US Army Corp or Engineers Land Use Regulations

The regulations covered in this part 327 shall be applicable to water resources development projects, completed or under construction, administered by the Chief of Engineers, and to those portions of jointly administered water resources development projects which are under the administrative jurisdiction of the Chief of Engineers. All other Federal, state and local laws and regulations remain in full force and effect where applicable to those water resources development projects.

[65 FR 6898, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.1 Policy.

(a) It is the policy of the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, to manage the natural, cultural and developed resources of each project in the public interest, providing the public with safe and healthful recreational opportunities while protecting and enhancing these resources.

(b) Unless otherwise indicated in this part, the term “District Commander” shall include the authorized representatives of the District Commander.

(c) The term “project” or “water resources development project” refers to the water areas of any water resources development project administered by the Chief of Engineers, without regard to ownership of underlying land, to all lands owned in fee by the Federal Government and to all facilities therein or thereon of any such water resources development project.

(d) All water resources development projects open for public use shall be available to the public without regard to sex, race, color, creed, age, nationality or place of origin. No lessee, licensee, or concessionaire providing a service to the public shall discriminate against any person because of sex, race, creed, color, age, nationality or place of origin in the conduct of the operations under the lease, license or concession contract.

(e) In addition to the regulations in this part 327, all applicable Federal, state and local laws and regulations remain in full force and effect on project lands or waters which are outgranted by the District Commander by lease, license or other written agreement.

(f) The regulations in this part 327 shall be deemed to apply to those lands and waters which are subject to treaties and Federal laws and regulations concerning the rights of Indian Nations and which lands and waters are incorporated, in whole or in part, within water resources development projects administered by the Chief of Engineers, to the extent that the regulations in this part 327 are not inconsistent with such treaties and Federal laws and regulations.

(g) Any violation of any section of this part 327 shall constitute a separate violation for each calendar day in which it occurs.

(h) For the purposes of this part 327, the operator of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft as described in this part, shall be presumed to be responsible for its use on project property. In the event where an operator cannot be determined, the owner of the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, whether attended or unattended, will be presumed responsible. Unless proven otherwise, such presumption will be sufficient to issue a citation for the violation of regulations applicable to the use of such vehicle, vessel or aircraft as provided for in § 327.25.

(i) For the purposes of this part 327, the registered user of a campsite, picnic area, or other facility shall be presumed to be responsible for its use. Unless proven otherwise, such presumption will be sufficient to issue a citation for the violation of regulations applicable to the use of such facilities as provided for in § 327.25.

[65 FR 6898, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.2 Vehicles.

(a) This section pertains to all vehicles, including, but not limited to, automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, mini-bikes, snowmobiles, dune buggies, all-terrain vehicles, and trailers, campers, bicycles, or any other such equipment.

(b) Vehicles shall not be parked in violation of posted restrictions and regulations, or in such a manner as to obstruct or impede normal or emergency traffic movement or the parking of other vehicles, create a safety hazard, or endanger any person, property or environmental feature. Vehicles so parked are subject to removal and impoundment at the owner’s expense.

(c) The operation and/or parking of a vehicle off authorized roadways is prohibited except at locations and times designated by the District Commander. Taking any vehicle through, around or beyond a restrictive sign, recognizable barricade, fence, or traffic control barrier is prohibited.

(d) Vehicles shall be operated in accordance with posted restrictions and regulations.

(e) No person shall operate any vehicle in a careless, negligent or reckless manner so as to endanger any person, property or environmental feature.

(f) At designated recreation areas, vehicles shall be used only to enter or leave the area or individual sites or facilities unless otherwise posted.

(g) Except as authorized by the District Commander, no person shall operate any motorized vehicle without a proper and effective exhaust muffler as defined by state and local laws, or with an exhaust muffler cutout open, or in any other manner which renders the exhaust muffler ineffective in muffling the sound of engine exhaust.

(h) Vehicles shall be operated in accordance with applicable Federal, state and local laws, which shall be regulated by authorized enforcement officials as prescribed in § 327.26.

[65 FR 6899, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.3 Vessels.

(a) This section pertains to all vessels or watercraft, including, but not limited to, powerboats, cruisers, houseboats, sailboats, rowboats, canoes, kayaks, personal watercraft, and any other such equipment capable of navigation on water or ice, whether in motion or at rest.

(b) The placement and/or operation of any vessel or watercraft for a fee or profit upon project waters or lands is prohibited except as authorized by permit, lease, license, or concession contract with the Department of the Army. This paragraph shall not apply to the operation of commercial tows or passenger carrying vessels not based at a Corps project which utilize project waters as a link in continuous transit over navigable waters of the United States.

(c) Vessels or other watercraft may be operated on the project waters, except in prohibited or restricted areas, in accordance with posted regulations and restrictions, including buoys. All vessels or watercraft so required by applicable Federal, state and local laws shall display an appropriate registration on board whenever the vessel is on project waters.

(d) No person shall operate any vessel or other watercraft in a careless, negligent, or reckless manner so as to endanger any person, property, or environmental feature.

(e) All vessels, when on project waters, shall have safety equipment, including personal flotation devices, on board in compliance with U.S. Coast Guard boating safety requirements and in compliance with boating safety laws issued and enforced by the state in which the vessel is located. Owners or operators of vessels not in compliance with this section may be requested to remove the vessel immediately from project waters until such time as items of non-compliance are corrected.

(f) Unless otherwise permitted by Federal, state or local law, vessels or other watercraft, while moored in commercial facilities, community or corporate docks, or at any fixed or permanent mooring point, may only be used for overnight occupancy when such use is incidental to recreational boating. Vessels or other watercraft are not to be used as a place of habitation or residence.

(g) Water skis, parasails, ski-kites and similar devices are permitted in nonrestricted areas except that they may not be used in a careless, negligent, or reckless manner so as to endanger any person, property or environmental feature.

(h) Vessels shall not be attached or anchored to structures such as locks, dams, buoys or other structures unless authorized by the District Commander. All vessels when not in actual use shall be removed from project lands and waters unless securely moored or stored at designated areas approved by the District Commander. The placing of floating or stationary mooring facilities on, adjacent to, or interfering with a buoy, channel marker or other navigational aid is prohibited.

(i) The use at a project of any vessel not constructed or maintained in compliance with the standards and requirements established by the Federal Safe Boating Act of 1971 (Pub. L. 92–75, 85 Stat. 213), or promulgated pursuant to such act, is prohibited.

(j) Except as authorized by the District Commander, no person shall operate any vessel or watercraft without a proper and effective exhaust muffler as defined by state and local laws, or with an exhaust muffler cutout open, or in any other manner which renders the exhaust muffler ineffective in muffling the sound of engine exhaust.

(k) All vessels or other watercraft shall be operated in accordance with applicable Federal, state and local laws, which shall be regulated by authorized enforcement officials as prescribed in § 327.26.

[65 FR 6899, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.4 Aircraft.

(a) This section pertains to all aircraft including, but not limited to, airplanes, seaplanes, helicopters, ultra-light aircraft, motorized hang gliders, hot air balloons, any non-powered flight devices or any other such equipment.

(b) The operation of aircraft on project lands at locations other than those designated by the District Commander is prohibited. This provision shall not be applicable to aircraft engaged on official business of Federal, state or local governments or law enforcement agencies, aircraft used in emergency rescue in accordance with the directions of the District Commander or aircraft forced to land due to circumstances beyond the control of the operator.

(c) No person shall operate any aircraft while on or above project waters or project lands in a careless, negligent or reckless manner so as to endanger any person, property or environmental feature.

(d) Nothing in this section bestows authority to deviate from rules and regulations or prescribed standards of the appropriate State Aeronautical Agency, or the Federal Aviation Administration, including, but not limited to, regulations and standards concerning pilot certifications or ratings, and airspace requirements.

(e) Except in extreme emergencies threatening human life or serious property loss, the air delivery or retrieval of any person, material or equipment by parachute, balloon, helicopter or other means onto or from project lands or waters without written permission of the District Commander is prohibited.

(f) In addition to the provisions in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section, seaplanes are subject to the following restrictions:

(1) Such use is limited to aircraft utilized for water landings and takeoff, in this part called seaplanes, at the risk of owner, operator and passenger(s).

(2) Seaplane operations contrary to the prohibitions or restrictions established by the District Commander (pursuant to part 328 of this title) are prohibited. The responsibility to ascertain whether seaplane operations are prohibited or restricted is incumbent upon the person(s) contemplating the use of, or using, such waters.

(3) All operations of seaplanes while upon project waters shall be in accordance with U.S. Coast Guard navigation rules for powerboats or vessels and § 327.3.

(4) Seaplanes on project waters and lands in excess of 24 hours shall be securely moored at mooring facilities and at locations permitted by the District Commander. Seaplanes may be temporarily moored on project waters and lands, except in areas prohibited by the District Commander, for periods less than 24 hours providing:

(i) The mooring is safe, secure, and accomplished so as not to damage the rights of the Government or members of the public, and

(ii) The operator remains in the vicinity of the seaplane and reasonably available to relocate the seaplane if necessary.

(5) Commercial operation of seaplanes from project waters is prohibited without written approval of the District Commander following consultation with and necessary clearance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other appropriate public authorities and affected interests.

(6) Seaplanes may not be operated at Corps projects between sunset and sunrise unless approved by the District Commander.

[65 FR 6899, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.5 Swimming.

(a) Swimming, wading, snorkeling or scuba diving at one’s own risk is permitted, except at launching sites, designated mooring points and public docks, or other areas so designated by the District Commander.

(b) An international diver down, or inland diving flag must be displayed during underwater activities.

(c) Diving, jumping or swinging from trees, bridges or other structures which cross or are adjacent to project waters is prohibited.

[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.6 Picnicking.

Picnicking and related day-use activities are permitted, except in those areas where prohibited by the District Commander.

[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.7 Camping.

(a) Camping is permitted only at sites and/or areas designated by the District Commander.

(b) Camping at one or more campsites at any one water resource project for a period longer than 14 days during any 30-consecutive-day period is prohibited without the written permission of the District Commander.

(c) The unauthorized placement of camping equipment or other items on a campsite and/or personal appearance at a campsite without daily occupancy for the purpose of reserving that campsite for future occupancy is prohibited.

(d) The digging or leveling of any ground or the construction of any structure without written permission of the District Commander is prohibited.

(e) Occupying or placement of any camping equipment at a campsite which is posted or otherwise marked or indicated as “reserved” without an authorized reservation for that site is prohibited.

[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.8 Hunting, fishing, and trapping.

(a) Hunting is permitted except in areas and during periods where prohibited by the District Commander.

(b) Trapping is permitted except in areas and during periods where prohibited by the District Commander.

(d) Additional restrictions pertaining to these activities may be established by the District Commander.

(e) All applicable Federal, State and local laws regulating these activities apply on project lands and waters, and shall be regulated by authorized enforcement officials as prescribed in § 327.26.

[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.9 Sanitation.

(a) Garbage, trash, rubbish, litter, gray water, or any other waste material or waste liquid generated on the project and incidental to authorized recreational activities shall be either removed from the project or deposited in receptacles provided for that purpose. The improper disposal of such wastes, human and animal waste included, on the project is prohibited.

(b) It is a violation to bring onto a project any household or commercial garbage, trash, rubbish, debris, dead animals or litter of any kind for disposal or dumping without the written permission of the District Commander. For the purposes of this section, the owner of any garbage, trash, rubbish, debris, dead animals or litter of any kind shall be presumed to be responsible for proper disposal. Such presumption will be sufficient to issue a citation for violation.

(c) The spilling, pumping, discharge or disposal of contaminants, pollutants or other wastes, including, but not limited to, human or animal waste, petroleum, industrial and commercial products and by-products, on project lands or into project waters is prohibited.

(d) Campers, picnickers, and all other persons using a water resources development project shall keep their sites free of trash and litter during the period of occupancy and shall remove all personal equipment and clean their sites upon departure.

(e) The discharge or placing of sewage, galley waste, garbage, refuse, or pollutants into the project waters from any vessel or watercraft is prohibited.

[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.10 Fires.

(a) Gasoline and other fuels, except that which is contained in storage tanks of vehicles, vessels, camping equipment, or hand portable containers designed for such purpose, shall not be carried onto or stored on the project without written permission of the District Commander.

(b) Fires shall be confined to those areas designated by the District Commander, and shall be contained in fireplaces, grills, or other facilities designated for this purpose. Fires shall not be left unattended and must be completely extinguished prior to departure. The burning of materials that produce toxic fumes, including, but not limited to, tires, plastic and other floatation materials or treated wood products is prohibited. The District Commander may prohibit open burning of any type for environmental considerations.

[65 FR 6900, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.11 Control of animals.

(a) No person shall bring or allow dogs, cats, or other pets into developed recreation areas or adjacent waters unless penned, caged, on a leash under six feet in length, or otherwise physically restrained. No person shall allow animals to impede or restrict otherwise full and free use of project lands and waters by the public. No person shall allow animals to bark or emit other noise which unreasonably disturbs other people. Animals and pets, except properly trained animals assisting those with disabilities (such as seeing-eye dogs), are prohibited in sanitary facilities, playgrounds, swimming beaches and any other areas so designated by the District Commander. Abandonment of any animal on project lands or waters is prohibited. Unclaimed or unattended animals are subject to immediate impoundment and removal in accordance with state and local laws.

(b) Persons bringing or allowing pets in designated public use areas shall be responsible for proper removal and disposal of any waste produced by these animals.

(c) No person shall bring or allow horses, cattle, or other livestock in camping, picnicking, swimming or other recreation areas or on trails except in areas designated by the District Commander.

(d) Ranging, grazing, watering or allowing livestock on project lands and waters is prohibited except when authorized by lease, license or other written agreement with the District Commander.

(e) Unauthorized livestock are subject to impoundment and removal in accordance with Federal, state and local laws.

(f) Any animal impounded under the provisions of this section may be confined at a location designated by the District Commander, who may assess a reasonable impoundment fee. This fee shall be paid before the impounded animal is returned to its owner(s).

(g) Wild or exotic pets and animals (including but not limited to cougars, lions, bears, bobcats, wolves, and snakes), or any pets or animals displaying vicious or aggressive behavior or otherwise posing a threat to public safety or deemed a public nuisance, are prohibited from project lands and waters unless authorized by the District Commander, and are subject to removal in accordance with Federal, state and local laws.

[65 FR 6901, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.12 Restrictions.

(a) The District Commander may establish and post a schedule of visiting hours and/or restrictions on the public use of a project or portion of a project. The District Commander may close or restrict the use of a project or portion of a project when necessitated by reason of public health, public safety, maintenance, resource protection or other reasons in the public interest. Entering or using a project in a manner which is contrary to the schedule of visiting hours, closures or restrictions is prohibited.

(b) Quiet shall be maintained in all public use areas between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., or those hours designated by the District Commander. Excessive noise during such times which unreasonably disturbs persons is prohibited.

(c) Any act or conduct by any person which interferes with, impedes or disrupts the use of the project or impairs the safety of any person is prohibited. Individuals who are boisterous, rowdy, disorderly, or otherwise disturb the peace on project lands or waters may be requested to leave the project.

(d) The operation or use of any sound producing or motorized equipment, including but not limited to generators, vessels or vehicles, in such a manner as to unreasonably annoy or endanger persons at any time or exceed state or local laws governing noise levels from motorized equipment is prohibited.

(e) The possession and/or consumption of alcoholic beverages on any portion of the project land or waters, or the entire project, may be prohibited when designated and posted by the District Commander.

(f) Unless authorized by the District Commander, smoking is prohibited in Visitor Centers, enclosed park buildings and in areas posted to restrict smoking.

[65 FR 6901, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.13 Explosives, firearms, other weapons and fireworks.

(a) The possession of loaded firearms, ammunition, loaded projectile firing devices, bows and arrows, crossbows, or other weapons is prohibited unless:

(1) In the possession of a Federal, state or local law enforcement officer;

(2) Being used for hunting or fishing as permitted under § 327.8, with devices being unloaded when transported to, from or between hunting and fishing sites;

(3) Being used at authorized shooting ranges; or

(4) Written permission has been received from the District Commander.

(b) Possession of explosives or explosive devices of any kind, including fireworks or other pyrotechnics, is prohibited unless written permission has been received from the District Commander.

[65 FR 6901, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.14 Public property.

(a) Destruction, injury, defacement, removal or any alteration of public property including, but not limited to, developed facilities, natural formations, mineral deposits, historical and archaeological features, paleontological resources, boundary monumentation or markers and vegetative growth, is prohibited except when in accordance with written permission of the District Commander.

(b) Cutting or gathering of trees or parts of trees and/or the removal of wood from project lands is prohibited without written permission of the District Commander.

(c) Gathering of dead wood on the ground for use in designated recreation areas as firewood is permitted, unless prohibited and posted by the District Commander.

(d) The use of metal detectors is permitted on designated beaches or other previously disturbed areas unless prohibited by the District Commander for reasons of protection of archaeological, historical or paleontological resources. Specific information regarding metal detector policy and designated use areas is available at the Manager’s Office. Items found must be handled in accordance with §§ 327.15 and 327.16 except for non-identifiable items such as coins of value less than $25.

[65 FR 6901, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.15 Abandonment and impoundment of personal property.

(a) Personal property of any kind shall not be abandoned, stored or left unattended upon project lands or waters. After a period of 24 hours, or at any time after a posted closure hour in a public use area or for the purpose of providing public safety or resource protection, unattended personal property shall be presumed to be abandoned and may be impounded and stored at a storage point designated by the District Commander, who may assess a reasonable impoundment fee. Such fee shall be paid before the impounded property is returned to its owner.

(b) Personal property placed on Federal lands or waters adjacent to a private residence, facility and/or developments of any private nature for more than 24 hours without permission of the District Commander shall be presumed to have been abandoned and, unless proven otherwise, such presumption will be sufficient to impound the property and/or issue a citation as provided for in § 327.25.

(c) The District Commander shall, by public or private sale or otherwise, dispose of all lost, abandoned or unclaimed personal property that comes into Government custody or control. However, property may not be disposed of until diligent effort has been made to find the owner, heirs, next of kin or legal representative(s). If the owner, heirs, next of kin or legal representative(s) are determined but not found, the property may not be disposed of until the expiration of 120 days after the date when notice, giving the time and place of the intended sale or other disposition, has been sent by certified or registered mail to that person at the last known address. When diligent efforts to determine the owner, heirs, next of kin or legal representative(s) are unsuccessful, the property may be disposed of without delay except that if it has a fair market value of $100 or more the property may not be disposed of until 90 days after the date it is received at the storage point designated by the District Commander. The net proceeds from the sale of property shall be conveyed into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts.

[65 FR 6901, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.16 Lost and found articles.

All articles found shall be deposited by the finder at the Manager’s office or with a ranger. All such articles shall be disposed of in accordance with the procedures set forth in § 327.15.

[65 FR 6902, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.17 Advertisement.

(a) Advertising and the distribution of printed matter is allowed within project land and waters provided that a permit to do so has been issued by the District Commander and provided that this activity is not solely commercial advertising.

(b) An application for such a permit shall set forth the name of the applicant, the name of the organization (if any), the date, time, duration, and location of the proposed advertising or the distribution of printed matter, the number of participants, and any other information required by the permit application form. Permit conditions and procedures are available from the District Commander.

(c) Vessels and vehicles with semipermanent or permanent painted or installed signs are exempt as long as they are used for authorized recreational activities and comply with all other rules and regulations pertaining to vessels and vehicles.

(d) The District Commander shall, without unreasonable delay, issue a permit on proper application unless:

(1) A prior application for a permit for the same time and location has been made that has been or will be granted and the activities authorized by that permit do not reasonably allow multiple occupancy of the particular area; or

(2) It reasonably appears that the advertising or the distribution of printed matter will present a clear and present danger to the public health and safety; or

(3) The number of persons engaged in the advertising or the distribution of printed matter exceeds the number that can reasonably be accommodated in the particular location applied for, considering such things as damage to project resources or facilities, impairment of a protected area’s atmosphere of peace and tranquility, interference with program activities, or impairment of public use facilities; or

(4) The location applied for has not been designated as available for the advertising or the distribution of printed matter; or

(5) The activity would constitute a violation of an applicable law or regulation.

(e) If a permit is denied, the applicant shall be so informed in writing, with the reason(s) for the denial set forth.

(f) The District Commander shall designate on a map, which shall be available for inspection in the applicable project office, the locations within the project that are available for the advertising or the distribution of printed matter. Locations may be designated as not available only if the advertising or the distribution of printed matter would:

(1) Cause injury or damage to project resources; or

(2) Unreasonably impair the atmosphere of the peace and tranquility maintained in natural, historic, or commemorative zones; or

(3) Unreasonably interfere with interpretive, visitor service, or other program activities, or with the administrative activities of the Corps of Engineers; or

(4) Substantially impair the operation of public use facilities or services of Corps of Engineers concessioners or contractors.

(5) Present a clear and present danger to the public health and safety.

(g) The permit may contain such conditions as are reasonably consistent with protection and use of the project area for the purposes for which it is established.

(h) No permit shall be issued for a period in excess of 14 consecutive days, provided that permits may be extended for like periods, upon a new application, unless another applicant has requested use of the same location and multiple occupancy of that location is not reasonably possible.

(i) It is prohibited for persons engaged in the activity under this section to obstruct or impede pedestrians or vehicles, harass project visitors with physical contact or persistent demands, misrepresent the purposes or affiliations of those engaged in the advertising or the distribution of printed matter, or misrepresent whether the printed matter is available without cost or donation.

(j) A permit may be revoked under any of those conditions, as listed in paragraph (d) of this section, that constitute grounds for denial of a permit, or for violation of the terms and conditions of the permit. Such a revocation shall be made in writing, with the reason(s) for revocation clearly set forth, except under emergency circumstances, when an immediate verbal revocation or suspension may be made, to be followed by written confirmation within 72 hours.

(k) Violation of the terms and conditions of a permit issued in accordance with this section may result in the suspension or revocation of the permit.

[65 FR 26137, May 5, 2000]

§ 327.18 Commercial activities.

(a) The engaging in or solicitation of business on project land or waters without the express written permission of the District Commander is prohibited.

(b) It shall be a violation of this part to refuse to or fail to comply with any terms, clauses or conditions of any lease, license or agreements issued by the District Commander.

[65 FR 6902, Feb. 11, 2000]

36 CFR § 327.19 – Permits.

CFR

§ 327.19 Permits.

