One line not filled in properly, and NOT needed anyway, stops defendant from winning motion to dismiss a case.

Posted: July 4, 2022 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Adventure Travel, Colorado, Minors, Youth, Children, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Dog Sled, Dog Sledding, Krabloonik, Minor's right to sue, Negligence, Parents right to waive minor's right to sue | Leave a comment

Release used for a dog sledding accident asked for the minor child’s name which was not written in, so the release failed.

Sturm v. Weber (D. Colo. 2022)

State: Colorado: United States District Court, D. Colorado

Plaintiff: Sandra Sturm, and Timothy Sturm and Sandra Sturm, as parents and next friends of their minor child, Holly Sturm Plaintiff

Defendant: Josef Weber a/k/a Joseph Weber, Krabloonik, Incorporated

Plaintiff Claims: negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and, in the alternative, premises liability pursuant to the Colorado Premises Liability Act

Defendant Defenses: Release

Holding: split decision

Year: 2022

Summary

Dog sled guide fell off the dog sled, and the sled hit a tree injuring the plaintiff. The release failed initially to stop the litigation because on line on the release was not filled in correctly. The line was not needed for the release to be valid.

Facts

Krabloonik is a recreational dogsled operation in Snowmass Village, Colorado. Krabloonik employs “mushers” to steer the dogsleds during the rides it offers its customers. Krabloonik’s dogsleds are not equipped with track-braking systems; instead, mushers are trained to use resistance and counterbalance to steer and control the speed of Krabloonik’s dogsleds. Josef Weber operated Sandra and Holly Sturm’s dogsled on March 11, 2019.

According to his Musher Accident Report, Weber steered the dogsled into a rut, causing it to tip. When Weber attempted to level the dogsled, he fell off, leaving Sandra and Holly Sturm on a runaway sled. Without Weber to break and steer, the dogsled did not come to a stop until it collided with a tree. Plaintiffs claim that as a result of the collision, Holly Sturm suffered a broken leg that had to be surgically repaired and Sandra Sturm injured her elbow. Per the Amended Complaint, Holly Sturm also suffers from PTSD, mental stress, and anxiety as a result of the dogsledding incident.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The entire case resolves around one issue at this point. Was the release ineffective or void because a blank line on the release was not filled in or filled in with incorrect information.

Timothy Sturm, as Holly Sturm’s parent, is permitted to waive negligence claims on her behalf. See C.R.S. § 13-22-107(3) (“A parent of a child may, on behalf of the child, release or waive the child’s prospective claim for negligence.”) Therefore, the Court agrees with Defendants that the lack of Holly Sturm’s signature is irrelevant. Notwithstanding this fact, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the Participation Agreement signed by Timothy Sturm is an effective release of his daughter’s claims. No name-let alone Holly’s-appears in the clearly marked space provided to identify the minor whose claims are being released, and neither party has explained to the Court who “Whitney” is. Therefore, the Court denies the Construed Motion with respect to Holly Sturm’s claims.

The issue is there was a line where the minor child’s name was to be written if the release was to stop a lawsuit by the minor child. That line was either blank or filled in with the name Whitney. Since the name of the injured child and daughter of the parent, signing the release was not on the line, the release is not valid to stop the claims of the minor child.

There is NO Need to have the name of the children on the release to begin with.

So, for whatever reason, a line to collect information or a desire to know the name on a release defeated the release. The Colorado statute is pretty clear C.R.S. § 13-22-107, all you have to do for a release to stop a claim by a minor, is to identify that the parent is signing away the child’s right to sue. No information has to be collected about the child or children.

A release was signed by the father which had the blank line. A release was also signed by the mother. The mother’s release did not indicate she was signing away her child’s right to sue. If the mothers release would have had language indicating she was signing away the child’s right to sue, the failure of the father’s release to be effective would not have mattered.

The mother also argued that the actions of the defendant were willful and wanton. This was an attempt for the mother to have the release she signed thrown out. Willful and wanton acts on the part of the defendant in Colorado, like all other states, bars the release from stopping claims for those acts.

Under Colorado law “”[w]illful and wanton conduct is purposeful conduct committed recklessly that exhibits an intent consciously to disregard the safety of others.” Not specifically plead, the court was able to find language in the complaint that might lend itself to a claim for willful and wanton conduct that would not be covered by the release.

In all other issues, the court found the release was valid under Colorado law.

On a procedural note, the motion giving rise to this decision was filed early in the case, prior to discovery being completed. Consequently, the court felt that because the facts of the case had not been fully briefed, it had little choice but to rule in favor of the plaintiff’s because there were so many questions of fact that had not been brought forward yet.

Discovery was completed by the time this decision was issued. The court in its motion stated the defense could file another motion for summary judgment because more information was available and because of the timing of the first motion, the court had ruled on it as a preliminary motion not a motion for summary judgement.

So Now What?

A release is a contract. It is not a marketing information collection document. Do not collect any information other than what is required for the release. Signatures are required, and dates help identify the person. Address, phone and other contact info could be helpful. But don’t confuse your guests or the judge and make it something it is not.

Why there were two releases does not make any sense. One for a parent to sign with minor children and one without? Why not have one release, that correctly states that signing the release gives up the parents right to sue and the child’s right to sue under Colorado law. That would have easily stopped this lawsuit.

Poor releases give way to bad decisions in courtrooms.

Word Count: 1230

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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

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This is a confusing case concerning whether or not a person is an intendent contractor or employee, has the right to sue the employer and whether the insurance company for the employer must provide coverage because of the confusion

Posted: May 9, 2022 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Climbing, Mountaineering, New Jersey, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Rock Climbing | Tags: Atain Speciality Insurance, Condition of Coverage, Insurance policy, Mountain Clmbing, Mountaineering, NE Mountain Guiding, Negligence, Northeast Mountain Guiding, Recision, Rock climbing, SAR, Search and Rescue | Leave a comment

This is a long and complicated case because know one understood what was needed and no one read their insurance policy.

Atain Specialty Ins Co v Ne Mountain Guiding LLC D NJ 2020

State: New Jersey, US District Court for the District of New Jersey

Plaintiff: Atain Specialty Insurance Co.

Defendant: Northeast Mountain Guiding, LLC, et al.,

Plaintiff Claims: negligence

Defendant Defenses:

Holding: Mostly for the Plaintiff

Year: 2020

Summary

An employee or independent contractor was hurt, maybe working, and sued his employer over his injuries. The insurance company for the employer, mountain guiding company, denied coverage because he was not an employee and they did not provide coverage for independent contractors.

This case is still a mess, but the important part is make sure you are honest on your insurance applications and make sure you know what you are buying when you purchase a policy.

Facts

Vulpis is the founder and sole member of NMG, a limited liability company in the outdoor adventure and education industry Vulpis has significant training and experience, as well as multiple certifications, in the field in which NMG operates. Enberg provided administrative assistance to NMG, developed a search and rescue training for NMG to provide to clients, and served as a mountaineering guide for NMG. Manchester performed work for NMG as a Lead Backpacking Guide and Assistant Rock Guide.

Donald Pachner is the sole member of Pachner & Associates, LLC and Pachner Risk Management, LLC. Donald Pachner and Pachner & Associates, LLC possess insurance broker licenses under New Jersey law.

Vulpis retained Pachner to obtain general commercial liability insurance for NMG. As part of this process, Pachner and Vulpis worked together to fill out an application (the “Application”) for insurance. The Application required Vulpis to estimate NMG’s gross revenues for the coming year. On Pachner’s advice, Vulpis checked the “No” box when answering the Application’s question concerning whether NMG “hire[s] Concessionaires, Independent Contractors, or Subcontractors.” As part of the Application, Vulpis initialed next to a requirement NMG (1) obtain from all participants an Atain-approved waiver of liability form, and (2) maintain those forms for three years. In response to NMG’s Application, Atain issued an insurance quote (the “Quote”), which Vulpis reviewed with Pachner. Among other things, the Quote contains a summary of several of the terms the Policy would contain

Pachner procured insurance (the “Policy”) from Atain for NMG. The Policy limits coverage to “GUIDED MOUNTAINEERING INCLUDING TOP ROPE CLIMBING & RAPPELLING; GUIDED KAYAK TRIPS; GUIDED SNOWSHOEING; GUIDED HIKING/BACKPACKING INCLUDING CAMPING.” The Policy excludes coverage for injuries suffered “in the course of employment by or service to” NMG.

On November 21, 2015, Manchester suffered an injury (the “Injury”) while using certain equipment (the “Equipment”) to engage in a certain activity (the “Activity”). Much of the dispute in this case centers on the proper characterization of the Activity and the Equipment. The essence of the Activity is that the participant uses the Equipment to move between two points. The evidence conflicts concerning whether the Equipment is a “Tyrolean Traverse” or a “Clifftop Zipline.” Ziplines were derived from Tyrolean Traverses, but the differences are too fine for untrained individuals to differentiate between the two.

On November 21, 2015, three NMG guides—Christy DeMarco, Enberg, and Vulpis—went to Allamuchy State Park to test the Equipment NMG expected to offer in the future for its customers. Vulpis and the other three guides set up the Equipment. Manchester was present at the time, and engaged in the Activity by traveling on the Equipment. While engaged in the Activity, Manchester suffered the Injury.

Following his Injury, Manchester filed a state court negligence action against Vulpis, Enberg, and NMG. NMG made a claim for coverage with Pachner and Atain. When reporting the claim to Atain, Pachner described Manchester as an independent contractor for NMG.

Atain filed this coverage action against its Vulpis, Enberg, and NMG, and also joined Manchester as a defendant. Atain seeks declaratory judgments against Vulpis, Enberg, NMG, and Manchester, authorizing Atain to disclaim coverage Manchester’s Injury. Additionally, Atain seeks a declaratory judgment voiding the Policy under common law rescission principles and the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:33A-1 et seq.

Vulpis, Enberg, and NMG brought a third-party action against NMG’s insurance broker Pachner, alleging Pachner’s negligence caused any failure of coverage by Atain. Manchester brought a similar action against Pachner.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The is the second of two decisions so far in this case, and it is still on going. This decision is based on multiple motions to dismiss, and motions for summary judgment filed by everyone.

I’m not even going to cover every issue involved in this order, just a few to make some points.

Another issue is the language of mountaineering, rock climbing and guiding is not totally understood by the court, so in some cases the decisions are not made for that reason. That can be because the court was not made away of the issues or the attempt to educate the court failed on the part of the parties.

First Issue: The activity giving rise to the injury is not covered.

The first issue is whether the activity giving rise to the injury is one that is covered under the insurance policy. The injured employee/contractor was not on the trip to learn; he just tagged along. He had not paid to attend the training and was not required to be there.

Because the insurance policy is unclear as to how it is interpreting what occurred, and the court is unclear on what relationship employee/contractor had while on the trip, the court determined it could not decide the issues on a motion for summary judgement.

Second Issue: Worker’s comp exclusion

In every general liability policy, there is an exclusion, no coverage for claims that should be insured by worker’s compensation. In this case that exclusion was called Employer’s Liability Exclusion. Employees in all states must be covered by worker’s compensation for any injury they receive while on the job. Since this person was claiming, in some aspects of the case, to be an employee, the general liability insurance company based on this exclusion should not have to pay for the damages.

The court refused to rule on this saying several of the statements made by the injured employee/contractor indicate he was not an employee.

Manchester was a participant acting outside the scope of his NMG employment at the time of his Injury. Manchester testified he had come to participate in the Activity because he “thought it would be fun.” Vulpis testified similarly: Manchester “came just to travel along the Tyrolean traverse. He wanted to try it out.” Manchester testified he never informed NMG he would be attending the Activity and further testified NMG did not know he would be attending. Manchester did not consider himself an employee or representative of Vulpis or Enberg at the time of the Injury.

At the same time, the court found several issues that indicated the injured employee/contractor was an employee at the time of his injury.

Most importantly, Manchester acknowledged he performed work for NMG as a Lead Backpacking Guide and Assistant Rock Guide. Vulpis and Manchester both testified Manchester came to be at Allamuchy State Park on the date of his Injury because Vulpis posted an invitation to a Facebook group whose members consisted only of NMG guides and staff Enberg testified although Manchester was not involved in setting up the Equipment and mostly observed others do so, Manchester did help Enberg “pull tension once, so just pull on a rope for me.” Enberg also testified, “[A]s far as I know, we just there all volunteering and testing the system.”

Until a jury determines the legal classification for the injured plaintiff, what insurance coverage is available cannot be decided.

Issue three: recission of the policy

Recission of an insurance policy is a rarely seen legal argument. It is granted when there is proof of fraud when entering into the contract. When there is recission of a policy, the court places the parties back in the position they were before the policy was issued. The insured gets a full refund, and the insurance company does not have to pay a claim.

“In the field of insurance, rescission has long been recognized as an available and necessary remedy to combat fraudulent behavior by an insured” It is settled that a material factual misrepresentation made in an application for insurance may justify rescission [of the resulting insurance policy] if the insurer relied upon it to determine whether or not to issue the policy” Rescission voids the [insurance policy] ab initio, meaning that it is considered ‘null from the beginning’ and treated as if it does not exist for any purpose.”

Here the insurance company was requesting recission of the policy because of fraudulent misrepresentation.

Rescission of an insurance policy for fraudulent misrepresentation is appropriate if four conditions are satisfied: (1) the applicant must make an “untruthful” representation to the insurer, (2) the representation must be “material to the particular risk assumed by the insurer,” (3) the insurer must “actually and reasonably rel[y] upon [the representation] in the issuance of the policy,” and (4) if the “insurance application . . . calls for subjective information,” then “the insured [must] kn[o]w that the information was false when completing the application.”

Again, the court would not rule on this motion because recission takes more than a mere oversight or honest mistake. It must be based on a specific intentional act or acts to defraud the insurance company. Here the answers placed on the policy were done so with the help of the insurance agent. And the court was not sure the acts of the insured were intentional. The other issue was, did the insurance agent supply the answers or where the answers supplied by the insured.

Fourth Issue: Projected Revenues

Most insurance policies are issued based on the projected revenues of the company. In rare instances, some outdoor recreation policies are issued based on expected user days. User days are used when it is easy to verify the number of user’s days, as in a whitewater rafting company working on river controlled by a federal land management agency which is also tracking user days. User days are the number or days a client is on the river. A half day counts as a full user day.

So, an insurance policy application has a place for the applicant to enter an estimate of the projected revenues for the season or year. Your premium is based on that number. When you sign the application, in most cases, you are also agreeing to be audited to make sure the number you put on the application is what your sales or income is. In this case, those projections were lower than the prior year.

Atain argues the projected amount listed on the Application was substantially lower than NMG’s actual revenue for the year preceding the Application and disproportionately less than the revenue NMG actually received in the Policy year.

The court rejected this argument because the projection was based on several factors that made the insured believe that his income was going to be lower that year.

