a) This section pertains to all vehicles, including, but not limited to, automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, mini-bikes, snowmobiles, dune buggies, all-terrain vehicles, and trailers, campers, bicycles, or any other such equipment.
(b) Vehicles shall not be parked in violation of posted restrictions and regulations, or in such a manner as to obstruct or impede normal or emergency traffic movement or the parking of other vehicles, create a safety hazard, or endanger any person, property or environmental feature. Vehicles so parked are subject to removal and impoundment at the owner’s expense.
(c) The operation and/or parking of a vehicle off authorized roadways is prohibited except at locations and times designated by the District Commander. Taking any vehicle through, around or beyond a restrictive sign, recognizable barricade, fence, or traffic control barrier is prohibited.
(d) Vehicles shall be operated in accordance with posted restrictions and regulations.
(e) No person shall operate any vehicle in a careless, negligent or reckless manner so as to endanger any person, property or environmental feature.
(f) At designated recreation areas, vehicles shall be used only to enter or leave the area or individual sites or facilities unless otherwise posted.
(g) Except as authorized by the District Commander, no person shall operate any motorized vehicle without a proper and effective exhaust muffler as defined by state and local laws, or with an exhaust muffler cutout open, or in any other manner which renders the exhaust muffler ineffective in muffling the sound of engine exhaust.
(h) Vehicles shall be operated in accordance with applicable Federal, state and local laws, which shall be regulated by authorized enforcement officials as prescribed in § 327.26.
[65 FR 6899, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.3 Vessels.
(a) This section pertains to all vessels or watercraft, including, but not limited to, powerboats, cruisers, houseboats, sailboats, rowboats, canoes, kayaks, personal watercraft, and any other such equipment capable of navigation on water or ice, whether in motion or at rest.
(b) The placement and/or operation of any vessel or watercraft for a fee or profit upon project waters or lands is prohibited except as authorized by permit, lease, license, or concession contract with the Department of the Army. This paragraph shall not apply to the operation of commercial tows or passenger carrying vessels not based at a Corps project which utilize project waters as a link in continuous transit over navigable waters of the United States.
(c) Vessels or other watercraft may be operated on the project waters, except in prohibited or restricted areas, in accordance with posted regulations and restrictions, including buoys. All vessels or watercraft so required by applicable Federal, state and local laws shall display an appropriate registration on board whenever the vessel is on project waters.
(d) No person shall operate any vessel or other watercraft in a careless, negligent, or reckless manner so as to endanger any person, property, or environmental feature.
(e) All vessels, when on project waters, shall have safety equipment, including personal flotation devices, on board in compliance with U.S. Coast Guard boating safety requirements and in compliance with boating safety laws issued and enforced by the state in which the vessel is located. Owners or operators of vessels not in compliance with this section may be requested to remove the vessel immediately from project waters until such time as items of non-compliance are corrected.
(f) Unless otherwise permitted by Federal, state or local law, vessels or other watercraft, while moored in commercial facilities, community or corporate docks, or at any fixed or permanent mooring point, may only be used for overnight occupancy when such use is incidental to recreational boating. Vessels or other watercraft are not to be used as a place of habitation or residence.
(g) Water skis, parasails, ski-kites and similar devices are permitted in nonrestricted areas except that they may not be used in a careless, negligent, or reckless manner so as to endanger any person, property or environmental feature.
(h) Vessels shall not be attached or anchored to structures such as locks, dams, buoys or other structures unless authorized by the District Commander. All vessels when not in actual use shall be removed from project lands and waters unless securely moored or stored at designated areas approved by the District Commander. The placing of floating or stationary mooring facilities on, adjacent to, or interfering with a buoy, channel marker or other navigational aid is prohibited.
(i) The use at a project of any vessel not constructed or maintained in compliance with the standards and requirements established by the Federal Safe Boating Act of 1971 (Pub. L. 92–75, 85 Stat. 213), or promulgated pursuant to such act, is prohibited.
(j) Except as authorized by the District Commander, no person shall operate any vessel or watercraft without a proper and effective exhaust muffler as defined by state and local laws, or with an exhaust muffler cutout open, or in any other manner which renders the exhaust muffler ineffective in muffling the sound of engine exhaust.
(k) All vessels or other watercraft shall be operated in accordance with applicable Federal, state and local laws, which shall be regulated by authorized enforcement officials as prescribed in § 327.26.
[65 FR 6899, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.4 Aircraft.
(a) This section pertains to all aircraft including, but not limited to, airplanes, seaplanes, helicopters, ultra-light aircraft, motorized hang gliders, hot air balloons, any non-powered flight devices or any other such equipment.
(b) The operation of aircraft on project lands at locations other than those designated by the District Commander is prohibited. This provision shall not be applicable to aircraft engaged on official business of Federal, state or local governments or law enforcement agencies, aircraft used in emergency rescue in accordance with the directions of the District Commander or aircraft forced to land due to circumstances beyond the control of the operator.
(c) No person shall operate any aircraft while on or above project waters or project lands in a careless, negligent or reckless manner so as to endanger any person, property or environmental feature.
(d) Nothing in this section bestows authority to deviate from rules and regulations or prescribed standards of the appropriate State Aeronautical Agency, or the Federal Aviation Administration, including, but not limited to, regulations and standards concerning pilot certifications or ratings, and airspace requirements.
(e) Except in extreme emergencies threatening human life or serious property loss, the air delivery or retrieval of any person, material or equipment by parachute, balloon, helicopter or other means onto or from project lands or waters without written permission of the District Commander is prohibited.
(f) In addition to the provisions in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section, seaplanes are subject to the following restrictions:
(1) Such use is limited to aircraft utilized for water landings and takeoff, in this part called seaplanes, at the risk of owner, operator and passenger(s).
(2) Seaplane operations contrary to the prohibitions or restrictions established by the District Commander (pursuant to part 328 of this title) are prohibited. The responsibility to ascertain whether seaplane operations are prohibited or restricted is incumbent upon the person(s) contemplating the use of, or using, such waters.
(3) All operations of seaplanes while upon project waters shall be in accordance with U.S. Coast Guard navigation rules for powerboats or vessels and § 327.3.
(4) Seaplanes on project waters and lands in excess of 24 hours shall be securely moored at mooring facilities and at locations permitted by the District Commander. Seaplanes may be temporarily moored on project waters and lands, except in areas prohibited by the District Commander, for periods less than 24 hours providing:
(i) The mooring is safe, secure, and accomplished so as not to damage the rights of the Government or members of the public, and
(ii) The operator remains in the vicinity of the seaplane and reasonably available to relocate the seaplane if necessary.
(5) Commercial operation of seaplanes from project waters is prohibited without written approval of the District Commander following consultation with and necessary clearance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other appropriate public authorities and affected interests.
(6) Seaplanes may not be operated at Corps projects between sunset and sunrise unless approved by the District Commander.
[65 FR 6899, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.5 Swimming.
(a) Swimming, wading, snorkeling or scuba diving at one’s own risk is permitted, except at launching sites, designated mooring points and public docks, or other areas so designated by the District Commander.
(b) An international diver down, or inland diving flag must be displayed during underwater activities.
(c) Diving, jumping or swinging from trees, bridges or other structures which cross or are adjacent to project waters is prohibited.
[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.6 Picnicking.
Picnicking and related day-use activities are permitted, except in those areas where prohibited by the District Commander.
[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.7 Camping.
(a) Camping is permitted only at sites and/or areas designated by the District Commander.
(b) Camping at one or more campsites at any one water resource project for a period longer than 14 days during any 30-consecutive-day period is prohibited without the written permission of the District Commander.
(c) The unauthorized placement of camping equipment or other items on a campsite and/or personal appearance at a campsite without daily occupancy for the purpose of reserving that campsite for future occupancy is prohibited.
(d) The digging or leveling of any ground or the construction of any structure without written permission of the District Commander is prohibited.
(e) Occupying or placement of any camping equipment at a campsite which is posted or otherwise marked or indicated as “reserved” without an authorized reservation for that site is prohibited.
[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.8 Hunting, fishing, and trapping.
(a) Hunting is permitted except in areas and during periods where prohibited by the District Commander.
(b) Trapping is permitted except in areas and during periods where prohibited by the District Commander.
(c) Fishing is permitted except in swimming areas, on boat ramps or other areas designated by the District Commander.