(a) It shall be a violation of this part to refuse to or fail to comply with the fee requirements or other terms or conditions of any permit issued under the provisions of this part 327.

(b) Permits for floating structures (issued under the authority of § 327.30) of any kind on/in waters of water resources development projects, whether or not such waters are deemed navigable waters of the United States but where such waters are under the management of the Corps of Engineers, shall be issued at the discretion of the District Commander under the authority of this section. District Commanders will delineate those portions of the navigable waters of the United States where this provision is applicable and post notices of this designation in the vicinity of the appropriate Manager’s office.

(c) Permits for non-floating structures (issued under the authority of § 327.30) of any kind constructed, placed in or affecting waters of water resources development projects where such waters are deemed navigable waters of the U.S. shall be issued under the provisions of section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act approved March 3, 1899 (33 U.S.C. 403). If a discharge of dredged or fill material in these waters is involved, a permit is required under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344). (See 33 CFR parts 320 through 330.)

(d) Permits for non-floating structures (issued under the authority of § 327.30) of any kind in waters of water resources development projects, where such waters are under the management of the Corps of Engineers and where such waters are not deemed navigable waters of the United States, shall be issued as set forth in paragraph (b) of this section. If a discharge of dredged or fill material into any water of the United States is involved, a permit is required under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344) (See 33 CFR parts 320 through 330). Water quality certification may be required pursuant to Section 401 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1341).

(e) Shoreline Use Permits to authorize private shoreline use facilities, activities or development (issued under the authority of § 327.30) may be issued in accordance with the project Shoreline Management Plan. Failure to comply with the permit conditions issued under § 327.30 is prohibited.

[65 FR 6902, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.20 Unauthorized structures.

The construction, placement, or existence of any structure (including, but not limited to, roads, trails, signs, non-portable hunting stands or blinds, buoys, docks, or landscape features) of any kind under, upon, in or over the project lands, or waters is prohibited unless a permit, lease, license or other appropriate written authorization has been issued by the District Commander. The design, construction, placement, existence or use of structures in violation of the terms of the permit, lease, license, or other written authorization is prohibited. The government shall not be liable for the loss of, or damage to, any private structures, whether authorized or not, placed on project lands or waters. Unauthorized structures are subject to summary removal or impoundment by the District Commander. Portable hunting stands, climbing devices, steps, or blinds, that are not nailed or screwed into trees and are removed at the end of a day’s hunt may be used.

[65 FR 6902, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.21 Special events.

(a) Special events including, but not limited to, water carnivals, boat regattas, fishing tournaments, music festivals, dramatic presentations or other special recreation programs are prohibited unless written permission has been granted by the District Commander. Where appropriate, District Commanders can provide the state a blanket letter of permission to permit fishing tournaments while coordinating the scheduling and details of tournaments with individual projects. An appropriate fee may be charged under the authority of § 327.23.

(b) The public shall not be charged any fee by the sponsor of such event unless the District Commander has approved in writing (and the sponsor has properly posted) the proposed schedule of fees. The District Commander shall have authority to revoke permission, require removal of any equipment, and require restoration of an area to pre-event condition, upon failure of the sponsor to comply with terms and conditions of the permit/permission or the regulations in this part 327.

[65 FR 6902, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.22 Unauthorized occupation.

(a) Occupying any lands, buildings, vessels or other facilities within water resource development projects for the purpose of maintaining the same as a full-or part-time residence without the written permission of the District Commander is prohibited. The provisions of this section shall not apply to the occupation of lands for the purpose of camping, in accordance with the provisions of § 327.7.

(b) Use of project lands or waters for agricultural purposes is prohibited except when in compliance with terms and conditions authorized by lease, license or other written agreement issued by the District Commander.

[65 FR 6903, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.23 Recreation use fees.

(a) In accordance with the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (16 U.S.C. 460l) and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103–66, the Corps of Engineers collects day use fees, special recreation use fees and/or special permit fees for the use of specialized sites, facilities, equipment or services related to outdoor recreation furnished at Federal expense.

(b) Where such fees are charged, the District Commander shall insure that clear notice of fee requirements is prominently posted at each area, and at appropriate locations therein and that the notice be included in publications distributed at such areas. Failure to pay authorized recreation use fees as established pursuant to Pub. L. 88–578, 78 Stat. 897, as amended (16 U.S.C. 460l–6a), is prohibited and is punishable by a fine of not more than $100.

(d) Any Golden Age or Golden Access Passport permittee shall be entitled, upon presentation of such a permit, to utilize special recreation facilities at a rate of 50 percent off the established use fee at Federally operated areas. Fraudulent use of a Golden Age or Golden Access Passport is prohibited.

[65 FR 6903, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.24 Interference with Government employees.

(a) It is a Federal crime pursuant to the provisions of sections 111 and 1114 of Title 18, United States Code, to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with, attempt to kill or kill any civilian official or employee for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers engaged in the performance of his or her official duties, or on account of the performance of his or her official duties. Such actions or interference directed against a Federal employee while carrying out the regulations in this part are violation of such regulations and may be a state crime pursuant to the laws of the state where they occur.

(b) Failure to comply with a lawful order issued by a Federal employee acting pursuant to the regulations in this part shall be considered as interference with that employee while engaged in the performance of their official duties. Such interference with a Federal employee includes failure to provide a correct name, address or other information deemed necessary for identification upon request of the Federal employee, when that employee is authorized by the District Commander to issue citations in the performance of the employee’s official duties.

[65 FR 6903, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.25 Violations of rules and regulations.

(a) Any person who violates the provisions of the regulations in this part, other than for a failure to pay authorized recreation use fees as separately provided for in § 327.23, may be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than six months or both and may be tried and sentenced in accordance with the provisions of section 3401 of Title 18, United States Code. Persons designated by the District Commander shall have the authority to issue a citation for violation of the regulations in this part, requiring any person charged with the violation to appear before the United States Magistrate within whose jurisdiction the affected water resources development project is located (16 U.S.C. 460d).

(b) Any person who commits an act against any official or employee of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that is a crime under the provisions of section 111 or section 1114 of Title 18, United States Code or under provisions of pertinent state law may be tried and sentenced as further provided under Federal or state law, as the case may be.

[65 FR 6903, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.26 State and local laws.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this part or by Federal law or regulation, state and local laws and ordinances shall apply on project lands and waters. This includes, but is not limited to, state and local laws and ordinances governing:

(1) Operation and use of motor vehicles, vessels, and aircraft;

(2) Hunting, fishing and trapping;

(3) Use or possession of firearms or other weapons;

(4) Civil disobedience and criminal acts;

(5) Littering, sanitation and pollution; and

(6) Alcohol or other controlled substances.

(b) These state and local laws and ordinances are enforced by those state and local enforcement agencies established and authorized for that purpose.

[65 FR 6903, Feb. 11, 2000]

§ 327.30 Shoreline Management on Civil Works Projects.

(a) Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to provide policy and guidance on management of shorelines of Civil Works projects where 36 CFR part 327 is applicable.

(b) Applicability. This regulation is applicable to all field operating agencies with Civil Works responsibilities except when such application would result in an impingement upon existing Indian rights.

(1) Section 4, 1944 Flood Control Act, as amended (16 U.S.C. 460d).

(2) The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1894, as amended and supplemented (33 U.S.C. 1)

(3) Section 10, River and Harbor Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. 403).

(4) National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (Pub. L. 89–665; 80 Stat. 915) as amended (16 U.S.C. 470 et seq.).

(5) The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.).

(6) The Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344, et seq.).

(7) The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99–662).

(8) Title 36, chapter III, part 327, Code of Federal Regulations, “Rules and Regulations Governing Public Use of Water Resource Development Projects Administered by the Chief of Engineers.”

(9) Executive Order 12088 (13 Oct. 78).

(10) 33 CFR parts 320–330, “Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers.”

(11) ER 1130–2–400, “Management of Natural Resources and Outdoor Recreation at Civil Works Water Resource Projects.”

(12) EM 385–1–1, “Safety and Health Requirements Manual.”

(d) Policy.

(1) It is the policy of the Chief of Engineers to protect and manage shorelines of all Civil Works water resource development projects under Corps jurisdiction in a manner which will promote the safe and healthful use of these shorelines by the public while maintaining environmental safeguards to ensure a quality resource for use by the public. The objectives of all management actions will be to achieve a balance between permitted private uses and resource protection for general public use. Public pedestrian access to and exit from these shorelines shall be preserved. For projects or portions of projects where Federal real estate interest is limited to easement title only, management actions will be appropriate within the limits of the estate acquired.

(2) Private shoreline uses may be authorized in designated areas consistent with approved use allocations specified in Shoreline Management Plans. Except to honor written commitments made prior to publication of this regulation, private shoreline uses are not allowed on water resource projects where construction was initiated after December 13, 1974, or on water resource projects where no private shoreline uses existed as of that date. Any existing permitted facilities on these projects will be grandfathered until the facilities fail to meet the criteria set forth in § 327.30(h).

(3) A Shoreline Management Plan, as described in § 327.30(e), will be prepared for each Corps project where private shoreline use is allowed. This plan will honor past written commitments. The plan will be reviewed at least once every five years and revised as necessary. Shoreline uses that do not interfere with authorized project purposes, public safety concerns, violate local norms or result in significant environmental effects should be allowed unless the public participation process identifies problems in these areas. If sufficient demand exists, consideration should be given to revising the shoreline allocations (e.g. increases/decreases). Maximum public participation will be encouraged as set forth in § 327.30(e)(6). Except to honor written commitments made prior to the publication of this regulation, shoreline management plans are not required for those projects where construction was initiated after December 13, 1974, or on projects not having private shoreline use as of that date. In that case, a statement of policy will be developed by the district commander to present the shoreline management policy. This policy statement will be subject to the approval of the division commander. For projects where two or more agencies have jurisdiction, the plan will be cooperatively prepared with the Corps as coordinator.

(4) Where commercial or other public launching and/or moorage facilities are not available within a reasonable distance, group owned mooring facilities may be allowed in Limited Development Areas to limit the proliferation of individual facilities. Generally only one permit will be necessary for a group owned mooring facility with that entity, if incorporated, or with one person from the organization designated as the permittee and responsible for all moorage spaces within the facility. No charge may be made for use of any permitted facility by others nor shall any commercial activity be engaged in thereon.

(5) The issuance of a private shoreline use permit does not convey any real estate or personal property rights or exclusive use rights to the permit holder. The public’s right of access and use of the permit area must be maintained and preserved. Owners of permitted facilities may take necessary precautions to protect their property from theft, vandalism or trespass, but may in no way preclude the public right of pedestrian or vessel access to the water surface or public land adjacent to the facility.

(6) Shoreline Use Permits will only be issued to individuals or groups with legal right of access to public lands.

(e) Shoreline Management Plan —

(1) General. The policies outlined in § 327.30(d) will be implemented through preparation of Shoreline Management Plans, where private shoreline use is allowed.

(2) Preparation. A Shoreline Management Plan is prepared as part of the Operational Management Plan. A moratorium on accepting applications for new permits may be placed in effect from the time an announcement of creation of a plan or formal revision of a plan is made until the action is completed.

(3) Approval. Approval of Shoreline Management Plans rests with division commanders. After approval, one copy of each project Shoreline Management Plan will be forwarded to HQUSACE (CECW-ON) WASH DC 20314–1000. Copies of the approved plan will also be made available to the public.

(4) Scope and Format. The Shoreline Management Plan will consist of a map showing the shoreline allocated to the uses listed in § 327.30(e)(6), related rules and regulations, a discussion of what areas are open or closed to specific activities and facilities, how to apply for permits and other information pertinent to the Corps management of the shoreline. The plan will be prepared in sufficient detail to ensure that it is clear to the public what uses are and are not allowed on the shoreline of the project and why. A process will be developed and presented in the Shoreline Management Plan that prescribes a procedure for review of activities requested but not specifically addressed by the Shoreline Management Plan.

(5) Shoreline Allocation. The entire shoreline will be allocated within the classifications below and delineated on a map. Any action, within the context of this rule, which gives a special privilege to an individual or group of individuals on land or water at a Corps project, that precludes use of those lands and waters by the general public, is considered to be private shoreline use. Shoreline allocations cover that land and/or water extending from the edge of the water and waterward with the exception of allocations for the purpose of vegetation modification which extends landward to the project boundary. These allocations should complement, but certainly not contradict, the land classifications in the project master plan. A map of sufficient size and scale to clearly display the shoreline allocations will be conspicuously displayed or readily available for viewing in the project administration office and will serve as the authoritative reference. Reduced or smaller scale maps may be developed for public dissemination but the information contained on these must be identical to that contained on the display map in the project administration office. No changes will be made to these maps except through the formal update process. District commanders may add specific constraints and identify areas having unique characteristics during the plan preparation, review, or updating process in addition to the allocation classifications described below.

(i) Limited Development Areas. Limited Development Areas are those areas in which private facilities and/or activities may be allowed consistent with § 327.30(h) and appendix A. Modification of vegetation by individuals may be allowed only following the issuance of a permit in accordance with appendix A. Potential low and high water conditions and underwater topography should be carefully evaluated before shoreline is allocated as Limited Development Area.

(ii) Public Recreation Areas. Public Recreation Areas are those areas designated for commercial concessionaire facilities, Federal, state or other similar public use. No private shoreline use facilities and/or activities will be permitted within or near designated or developed public recreation areas. The term “near” depends on the terrain, road system, and other local conditions, so actual distances must be established on a case by case basis in each project Shoreline Management Plan. No modification of land forms or vegetation by private individuals or groups of individuals is permitted in public recreation areas.

(iii) Protected Shoreline Areas. Protected Shoreline Areas are those areas designated to maintain or restore aesthetic, fish and wildlife, cultural, or other environmental values. Shoreline may also be so designated to prevent development in areas that are subject to excessive siltation, erosion, rapid dewatering, or exposure to high wind, wave, or current action and/or in areas in which development would interfere with navigation. No Shoreline Use Permits for floating or fixed recreation facilities will be allowed in protected areas. Some modification of vegetation by private individuals, such as clearing a narrow meandering path to the water, or limited mowing, may be allowed only following the issuance of a permit if the resource manager determines that the activity will not adversely impact the environment or physical characteristics for which the area was designated as protected. In making this determination the effect on water quality will also be considered.

(iv) Prohibited Access Areas. Prohibited Access Areas are those in which public access is not allowed or is restricted for health, safety or security reasons. These could include hazardous areas near dams, spillways, hydro-electric power stations, work areas, water intake structures, etc. No shoreline use permits will be issued in Prohibited Access Areas.

(6) Public Participation. District commanders will ensure public participation to the maximum practicable extent in Shoreline Management Plan formulation, preparation and subsequent revisions. This may be accomplished by public meetings, group workshops, open houses or other public involvement techniques. When master plan updates and preparation of the Shoreline Management Plans are concurrent, public participation may be combined and should consider all aspects of both plans, including shoreline allocation classifications. Public participation will begin during the initial formulation stage and must be broad-based to cover all aspects of public interest. The key to successful implementation is an early and continual public relations program. Projects with significant numbers of permits should consider developing computerized programs to facilitate exchange of information with permittees and to improve program efficiency. Special care will be taken to advise citizen and conservation organizations; Federal, state and local natural resource management agencies; Indian Tribes; the media; commercial concessionaires; congressional liaisons; adjacent landowners and other concerned entities during the formulation of Shoreline Management Plans and subsequent revisions. Notices shall be published prior to public meetings to assure maximum public awareness. Public notices shall be issued by the district commander allowing for a minimum of 30 days for receipt of written public comment in regard to the proposed Shoreline Management Plan or any major revision thereto.

(7) Periodic Review. Shoreline Management Plans will be reviewed periodically, but no less often than every five years, by the district commander to determine the need for update. If sufficient controversy or demand exists, consideration should be given, consistent with other factors, to a process of reevaluation of the shoreline allocations and the plan. When changes to the Shoreline Management Plan are needed, the plan will be formally updated through the public participation process. Cumulative environmental impacts of permit actions and the possibility of preparing or revising project NEPA documentation will be considered. District commanders may make minor revisions to the Shoreline Management Plan when the revisions are consistent with policy and funds for a complete plan update are not available. The amount and type of public involvement needed for such revision is at the discretion of the district commander.

(f) Instruments for Shoreline Use. Instruments used to authorize private shoreline use facilities, activities or development are as follows:

(1) Shoreline Use Permits.

(i) Shoreline Use Permits are issued and enforced in accordance with provisions of 36 CFR 327.19.

(ii) Shoreline Use Permits are required for private structures/activities of any kind (except boats) in waters of Civil Works projects whether or not such waters are deemed navigable and where such waters are under the primary jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army and under the management of the Corps of Engineers.

(iii) Shoreline Use Permits are required for non-floating structures on waters deemed commercially non-navigable, when such waters are under management of the Corps of Engineers.

(iv) Shoreline Use Permits are also required for land vegetation modification activities which do not involve disruption to land form.

(v) Permits should be issued for a term of five years. To reduce administration costs, one year permits should be issued only when the location or nature of the activity requires annual reissuance.

(vi) Shoreline Use Permits for erosion control may be issued for the life or period of continual ownership of the structure by the permittee and his/her legal spouse.

(2) Department of the Army Permits. Dredging, construction of fixed structures, including fills and combination fixed-floating structures and the discharge of dredged or fill material in waters of the United States will be evaluated under authority of section 10, River and Harbor Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. 403) and section 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344). Permits will be issued where appropriate.

(3) Real Estate Instruments. Commercial development activities and activities which involve grading, cuts, fills, or other changes in land form, or establishment of appropriate land-based support facilities required for private floating facilities, will continue to be covered by a lease, license or other legal grant issued through the appropriate real estate element. Shoreline Management Plans should identify the types of activities that require real estate instruments and indicate the general process for obtaining same. Shoreline Use Permits are not required for facilities or activities covered by a real estate instrument.

(g) Transfer of Permits. Shoreline Use Permits are non-transferable. They become null and void upon sale or transfer of the permitted facility or the death of the permittee and his/her legal spouse.

(h) Existing Facilities Now Under Permit. Implementation of a Shoreline Management Plan shall consider existing permitted facilities and prior written Corps commitments implicit in their issuance. Facilities or activities permitted under special provisions should be identified in a way that will set them apart from other facilities or activities.

(1) Section 6 of Pub. L. 97–140 provides that no lawfully installed dock or appurtenant structures shall be required to be removed prior to December 31, 1989, from any Federal water resources reservoir or lake project administered by the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, on which it was located on December 29, 1981, if such property is maintained in usable condition, and does not occasion a threat to life or property.

(2) In accordance with section 1134(d) of Pub. L. 99–662, any houseboat, boathouse, floating cabin or lawfully installed dock or appurtenant structures in place under a valid shoreline use permit as of November 17, 1986, cannot be forced to be removed from any Federal water resources project or lake administered by the Secretary of the Army on or after December 31, 1989, if it meets the three conditions below except where necessary for immediate use for public purposes or higher public use or for a navigation or flood control project.

(i) Such property is maintained in a usable and safe condition,

(ii) Such property does not occasion a threat to life or property, and

(iii) The holder of the permit is in substantial compliance with the existing permit.

(3) All such floating facilities and appurtenances will be formally recognized in an appropriate Shoreline Management Plan. New permits for these permitted facilities will be issued to new owners. If the holder of the permit fails to comply with the terms of the permit, it may be revoked and the holder required to remove the structure, in accordance with the terms of the permit as to notice, time, and appeal.

(i) Facility Maintenance. Permitted facilities must be operated, used and maintained by the permittee in a safe, healthful condition at all times. If determined to be unsafe, the resource manager will establish together with the permittee a schedule, based on the seriousness of the safety deficiency, for correcting the deficiency or having it removed, at the permittee’s expense. The applicable safety and health prescriptions in EM 385–1–1 should be used as a guide.

(j) Density of Development. The density of private floating and fixed recreation facilities will be established in the Shoreline Management Plan for all portions of Limited Development areas consistent with ecological and aesthetic characteristics and prior written commitments. The facility density in Limited Development Areas should, if feasible, be determined prior to the development of adjacent private property. The density of facilities will not be more than 50 per cent of the Limited Development Area in which they are located. Density will be measured by determining the linear feet of shoreline as compared to the width of the facilities in the water plus associated moorage arrangements which restrict the full unobstructed use of that portion of the shoreline. When a Limited Development Area or a portion of a Limited Development area reaches maximum density, notice should be given to the public and facility owners in that area that no additional facilities will be allowed. In all cases, sufficient open area will be maintained for safe maneuvering of watercraft. Docks should not extend out from the shore more than one-third of the width of a cove at normal recreation or multipurpose pool. In those cases where current density of development exceeds the density level established in the Shoreline Management Plan, the density will be reduced to the prescribed level through attrition.

(k) Permit Fees. Fees associated with the Shoreline Use Permits shall be paid prior to issuing the permit in accordance with the provisions of § 327.30(c)(1). The fee schedule will be published separately.

Appendix A to § 327.30—Guidelines for Granting Shoreline Use Permits

1. General

a. Decisions regarding permits for private floating recreation facilities will consider the operating objectives and physical characteristics of each project. In developing Shoreline Management Plans, district commanders will give consideration to the effects of added private boat storage facilities on commercial concessions for that purpose. Consistent with established policies, new commercial concessions may be alternatives to additional limited development shoreline.

b. Permits for individually or group owned shoreline use facilities may be granted only in Limited Development Areas when the sites are not near commercial marine services and such use will not despoil the shoreline nor inhibit public use or enjoyment thereof. The installation and use of such facilities will not be in conflict with the preservation of the natural characteristics of the shoreline nor will they result in significant environmental damage. Charges will be made for Shoreline Use Permits in accordance with the separately published fee schedule.

c. Permits may be granted within Limited Development Areas for ski jumps, floats, boat moorage facilities, duck blinds, and other private floating recreation facilities when they will not create a safety hazard and inhibit public use or enjoyment of project waters or shoreline. A Corps permit is not required for temporary ice fishing shelters or duck blinds when they are regulated by a state program. When the facility or activity is authorized by a shoreline use permit, a separate real estate instrument is generally not required.

d. Group owned boat mooring facilities may be permitted in Limited Development Areas where practicable (e.g. where physically feasible in terms of access, water depths, wind protection, etc.).