First, Vulpis was divorcing his spouse, which he believed would impact NMG’s ability to remain in business. Second, Vulpis had hired new guides, and expected revenues would be lower while his new guides gained experience. Third, “a chronic, life-threatening auto-immune disease” hospitalized Vulpis shortly before he filed the Application, and he was “not sure [he] would live through” the year, “much less have any revenues in NMG.” Even taking those factors into account, the revenue Vulpis projected on the Application was approximately equal to NMG’s annual revenue two years prior to the Application, and was slightly lower than the average of the revenue for the preceding three years. Taking these facts in the light most favorable to NMG, a reasonable fact-finder could determine NMG did not knowingly misrepresent its projected income.

Fifth Issue: use of independent contractors

The outfitter specifically stated on the insurance application that he did not use sub-contractors or independent contractors. Then after the accident it came to light that some people working for the outfitter might be independent contractors.

The court did not accept this motion because it was unclear what the people working for the outfitter were. Also, the outfitter had been told by the insurance agent to say no on the application about sub-contractors or independent contractors.

You had two conflicting issues that prevented the appellate court from deciding this issue. The first was further complicated because the court felt the insurance did not understand what an independent contractor was.

Sixth Issue: Knowing Misrepresentation

The insurance company argued that the policy should be rescinded because the outfitter made knowing misrepresentations, about whether or not he was hiring independent contractors or used only employees.

The court through this motion because it felt the outfitter really did not know the difference.

Given the issue’s complexity, the Court is not surprised Vulpis’s testimony suggests he had genuine difficulty distinguishing between employees and independent contractors. Vulpis’s testimony concerning his thinking at the time demonstrates his confusion. For instance, Vulpis described his guides as “1099 employees,” something of a misnomer. When completing the Application, Vulpis discussed how to answer the “independent contractor” question with Donald Pachner, whose less-than-illuminating explanation was to describe the meaning of independent contractor as a “gray area Even when answering interrogatories in this case—presumably with the assistance of counsel—Vulpis initially described his guides as independent contractors, then amended his answer to strike that characterization. The Application does not instruct the applicant on the meaning of “independent contractor,” nor does it suggest which (if any) of the legal tests an applicant should apply—missing an opportunity to dispel Vulpis’s confusion.

The court stated:

The variety of tests creates a “paradoxical truth that even when the same person performs the same acts at the same time in the same place under the same conditions,” the person “may be considered an employee for one purpose and an independent contractor for another.”

The court recognized the issue that whether or not a person working for you is an independent contractor or not is not only confusing and constantly litigated by the courts, not necessarily something a non-lawyer can understand.

Viewed in the light most favorable to non-movant NMG, a reasonable fact-finder could determine Vulpis merely failed to appreciate every nuance of the difference between employees and independent contractors when he wrote on the Application NMG did not use independent contractors or subcontractors. Such a misunderstanding would constitute an “honest mistake,” not a “lie” or a “willful” falsification.

Seventh Issue: Failure to Maintain Signed Liability Waivers

This next issue is a two-factor issue. If the employee/contractor signed a release, he was probably not an employee and was either a contractor or guest. A release was a factor required by the insurance company. If a release was signed it would stop the lawsuit by the injured employee/contractor. A release or liability waiver signed by all participants was a condition of coverage under the policy.

If there was no release signed, then the injured employee/contractor was probably an employee and covered by Worker’s Compensation. Either way, a signed release or no release provided an out for the insurance company.

New Jersey law permits an insurer to escape liability for its obligations under an insurance policy if the insured breaches a condition of coverage, but only if the insurance carrier suffers appreciable prejudice from the breach.

There is a two-factor test under New Jersey law the insurance company must meet to win on a coverage condition argument.

“[F]irst, ‘whether substantial rights have been irretrievably lost’ as a result of the insured’s breach, and second, ‘the likelihood of success of the insurer in defending against the accident victim’s claim’ had there been no breach.”

Since the insurance company wrote the policy, the insurance company has the burden of proving both factors of the test.

The motion for summary judgment was denied because the outfitter said that he misplaced the waiver. An even bigger reason for not granting the motion was:

Second, even if Atain cannot obtain Manchester’s waiver in time to rely on the waiver against Manchester in the underlying state court litigation, the absence of Manchester’s waiver will not necessarily reduce “the likelihood of success of the insurer in defending against the accident victim’s claim.”

The court is probably correct in this statement because the injured guide had signed several releases previously. There was just not one for the day of the accident.

NMG has provided Atain with Manchester’s signed acknowledgment of receipt of NMG’s employee handbook, which contains a waiver form. Moreover, while Vulpis acknowledged he could not locate the forms, Vulpis testified Manchester had previously signed a waiver (1) when Manchester initially became was a customer of NMG prior to serving as a guide, and (2) for the year 2015, when Manchester served as a guide. The only contrary evidence is Manchester did not sign a waiver on the day of the Injury. Atain points to no evidence contradicting Vulpis’s testimony concerning Manchester previously signing a waiver before the day of the Injury. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to NMG, a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether NMG’s loss of Manchester’s waiver will appreciably prejudice Atain’s defense of Manchester’s underlying state court litigation.

At this point, the case is scheduled to proceed to trial.

So Now What?

1. I’ve said dozens of times, every person on a trip has to be identified as either an employee or a participant. If the person is an employee, they have to be listed on the worker’s compensation insurance. Everyone else, paying customer, friend, independent contractor or your mother-in-law must sign a release.

2. Independent contractors are a liability mess. Many companies attempt to use independent contractors because they believe it saves them state and federal taxes. It might. And it can be a good way to get a company started for the first several months. However, the issue of independent contractors has more traps than value.

There are no liability savings. As the outfitter or company, you are liable for any incident no matter if the person who caused the issues is an employee or independent contractor. If nothing else, you are liable for hiring an independent contractor who failed to do their job properly.

First contractors, especially in the outdoor industry, don’t have health insurance. So many, if injured, have no way to pay for their medical bills. Consequently, using independent contracts increases your chances of having a lawsuit, just like this one, because an independent contractor needs money to pay his or her medical bills and other bills when they can’t work.

On top of the other issues, proving someone is an independent contractor is very difficult. Many states have adopted the rule that says unless certain requirements are met, such a written contract, an independent contractor is an employee. An independent contractor has the right to show up at the job site at any time they want unless written differently in the contract. They should bring their own tools to work and have the freedom to make decisions. The only control the person hiring the contractor has over the independent contractor is to specify the job, the time frame, and how much they are going to pay for the job.

An even bigger issue for an employer is what is everyone else in the industry doing. If all of your competitors are using employees and not independent contractors, you face an insurmountable hurdle.

As the court stated:

Distinguishing independent contractors from employees is among the most contentiously litigated issues in courts today, arising in a host of different contexts, each with a different standard.

3. UNDERSTAND your insurance application, do not lie on it. If there are issues or questions, then attach a supplemental letter to the broker or to the policy explaining the decisions or answers on the application.

4. When you get your policy read it. You must know and understand all conditions of coverage. What must you do to make sure the policy covers you.

You also must know what you bought. Does the policy cover the activities that your company is doing? If in the summer you teach fishing at a pond and once in a while in the winter people ice skate on the same pond, you are more than a fishing guide and you better have coverage for ice skating.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

Who am I

Jim Moss

I’m an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the Outdoor Recreation Industry

I represent Manufactures, Outfitters, Guides, Reps, College & University’s, Camps, Youth Programs, Adventure Programs and Businesses

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn

If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.

Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com

James H. Moss

Iowa Supreme upholds release for injuries due to an accident on a zip line.

Posted: May 2, 2022 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Iowa, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Zip Line | Tags: Iowa, Iowa Law, Mt. Crescent Ski Area, Negligence, Safehold Special Risk, zip line, Zipline | Leave a comment

However, case goes to trial based on plaintiffs’ claims of gross negligence, which do not exist under Iowa law?

Lukken v. Fleischer, 962 N.W.2d 71 (Iowa 2021)

State: Iowa, Supreme Court of Iowa

Plaintiff: Thomas Lukken

Defendant: Korby L. FLEISCHER, individually and d/b/a Mt. Crescent Ski Area ; Samantha Fleischer, individually and d/b/a Mt. Crescent Ski Area; Mt. Crescent Ski Area, an unknown business entity; Safehold Special Risk, Inc., an Illinois corporation; Challenge Quest, LLC, an Oklahoma Corporation d/b/a Challenge Quest, LLC ; and Kirk Gregory Engineering, P.C., a Texas Corporation; KG Structural Solutions, LLC, a Texas Corporation; and Atlas Engineering, LLC, a Nebraska Corporation

Plaintiff Claims: Negligence and strict liability, and requesting punitive damages

Defendant Defenses: Release

Holding: Granted to specific defendants and reversed as to others

Year: 2021

Summary

A zipline braking system was not reset before the plaintiff slammed into the end. The plaintiff sued the original designer and installer of the zipline who had not designed or had anything to do with the new braking system that failed.

The court also found that the release protecting the zipline operator would not protect the zipline operator from claims of greater than ordinary negligence. What is confusing is Iowa does not recognize gross or willful and wanton negligence as a legal claim.

Facts

Thomas Lukken stepped off an elevated platform and sped down a zip line at the Mt. Crescent Ski Area. An employee at the end of the zip line had failed to reset the zip line’s braking system after the previous rider exited. By the time the employee realized his mistake, it was too late. Lukken slammed into a wooden pole at the base of the zip line and fractured his neck. He sued the zip line’s original designer and its owner. The district court dismissed the claims against the zip line’s designer primarily based on the fact that the braking system that failed to stop Lukken had been completely replaced by a different supplier before the incident. And the district court dismissed the claims against the zip line’s owner based on a liability waiver that Lukken signed before riding. Lukken appeals.

Double Diamond, Inc. d/b/a Mt. Crescent Ski Area (Mt. Crescent) operates a skiing and sledding business in winter months and offers other outdoor recreational activities, including zip lining, in warmer months. The zip line begins on a twenty-four-foot-high platform atop the ski hill. Harnessed riders travel down the zip line reaching speeds of up to forty miles per hour before landing on a lower thirty-three-foot-high landing platform at the bottom of the hill. The zip line extends 1576 feet from start to finish.

In April 2014, Mt. Crescent contracted with Challenge Quest, LLC, to build and install the zip line. Challenge Quest designed the zip line to have enough slack so that riders would nearly run out of momentum before reaching the landing platform. To bring riders nearing the landing platform to a complete stop, a small device with wheels that rode on top of the zip line and connected the rider’s harness to the zip line (referred to as a “trolley”) made contact with a padded brake block. The brake block connected to a rope-pulley system. An operator on the landing platform held onto a rope connected to the pulley and applied manual resistance to bring riders to a complete stop. This rope-braking feature slowed riders as the rope ran through the operator’s hands, with operators tightening or releasing their hold as needed to apply the appropriate amount of friction. Because slack in the zip line could cause riders to slide back away from the landing platform once a rider’s forward momentum stopped, the brake block also featured a capture arm that prevented riders from backsliding. The operator used the same rope-pulley system to pull stopped riders all the way onto the landing platform. After an operator unhooked a completed rider on the landing platform, the operator would use the same rope-pulley system to manually move the brake block back out for the next rider.

Challenge Quest completed construction of the zip line in August 2014. It then provided, as contemplated by the parties’ contract, a four day “site specific high technical training for full time staff,” including training on the braking system, after which it turned full control of the zip line over to Mt. Crescent. After the zip line opened to the public, Mt. Crescent’s operators in several instances failed to sufficiently slow riders using grip friction on the rope to control the brake block. Riders arrived at the landing platform at speeds in excess of six miles per hour, the maximum recommended by a trade association called the Association for Challenge Course Technology (ACCT), which develops safety standards for zip line courses. In some cases, these riders collided with the Mt. Crescent employees engaged in stopping them. A handful of injuries resulted, the most serious apparently being an injured ankle.

Mt. Crescent decided to consult with a different contractor about a different braking system than the original one Challenge Quest had installed. This new contractor, Sky Line, inspected Mt. Crescent’s zip line and recommended a “zipSTOP” braking system. Mt. Crescent had initially considered a zipSTOP braking system as part of the zip line that Challenge Quest designed but decided against it. Mt. Crescent agreed with Sky Line’s recommendation and hired Sky Line to install the zipSTOP system on its existing zip line. Sky Line completed the installation in July 2016. Mt. Crescent informed Challenge Quest of none of this.

Like the original braking system, the zipSTOP braking system also uses a brake block to bring riders to a complete stop. But instead of rope pulleys controlling the brake block using an operator’s hand resistance, the brake block uses a magnetic-resistance wheel to bring riders to a complete stop. The brake block automatically moves back to the correct position on the zip line in preparation for the next rider, but an operator must manually redeploy it before it will move.

Lukken rode Mt. Crescent’s zip line in October 2016 with the zipSTOP braking system in place. The Mt. Crescent employee on the landing platform forgot to redeploy the brake block after the rider ahead of Lukken finished. Lukken was already whizzing down the zip line toward the landing platform by the time the operator realized his mistake. The operator’s tardy redeployment of the zipSTOP braking system didn’t permit enough time for it to stop Lukken, and he crashed into a wooden pole at the base of the zip line and suffered a neck fracture.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Challenge Quest, holding that it breached no duty to Lukken and that it didn’t cause Lukken’s injuries. The district court reasoned that Challenge Quest owed no duty to Lukken because it had completed its work under its contract and transferred control of the zip line to Mt. Crescent by the time of the incident, and, further, that its actions were not the “cause” of Lukken’s injuries because it didn’t install the allegedly defective braking system in place when Lukken was injured.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The first claim pleaded by the plaintiff was the builder of the zip line owed him a duty of care. Under Iowa law “To maintain a claim for negligence, Lukken must prove that Challenge Quest owed a duty to protect him from the harm he suffered.”

To prove his claim the plaintiff argued:

Lukken contends that Challenge Quest owed a bevy of duties to Mt. Crescent, including a duty (1) to design and construct a zip line that complied with industry standards, (2) to provide Mt. Crescent appropriate instruction on how to operate the zip line, (3) to address Mt. Crescent’s safety concerns about the zip line, (4) to ensure that Mt. Crescent had procedures in place to train new employees, and (5) to address safety issues with Mt. Crescent arising in future safety inspections. Lukken argues that Challenge Quest owes each of these duties to Mt. Crescent and, based on the risk of physical harm to Mt. Crescent’s zip line riders, these duties extend to Lukken as well.

The court looked at the issue as one of control. Who had control of the zip line after Challenge Quest was no longer involved in the operation, maintenance or repair of the zipline.

Since Challenge Quest was no longer servicing the zip line and had been replaced by another company, Challenge Quest had no control over the zip line. That lack of control extended both to the design, installation and operation of the zipline as well as its operation on the day the plaintiff was injured.

So too here, once Mt. Crescent decided to replace the braking system, any machine- or human-related flaws in that system ceased to be Challenge Quest’s responsibility. Challenge Quest’s braking system didn’t fail; it no longer existed. Challenge Quest likewise had no connection to the actions of Mt. Crescent’s employee who failed to reset the brake in time to stop Lukken. The employee didn’t work for Mt. Crescent when Challenge Quest conducted its four-day technical training for Mt. Crescent employees prior to Mt. Crescent opening the course to the public. Challenge Quest had no role in the employee’s hiring, supervision, or instruction.