(d) Additional restrictions pertaining to these activities may be established by the District Commander.
(e) All applicable Federal, State and local laws regulating these activities apply on project lands and waters, and shall be regulated by authorized enforcement officials as prescribed in § 327.26.
[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.9 Sanitation.
(a) Garbage, trash, rubbish, litter, gray water, or any other waste material or waste liquid generated on the project and incidental to authorized recreational activities shall be either removed from the project or deposited in receptacles provided for that purpose. The improper disposal of such wastes, human and animal waste included, on the project is prohibited.
(b) It is a violation to bring onto a project any household or commercial garbage, trash, rubbish, debris, dead animals or litter of any kind for disposal or dumping without the written permission of the District Commander. For the purposes of this section, the owner of any garbage, trash, rubbish, debris, dead animals or litter of any kind shall be presumed to be responsible for proper disposal. Such presumption will be sufficient to issue a citation for violation.
(c) The spilling, pumping, discharge or disposal of contaminants, pollutants or other wastes, including, but not limited to, human or animal waste, petroleum, industrial and commercial products and by-products, on project lands or into project waters is prohibited.
(d) Campers, picnickers, and all other persons using a water resources development project shall keep their sites free of trash and litter during the period of occupancy and shall remove all personal equipment and clean their sites upon departure.
(e) The discharge or placing of sewage, galley waste, garbage, refuse, or pollutants into the project waters from any vessel or watercraft is prohibited.
[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.10 Fires.
(a) Gasoline and other fuels, except that which is contained in storage tanks of vehicles, vessels, camping equipment, or hand portable containers designed for such purpose, shall not be carried onto or stored on the project without written permission of the District Commander.
(b) Fires shall be confined to those areas designated by the District Commander, and shall be contained in fireplaces, grills, or other facilities designated for this purpose. Fires shall not be left unattended and must be completely extinguished prior to departure. The burning of materials that produce toxic fumes, including, but not limited to, tires, plastic and other floatation materials or treated wood products is prohibited. The District Commander may prohibit open burning of any type for environmental considerations.
(c) Improper disposal of lighted smoking materials, matches or other burning material is prohibited.
[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.11 Control of animals.
(a) No person shall bring or allow dogs, cats, or other pets into developed recreation areas or adjacent waters unless penned, caged, on a leash under six feet in length, or otherwise physically restrained. No person shall allow animals to impede or restrict otherwise full and free use of project lands and waters by the public. No person shall allow animals to bark or emit other noise which unreasonably disturbs other people. Animals and pets, except properly trained animals assisting those with disabilities (such as seeing-eye dogs), are prohibited in sanitary facilities, playgrounds, swimming beaches and any other areas so designated by the District Commander. Abandonment of any animal on project lands or waters is prohibited. Unclaimed or unattended animals are subject to immediate impoundment and removal in accordance with state and local laws.
(b) Persons bringing or allowing pets in designated public use areas shall be responsible for proper removal and disposal of any waste produced by these animals.
(c) No person shall bring or allow horses, cattle, or other livestock in camping, picnicking, swimming or other recreation areas or on trails except in areas designated by the District Commander.
(d) Ranging, grazing, watering or allowing livestock on project lands and waters is prohibited except when authorized by lease, license or other written agreement with the District Commander.
(e) Unauthorized livestock are subject to impoundment and removal in accordance with Federal, state and local laws.
(f) Any animal impounded under the provisions of this section may be confined at a location designated by the District Commander, who may assess a reasonable impoundment fee. This fee shall be paid before the impounded animal is returned to its owner(s).
(g) Wild or exotic pets and animals (including but not limited to cougars, lions, bears, bobcats, wolves, and snakes), or any pets or animals displaying vicious or aggressive behavior or otherwise posing a threat to public safety or deemed a public nuisance, are prohibited from project lands and waters unless authorized by the District Commander, and are subject to removal in accordance with Federal, state and local laws.
[65 FR 6901, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.12 Restrictions.
(a) The District Commander may establish and post a schedule of visiting hours and/or restrictions on the public use of a project or portion of a project. The District Commander may close or restrict the use of a project or portion of a project when necessitated by reason of public health, public safety, maintenance, resource protection or other reasons in the public interest. Entering or using a project in a manner which is contrary to the schedule of visiting hours, closures or restrictions is prohibited.
(b) Quiet shall be maintained in all public use areas between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., or those hours designated by the District Commander. Excessive noise during such times which unreasonably disturbs persons is prohibited.
(c) Any act or conduct by any person which interferes with, impedes or disrupts the use of the project or impairs the safety of any person is prohibited. Individuals who are boisterous, rowdy, disorderly, or otherwise disturb the peace on project lands or waters may be requested to leave the project.
(d) The operation or use of any sound producing or motorized equipment, including but not limited to generators, vessels or vehicles, in such a manner as to unreasonably annoy or endanger persons at any time or exceed state or local laws governing noise levels from motorized equipment is prohibited.
(e) The possession and/or consumption of alcoholic beverages on any portion of the project land or waters, or the entire project, may be prohibited when designated and posted by the District Commander.
(f) Unless authorized by the District Commander, smoking is prohibited in Visitor Centers, enclosed park buildings and in areas posted to restrict smoking.
[65 FR 6901, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.13 Explosives, firearms, other weapons and fireworks.
(a) The possession of loaded firearms, ammunition, loaded projectile firing devices, bows and arrows, crossbows, or other weapons is prohibited unless:
(1) In the possession of a Federal, state or local law enforcement officer;
(2) Being used for hunting or fishing as permitted under § 327.8, with devices being unloaded when transported to, from or between hunting and fishing sites;
(3) Being used at authorized shooting ranges; or
(4) Written permission has been received from the District Commander.
(b) Possession of explosives or explosive devices of any kind, including fireworks or other pyrotechnics, is prohibited unless written permission has been received from the District Commander.
[65 FR 6901, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.14 Public property.
(a) Destruction, injury, defacement, removal or any alteration of public property including, but not limited to, developed facilities, natural formations, mineral deposits, historical and archaeological features, paleontological resources, boundary monumentation or markers and vegetative growth, is prohibited except when in accordance with written permission of the District Commander.
(b) Cutting or gathering of trees or parts of trees and/or the removal of wood from project lands is prohibited without written permission of the District Commander.
(c) Gathering of dead wood on the ground for use in designated recreation areas as firewood is permitted, unless prohibited and posted by the District Commander.
(d) The use of metal detectors is permitted on designated beaches or other previously disturbed areas unless prohibited by the District Commander for reasons of protection of archaeological, historical or paleontological resources. Specific information regarding metal detector policy and designated use areas is available at the Manager’s Office. Items found must be handled in accordance with §§ 327.15 and 327.16 except for non-identifiable items such as coins of value less than $25.
[65 FR 6901, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.15 Abandonment and impoundment of personal property.
(a) Personal property of any kind shall not be abandoned, stored or left unattended upon project lands or waters. After a period of 24 hours, or at any time after a posted closure hour in a public use area or for the purpose of providing public safety or resource protection, unattended personal property shall be presumed to be abandoned and may be impounded and stored at a storage point designated by the District Commander, who may assess a reasonable impoundment fee. Such fee shall be paid before the impounded property is returned to its owner.
(b) Personal property placed on Federal lands or waters adjacent to a private residence, facility and/or developments of any private nature for more than 24 hours without permission of the District Commander shall be presumed to have been abandoned and, unless proven otherwise, such presumption will be sufficient to impound the property and/or issue a citation as provided for in § 327.25.
(c) The District Commander shall, by public or private sale or otherwise, dispose of all lost, abandoned or unclaimed personal property that comes into Government custody or control. However, property may not be disposed of until diligent effort has been made to find the owner, heirs, next of kin or legal representative(s). If the owner, heirs, next of kin or legal representative(s) are determined but not found, the property may not be disposed of until the expiration of 120 days after the date when notice, giving the time and place of the intended sale or other disposition, has been sent by certified or registered mail to that person at the last known address. When diligent efforts to determine the owner, heirs, next of kin or legal representative(s) are unsuccessful, the property may be disposed of without delay except that if it has a fair market value of $100 or more the property may not be disposed of until 90 days after the date it is received at the storage point designated by the District Commander. The net proceeds from the sale of property shall be conveyed into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts.
[65 FR 6901, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.16 Lost and found articles.