2. Applications for Shoreline Use Permits

a. Applications for private Shoreline Use Permits will be reviewed with full consideration of the policies set forth in this and referenced regulations, and the Shoreline Management Plan. Fees associated with the Shoreline Use Permit shall be paid prior to issuing the permit. Plans and specifications of the proposed facility shall be submitted and approved prior to the start of construction. Submissions should include engineering details, structural design, anchorage method, and construction materials; the type, size, location and ownership of the facility; expected duration of use; and an indication of willingness to abide by the applicable regulations and terms and conditions of the permit. Permit applications shall also identify and locate any land-based support facilities and any specific safety considerations.

b. Permits will be issued by the district commander or his/her authorized representative on ENG Form 4264–R (Application for Shoreline Use Permit) (appendix B). Computer generated forms may be substituted for ENG Form 4264–R provided all information is included. The computer generated form will be designated, “ENG Form 4264-R-E, Oct 87 (Electronic generation approved by USACE, Oct 87)”.

c. The following are guides to issuance of Shoreline Use Permits:

(1) Use of boat mooring facilities, including piers and boat (shelters) houses, will be limited to vessel or watercraft mooring and storage of gear essential to vessel or watercraft operation.

(2) Private floating recreation facilities, including boat mooring facilities shall not be constructed or used for human habitation or in a manner which gives the appearance of converting Federal public property on which the facility is located to private, exclusive use. New docks with enclosed sides (i.e. boathouses) are prohibited.

(3) No private floating facility will exceed the minimum size required to moor the owner’s boat or boats plus the minimum size required for an enclosed storage locker of oars, life preservers and other items essential to watercraft operation. Specific size limitations may be established in the project Shoreline Management Plan.

(4) All private floating recreation facilities including boat mooring facilities will be constructed in accordance with plans and specifications, approved by the resource manager, or a written certification from a licensed engineer, stating the facility is structurally safe will accompany the initial submission of the plans and specifications.

(5) Procedures regarding permits for individual facilities shall also apply to permits for non-commercial group mooring facilities.

(6) Facilities attached to the shore shall be securely anchored by means of moorings which do not obstruct the free use of the shoreline, nor damage vegetation or other natural features. Anchoring to vegetation is prohibited.

(7) Electrical service and equipment leading to or on private mooring facilities must not pose a safety hazard nor conflict with other recreational use. Electrical installations must be weatherproof and meet all current applicable electrical codes and regulations. The facility must be equipped with quick disconnect fittings mounted above the flood pool elevation. All electrical installations must conform to the National Electric Code and all state, and local codes and regulations. In those states where electricians are licensed, registered, or otherwise certified, a copy of the electrical certification must be provided to the resource manager before a Shoreline Use Permit can be issued or renewed. The resource manager will require immediate removal or disconnection of any electrical service or equipment that is not certified (if appropriate), does not meet code, or is not safely maintained. All new electrical lines will be installed underground. This will require a separate real estate instrument for the service right-of-way. Existing overhead lines will be allowed, as long as they meet all applicable electrical codes, regulations and above guidelines, to include compatibility and safety related to fluctuating water levels.

(8) Private floating recreation facilities will not be placed so as to interfere with any authorized project purposes, including navigation, or create a safety or health hazard.

(9) The district commander or his/her authorized representative may place special conditions on the permit when deemed necessary. Requests for waivers of shoreline management plan permit conditions based on health conditions will be reviewed on a case by case basis by the Operations Manager. Efforts will be made to reduce onerous requirements when a limiting health condition is obvious or when an applicant provides a doctor’s certification of need for conditions which are not obvious.

(10) Vegetation modification, including but not limited to, cutting, pruning, chemical manipulation, removal or seeding by private individuals is allowed only in those areas designated as Limited Development Areas or Protected Shoreline Areas. An existing (as of July 1, 1987) vegetation modification permit, within a shoreline allocation which normally would not allow vegetation modification, should be grandfathered. Permittees will not create the appearance of private ownership of public lands.

(11) The term of a permit for vegetation modification will be for five years. Where possible, such permits will be consolidated with other shoreline management permits into a single permit. The district commander is authorized to issue vegetation modification permits of less than five years for one-time requests or to aid in the consolidation of shoreline management permits.

(12) When issued a permit for vegetative modification, the permittee will delineate the government property line, as surveyed and marked by the government, in a clear but unobtrusive manner approved by the district commander and in accordance with the project Shoreline Management Plan and the conditions of the permit. Other adjoining owners may also delineate the common boundary subject to these same conditions. This delineation may include, but is not limited to, boundary plantings and fencing. The delineation will be accomplished at no cost to the government.

(13) No permit will be issued for vegetation modification in Protected Shoreline Areas until the environmental impacts of the proposed modification are assesed by the resource manager and it has been determined that no significant adverse impacts will result. The effects of the proposed modification on water quality will also be considered in making this determination.

(14) The original of the completed permit application is to be retained by the permittee. A duplicate will be retained in the resource manager’s office.

3. Permit Revocation

Permits may be revoked by the district commander when it is determined that the public interest requires such revocation or when the permittee fails to comply with terms and conditions of the permit, the Shoreline Management Plan, or of this regulation. Permits for duck blinds and ice fishing shelters will be issued to cover a period not to exceed 30 days prior to and 30 days after the season.

4. Removal of Facilities

Facilities not removed when specified in the permit or when requested after termination or revocation of the permit will be treated as unauthorized structures pursuant to 36 CFR 327.20.

5. Posting of Permit Number

Each district will procure 5″ × 8″ or larger printed permit tags of light metal or plastic for posting. The permit display tag shall be posted on the facility and/or on the land area covered by the permit, so that it can be visually checked, with ease in accordance with instructions provided by the resource manager. Facilities or activities permitted under special provisions should be identified in a way that will set apart from other facilities or activities.

Appendix B to § 327.30—Application for Shoreline Use Permit [Reserved]

Appendix C to § 327.30—Shoreline Use Permit Conditions

1. This permit is granted solely to the applicant for the purpose described on the attached permit.

2. The permittee agrees to and does hereby release and agree to save and hold the Government harmless from any and all causes of action, suits at law or equity, or claims or demands or from any liability of any nature whatsoever for or on account of any damages to persons or property, including a permitted facility, growing out of the ownership, construction, operation or maintenance by the permittee of the permitted facilities and/or activities.

3. Ownership, construction, operation, use and maintenance of a permitted facility are subject to the Government’s navigation servitude.

4. No attempt shall be made by the permittee to forbid the full and free use by the public of all public waters and/or lands at or adjacent to the permitted facility or to unreasonably interfere with any authorized project purposes, including navigation in connection with the ownership, construction, operation or maintenance of a permitted facility and/or activity.

5. The permittee agrees that if subsequent operations by the Government require an alteration in the location of a permitted facility and/or activity or if in the opinion of the district commander a permitted facility and/or activity shall cause unreasonable obstruction to navigation or that the public interest so requires, the permittee shall be required, upon written notice from the district commander to remove, alter, or relocate the permitted facility, without expense to the Government.

6. The Government shall in no case be liable for any damage or injury to a permitted facility which may be caused by or result from subsequent operations undertaken by the Government for the improvement of navigation or for other lawful purposes, and no claims or right to compensation shall accrue from any such damage. This includes any damage that may occur to private property if a facility is removed for noncompliance with the conditions of the permit.

7. Ownership, construction, operation, use and maintenance of a permitted facility and/or activity are subject to all applicable Federal, state and local laws and regulations. Failure to abide by these applicable laws and regulations may be cause for revocation of the permit.

8. This permit does not convey any property rights either in real estate or material; and does not authorize any injury to private property or invasion of private rights or any infringement of Federal, state or local laws or regulations, nor does it obviate the necessity of obtaining state or local assent required by law for the construction, operation, use or maintenance of a permitted facility and/or activity.

9. The permittee agrees to construct the facility within the time limit agreed to on the permit issuance date. The permit shall become null and void if construction is not completed within that period. Further, the permittee agrees to operate and maintain any permitted facility and/or activity in a manner so as to provide safety, minimize any adverse impact on fish and wildlife habitat, natural, environmental, or cultural resources values and in a manner so as to minimize the degradation of water quality.

10. The permittee shall remove a permitted facility within 30 days, at his/her expense, and restore the waterway and lands to a condition accepted by the resource manager upon termination or revocation of this permit or if the permittee ceases to use, operate or maintain a permitted facility and/or activity. If the permittee fails to comply to the satisfaction of the resource manager, the district commander may remove the facility by contract or otherwise and the permittee agrees to pay all costs incurred thereof.

11. The use of a permitted boat dock facility shall be limited to the mooring of the permittee’s vessel or watercraft and the storage, in enclosed locker facilities, of his/her gear essential to the operation of such vessel or watercraft.

12. Neither a permitted facility nor any houseboat, cabin cruiser, or other vessel moored thereto shall be used as a place of habitation or as a full or part-time residence or in any manner which gives the appearance of converting the public property, on which the facility is located, to private use.

13. Facilities granted under this permit will not be leased, rented, sub-let or provided to others by any means of engaging in commercial activity(s) by the permittee or his/her agent for monetary gain. This does not preclude the permittee from selling total ownership to the facility.

14. Floats and the flotation material for all docks and boat mooring buoys shall be fabricated of materials manufactured for marine use. The float and its flotation material shall be 100% warranted for a minimum of 8 years against sinking, becoming waterlogged, cracking, peeling, fragmenting, or losing beads. All floats shall resist puncture and penetration and shall not be subject to damage by animals under normal conditions for the area. All floats and the flotation material used in them shall be fire resistant. Any float which is within 40 feet of a line carrying fuel shall be 100% impervious to water and fuel. The use of new or recycled plastic or metal drums or non-compartmentalized air containers for encasement or floats is prohibited. Existing floats are authorized until it or its flotation material is no longer serviceable, at which time it shall be replaced with a float that meets the conditions listed above. For any floats installed after the effective date of this specification, repair or replacement shall be required when it or its flotation material no longer performs its designated function or it fails to meet the specifications for which it was originally warranted.

15. Permitted facilities and activities are subject to periodic inspection by authorized Corps representatives. The resource manager will notify the permittee of any deficiencies and together establish a schedule for their correction. No deviation or changes from approved plans will be allowed without prior written approval of the resource manager.

16. Floating facilities shall be securely attached to the shore in accordance with the approved plans by means of moorings which do not obstruct general public use of the shoreline or adversely affect the natural terrain or vegetation. Anchoring to vegetation is prohibited.

17. The permit display tag shall be posted on the permitted facility and/or on the land areas covered by the permit so that it can be visually checked with ease in accordance with instructions provided by the resource manager.

18. No vegetation other than that prescribed in the permit will be damaged, destroyed or removed. No vegetation of any kind will be planted, other than that specifically prescribed in the permit.

19. No change in land form such as grading, excavation or filling is authorized by this permit.

20. This permit is non-transferable. Upon the sale or other transfer of the permitted facility or the death of the permittee and his/her legal spouse, this permit is null and void.

21. By 30 days written notice, mailed to the permittee by certified letter, the district commander may revoke this permit whenever the public interest necessitates such revocation or when the permittee fails to comply with any permit condition or term. The revocation notice shall specify the reasons for such action. If the permittee requests a hearing in writing to the district commander through the resource manager within the 30-day period, the district commander shall grant such hearing at the earliest opportunity. In no event shall the hearing date be more than 60 days from the date of the hearing request. Following the hearing, a written decision will be rendered and a copy mailed to the permittee by certified letter.

22. Notwithstanding the conditions cited in condition 21 above, if in the opinion of the district commander, emergency circumstances dictate otherwise, the district commander may summarily revoke the permit.

23. When vegetation modification on these lands is accomplished by chemical means, the program will be in accordance with appropriate Federal, state and local laws, rules and regulations.

24. The resource manager or his/her authorized representative shall be allowed to cross the permittee’s property, as necessary to inspect facilities and/or activities under permit.

25. When vegetation modification is allowed, the permittee will delineate the government property line in a clear, but unobtrusive manner approved by the resource manager and in accordance with the project Shoreline Management Plan.

26. If the ownership of a permitted facility is sold or transferred, the permittee or new owner will notify the Resource Manager of the action prior to finalization. The new owner must apply for a Shoreline Use Permit within 14 days or remove the facility and restore the use area within 30 days from the date of ownership transfer.

27. If permitted facilities are removed for storage or extensive maintenance, the resource manager may require all portions of the facility be removed from public property.

Appendix D to § 327.30—Permit [Reserved]

[55 FR 30697, July 27, 1990, as amended at 57 FR 21895, May 26, 1992; 57 FR 29220, July 1, 1992; 63 FR 35828, July 1, 1998]

Effective Date Note

Effective Date Note:

The amendment to § 327.30 revising the last sentence of paragraph (k), published at 56 FR 29587, June 28, 1991, was deferred indefinitely. See 56 FR 49706, Oct. 1, 1991. The administrative charges contained in § 327.30, Shoreline Management on Civil Works Projects, published in the July 1, 1991, edition of the Code of Federal Regulations will remain in effect. Any future decisions affecting this regulation will be published in the Federal Register at a later date by the Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army. For the convenience of the user, the rule published on June 28, 1991, at FR page 29587, is set forth as follows:

§ 327.30 Shoreline Management on Civil Works Projects.

(k) * * * The Fee Schedule is published in § 327.31.

§ 327.31 Shoreline management fee schedule.

A charge will be made for Shoreline Use Permits to help defray expenses associated with issuance and administration of the permits. As permits become eligible for renewal after July 1, 1976, a charge of $10 for each new permit and a $5 annual fee for inspection of floating facilities will be made. There will be no annual inspection fee for permits for vegetative modification on Shoreline areas. In all cases the total administrative charge will be collected initially at the time of permit issuance rather than on a piecemeal annual basis.

[56 FR 61163, Dec. 2, 1991; 56 FR 65190, Dec. 16, 1991]

Creation Date	1/15/24	File Name	Permits.docx
Save Date	1/15/24	File Location	F:\1. Legal\1.2.1 Laws\Federal\US Army Corp of Engineers\Permits.docx

When an organization makes rules and regulations that a subsidiary organization is supposed to obey, and then fails to follow, both organizations are liable to any plaintiff injured due to the failure to follow or enforce the organizational rules, policies, regulations or standards.

Posted: July 31, 2017 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Illinois, Minors, Youth, Children, Youth Camps | Tags: ACA, American Camping Association, Boy Scouts of America, Boys & Girls Clubs, Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Child Care, Child Care Facility, cognizable, conscious disregard, exclusive control, factual allegations, farm, GSS, Guide to Safe Scouting, Guidelines, indifference, legal conclusions, Licensed Child Care, Licensed Child Care Facility, medical expenses, National Organization, negligence claims, Negligence per se, Notice, owed, pleaded, Policies, public highway, public road, pulled, pulling, Reckless, Regulations, res ipsa loquitur, right to relief, Rules, seat, speculative, Standards, supervise, Supervision, trailer, Transport, Wanton, wanton misconduct, willful | Leave a comment

In this case, the national organization was also sued for failing to instruct and enforce the regional organization in the rules, regulations, standards or policies. If you are going to make rules, and you say the rules must be followed you have to make sure you train in the rules and that everyone follows the rules.

If you make a rule you have to enforce it if you are in charge of making rules.
Otherwise, don’t make rules!

T.K., a minor, v. Boys & Girls Clubs of America, et. al. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87005

State: Illinois, United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division

Plaintiff: T.K., a minor, by and through his natural Father and Next Friend, Timothy Killings, and Timothy Killings, individually

Defendant: Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Boys and Girls Club of Decatur, Inc., and Mary K. Paulin

Plaintiff Claims: negligence and willful and wanton misconduct

Defendant Defenses: Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted filed in a Motion to dismiss

Holding: for the plaintiff

Year: 2017

This case is a federal diversity case. That means the plaintiff(s) and the defendant(s) were legally residents of different states, and the amount claimed by the plaintiff was greater than $75,000.00. In this case, the plaintiff was from California, and the Defendant was located in Illinois.

The plaintiff was in Illinois and attending the Decatur Boys & Girls Club, which was part of the America Boys & Girls Club. America Boys & Girls Club was based in Georgia.

America Boys & Girls Club provided policies, procedures, rules, guidelines and instructions to the Decatur Boys & Girls Clubs, and all other Boys & Girls Clubs. The Boys & Girls Clubs are required to follow the operating policies, procedures, rules, guidelines, and instructions.

While attending the club, the plaintiff was taken to a local farm. Neither of the defendants had permission to transport the minor plaintiff to the farm. While there the plaintiff was riding on a trailer (probably a hay ride)that did not have guardrails, seats, seatbelts or other equipment designed from keeping people from falling off. (But then very few hay rides do.) The tractor and trailer were pulled onto a public highway with 15-20 children on it. While on the highway the plaintiff either jumped or fell off or might have been pushed
off sustaining injuries.

The farm trailer was not designed or intended to transport people, and the trailer lacked guardrails, seats, seatbelts, and other equipment that might prevent people from falling off it. Defendant Paulin pulled the trailer, with T.K. and 15 to 20 additional children riding on it, onto a public highway with a tractor defendant.

The issue that the trailer was not designed to be on a highway and did not have seats, seatbelts or other equipment to keep people from falling off was repeatedly brought up by the court.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and this opinion is court’s response to that motion.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

A motion to dismiss is a preliminary motion filed when the allegations in the complaint do not meet the minimum requirements to make a legally recognizable claim.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Plausibility means alleging factual content that allows a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. A plaintiff’s complaint must suggest a right to relief, “raising that possibility above a speculative level.” “The required level of factual specificity rises with the complexity of the claim.”

When reviewing a motion to dismiss the court must look at the plaintiff’s pleadings as true and any inference that must be drawn from the pleadings is done so in favor of the plaintiff.

To plead negligence under Illinois’s law the plaintiff must prove “…that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty, it breached that duty, and the breach proximately caused plaintiff’s injury.” In Illinois, every person owes all other persons “a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury which naturally flows as a reasonably probable and foreseeable consequence of his act.”

Whether this duty arises in a particular context depends on “the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, the likelihood of the injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing the burden on defendants.” Id. A child’s caretaker has a duty to protect the child from harm.

It is a legal question to be decided by the court if a legal duty exists.

…the relationship between him and America Boys & Girls Club and Decatur Boys & Girls Club imposed on the two organizations a duty of care to adequately supervise him and protect him from harm, any unreasonable risk of harm, dangerous instrumentalities, and dangerous conditions.

The plaintiffs argued the duty of care of the two organizations was breached by:

(1) negligently supervising him, (2) allowing and causing him to be placed on a farm trailer that was not designed for transporting children and was therefore dangerous and not reasonably safe for him, (3) failing to warn or failing to adequately warn him of the potential for injury before putting him on the trailer, (4) failing to properly supervise the minors they placed on the trailer, and (5) failing to provide enough staff members to monitor the children they placed on the trailer.

The plaintiff’s also argued there was a greater responsibility and as such duty on the part of the America Boys & Girls Club to train the Decatur club on its rules, regulations and policies and failing to train on them was also negligent.

T.K. further alleges that it failed to properly train Decatur Boys & Girls Club on the operating policies, procedures, rules, guidelines, and instructions of America Boys & Girls Club, and that it failed to supervise Decatur Boys & Girls Club to ensure that the operating policies, procedures, rules, guidelines, and instructions were followed.

In this case, the duty of care was created by the rules, regulations, policies and procedures created by the America Boys & Girls Clubs upon the Decatur Boys & Girls Club.

The plaintiff went on to argue, and since it was quoted by the court, accepted by the court that:

Defendant Paulin put him on the farm trailer even though Defendant Paulin did not have the requisite permission to give him a ride on the trailer. Defendant Paulin towed the trailer, while T.K. and 15 to 20 additional children were on board, with a tractor onto a public highway. According to T.K., Defendant Paulin owed him a duty of care to protect him from any unreasonable risk of harm and breached that duty by (1) allowing and causing him to be placed on a farm trailer that was not designed for transporting children and was therefore dangerous and not reasonably safe for him; (2)
failing to warn him of the potential for injury before putting him on the trailer and pulling the trailer onto a public highway; (3) failing to warn him that the trailer was dangerous and not reasonably safe given that the trailer had no railings, barriers, walls, or seats; and (4) creating a dangerous condition by placing him on the trailer and pulling it onto a public highway.

The court held this was enough to create a duty of care and proved a possible negligence claim.

Furthermore, of note was a statement that a statutory violation of a statute in Illinois does not create a negligence per se claim.

A violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect human life or property is prima facie evidence of negligence. . . . The violation does not constitute negligence per se, however, and therefore the defendant may prevail by showing that he acted reasonably under the circumstances.”

The court then looked at the minor plaintiff’s father claims to see if those met the requirements to prove negligence in Illinois.

To state a negligence cause of action, Mr. Killings must plead enough facts to make it plausible that he was harmed as a proximate result of Defendants’ breach of a duty they owed to him.

However, the father was not able to prove his claim because it is separate and distinct from the minor’s claim. “The fact that Defendants were responsible for T.K.’s well-being on July 17, 2015, does not mean that Defendants had any duty to Mr. Killings.”

It was T.K., not Mr. Killings, who was placed on an unsafe farm trailer and pulled onto a public road. Defendants, therefore, had a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to T.K., not Mr. Killings. Further, Mr. Killings does not claim that he was physically injured as a result of Defendants’ negligence; his only claimed injury is the money he has spent and the money he will spend in the future for T.K.’s past and future medical treatment. In short, Mr. Killings has not met the pleading requirements for a negligence claim against any Defendant.

The father also pleaded a claim for loss of aid, comfort, society and companionship of his child. However, Illinois’s law does not allow for recovery of those emotional damages unless the child’s injury is a fatality.

The claim is not one for damages stemming from the child’s physical injury, but one founded on the parents’ liability for the minor’s medical expenses under the Illinois Family Expense Act.

However, the father did have a claim for the medical expenses the father paid on behalf of his minor son for the injuries he incurred.

The plaintiff also pleaded res ipsa loquitur.

Res ipsa loquitur allows “proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning cause of injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant.” The doctrine “is meant to bridge an evidentiary gap when an injury could not have happened but for the defendant’s negligence.” Accordingly, res ipsa lo-quitur applies only when the facts “admit of the single inference that the accident would not have happened unless the defendant had been negligent.”

Res ipsa loquitur is a claim that when an incident has occurred, the control of the instrumentality was solely within the control of the defendant.