That lack of control extended to the new braking system. Challenge Quest did not design, install or operate the new braking system that was not reset properly on the day of the accident.

And Challenge Quest neither designed nor constructed the braking system that the employee failed to reset when Lukken rode the zip line. By that time, Sky Line’s zipSTOP braking system had replaced Challenge Quest’s original system. Challenge Quest owed no duty of care to prevent Mt. Crescent from changing the braking system. Because Challenge Quest owed no duty of care associated with the zip line’s braking system after its own braking system had been uninstalled, no cause of action for negligence exists as a matter of law, and the district court thus properly granted summary judgment in Challenge Quest’s favor.

Because there was no control over the zipline or braking system, Challenge Quest could not be held liable for the failure of the new braking system.

The Supreme Court then reviewed the dismissal of the complaint against the ski area based on the release.

Under Iowa law, releases are valid.

The court in its analysis of the arguments made by the plaintiff veered into the idea that a release under Iowa law cannot stop a claim for greater than normal negligence, (gross or willful and wanton negligence).

However, Iowa does not recognize any negligence other than ordinary negligence.

“Gross negligence” is not a distinct cause of action under our common law, but instead is a measure of conduct in a cause of action for negligence. “In this state, as is well known, the actionable character of negligence is not dependent upon its ‘degree,’ and the ancient differentiation into ‘gross,’ ‘ordinary,’ and ‘slight’ has come to mean little more than a matter of comparative emphasis in the discussion of testimony.” Under our common law “there are no degrees of care or of negligence in Iowa, and we thus do not recognize a tort cause of action based on “gross” negligence as distinct from “ordinary” negligence.

The court then wove through an intricate review of statute and case law to determine that although Iowa does not recognize greater than ordinary negligence, if greater than ordinary negligence is found in this case, the release will not stop a claim for it.

We therefore hold that the contractual waiver limiting Mt. Crescent’s liability is unenforceable to the extent it purports to eliminate liability for the willful, wanton, or reckless conduct that Lukken has alleged. To the extent Lukken’s claims against Mt. Crescent involve culpability that constitutes only negligent conduct (regardless of any degree of negligence), his claims fail as a matter of law based on the liability waiver.

So Now What?

The release could have stopped several more of the claims if it had been written better. Besides the ski area, the release could have protected the builder of the zip line and anyone who worked on the zip line after it was built.

As to the release, the Iowa Supreme Court seems to have not muddied the water but moved the entire river to a different stream bed. I do not know how to interpret a case where a release cannot apply to a legal claim that does not exist.

However, this analysis is not that far outside of the laws in most other states. It is just how the court got to this position that is confusing.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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James H. Moss

Lukken v. Fleischer, 962 N.W.2d 71 (Iowa 2021)

Posted: May 2, 2022 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Iowa, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Zip Line | Tags: Challenge Quest, Mt. Crescent Ski Area, Negligence, Release, Safehold Special Risk, zip line, Zipline | Leave a comment

962 N.W.2d 71

Thomas LUKKEN, Appellant,
v.
Korby L. FLEISCHER, individually and d/b/a Mt. Crescent Ski Area ; Samantha Fleischer, individually and d/b/a Mt. Crescent Ski Area; Mt. Crescent Ski Area, an unknown business entity; Safehold Special Risk, Inc., an Illinois corporation; Challenge Quest, LLC, an Oklahoma Corporation d/b/a Challenge Quest, LLC ; and Kirk Gregory Engineering, P.C., a Texas Corporation; KG Structural Solutions, LLC, a Texas Corporation; and Atlas Engineering, LLC, a Nebraska Corporation, Appellees.

No. 20-0343

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Submitted March 24, 2021
Filed June 30, 2021

Matthew A. Lathrop (argued) of Law Office of Mathew A. Lathrop, Omaha, Nebraska, and Robert M. Livingston of Stuart Tinley Law Firm, LLP, Council Bluffs, for appellant.

Thomas Henderson (argued) and Peter J. Chalik of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for Mt. Crescent appellees.

Joshua S. Weiner (argued) and Robert M. Slovek of Kutak Rock LLP, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellee Challenge Quest, LLC.

McDermott, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, Mansfield, McDonald, and Oxley, JJ., joined. Appel, J., filed an opinion concurring specially.

McDERMOTT, Justice.

Before riding on the zip line, Lukken signed a release and waiver-of-liability agreement in favor of Mt. Crescent. It stated in relevant part:

I am aware and fully understand that these activities are very dangerous. They involve the risk of damage, serious injury and death, both to myself and to others.

I understand that there are many potential causes for property damage, serious injury and death at Mt Crescent Ski Area including the negligence of Mt Crescent Ski Area, its owners, agents, employees, volunteer staff, rescue personnel, and equipment as well as my own negligence and the negligence of others.

In consideration of being permitted to participate in the activities offered at Mt Crescent Ski Area I hereby agree to release, waive, discharge, and covenant not to sue Mt Crescent Ski Area, its owners, agents, employees, volunteer staff, or rescue personnel as well as any equipment manufacturers and distributors involved with the Mt Crescent Ski Area facilities from any and all liability from any and all loss or damage I may have and any claims or demands I may have on account of injury to my person and property or the person and property of others, including death, arising out of or related to the activities offered at Mt Crescent Ski Area whether caused by the negligence of Mt Crescent Ski Area, its owners, agents, employees, volunteer staff, rescue personnel, equipment manufacturers, or distributors or otherwise.

….

In consideration of being permitted to participate in the activities offered at Mt Crescent Ski Area, I agree that this Release and Waiver of Liability, Assumption of Risk and Indemnity Agreement extends to any and all acts of negligence by Mt Crescent Ski Area, its owners, agents, employees, volunteer staff, rescue personnel, and equipment manufacturers, and distributors, including negligent rescue operations and is intended to be as broad and inclusive as permitted by Iowa law and that if any portion is held invalid, it is agreed that the balance shall continue in full legal force and effect.

He filed suit against Mt. Crescent (and related individuals and entities alleged to own it) and Challenge Quest (and related entities alleged to have participated in the zip line’s design and construction), pleading causes of action for negligence and strict liability, and requesting punitive damages.

The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Mt. Crescent, holding the waiver dispositive of the claims. The district court reasoned that Iowa courts consistently uphold exculpatory agreements and that the waiver at issue contained language sufficiently “clear and unequivocal” to demonstrate that Lukken understood he was waiving future claims of negligence. The court held that the express language of waiving “any and all negligence” waived all of Lukken’s negligence claims, including his claim for gross negligence. The district court declined to hold the waiver unenforceable based on public-policy grounds and held that the waiver wasn’t preempted by statute.

Lukken appeals each of the district court’s summary judgment rulings.

II.

We turn first to Lukken’s claims against Challenge Quest. Lukken pleaded claims against Challenge Quest under theories of both negligence and strict liability. Yet his summary judgment and appellate briefing contain no separate legal arguments distinguishing the two theories. He cites no products liability law despite the fact that his petition alleges claims for strict liability based on design defects in the zip line. He instead focuses solely on traditional negligence principles. We will thus analyze Challenge Quest’s liability through the lens of a negligence claim.

To maintain a claim for negligence, Lukken must prove that Challenge Quest owed a duty to protect him from the harm he suffered. See
Thompson v. Kaczinski , 774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009). Lukken contends that Challenge Quest owed a bevy of duties to Mt. Crescent, including a duty (1) to design and construct a zip line that complied with industry standards, (2) to provide Mt. Crescent appropriate instruction on how to operate the zip line, (3) to address Mt. Crescent’s safety concerns about the zip line, (4) to ensure that Mt. Crescent had procedures in place to train new employees, and (5) to address safety issues with Mt. Crescent arising in future safety inspections. Lukken argues that Challenge Quest owes each of these duties to Mt. Crescent and, based on the risk of physical harm to Mt. Crescent’s zip line riders, these duties extend to Lukken as well.

Whether a defendant owes a duty of care under particular circumstances is a question of law for the court. Hoyt v. Gutterz Bowl & Lounge L.L.C. , 829 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Iowa 2013). The district court in granting summary judgment held that Challenge Quest owed Lukken no duty of care for the injury he sustained. We review the district court’s holding for correction of legal error. Lewis v. Howard L. Allen Invs., Inc. , 956 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Iowa 2021).

The central issue here is the scope of Challenge Quest’s duty in regard to the braking system after the braking system had been replaced without Challenge Quest’s involvement. We have reiterated that, under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, control remains an important consideration in whether a duty exists and liability normally follows control. See
McCormick v. Nikkel & Assocs., Inc. , 819 N.W.2d 368, 371–73 (Iowa 2012). In McCormick v. Nikkel & Associates, Inc. , we held as a matter of law that a subcontractor owed no duty to assure the safety of a jobsite once it locked up the switchgear and transferred control back to the contractor. Id. at 373–75. So too here, once Mt. Crescent decided to replace the braking system, any machine- or human-related flaws in that system ceased to be Challenge Quest’s responsibility. Challenge Quest’s braking system didn’t fail; it no longer existed. Challenge Quest likewise had no connection to the actions of Mt. Crescent’s employee who failed to reset the brake in time to stop Lukken. The employee didn’t work for Mt. Crescent when Challenge Quest conducted its four-day technical training for Mt. Crescent employees prior to Mt. Crescent opening the course to the public. Challenge Quest had no role in the employee’s hiring, supervision, or instruction.

Lukken argues more specifically that Challenge Quest should have incorporated an emergency brake as part of its original braking system. But this argument fails, too, based on the replacement of the braking system and Challenge Quest’s lack of any control at that point. When Mt. Crescent decided to install a different braking system, it became the responsibility of Mt. Crescent and Sky Line to assure the safety of that system. Challenge Quest’s original braking system (without an emergency brake) apparently resulted in some minor mishaps until it was replaced in July 2016. Sky Line’s replacement braking system (without an emergency brake) had the potential to result in a more serious accident in the event of an operator’s error. It would be unfair to make Challenge Quest legally responsible for this replacement system. See
Huck v. Wyeth, Inc. , 850 N.W.2d 353, 381 (Iowa 2014) (reaffirming the “long-standing” rule that requires the plaintiff “to prove the defendant manufactured or supplied the product that caused her injury, and [declining] to extend the duty of product manufacturers to those injured by use of a competitor’s product”). In this case, to the extent any product failed, it wasn’t Challenge Quest’s product. Cf. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co. , 620 N.W.2d 819, 825 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (“[T]o establish assembler liability, the plaintiff must show that the assembler actually sold or otherwise placed the defective product on the market. Baughman [ v.
Gen. Motors Corp. , 780 F.2d 1131, 1132–33 (4th Cir. 1986)] (refusing to hold truck manufacturer liable for defective wheel rim that was placed on vehicle after sale and that manufacturer did not supply); Exxon [ Shipping Co. v. Pac. Res., Inc. , 789 F. Supp. 1521, 1522–23, 1527 (D. Haw. 1991)] (refusing to hold designer of mooring terminal liable for defective replacement chain).”) That Lukken claims the new, different product was similarly defective does not provide him a basis to pursue Challenge Quest for a defect in a product that Lukken never used and that didn’t injure him. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 15 cmt. b , illus. 2, at 232 (Am. L. Inst. 1998).

Lukken also contends that Challenge Quest’s zip line design defects caused riders to reach speeds in excess of ACCT’s standards, which left the braking system unable to safely stop him. But the record demonstrates that Sky Line independently examined the existing zip line, recommended the zipSTOP braking system, and (at Mt. Crescent’s direction) installed it. As the district court correctly found, the actions of Sky Line and Mt. Crescent cut off Challenge Quest’s liability. See
McCormick , 819 N.W.2d at 374 (noting that the party in control “is best positioned to take precautions to identify risks and take measures to improve safety”). In this case, when Mt. Crescent scrapped Challenged Quest’s original braking system and installed Sky Line’s zipSTOP braking system, Challenge Quest was relieved of any liability associated with insufficient stopping capacity or other defects in its original braking system.

Lukken further claims that Challenge Quest breached a duty to provide Mt. Crescent information, training, and policies to ensure Mt. Crescent’s safe ongoing operation of the zip line. Lukken asserts that had Challenge Quest instructed Mt. Crescent on safety procedures that included, for instance, operational redundancies or checklists, Mt. Crescent might have ensured the braking system was properly deployed and cross-checked before Lukken ever started down the zip line. But this claimed duty on Challenge Quest fails for reasons inherent in the different braking systems that were installed. The original braking system required an employee’s active, manual stopping efforts to ensure riders stopped at the landing platform. Yet the zipSTOP system stops riders through an automated brake that requires no similar manual exertion. Challenge Quest had no reason to provide the type of instruction or policies that would have caused Mt. Crescent’s employees to remember to redeploy an automated braking system that, at the time, didn’t exist on this zip line. Challenge Quest trained Mt. Crescent’s employees on how to stop a rider using the original manual stopping method; we see no basis to impose on Challenge Quest some requirement to provide instruction or procedures on operating a distinct braking system that hadn’t been installed. On these facts, Challenge Quest had no duty to provide training or policies on the safe operation of a braking system that relied on a completely different stopping mechanism and that required completely different actions by Mt. Crescent’s employees.

We thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Challenge Quest.

III.

We turn to the dismissal of Lukken’s negligence claim against Mt. Crescent.

The district court found that the waiver Lukken signed before riding the zip line was “broad in its inclusiveness and contained clear and unequivocal language sufficient to notify Plaintiff that by signing the document, he would be waiving all future claims for negligence against Defendants.” Lukken argues that even if the waiver’s language could be considered “clear and unequivocal,” Mt. Crescent’s negligence went beyond ordinary negligence and into the realm of gross negligence. He argues that the gross negligence alleged in this case involves conduct more culpable than the inadvertence or inattention of ordinary negligence and that, as a matter of public policy, Iowa courts should not enforce clauses that exculpate parties from grossly negligent conduct.

Exculpatory clauses, sometimes referred to as “hold harmless” clauses, relieve parties from responsibility for the consequences of their actions. “[W]e have repeatedly held that contracts exempting a party from its own negligence are enforceable, and are not contrary to public policy.” Huber v. Hovey , 501 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Iowa 1993). An enforceable waiver must contain “clear and unequivocal language” notifying a casual reader that by signing, she agrees to waive all claims for future acts or omissions of negligence. Sweeney v. City of Bettendorf , 762 N.W.2d 873, 878–79 (Iowa 2009). An intention to absolve a party from all claims of negligence must be clearly and unequivocally expressed in the waiver. Id. at 878–79 ; see also
Baker v. Stewarts’ Inc. , 433 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1988) (stating that an intent “to absolve the establishment from liability based upon the acts or omissions of its professional staff … must be clearly and unequivocally expressed”).