All articles found shall be deposited by the finder at the Manager’s office or with a ranger. All such articles shall be disposed of in accordance with the procedures set forth in § 327.15.
[65 FR 6902, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.17 Advertisement.
(a) Advertising and the distribution of printed matter is allowed within project land and waters provided that a permit to do so has been issued by the District Commander and provided that this activity is not solely commercial advertising.
(b) An application for such a permit shall set forth the name of the applicant, the name of the organization (if any), the date, time, duration, and location of the proposed advertising or the distribution of printed matter, the number of participants, and any other information required by the permit application form. Permit conditions and procedures are available from the District Commander.
(c) Vessels and vehicles with semipermanent or permanent painted or installed signs are exempt as long as they are used for authorized recreational activities and comply with all other rules and regulations pertaining to vessels and vehicles.
(d) The District Commander shall, without unreasonable delay, issue a permit on proper application unless:
(1) A prior application for a permit for the same time and location has been made that has been or will be granted and the activities authorized by that permit do not reasonably allow multiple occupancy of the particular area; or
(2) It reasonably appears that the advertising or the distribution of printed matter will present a clear and present danger to the public health and safety; or
(3) The number of persons engaged in the advertising or the distribution of printed matter exceeds the number that can reasonably be accommodated in the particular location applied for, considering such things as damage to project resources or facilities, impairment of a protected area’s atmosphere of peace and tranquility, interference with program activities, or impairment of public use facilities; or
(4) The location applied for has not been designated as available for the advertising or the distribution of printed matter; or
(5) The activity would constitute a violation of an applicable law or regulation.
(e) If a permit is denied, the applicant shall be so informed in writing, with the reason(s) for the denial set forth.
(f) The District Commander shall designate on a map, which shall be available for inspection in the applicable project office, the locations within the project that are available for the advertising or the distribution of printed matter. Locations may be designated as not available only if the advertising or the distribution of printed matter would:
(1) Cause injury or damage to project resources; or
(2) Unreasonably impair the atmosphere of the peace and tranquility maintained in natural, historic, or commemorative zones; or
(3) Unreasonably interfere with interpretive, visitor service, or other program activities, or with the administrative activities of the Corps of Engineers; or
(4) Substantially impair the operation of public use facilities or services of Corps of Engineers concessioners or contractors.
(5) Present a clear and present danger to the public health and safety.
(g) The permit may contain such conditions as are reasonably consistent with protection and use of the project area for the purposes for which it is established.
(h) No permit shall be issued for a period in excess of 14 consecutive days, provided that permits may be extended for like periods, upon a new application, unless another applicant has requested use of the same location and multiple occupancy of that location is not reasonably possible.
(i) It is prohibited for persons engaged in the activity under this section to obstruct or impede pedestrians or vehicles, harass project visitors with physical contact or persistent demands, misrepresent the purposes or affiliations of those engaged in the advertising or the distribution of printed matter, or misrepresent whether the printed matter is available without cost or donation.
(j) A permit may be revoked under any of those conditions, as listed in paragraph (d) of this section, that constitute grounds for denial of a permit, or for violation of the terms and conditions of the permit. Such a revocation shall be made in writing, with the reason(s) for revocation clearly set forth, except under emergency circumstances, when an immediate verbal revocation or suspension may be made, to be followed by written confirmation within 72 hours.
(k) Violation of the terms and conditions of a permit issued in accordance with this section may result in the suspension or revocation of the permit.
[65 FR 26137, May 5, 2000]
§ 327.18 Commercial activities.
(a) The engaging in or solicitation of business on project land or waters without the express written permission of the District Commander is prohibited.
(b) It shall be a violation of this part to refuse to or fail to comply with any terms, clauses or conditions of any lease, license or agreements issued by the District Commander.
[65 FR 6902, Feb. 11, 2000]
36 CFR § 327.19 – Permits.
CFR
§ 327.19 Permits.
(a) It shall be a violation of this part to refuse to or fail to comply with the fee requirements or other terms or conditions of any permit issued under the provisions of this part 327.
(b) Permits for floating structures (issued under the authority of § 327.30) of any kind on/in waters of water resources development projects, whether or not such waters are deemed navigable waters of the United States but where such waters are under the management of the Corps of Engineers, shall be issued at the discretion of the District Commander under the authority of this section. District Commanders will delineate those portions of the navigable waters of the United States where this provision is applicable and post notices of this designation in the vicinity of the appropriate Manager’s office.
(c) Permits for non-floating structures (issued under the authority of § 327.30) of any kind constructed, placed in or affecting waters of water resources development projects where such waters are deemed navigable waters of the U.S. shall be issued under the provisions of section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act approved March 3, 1899 (33 U.S.C. 403). If a discharge of dredged or fill material in these waters is involved, a permit is required under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344). (See 33 CFR parts 320 through 330.)
(d) Permits for non-floating structures (issued under the authority of § 327.30) of any kind in waters of water resources development projects, where such waters are under the management of the Corps of Engineers and where such waters are not deemed navigable waters of the United States, shall be issued as set forth in paragraph (b) of this section. If a discharge of dredged or fill material into any water of the United States is involved, a permit is required under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344) (See 33 CFR parts 320 through 330). Water quality certification may be required pursuant to Section 401 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1341).
(e) Shoreline Use Permits to authorize private shoreline use facilities, activities or development (issued under the authority of § 327.30) may be issued in accordance with the project Shoreline Management Plan. Failure to comply with the permit conditions issued under § 327.30 is prohibited.
[65 FR 6902, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.20 Unauthorized structures.
The construction, placement, or existence of any structure (including, but not limited to, roads, trails, signs, non-portable hunting stands or blinds, buoys, docks, or landscape features) of any kind under, upon, in or over the project lands, or waters is prohibited unless a permit, lease, license or other appropriate written authorization has been issued by the District Commander. The design, construction, placement, existence or use of structures in violation of the terms of the permit, lease, license, or other written authorization is prohibited. The government shall not be liable for the loss of, or damage to, any private structures, whether authorized or not, placed on project lands or waters. Unauthorized structures are subject to summary removal or impoundment by the District Commander. Portable hunting stands, climbing devices, steps, or blinds, that are not nailed or screwed into trees and are removed at the end of a day’s hunt may be used.
[65 FR 6902, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.21 Special events.
(a) Special events including, but not limited to, water carnivals, boat regattas, fishing tournaments, music festivals, dramatic presentations or other special recreation programs are prohibited unless written permission has been granted by the District Commander. Where appropriate, District Commanders can provide the state a blanket letter of permission to permit fishing tournaments while coordinating the scheduling and details of tournaments with individual projects. An appropriate fee may be charged under the authority of § 327.23.
(b) The public shall not be charged any fee by the sponsor of such event unless the District Commander has approved in writing (and the sponsor has properly posted) the proposed schedule of fees. The District Commander shall have authority to revoke permission, require removal of any equipment, and require restoration of an area to pre-event condition, upon failure of the sponsor to comply with terms and conditions of the permit/permission or the regulations in this part 327.
[65 FR 6902, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.22 Unauthorized occupation.
(a) Occupying any lands, buildings, vessels or other facilities within water resource development projects for the purpose of maintaining the same as a full-or part-time residence without the written permission of the District Commander is prohibited. The provisions of this section shall not apply to the occupation of lands for the purpose of camping, in accordance with the provisions of § 327.7.
(b) Use of project lands or waters for agricultural purposes is prohibited except when in compliance with terms and conditions authorized by lease, license or other written agreement issued by the District Commander.
[65 FR 6903, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.23 Recreation use fees.
(a) In accordance with the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (16 U.S.C. 460l) and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103–66, the Corps of Engineers collects day use fees, special recreation use fees and/or special permit fees for the use of specialized sites, facilities, equipment or services related to outdoor recreation furnished at Federal expense.
(b) Where such fees are charged, the District Commander shall insure that clear notice of fee requirements is prominently posted at each area, and at appropriate locations therein and that the notice be included in publications distributed at such areas. Failure to pay authorized recreation use fees as established pursuant to Pub. L. 88–578, 78 Stat. 897, as amended (16 U.S.C. 460l–6a), is prohibited and is punishable by a fine of not more than $100.
(c) Failure to pay authorized day use fees, and/or properly display applicable receipt, permit or pass is prohibited.