An example of res ipsa loquitur is a passenger in an airplane that crashes. The pilot is the defendant, and the
control of the airplane is solely with the pilot.

Indeed, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be appropriate if the instrument that caused the injury was in the defendant’s exclusive control “at a time prior to the injury and there is no change in conditions or intervening act that could reasonably have caused the event resulting in the injury.

However, the allegations of the plaintiff did not meet the requirements of res ipsa loquitur in Illinois.

Plaintiff’s final allegation discussed in the opinion was one for willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the defendants. Under Illinois’s law to establish a claim for willful and wanton conduct, the plaintiff must.

…plead facts establishing the elements of a negligence claim–duty, breach, proximate causation, and harm–and “either a deliberate intention to harm or an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the welfare of the plaintiff.

Generally, this is the same standard to prove willful and wanton conduct in most states. Once the negligence claim is proved, then the allegations only need to support the additional acts as willful and wanton.

Therefore, to state claims for willful and wanton misconduct against Defendants, T.K. need only additionally allege either intentional or reckless willful and wanton misconduct committed by Defendants.

The court defined willful and wanton conduct.

Reckless willful and wanton misconduct is conduct committed with an utter indifference of or a conscious disregard for the safety of others. To meet this standard, the defendant “must be conscious of his conduct, and, though having no intent to injure, must be conscious, from his knowledge of the surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will naturally and probably result in injury.

With the allegations plead, the court found sufficient information to confirm the plaintiff going forward with willful and wanton claims. Those allegations include:

Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club placed him and 15 to 20 other minors on an unsafe farm trailer with no guardrails, sidewalls, barriers, or seats while providing inadequate supervision. T.K. further alleges that the trailer was not designed to transport people.

Putting kids on a trailer was a major issue for the court. Kids on a highway on a vehicle not created to transport people were enough to create willful and wanton conduct.

The defendant argued that the allegations that created the negligence claim were also allowed to be the same facts. No new allegations needed to be plead to support the claims for willful and wanton conduct.

Under Illinois’s law, “[t]he same acts by a defendant, if sufficiently egregious, can constitute both negligence and willful and wanton conduct.” Therefore, “one can plead the same facts in two counts, one characterizing them as negligence and the other as willful and wanton conduct, if the same facts could support both theories.

The plaintiff had pled enough facts that the court found relevant and substantial to continue with the negligence and willful and wanton claim.

So Now What?

The actual rules, regulations, procedures were not identified by the court in making its decision. However, the continuous restatement of the plaintiff’s allegations in the same order and words. However, the court specifically stated the defendants failed to follow their own rules.

If you have rules, regulations, policies, procedures, or you must abide by such you MUST follow them. There are no loop holes, exceptions or “just this one time” when dealing with rules, policies and procedures that affect safety or affect minors. If you make them, you must follow them.

If you make them, you must make sure everyone is trained on them. One of the big issues the plaintiff pleads and the court accepted was the rules made by the parent organization were not known or followed by the subsidiary organization. The parent organization when making rules is under a requirement to make sure
the rules are understood and followed according to this decision in Tennessee.

The other major issue was transporting the plaintiff away from the location where the parents thought the plaintiff would be without their permission and then transporting the plaintiff on a road without meeting the requirements of state law, seats, seat belts, etc.

When you have minors, especially minors under the age of ten, you are only acting within the realm and space permitted by the parents. The line that makes me cringe every time I hear it on the news is “If I would have known they were going to do ______________, I never would have let me kid go.” Listen and you
will realize you will hear it a lot when a minor is injured.

You need to prepare your program and your parents so that line is never spoken about you.

If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn

Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

To Purchase Go Here:

Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com

Google+: +Recreation

Twitter: RecreationLaw

Facebook: Rec.Law.Now

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Blog:www.recreation-law.com

Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com

By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw,
#AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps,
#ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw,
#FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation,
#IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence,
#OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw,
#Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer,
#RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom,
#Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer,
#RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding,
#SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, trailer,
willful, farm, wanton misconduct, res ipsa loquitur, negligence claims, pleaded,
cognizable, exclusive control, wanton, medical expenses, supervision, pulled,
negligence per se, public road, legal conclusions, pulling, seat, factual
allegations, right to relief, conscious disregard, indifference, speculative,
supervise, reckless, notice, owed, public highway, guidelines, transport, Guide
to Safe Scouting, GSS, Standards, Rules, Regulations, Policies, National
Organization, Boy Scouts of America, Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Boys
& Girls Clubs, Child Care, ACA, American Camping Association, Child Care
Facility, Licensed Child Care, Licensed Child Care Facility,

T.K., a minor, v. Boys & Girls Clubs of America, et. al. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87005

Posted: July 18, 2017 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Illinois, Minors, Youth, Children, Youth Camps | Tags: ACA, American Camping Association, Boys & Girls Clubs, Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Child Care, Child Care Facility, cognizable, conscious disregard, exclusive control, factual allegations, farm, GSS, Guide to Safe Scouting, Guidelines, Hay Ride, Hayride, indifference, legal conclusions, Licensed Child Care, Licensed Child Care Facility, medical expenses, National Organization, negligence claims, Negligence per se, Notice, owed, pleaded, Policies, public highway, public road, pulled, pulling, Reckless, Regulations, res ipsa loquitur, right to relief, Rules, seat, speculative, Standards, supervise, Supervision, Tractor, trailer, Transport, Wanton, wanton misconduct, willful | Leave a comment

T.K., a minor, v. Boys & Girls Clubs of America, et. al. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87005

T.K., a minor, by and through his natural Father and Next Friend, Timothy Killings, and Timothy Killings, individually, Plaintiffs, v. Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Boys and Girls Club of Decatur, Inc., and Mary K. Paulin, Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-03056

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87005

June 6, 2017, Decided

June 7, 2017, E-Filed

CORE TERMS: trailer, willful, farm, wanton misconduct, res ipsa loquitur, negligence claims, pleaded, cognizable, exclusive control, wanton, medical expenses, supervision, pulled, negligence per se, public road, legal conclusions, pulling, seat, factual allegations, right to relief, conscious disregard, indifference, speculative, supervise, reckless, notice, owed, public highway, guidelines, transport

COUNSEL: [*1] For T.K., a Minor, By And Through His Natural Father and Next Friend, Timothy Killings, Timothy Killings, Plaintiffs: Christopher Ryan Dixon, THE DIXON INJURY FIRM, St Louis, MO.

For Boys & Girls Club of America, Boys and Girls Club of Decatur, Inc., Defendants: Randall A Mead, LEAD ATTORNEY, DRAKE NARUP & MEAD PC, Springfield, IL.

For Mary K Paulin, Defendant: Daniel R Price, LEAD ATTORNEY, WHAM & WHAM, Centralia, IL.

JUDGES: SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

OPINION BY: SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

Before the Court are Defendants Boys & Girls Clubs of America and Boys & Girls Club of Decatur, Inc.’s Combined Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Alternative Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Portions of Count I of the Second Amended Complaint (d/e 32) and Defendant Mary K. Paulin’s Combined Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Alternative Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Portions of Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint (d/e 33). The motion filed by Defendants Boys and Girls Club of Decatur, Inc. (Decatur Boys & Girls Club) and Boys & Girls Clubs of America (America Boys & Girls Club) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant Paulin’s motion is DENIED. In the Second Amended Complaint, T.K., a [*2] minor, through his father, Timothy Killings, sufficiently pleads negligence and willful and wanton misconduct causes of action against all Defendants. In addition, Mr. Killings pleads cognizable claims for T.K.’s past and future medical expenses against all Defendants. However, the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint are not sufficient to render the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable against Decatur Boys & Girls Club or America Boys & Girls Club.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts come from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. The Court accepts them as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).

On July 17, 2015, T.K., a then-eight-year-old resident of California, was a member of Decatur Boys & Girls Club, a corporate citizen of Illinois and a licensed child-care facility. On that same date, Decatur Boys & Girls Club was operating a summer camp through its agents and employees, and T.K. was under the paid care and supervision of Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club. America Boys & Girls Club, a corporate citizen of Georgia, provides operating policies, procedures, rules, guidelines, and instructions regarding how Decatur Boys & Girls Club is to operate. Decatur [*3] Boys & Girls Club is required to follow these operating policies, procedures, rules, guidelines, and instructions.

On July 17, 2015, T.K. was taken from the premises of Decatur Boys & Girls Club in Decatur, Illinois, to property in Clinton, Illinois, owned by Defendant Paulin, an Illinois citizen. Neither Decatur Boys & Girls Club nor America Boys & Girls Club had permission to transport T.K. from Decatur to Defendant Paulin’s property in Clinton. Defendants,¹ again without permission, put T.K. on a farm trailer owned by Defendant Paulin and located on Defendant Paulin’s property. The farm trailer was not designed or intended to transport people, and the trailer lacked guardrails, seats, seatbelts, and other equipment that might prevent people from falling off it. Defendant Paulin pulled the trailer, with T.K. and 15 to 20 additional children riding on it, onto a public highway with a tractor Defendant Paulin owned. The trailer was not being used in connection with a parade or a farm-related activity.

1 The use of “Defendants” in this Opinion will refer collectively to Decatur Boys & Girls Club, America Boys & Girls Club, and Mary K. Paulin.

While riding on the trailer, T.K. fell or jumped off the trailer or was pushed off. As a result, T.K. sustained injuries to his head, face, eyes, chest, neck, back, arms, lungs, hands, legs, [*4] and feet. T.K. underwent medical treatment for his injuries and will have to undergo additional treatment in the future. T.K’s father, Timothy Killings, a citizen of California, has incurred expenses related to his son’s medical care and will incur additional expenses in the future for his son’s future medical care.

On March 3, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint (d/e 1) against Defendants. Plaintiffs subsequently filed their First Amended Complaint (d/e 26) on May 23, 2016, and their Second Amended Complaint (d/e 31) on June 17, 2016. The Second Amended Complaint contains five counts. Counts 1 through 3 allege claims against Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club for, respectively, negligence, negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and willful and wanton misconduct. Counts 4 and 5 allege negligence and willful and wanton misconduct claims, respectively, against Defendant Paulin.

On June 27, 2016, Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club filed their Combined Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Alternative Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Portions of Count I of the Second Amended Complaint, asking the Court to dismiss Counts 1 through 3 for failing to [*5] state cognizable claims or, in the alternative, to strike certain paragraphs of the Second Amended Complaint. On June 30, 2017, Defendant Paulin filed her Combined Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Alternative Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Portions of Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint, asking the Court to dismiss Counts 4 and 5 for failing to state cognizable claims or, in the alternative, to strike certain paragraphs of the Second Amended Complaint.

II. JURISDICTION

This Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims because no Plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any Defendant and Plaintiffs are seeking damages in excess of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); McMillian v. Sheraton Chi. Hotel & Towers, 567 F.3d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 2009) (“When the jurisdictional threshold is uncontested, we generally will accept the plaintiff’s good faith allegation of the amount in controversy unless it appear[s] to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Plausibility means alleging factual content that allows a court to reasonably infer [*6] that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A plaintiff’s complaint must suggest a right to relief, “raising that possibility above a speculative level.” Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016). “The required level of factual specificity rises with the complexity of the claim.” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616-17 (7th Cir. 2011).

When faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016). “[L]egal conclusions and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth.” McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616. Further, the Court is “not obliged to ignore any facts set forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff’s claim.” R.J.R. Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 895 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir. 1989). The Court may “strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(f).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Count I and Count IV Sufficiently Plead Negligence and Medical Expense Claims Against All Defendants.

1. T.K. has pleaded cognizable negligence claims against all Defendants.

In a case where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, “[s]tate substantive law applies, but federal procedural rules govern.” Doermer v. Callen, 847 F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 2017). “To state a claim for negligence under Illinois law, a plaintiff must plead [*7] that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty, it breached that duty, and the breach proximately caused plaintiff’s injury.” Allstate Indem. Co. v. ADT LLC, 110 F. Supp. 3d 856, 862-63 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2012 IL 110662, 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1097, 358 Ill. Dec. 613 (Ill. 2012). In Illinois, “every person owes to all other persons a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury which naturally flows as a reasonably probable and foreseeable consequence of his act.” Jane Doe-3 v. McLean Cnty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 2012 IL 112479, 973 N.E.2d 880, 890, 362 Ill. Dec. 484 (Ill. 2012). Whether this duty arises in a particular context depends on “the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, the likelihood of the injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing the burden on defendants.” Id. A child’s caretaker has a duty to protect the child from harm. Ryan v. Yarbrough, 355 Ill. App. 3d 342, 823 N.E.2d 259, 262, 291 Ill. Dec. 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be decided by the Court. Simpkins, 965 N.E.2d at 1096.

In support of his negligence claims against America Boys & Girls Club and Decatur Boys & Girls Club, T.K.² alleges that he was a member of Decatur Boys & Girls Club and was entrusted to the care of both organizations on July 17, 2015. Sec. Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 15-16. America Boys & Girls Club and Decatur Boys & Girls Club agreed to accept the “care, custody, and control” of T.K. for the purpose of providing child care. Id. ¶ 16. T.K. also alleges [*8] that on July 17, 2015, the relationship between him and America Boys & Girls Club and Decatur Boys & Girls Club imposed on the two organizations a duty of care to adequately supervise him and protect him from harm, any unreasonable risk of harm, dangerous instrumentalities, and dangerous conditions. Id. ¶¶ 42-43.

2 Plaintiffs do not separate T.K’s claims from Mr. Killings’ claims in the Second Amended Complaint. To avoid confusion, the Court will address the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint as those of T.K. when analyzing T.K’s claims and as those of Mr. Killings when analyzing Mr. Killings’ claims.

Further, according to T.K., America Boys & Girls Club and Decatur Boys & Girls Club breached the duty of care they owed him in several ways, including by (1) negligently supervising him, (2) allowing and causing him to be placed on a farm trailer that was not designed for transporting children and was therefore dangerous and not reasonably safe for him, (3) failing to warn or failing to adequately warn him of the potential for injury before putting him on the trailer, (4) failing to properly supervise the minors they placed on the trailer, and (5) failing to provide enough staff members to monitor the children they placed on the trailer. Id. ¶ 45. With respect to America Boys & Girls Club, T.K. further alleges that it failed to properly train Decatur Boys & Girls Club on the operating policies, procedures, rules, guidelines, and instructions of America Boys & Girls Club and [*9] that it failed to supervise Decatur Boys & Girls Club to ensure that the operating policies, procedures, rules, guidelines, and instructions were followed. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. In addition, T.K. claims that the actions of America Boys & Girls Club and Decatur Boys & Girls Club proximately caused his injuries. Id. ¶¶ 33-39, 49.

In support of his negligence claim against Defendant Paulin, T.K. alleges that on July 17, 2015, Defendant Paulin put him on the farm trailer even though Defendant Paulin did not have the requisite permission to give him a ride on the trailer. Sec. Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 21, 23. Defendant Paulin towed the trailer, while T.K. and 15 to 20 additional children were on board, with a tractor onto a public highway. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. According to T.K., Defendant Paulin owed him a duty of care to protect him from any unreasonable risk of harm and breached that duty by (1) allowing and causing him to be placed on a farm trailer that was not designed for transporting children and was therefore dangerous and not reasonably safe for him; (2) failing to warn him of the potential for injury before putting him on the trailer and pulling the trailer onto a public highway; (3) failing to warn [*10] him that the trailer was dangerous and not reasonably safe given that the trailer had no railings, barriers, walls, or seats; and (4) creating a dangerous condition by placing him on the trailer and pulling it onto a public highway. Id. ¶¶ 72-73. In addition, T.K. alleges that the actions of Defendant Paulin proximately caused his injuries. Id. ¶¶ 33-39, 75.

Based on these allegations, T.K. has sufficiently pleaded negligence claims against Decatur Boys & Girls Club, America Boys & Girls Club, and Defendant Paulin. The allegations in Count I and Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint give Defendants notice of the basis for T.K.’s negligence claims against them and are sufficient to establish that T.K. has a plausible, as opposed to speculative, right to relief against Defendants. This is all that is required of a plaintiff under the federal notice pleading regime. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547.

Defendants do not seem to dispute such a finding. Indeed, their arguments for the dismissal of Count I and Count IV focus on the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint relating to an alleged violation of 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1408, a provision of the Illinois Vehicle Code, and claims that their alleged statutory violations constitute [*11] negligence per se. See Mot. to Dismiss (d/e 32), at 1-2; Memorandum of Law (d/e 21), at 4-6; Mot. to Dismiss (d/e 33), at 1-2; Memorandum of Law (d/e 34), at 1-2. Defendants are correct that Illinois does not recognize statutory violations as negligence per se. See Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., 144 Ill. 2d 425, 581 N.E.2d 656, 661, 163 Ill. Dec. 502 (Ill. 1991) (“A violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect human life or property is prima facie evidence of negligence. . . . The violation does not constitute negligence per se, however, and therefore the defendant may prevail by showing that he acted reasonably under the circumstances.”). But the inclusion of allegations regarding violations of 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-1408 and negligence per se do not require the dismissal of Count I or Count IV. As the Court has explained above, T.K. has sufficiently pleaded negligence claims against Defendants without the allegations relating to statutory violations. Cf. Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he complaint need not identify a legal theory, and specifying an incorrect theory is not fatal.”).

2. Timothy Killings has pleaded cognizable medical expense claims against all Defendants.

Just because T.K. has cognizable negligence claims against Defendants does not mean that Timothy Killings, T.K.’s father, also has such claims. To state a [*12] negligence cause of action, Mr. Killings must plead enough facts to make it plausible that he was harmed as a proximate result of Defendants’ breach of a duty they owed to him. Allstate, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 862-63. Mr. Killings has failed to meet his burden. The fact that Defendants were responsible for T.K.’s well-being on July 17, 2015, does not mean that Defendants had any duty to Mr. Killings. See Bruntjen v. Bethalto Pizza, LLC, 2014 IL App (5th) 120245, 385 Ill. Dec. 215, 18 N.E.3d 215, 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (“The criterion in a duty analysis is whether a plaintiff and a defendant stood in such a relationship to each other that the law imposed an obligation upon the defendant to act for the protection of the plaintiff.”). It was T.K., not Mr. Killings, who was placed on an unsafe farm trailer and pulled onto a public road. Defendants therefore had a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to T.K., not Mr. Killings. Further, Mr. Killings does not claim that he was physically injured as a result of Defendants’ negligence; his only claimed injury is the money he has spent and the money he will spend in the future for T.K.’s past and future medical treatment. See Sec. Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 38-39. In short, Mr. Killings has not met the pleading requirements for a negligence claim against any Defendant.

But just because Mr. [*13] Killings has not pleaded cognizable negligence claims against Defendants does not mean that he has pleaded no cognizable claims against them. In Illinois, parents have a cause of action against a tortfeasor who injures their child and causes them to incur medical expenses. Pirrello v. Maryville Acad., Inc., 2014 IL App (1st) 133964, 386 Ill. Dec. 108, 19 N.E.3d 1261, 1264 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). The claim is not one for damages stemming from the child’s physical injury, but one founded on the parents’ liability for the minor’s medical expenses under the Illinois Family Expense Act. Id.; see also 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 65/15(a)(1) (obligating parents to pay for the “expenses of the family”). T.K. has pleaded cognizable negligence claims against Defendants. Mr. Killings alleges that he has been saddled with bills stemming from T.K.’s medical care, some of which he has paid, and that he will incur additional medical bills in the future as a result of the injuries T.K. suffered on account of Defendants’ negligence. Sec. Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 38-39. Mr. Killings is the father of T.K., a minor, and is required by law to pay for T.K.’s medical expenses, Mr. Killings has adequately pleaded claims against Defendants for the recovery of the amounts paid or to be paid for T.K.’s past and future medical expenses stemming from Defendants’ negligence.

One [*14] final point merits a brief discussion. In the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Killings alleges that he has suffered, as a result of T.K.’s injuries, “loss of aid, comfort, society, companionship, pleasure, and the family relationship.” Sec. Am. Complaint, ¶ 40. However, in Illinois, a parent may not “recover for loss of the society and companionship of a child who is nonfatally injured.” Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 806 N.E.2d 632, 633, 282 Ill. Dec. 335 (Ill. 2004). Therefore, Mr. Killings has no valid claim for loss of society and companionship in this case.

3. The Court strikes paragraph 27 from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.

As an alternative to the dismissal of Count I of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendants Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club ask the Court to strike paragraphs 50 through 55 of the Complaint. Mot. to Dismiss (d/e 32), at 2. Similarly, Defendant Paulin asks the Court, as an alternative to the dismissal of Count IV, to strike paragraphs 76 through 81 of the Second Amended Complaint. Mot. to Dismiss (d/e 33), at 1-2. According to Defendants, the Court should strike these paragraphs because they are ultimately used to claim that Defendants’ alleged statutory violations constitute negligence per se.

Additionally, Defendants [*15] Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club request that the Court strike paragraph 27 from the Second Amended Complaint for being duplicative of paragraph 25 and strike paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 48, 68, 69, and 70 because those paragraphs are legal conclusions. Mot. to Dismiss (d/e 32), at 4. But even assuming that the aforementioned paragraphs are legal conclusions, as opposed to factual allegations, that is no reason to strike them from the Second Amended Complaint. Although Plaintiffs are required to plead facts that indicate they have a plausible, as opposed to a speculative, right to relief, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, they are not prohibited from also pleading legal conclusions that might help to provide Defendants with notice of the claims brought against them or provide context for the factual allegations. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989)) (noting that “legal conclusions are an integral part of the federal notice pleading regime” and that Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires parties to respond to all allegations contained within a pleading, including legal conclusions). Therefore, the Court strikes only paragraph 27 of the Second Amended Complaint, as it is duplicative of paragraph 25.

B. The Allegations of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended [*16] Complaint Are Insufficient to Render the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur Applicable Against Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club.

Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence applicable to a negligence claim, not a distinct theory of recovery. Rice v. Burnley, 230 Ill. App. 3d 987, 596 N.E.2d 105, 108, 172 Ill. Dec. 826 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Res ipsa loquitur allows “proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning cause of injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant.” Metz v. Cent. Ill. Elec. & Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446, 207 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ill. 1965). The doctrine “is meant to bridge an evidentiary gap when an injury could not have happened but for the defendant’s negligence.” Buechel v. United States, 746 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, res ipsa loquitur applies only when the facts “admit of the single inference that the accident would not have happened unless the defendant had been negligent.” Britton v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 382 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 889 N.E.2d 706, 709, 321 Ill. Dec. 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies is a question of law to be determined by the Court. Imig v. Beck, 115 Ill. 2d 18, 503 N.E.2d 324, 329, 104 Ill. Dec. 767 (Ill. 1986).