Exculpatory clauses reside at the intersection of tort law and contract law. Under tort law, courts generally permit a party to whom a duty of care is owed to pursue damages against another for acts that breach that duty if those acts were the factual cause of the harm and within the other party’s scope of liability. See
Thompson , 774 N.W.2d at 837. But under contract law, “parties of full age and competent understanding must have the greatest freedom of contracting, and contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, must be upheld and enforced by the courts.” 5 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 12:3, at 862–870 (4th ed. 2009). Not enforcing exculpatory clauses advances the interests of tort law (deterring unsafe conduct and compensating accident victims) but abridges parties’ power to contract; enforcing exculpatory clauses advances the parties’ power to contract but abridges tort remedies.

Courts attempt to strike a balance by not enforcing exculpatory contracts that contravene public policy. See
Wunschel L. Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh , 291 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Iowa 1980). Admittedly, courts have struggled to articulate a predictable framework for parties to anticipate which agreements will contravene public policy in a future given case and which will not. We have stated in general terms that courts should not enforce a contract that “tends to be injurious to the public or contrary to the public good.” Walker v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. , 340 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1983). Yet declaring contracts unenforceable as violating public policy “is a delicate power which ‘should be exercised only in cases free from doubt.’ ” Wunschel L. Firm, P.C. , 291 N.W.2d at 335 (quoting Richmond v. Dubuque & Sioux City R.R. , 26 Iowa 191, 202 (1868) ). We will not “curtail the liberty to contract by enabling parties to escape their valid contractual obligation on the ground of public policy unless the preservation of the general public welfare imperatively so demands.” Walker , 340 N.W.2d at 601 (quoting Tschirgi v. Merchs. Nat’l Bank of Cedar Rapids , 253 Iowa 682, 690, 113 N.W.2d 226, 231 (1962) ); see also
Robinson v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. , 816 N.W.2d 398, 408 (Iowa 2012) (” ‘[T]here is a certain danger in too freely invalidating private contracts on the basis of public policy.’ … To do so ‘is to mount “a very unruly horse, and when you once get astride it, you never know where it will carry you.” ‘ ” (alteration in original) (first quoting Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Centennial Ins. , 331 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 1983) ) (second quoting Grinnell Mut. Reins. v. Jungling , 654 N.W.2d 530, 540 (Iowa 2002) )). And yet, in Galloway v. State , we held that “public policy precludes enforcement of a parent’s preinjury waiver of her child’s cause of action for [negligently inflicted] injuries” on an educational field trip. 790 N.W.2d 252, 253, 256, 258 (Iowa 2010). But see
Kelly v. United States , 809 F. Supp. 2d 429, 437 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (anticipating that the North Carolina Supreme Court would enforce the parent’s liability waiver for fifteen-year-old’s high school enrichment program and describing Galloway as an “outlier”).

Lukken argues that we should not enforce an exculpatory clause against him that purports to release claims of “any and all acts of negligence” as contrary to public policy to the extent it includes claims of gross negligence. While we have never provided an all-encompassing framework for analyzing public-policy exceptions, in Baker v. Stewarts’ Inc. , we recited several factors that might be considered to determine whether a contract implicated a public interest. See 433 N.W.2d at 708. The district court in this case found that one of these factors—whether “the party seeking exculpation performs a service of great importance to the public which is of practical necessity for at least some members of the public,” id. —cut sharply against a finding that zip lining implicated a sufficient public interest to warrant interference with the parties’ contract. The district court noted that the Iowa Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion determined that snow sledding was a “purely recreational activity” and thus not a service of great importance or necessity to the public to justify applying the public-policy exception. Lathrop v. Century, Inc. , No. 01-1058, 2002 WL 31425215, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2002).

But this focus somewhat misconstrues Lukken’s argument. Lukken’s focus isn’t on whether Mt. Crescent may enforce an exculpatory clause for voluntary recreational activities (under Iowa law, it may), but whether Mt. Crescent may enforce an exculpatory clause that negates claims for more culpable conduct. Lukken argues that the district court’s ruling overlooks the differences between “ordinary” negligence and “gross” negligence, and thus overlooks the public-policy implications associated with the differences in the culpability of the conduct that he alleges.

In his summary judgment and appeal briefing, Lukken contends that gross negligence includes “wanton” conduct based on its description in Iowa Code section 85.20. That statute describes gross negligence as conduct “amounting to such lack of care as to amount to wanton neglect.” Iowa Code § 85.20(2) (2018); see also
Thompson v. Bohlken , 312 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1981) (en banc). Lukken recites cases that define gross negligence similar to wanton conduct (and wanton conduct’s close sibling, reckless conduct) as a basis for refusing to enforce contracts that include exculpatory clauses for gross negligence. Yet Lukken’s argument—that his gross negligence claim includes wanton or reckless conduct—glosses over a distinction in our cases between our common law conception of gross negligence and different statutory renderings of gross negligence.

“Gross negligence” is not a distinct cause of action under our common law, but instead is a measure of conduct in a cause of action for negligence. Unertl v. Bezanson , 414 N.W.2d 321, 326–27 (Iowa 1987) (en banc). “In this state, as is well known, the actionable character of negligence is not dependent upon its ‘degree,’ and the ancient differentiation into ‘gross,’ ‘ordinary,’ and ‘slight’ has come to mean little more than a matter of comparative emphasis in the discussion of testimony.” Denny v. Chi., R.I. & P. Ry. , 150 Iowa 460, 464–65, 130 N.W. 363, 364 (1911). Under our common law “there are no degrees of care or of negligence in Iowa,” Tisserat v. Peters , 251 Iowa 250, 252, 99 N.W.2d 924, 925–26 (1959), and we thus do not recognize a tort cause of action based on “gross” negligence as distinct from “ordinary” negligence. Hendricks v. Broderick , 284 N.W.2d 209, 214 (Iowa 1979).

Yet analysis of “gross negligence” appears frequently in our cases interpreting statutes that employ the term. See, e.g. , Thompson , 312 N.W.2d at 504 (interpreting the meaning of “gross negligence” in section 85.20 ); Sechler v. State , 340 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Iowa 1983) (en banc) (interpreting the meaning of “gross negligence” in section 306.41). In Thompson v. Bohlken , for instance, we analyzed the term “gross negligence” in section 85.20, which the statute describes as conduct “amounting to such lack of care as to amount to wanton neglect.” 312 N.W.2d at 504 (quoting Iowa Code § 85.20 (1977)). We determined that the term “gross negligence” under this statute included elements requiring proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the danger, the defendant’s knowledge that injury is probable (not merely possible) to result from the danger, and the defendant’s conscious failure to avoid the danger. Id. at 505. These elements generally track the definition of recklessness in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See
Leonard ex rel. Meyer v. Behrens , 601 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Iowa 1999) (per curiam) (relying on the definition of “recklessness” in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500, at 587 (Am. L. Inst. 1965) ).

But we have warned that conceptions of “gross negligence” deriving from statutory uses of that term are not to be applied beyond those statutes. In Sechler v. State , a case tried before Iowa’s adoption of comparative negligence, we defined gross negligence for purposes of Iowa Code section 306.41 (1983) as not to include wanton neglect. 340 N.W.2d at 761. We later stated that, “[f]ar from creating a new basis of liability, the ‘gross negligence’ discussed in Thompson was a restriction, not an expansion, of the scope of negligence suits.” Unertl , 414 N.W.2d at 327. The notion of gross negligence as including “wanton” conduct under section 85.20 thus is “a concept limited by its terms to workers’ compensation cases.” Id. at 326–27.

As a result, Lukken’s argument that common law gross negligence incorporates wanton or reckless conduct based on the description in section 85.20 doesn’t square with our cases. The district court, reciting our cases stating that gross negligence is simply another degree of ordinary negligence, determined that the exculpatory clause releasing “any and all negligence” likewise released Lukken’s gross negligence claims, and thus dismissed Lukken’s claims against Mt. Crescent.

Lukken’s confusion about how reckless or wanton conduct falls within the scope of gross negligence doesn’t end the analysis in this case, however, because Lukken in his petition alleged that Mt. Crescent engaged in not only negligent conduct but also willful, wanton, and reckless conduct. We have long recognized separate grounds for tort liability based on these more culpable types of conduct. See, e.g. , Leonard ex rel. Meyer , 601 N.W.2d at 80 (recognizing a cause of action in tort for reckless disregard for safety); see also
Hendricks , 284 N.W.2d at 214 (analyzing alleged reckless conduct separate from negligence).

Both the Restatements of Contracts and Torts disfavor exculpatory clauses that attempt to limit liability for harm caused recklessly or intentionally. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(1), at 65 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liab. § 2 cmt. d , at 20 (Am. L. Inst. 2000) (stating that generally “contracts absolving a party from intentional or reckless conduct are disfavored”).

The Restatement (Second) of Torts notes that “[i]n the construction of statutes which specifically refer to gross negligence, that phrase is sometimes construed as equivalent to reckless disregard” of the interest of others. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282 cmt. e , special n. 5, at 11. And so it has been in Iowa. Wanton conduct “involves the combination of attitudes: a realization of imminent danger, coupled with a reckless disregard or lack of concern for the probable consequences of the act.” Thompson , 312 N.W.2d at 505. While willfulness is “characterized by intent to injure,” wantonness is characterized by “indifference as to whether the act will injure another.” Id. (citing 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 102, at 452–53 (1971) ).

Many courts have considered in the same classification the concepts of wantonness, recklessness, and willfulness in declaring liability waivers unenforceable to the extent they seek to release such conduct. See, e.g. , Wolfgang v. Mid-Am. Motorsports, Inc. , 898 F. Supp. 783, 788 (D. Kan. 1995) (recognizing that under Kansas common law “any attempt to limit liability for gross negligence or willful and wanton conduct is unenforceable”); Moore v. Waller , 930 A.2d 176, 179 (D.C. 2007) (recognizing that courts generally don’t enforce exculpatory clauses limiting a party’s liability for “gross negligence, recklessness or intentional torts” (quoting Carleton v. Winter , 901 A.2d 174, 181 (D.C. 2006) )); Jones v. Dressel , 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (holding that “in no event will such an [exculpatory] agreement provide a shield against a claim for willful and wanton negligence”); Brady v. Glosson , 87 Ga.App. 476, 74 S.E.2d 253, 255–56 (1953) (holding an exculpatory clause unenforceable to relieve liability for willful or wanton conduct); Wolf v. Ford , 335 Md. 525, 644 A.2d 522, 525 (1994) (stating that “a party will not be permitted to excuse its liability for … the more extreme forms of negligence, i.e., reckless, wanton, or gross”); Anderson v. McOskar Enters., Inc. , 712 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that “any ‘term’ in a contract which attempts to exempt a party from liability for gross negligence or wanton conduct is unenforceable” (quoting Wolfgang , 898 F. Supp. at 788 )); New Light Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs. , 247 Neb. 57, 525 N.W.2d 25, 30 (1994) (holding that public policy prevents parties from limiting damages for “gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct”). We conclude that, consistent with the great weight of authority, exculpatory clauses purporting to negate liability for acts that are wantonly or recklessly committed generally violate public policy.

We therefore hold that the contractual waiver limiting Mt. Crescent’s liability is unenforceable to the extent it purports to eliminate liability for the willful, wanton, or reckless conduct that Lukken has alleged. To the extent Lukken’s claims against Mt. Crescent involve culpability that constitutes only negligent conduct (regardless of any degree of negligence), his claims fail as a matter of law based on the liability waiver. Yet Lukken maintains the opportunity, notwithstanding the liability waiver, to pursue against Mt. Crescent his claims of willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.

We reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling as to Mt. Crescent and, in light of this determination, need not address the plaintiff’s other arguments concerning the claims against Mt. Crescent in this appeal. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

All justices concur except Appel, J., who concurs specially.

APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).

I cannot join the majority’s overbroad duty analysis suggesting that because of lack of control, duty invariably evaporates. If the zip line was negligently constructed by Challenge Quest and a patron was injured as a result of the negligent design, a potential claim by the injured patron would not be defeated by a lack of duty. As noted by comment g of the Restatement (Third), section 49, a contractor no longer in possession “is subject to a duty of reasonable care as provided in § 7 for any risk created by the contractor in the course of its work.” 2 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical and Emotional Harm § 49 cmt. g , at 235 (Am. L. Inst. 2012). See generally
McCormick v. Nikkel & Assocs., Inc. , 819 N.W.2d 368, 377–83 (Iowa 2012) (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the duty of care for contractors after relinquishing possession of land). The analysis after a contractor is no longer in control of the premises concerns the fact-based questions of whether the risk was within the scope of liability and causation, not the legal question of duty. See generally
Morris v. Legends Fieldhouse Bar and Grill, LLC, 958 N.W.2d 817, 828–42 (Iowa 2021) (Appel, J., dissenting) (describing the proper analysis in most negligence cases rests with the fact questions of breach of duty and causation).

Generally, of course, these fact questions are not amenable to summary judgment. See
Thompson v. Kaczinski , 774 N.W.2d 829, 832 (Iowa 2009). But here, causation is not present with respect to the design of the braking system itself as the allegedly defective Challenge Quest system was entirely replaced by another independent vendor. To the extent there was an equipment defect in the braking system (i.e. not having an emergency brake), it was the defect in the new braking system, and not the original braking system, that caused the accident. And, the plaintiff showed no linkage between the unfortunate accident and the nebulous and allegedly insufficient training and safety policies, or the accident and the newly installed braking system (with a fundamentally different design from the original Challenge Quest system). So I concur in the district court’s conclusion that any claim against Challenge Quest fails. But this is an oddball case tightly controlled by its facts that should not be decided based on the legal principles of duty.

I concur in the majority’s holding with respect to the waiver of claims sounding in gross negligence.

Sheldon v. Retreat, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69461 (D. Colo. 2020)

Posted: April 25, 2022 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Challenge or Ropes Course, Colorado, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: challenge course, Golden Bell Camp and Conference Center, Golden Bell Retreat, Negligence, Release, Ropes Courses, The Colorado District Church of the Nazarene, Waiver | 1 Comment

Sheldon v. Retreat, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69461 (D. Colo. 2020)

JODI SHELDON, Plaintiff,
v.
GOLDEN BELL RETREAT d/b/a THE COLORADO DISTRICT CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE,
d/b/a GOLDEN BELL RANCH and GOLDEN BELL CAMP and CONFERENCE CENTER,
CROSS BEARING ADVENTURES, LLC, KENT FIELDEN MCILHANY, an individual,
and JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-cv-01371-REB-NYW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

April 20, 2020

Judge Robert E. Blackburn

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Blackburn, J.

The matters before me are (1) the Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Personal Injury Claims Against Golden Bell Retreat d/b/a The Colorado District Church of the Nazarene d/b/a Golden Bell Ranch and Golden Bell Camp and Conference Center [#42],1 filed January 21, 2020; and (2) Defendants Cross Bearing Adventures, LLC’s and Kent Fielden McIlhany’s Motion for Summary Judgment [#55], filed March 9, 2020. I grant both motions and dismiss plaintiff’s remaining claims with prejudice as against the named defendants and without prejudice as against the Doe defendants.