(d) Any Golden Age or Golden Access Passport permittee shall be entitled, upon presentation of such a permit, to utilize special recreation facilities at a rate of 50 percent off the established use fee at Federally operated areas. Fraudulent use of a Golden Age or Golden Access Passport is prohibited.
[65 FR 6903, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.24 Interference with Government employees.
(a) It is a Federal crime pursuant to the provisions of sections 111 and 1114 of Title 18, United States Code, to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with, attempt to kill or kill any civilian official or employee for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers engaged in the performance of his or her official duties, or on account of the performance of his or her official duties. Such actions or interference directed against a Federal employee while carrying out the regulations in this part are violation of such regulations and may be a state crime pursuant to the laws of the state where they occur.
(b) Failure to comply with a lawful order issued by a Federal employee acting pursuant to the regulations in this part shall be considered as interference with that employee while engaged in the performance of their official duties. Such interference with a Federal employee includes failure to provide a correct name, address or other information deemed necessary for identification upon request of the Federal employee, when that employee is authorized by the District Commander to issue citations in the performance of the employee’s official duties.
[65 FR 6903, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.25 Violations of rules and regulations.
(a) Any person who violates the provisions of the regulations in this part, other than for a failure to pay authorized recreation use fees as separately provided for in § 327.23, may be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than six months or both and may be tried and sentenced in accordance with the provisions of section 3401 of Title 18, United States Code. Persons designated by the District Commander shall have the authority to issue a citation for violation of the regulations in this part, requiring any person charged with the violation to appear before the United States Magistrate within whose jurisdiction the affected water resources development project is located (16 U.S.C. 460d).
(b) Any person who commits an act against any official or employee of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that is a crime under the provisions of section 111 or section 1114 of Title 18, United States Code or under provisions of pertinent state law may be tried and sentenced as further provided under Federal or state law, as the case may be.
[65 FR 6903, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.26 State and local laws.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this part or by Federal law or regulation, state and local laws and ordinances shall apply on project lands and waters. This includes, but is not limited to, state and local laws and ordinances governing:
(1) Operation and use of motor vehicles, vessels, and aircraft;
(2) Hunting, fishing and trapping;
(3) Use or possession of firearms or other weapons;
(4) Civil disobedience and criminal acts;
(5) Littering, sanitation and pollution; and
(6) Alcohol or other controlled substances.
(b) These state and local laws and ordinances are enforced by those state and local enforcement agencies established and authorized for that purpose.
[65 FR 6903, Feb. 11, 2000]
§ 327.30 Shoreline Management on Civil Works Projects.
(a) Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to provide policy and guidance on management of shorelines of Civil Works projects where 36 CFR part 327 is applicable.
(b) Applicability. This regulation is applicable to all field operating agencies with Civil Works responsibilities except when such application would result in an impingement upon existing Indian rights.
(c) References.
(1) Section 4, 1944 Flood Control Act, as amended (16 U.S.C. 460d).
(2) The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1894, as amended and supplemented (33 U.S.C. 1)
(3) Section 10, River and Harbor Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. 403).
(4) National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (Pub. L. 89–665; 80 Stat. 915) as amended (16 U.S.C. 470 et seq.).
(5) The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.).
(6) The Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344, et seq.).
(7) The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99–662).
(8) Title 36, chapter III, part 327, Code of Federal Regulations, “Rules and Regulations Governing Public Use of Water Resource Development Projects Administered by the Chief of Engineers.”
(9) Executive Order 12088 (13 Oct. 78).
(10) 33 CFR parts 320–330, “Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers.”
(11) ER 1130–2–400, “Management of Natural Resources and Outdoor Recreation at Civil Works Water Resource Projects.”
(12) EM 385–1–1, “Safety and Health Requirements Manual.”
(d) Policy.
(1) It is the policy of the Chief of Engineers to protect and manage shorelines of all Civil Works water resource development projects under Corps jurisdiction in a manner which will promote the safe and healthful use of these shorelines by the public while maintaining environmental safeguards to ensure a quality resource for use by the public. The objectives of all management actions will be to achieve a balance between permitted private uses and resource protection for general public use. Public pedestrian access to and exit from these shorelines shall be preserved. For projects or portions of projects where Federal real estate interest is limited to easement title only, management actions will be appropriate within the limits of the estate acquired.
(2) Private shoreline uses may be authorized in designated areas consistent with approved use allocations specified in Shoreline Management Plans. Except to honor written commitments made prior to publication of this regulation, private shoreline uses are not allowed on water resource projects where construction was initiated after December 13, 1974, or on water resource projects where no private shoreline uses existed as of that date. Any existing permitted facilities on these projects will be grandfathered until the facilities fail to meet the criteria set forth in § 327.30(h).
(3) A Shoreline Management Plan, as described in § 327.30(e), will be prepared for each Corps project where private shoreline use is allowed. This plan will honor past written commitments. The plan will be reviewed at least once every five years and revised as necessary. Shoreline uses that do not interfere with authorized project purposes, public safety concerns, violate local norms or result in significant environmental effects should be allowed unless the public participation process identifies problems in these areas. If sufficient demand exists, consideration should be given to revising the shoreline allocations (e.g. increases/decreases). Maximum public participation will be encouraged as set forth in § 327.30(e)(6). Except to honor written commitments made prior to the publication of this regulation, shoreline management plans are not required for those projects where construction was initiated after December 13, 1974, or on projects not having private shoreline use as of that date. In that case, a statement of policy will be developed by the district commander to present the shoreline management policy. This policy statement will be subject to the approval of the division commander. For projects where two or more agencies have jurisdiction, the plan will be cooperatively prepared with the Corps as coordinator.
(4) Where commercial or other public launching and/or moorage facilities are not available within a reasonable distance, group owned mooring facilities may be allowed in Limited Development Areas to limit the proliferation of individual facilities. Generally only one permit will be necessary for a group owned mooring facility with that entity, if incorporated, or with one person from the organization designated as the permittee and responsible for all moorage spaces within the facility. No charge may be made for use of any permitted facility by others nor shall any commercial activity be engaged in thereon.
(5) The issuance of a private shoreline use permit does not convey any real estate or personal property rights or exclusive use rights to the permit holder. The public’s right of access and use of the permit area must be maintained and preserved. Owners of permitted facilities may take necessary precautions to protect their property from theft, vandalism or trespass, but may in no way preclude the public right of pedestrian or vessel access to the water surface or public land adjacent to the facility.
(6) Shoreline Use Permits will only be issued to individuals or groups with legal right of access to public lands.
(e) Shoreline Management Plan —
(1) General. The policies outlined in § 327.30(d) will be implemented through preparation of Shoreline Management Plans, where private shoreline use is allowed.
(2) Preparation. A Shoreline Management Plan is prepared as part of the Operational Management Plan. A moratorium on accepting applications for new permits may be placed in effect from the time an announcement of creation of a plan or formal revision of a plan is made until the action is completed.
(3) Approval. Approval of Shoreline Management Plans rests with division commanders. After approval, one copy of each project Shoreline Management Plan will be forwarded to HQUSACE (CECW-ON) WASH DC 20314–1000. Copies of the approved plan will also be made available to the public.
(4) Scope and Format. The Shoreline Management Plan will consist of a map showing the shoreline allocated to the uses listed in § 327.30(e)(6), related rules and regulations, a discussion of what areas are open or closed to specific activities and facilities, how to apply for permits and other information pertinent to the Corps management of the shoreline. The plan will be prepared in sufficient detail to ensure that it is clear to the public what uses are and are not allowed on the shoreline of the project and why. A process will be developed and presented in the Shoreline Management Plan that prescribes a procedure for review of activities requested but not specifically addressed by the Shoreline Management Plan.
(5) Shoreline Allocation. The entire shoreline will be allocated within the classifications below and delineated on a map. Any action, within the context of this rule, which gives a special privilege to an individual or group of individuals on land or water at a Corps project, that precludes use of those lands and waters by the general public, is considered to be private shoreline use. Shoreline allocations cover that land and/or water extending from the edge of the water and waterward with the exception of allocations for the purpose of vegetation modification which extends landward to the project boundary. These allocations should complement, but certainly not contradict, the land classifications in the project master plan. A map of sufficient size and scale to clearly display the shoreline allocations will be conspicuously displayed or readily available for viewing in the project administration office and will serve as the authoritative reference. Reduced or smaller scale maps may be developed for public dissemination but the information contained on these must be identical to that contained on the display map in the project administration office. No changes will be made to these maps except through the formal update process. District commanders may add specific constraints and identify areas having unique characteristics during the plan preparation, review, or updating process in addition to the allocation classifications described below.