Under Illinois law, a plaintiff bringing a negligence claim based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must plead that he was injured “in an occurrence that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence” and that it was caused “by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control.” Avalos-Landeros v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 3d 921, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 877 N.E.2d 1064, 1076, 315 Ill. Dec. 735 (Ill. 2007)). Although, in the past, [*17] a plaintiff had to allege that the “the injury occurred under circumstances indicating that it was not due to any voluntary act or neglect on the part of the plaintiff,” this requirement was removed due to the adoption of comparative fault principles in Illinois. Heastie, 877 N.E.2d at 1076. With respect to the requirement of “exclusive control,” a defendant’s control over the instrumentality “at the time of the alleged negligence is not defeated by lack of control at the time of the injury.” Darrough v. Glendale Heights Cmty. Hosp., 234 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 600 N.E.2d 1248, 1252-53, 175 Ill. Dec. 790 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Indeed, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be appropriate if the instrument that caused the injury was in the defendant’s exclusive control “at a time prior to the injury and there is no change in conditions or intervening act that could reasonably have caused the event resulting in the injury.” Id. at 1253.

T.K. alleges that “a minor child under the care and supervision of a registered, licensed professional child care facility does not ordinarily sustain serious injuries when properly supervised in the absence of negligence.” Sec. Am. Complaint, ¶ 60. Further, T.K. claims that at the time he sustained his injuries, the farm trailer that injured him was under the exclusive control of Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys [*18] & Girls Club. Id. ¶ 61. These allegations are not sufficient to render the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable here. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (noting that “a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements” will not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). And although the Second Amended Complaint contains numerous factual allegations regarding the incident in which T.K. was injured, those allegations do not indicate a plausible right to relief for T.K. under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Because the facts pleaded in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint provide no support for the second prong in the res ipsa loquitur analysis–whether an injury was caused by an object within the defendant’s exclusive control–the Court’s res ipsa loquitur analysis will begin and end with that prong. Even assuming that the incident in which T.K. was injured was one that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence, T.K.’s account of the circumstances surrounding the accident indicate that it was Defendant Paulin, not Decatur Boys & Girls Club or America Boys & Girls Club, who had exclusive control of the farm trailer. According to the Second Amended Complaint, the farm trailer that injured T.K. was owned [*19] by Defendant Paulin and located on Defendant Paulin’s property. Defendant Paulin was the one who pulled the trailer onto a public road with T.K. and several other minor children on board. Defendant Paulin owned the tractor with which the trailer was pulled. Although T.K. claims that Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club were responsible for placing him on the farm trailer, he makes the same allegation with respect to Defendant Paulin. See Sec. Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 22-23. In short, there is nothing in the Second Amended Complaint to support T.K.’s allegation that Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club were in exclusive control of the farm trailer at any time.

Based on this analysis, the Court has determined that the factual allegations of the Second Amended Complaint are not sufficient to render the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable. In doing so, the Court again notes that res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary rule, not a distinct theory of recovery. If facts uncovered through the discovery process sufficiently support the application of res ipsa loquitur against any Defendant, the Court will allow T.K. to rely on the doctrine at the summary judgment [*20] stage and will allow the trier of fact to consider and apply the doctrine as to that Defendant.

C. Count III and Count V Sufficiently Plead Willful and Wanton Misconduct Claims Against the Defendants.

To state a claim under Illinois law for willful and wanton misconduct, a plaintiff must plead facts establishing the elements of a negligence claim–duty, breach, proximate causation, and harm–and “either a deliberate intention to harm or an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the welfare of the plaintiff.” Kirwan v. Lincolnshire-Riverwoods Fire Protections Dist., 349 Ill. App. 3d 150, 811 N.E.2d 1259, 1263, 285 Ill. Dec. 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 129 Ill. 2d 497, 544 N.E.2d 733, 743, 136 Ill. Dec. 47 (Ill. 1989)). As noted above, T.K. has sufficiently pleaded negligence causes of action against all Defendants. T.K. has incorporated the allegations comprising his negligence claims into his willful and wanton misconduct claims against Defendants. Therefore, to state claims for willful and wanton misconduct against Defendants, T.K. need only additionally allege either intentional or reckless willful and wanton misconduct committed by Defendants. Reckless willful and wanton misconduct is conduct committed with an utter indifference of or a conscious disregard for the safety of others. Kirwan, 811 N.E.2d at 1263. To meet this standard, the defendant “must be conscious of his conduct, [*21] and, though having no intent to injure, must be conscious, from his knowledge of the surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will naturally and probably result in injury.” Id.

In the Second Amended Complaint, T.K. alleges that on July 17, 2015, Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club placed him and 15 to 20 other minors on an unsafe farm trailer with no guardrails, sidewalls, barriers, or seats while providing inadequate supervision. Sec. Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 22, 65. T.K. further alleges that the trailer was not designed to transport people. Id. ¶ 24. T.K claims that Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club failed to take necessary safety precautions and operated their summer camp recklessly or with gross negligence. Id. ¶¶ 64, 68. According to T.K., the actions and inaction of Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club were “willful, wanton, grossly negligent, careless, [and] reckless” and “showed an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of [T.K.].” Id. ¶ 70.

T.K. also includes several allegations in Count III about what Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club “knew or should have [*22] known.” Specifically, according to T.K., Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club knew or should have known that the farm trailer was unreasonably dangerous, that additional supervision was required for the 15 to 20 children riding on the farm trailer, and that there was no way for the children to be properly seated on the farm trailer. Id. ¶¶ 66-68. Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club also knew or should have known that placing children on the farm trailer and pulling it with a tractor without proper supervision posed a high probability of serious physical harm to T.K. Id. ¶ 69.

With respect to Defendant Paulin, T.K. alleges that Defendant Paulin placed T.K. on a farm trailer that was not designed or intended to transport people and had no guardrails, seats, or seat belts to prevent people from falling off it. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25-26. Further, T.K. claims that Defendant Paulin had no intention of making sure that T.K. was safe when she placed him on the farm trailer and pulled it onto a public road. Id. ¶ 83. T.K. also claims that Defendant Paulin failed to take necessary safety precautions. Id. ¶ 85. Defendant Paulin’s conduct, according to T.K., was “willful, [*23] wanton, grossly negligent, careless, [and] reckless” and showed a “conscious disregard for the safety of [T.K.].” Id. ¶ 87.

As with Decatur Boys & Girls Club and America Boys & Girls Club, T.K. includes allegations in the Second Amended Complaint regarding what Defendant Paulin “knew or should have known.” Specifically, T.K. alleges that Defendant Paulin knew or should have known that the farm trailer was unreasonably dangerous, that pulling children onto a public road while on the trailer was unreasonably dangerous, and that placing children on the farm trailer and pulling the trailer onto a public roadway without proper supervision posed a high probability of serious physical harm or death. Id. ¶¶ 83-84, 86.

T.K.’s allegations are sufficient to plead willful and wanton misconduct claims against Defendants. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a pleading include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff need not plead enough facts to show that he is likely to prevail on his claim; rather, he is required only to include enough facts to raise his claim from speculative to plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The allegations set forth [*24] above are sufficient to make it plausible that Defendants committed willful and wanton misconduct when they put T.K. on an unsafe farm trailer not designed for transporting people, failed to take necessary safety precautions, and either failed to properly supervise T.K. or pulled the trailer, with T.K. on it, onto a public road. See Worthem v. Gillette Co., 774 F. Supp. 514, 517 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded willful and wanton misconduct claims where she alleged that “willful and wanton acts or omissions [were] committed or omitted with conscious indifference to existing circumstances and conditions” and went on to “enumerate specific instances of willful and wanton conduct”).

Although T.K.’s “knew or should have known” allegations against Defendants may have been insufficient to meet his pleading burden with respect to willful and wanton misconduct claims, see id. (admitting that the court “might agree” with the defendant’s arguments that “knew or should have known” allegations are mere negligence allegations insufficient to merit punitive damages), T.K. does not rely solely on these allegations in his willful and wanton misconduct claims against Defendants. Indeed, as the Court has noted above, Count III [*25] and Count V of the Second Amended Complaint, which incorporate the allegations from the counts preceding them, contain specific factual allegations regarding the actions Defendants took. Further, the Court does not view T.K.’s “knew or should have known” allegations as completely irrelevant to a willful and wanton misconduct claim under Illinois law, which holds that willful and wanton misconduct can be found where there is a failure to discover a danger through carelessness when it could have been discovered through the exercise of ordinary care. Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267, 641 N.E.2d 402, 406, 204 Ill. Dec. 178 (Ill. 1994).

The fact that T.K. bases his willful and wanton claims on the same facts as his negligence claims is of no concern. Under Illinois law, “[t]he same acts by a defendant, if sufficiently egregious, can constitute both negligence and willful and wanton conduct.” Bastian v. TPI Corp., 663 F. Supp. 474, 476 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (citing Smith v. Seiber, 127 Ill. App. 3d 950, 469 N.E.2d 231, 235, 82 Ill. Dec. 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Therefore, “one can plead the same facts in two counts, one characterizing them as negligence and the other as willful and wanton conduct, if the same facts could support both theories.” Bastian, 663 F. Supp. at 476 (citing O’Brien v. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 214, 83 Ill. 2d 462, 415 N.E.2d 1015, 1018, 47 Ill. Dec. 702 (Ill. 1980).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Boys & Girls Club of America and Boys & Girls Club of Decatur, Inc.’s Combined Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Alternative Rule 12(f) Motion [*26] to Strike Portions of Count I of the Second Amended Complaint (d/e 32) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Count II of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Further, the Court STRIKES paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint as duplicative. Defendant Mary K. Paulin’s Combined Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Alternative Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Portions of Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint (d/e 33) is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 12(a)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants have 14 days from the date they receive a copy of this Order to file an answer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.

ENTER: June 6, 2017.

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Great analysis of the “Rescue Doctrine” in a ballooning case from South Dakota

Posted: July 13, 2015 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, South Dakota | Tags: Ballooning, FAA, Negligence, Negligence per se, Regulations, Rescue Doctrine, South Dakota, Supreme Court | Leave a comment

The rescue doctrine was created so that the person causing the injury or putting the plaintiff in peril also is responsible for any rescuer of the plaintiff.

Thompson v. Summers, 1997 SD 103; 567 N.W.2d 387; 1997 S.D. LEXIS 103

State: South Dakota, Supreme Court of South Dakota

Plaintiff: Marvin Thompson

Defendant: Charles Summers

Plaintiff Claims: General negligence claims

Defendant Defenses: no duty

Holding: for the Plaintiff

Year: 1997

This is an interesting case that never fully played out so we don’t know the outcome of the case. A balloonist, eventual defendant, was teaching a student to fly and was attempting to land. Another balloon instructor on the ground, who had taught the instructor in the balloon, thought the landing was not going to be good and attempted to help with the landing.

The balloonist on the ground thought the balloon was going to hit high-voltage power lines. As the balloon got lower to the ground, the balloonist on the ground, the plaintiff, ran over and grabbed the balloon in an attempt to stop the balloon. The balloon hit the power lines and the plaintiff, rescuer, suffered burns over 60% of his body. The two people in the balloon were not injured.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for not employing the rip cord, which opens the balloon to release the hot air. The plaintiff argued failing to employ the rip cord was negligence. (The obvious issue here is what duty was owed by the balloonist to the plaintiff on the ground, other than to not land on him.)

This is confusing, in that failing to protect yourself from injury is a negligent act to one who is injured rescuing you? It is difficult to understand in this case the liability owed to an intervener for your failure to act. Stated another way, your liability because the intervener expected you to act in a certain way?

South Dakota only has one appellate court, the South Dakota Supreme Court. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, and the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court of South Dakota.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Meaning this case was dismissed prior to any discovery or even an answer from the defendant. Therefore, when the appellate court reviews the issues, it must do so to look for any allegations by the plaintiff that may support a claim. This analysis is not whether a claim was supported or could be won in court, just whether or not it, there was any possibly that the case could be.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The court started its analysis by looking at the rescue doctrine. The rescue doctrine is an odd, but arguably valid legal argument. If you attempt to assist someone who needs rescued, are injured during that assistance, the person who caused the accident is also responsible for your injuries.

This theory provides that one who, through negligence, jeopardizes the safety of another, may be held liable for injuries sustained by a “rescuer” who attempts to save the other from injury.

A rescuer’s right of action against the initial negligent actor rests upon the view that one who imperils another at a place where there may be bystanders, must take into account the chance that some bystander will yield to the impulse to save life or even property from destruction and will attempt a rescue; negligence which creates peril invites rescue and, should the rescuer be hurt in the process, the tortfeasor will be held liable not only to the primary victim, but to the rescuer as well.

There is an argument that the rescue doctrine was not properly raised at the trial court level and a variation of the rescue doctrine a dissenting opinion. The dissenting opinion agreed with the outcome of the majority, but felt the analysis of the rescue doctrine was premature. Either way, the court looked at the argument and found it applied to this case.

One argument made by the defendant was that he could not be liable, unless he requested the assistance or at least knew about the assistance.

Summers claims that he would have had to request Thompson’s assistance to establish a duty under these circumstances. At the very least, he argues, Summers must have been aware of Thompson’s presence. At oral argument, counsel for Summers went so far as to state there must be a “relationship” between the plaintiff and the defendant before a duty can be established. On the contrary, it is foreseeability of injury to another, not a relationship with another, which is a prerequisite to establishing a duty necessary to sustain a negligence cause of action. See SDCL 20-9-1, wherein the Legislature codified the common law of negligence: “Every person is responsible for injury to the person, property, or rights of another caused by his willful acts or caused by his want of ordinary care or skill, subject in the latter cases to the defense of contributory negligence.”

The court did not buy this argument. “As indicated above, “negligence which creates peril invites rescue and, should the rescuer be hurt in the process, the tortfeasor will be held liable not only to the primary victim, but to the rescuer as well”

Not only, that unconscious victims or rescuers the victim does not know about would leave rescuers risking their cost of their own injuries.

Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer.

The court also looked at other theories how the plaintiff’s claim may have merit.

One was the argument that the defendant breached federal regulations created by the Federal Aviation Administration. Breaching a statute creates a negligence per se action. “This court has consistently held that “an unexcused violation of a statute enacted to promote safety constitutes negligence per se.”

Whether Summers violated one or more of these statutes and regulations, and if so, whether the violation was the proximate cause of Thompson’s injuries constitutes a question for the factfinder.

However, here again, any breach of an FAA regulation would inure to the passenger, not the rescuer; I would think? However it was held to support the claim of the plaintiff/rescuer here.

However, the court seemed to circle back to that argument when it stated:

The court sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings and closed with this summary.

Negligence is the breach of a legal duty imposed by statute or common law.” Thompson clearly outlined a claim under a common-law negligence theory. (“The three necessary elements of actionable negligence are: (1) A duty on the part of the defendant; (2) a failure to perform that duty; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff resulting from such a failure.”). The rescue doctrine is part of the common law of negligence.

So Now What?

The biggest issue which is confusing is the original claim must be based on a negligent act which never occurred to the possible plaintiff, just the defendant. How can the defendant be liable for his own rescue? What negligent act on the part of the defendant created the liability to create the liability for the rescuer?

Where the rescue doctrine comes into play in the outdoor recreation and adventure travel field that creates problems is when other guests attempt to help. Whenever someone is in a jam, everyone wants to help, and you may need everyone’s help. If another guest is injured when helping, and you were the legally the cause of the original accident, you could be liable for the guests who helped also.

Does that mean guests cannot help? No, many times you may need the guests to assist in rescuing someone. Just make sure they know their job, are doing it in a safe way and keep your eyes on them.

Will a release work to stop the claims of the injured guest/rescuer? I have no idea, maybe, but no court that I know of has ever looked at the issue.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FaceBook, Twitter or LinkedIn

Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com

Google+: +Recreation

Twitter: RecreationLaw

Facebook: Rec.Law.Now

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Blog: www.recreation-law.com

Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com

By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

Thompson v. Summers, 1997 SD 103; 567 N.W.2d 387; 1997 S.D. LEXIS 103

Posted: June 26, 2015 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Legal Case, South Dakota | Tags: Ballooning, FAA, Negligence, Negligence per se, Regulations, Rescue Doctrine, South Dakota, Supreme Court | Leave a comment

Thompson v. Summers, 1997 SD 103; 567 N.W.2d 387; 1997 S.D. LEXIS 103

Marvin Thompson, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charles Summers, Defendant and Appellee.

# 19940

Supreme Court of South Dakota

1997 SD 103; 567 N.W.2d 387; 1997 S.D. LEXIS 103

June 4, 1997, Argued

August 13, 1997, Opinion Filed

PRIOR HISTORY: [***1]

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA. THE HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRIMBLE Judge.

DISPOSITION:

Reversed and remanded.

COUNSEL:

DAVE L. CLAGGETT of Claggett & Madsen, Spearfish, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.

DONALD A. PORTER of Costello, Porter, Hill, Heisterkamp & Bushnell, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellee.

JUDGES: SABERS, Justice. KONENKAMP, Justice, concurs. MILLER, Chief Justice, and AMUNDSON and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur in result.

OPINION BY: SABERS

OPINION: [**389]

SABERS, Justice.

¶2 On September 4, 1993, Charles Summers was piloting a hot air balloon in an instructional flight over Rapid City, accompanied by flight student Matt McCormick. At about 8:25 a.m., Summers attempted to land the balloon in a public recreational area of Rapid City’s flood plain known as the “greenway.” Marvin Thompson, also a hot air balloon pilot, was at the greenway and recognized the balloon as one he sold to Summers. As Thompson observed Summers’ descent, he became concerned the wind was going to drag the balloon into nearby high voltage power lines. As the balloon skimmed across the ground toward the power lines, Thompson ran over and seized the basket of the balloon, hoping to prevent it from making contact with the power lines. Despite his efforts, Thompson suffered severe electrical burns to over 60% of his body. Summers and McCormick were apparently not injured.

¶3 Thompson sued Summers for his injuries, claiming he was negligent in not employing the rip cord to “rip out” the balloon, a procedure which instantly deflates and stops the balloon. Failure to do so, he claims, was negligence and the cause of his injuries. He argues that, under the “rescue doctrine,” it was foreseeable to Summers that a bystander might intervene when Summers’ negligence put others in peril. In addition, Thompson claims Summers violated several state and federal statutory duties of care pertaining to hot air balloon piloting and landing safety, including proper use of the ripcord.

¶4 Without submitting an answer, Summers made a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Thompson failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted according to SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5) [hereinafter Rule 12(b)(5) ], which provides:

Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:

…

(5) Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.] [1]

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Thompson appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5) tests the law of a plaintiff’s claim, not the facts which support it. Stumes v. Bloomberg, 1996 SD 93, p 6, 551 N.W.2d 590, 592; Schlosser v. Norwest Bank South Dakota, 506 N.W.2d 416, 418 (S.D.1993) (citations omitted). The motion is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. Schlosser directs the trial court to consider the complaint’s allegations and any exhibits which are attached. The court accepts the pleader’s description of what happened along with any conclusions reasonably drawn therefrom. The motion may be directed to the whole complaint or only specified counts contained in it…. “In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” [quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80, 84 (1957) ]. The question is whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with doubt resolved in his or her behalf, the complaint states any valid claim of relief. The court must go beyond the allegations for relief and “examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.” [quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (1971) ].

506 N.W.2d at 418 (emphasis added). As this appeal presents a question of law, our review is de novo, with no deference given to the trial court’s legal conclusions. City of Colton v. Schwebach, 1997 SD 4, p 8, 557 N.W.2d 769, 771.

¶6 WHETHER ANY LEGAL THEORY EXISTS TO SUPPORT THOMPSON’S CLAIM.

¶7 Thompson advances at least three legal theories which may support his cause of action. We need not, and do not, decide whether he will ultimately succeed on any of these theories. See Schlosser, 506 N.W.2d at 418:

[P]leadings should not be dismissed merely because the court entertains doubts as to whether the pleader will prevail in the action as this is a matter of proof, not pleadings. The rules of procedure favor the resolution of cases upon the merits by trial or summary judgment rather than on failed or inartful accusations.

(Quoting Janklow v. Viking Press, 378 N.W.2d 875, 877 (S.D.1985) (citing Federal Practice and Procedure, supra )).

¶8 First, Thompson argues that the common law of negligence, particularly the “rescue doctrine,” is applicable to this case. [2] That doctrine is simply an adjunct of the common law of negligence. It is “nothing more than a negligence doctrine addressing the problem of proximate causation.” Lowery v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 891 F.2d 1187, 1194 (5th Cir.1990); accord Stuart M. Speiser et al., The American Law of Torts § 9:23, at 1147 (1985) (“In considering the rescue doctrine and its ramifications, it must be always kept in mind that many–if, indeed not most–American courts regard it in terms of proximate causation.”). This theory provides that one who, through negligence, jeopardizes the safety of another, may be held liable for injuries sustained by a “rescuer” who attempts to save the other from injury. See 57A AmJur2d Negligence § 689 (1989):

(Footnotes & citations omitted). Interestingly, the rescue doctrine can be traced to an 1822 case involving a crowd rushing to assist a descending balloonist. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 44, at 307 & n.63 (5th ed.1984) (citing Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y.1822), and noting that since that case, the concept of the rescuer is “nothing abnormal”).

¶9 Summers argues that Thompson cannot raise this theory in this appeal because he did not present it to the trial court. We disagree for two reasons: First, Thompson’s complaint and his brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss adequately set forth his reliance on the rescue doctrine. [3] In his complaint, he stated:

Plaintiff perceived the situation to be an imminent threat to the general public on land and further perceived Defendant and Matt McCormick to be in imminent danger of severe physical harm or death. Plaintiff, in an attempt to prevent the same, went to the location of the balloon and grabbed on to it to help prevent it from drifting into the power lines.

(Emphasis added). In his brief, he reiterates the foregoing portion of his complaint, and adds: “Thompson responded to the emergency. In attempting to prevent an accident from happening, he grabbed the balloon to help prevent it from hitting the power lines.”