I. JURISDICTION

I have jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. §1332 (diversity of citizenship).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if the issue could be resolved in favor of either party. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Farthing v. City of Shawnee, 39 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10^th Cir. 1994). A fact is “material” if it might reasonably affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Farthing, 39 F.3d at 1134.

A party who does not have the burden of proof at trial must show the absence of a genuine factual dispute. Concrete Works, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1517 (10^th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1315 (1995). Once the motion has been properly supported, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show, by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence, that summary judgment is not proper. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1518. All the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10^th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 53 (1999).

III. ANALYSIS

On June 29, 2018, plaintiff Jodi Sheldon was seriously injured while participating in a high ropes course at the Golden Bell Ranch (“Golden Bell”). Ms. Sheldon sued Golden Bell under Colorado’s Premises Liability Act (“PLA”), §13-21-115, C.R.S. She also brought a claim of negligence against Cross Bearing Adventures (“CBA”), the company which constructed and inspected the course and trained Golden Bell employees on the safety and facilitation of various aspects of the course, and its owner, Kent McIlhany.2

All three defendants claim Ms. Sheldon’s claims are barred by a Waiver, Release and Indemnification Agreement (the “Waiver”) which she signed on May 18, 2018, prior to participating in the high ropes course. The Waiver provided, in relevant part,

I wish to participate in recreational activities to be made available to participants at Golden Bell Camp including activities that may be hazardous or otherwise involve a risk of physical injury or death to the participants (the”Activities”).

I expressly assume any and all risks of injury or death arising from or relating to the Activities including horseback riding, agricultural recreation and waive and release any and all actions, claims, suits or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever against Golden Bell Camp, its corporate affiliates, contractors, vendors, officer, agents, sponsors, volunteers or representatives of any kind (collectively “Releases”) arising from or relating in any way to my voluntary participation in these activities. I understand that this Waiver, Release and Indemnification agreement means, among other things, that if I am injured or die as a result of my participation in these activities, I and/or my family or heirs cannot under any circumstances sue Releases or any of them for damages relating to or caused by my injuries or death.

. . .

I agree to indemnify Releases or any of them and their subrogees, if any, in the event of any loss, damage or claim arising from or relating in any way to my participation in any of the Activities.

. . . .

I have read this Waiver, Release and Indemnification Agreement, have asked and received answers to any questions I had concerning its meaning and execute it freely, without duress, and in full complete understanding of its legal effect, and of the fact that it may affect my legal rights.

(CBA Motion App., Exh. C, Attachment 2.) Ms. Sheldon received the Waiver from her aunt3 after having been given a list of activities offered at Golden Bell and indicating her interest in participating in the high ropes course. (Id., Exh. C, Attachment 1 at 25-26.)

To begin, Ms. Sheldon does not oppose Mr. McIlhany’s motion to dismiss her claims against him personally. The uncontested evidence supports Mr. McIlhany’s assertion that all actions taken by him of which Ms. Sheldon complains were done in his capacity as a member, manager, and operator of CBA and that he never performed any services for Golden Bell in his individual capacity. Ms. Sheldon’s claims against Mr. McIlhany therefore will be dismissed with prejudice.

As for Ms. Sheldon’s claims against Golden Bell and CBA, they are precluded by the Waiver.4 Because this case implicates the court’s diversity jurisdiction, I apply Colorado law. Wade v. EMASCO Insurance Co., 483 F.3d 657, 665-66 (10^th Cir. 2007). Exculpatory agreements “stand at the crossroads of two competing principles: freedom of contract and responsibility for damages caused by one’s own negligent acts,” Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. 1989). Thus, although such agreements are generally disfavored, see B & B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl, 960 P.2d 134, 136 (Colo. 1998), and cannot “shield against a claim for willful and wanton conduct, regardless of the circumstances or intent of the parties,” Boles v. Sun Ergoline, Inc., 223 P.3d 724, 726 (Colo. 2010), “Colorado common law does not categorically prohibit the enforcement of contracts seeking to release claims of negligence,” Espinoza v. Arkansas Valley Adventures, LLC, 809 F.3d 1150, 1152 (10^th Cir. 2016).

Colorado courts have identified four factors which inform the decision whether to enforce an exculpatory agreement: “(1) the existence of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.” Brigance v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc., 883 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10t Cir. 2018) (quoting Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The first two Jones factors focus on public policy questions – asking whether the party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity. Meanwhile, the latter two factors focus on more party – and contract-specific questions – asking whether the release was fairly obtained and clearly and unambiguously expressed.

Patterson v. Powder Monarch, LLC, 926 F.3d 633, 639 (10^th Cir. 2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[I]f an exculpatory agreement satisfies any of the four factors, it must be deemed unenforceable.” Brigance, 883 F.3d at 1250. The determination of this question is a matter of law for the court. Jones, 623 P.2d at 376. See also Johnson v. Gold’s Gym Rockies, LLC, 2019 WL 1112374 at *3 (D. Colo. March 11, 2019).

The first two factors are generally inapplicable to businesses engaged in recreational activities, Patterson, 926 F.3d at 639; Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo. 2004), and the parties do not argue otherwise. See also Brigance, 883 F.3d at 1250-51, 1252-53 (citing cases). Nor is there any argument or evidence to establish that the third factor – whether the contract was fairly entered into – is applicable here. Indeed, because recreational activities are not considered either essential services or practically necessary, “a person is not ‘at the mercy’ of a business’s negligence when entering an exculpatory agreement involving recreational activities.” Brigance, 883 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Hamill v. Cheley Colorado Camps, Inc., 262 P.3d 945, 949-50 (Colo. App. 2011)).

Thus, whether the Waiver is enforceable turns exclusively on the fourth factor, “whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.” Jones, 623 P.2d at 376. In analyzing this factor, the court focuses on whether the parties’ intent to “extinguish liability . . . was clearly and unambiguously expressed.” Heil Valley Ranch, 784 P.2d at 785.

To determine whether the intent of the parties is clearly and unambiguously expressed, [Colorado courts] have previously examined the actual language of the agreement for legal jargon, length and complication, and any likelihood of confusion or failure of a party to recognize the full extent of the release provisions. [They] have even taken into account an injured party’s subsequent acknowledgment that he understood the meaning of the provision.

Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 467 (internal citations omitted).

Ms. Sheldon insists the Waiver is ambiguous as to whether the high ropes course was within the scope of the activities covered. I am not persuaded. Here, the Waiver defined the term “Activities” as “recreational activities . . . including activities that may be hazardous or otherwise involve a risk of physical injury or death to participants.” (Emphasis added.) The use of the term “including” plainly signifies that some – but not all – of the Activities covered by the Waiver will be hazardous or involve a risk of physical injury. Thus, even accepting Ms. Sheldon’s suggestion that a high ropes course is not a hazardous activity,⁵ her argument fails.

Nor does the Waiver’s failure to refer specifically to the high ropes course render it ambiguous with respect to the type of activities covered.⁶ Colorado law does not require “an exculpatory agreement describe in detail each specific risk that the signor might encounter.” Squires v. Breckenridge Outdoor Education Center, 715 F.3d 867, 873 (10^th Cir. 2013). Read in context, and considering not only its structure and language but also its purpose, the Waiver clearly and unambiguously applies to activities such as the high ropes course. See Patterson, 926 F.3d at 642. In this regard, Ms. Sheldon testified that prior to signing up for the high ropes course, she reviewed a list of activities offered by Golden Bell which, in addition to the high ropes course, also included “horseback riding,” an activity specifically referenced in and covered by the Waiver. (CBA Motion App., Exh. C, Attachment 1 at 25.) Moreover, nothing in the record suggests Ms. Sheldon would have been asked to sign a Waiver had she not requested to participate in the high ropes course. Given those circumstances, it “strains logic,” Squires, 715 F.3d at 874, to suggest Ms. Sheldon was confused or misled as to the fact that she was being asked to waive potential claims of negligence associated with the high ropes course. See also Hamill, 262 P.3d at 952 (exculpatory waiver enforceable against parent who signed on behalf of minor child where parent knew activities that were offered at camp; “An agreement with such plain and unambiguous terms will not fail because one of the parties, in hindsight, now claims to have misunderstood the scope of that agreement . . . based on ambiguities not readily apparent within the four corners of the agreement.”).7

Relatedly, the Waiver also clearly bars Ms. Sheldon’s claims against CBA. “A person not a party to an express contract may bring an action on such contract if the parties to the agreement intended to benefit the non-party, provided that the benefit claimed is a direct and not merely an incidental benefit of the contract.” E.B. Roberts Const. Co. v. Concrete Contractors, Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 865 (Colo. 1985). The Waiver specifically protects Golden Bell’s “contractors” and “vendors” from claims “arising from or relating in any way to [Ms. Sheldon’s] voluntary participation in these activities.” (CBA Motion App., Exh. C, Attachment 2.) Clearly, the Waiver was intended to cover parties like CBA in precisely the situation presented by this lawsuit. Moreover, the benefit thus conferred is directly related to its purpose – to absolve such parties from liability for claims of negligence.

Ms. Sheldon’s suggestion that the Wavier is ambiguous as to whether contractors and vendors are covered for all purposes or only when they are on site is meritless. The Waiver plainly is intended to have the broadest possible scope, applying to claims “arising from or relating in any way” to Ms. Sheldon’s participation in the covered activities. Clearly, the parties intended to absolve contractors from claims they were negligent in any way in relation to the subject activities, regardless whether that negligence happened on site at the time of the event. I thus find and conclude that the Waiver clearly and unambiguously bars Ms. Sheldon’s claims against CBA as well.

Ms. Sheldon’s remaining arguments attempting to avoid the effect of the Waiver are likewise unavailing. The Waiver does not fail for lack of consideration. Contrary to Ms. Sheldon’s arguments, the mere lapse of time between her payment to participate in the activity and the date the waiver was delivered to Golden Bell is not fatal to its enforcement. Instead, the pertinent question is whether the release of liability was a contract modification or rather is part of the same transaction and thus enforceable without additional consideration. See Patterson, 926 F.3d at 638 (“[E]ven aside from the question of timing, we are persuaded based on the nature and circumstances of the transaction that the payment and exculpatory agreement here . . . are better viewed as part of the same transaction, rather than as a subsequent contract modification.”) (citing Mincin, 308 F.3d at 1109).8

I am similarly unpersuaded by Ms. Sheldon’s suggestion that the Waiver fails due to either unilateral or mutual mistake. The doctrine of mutual mistake permits a party to rescind a contract “if all parties labored under the same erroneous conception of the contract’s terms and conditions.” In re Estate of Ramstetter, 411 P.3d 1043, 1051 (Colo. App. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Sheldon has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that such is the case here. Cabs, Inc. v. Hartford Insurance Group, 151 Fed. Appx. 604, 610 (10^th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Buckeye Gas Products Co., 797 P.2d 11, 13 (Colo. 1990).

For one thing, it is not clear that Ms. Sheldon’s asserted mistake – that Golden Bell’s high ropes course had been licensed by the state of Colorado – was sufficiently similar to Golden Bell’s mistake – that it did not require such a license – to warrant application of the doctrine at all.⁹ Assuming arguendo that it does, however, the doctrine of mutual mistake permits reformation of the contract “where both parties’ understanding of their agreement is contrary to the terms of a written instrument due to a drafting error[.]” Tatonka Capital Corp. v. Connelly, 390 F.Supp.3d 1289, 1294 (D. Colo. 2019), as modified on reconsideration, 2019 WL 5535226 (D. Colo. Oct. 25, 2019), appeal filed, 2019 WL 5535226 (10^th Cir. Nov. 25, 2019) (No. 19-1450). See also Casey v. Colorado Higher Education Insurance Benefits Alliance Trust, 310 P.3d 196, 207 (Colo. App. 2012) (“A mutual mistake claim requires a showing that both parties were laboring under the same erroneous conception of the contract’s terms and conditions.”) See also Ranch O, LLC v. Colorado Cattlemen’s Agricultural Land Trust, 361 P.3d 1063, 1066-67 (Colo. App. 2015) (doctrine of mutual mistake applies only to mistakes going to a “basic assumption” underlying the contract).10

No term of the contract here addressed whether Golden Bell had, or was required to have, a state-issued license. Thus, any mistake as to that fact “did not create any ambiguity regarding the terms or substance of the [Waiver].” Shoels v. Klebold, 375 F.3d 1054, 1067 (10^th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1302 (2005). The Colorado Supreme Court long ago warned that courts “should not sanction, under the guise of reformation, the insertion in [contracts] of a new term or provision which was never even in the minds of the parties, let alone assented to by them.” Segelke v. Kilmer, 360 P.2d 423, 427 (Colo. 1961). “To order reformation under these circumstances is to rewrite, not to reform, the instruments.” Id. Just so here. I thus find the Waiver is not infirm based on mutual mistake.

I likewise reject Ms. Sheldon’s suggestion that she may avoid the waiver’s effect under the doctrine of unilateral mistake. “[A] unilateral mistake by one party to a contract can permit reformation if the evidence demonstrates that, at the time the contract was formed, the non-mistaken party was aware of the mistaken party’s mistake.” Tatonka Capital Corp., 390 F.Supp.3d at 1299. Thus, one party’s unilateral mistake may permit reformation where “the other engaged in fraud or inequitable conduct.” Poly Trucking, Inc. v. Concentra Health Service., Inc., 93 P.3d 561, 563 (Colo. App. 2004). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (contract may be avoided based on unilateral mistake where “(a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or (b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake”); Shoels, 375 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Powder Horn Constructors, Inc. v. City of Florence, 754 P.2d 356, 364 (Colo.1988) (“[E]quity will not allow a party to knowingly take advantage of a mistake of another.”)).

None of these circumstances pertains here. It cannot be unconscionable to enforce an exculpatory contract which, like this one, is enforceable under Colorado law. Moreover, there is no hint in the record that Golden Bell knew or had reason to know that Ms. Sheldon did not know its high ropes course was not licensed by the state. Nor is there evidence to suggest Golden Bell was required to make its licensing status known to participants or that it purposefully hid its licensing status from Ms. Sheldon. At best, the evidence suggests Golden Bell’s website made it appear the camp’s activities were open to the general public, which if true would have rendered them subject to inspection and licensing by the state.11 Yet there is neither argument nor evidence that Ms. Sheldon even consulted, much less relied on, Golden Bell’s website in deciding to participate in the high ropes course or sign the Waiver.12 I thus find and conclude that the Waiver is not voidable based on unilateral mistake either.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the named defendants are entitled to summary judgment, and Ms. Sheldon’s remaining claims against them will be dismissed with prejudice. Although the caption of this case named a number of unknown John Doe defendant corporations who may have had “ownership and control of the subject obstacle activity (Complaint ¶ 10 at 3 [#1], filed May 13, 2019), with discovery now closed, Ms. Sheldon has not identified any such entities. These defendants therefore also should be dismissed, albeit without prejudice.13
See Culp v. Williams, 2011 WL 1597686 at *3 (D. Colo. April 27, 2011) (because Doe designation is not permitted where “plaintiff’s ignorance of the defendant’s true identity is the result of willful ignorance or lack of reasonable inquiry,” Doe defendants dismissed where case had been pending for more than a year and plaintiff failed to show “good reason as to why [it] ha[d] been unable to obtain the true identity of these unnamed Defendants”).