(i) Limited Development Areas. Limited Development Areas are those areas in which private facilities and/or activities may be allowed consistent with § 327.30(h) and appendix A. Modification of vegetation by individuals may be allowed only following the issuance of a permit in accordance with appendix A. Potential low and high water conditions and underwater topography should be carefully evaluated before shoreline is allocated as Limited Development Area.
(ii) Public Recreation Areas. Public Recreation Areas are those areas designated for commercial concessionaire facilities, Federal, state or other similar public use. No private shoreline use facilities and/or activities will be permitted within or near designated or developed public recreation areas. The term “near” depends on the terrain, road system, and other local conditions, so actual distances must be established on a case by case basis in each project Shoreline Management Plan. No modification of land forms or vegetation by private individuals or groups of individuals is permitted in public recreation areas.
(iii) Protected Shoreline Areas. Protected Shoreline Areas are those areas designated to maintain or restore aesthetic, fish and wildlife, cultural, or other environmental values. Shoreline may also be so designated to prevent development in areas that are subject to excessive siltation, erosion, rapid dewatering, or exposure to high wind, wave, or current action and/or in areas in which development would interfere with navigation. No Shoreline Use Permits for floating or fixed recreation facilities will be allowed in protected areas. Some modification of vegetation by private individuals, such as clearing a narrow meandering path to the water, or limited mowing, may be allowed only following the issuance of a permit if the resource manager determines that the activity will not adversely impact the environment or physical characteristics for which the area was designated as protected. In making this determination the effect on water quality will also be considered.
(iv) Prohibited Access Areas. Prohibited Access Areas are those in which public access is not allowed or is restricted for health, safety or security reasons. These could include hazardous areas near dams, spillways, hydro-electric power stations, work areas, water intake structures, etc. No shoreline use permits will be issued in Prohibited Access Areas.
(6) Public Participation. District commanders will ensure public participation to the maximum practicable extent in Shoreline Management Plan formulation, preparation and subsequent revisions. This may be accomplished by public meetings, group workshops, open houses or other public involvement techniques. When master plan updates and preparation of the Shoreline Management Plans are concurrent, public participation may be combined and should consider all aspects of both plans, including shoreline allocation classifications. Public participation will begin during the initial formulation stage and must be broad-based to cover all aspects of public interest. The key to successful implementation is an early and continual public relations program. Projects with significant numbers of permits should consider developing computerized programs to facilitate exchange of information with permittees and to improve program efficiency. Special care will be taken to advise citizen and conservation organizations; Federal, state and local natural resource management agencies; Indian Tribes; the media; commercial concessionaires; congressional liaisons; adjacent landowners and other concerned entities during the formulation of Shoreline Management Plans and subsequent revisions. Notices shall be published prior to public meetings to assure maximum public awareness. Public notices shall be issued by the district commander allowing for a minimum of 30 days for receipt of written public comment in regard to the proposed Shoreline Management Plan or any major revision thereto.
(7) Periodic Review. Shoreline Management Plans will be reviewed periodically, but no less often than every five years, by the district commander to determine the need for update. If sufficient controversy or demand exists, consideration should be given, consistent with other factors, to a process of reevaluation of the shoreline allocations and the plan. When changes to the Shoreline Management Plan are needed, the plan will be formally updated through the public participation process. Cumulative environmental impacts of permit actions and the possibility of preparing or revising project NEPA documentation will be considered. District commanders may make minor revisions to the Shoreline Management Plan when the revisions are consistent with policy and funds for a complete plan update are not available. The amount and type of public involvement needed for such revision is at the discretion of the district commander.
(f) Instruments for Shoreline Use. Instruments used to authorize private shoreline use facilities, activities or development are as follows:
(1) Shoreline Use Permits.
(i) Shoreline Use Permits are issued and enforced in accordance with provisions of 36 CFR 327.19.
(ii) Shoreline Use Permits are required for private structures/activities of any kind (except boats) in waters of Civil Works projects whether or not such waters are deemed navigable and where such waters are under the primary jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army and under the management of the Corps of Engineers.
(iii) Shoreline Use Permits are required for non-floating structures on waters deemed commercially non-navigable, when such waters are under management of the Corps of Engineers.
(iv) Shoreline Use Permits are also required for land vegetation modification activities which do not involve disruption to land form.
(v) Permits should be issued for a term of five years. To reduce administration costs, one year permits should be issued only when the location or nature of the activity requires annual reissuance.
(vi) Shoreline Use Permits for erosion control may be issued for the life or period of continual ownership of the structure by the permittee and his/her legal spouse.
(2) Department of the Army Permits. Dredging, construction of fixed structures, including fills and combination fixed-floating structures and the discharge of dredged or fill material in waters of the United States will be evaluated under authority of section 10, River and Harbor Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. 403) and section 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344). Permits will be issued where appropriate.
(3) Real Estate Instruments. Commercial development activities and activities which involve grading, cuts, fills, or other changes in land form, or establishment of appropriate land-based support facilities required for private floating facilities, will continue to be covered by a lease, license or other legal grant issued through the appropriate real estate element. Shoreline Management Plans should identify the types of activities that require real estate instruments and indicate the general process for obtaining same. Shoreline Use Permits are not required for facilities or activities covered by a real estate instrument.
(g) Transfer of Permits. Shoreline Use Permits are non-transferable. They become null and void upon sale or transfer of the permitted facility or the death of the permittee and his/her legal spouse.
(h) Existing Facilities Now Under Permit. Implementation of a Shoreline Management Plan shall consider existing permitted facilities and prior written Corps commitments implicit in their issuance. Facilities or activities permitted under special provisions should be identified in a way that will set them apart from other facilities or activities.
(1) Section 6 of Pub. L. 97–140 provides that no lawfully installed dock or appurtenant structures shall be required to be removed prior to December 31, 1989, from any Federal water resources reservoir or lake project administered by the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, on which it was located on December 29, 1981, if such property is maintained in usable condition, and does not occasion a threat to life or property.
(2) In accordance with section 1134(d) of Pub. L. 99–662, any houseboat, boathouse, floating cabin or lawfully installed dock or appurtenant structures in place under a valid shoreline use permit as of November 17, 1986, cannot be forced to be removed from any Federal water resources project or lake administered by the Secretary of the Army on or after December 31, 1989, if it meets the three conditions below except where necessary for immediate use for public purposes or higher public use or for a navigation or flood control project.
(i) Such property is maintained in a usable and safe condition,
(ii) Such property does not occasion a threat to life or property, and
(iii) The holder of the permit is in substantial compliance with the existing permit.
(3) All such floating facilities and appurtenances will be formally recognized in an appropriate Shoreline Management Plan. New permits for these permitted facilities will be issued to new owners. If the holder of the permit fails to comply with the terms of the permit, it may be revoked and the holder required to remove the structure, in accordance with the terms of the permit as to notice, time, and appeal.
(i) Facility Maintenance. Permitted facilities must be operated, used and maintained by the permittee in a safe, healthful condition at all times. If determined to be unsafe, the resource manager will establish together with the permittee a schedule, based on the seriousness of the safety deficiency, for correcting the deficiency or having it removed, at the permittee’s expense. The applicable safety and health prescriptions in EM 385–1–1 should be used as a guide.
(j) Density of Development. The density of private floating and fixed recreation facilities will be established in the Shoreline Management Plan for all portions of Limited Development areas consistent with ecological and aesthetic characteristics and prior written commitments. The facility density in Limited Development Areas should, if feasible, be determined prior to the development of adjacent private property. The density of facilities will not be more than 50 per cent of the Limited Development Area in which they are located. Density will be measured by determining the linear feet of shoreline as compared to the width of the facilities in the water plus associated moorage arrangements which restrict the full unobstructed use of that portion of the shoreline. When a Limited Development Area or a portion of a Limited Development area reaches maximum density, notice should be given to the public and facility owners in that area that no additional facilities will be allowed. In all cases, sufficient open area will be maintained for safe maneuvering of watercraft. Docks should not extend out from the shore more than one-third of the width of a cove at normal recreation or multipurpose pool. In those cases where current density of development exceeds the density level established in the Shoreline Management Plan, the density will be reduced to the prescribed level through attrition.