¶10 In opposing the motion to dismiss, Thompson briefed the case of Olson v. Waitman, 88 S.D. 443, 221 N.W.2d 23 (S.D.1974), which is not precisely on point, but somewhat analogous to the rescue doctrine, and certainly a common law negligence case. That case held that the jury was properly instructed that a plaintiff may have been contributory negligent when she was pinned under a car after she got behind it to push it from a ditch. However, it was error to so instruct the jury on the plaintiff’s second claim of negligence (she was severely burned after the defendant attempted to drive the car off of her). This court held that the plaintiff had two separate claims of negligence against the defendant and stated:

Regardless of how negligent the plaintiff may have been in getting into this predicament, she did not thereby give the defendant license to thereafter injure her with impunity. Id. at 446, 221 N.W.2d at 25 (remanding for new trial with proper instructions).

¶11 Clearly, Thompson adequately outlined his claim even if he did not include the term “rescue doctrine”. See, e.g., Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596 F.2d 784, 787 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899, 100 SCt 208, 62 L.Ed.2d 135 (1979) (stating that a complaint should not be dismissed because it does not state with precision all elements that give rise to a legal basis for recovery); accord Jackson Sawmill Co., Inc., v. United States, 580 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1070, 99 S.Ct. 839, 59 L.Ed.2d 35 (1979).

¶12 The second reason we disagree with Summers’ argument that Thompson cannot raise a legal theory for the first time on appeal concerns the nature of a Rule 12(b)(5) motion. It is settled law that the trial court is under a duty to determine if the plaintiff’s allegations provide for relief on any possible theory, regardless of whether the plaintiff considered the theory. Schlosser, 506 N.W.2d at 418; Eide v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 1996 SD 11, p 7, 542 N.W.2d 769, 771; Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357; Seeley v. Brotherhood of Painters, 308 F.2d 52, 58 (5thCir.1962) (“[T]he theory of the plaintiff in stating his claim is not so important and the complaint should not be dismissed on motion unless, upon any theory, it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts that could be proved in support of his claim.”); cf. Doss v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 834 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir.1987) (“[T]he fact that a plaintiff pleads an improper legal theory does not preclude recovery under the proper theory.”); Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 714 (8th Cir.1979) (“The ‘theory of the pleadings’ doctrine, under which a plaintiff must succeed on those theories that are pleaded or not at all, has been effectively abolished under the federal rules.”).

¶13 Summers argues the motion to dismiss was properly granted because Thompson cannot establish a duty owed by Summers to Thompson. Summers claims that he would have had to request Thompson’s assistance to establish a duty under these circumstances. At the very least, he argues, Summers must have been aware of Thompson’s presence. [4] At oral argument, counsel for Summers went so far as to state there must be a “relationship” between the plaintiff and the defendant before a duty can be established. On the contrary, it is foreseeability of injury to another, not a relationship with another, which is a prerequisite to establishing a duty necessary to sustain a negligence cause of action. See SDCL 20-9-1, wherein the Legislature codified the common law of negligence: “Every person is responsible for injury to the person, property, or rights of another caused by his willful acts or caused by his want of ordinary care or skill, subject in the latter cases to the defense of contributory negligence.” See also Muhlenkort v. Union County Land Trust, 530 N.W.2d 658, 662 (S.D.1995), where this court stated, “To establish a duty on the part of the defendant, it must be foreseeable that a party would be injured by the defendant’s failure to discharge that duty.”

¶14 Additionally, Summers misapprehends the principles of the rescue doctrine. The basic theory of this doctrine is that the defendant’s negligence in placing another in a position of imminent peril is not only a wrong to that person, but also to the rescuing plaintiff. Wharf v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 60 F.3d 631, 635 (9th Cir.1995); Dinsmoore v. Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 505, 507 (10thCir.1991); Lowery, 891 F.2d at 1194; Bonney v. Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co., 800 F.2d 274, 276 (1st Cir.1986); Barger v. Charles Mach. Works, Inc., 658 F.2d 582, 587 (8th Cir.1981); Barnes v. Geiger, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 365, 446 N.E.2d 78, 81-82 (1983) (collecting cases); Metzger v. Schermesser, 687 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Mo.Ct.App.1985); see generally The American Law of Torts, supra § 9:23; Prosser & Keeton, supra § 44, at 307-09 (collecting cases from nearly every state). The rescuer may also recover from the imperiled party if that party’s negligence caused the peril. Wharf, 60 F.3d at 635. As indicated above, “negligence which creates peril invites rescue and, should the rescuer be hurt in the process, the tortfeasor will be held liable not only to the primary victim, but to the rescuer as well.” 57A AmJur2d Negligence § 689 (1989). Judge Cardozo’s statement regarding the rescue doctrine is often quoted in these cases:

¶15 This theory of “duty” comports with the well-established view of this court. See, e.g., Mark, Inc. v. Maguire Ins. Agency, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (S.D.1994) (“Whether a duty exists depends on the foreseeability of injury.”); accord Muhlenkort, 530 N.W.2d at 662; see also Mid-Western Elec., Inc. v. DeWild Grant Reckert & Assocs. Co., 500 N.W.2d 250, 254 (S.D.1993) (“We instruct trial courts to use the legal concept of foreseeability to determine whether a duty exists.”).

¶16 Under Thompson’s second theory, he claims that Summers violated a standard of care as provided in SDCL chapter 50-13, “Air Space and Operation of Aircraft.” “Aircraft” includes balloons. SDCL 50-13-1. SDCL 50-13-4 provides:

Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this state is lawful, unless … so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or water beneath.

See also SDCL 50-13-6, which provides, in relevant part:

The owner and the pilot, or either of them, of every aircraft which is operated over lands or waters of this state shall be liable for injuries or damage to persons or property on the land or water beneath, caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom in accordance with the rules of law applicable to torts in this state.

Additionally, SDCL 50-13-16 provides:

It is a Class 1 misdemeanor to operate an aircraft within the airspace over, above and upon the lands and waters of this state, carelessly and heedlessly in intentional disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property.

All of these statutes were presented to the trial court. This court has consistently held that “an unexcused violation of a statute enacted to promote safety constitutes negligence per se.” Bell v. East River Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 535 N.W.2d 750, 755 (S.D.1995) (citing Engel v. Stock, 88 S.D. 579, 225 N.W.2d 872, 873 (1975); Bothern v. Peterson, 83 S.D. 84, 155 N.W.2d 308 (1967); Blakey v. Boos, 83 S.D. 1, 153 N.W.2d 305 (1967)).

¶17 Third, Thompson argues that Summers violated certain federal regulations [5] relating to hot air balloon piloting and landing safety, including proper use of the ripcord in emergency operations. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 61.125(e)(5), which requires applicants for a commercial certificate for piloting balloons to have knowledge in

Operating principles and procedures for free balloons, including emergency procedures such as crowd control and protection, high wind and water landings, and operations in proximity to buildings and power lines.

Additionally, id. § 61.127(f) sets minimum proficiency requirements for balloon pilots and requires competence in, among other procedures, landing and emergency operations, including the use of the ripcord. See also id. § 91.13 (“No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.”). These regulations were presented to the trial court.

¶18 Whether Summers violated one or more of these statutes and regulations, and if so, whether the violation was the proximate cause of Thompson’s injuries constitutes a question for the factfinder. Violation of the statute “alone is not sufficient to render them liable to the plaintiff. Before they may be held to respond in damages it must further appear that their violation of the duty placed on them by this rule was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. The burden of establishing this is on the plaintiff.” Blakey, 83 S.D. at 8, 153 N.W.2d at 309 (citation omitted); accord Musch v. H-D Coop., Inc., 487 N.W.2d 623, 625-26 (S.D.1992):

With regard to the proximate cause issue, this court has recognized that the mere violation of a statute is insufficient to support an action for damages. Rather, a plaintiff must show that the violation of a statutory duty was the proximate cause of his injury to support a recovery in negligence. Serles v. Braun, 79 S.D. 456, 113 N.W.2d 216 (1962); Zeller v. Pikovsky, 66 S.D. 71, 278 N.W. 174 (1938). In Leslie v. City of Bonesteel, 303 N.W.2d 117, 119 (S.D.1981), we stated: “For proximate cause to exist, ‘the harm suffered must be found to be a foreseeable consequence of the act complained of…. The negligent act must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.’ Williams v. United States, 450 F.Supp. 1040, 1046 (D.S.D.1978).”

(Emphasis & alterations omitted). Questions of proximate cause are for the jury in “all but the rarest of cases.” Bauman v. Auch, 539 N.W.2d 320, 325 (S.D.1995); Nelson v. Nelson Cattle Co., 513 N.W.2d 900, 903 (S.D.1994); Holmes v. Wegman Oil Co., 492 N.W.2d 107, 114 (S.D.1992).

CONCLUSION

¶19 “Negligence is the breach of a legal duty imposed by statute or common law.” Stevens v. Wood Sawmill, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 13, 14 (S.D.1988) (citing Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120, 122 (S.D.1982)). Thompson clearly outlined a claim under a common-law negligence theory. See id. (“The three necessary elements of actionable negligence are: (1) A duty on the part of the defendant; (2) a failure to perform that duty; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff resulting from such a failure.”). The rescue doctrine is part of the common law of negligence. Therefore, under the law governing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5), it was improper to dismiss Thompson’s lawsuit even if the doctrine was not yet addressed in South Dakota. [6]

¶20 Additionally, Thompson set out South Dakota statutes and federal regulations which establish the standard of care for a hot air balloon pilot. The question is “whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with doubt resolved in his or her behalf, the complaint states any valid claim of relief.” Schlosser, 506 N.W.2d at 418 (emphasis added). Thompson asserts at least three theories which may support his cause of action. Therefore, the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that Thompson did not allege a duty owed by Summers. Whether he can ultimately succeed presents questions not capable of resolution by a motion to dismiss. We reverse and remand for trial.

¶21 KONENKAMP, J., concurs.

¶22 MILLER, C.J., and AMUNDSON and GILBERTSON, JJ., concur in result.

MILLER, Chief Justice (concurring in result).

¶23 I agree with Justice Sabers’ ultimate result and his discussion noting that Thompson’s complaint states various theories which may support the cause of action (common-law negligence, state statutes and federal regulations). I must merely concur in result, however, because I disagree with and disassociate myself from the discussion and analysis of the rescue doctrine, specifically pp 8-16 supra.

¶24 Analysis of the propriety and applicability of the rescue doctrine at this juncture in these proceedings is premature at best. The doctrine was not argued or advanced by Thompson as a theory to support his cause of action below. It is well settled that we will not review issues which have not been presented to the trial court. Boever v. Board of Accountancy, 526 N.W.2d 747, 750 (S.D.1995); Fullmer v. State Farm Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 861, 866 (S.D.1994) (citations omitted). Matters not determined by the trial court are not appropriate for appellate review. See Schull Construction Co. v. Koenig, 80 S.D. 224, 229, 121 N.W.2d 559, 561 (1963). The parties agree and the trial court’s memorandum indicates that the rescue doctrine was not considered in the trial court’s grant of the motion to dismiss. [7] Accordingly, we need not and should not examine the doctrine at this time. [8]

¶25 Any contention that the rescue doctrine was presented to the trial court via the language of the complaint is not persuasive reasoning for reviewing the rescue doctrine as a possible theory of recovery, especially when Thompson specifically concedes he failed to consider the doctrine or present it for the trial court’s consideration. While pleadings need not be so artfully drafted as to specifically list each and every possible claim, the complaint must set forth the facts alleged and contain the essential elements of the cause of action pursued in order to be sufficient. Harmon v. Christy Lumber, Inc., 402 N.W.2d 690, 693 (S.D.1987). See also Weller v. Spring Creek Resort, Inc., 477 N.W.2d 839, 841-42 (S.D.1991). Our deferential standard of review allowing complaints to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim so long as the “complaint states any valid claim for relief …. ‘on any possible theory,’ ” Schlosser v. Norwest Bank South Dakota, 506 N.W.2d 416, 418 (S.D.1993) (citations omitted), does not require the trial court to ferret out and advance a theory on behalf of a party which has not been recognized in this jurisdiction. Such a requirement would put the trial court in the inappropriate position of advocating on behalf of a party and would unduly strain judicial resources in an effort to explore every conceivable theory, whether recognized in this jurisdiction or not.

¶26 Thompson’s complaint states sufficient theories to support his cause of action; therefore, the trial court’s grant of the motion to dismiss was in error and I agree with Justice Sabers that it should be reversed. However, I respectfully assert that the issue of whether the rescue doctrine is a valid theory of common-law negligence in this jurisdiction should be left until another day when the issue has been properly presented for our review.

¶27 I am authorized to state that Justices AMUNDSON and GILBERTSON join in this concurrence in result.

———

Notes:

[1] SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5) is identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

[2] In response to Chief Justice Miller’s special writing, we are reversing on precisely the three theories which he lists as meriting reversal. The rescue doctrine is not, standing alone, a viable theory. It is part of negligence in the same way that respondeat superior, vicarious liability, imputed negligence, and concurrent negligence are a part of negligence. Whether the rescue doctrine will be adopted in South Dakota is premature at this state of the proceedings and must await proper disposition upon remand.

However, the rescue doctrine was pled, argued, and reached even if the precise term “rescue doctrine” was not employed. The complaint clearly demonstrates that Thompson set forth the facts and essential elements of this cause of action. The sum total of the trial court’s decision is as follows:

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is hereby granted. In order for a negligence action to stand, there must be a duty on the part of the defendant running to the plaintiff; the existence of such a duty is a question of law for the Court. This Court finds that no such duty has been established by the Plaintiff in the case at bar, and therefore the case is dismissed. Defendant is requested to draft and submit the appropriate Order.

By determining that no duty existed, the trial court rejected all three theories, including the common law of negligence, of which the rescue doctrine is a part.

[3] While Thompson’s complaint did not include the term “rescue doctrine”, it pleads a legally sufficient cause of action for negligence under “notice pleading” theory. See SDCL 15-6-8(a):

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain

(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and

(2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled.

Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.

(Emphasis added); see also Norwest Bank Black Hills v. Rapid City Teachers Fed. Credit Union, 433 N.W.2d 560, 563 (S.D.1988) (“Under SDCL 15-6-8(a) it is not necessary to plead ‘duty’ in negligence cases where the existence of a duty may be logically inferred from the claim stated in one’s complaint.”); accord Korstad-Tebben, Inc. v. Pope Architects, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D.1990). Thompson claimed that Summers breached a duty to him by failing to rip out the balloon. It did not require the trial court to “explore every conceivable theory” (infra p 25 (Miller, C.J., concurring in result)) to ascertain whether a duty was indeed owed. Duty is based upon foreseeability of injury to another. Analysis of this case depends upon whether injury to Thompson was foreseeable to Summers, and the rescue doctrine simply facilitates the analysis.

[4] Although not material on a motion to dismiss, Summers claims he did not know until afterward that Thompson tried to help him land safely. As noted, the court accepts the pleader’s description of events. Schlosser, 506 N.W.2d at 418.

[5] “The reasons which persuaded us to hold that the violation of a safety statute or ordinance is negligence as a matter of law apply with equal validity to safety rules and regulations[.]” Blakey, 83 S.D. at 7, 153 N.W.2d at 308.

[6] While this is the first time issues involving the rescue doctrine have been presented to this court, the public policy inherent in the doctrine is already in our statutes. The policy underlying the rescue doctrine is the public’s need for quick and courageous action in emergency situations. Compare SDCL 20-9-4.1, which provides individuals general immunity from liability for their actions in emergency situations:

No peace officer, conservation officer, member of any fire department, police department and their first aid, rescue or emergency squad, or any citizen acting as such as a volunteer, or any other person is liable for any civil damages as a result of their acts of commission or omission arising out of and in the course of their rendering in good faith, any emergency care and services during an emergency which is in their judgment indicated and necessary at the time. Such relief from liability for civil damages shall extend to the operation of any motor vehicle in connection with any such care or services….

(Emphasis added). By adopting this “Good Samaritan” statute, the Legislature adopted the public policy of encouraging persons, and–as the emphasized language indicates–not just professional persons, to act on their instinct when confronted with emergency situations. Of course, persons paid to act in emergencies cannot recover from the tortfeasor under the rescue doctrine. See, e.g., Gray v. Russell, 853 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Mo.1993) (en banc) (explaining the rationale for the “firefighter rule”):

Firefighters and police officers are hired, trained, and compensated to deal with dangerous situations affecting the public as a whole. Because of their exceptional responsibilities, when firefighters and police officers are injured in the performance of their duties the cost of their injuries should also be borne by the public as a whole, through the workers’ compensation laws and the provision of insurance benefits and special disability pensions.

(Citation omitted).

[7] At oral argument, Summers argued and Thompson conceded that the trial court was never presented with the rescue doctrine theory and did not reach the issue.

[8] There are a number of reasons for leaving an analysis of the rescue doctrine for another day. The rescue doctrine presents an issue of first impression in this jurisdiction. The failure to raise the doctrine below foreclosed the opportunity for full briefing and presentation of argument on the issue. The rescue doctrine should not be analyzed without the benefit of all the pertinent authorities and public policy arguments if a complete and informed decision is to be reached.

Additionally, “[p]rinciples of judicial restraint dictate that when an issue effectively disposes of the case, other issues that are presented should not be reached.” Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238, 248 (S.D.1994). The conclusion that the trial court’s motion to dismiss should be reversed on other theories negates the necessity of addressing the rescue doctrine on this appeal.

———

Rules (and laws) don’t control behavior. This school district it does the exact opposite, the more rules the more bad behavior

Posted: April 3, 2014 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Minors, Youth, Children | Tags: Kids, Laws, playground, Principal, Regulations, Rules, Schools | Leave a comment

No rules also increased student attentiveness, increased their creative side and stopped bullying. Kids were too busy having fun to be a problem.

This is an amazing article. Here are some quotes from the article and the principle which in this day and age in the US is sort of mind blowing.

Fewer children were getting hurt on the playground. Students focused better in class. There was also less bullying, less tattling. Incidents of vandalism had dropped off.

The parent continued: “I just wanted to make sure you don’t change this play environment, because kids break their arms.”

This is my favorite quote!

“I’ve been the principal who’s stood there and said ‘Oy, kid! Get off your bike! You’ve got to walk your bike!’ Then I’d go away and think ‘Why the hell did I say that?’”

Don’t ride your bike you may get hurt! Why did the kids’ parents buy the child a bike? We know it was not to get hurt, so why can’t the kid ride a bike.

But the results spoke for themselves, he said. The students weren’t hurting themselves — in fact, they were so busy and physically active at recess that they returned to the classroom ready to learn. They came back vibrant and motivated, not agitated or annoyed.

Children don’t hurt themselves because they’re testing their boundaries, Mr. McLachlan said. They don’t set out to recklessly self-injure, though it may happen in the process of finding their footing.

Who are the rules for? Adults! Kids’ don’t want rules; kids don’t remember rules and kids work hard to ignore rules. Obviously the only reason to have rules is because adults like rules. Wait that does not make sense. It must be because adults believe that rules work. Wait, our prisons are full and overcrowded. Why do we have rules?

So many of the rules, he said, are “ridiculous,” and designed to soothe adults. That said, there are still limitations to the two, 40-minute long free play breaks each day.

If a kid is hurt breaking a rule then the adults have an excuse.

· It’s not my fault

· The kid deserved it he broke the rule

This principal is amazing. Read this quote!

Mr. McLachlan said. “One of the rules I said facetiously is kids aren’t allowed to hurt other people. But in fact they are. … If you hurt somebody in a game where you are playing hard, or a boxing match or a stone-throwing competition, for me it’s absolutely fine — as long as the other person was willing to get hurt.”

The results from the principals thinking?

He knew children might get hurt, and that was exactly the point — perhaps if they were freed from the “cotton-wool” in which their 21st century parents had them swaddled, his students may develop some resilience, use their imaginations, solve problems on their own.

This is my favorite statement from a different perspective. People don’t sue for money, they sue because they have bills to pay.

Kiwi parents are much less likely to sue a school if a child is injured anyway, he said, partly because a litigious culture just doesn’t exist and also because New Zealanders’ health care is fully paid for by the state if they’re victims of an accident.

It gets pretty absurd when we make playgrounds safe and then build climbing walls and ropes courses for adults to go have fun!

Read this article!When one New Zealand school tossed its playground rules and let students risk injury, the results were surprising

Here are some more articles exploring these concepts.