V. ORDERS

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. That the Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Personal Injury Claims Against Golden Bell Retreat d/b/a The Colorado District Church of the Nazarene d/b/a Golden Bell Ranch and Golden Bell Camp and Conference Center [#42], filed January 21, 2020, is granted;

2. That Defendants Cross Bearing Adventures, LLC’s and Kent Fielden McIlhany’s Motion for Summary Judgment [#55], filed March 9, 2020, is granted;

3. That plaintiff’s remaining claims against defendants are dismissed as follows:

a. That the remaining claims of plaintiff against defendants, Golden Bell Retreat d/b/a The Colorado District Church of the Nazarene d/b/a Golden Bell Ranch and Golden Bell Camp and Conference Center; Cross Bearing Adventures, LLC; Kent Fielden McIlhany, an individual, are dismissed with prejudice; and

b. That the remaining claims of plaintiff against defendants, John Doe Corporations 1 through 10 are dismissed without prejudice;

4. That judgment shall enter as follows:

a. That judgment with prejudice shall enter on behalf of defendants, Golden Bell Retreat d/b/a The Colorado District Church of the Nazarene d/b/a Golden Bell Ranch and Golden Bell Camp and Conference Center; Cross Bearing Adventures, LLC; and Kent Fielden McIlhany, an individual, and against plaintiff, Jodi Sheldon, as to all remaining claims for relief and causes of action asserted herein;

b. That judgment without prejudice shall enter on behalf of defendants, John Doe Corporations 1 through 10, and against plaintiff, Jodi Sheldon, as to all remaining claims for relief and causes of action asserted herein;

5. That judgment shall enter further in accordance with my Order Adopting Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [#35], filed January 8, 2020;

6. That the combined Final Pretrial Conference and Trial Preparation Conference scheduled for June 11, 2020, at 10:00 a.m., is vacated;

7. That the trial scheduled to commence on June 29, 2020, is vacated;

8. That defendants are awarded their costs, to be taxed by the clerk in the time and manner required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1; and

9. That this case is closed.

Dated April 20, 2020, at Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

/s/_________
Robert E. Blackburn
United States District Judge

——–

Footnotes:

1. “[#42]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a specific paper by the court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I use this convention throughout this order.

2. Ms. Sheldon’s claims of negligence and fraudulent concealment against Golden Bell were dismissed previously as preempted by the PLA. (See Order Adopting Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge [#35], filed January 8, 2020.)

3. Ms. Sheldon, who is a resident of Illinois, attended Golden Bell as part of a large family reunion.

4. I reject Ms. Sheldon’s suggestion that I should defer ruling on this motion until after Golden Bell’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is completed. Pursuant to Rule 56(d), to warrant such action, Ms. Sheldon must “show[] by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, [she] cannot present facts essential to justify [her] opposition.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d). No such affidavit or declaration has been submitted in support of Ms. Sheldon’s request. The request also violates D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d), which provides that “[a] motion shall not be included in a response or reply to the original motion. A motion shall be filed as a separate document.” I therefore deny this request and consider the summary judgment motions as submitted.

5. Frankly, however, this argument strains credulity. I would be hard pressed to find that it is not inherently risky to be suspended many feet above the ground, regardless of safety measures taken to mitigate the risk. Moreover, Ms. Sheldon’s subjective belief that the ropes course was not inherently dangerous is irrelevant. See Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc., 127 F.3d 1273, 1275 n.1 (10t Cir. 1997) (“Plaintiffs’ subjective intent is inadmissible to overcome the parties overt manifestation of intent in the releases because the language in these agreements is clear and unambiguous.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

6. Ms. Sheldon’s reliance on the district court’s decision in Schlumbrecht-Muniz v. Steamboat Ski & Resort Corp., 132 F.Supp.3d 1310 (D. Colo. 2015), is misplaced. There, although the agreement at issue clearly and unambiguously released the defendant from claims related to the plaintiff’s participation in “the Event” (a ski race), it was not clear that it covered injuries the plaintiff sustained after she finished competing in that event. See id. at 1315. There is no such ambiguity here. Ms. Sheldon was injured while participating in the “activities” which were the subject of the Waiver.

7. I further reject Ms. Sheldon’s argument that her claim of gross negligence against Golden Bell cannot be waived. Assuming such is the case as a matter of law, as a matter of fact, Ms. Sheldon failed to plead such a claim.

8. In reaching its determination, the Mincin court relied on two state court decisions which reached similar conclusions. See Mincin, 308 F.3d at 1109 (citing Beehner v. Cragun Corp., 636 N.W.2d 821, 829 (Minn. Ct. App.2001) (“This court has held that an exculpatory agreement signed after a fee to participate in a recreational activity has been paid is part of the same transaction and is therefore enforceable without additional consideration other than permission to participate in the activity.”), and Hewitt v. Miller, 521 P.2d 244, 248 n.3 (Wash. App. 1974) (concluding that release signed by scuba diving student after payment of fee was an integrated part of the whole transaction and was thus supported by original consideration)).

9. At the time Ms. Sheldon participated in the high ropes course, the course was not licensed by the Colorado Division of Oil and Public Safety (“OPS”) because Golden Bell believed itself subject to a “private event” exception, as its activities were available only to persons staying at the camp or its associated RV park and not open to the general public. However, because Golden Bell charged a separate fee for participation in activities at the camp to groups making use of the RV park, OPS found Golden Bell was not entitled to the benefit of this exclusion. Golden Bell resolved the violation by changing the way in which it offers its activities to guests of the RV park. OPS waived the fine assessed and considered the matter resolved as of August 23, 2019. (See Pl. Resp. App. [#52], Exh. J, Golden Bell Motion App., Exhs. A & B.)

10. Even where the doctrine of mutual mistake is otherwise applicable, however, a party is not entitled to reformation where she was “‘aware, at the time the contract is made, that [she] ha[d] only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treat[ed] [her] limited knowledge as sufficient.'” In re Estate of Ramstetter, 411 P.3d 1043, 1051 (Colo. App. 2016) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b)). Such is arguably the case here as well.

11.
See supra, note 6.

12. These same reasons preclude Ms. Sheldon’s belated assertion that Golden Bell engaged in fraud which would invalidate the Waiver. Otherwise, this argument is so woefully undeveloped and unsupported by citation to any legal authority that I decline to consider it. See Bird v. Regents of New Mexico State University, 619 Fed. Appx. 733, 766 (10^th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (arguments which re “conclusory, unsupported, and undeveloped” “are insufficient to overcome summary judgment “); Center for Biological Diversity v. Pizarchik, 858 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1230 n.11 (D. Colo. 2012) (court does not consider “cursory, unsupported, or otherwise inadequately briefed arguments”). To the extent Ms. Sheldon believed she required further discovery to make this argument, she has forfeited any such argument. See supra, note 4.

13. Without knowledge as to how any such corporations may be related to or associated with Golden Bell, it is impossible to say whether they would be covered by the Waiver and thus entitled to dismissal with prejudice. Cf. Roper v. Grayson, 81 F.3d 124, 126 (10^th Cir. 1996); Bustamante v. Board of County Commissioners of San Miguel County, 2009 WL 10706928 at *5 n.7 (D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2009).

——–

Just because your son died, does not mean you get money

Posted: January 19, 2022 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Oregon, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Cause, fatality, Injury, Mt. Bachelor Ski and Summer Resort, Negligence, skiing, snowboarding, Tree Well | Leave a comment

https://rec-law.us/3qXgQ5b

State: Oregon

Most non-attorneys think this way. I got hurt; therefore, someone owes me money. I even got an email from someone who admitted they were not paying attention and walked off the curb and were injured. They wanted to sue. They did not know who to sue, but simply because they were injured, they thought they were owed money.

Or in this example, it may be pain. I hurt because I lost a loved one, therefore, you owe me money.

In this case, there are two different lawsuits going against Mt. Bachelor for two tree well deaths that occurred on the same day four years ago. The father of one of the deceased made this statement in the article.

“If you have four accidents on the highway, they will fix that turn; they will do something,” Braun said Friday. “They will close it, they will fix it.”

When someone has a duty to keep the highways safe, then that occurs. However, most states do not owe you a duty to keep highways safe. The poor father’s knowledge of how the law works is going to confuse him even more when he loses his lawsuit.

And I suspect that his deceased son was not skiing fresh powder because it was easy, because there was no risk. Skiing is risky and most of us ski for that risk.

What’s worse, is the writer is supporting this misinformation by writing about it. If it is in the news, it must be true.

It is a perfect combination to write a bad article to make someone feel worse. The only people who are going to “win” in this mess is the writer, who will move on and the attorneys.

It also appears that the plaintiff’s attorneys are not skiers or boarders. Allegedly, the complaint has an allegation that Mt. Bachelor is negligent because the ski area did not “mark the tree wells or monitor them.”

If Mt. Bachelor or anyone knew where the tree wells were, or even if there was a way to find them, I suspect they would. But if you have never skied fresh power after a dump, you have no idea what you are complaining about.

Why Is This Interesting?

It’s sad more than anything.

@MtBachelor #Lawsuit #SkiFatality @RecreationLaw #SkiLaw #SkiAreaLaw #RecLaw #RecreationLaw #OutdoorRecreationLaw #OutdoorLaw #OutdoorIndustry

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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

N.H. Fish & Game Dep’t v. Bacon, 167 N.H. 591, 116 A.3d 1060, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 34

Posted: July 19, 2021 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Legal Case, New Hampshire, Search and Rescue (SAR) | Tags: act negligently, argues, award damages, Costs, Damages, dislocated, Hike, Hiking, hip, ledge, memorandum, Mountains, Negligence, negligent act, Prior Injury, reasonable cost, Rescue, rock, SAR, Search and Rescue, Standard of Care, Trail, Trial court, winds | Leave a comment

N.H. Fish & Game Dep’t v. Bacon, 167 N.H. 591, 116 A.3d 1060, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 34

Supreme Court of New Hampshire

January 15, 2015, Argued; April 30, 2015, Opinion Issued

No. 2014-158

New Hampshire Fish and Game Department v. Edward Bacon

Prior History: [***1] 6th Circuit Court — Concord District Division.

NEW HAMPSHIRE OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES

NH1.[] 1.

Negligence > Standard of Care > Ordinary and Reasonable Care

The search and rescue response statute plainly is intended to create a statutory cause of action in favor of the New Hampshire Fish and Game Department to recover the costs it incurs in conducting a search and rescue operation for a person whose negligent conduct required such an operation. Whether or not a common law duty exists, a plaintiff may maintain an action directly under a statute if a statutory cause of action is either expressed or implied by the legislature. Also plain is that the statute imposes as the duty of care the common law standard of negligence, which has been defined as how a reasonable person would be expected to act under the same circumstances. Thus, in order to avoid liability for search and rescue costs, the defendant must have acted in a manner that was reasonable under all of the circumstances. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in using the common law standard of negligence to evaluate defendant’s conduct under the statute. RSA 206:26-bb.

NH2.[] 2.

Appeal and Error > Standards of Review > Generally

The court will uphold the trial court’s findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous. It is within the province of the trial court to accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever evidence was presented, including that of the expert witnesses. The standard of review is not whether the court would rule differently than the trial court, but whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial court based upon the same evidence. Thus, the court defers to the trial court’s judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in the testimony, measuring the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence.

NH3.[] 3.

Negligence > Proceedings > Generally

In determining that a hiker was liable under the search and rescue response statute for his rescue costs, the trial court properly found that he was negligent when he had undergone multiple hip surgeries, had an artificial hip that had dislocated five times, had trained in a city park that did not remotely resemble the challenging mountain terrain he [*592] would experience, had continued his hike despite the fact that bad weather had been forecast days in advance and when he encountered high winds and rain early on, and chose to jump backward over a rock ledge he was unable to pass. RSA 206:26-bb.

NH4.[] 4.

Negligence > Proximate Cause > Tests and Standards

To establish proximate cause a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct caused or contributed to cause the harm.

NH5.[] 5.

Damages > Practice and Procedure > Generally

In reviewing damage awards, the court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Furthermore, the court will not disturb the decision of the fact-finder unless it is clearly erroneous. The law does not require absolute certainty for recovery of damages. The court does, however, require an indication that the award of damages was reasonable.

NH6.[] 6.

Negligence > Damages > Particular Cases

The damage award of $9,186.38 against a rescued hiker who was found to have been negligent under the search and rescue response statute was reasonable when it represented the costs for the 15 people who participated in the rescue, including overtime, mileage, and benefits. The hiker’s argument that the Fish and Game Department employees were on duty and would have been paid regardless of their participation in the rescue failed to take into account the overtime paid, and also ignored the fact that by being diverted to the rescue operation, the employees were unable to perform their other assigned duties. RSA 206:26-bb.

NH7.[] 7.

Environment and Natural Resources > Game and Fish > Particular Matters

The search and rescue response statute specifically states that the New Hampshire Fish and Game Department is to receive the reasonable costs associated with a rescue. Nothing in the statute otherwise limits the Department’s recovery, and the court will not add limiting language to the statute that the legislature did not include. RSA 206:26-bb.

NH8.[] 8.

Statutes > Generally > Legislative History or Intent

A court interprets legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.

Counsel: Joseph A. Foster, attorney general (Philip B. Bradley, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Seufert, Davis & Hunt, PLLC, of Franklin (Brad C. Davis on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

Judges: LYNN, J. DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.

Opinion by: LYNN

Opinion

[**1062] Lynn, J. The defendant, Edward Bacon, appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Boyle, J.), following a bench trial, finding that he violated RSA 206:26-bb (2011) (amended 2014) by acting negligently while hiking, so as to require a search and rescue effort by the plaintiff, the New Hampshire Fish and Game Department (Department), and that he, thus, was responsible to the Department for the reasonable costs associated with the search and rescue. We affirm.

The following facts are established by the record. On September 16, 2012, the defendant began a five-day solo hiking trip in the White [*593] Mountains, during which he planned to hike several mountains with summits over 5,000 feet. At the time of the hike, the defendant was fifty-nine years old, had undergone four hip surgeries since 2005, and had an artificial hip that had dislocated on five occasions, twice [***2] during the prior year. The defendant also had a “bad back” and was taking a variety of medications for multiple ailments. In preparation for his hike, the defendant trained in a city park in Michigan, which had 250-foot hills and some “gravelly” spots. The conditions on the Franconia Ridge Trail between Liberty and Little Haystack Mountains, on which the rescuers eventually located the defendant, are rocky and steep in various locations.