(k) Permit Fees. Fees associated with the Shoreline Use Permits shall be paid prior to issuing the permit in accordance with the provisions of § 327.30(c)(1). The fee schedule will be published separately.
Appendix A to § 327.30—Guidelines for Granting Shoreline Use Permits
1. General
a. Decisions regarding permits for private floating recreation facilities will consider the operating objectives and physical characteristics of each project. In developing Shoreline Management Plans, district commanders will give consideration to the effects of added private boat storage facilities on commercial concessions for that purpose. Consistent with established policies, new commercial concessions may be alternatives to additional limited development shoreline.
b. Permits for individually or group owned shoreline use facilities may be granted only in Limited Development Areas when the sites are not near commercial marine services and such use will not despoil the shoreline nor inhibit public use or enjoyment thereof. The installation and use of such facilities will not be in conflict with the preservation of the natural characteristics of the shoreline nor will they result in significant environmental damage. Charges will be made for Shoreline Use Permits in accordance with the separately published fee schedule.
c. Permits may be granted within Limited Development Areas for ski jumps, floats, boat moorage facilities, duck blinds, and other private floating recreation facilities when they will not create a safety hazard and inhibit public use or enjoyment of project waters or shoreline. A Corps permit is not required for temporary ice fishing shelters or duck blinds when they are regulated by a state program. When the facility or activity is authorized by a shoreline use permit, a separate real estate instrument is generally not required.
d. Group owned boat mooring facilities may be permitted in Limited Development Areas where practicable (e.g. where physically feasible in terms of access, water depths, wind protection, etc.).
2. Applications for Shoreline Use Permits
a. Applications for private Shoreline Use Permits will be reviewed with full consideration of the policies set forth in this and referenced regulations, and the Shoreline Management Plan. Fees associated with the Shoreline Use Permit shall be paid prior to issuing the permit. Plans and specifications of the proposed facility shall be submitted and approved prior to the start of construction. Submissions should include engineering details, structural design, anchorage method, and construction materials; the type, size, location and ownership of the facility; expected duration of use; and an indication of willingness to abide by the applicable regulations and terms and conditions of the permit. Permit applications shall also identify and locate any land-based support facilities and any specific safety considerations.
b. Permits will be issued by the district commander or his/her authorized representative on ENG Form 4264–R (Application for Shoreline Use Permit) (appendix B). Computer generated forms may be substituted for ENG Form 4264–R provided all information is included. The computer generated form will be designated, “ENG Form 4264-R-E, Oct 87 (Electronic generation approved by USACE, Oct 87)”.
c. The following are guides to issuance of Shoreline Use Permits:
(1) Use of boat mooring facilities, including piers and boat (shelters) houses, will be limited to vessel or watercraft mooring and storage of gear essential to vessel or watercraft operation.
(2) Private floating recreation facilities, including boat mooring facilities shall not be constructed or used for human habitation or in a manner which gives the appearance of converting Federal public property on which the facility is located to private, exclusive use. New docks with enclosed sides (i.e. boathouses) are prohibited.
(3) No private floating facility will exceed the minimum size required to moor the owner’s boat or boats plus the minimum size required for an enclosed storage locker of oars, life preservers and other items essential to watercraft operation. Specific size limitations may be established in the project Shoreline Management Plan.
(4) All private floating recreation facilities including boat mooring facilities will be constructed in accordance with plans and specifications, approved by the resource manager, or a written certification from a licensed engineer, stating the facility is structurally safe will accompany the initial submission of the plans and specifications.
(5) Procedures regarding permits for individual facilities shall also apply to permits for non-commercial group mooring facilities.
(6) Facilities attached to the shore shall be securely anchored by means of moorings which do not obstruct the free use of the shoreline, nor damage vegetation or other natural features. Anchoring to vegetation is prohibited.
(7) Electrical service and equipment leading to or on private mooring facilities must not pose a safety hazard nor conflict with other recreational use. Electrical installations must be weatherproof and meet all current applicable electrical codes and regulations. The facility must be equipped with quick disconnect fittings mounted above the flood pool elevation. All electrical installations must conform to the National Electric Code and all state, and local codes and regulations. In those states where electricians are licensed, registered, or otherwise certified, a copy of the electrical certification must be provided to the resource manager before a Shoreline Use Permit can be issued or renewed. The resource manager will require immediate removal or disconnection of any electrical service or equipment that is not certified (if appropriate), does not meet code, or is not safely maintained. All new electrical lines will be installed underground. This will require a separate real estate instrument for the service right-of-way. Existing overhead lines will be allowed, as long as they meet all applicable electrical codes, regulations and above guidelines, to include compatibility and safety related to fluctuating water levels.
(8) Private floating recreation facilities will not be placed so as to interfere with any authorized project purposes, including navigation, or create a safety or health hazard.
(9) The district commander or his/her authorized representative may place special conditions on the permit when deemed necessary. Requests for waivers of shoreline management plan permit conditions based on health conditions will be reviewed on a case by case basis by the Operations Manager. Efforts will be made to reduce onerous requirements when a limiting health condition is obvious or when an applicant provides a doctor’s certification of need for conditions which are not obvious.
(10) Vegetation modification, including but not limited to, cutting, pruning, chemical manipulation, removal or seeding by private individuals is allowed only in those areas designated as Limited Development Areas or Protected Shoreline Areas. An existing (as of July 1, 1987) vegetation modification permit, within a shoreline allocation which normally would not allow vegetation modification, should be grandfathered. Permittees will not create the appearance of private ownership of public lands.
(11) The term of a permit for vegetation modification will be for five years. Where possible, such permits will be consolidated with other shoreline management permits into a single permit. The district commander is authorized to issue vegetation modification permits of less than five years for one-time requests or to aid in the consolidation of shoreline management permits.
(12) When issued a permit for vegetative modification, the permittee will delineate the government property line, as surveyed and marked by the government, in a clear but unobtrusive manner approved by the district commander and in accordance with the project Shoreline Management Plan and the conditions of the permit. Other adjoining owners may also delineate the common boundary subject to these same conditions. This delineation may include, but is not limited to, boundary plantings and fencing. The delineation will be accomplished at no cost to the government.
(13) No permit will be issued for vegetation modification in Protected Shoreline Areas until the environmental impacts of the proposed modification are assesed by the resource manager and it has been determined that no significant adverse impacts will result. The effects of the proposed modification on water quality will also be considered in making this determination.
(14) The original of the completed permit application is to be retained by the permittee. A duplicate will be retained in the resource manager’s office.
3. Permit Revocation
Permits may be revoked by the district commander when it is determined that the public interest requires such revocation or when the permittee fails to comply with terms and conditions of the permit, the Shoreline Management Plan, or of this regulation. Permits for duck blinds and ice fishing shelters will be issued to cover a period not to exceed 30 days prior to and 30 days after the season.
4. Removal of Facilities
Facilities not removed when specified in the permit or when requested after termination or revocation of the permit will be treated as unauthorized structures pursuant to 36 CFR 327.20.
5. Posting of Permit Number
Each district will procure 5″ × 8″ or larger printed permit tags of light metal or plastic for posting. The permit display tag shall be posted on the facility and/or on the land area covered by the permit, so that it can be visually checked, with ease in accordance with instructions provided by the resource manager. Facilities or activities permitted under special provisions should be identified in a way that will set apart from other facilities or activities.
Appendix B to § 327.30—Application for Shoreline Use Permit [Reserved]
Appendix C to § 327.30—Shoreline Use Permit Conditions
1. This permit is granted solely to the applicant for the purpose described on the attached permit.
2. The permittee agrees to and does hereby release and agree to save and hold the Government harmless from any and all causes of action, suits at law or equity, or claims or demands or from any liability of any nature whatsoever for or on account of any damages to persons or property, including a permitted facility, growing out of the ownership, construction, operation or maintenance by the permittee of the permitted facilities and/or activities.
3. Ownership, construction, operation, use and maintenance of a permitted facility are subject to the Government’s navigation servitude.
4. No attempt shall be made by the permittee to forbid the full and free use by the public of all public waters and/or lands at or adjacent to the permitted facility or to unreasonably interfere with any authorized project purposes, including navigation in connection with the ownership, construction, operation or maintenance of a permitted facility and/or activity.