Year in Ideas: The risks of overprotective school policies

Return of risk: The growing movement to let kids play like kids

Some articles I’ve written about the subject:

An example of adults and money getting in the way of kids has fun

Is being overprotective putting our kids at risk

This article takes a real look at the risks parents allow their children to face

What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn

Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com

Google+: +Recreation

Twitter: RecreationLaw

Facebook: Rec.Law.Now

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Blog:www.recreation-law.com

Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com

James H. Moss #Authorrank

#RecreationLaw, #Recreation-Law.com, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #AdventureTravelLaw, #law, #TravelLaw, #JimMoss, #JamesHMoss, #Tourism, #AdventureTourism, #Rec-Law, #RiskManagement, #CyclingLaw, #BicyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #Recreation-Law.com, #Backpacking, #Hiking, #Mountaineering, #IceClimbing, #RockClimbing, #RopesCourse, #ChallengeCourse, #SummerCamp, #Camps, #YouthCamps, #Skiing, #Ski Areas, #Negligence, #Snowboarding, #RecreationLaw, #@RecreationLaw, #Cycling.Law, #SkiLaw, #Outside.Law, #Recreation.Law, #RecreationLaw.com, #OutdoorLaw, #RecreationLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #AdventureTravelLaw, #Law, #TravelLaw, #JimMoss, #JamesHMoss, #AttorneyatLaw, #Tourism, #AdventureTourism, #RecLaw, #RecLawBlog, #RecreationLawBlog, #RiskManagement, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation,# CyclingLaw, #BicyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #RecreationLaw.com, #Backpacking, #Hiking, #Mountaineering, #IceClimbing, #RockClimbing, #RopesCourse, #ChallengeCourse, #SummerCamp, #Camps, #YouthCamps, #Skiing, #Ski Areas, #Negligence, #Snowboarding, sport and recreation laws, ski law, cycling law, Colorado law, law for recreation and sport managers, bicycling and the law, cycling and the law, ski helmet law, skiers code, skiing accidents, Recreation Lawyer, Ski Lawyer, Paddlesports Lawyer, Cycling Lawyer, Recreational Lawyer, Fitness Lawyer, Rec Lawyer, Challenge Course Lawyer, Ropes Course Lawyer, Zip Line Lawyer, Rock Climbing Lawyer, Adventure Travel Lawyer, Outside Lawyer, Recreation Lawyer, Ski Lawyer, Paddlesports Lawyer, Cycling Lawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #FitnessLawyer, #RecLawyer, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #RopesCourseLawyer, #ZipLineLawyer, #RockClimbingLawyer, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #OutsideLawyer, Good Samaritan, Samaritan, First Aid, Playground, Kids, Principal, Schools, Rules, Regulations, Laws,

WordPress Tags: Rules,laws,behavior,district,student,Kids,article,Here,principle,Fewer,playground,Students,Incidents,vandalism,environment,bike,hell,parents,fact,classroom,Children,boundaries,McLachlan,self,Adults,Wait,prisons,limitations,Read,competition,person,pals,cotton,wool,century,resilience,imaginations,statement,perspective,People,money,Kiwi,Zealanders,health,victims,accident,Zealand,injury,concepts,Ideas,policies,Return,Some,example,Leave,Twitter,LinkedIn,Recreation,Edit,Email,Google,RecreationLaw,Facebook,Page,Outdoor,Adventure,Travel,Blog,Mobile,Site,James,Moss,Authorrank,author,OutdoorLaw,OutdoorRecreationLaw,AdventureTravelLaw,TravelLaw,JimMoss,JamesHMoss,Tourism,AdventureTourism,RiskManagement,CyclingLaw,BicyclingLaw,FitnessLaw,RopesCourse,ChallengeCourse,SummerCamp,Camps,YouthCamps,Areas,Negligence,SkiLaw,Outside,AttorneyatLaw,RecLaw,RecLawBlog,RecreationLawBlog,HumanPoweredRecreation,Colorado,managers,helmet,accidents,Lawyer,Paddlesports,Recreational,Challenge,Course,Ropes,Line,Rock,RecreationalLawyer,FitnessLawyer,RecLawyer,ChallengeCourseLawyer,RopesCourseLawyer,ZipLineLawyer,RockClimbingLawyer,AdventureTravelLawyer,OutsideLawyer,Samaritan,Principal,Schools,Regulations

Industry standards are proof of gross negligence and keep defendant in lawsuit even with good release

Posted: August 19, 2013 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Cycling, Massachusetts, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Triathlon | Tags: #race, Boys and Girls Clubs of Metrowest, Cycling, d/b/a Fiske Independent Race Management, Defendant, Fiske Independent Race Management, Gross negligence, Inc's, Inc., Massachusetts, Massachusetts. MA, Negligence, Regulations, Sports, Standards, Triathlon, USA Triathlon, Wet 'N' Wild Triathlon, William Fiske | Leave a comment

If the industry says you should and calls it a standard you better

Lautieri v. Bae, 17 Mass. L. Rep. 4; 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 290 (Mass. Sup 2003)

Plaintiff: Derek A. Lautieri

Defendant: Jorun G. Bae

Third Party Defendants: defendants USA Triathlon, Inc., William Fiske d/b/a Fiske Independent Race Management, the Boys and Girls Clubs of Metrowest, Inc.

Plaintiff Claims: negligence and court added gross negligence

Defendant Defenses: Release

Holding: Holding release released defendants who could not be held to gross negligence.

This decision is from a trial court in Massachusetts. It has limited value in Massachusetts and other states.

If you have read many of these articles, you understand that releases do not bar claims for gross negligence. In this case, the release did not bar the claim for gross negligence, even when the plaintiff did not plead gross negligence.

This is a car/bike accident case during a triathlon. The plaintiff was cycling in a triathlon with several other cyclists. The defendant Bae, driver pulled out in front of the cyclists resulting in a collision. The course was not closed to traffic.

The defendant car driver brought in as third party defendants the race organizer, William Fiske d/b/a Fiske Independent Race Management (Fiske), the race charity Boys and Girls Clubs of Metrowest, Inc. (BGC) and the triathlon association sanctioning body USA Triathlon, Inc., (USTA).

The third party defendants were brought in for “contribution.” Contribution is defined in Massachusetts as:

Where two or more persons become jointly liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, there shall be a right of contribution among them.” The Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) has consistently interpreted the language of this statute to mean that an “action for contribution is not barred if, at the time the accident occurred, the party for whom contribution is sought could have been held liable in tort.”

For the defendant, Bae to enable to enforce contribution against the third party defendants she must show that the third party defendants could be held liable at trial in tort. Any defenses available to the third party defendants against the original plaintiff will also be a defense to the contribution claim of the defendant Bae.

Therefore, in order for Bae to be able to enforce a right of contribution against any of the third-party defendants, she must be able to show that the particular third-party defendant could have been found tortiously liable to the plaintiff at the time the accident occurred.

Fiske was the person who put the triathlon together. Even though Fiske was operating as Fiske Independent Race Management, the court indicated that Fiske was not a corporation or company (LLC). USTA sanctioned the race, including providing liability insurance and standards, according to the court, on how the race should be run.

The defendant Bae argued that the third party defendants should be liable for failing to “a safe layout for the race course, failure to provide warning signs and directions, and failure to place volunteers and/or police personnel at the intersection where the incident occurred.”

The court determined that USTA was:

…the governing body of triathlon races and promulgates safety requirements for use by organizers of sanctioned triathlon races.

USTA is the governing body of triathlon races and promulgates safety requirements for use by organizers of sanctioned triathlon races.

In that position, USTA created regulations for running triathlons which the court quoted:

2. It is highly recommended to close the [bike race] road to traffic. If not possible, cone bike lanes with a minimum width of six feet from vehicles . . . 9. Control stoplights/stop sign intersections, traffic hazards and turnarounds with police and an ample amount of volunteers . . . 12. Use ‘Race in Progress’ or ‘Watch for Cyclists’ signs placed along the course to help warn motorists about conditions . . . 23. All turns, turn-arounds, traffic hazards and intersections must be monitored and marked with signs and volunteers. Any intersections with stop signs or stop lights must be controlled by police or professional traffic personnel.

Fiske did not follow any of the guidelines offered by the USTA.

…it does not appear that Fiske, as Race Director, heeded any of the guidelines described above for the triathlon at issue; rather, he left the intersection at which Lautieri collided with Bae open to traffic, uncontrolled by police or volunteers, unmarked with warnings, and unmonitored.

Summary of the case

The defense raised by the third party defendants was “release.” The plaintiff signed a release to join the USTA and receive a license. The plaintiff also signed an application which contained language similar to that of a release when she entered the race.

Under Massachusetts law, the enforceability of a release is a question (issue) of law to be decided by the court. “Massachusetts law favors the enforcement of releases.”

There can be no doubt . . . that under the law of Massachusetts . . . in the absence of fraud a person may make a valid contract exempting himself from any liability to another which he may in the future incur as a result of his negligence or that of his agents or employees acting on his behalf.” While any doubts about the interpretation of a release must be resolved in the favor of the plaintiff, an unambiguous and comprehensive release will be enforced as drafted.

Nor does the word negligence have to be found in the release. Releases, like all other states, do not bar claims of gross negligence. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant complained of any gross negligence. The court, however, stated that even though not pled, gross negligence could be found later against Fiske. If that was the case, then the releases signed by the plaintiff did not bar the claim against Fiske. “While these waivers are sufficient to release Fiske from all liability for harm caused by his own negligence, they do not release him from his own gross negligence.” The court found that the actions of Fiske could rise to the level of gross negligence.

The basis of that finding was Fiske did not follow the guidelines or regulations of the governing body, the USTA in running the race. “As this definition is necessarily vague, it is important to note that courts have found that “industry standards may be some evidence of negligence.”

To some extent, the court must have thought that Fiske’s failure to follow the standards of the USTA was very egregious to raise the issue of gross negligence in the case.

The court quoted the regulations cited above as evidence that what Fiske did when ignoring the industry standards was sufficient to void the release because it raised the possibility that Fiske was grossly negligent.

The court further defined negligence and gross negligence under Massachusetts law.

Negligence, without qualification and in its ordinary sense, is the failure of a responsible person, either by omission or by action, to exercise that degree of care, vigilance and forethought which, in the discharge of the duty then resting on him, the person of ordinary caution and prudence ought to exercise under the particular circumstances. It is a want of diligence commensurate with the requirement of the duty at the moment imposed by the law.

Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence. It is materially more want of care than constitutes simple inadvertence. It is an act or omission respecting legal duty of an aggravated character as distinguished from a mere failure to exercise ordinary care. It is very great negligence, or the absence of slight diligence, or the want of even scant care. It amounts to indifference to present legal duty and to utter forgetfulness of legal obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the rights of others. The element of culpability which characterizes all negligence is in gross negligence magnified to a high degree as compared with that present in ordinary negligence. Gross negligence is a manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence . . . It falls short of being such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a wilful and intentional wrong. Ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention, while both differ in kind from wilful and intentional conduct which is or ought to be known to have a tendency to injure.”

The court’s justification for not letting Fiske out of the case and for allowing the possibility of a claim for gross negligence was interesting.

While Bae has specifically pled negligence, and not gross negligence, this Court has considered the summary judgment motion as if a claim for gross negligence against the third-party defendants has been made.

Accordingly, because gross negligence may be considered an alternative theory of a standard negligence claim, Bae should be permitted to proceed with her claim of gross negligence against the third-party defendants.

The court then looked at the allegations against the USTA.

In order for Lautieri to establish that USTA owed him a duty of care at the time the accident occurred, Lautieri would have to establish that such a duty has a “source existing in social values and customs,” or that USTA voluntarily, or for consideration, assumed a duty of care to Lautieri. This is a burden that Lautieri–or, more appropriately, Bae, standing in Lautieri’s shoes–cannot meet.

There was no evidence that showed USTA participated or was supposed to participate in the planning, operation, supervision or running of the race. USTA did not even have a representative of USTA attend the race. Consequently, because there was no duty and USTA created no duty to the plaintiff the release barred the claims of the third party defendant.

The court’s discussion of the Boys and Girls Club was shorter.

USTA and the Boys and Girls Club were dismissed from the lawsuit.

So Now What?

The “release” or as identified by the court, application, was extremely weak. If the release had identified the course as being an open course, not closed to cars, this might have changed the outcome of the case for Fiske. No matter, the document was too weak not to create problems rather than resolve them in this case.

However, even if the release was stronger, it might not have gotten Fiske out of the case because of the court raised allegations of gross negligence. The USTA created regulations for running a race. By requesting and receiving sanctioning for the race, Fiske knowingly or unknowingly, became burdened or bound by those regulations. The court called them standards, regulations and guidelines throughout the decision, but the simple fact is they were a noose around the third party defendant’s neck.

You cannot look at your industry and not understand the standard of care in the industry or not find and follow the guidelines the industry is creating.

These “regulations” are fairly simple and appear to be commons sense. However, they substantially increase the cost of running an event. Closing a street requires government paperwork, government employees and usually help from law enforcement. All significantly increase the cost of running the event.

However, the regulations more importantly are proof that if an industry association creates regulations, standards, guidelines or rules, they are the standard of care against which members of the same industry will be judged in court.

For more articles on how standards created by an association are used to harm association members see:

ACA Standards are used by Expert for the Plaintiff in a lawsuit against a Camp

Expert Witness Report: ACA “Standards” are used by Expert for the Plaintiff in a lawsuit against a Camp

Plaintiff uses standards of ACCT to cost defendant $4.7 million

Trade Association Standards sink a Summer Camp when plaintiff uses them to prove Camp was negligent

What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FaceBook, Twitter or LinkedIn

Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com

Google+: +Recreation

Twitter: RecreationLaw

Facebook: Rec.Law.Now

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Blog: www.recreation-law.com

Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com

By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss #Authorrank

<rel=”author” link=” https://plus.google.com/u/0/b/112453188060350225356/” />

#RecreationLaw, #@RecreationLaw, #Cycling.Law #Fitness.Law, #Ski.Law, #Outside.Law, #Recreation.Law, #Recreation-Law.com, #Outdoor Law, #Recreation Law, #Outdoor Recreation Law, #Adventure Travel Law, #law, #Travel Law, #Jim Moss, #James H. Moss, #Attorney at Law, #Tourism, #Adventure Tourism, #Rec-Law, #Rec-Law Blog, #Recreation Law, #Recreation Law Blog, #Risk Management, #Human Powered, #Human Powered Recreation,# Cycling Law, #Bicycling Law, #Fitness Law, #Recreation-Law.com, #Backpacking, #Hiking, #Mountaineering, #Ice Climbing, #Rock Climbing, #Ropes Course, #Challenge Course, #Summer Camp, #Camps, #Youth Camps, #Skiing, #Ski Areas, #Negligence, #Snowboarding, #RecreationLaw, #@RecreationLaw, #Cycling.Law #Fitness.Law, #SkiLaw, #Outside.Law, #Recreation.Law, #RecreationLaw.com, #OutdoorLaw, #RecreationLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #AdventureTravelLaw, #Law, #TravelLaw, #JimMoss, #JamesHMoss, #AttorneyatLaw, #Tourism, #AdventureTourism, #RecLaw, #RecLawBlog, #RecreationLawBlog, #RiskManagement, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation,# CyclingLaw, #BicyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #RecreationLaw.com, #Backpacking, #Hiking, #Mountaineering, #IceClimbing, #RockClimbing, #RopesCourse, #ChallengeCourse, #SummerCamp, #Camps, #YouthCamps, #Skiing, #Ski Areas, #Negligence, #Snowboarding, sport and recreation laws, ski law, cycling law, Colorado law, law for recreation and sport managers, bicycling and the law, cycling and the law, ski helmet law, skiers code, skiing accidents, Recreation Lawyer, Ski Lawyer, Paddlesports Lawyer, Cycling Lawyer, Recreational Lawyer, Fitness Lawyer, Rec Lawyer, Challenge Course Lawyer, Ropes Course Lawyer, Zip Line Lawyer, Rock Climbing Lawyer, Adventure Travel Lawyer, Outside Lawyer, Recreation Lawyer, Ski Lawyer, Paddlesports Lawyer, Cycling Lawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #FitnessLawyer, #RecLawyer, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #RopesCourseLawyer, #ZipLineLawyer, #RockClimbingLawyer, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #OutsideLawyer, USA Triathlon, Inc’s, Boys and Girls Clubs of Metrowest, Inc., William Fiske, d/b/a Fiske Independent Race Management, William Fiske, Fiske Independent Race Management, cycling, Triathlon, Race, Standards, Regulations, Massachusetts. MA, Wet ‘N’ Wild Triathlon,

WordPress Tags: Industry,negligence,defendant,lawsuit,Lautieri,Mass,Super,LEXIS,Plaintiff,Derek,Jorun,Third,Defendants,Triathlon,William,Fiske,Independent,Race,Management,Boys,Girls,Clubs,Metrowest,Claims,Defenses,Release,decision,Massachusetts,bike,accident,driver,collision,organizer,association,USTA,contribution,Where,tort,injury,person,Supreme,Judicial,Court,statute,action,corporation,insurance,layout,failure,personnel,intersection,incident,requirements,organizers,road,lanes,width,feet,vehicles,Control,intersections,turnarounds,Watch,Cyclists,motorists,guidelines,Director,warnings,Summary,Under,enforcement,absence,fraud,agents,employees,interpretation,Releases,Neither,waivers,basis,definition,extent,qualification,omission,degree,vigilance,forethought,prudence,diligence,requirement,moment,Gross,magnitude,inadvertence,amounts,indifference,obligations,violation,circumspection,consequences,Ordinary,inattention,tendency,justification,judgment,theory,allegations,supervision,discussion,Club,cars,outcome,fact,noose,neck,commons,cost,event,street,government,paperwork,Standards,Expert,Camp,Report,ACCT,million,Trade,Summer,Leave,FaceBook,Twitter,LinkedIn,Recreation,Edit,Email,Google,RecreationLaw,Page,Outdoor,Adventure,Travel,Blog,Mobile,Site,James,Moss,Authorrank,author,Outside,Attorney,Tourism,Risk,Human,Rock,Ropes,Course,Challenge,Camps,Youth,Areas,SkiLaw,OutdoorLaw,OutdoorRecreationLaw,AdventureTravelLaw,TravelLaw,JimMoss,JamesHMoss,AttorneyatLaw,AdventureTourism,RecLaw,RecLawBlog,RecreationLawBlog,RiskManagement,HumanPoweredRecreation,CyclingLaw,BicyclingLaw,FitnessLaw,RopesCourse,ChallengeCourse,SummerCamp,YouthCamps,Colorado,managers,helmet,accidents,Lawyer,Paddlesports,Recreational,Line,RecreationalLawyer,FitnessLawyer,RecLawyer,ChallengeCourseLawyer,RopesCourseLawyer,ZipLineLawyer,RockClimbingLawyer,AdventureTravelLawyer,OutsideLawyer,Regulations,Wild,wilful

Lautieri v. Bae, 17 Mass. L. Rep. 4; 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 290

Posted: August 19, 2013 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Cycling, Legal Case, Massachusetts, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Triathlon | Tags: #race, Boys and Girls Clubs of Metrowest, Cycling, d/b/a Fiske Independent Race Management, Fiske Independent Race Management, Inc's, Inc., Massachusetts. MA, Regulations, Standards, Triathlon, USA Triathlon, Wet 'N' Wild Triathlon, William Fiske | Leave a comment

Lautieri v. Bae, 17 Mass. L. Rep. 4; 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 290

Derek A. Lautieri v. Jorun G. Bae ¹

1 The Town of Hudson was also named as a third-party defendant in the complaint. Count IV against the Town has been dismissed. Memorandum of Decision, dated June 7, 2002 (Bohn, J.).

01-4078

SUPERIOR COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT MIDDLESEX

17 Mass. L. Rep. 4; 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 290

October 29, 2003, Decided

October 29, 2003, Filed

DISPOSITION: Third party defendants’ motions for summary judgment allowed in part and denied in part.

JUDGES: [*1] Kenneth J. Fishman, Justice of the Superior Court.

OPINION BY: Kenneth J. Fishman

OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Derek A. Lautieri (“Lautieri”), was injured during a triathlon held in Hudson, Massachusetts. Lautieri brought this action against the defendant/third-party plaintiff, Jorun G. Bae (“Bae”), claiming negligence for Bae’s failure to exercise reasonable care in the operation of her motor vehicle. Bae in turn brought an action against third-party defendants USA Triathlon, Inc. (“USAT”) (Count I of Third-Party Complaint), William Fiske (“Fiske”) d/b/a Fiske Independent Race Management (Count II) ² and the Boys and Girls Clubs of Metrowest, Inc. (“B&G Clubs”) (Count III), seeking contribution in the event that the plaintiff recovers damages for his alleged injuries. ³ Specifically, Bae claims negligence on part of the third-party defendants for failure to provide a safe layout for the race course, failure to provide warning signs and directions, and failure to place volunteers and/or police personnel at the intersection where the incident occurred. This matter is before this Court on the third-party [*2] defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to all counts. For the reasons described below, the third party defendants’ motions are ALLOWED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

2 Bae’s complaint uses the spelling “Fisk” in the caption. As all the parties, including Bae, have since used the spelling “Fiske”, this Court will use the latter spelling.

3 Bae initially also claimed a duty of indemnification, but has since stipulated that no privity of contract existed between himself and any of the third-party defendants, and, therefore, that no right of indemnification exists.

BACKGROUND

On June 4, 2000, Lautieri participated in an organized triathlon, one leg of which was competitive bicycling. Bae, while operating a motor vehicle, came to the intersection of Main Street and Lewis Street in Hudson. Bae stopped, looked to her left, looked to her right, and then looked to her left again for approaching traffic. Seeing no vehicles approaching, Bae proceeded straight through the intersection. Lautieri, [*3] then approaching the intersection with four or five other bicyclists, turned to avoid Bae’s vehicle but did not have sufficient time to prevent a collision. Lautieri suffered significant injuries as a result of the accident.

On May 12, 2000, prior to the race, Lautieri completed and signed a “USA Triathlon Annual Licence Application Waiver.” That waiver contained the following language in the form duplicated below:

I acknowledge that a triathlon or bisport/duathlon event is an extreme test of a person’s physical and mental limits and carries with it the potential for death, serious injury and property loss. I HEREBY ASSUME THE RISKS OF PARTICIPATING IN TRIATHLONS OR BISPORT/DUATHLON EVENTS. I certify that I am physically fit and have sufficiently trained for participating in this event(s), and have not been advised against participating by a qualified health professional. I acknowledge that my statements in this AWRL are being accepted by the USAT in consideration for allowing me to become a member in USAT and are being relied upon by USAT and the various race sponsors, organizers and administrators in permitting me to participate in any USAT sanctioned event . . . (b) I AGREE that [*4] prior to participating in an event I will inspect the race course, facilities, equipment and areas to be used and if I believe they are unsafe I will immediately advise the person supervising the event activity or area; (c) I waive, release, AND DISCHARGE for any and all claims, losses or liabilities for death, personal injury, partial or permanent disability, property damage, medical or hospital bills, theft, or damage of any kid, including economic losses, which may in the future arise out of or relate to my participation in or my traveling to and from a USAT sanctioned event, THE FOLLOWING PERSONS OR ENTITIES: USAT, EVENT SPONSORS, RACE DIRECTORS, EVENT PRODUCERS, VOLUNTEERS, ALL STATES, CITIES, COUNTIES, OR LOCALITIES IN WHICH EVENTS OR SEGMENTS OR EVENTS ARE HELD, AND THE OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, EMPLOYEES, REPRESENTATIVES AND AGENTS OF ANY OF THE ABOVE, EVEN IF SUCH CLAIMS, LOSSES OR LIABILITIES ARE CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF OMISSIONS OF THE PERSONS I AM HEREBY RELEASING OR ARE CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF ANY OTHER PERSON OR ENTITY; (d) I ACKNOWLEDGE that there may be traffic or persons on the course route, and I ASSUME THE RISK OF RUNNING, BIKING, SWIMMING [*5] OR PARTICIPATING IN ANY OTHER EVENT SANCTIONED BY USAT.

(e) I AGREE NOT TO SUE any of the persons or entities mentioned above in paragraph (c) for any of the claims, losses or liabilities that I have waived, released or discharged herein; (f) I INDEMNIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS the persons or entities mentioned above in paragraph (c) for any and all claims made or liabilities assessed against them as a result of my acts or inactions (ii) the actions, inactions or negligence of others including those parties hereby indemnified (iii) the conditions of the facilities, equipment or areas where the event or activity is being conducted (iv) the Competitive Rules (v) any other harm caused by an occurrence related to a USAT event . . .