[**1063] On September 18, the defendant left the Liberty Springs campsite to begin a planned hike to the summits of Liberty, Little Haystack, Lincoln, and Lafayette Mountains; he planned to end at the Greenleaf Hut, which provides overnight accommodations to hikers. Days in advance, stormy weather had been forecast for the morning the defendant began the hike, and rain began a few hours after he departed the campsite. A bit later, the defendant’s pack cover “on its own accord came off and flew away in the wind.” Sergeant Brad Morse, a Conservation Officer with the Department who helped rescue the defendant, testified that the winds were among the worst he had ever experienced in that part of the Franconia Ridge Trail and had repeatedly blown him to the ground. [***3] Sometime that morning, the defendant slipped on loose gravel, slid down the trail, hit his pack on a rock, and lost his tent which fell down a ravine. At noon time, the defendant took a photograph of two other hikers he encountered on the trail, both of whom were wearing full rain gear with their hoods over their heads.

At around 1:00 p.m., the defendant encountered a waist-high rock ledge that he needed to traverse in order to continue on the trail. He attempted to jump backward up onto the ledge and, in the process, fell and dislocated his hip. Approximately one hour later, Morse received an alert that a hiker had dislocated his hip and needed assistance. He responded immediately and eventually located the defendant on the trail between Little Haystack and Lincoln Mountains. Morse testified that when he found the defendant his left leg was flexed and internally rotated, the very position that the defendant’s orthopedic surgeon had warned him to avoid due to his hip replacement.

Approximately fifteen Department personnel and thirty-five volunteers participated in the defendant’s rescue during the afternoon and evening of September 18 and into the early morning hours of September 19. [***4] When Lieutenant James Kneeland visited the defendant in the hospital after his rescue, the defendant explained that he had misread the weather report: he thought the forecast called for 30-40 mph winds with gusts up to 70 mph and heavy rain, instead of the actual forecast of 30-40 mph winds increasing [*594] to 70 mph and heavy rain. The defendant also told Kneeland that he had caught his left leg while attempting to jump backward up onto a rock ledge and dislocated his artificial hip when he fell.

The defendant testified to a different version of events at trial. For instance, he testified that he was unaware of the weather conditions on the day of the hike because he did not have his reading glasses with him, and that he did not encounter any significant rain or wind. Additionally, he testified that when he dislocated his hip he had not fallen, as he told Kneeland, but instead had jumped backward over a rock ledge and swung his legs up while perfectly maintaining his left leg to avoid flexion and internal rotation.

At the close of the trial, the court accepted closing memoranda from both parties. Thereafter, the court found for the Department “for all of the reasons cited in the plaintiff’s [***5] closing memorandum,” and awarded the Department $9,334.86 in damages. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider, to which the Department objected. The court denied the defendant’s motion, stating that “[t]he actions of the defendant were a gross deviation from those of a reasonable person that surpasses the [negligence] standard required.” This appeal followed.

The defendant raises three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the trial [**1064] court erred by judging his conduct under an ordinary negligence standard which, he asserts, is not the standard mandated by RSA 206:26-bb. Second, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that his actions while hiking were negligent, thus necessitating his rescue by the Department. Third, he argues that the court’s damages award was improper under RSA 206:26-bb because the award included recovery for expenses that the Department would have incurred regardless of its effort to rescue him. We address each argument in turn.

The defendant first argues that the court erred by applying the ordinary negligence standard to determine his liability under RSA 206:26-bb. He characterizes this standard as “incorrect,” and asserts that the court should instead have [***6] applied “the full and complete” civil standard of negligence, although he fails to articulate how this standard differs from the standard of “ordinary negligence.”

To resolve this issue we must engage in statutory interpretation. HN1[] “Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” [*595]
Appeal of Local Gov’t Ctr., 165 N.H. 790, 804, 85 A.3d 388 (2014). “In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Id. “We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.” Id. “We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result.” Id.

NH[1][] [1] We have not previously had occasion to construe the search and rescue response statute. It provides, in pertinent part:

HN2[] I. [A]ny person determined by the department to have acted negligently in requiring a search and rescue response by the department shall be liable to the department [***7] for the reasonable cost of the department’s expenses for such search and rescue response. The executive director shall bill the responsible person for such costs. Payment shall be made to the department within 30 days after the receipt of the bill, or by some other date determined by the executive director. If any person shall fail or refuse to pay the costs … the department may pursue payment by legal action … .

RSA 206:26-bb. HN3[] This statute plainly is intended to create a statutory cause of action in favor of the Department to recover the costs it incurs in conducting a search and rescue operation for a person whose negligent conduct required such an operation. See Marquay v. Eno , 139 N.H. 708, 714, 662 A.2d 272 (1995) (“Whether or not a common law duty exists, … a plaintiff may maintain an action directly under [a] statute if a statutory cause of action is either expressed or implied by the legislature.”). Also plain is that the statute imposes as the duty of care the common law standard of negligence, which we have defined as how a reasonable person would be expected to act under the same circumstances. See Gelinas v. Metropolitan Prop. & Liability Ins. Co., 131 N.H. 154, 161, 551 A.2d 962 (1988). Thus, in order to avoid liability for search and rescue costs, the defendant must have hiked in a manner that was reasonable under [***8] all of the circumstances. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in using the common law standard of negligence to [**1065] evaluate the defendant’s conduct under RSA 206:26-bb.

The defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence upon which to find that he acted negligently, resulting in his need for rescue by [*596] the Department. In particular, the defendant takes issue with the fact that the trial court’s order stated that it found for the Department “for all of the reasons cited in the plaintiff’s closing memorandum.” He asserts that, in so doing, the court improperly adopted as its findings the facts recited in the Department’s memorandum — which facts, he claims, are not supported by the evidence. We disagree.

NH[2][] [2] HN4[] We will uphold the trial court’s findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous. Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780, 829 A.2d 1059 (2003). “It is within the province of the trial court to accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever evidence was presented, including that of the expert witnesses.” Id. “Our standard of review is not whether we would rule differently than the trial court, but whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial court based upon the same [***9] evidence.” Id. “Thus, we defer to the trial court’s judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in the testimony, measuring the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence.” Id.

We first consider the defendant’s argument that the trial court’s findings are not supported by the evidence because the court adopted the Department’s closing memorandum, which he claims relied upon findings that were also not supported by the evidence. Having reviewed both the evidence presented at trial and the Department’s closing memorandum, we reject the defendant’s argument that the Department’s closing memorandum was not supported by the evidence.

NH[3][] [3] We next consider whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that the defendant acted negligently. As previously stated, a person violates RSA 206:26-bb by not acting as a reasonable person would have acted under the same circumstances. The defendant argues that he did not act negligently because he was prepared for the conditions, physically capable, had proper equipment, and had adequately planned his hike. The trial court concluded to the contrary when it found that the defendant did not act as a reasonably [***10] prudent hiker would have acted under the same circumstances. The following facts, recited by the Department in its memorandum and based upon the evidence, support the trial court’s conclusion: the defendant had undergone multiple hip surgeries; he had an artificial hip that had dislocated five times, twice within the year prior to his hike; he had trained in a city park that did not remotely resemble the challenging terrain he would experience in the White Mountains; he had continued his hike despite the fact that bad weather had been forecast days in advance and that he encountered high winds and rain early into his hike; and he chose to jump backward over a rock ledge he was unable to pass, despite his artificial hip and experience with hip dislocation.

[*597] NH[4][] [4] To the extent that the defendant argues that his injury was not foreseeable, we agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the defendant’s injury was foreseeable and directly caused his need to be rescued by the Department. See Estate of Joshua T. v. State , 150 N.H. 405, 408, 840 A.2d 768 (2003) (stating that HN5[] to establish proximate cause a plaintiff must show “that the defendant’s conduct caused or contributed to cause the harm”). For the foregoing reasons [**1066] we conclude that the trial court’s determination [***11] that the defendant acted negligently does not lack evidentiary support and is not legally erroneous. See Cook , 149 N.H. at 780. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s ruling.

Finally, the defendant argues that the court’s damages award was improper because it included wages and mileage for on-duty Department officers who would have been paid regardless of their participation in the rescue operation. In essence, he claims that the damages provide a windfall to the Department. We disagree.

NH[5][] [5] HN6[] “In reviewing damage awards, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Gallentine v. Geis, 145 N.H. 701, 703, 765 A.2d 696 (2001) (quotation and brackets omitted). “Furthermore, we will not disturb the decision of the fact-finder unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The law does not require ‘absolute certainty’ for recovery of damages.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We do, however, require an indication that the award of damages was reasonable.” Id.
RSA 206:26-bb states that “any person determined by the department to have acted negligently in requiring a search and rescue response by the department shall be liable to the department for the reasonable cost of the department’s expenses for such search and rescue response.” (Emphasis [***12] added.)

NH[6][] [6] The trial court awarded $9,186.38 in damages to the Department, plus costs and interest. At trial, Kneeland testified that this amount represented the Department’s costs for the fifteen personnel who participated in the rescue, and included overtime, mileage, and benefits. These figures were contained in a document entitled “Search and Rescue Mission Report,” which was admitted by stipulation as a full exhibit. This detailed, itemized report, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Department, indicates that the trial court’s damages award represented the “reasonable costs” associated with the rescue, as required by RSA 206:26-bb.

NH[7,8][] [7, 8] We reject the defendant’s argument that this sum provides a windfall to the Department because certain officers were on duty and thus would have been paid regardless of their participation in his rescue. Not only does this argument fail to take into account the overtime paid to [*598] Department employees who would not have worked in the absence of the rescue, but it also ignores the fact that, by being diverted to the rescue operation, Department employees were unable to perform their other assigned duties. HN7[] The statute specifically states that the Department is [***13] to receive the “reasonable costs” associated with the rescue. RSA 206:26-bb. Nothing in the statute otherwise limits the Department’s recovery, and we will not add limiting language to the statute that the legislature did not include. See Appeal of Local Gov’t Ctr., 165 N.H. at 804 (HN8[] “We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.”). Because the trial court’s damages award of $9,186.38, plus costs and interest, is reasonable, and thus is not clearly erroneous, we uphold it.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

South Dakota in Federal District Court decision seems to allow a release to stop the claims for a minor.

Posted: October 19, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Risk Management, Snow Tubing, South Dakota | Tags: appreciated, assumption of the risk, bottom, Careless, Collisions, deliberate, depo, descended, descent, genuine, Gross negligence, Guests, Negligence, nonmoving, Reckless, recommends, Release, Resort, Slope, slower, Snow Tubbing, State of Mind, station, tear, top, Tubbing, tube, tubers, Wanton, Willful and Wanton | 2 Comments

Release was effective in stopping ordinary negligence claims; however, the gross negligence claims were allowed to continue.

Reed v. Union Resort, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225856, 2018 WL 8332583

State: South Dakota, United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, Western Division

Plaintiff: Brad Reed, Individually and as Joint Limited Conservators of I.R., a Minor; and Tara Reed, Individually and as Joint Limited Conservators of I.R., a Minor

Defendant: Union Resort, LLC, dba Mystic Miner

Plaintiff Claims: negligence and gross negligence

Defendant Defenses: Release

Holding: For both plaintiff and defendant, but proceeding to trial

Year: 2018

Summary

The minor child was injured on a tubing hill when her tube stopped in the middle of the hill, and she was hit and injured by her brother coming after her. The release the parents signed stopped the ordinary negligence claim but under South Dakota, law did not stop a claim for gross negligence.

There was no discussion in the decision as to whether the release stopped the claims of the minor child, the injured plaintiff. It just seemed to be taken for granted by the court, or at least not argued by the plaintiffs.

Facts

On March 13, 2015, Brad and Tara Reed brought their children to the defendant’s resort near Lead, South Dakota, for an afternoon of recreational snow tubing.1 The resort was owned and operated by Union Resort, LLC, dba Mystic Miner. Among the Reeds’ children with them that day was seven-year-old I.R. Accompanying the Reeds were another couple and Alex, a social worker from the Philippines.

Upon arriving shortly before noon, the Reed party entered the lodge area where customers are required to check in and purchase admission tickets for the resort. The Reeds purchased snow tubing day passes for themselves and their children, including I.R. As a condition of allowing I.R. to use the resort, Union required the Reeds to agree to a written release of liability. The Reeds signed the release and printed the names of each of their children, including I.R., as participants.

The Reeds understood the document was a release of liability agreement and that, by signing, they would be relinquishing certain unspecified rights. They did not ask any questions about the release. The release informed resort participants that tubing activities are extremely hazardous and can result in personal injury. The Reeds understood that tubing carried with it a degree of risk, including risk of trauma to the head, and that I.R. would be exposed to this risk.

After signing the release and paying the admission fee, the Reeds and their kids received individual tickets for the tube park. Those tickets included additional warnings.

At the resort, there are numerous bright red signs that provide instructions and warnings to participants. Among the messages on some of the signs was a warning that collisions with other tubers was one of the dangers of tubing. Other signs instructed the tubers to follow the attendant’s instructions and to wait for the attendant’s signal before starting [down the tube run]. The Reeds do not recall whether they saw or read any of these signs.

The Reeds were directed to select tubes from the resort’s selection of tubes, which they did. Defendant had approximately 50 to 70 tubes in inventory at the time, but there is no evidence how many of these tubes had already been selected by prior guests. No employee of defendant selected the tubes for the Reeds. Several defendant employees testified at their depositions that it was a practice at the resort to leave tubes with tears in the bottoms in circulation for guests to use. The employees explained that such tubes were slower and slower equated to safer in their minds.

During the Reeds’ stay at the resort, they went down the tube runs approximately 15 to 20 times. Two of the four tube runs at the resort were open that day. During the Reeds’ runs, there were two defendant employees at the bottom of the tube runs assisting guests with the tow rope (which towed guests to the top of the run).

On approximately two of the Reeds’ 15-20 tubing runs, there was a young man at the top of the tube runs who also appeared to be a resort employee with a radio in his possession. However, the young man never monitored the tube runs, never gave instructions to tubers, and never staged tubers going down the tube runs. “Staging” means controlling the entry of guests onto the tube runs to ensure that the prior tuber has finished the run and cleared the area before the next tuber is allowed to begin his or her descent. There was no staging and, instead, tubers decided themselves when to begin their descent, a situation Brad Reed described as a “free-for-all.”

At approximately 2 p.m., the Reeds decided to take one last run down the tube runs before leaving the resort. Up to this point, the Reeds had experienced no concerns or incidents. Up to this final run, I.R. had always completed her run down the slope as part of a group or with one of her parents. On the final run, she asked to be allowed to go down the tube run by herself, to which her parents agreed. Mrs. Reed told I.R. they would go down the run together, parallel to each other in each of the two open tube runs. At this point, Alex was directly behind I.R. in line for the same tube lane. Mr. Reed was behind Alex in the same line.