5. The permittee agrees that if subsequent operations by the Government require an alteration in the location of a permitted facility and/or activity or if in the opinion of the district commander a permitted facility and/or activity shall cause unreasonable obstruction to navigation or that the public interest so requires, the permittee shall be required, upon written notice from the district commander to remove, alter, or relocate the permitted facility, without expense to the Government.
6. The Government shall in no case be liable for any damage or injury to a permitted facility which may be caused by or result from subsequent operations undertaken by the Government for the improvement of navigation or for other lawful purposes, and no claims or right to compensation shall accrue from any such damage. This includes any damage that may occur to private property if a facility is removed for noncompliance with the conditions of the permit.
7. Ownership, construction, operation, use and maintenance of a permitted facility and/or activity are subject to all applicable Federal, state and local laws and regulations. Failure to abide by these applicable laws and regulations may be cause for revocation of the permit.
8. This permit does not convey any property rights either in real estate or material; and does not authorize any injury to private property or invasion of private rights or any infringement of Federal, state or local laws or regulations, nor does it obviate the necessity of obtaining state or local assent required by law for the construction, operation, use or maintenance of a permitted facility and/or activity.
9. The permittee agrees to construct the facility within the time limit agreed to on the permit issuance date. The permit shall become null and void if construction is not completed within that period. Further, the permittee agrees to operate and maintain any permitted facility and/or activity in a manner so as to provide safety, minimize any adverse impact on fish and wildlife habitat, natural, environmental, or cultural resources values and in a manner so as to minimize the degradation of water quality.
10. The permittee shall remove a permitted facility within 30 days, at his/her expense, and restore the waterway and lands to a condition accepted by the resource manager upon termination or revocation of this permit or if the permittee ceases to use, operate or maintain a permitted facility and/or activity. If the permittee fails to comply to the satisfaction of the resource manager, the district commander may remove the facility by contract or otherwise and the permittee agrees to pay all costs incurred thereof.
11. The use of a permitted boat dock facility shall be limited to the mooring of the permittee’s vessel or watercraft and the storage, in enclosed locker facilities, of his/her gear essential to the operation of such vessel or watercraft.
12. Neither a permitted facility nor any houseboat, cabin cruiser, or other vessel moored thereto shall be used as a place of habitation or as a full or part-time residence or in any manner which gives the appearance of converting the public property, on which the facility is located, to private use.
13. Facilities granted under this permit will not be leased, rented, sub-let or provided to others by any means of engaging in commercial activity(s) by the permittee or his/her agent for monetary gain. This does not preclude the permittee from selling total ownership to the facility.
14. Floats and the flotation material for all docks and boat mooring buoys shall be fabricated of materials manufactured for marine use. The float and its flotation material shall be 100% warranted for a minimum of 8 years against sinking, becoming waterlogged, cracking, peeling, fragmenting, or losing beads. All floats shall resist puncture and penetration and shall not be subject to damage by animals under normal conditions for the area. All floats and the flotation material used in them shall be fire resistant. Any float which is within 40 feet of a line carrying fuel shall be 100% impervious to water and fuel. The use of new or recycled plastic or metal drums or non-compartmentalized air containers for encasement or floats is prohibited. Existing floats are authorized until it or its flotation material is no longer serviceable, at which time it shall be replaced with a float that meets the conditions listed above. For any floats installed after the effective date of this specification, repair or replacement shall be required when it or its flotation material no longer performs its designated function or it fails to meet the specifications for which it was originally warranted.
15. Permitted facilities and activities are subject to periodic inspection by authorized Corps representatives. The resource manager will notify the permittee of any deficiencies and together establish a schedule for their correction. No deviation or changes from approved plans will be allowed without prior written approval of the resource manager.
16. Floating facilities shall be securely attached to the shore in accordance with the approved plans by means of moorings which do not obstruct general public use of the shoreline or adversely affect the natural terrain or vegetation. Anchoring to vegetation is prohibited.
17. The permit display tag shall be posted on the permitted facility and/or on the land areas covered by the permit so that it can be visually checked with ease in accordance with instructions provided by the resource manager.
18. No vegetation other than that prescribed in the permit will be damaged, destroyed or removed. No vegetation of any kind will be planted, other than that specifically prescribed in the permit.
19. No change in land form such as grading, excavation or filling is authorized by this permit.
20. This permit is non-transferable. Upon the sale or other transfer of the permitted facility or the death of the permittee and his/her legal spouse, this permit is null and void.
21. By 30 days written notice, mailed to the permittee by certified letter, the district commander may revoke this permit whenever the public interest necessitates such revocation or when the permittee fails to comply with any permit condition or term. The revocation notice shall specify the reasons for such action. If the permittee requests a hearing in writing to the district commander through the resource manager within the 30-day period, the district commander shall grant such hearing at the earliest opportunity. In no event shall the hearing date be more than 60 days from the date of the hearing request. Following the hearing, a written decision will be rendered and a copy mailed to the permittee by certified letter.
22. Notwithstanding the conditions cited in condition 21 above, if in the opinion of the district commander, emergency circumstances dictate otherwise, the district commander may summarily revoke the permit.
23. When vegetation modification on these lands is accomplished by chemical means, the program will be in accordance with appropriate Federal, state and local laws, rules and regulations.
24. The resource manager or his/her authorized representative shall be allowed to cross the permittee’s property, as necessary to inspect facilities and/or activities under permit.
25. When vegetation modification is allowed, the permittee will delineate the government property line in a clear, but unobtrusive manner approved by the resource manager and in accordance with the project Shoreline Management Plan.
26. If the ownership of a permitted facility is sold or transferred, the permittee or new owner will notify the Resource Manager of the action prior to finalization. The new owner must apply for a Shoreline Use Permit within 14 days or remove the facility and restore the use area within 30 days from the date of ownership transfer.
27. If permitted facilities are removed for storage or extensive maintenance, the resource manager may require all portions of the facility be removed from public property.
Appendix D to § 327.30—Permit [Reserved]
[55 FR 30697, July 27, 1990, as amended at 57 FR 21895, May 26, 1992; 57 FR 29220, July 1, 1992; 63 FR 35828, July 1, 1998]
Effective Date Note
Effective Date Note:
The amendment to § 327.30 revising the last sentence of paragraph (k), published at 56 FR 29587, June 28, 1991, was deferred indefinitely. See 56 FR 49706, Oct. 1, 1991. The administrative charges contained in § 327.30, Shoreline Management on Civil Works Projects, published in the July 1, 1991, edition of the Code of Federal Regulations will remain in effect. Any future decisions affecting this regulation will be published in the Federal Register at a later date by the Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army. For the convenience of the user, the rule published on June 28, 1991, at FR page 29587, is set forth as follows:
§ 327.30 Shoreline Management on Civil Works Projects.
(k) * * * The Fee Schedule is published in § 327.31.
§ 327.31 Shoreline management fee schedule.
A charge will be made for Shoreline Use Permits to help defray expenses associated with issuance and administration of the permits. As permits become eligible for renewal after July 1, 1976, a charge of $10 for each new permit and a $5 annual fee for inspection of floating facilities will be made. There will be no annual inspection fee for permits for vegetative modification on Shoreline areas. In all cases the total administrative charge will be collected initially at the time of permit issuance rather than on a piecemeal annual basis.
[56 FR 61163, Dec. 2, 1991; 56 FR 65190, Dec. 16, 1991]
| Creation Date | 1/15/24 | File Name | Permits.docx |
| Save Date | 1/15/24 | File Location | F:\1. Legal\1.2.1 Laws\Federal\US Army Corp of Engineers\Permits.docx |
Release validity was based on whether brother had authorized brother to sign electronic release for him.
Posted: January 29, 2024 Filed under: Massachusetts, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Electronic Release, Release, Rental Release, Ski Rental, Wachusett Mountain Ski Area, Waiver Leave a commentThe issue revolved around the authority of one brother to sign the electronic release on behalf of the other brother.
Marken v. Wachusett Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 21-P-667 (Mass. App. May 02, 2022)
State: Massachusetts; Appeals Court of Massachusetts
Plaintiff: Charles Marken
Defendant: Wachusett Mountain Ski Area, Inc.
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Release
Holding: Ski Area Defendant
Year: 2022
Summary
One brother signed the release for himself and his other brother when renting ski equipment at the resort. The non-signing brother was injured and sued. The release was upheld because the non-injured brother stated during his deposition that he had the authority to sign for his brother.