Prior to the race, Lautieri also completed and signed a “Wet ‘N’ Wild Triathlon Application,” which contained the following language:

In consideration of the entry being accepted, I do hereby forever waive and release Fiske Independent Race Management, the sponsoring organization, companies, agents, representatives, assigns and successors from all claims of action, which I at any time acquire as a result of participation in the event for which this entry relates.

[*6] USTA is the governing body of triathlon races and promulgates safety requirements for use by organizers of sanctioned triathlon races. The subject triathlon was sanctioned by USTA based upon an application submitted by Fiske. On that application, William Fiske is identified as the Race Director. The Boys and Girls Clubs of Metrowest, Inc. provided a number of volunteers for the event.

DISCUSSION

[HN1] A party is entitled to summary judgment, “if pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden of the moving party “is not sustained by the mere filing of the summary judgment motion,” but “must be supported by one or more of the materials listed in rule 56(c) . . .” Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 714, 575 N.E.2d 734, citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). That party may satisfy this burden either by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential [*7] element of the opposing party’s case or by demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of his case at trial. Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809, 575 N.E.2d 1107 (1991); Kourouvacilis, 410 Mass. at 716. “If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts which would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17, 532 N.E.2d 1211 (1989), citing O’Brion, Russell & Co. v. LeMay, 370 Mass. 243, 245, 346 N.E.2d 861 (1976).

General Laws c. 231B, § 1, [HN2] provides in pertinent part: “Where two or more persons become jointly liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, there shall be a right of contribution among them.” The Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) has consistently interpreted the language of this statute to mean that an “action for contribution is not barred if, at the time the accident occurred, the party for whom [*8] contribution is sought could have been held liable in tort.” McGrath v. Stanley, 397 Mass. 775, 781, 493 N.E.2d 832 (1986) (emphasis in original). See also, Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 346-50, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (1983); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Westerlind, 374 Mass. 524, 526, 373 N.E.2d 957 (1978); O’Mara v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 359 Mass. 235, 238, 268 N.E.2d 685 (1971). ⁴ Therefore, in order for Bae to be able to enforce a right of contribution against any of the third-party defendants, she must be able to show that the particular third-party defendant could have been found tortiously liable to the plaintiff at the time the accident occurred. Each third-party defendant will be discussed separately below.

4 In McGrath, where a plaintiff’s failure to comply with the particular jurisdictional requirements of G.L.c. 258, § 4 was held not sufficient to bar a right of contribution, the SJC noted that the “contribution statute is aimed at eliminating the unfairness of allowing a disproportionate share of a plaintiff’s recovery to be borne by one of several joint tortfeasors.” 397 Mass. at 777-78. The third-party defendants in the instant case, however, are not claiming a lack of jurisdiction, but instead that the plaintiff’s signature on certain waivers releases them from all liability. The SJC has approved the denial of the right of contribution in similar cases. See O’Mara, 359 Mass. at 238 (denying contribution to defendant company from the driver of car in which plaintiff was a passenger when company truck hit driver’s car); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 374 Mass. at 526 (denying contribution of plaintiff’s employer for work related injury on grounds that the employer’s contributions to workers’ compensation benefits released the employer from all tort claims that might have resulted from the accident).

[*9] A. William Fiske d/b/a/ Fiske Independent Race Management

Fiske argues that he was released from all liability regarding the Wet ‘N’ Wild Triathlon when Lautieri signed the USA Triathlon Annual Licence Application Waiver and the Wet ‘N’ Wild Triathlon Application. [HN3] Whether the waivers signed by the plaintiff are enforceable to bar any claims in tort against Fiske is a question of law to be decide by this Court.

[HN4] “Massachusetts law favors the enforcement of releases.” Sharon v. City of Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 105, 769 N.E.2d 738 (2002). “There can be no doubt . . . that under the law of Massachusetts . . . in the absence of fraud a person may make a valid contract exempting himself from any liability to another which he may in the future incur as a result of his negligence or that of his agents or employees acting on his behalf.” Id., quoting Schell v. Ford, 270 F.2d 384, 386 (1st Cir. 1959). While any doubts about the interpretation of a release must be resolved in the favor of the plaintiff, an unambiguous and comprehensive release will be enforced as drafted. Cormier v. Central Massachusetts Chapter of the National Safety Council, 416 Mass. 286, 288, 620 N.E.2d 784 (1993). [*10]

Thus, in Cormier, the SJC upheld summary judgment against a plaintiff who executed a waiver of liability prior to sustaining injuries while riding on a motorcycle safety course. The Court found the waiver sufficient to bar a claim in negligence, even though the word negligence never appeared in the document. Id. at 288. The SJC also rejected the plaintiff’s claim that she believed that she was only relieving the defendant for liability for any accidental injury, not for any injury caused by the defendant’s negligence, holding that her “subjective intent not to release any claim for negligence, does not furnish a basis for avoiding the release on the ground of mistake.” Id. at 289.

Upon examination of the two releases signed by Lautieri prior to the subject triathlon, it is evident that he executed an unambiguous release of the third-party defendant, William Fiske. The USA Triathlon Annual Licence Application Waiver clearly and unambiguously releases “RACE DIRECTORS” from “any and all claims, losses or liabilities . . .” Fiske is listed as the “Race Director” on the 2000 USA Triathlon Event Sanction Application submitted to USAT. Furthermore, [*11] the Wet ‘N’ Wild Triathlon Application releases “Fiske Independent Race Management, the sponsoring organization, companies, agents, representatives, assigns and successors from all claims of action . . .” To the extent that Bae argues that the phrase “agents, representatives, assigns and successors” might refer to the phrase “sponsoring organization,” and that Fiske Independent Race Management–while not a legal entity–does not actually refer to William Fiske, individually, such interpretations are not reasonable given the plain meaning of the waiver language. ⁵ Nevertheless, even if this Court were to hold that the Wet ‘N’ Wild Triathlon Application was sufficiently ambiguous to render the waiver unenforceable, the language of the USA Triathlon Annual Licence Application Waiver is unambiguous and releases Fiske from liability. Thus, Fiske’s motion for summary judgment, as it relates to Bae’s claim of negligence against him, is well founded.

5 William Fiske used the name “Fiske Independent Race Mgt.” and “F.I.R.M” on the 2000 USA Triathlon Event Sanction Application regarding the Wet ‘N’ Wild Triathlon. Since there is no evidence in the record that “Fiske Independent Race Mgt.” or “F.I.R.M” are incorporated entities, or that William Fiske filed a business certificate in Massachusetts under these names, William Fiske is not afforded any legal protection by virtue of the use of these fictional business entities. See Pedersen v. Leahy, 397 Mass. 689, 691, 493 N.E.2d 486 (1986).

[*12] This analysis, however, does not end the matter. [HN5] Both the SJC and the Appeals Court “have noted that releases are effective against liability for ordinary negligence.” Zavras v. Capeway Rovers Motorcycle Club, Inc., 44 Mass.App.Ct 17, 18, 687 N.E.2d 1263 (1997) (emphasis in original), citing Lee v. Allied Sports Associates, Inc., 349 Mass. 544, 551, 209 N.E.2d 329 (1965). In Zavras, the Appeals Court, citing reasons of public policy, held that the owner of a premises at which organized dirt bike races were held did not exempt itself from liability for gross negligence by requiring participants in races to sign a release as a condition of participating. 44 Mass.App.Ct. at 18-19. See also, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 (1981) (“A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public policy”). The Zavaras court noted that there is “substantial authority . . . [for] the position that while a party may contract against liability for harm caused by its negligence, it may not do so with respect to its gross [*13] negligence.” 44 Mass.App.Ct. at 19.

The present case is indistinguishable from Zavras. Here, Lautieri signed two valid waivers releasing Fiske, among others, from any and all liability that might arise from his participation in the subject triathlon race. While these waivers are sufficient to release Fiske from all liability for harm caused by his own negligence, they do not release him from his own gross negligence.

Thus, for purposes of determining contribution, the question for this Court becomes whether a finder of fact could find Fiske liable to Lautieri for gross negligence. Based on the summary judgment record viewed in a light most favorable to Bae, a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether the accident resulted from Fiske’s gross negligence.

[HN6] Gross negligence is defined as “very great negligence, or the absence of slight diligence, or the want of even scant care.” Zavras, 44 Mass.App.Ct. at 20, quoting Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 591, 121 N.E. 505 (1919). ⁶ As this definition is necessarily vague, it is important to note that courts have found that “industry standards may be some evidence of negligence. [*14] ” Fidalgo v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., 56 Mass.App.Ct. 176, 184, 775 N.E.2d 803 (2002), citing Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. 206, 211, 372 N.E.2d 212 (1978); Resendes v. Boston Edison Co., 38 Mass.App.Ct. 344, 358, 648 N.E.2d 757 (1995). Bae has submitted the USAT 2000 Event Sanctioning Guidelines & Requirements as evidence of the negligence of Fiske and the other third-party defendants. In the section entitled “Bike,” the USAT triathlon regulations state: “2. It is highly recommended to close the [bike race] road to traffic. If not possible, cone bike lanes with a minimum width of six feet from vehicles . . . 9. Control stoplights/stop sign intersections, traffic hazards and turnarounds with police and an ample amount of volunteers . . . 12. Use ‘Race in Progress’ or ‘Watch for Cyclists’ signs placed along the course to help warn motorists about conditions . . . 23. All turns, turn-arounds, traffic hazards and intersections must be monitored and marked with signs and volunteers. Any intersections with stop signs or stop lights must be controlled by police or professional traffic personnel.” Based on the record before this Court, [*15] it does not appear that Fiske, as Race Director, heeded any of the guidelines described above for the triathlon at issue; rather, he left the intersection at which Lautieri collided with Bae open to traffic, uncontrolled by police or volunteers, unmarked with warnings, and unmonitored. Therefore, this Court cannot say that there is no genuine dispute as to whether a failure to heed any of the triathlon industry guidelines regarding intersections, which left oncoming drivers totally unaware of the possible dangers that awaited them, constitutes gross negligence. See Chiacchia v. Lycott Environmental Research, Inc., 4 Mass. L. Rptr. 399, 1995 WL 1146824, *10 (Mass.Super.) (finding that the multiple ways in which the defendant’s investigation of certain property “failed to conform to established standards in the industry lead the court to conclude that [defendant’s] negligence in this matter [amounted] to gross negligence”).

6 [HN7] “Negligence, without qualification and in its ordinary sense, is the failure of a responsible person, either by omission or by action, to exercise that degree of care, vigilance and forethought which, in the discharge of the duty then resting on him, the person of ordinary caution and prudence ought to exercise under the particular circumstances. It is a want of diligence commensurate with the requirement of the duty at the moment imposed by the law.

[HN8] “Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence. It is materially more want of care than constitutes simple inadvertence. It is an act or omission respecting legal duty of an aggravated character as distinguished from a mere failure to exercise ordinary care. It is very great negligence, or the absence of slight diligence, or the want of even scant care. It amounts to indifference to present legal duty and to utter forgetfulness of legal obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the rights of others. The element of culpability which characterizes all negligence is in gross negligence magnified to a high degree as compared with that present in ordinary negligence. Gross negligence is a manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence . . . It falls short of being such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a wilful and intentional wrong. Ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention, while both differ in kind from wilful and intentional conduct which is or ought to be known to have a tendency to injure.” Altman, 231 Mass. at 591-92.

[*16] While Bae has specifically pled negligence, and not gross negligence, this Court has considered the summary judgment motion as if a claim for gross negligence against all of the third-party defendants has been made. [HN9] “Under current Massachusetts State practice there is no requirement that a complaint state the correct substantive theory of the case.” Gallant v. Worcester, 383 Mass. 707, 709, 421 N.E.2d 1196 (1981), citing Mass.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Mass.R.Civ.P. 54 (c). Even though it is sound practice to state all possible claims, the SJC has held that “a complaint is not subject to dismissal if it would support relief on any theory of law.” Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 89, 390 N.E.2d 243 (1979) (emphasis in original), citing Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1973). Thus, courts are generally “obligated to consider each of the alternative theories of law . . . on which [the complaining party’s] action might be maintained.” Id. Several courts in other jurisdictions have permitted a plaintiff to proceed with a claim for gross negligence after having only pled a claim for negligence. [*17] See, e.g., McTavish v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Co., 485 F.2d 510, 512 (4th Cir.1973) (holding that Kentucky law permitted a claim of gross negligence to flow from an allegation of “negligence and carelessness”); Smith v. Hill, 510 F. Supp. 767, 775 (D.Utah 1981) (upon review of pleading and briefs court assumed that plaintiff “intended to plead that the [defendants] were grossly negligent”). Accordingly, because gross negligence may be considered an alternative theory of a standard negligence claim, Bae should be permitted to proceed with her claim of gross negligence against the third-party defendants. See Altman, 231 Mass. at 593 (holding that a plaintiff has the right to insist that a jury be instructed on the distinction between negligence and gross negligence at trial).

Accordingly, Fiske may be held liable for contribution to any successful claim for gross negligence that Lautieri could have made against Fiske at the time of the accident.

B. USAT

USAT argues that no duty exists between itself and the individuals who choose to participate in the triathlon. [HN10] Neither the SJC nor the Appeals Court has specifically ruled [*18] on whether a duty of care is owned to participants in an athletic event by a sanctioning body of the subject sport when that race takes place on public property.

USAT argues that the reasoning in Gauvin v. Clark, 404 Mass. 450, 537 N.E.2d 94 (1989), compels the application of a recklessness standard in the present case. In Gauvin, the SJC held that “personal injury cases arising out of an athletic event must be predicted on reckless disregard of safety,” on grounds that “vigorous and active participation in sporting events should not be chilled by the threat of litigation.” Id. at 454, citing Kabella v. Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461, 465, 672 P.2d 290 (1983). The Gauvin case is not controlling here. Bae is not seeking to hold another participant in the triathlon responsible for Lautieri’s injuries. Instead, he is seeking damages from those who organized and sanctioned the event.

[HN11] Whether a defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff is a question of law. O’Sullivan v. Shaw, 431 Mass. 201, 204, 726 N.E.2d 951 (2000). In order for Lautieri to establish that USAT owed him a duty of care at the time the accident [*19] occurred, Lautieri would have to establish that such a duty has a “source existing in social values and customs,” Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 404 Mass. 624, 629, 536 N.E.2d 1067 (1989), or that USAT voluntarily, or for consideration, assumed a duty of care to Lautieri. Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 52-53, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983). This is a burden that Lautieri–or, more appropriately, Bae, standing in Lautieri’s shoes–cannot meet. The only involvement of USAT with the subject triathlon was its approval of Fiske’s application, which, in essence, effectively permitted Fiske to be eligible for insurance coverage from the USAT Triathlon liability policy. There is no evidence in the record that suggests that USAT had any obligation or was expected to participate in the planning, operation, or supervision of the race, much less have a representative attend the Wet ‘N’ Wild triathlon. Accordingly, there is no basis on which to conclude that USAT owed Lautieri a duty of care. Assuming, arguendo, that USAT did owe a duty of care to Lautieri, the summary judgment record is devoid of any evidence that would permit a finder of fact [*20] to conclude that USAT acted with gross negligence with regard to Lautieri or the subject triathlon. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of third-party defendant USAT must be allowed.

C. Boys and Girls Clubs of Metrowest, Inc.

A similar finding regarding the B&G Clubs is mandated. While there is evidence that the B&G Clubs provided volunteers for the triathlon, there is no evidence to support a claim of gross negligence against the B&G Clubs or any of its members. Thus, the waivers are operative to release the B&G Clubs from liability. Accordingly, summary judgment for the third-party defendant B&G Clubs must also be allowed.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, USA Triathlon, Inc’s and Boys and Girls Clubs of Metrowest, Inc.’s motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED, and, accordingly, judgment shall enter for the third-party defendants on Counts I and III of the third-party complaint, as they relate to claims of contribution, and on Counts I, II, and III of the third-party complaint, as they relate to indemnification. William Fiske, d/b/a Fiske Independent Race Management’s motion for summary judgment on Count II of the third-party complaint is DENIED as it relates [*21] to a claim for contribution.

Kenneth J. Fishman

Justice of the Superior Court

Date: October 29, 2003

WordPress Tags: Lautieri,Mass,Super,LEXIS,Derek,Jorun,Town,Hudson,defendant,complaint,Count,Memorandum,Decision,June,Bohn,SUPERIOR,COURT,MASSACHUSETTS,MIDDLESEX,October,DISPOSITION,Third,defendants,judgment,JUDGES,Kenneth,Fishman,Justice,OPINION,ORDER,MOTIONS,SUMMARY,INTRODUCTION,Plaintiff,action,negligence,failure,vehicle,Triathlon,USAT,William,Fiske,Independent,Race,Management,Boys,Girls,Clubs,Metrowest,contribution,event,injuries,layout,personnel,intersection,incident,Fisk,caption,BACKGROUND,Main,Street,Lewis,vehicles,collision,accident,Annual,Licence,Application,Waiver,person,death,injury,HEREBY,ASSUME,RISKS,TRIATHLONS,BISPORT,DUATHLON,EVENTS,health,statements,AWRL,member,organizers,administrators,AGREE,facilities,equipment,areas,area,DISCHARGE,liabilities,hospital,theft,participation,PERSONS,ENTITIES,SPONSORS,DIRECTORS,PRODUCERS,VOLUNTEERS,STATES,CITIES,COUNTIES,LOCALITIES,SEGMENTS,HELD,OFFICERS,EMPLOYEES,AGENTS,ABOVE,CLAIMS,LOSSES,NEGLIGENT,ACTS,OMISSIONS,ACKNOWLEDGE,RISK,paragraph,INDEMNIFY,HOLD,inactions,Competitive,Rules,occurrence,Prior,Wild,successors,USTA,requirements,Director,DISCUSSION,admissions,affidavits,Kourouvacilis,General,Motors,Corp,Celotex,Catrett,expectation,Flesner,Technical,Communications,absence,existence,fact,Pederson,Time,Brion,Russell,LeMay,Laws,Where,tort,Supreme,Judicial,statute,McGrath,Stanley,emphasis,Correia,Tire,Rubber,Mutual,Westerlind,Mara,Sons,recovery,jurisdiction,signature,waivers,denial,driver,truck,employer,contributions,workers,compensation,Whether,enforcement,Sharon,Newton,fraud,Schell,Ford,interpretation,Cormier,Central,Chapter,National,Council,Thus,motorcycle,basis,Upon,examination,Sanction,extent,interpretations,certificate,protection,virtue,Pedersen,Leahy,analysis,Both,Appeals,Zavras,Capeway,Rovers,Club,Sports,Associates,policy,owner,premises,dirt,bike,participants,Restatement,Second,Contracts,Zavaras,Here,purposes,finder,Gross,diligence,Altman,Aronson,definition,industry,Fidalgo,Columbus,McKinnon,Poirier,Plymouth,Resendes,Boston,Edison,Guidelines,road,lanes,width,feet,Control,intersections,turnarounds,Watch,Cyclists,motorists,warnings,drivers,dangers,Chiacchia,Lycott,Environmental,Research,Rptr,investigation,qualification,omission,degree,vigilance,forethought,prudence,requirement,moment,magnitude,inadvertence,amounts,indifference,obligations,violation,circumspection,consequences,Ordinary,inattention,tendency,Under,State,theory,Gallant,Worcester,dismissal,relief,Whitinsville,Plaza,Kotseas,Thompson,Allstate,theories,Several,jurisdictions,McTavish,Chesapeake,Ohio,Railroad,Kentucky,allegation,Smith,Hill,Supp,Utah,jury,distinction,individuals,Neither,Gauvin,Clark,threat,litigation,Kabella,Bouschelle,participant,Instead,Sullivan,Shaw,Yakubowicz,Paramount,Pictures,Mullins,Pine,Manor,College,involvement,approval,essence,insurance,coverage,obligation,supervision,Counts,Date,indemnification,himself,unenforceable,wilful

Recreation Law

It's not what I write, It's what you Learn

US Army Corp or Engineers Land Use Regulations

US Army Corp of Engineers Land Use Regulations

When an organization makes rules and regulations that a subsidiary organization is supposed to obey, and then fails to follow, both organizations are liable to any plaintiff injured due to the failure to follow or enforce the organizational rules, policies, regulations or standards.

T.K., a minor, v. Boys & Girls Clubs of America, et. al. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87005

T.K., a minor, v. Boys & Girls Clubs of America, et. al. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87005

Great analysis of the “Rescue Doctrine” in a ballooning case from South Dakota

Thompson v. Summers, 1997 SD 103; 567 N.W.2d 387; 1997 S.D. LEXIS 103

Rules (and laws) don’t control behavior. This school district it does the exact opposite, the more rules the more bad behavior

It gets pretty absurd when we make playgrounds safe and then build climbing walls and ropes courses for adults to go have fun!

Industry standards are proof of gross negligence and keep defendant in lawsuit even with good release

Lautieri v. Bae, 17 Mass. L. Rep. 4; 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 290

Recognized as the Go to Lawyer by the Outdoor Recreation Industry

If you want to book an appointment?

My New Book: Boating the Grand Canyon: A “How To” for Private Boaters

Enter your email address to follow this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

James H. Moss, J.D.

Pages

Recreation Law

Follow Blog via Email

Follow on Twitter

Categories: by Activity, State & Legal Issue

Blog Stats

StatCounter

It's not what I write, It's what you Learn

US Army Corp of Engineers Land Use Regulations

Rate this:

Share this:

Rate this:

Share this:

T.K., a minor, v. Boys & Girls Clubs of America, et. al. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87005

Rate this:

Share this:

Rate this:

Share this:

Rate this:

Share this:

It gets pretty absurd when we make playgrounds safe and then build climbing walls and ropes courses for adults to go have fun!

Rate this:

Share this:

Rate this:

Share this:

Rate this:

Share this:

Recognized as the Go to Lawyer by the Outdoor Recreation Industry

If you want to book an appointment?

My New Book: Boating the Grand Canyon: A “How To” for Private Boaters

Enter your email address to follow this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

James H. Moss, J.D.

Pages

Follow Blog via Email

Follow on Twitter

Categories: by Activity, State & Legal Issue

Blog Stats

StatCounter