Facts
On January 7, 2017, the plaintiff, a beginner skier, met his brother, Anthony Marken, at Wachusett Mountain for a day of skiing. When Charles arrived, Anthony was at the rental shop. Anthony had already rented ski equipment for both of them by the time Charles arrived.
In order to rent equipment, a renter must agree to the terms of a rental agreement using a digital kiosk system. After reviewing the rental agreement, which contains a release from “any legal liability,” renters must click “I agree” on the screen. The renter then enters personal information including height, weight, age, boot size, and skier type. The system uses this information to calculate the appropriate ski binding release setting. Once the rental agreement is signed, the system prints a sticker with the renter’s information, including the binding release setting. The ski technician uses the information on the sticker to select ski boots that are fitted to match the renter’s boot size and binding release setting. Charles and Anthony obtained their equipment consistent with the foregoing process, and began to ski. Charles, an admitted beginner, fell twice while skiing prior to the injury at issue; on both occasions, his bindings released properly. At some point, Charles decided to ski a black diamond trail which is for expert skiers. During that run, Charles tried to slow down. He fell, sustained serious injuries to his left leg, and was transported to a hospital. Thereafter, the defendants tested the equipment that Charles had used. The equipment passed inspection and testing, and was returned to the rental inventory.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
Releases in Massachusetts are supported and normally upheld.
Generally, we will enforce a release disposing of all claims and demands arising out of any transactions between parties. Indeed, “Massachusetts law favors the enforcement of releases. This is true even where, as here, the party signing the release either does not read it or does not understand it.
Since the non-suing brother signed the release for the brother who was injured, the issue became one of authority. Did the brother that got injured authorize his brother to sign the release for him.
The non-injured brother said unequivocally yes his brother gave him the authority to sign. The injured brother argued on appeal he had not given his brother the authority to sign the release.
Charles does not challenge the validity or enforceability of the release itself. Instead, he claims that the release is unenforceable because he did not sign it, and did not authorize Anthony to sign it on his behalf. However, this claim is belied by Charles’s sworn deposition testimony. Charles was asked, “Had you authorized your brother to [complete the rental agreement] for you?” He answered, “Yes.” He did not equivocate and did not amend his deposition answers. Charles cannot now create an issue of material fact by claiming that he did not authorize Anthony to sign the release on his behalf.
Since the non-injured brother was so firm with his answer, that testimony was accepted by the courts and the release was valid.
So Now What?
This is a tough situation that resorts, outfitters, and rental programs face every day. More so with releases being signed online. Who is signing the release.
Your options for solving this problem are multiple, however none of them lend themselves to great customer service.
You can have each person complete their information and sign the release for themselves and only themselves.
You could have the person signing on the computer state they have the legal authority to sign for the other people listed on the release at that point.
To verify who is signing the release, you need to make sure you know who is signing the release. The secure way of doing this is to have the person fill out their credit card information first and then agree to the release. Their contract with the credit card company states that since it is their credit card they are the ones that are using it.
Either way, it is a mess. However, for your releases to be valid, you need to know who has signed the release when they enter your establishment and those who have not signed, complete the information and sign the release.
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Marken v. Wachusett Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 21-P-667 (Mass. App. May 02, 2022)
Posted: January 29, 2024 Filed under: Massachusetts, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Electronic Release, Release, Rental Equipment, skiing, Wachusett Mountain Associates, Wachusett Mountain Ski Area Leave a commentTo Read an Analysis of this decision see: Release validity was based on whether brother had authorized brother to sign electronic release for him.
CHARLES MARKEN
v.
WACHUSETT MOUNTAIN SKI AREA, INC., & another.[1]
No. 21-P-667
Appeals Court of Massachusetts
May 2, 2022
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel’s decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Charles Marken, filed a complaint in the Superior Court against Wachusett Mountain Ski Area, Inc. and Wachusett Mountain Associates, Inc. (the defendants or Wachusett) for injuries he sustained while skiing.[2] On cross motions for summary judgment, the judge allowed the defendants’ motion and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed. We affirm.
Background.
As the party against whom summary judgment entered, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Cesso v. Todd, 92 Mass.App.Ct. 131, 132 (2017). On January 7, 2017, the plaintiff, a beginner skier, met his brother, Anthony Marken, at Wachusett Mountain for a day of skiing. When Charles arrived, Anthony was at the rental shop. Anthony had already rented ski equipment for both of them by the time Charles arrived.[3]
In order to rent equipment, a renter must agree to the terms of a rental agreement using a digital kiosk system. After reviewing the rental agreement, which contains a release from “any legal liability,” renters must click “I agree” on the screen. The renter then enters personal information including height, weight, age, boot size, and skier type. The system uses this information to calculate the appropriate ski binding release setting. Once the rental agreement is signed, the system prints a sticker with the renter’s information, including the binding release setting. The ski technician uses the information on the sticker to select ski boots that are fitted to match the renter’s boot size and binding release setting. Charles and Anthony obtained their equipment consistent with the foregoing process, and began to ski. Charles, an admitted beginner, fell twice while skiing prior to the injury at issue; on both occasions, his bindings released properly. At some point, Charles decided to ski a black diamond trail which is for expert skiers. During that run, Charles tried to slow down. He fell, sustained serious injuries to his left leg, and was transported to a hospital. Thereafter, the defendants tested the equipment that Charles had used. The equipment passed inspection and testing, and was returned to the rental inventory.
Discussion.
“We review a motion for summary judgment de novo. … In doing so, we must determine ‘whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Psychemedics Corp. v. Boston, 486 Mass. 724, 731 (2021), quoting Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991). Here, the defendants claim that the release of liability in the rental agreement is valid and enforceable against the plaintiff. Generally, we will enforce a release disposing of all claims and demands arising out of any transactions between parties. See Leblanc v. Friedman, 438 Mass. 592, 597-598 (2003). Indeed, “Massachusetts law favors the enforcement of releases.” Sharon v. Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 105 (2002). This is true even where, as here, the party signing the release either does not read it or does not understand it. See Id. at 103.
Charles does not challenge the validity or enforceability of the release itself. Instead, he claims that the release is unenforceable because he did not sign it, and did not authorize Anthony to sign it on his behalf.[4] However, this claim is belied by Charles’s sworn deposition testimony. Charles was asked, “Had you authorized your brother to [complete the rental agreement] for you?” He answered, “Yes.”[5] He did not equivocate and did not amend his deposition answers. See Tarn v. Federal Mgt. Co., 99 Mass.App.Ct. 41, 46-50 (2021). Charles cannot now create an issue of material fact by claiming that he did not authorize Anthony to sign the release on his behalf. See O’Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc., 34 Mass.App.Ct. 905, 90 6 (1993) (party cannot create disputed issue of fact by contradicting statements previously made under oath at deposition). As such, summary judgment was properly granted to the defendants.[6] See Tarn, supra (summary judgment proper where plaintiff was bound by deposition testimony and where binding admission established she could not prevail at trial).
Request for attorney’s fees and costs.
The defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs is allowed. The defendants may submit a petition for appellate attorney’s fees to this court in the manner prescribed in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004), within twenty days of the issuance of this memorandum and order. The plaintiff may respond to the petition within twenty days of said filing.
Judgment affirmed.
Blake, Lemire & Hershfang, JJ. [7]
———
Notes:
[1] Wachusett Mountain Associates, Inc. All claims against third-party defendant Head USA, Inc. were voluntarily dismissed prior to the entry of summary judgment, and it is not a party to this appeal.
[2] The complaint asserted claims for negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligent misrepresentation.
[3] Because the plaintiff and his brother share a surname, we use their first names to avoid confusion.
[4] Charles testified that on previous ski trips he had signed a release, and therefore he expected to sign a release at Wachusett.
[5] To the extent that Charles argues that this question and answer must be viewed in context with the entire line of questioning, we agree. In so doing, we conclude that Charles authorized Anthony to sign the rental agreement containing the release on his behalf. See Fergus v. Ross, 477 Mass. 563, 567 (2017) (“Apparent authority exists when the principal, by his . . . words or conduct, causes a third person to reasonably believe that the principal consents to the agent acting on the principal’s behalf”).
[6] Because of the result we reach, we do not consider Charles’s spoliation of evidence claim.
[7] The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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