Once both lanes were clear, Mrs. Reed and I.R. began their descents. Mrs. Reed went all the way down the run, but I.R.’s tube stopped approximately 3/4 of the way down the slope. While I.R. was stopped, Alex began her descent before I.R. cleared the lane. When Alex’s tube reached I.R.’s tube, they collided. No defendant employee told Alex to begin her descent, but no defendant employee was present at the top of the run to tell her, instruct her, or prevent her from beginning her descent until I.R. cleared the lane.

From the top of the slope, Mr. Reed testified Alex should have been able to see I.R. had not cleared the lane had Alex been paying attention. Mr. Reed himself was able to observe the collision from his vantage point at the top of the slope.

After the accident, the Reeds observed an approximately 8-inch hole in the bottom of I.R.’s tube that had filled with snow. Defendant asserts it was its policy to stow the tubes under the deck each night and to pull them out the next day for guests’ use. Defendant asserts employees were directed to observe the tubes for significant tears or defects and to remove defective tubes during this process. However, several defendant employees testified they left tubes with tears in their bottoms in rotation for guest use because the tears would slow the tuber down as they descended the slope. Employees believed a slower descent was a safer descent.

If a lightweight child descended the slope with a tube with a tear in it, sometimes the tube would stop mid-way down the slope and a defendant employee would have to walk up the slope to retrieve the child. In such an instance, the defendant employee at the bottom of the slope would radio the employee at the top and tell them to stop sending guests down the slope until the child was retrieved and taken to the bottom.

No photograph was taken of I.R.’s tube at the beginning of the day, after the accident, or at any other time on the day of the accident. It is unknown if the tear in the bottom of her tube was there from the start of the day or whether the tear occurred during the Reeds’ use of the tube that day. The Reeds mixed and mingled the various tubes they checked out, so several members of the Reeds’ group could have used the accident tube at various times of the day.

The accident tube was the only tube checked out by the Reed group that had a tear in it. The Reeds did not notice the tear until after I.R.’s injury. The Reeds did not inform anyone at the resort about the tear in the tube after the accident occurred. There is no evidence that any defendant employee had specific knowledge that the Reeds had checked out a tube with a tear in it on the day of the accident, though defendant employees had general knowledge that such tubes were often retained in inventory because they were perceived to be “safer” because they were slower.

From the beginning of the 2010-11 season through the end of the 2014-15 season, defendant had incident reports of 17 collisions of tubers. During that same time frame, there were 72 total incident reports.3 Several of these collisions between tubers occurred within a few weeks and, in two examples, a few days, of I.R.’s collision. Specifically, there were 5 incident reports involving collisions between tubers going down the tube lane between December 30, 2014, and February 27, 2015. None of defendant’s incident reports record whether a hole in a tube contributed to the incident.

Defendant maintains that it had a proper protocol of having at least one employee at the top of the tube run and one employee at the bottom of the tube run at all times. The employee at the top of the tube run was supposed to “stage” the tubers going down. The employee at the bottom of the tube run would retrieve items lost by tubers going down the slope (hats, mittens, etc.) and also retrieve guests whose tubes stopped without fully descending the slope.

The Reeds assert defendant was chronically understaffed and that defendant made a deliberate decision not to station an employee at the top of the tube run the day of I.R.’s accident. Defendant asserts the Reeds have no evidence to support the assertion that the decision not to station an employee at the top of the tube run was a deliberate decision.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The plaintiff’s conceded that the release barred their claims for negligence, the first count in their complaint. That left the issue of whether the release barred their claims for gross negligence and whether they had pled enough facts to support a gross negligence claim.

Gross negligence under South Dakota law is the same as willful and wanton conduct:

Under South Dakota law, the phrase “gross negligence” is synonymous with the phrase “willful and wanton misconduct.” Both phrases refer “to a category of tort that is different in kind and characteristics than negligence.” Negligence occurs when one acts with an “unreasonable risk of harm to another.” Willful and wanton misconduct requires a risk of harm that is “substantially greater than that which is necessary to make the conduct negligent.” The threatened harm “must be an easily perceptible danger of death or substantial physical harm.”

The major difference between ordinary negligence and gross negligence is the mental state of the defendant.

In addition, proof of a negligence claim focuses on the ordinary standard of care, while a gross negligence claim focuses on the defendant’s mental state. A defendant acts willfully and wantonly when it knows or has reason to know at the time of its actions of the dire risk and proceeds without concern for the safety of others. The standard does not require proof of intent to harm, but it does “partake to some appreciable extent … of the nature of a deliberate and intentional wrong.” Gross negligence requires “an affirmatively reckless state of mind.” There must be “a conscious realization that a serious physical injury was a probable, as distinguished from a possible (ordinary negligence), result of such conduct.”

That creates a two-step test to determine if the defendant was grossly negligent.

Summarizing the above case law, gross negligence is distinguished from ordinary negligence by two factors. The risk of harm must be greater for gross negligence—whereas under ordinary negligence, the risk of harm can be anything from negligible harm to death, the risk of harm for gross negligence must be death or serious harm. Secondly, the likelihood that harm will come about, phrased in terms of the defendant’s state of mind, must be greater. For example, if there is a 10 percent chance some harm will happen and the defendant fails to take steps to ensure that harm does not come about, he is merely negligent. If there is an 85 percent chance serious harm or death will happen and the defendant fails to take steps to ensure the harm does not occur, he has acted willfully and wantonly or with gross negligence.

The court’s analysis of the chance of the harm occurring is a way of looking at the differences between ordinary and gross negligence that I have never seen before.

The court looked at the facts as presented by both sides and found both lacking the information the court felt would prove the plaintiff’s case. However, the court made this statement.

Under the law of gross negligence, South Dakota has recognized a plaintiff will rarely have direct evidence of the defendant’s state of mind. Rather, state of mind must be inferred from the circumstances. Id. Also, under the law of summary judgment, all inferences from the facts must be made in favor of the nonmoving party, Both sources of law, then, support taking the Reeds’ view of the inference to be drawn from the fact that defendant was chronically understaffed and did not have an employee stationed at the top of the tube run at the time of I.R.’s accident.

So, with the inferences created by the plaintiffs about the state of mind of the tubing hill, the court held that there was enough information plead to allow the gross negligence claim to continue.

The court then looked at the assumption of the risk argument made by the defendant. There was no case law in South Dakota stating that assumption of the risk was a defense to gross negligence, so the court held that assumption of the risk would not stop the gross negligence claim.

So Now What?

What did not arise in this case is whether the release stopped the claims of the minor child. The case was captioned as the parents suing on behalf of their minor child. In that regard, the release would bar the claims of the parents. However, this is a different way of suing on behalf of a minor, not away normally done in most states any more.

Also, this is a decision by a Federal District Court applying South Dakota law so, whether a not a release stops a minor’s claims is probably still up in the air until the South Dakota Supreme Court decides the issue.

However, it is a decision to lean on if you have participants who are minors in your program.

The other issues are classic situations where the defendant looks at a situation one way as a positive for patrons but the injured patron is able to turn the situation around and use it as a club against the defendant. Torn tubes were regarded by the defendant as good because they were slower than the other tubes. However, a torn tube is not a product that is 100%, in the condition it was received from the manufacturer. It was a defective product. So, the plaintiff was able to show the defendant was derelict in using them.

If they placed the tubes in a different location with a sign that said, slower tubes it might have been helpful.

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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

tube, tubers, resort, top, slope, guests, collisions, tear, bottom, wanton, deliberate, recommends, descent, genuine, depo, reckless, station, appreciated, descended, nonmoving, slower

Putting a saddle on a horse does not turn a livery into a saddle manufacturer. Release stops negligence claims and law stops product liability claims.

Posted: October 12, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Colorado, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Customers, Horse, horse-back, lease, Manufacturer, mutual, Mutual Mistake, Negligence, Product liability, Reformation, Release, ride, Saddle, Service, Stables, Trail, Waiver, Wanton, willful, Willful and Wanton | Leave a comment

A woman who fell off a horse while on a horseback ride. She sued for negligence, which the release stopped, product liability which the law stopped and willful and wanton conduct, which will proceed to trial.

Messer v. Hi Country Stables Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2675, 2013 WL 93183

State: Colorado; United States District Court for the District of Colorado

Plaintiff: Alva Messer

Defendant: Hi Country Stables Corporation

Plaintiff Claims: negligence; product liability; and, willful and wanton conduct

Defendant Defenses: Release

Holding: Mostly for defendant, however plaintiff could continue on willful and wanton claims

Year: 2013

Summary

A woman purchased a trail ride from the defendant. On the ride, her saddle slipped, and she fell off the horse. She sued for negligence which the release stopped, product’s liability, which failed because the stable is not a manufacturer and willful and wanton conduct. The court allowed the willful and wanton claim to proceed.

Facts

On July 16, 2009, Plaintiff Alva Messer purchased a guided horseback ride from Hi County Stables. Defendant HCS operates commercial horse-back riding at Glacier Creek Stables in Rocky Mountain National Park (“RMNP”). HCS is one of two equestrian companies owned by Rex Walker. The other equestrian company is Sombrero Ranches, Inc. (“SRI”). Before beginning any guided horseback ride, both companies require customers to sign an exculpatory contract, titled “Release” (hereafter “the Release” or “Release Forms”). The Release Forms for HCS and SRI are identical, except for the name of the company being released from liability. The Release Forms for HCS and SRI are printed in tablets containing 100 tear-away forms per tablet. Once printed, the printing company delivers the tablets to the offices of HCS and SRI.

At the start of the 2009 riding season, one tablet of Release Forms labeled SRI was placed in a box of office supplies for delivery to HCS. For reasons that are unexplained by Defendant, those same Release Forms—which Released SRI from liability—were used by HCS at Glacier Creek Stables on July 16, 2009.

Typically, when customers arrive at HCS, they are informed that they must sign a Release. Amongst other employees at HCS, Dallas Marshall informs customers that they are required to sign the Release and “mark their riding ability.”

When the Messers arrived at HCS on July 16, 2009, Marshall followed her normal practice and informed the Messers of the Release. She also requested that they indicate their riding ability, which Plaintiff did. Following this, and before commencing the guided horseback ride, Plaintiff signed the Release. The Release expressly provides that the customer “understands. . .the specific risks. . .arising from riding a horse. . .and that the [customer] nevertheless intentionally agree[s] to assume these risks.”

After signing the Release, Plaintiff entered the corral where she was assigned her horse before commencing the trail ride. The wrangler who led the guests on Plaintiff’s trail ride was Terry Humphrey.

Plaintiff encountered problems with her saddle during the trail ride which required adjustment by Plaintiff and Humphrey.

At the midway point, the Messer group stopped to take a rest break. Plaintiff encountered further problems with her saddle—including slippage of the saddle to the horse’s right.

Sometime later, as Plaintiff’s horse was stepping down a “rock stair” in the trail, Plaintiff fell off the right side of the horse (the “Incident.”) Plaintiff allegedly sustained serious injuries and economic loss resulting from the Incident.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The first issue was the fact the release that was signed did not name the proper defendant. Two stables were owned by the same person, each with different names. Each had a release that named it as the entity being protected. Somehow, a pad of the wrong releases ended up at the defendant, and the release signed by the plaintiff had the name of a different stable on it then where she was riding.

To make changes in a contract like this is called reformation. The court can reform a contract if the party’s intention when signing the contract is the same, and the language does not express the correct intention of the parties.

Reformation of a written instrument is appropriate only when the instrument does not represent the true agreement of the parties and the purpose of reformation is to give effect to the parties’ actual intentions.” Mutual mistake of a contract provides grounds for reformation if the written instrument “does not express the true intent or agreement of the parties.”

A mutual mistake must have occurred for a reformation to be effective.

An “essential prerequisite to a court’s power to reform a contract on the ground of mutual mistake is the existence of a prior agreement that represents the actual expectations of the parties and provides the basis upon which a court orders reformation.”

Because it was obvious that the plaintiff intended to go on a horseback ride with the defendant, where she signed the release, where she paid her money and where she took the ride, the court had no problems correcting the mutual mistake and placing the correct language in the release. This meant placing the name of the defendant in the position of the person to be protected by the release.

Accordingly, the Court finds that there was a mutual mistake at the time the Release was entered into. Mutual intent of the parties was to enter into an agreement whereby HCS would be released from certain claims. This provides the equitable basis to grant the relief. The Court orders that the name “Sombrero Ranches, Inc.” (SRI) be deleted and substituted with “Hi Country Stables” (HCS) in the Release.

The next issue was the validity of the release itself. Under Colorado law, there is a four-part test that a release must pass to be valid.

To determine whether the Release bars Plaintiff’s negligence claim, the Court must consider four factors: (1) the existence of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.

The first three parts of the test the court quickly covered. Prior Colorado Supreme Court cases held that a recreational activity owes no duty to the public; horseback riding is not an essential service that would bar the release under part two of the test and there was no evidence the release was entered into unfairly.

The fourth test the court also found was valid with this release.

It was obvious that the intent of the parties was to decide in advance who would pay for the injuries of any patron of the ride. The release in this case repeatedly used the word negligence throughout the document so the plaintiff knew the purpose of the release. The release also pointed out specific risks of horseback riding that the signor could suffer.

The release was valid to stop the negligence claims.

The next issue was the product liability claim. The plaintiff argued that since the defendant had placed the saddle in the stream of commerce, by placing it on the horse, it was liable for any injuries caused by the defectiveness of the saddle.

The defendant argued that the release stopped this claim also. However, the law in Colorado is that a release cannot stop a product liability claim.

That case held that an agreement releasing “a manufacturer from strict products liability for personal injury, in exchange for nothing more than an individual consumer’s right to have or use the product, necessarily violates the public policy of this jurisdiction and is void.”

The court found the product liability claim was not barred by the release. However, the court did hold that just placing a saddle on a horse for a trail ride does not create a product liability claim for defective equipment in Colorado. Horseback riding is a service; it is not a manufacturing process. Placing a saddle on the horse does not change that. The horse-riding service could not exist (for 99.9% of the people) without the saddle.

Plaintiff entered into a contract for a guided five-hour horseback ride through RMNP. This service primarily relied upon a horse (which is not a product) and a saddle (which incidental to that service). Without a product, the product liability claims cannot succeed.

The saddle was not an item manufactured by the defendant; it was incidental to the service being offered by the defendant and so the product liability claim failed. Finally, the defendant was not a manufacturer of saddles.

The final issues were the claims for willful and wanton conduct. A release cannot bar claims that are greater than negligence, willful and wanton conduct or gross negligence.

Willful and wanton conduct claims are mental state claims. Meaning the claim goes to the actions, the mental state of the defendant in ignoring or creating the issue. This require conscious thought, not simple failure. “…willful and wanton conduct requires a mental state “consonant with purpose, intent and voluntary choice.”

The court then allowed the plaintiffs claims based on willful and wanton conduct of the defendant to proceed to trial.

So Now What?

First, there is a need to look at the product liability claim. Not in the fact that most recreation businesses are manufacturing items, but because they are repairing them. Although you can find outfitter made items such as old raft frames, most items used now days are manufactured by a third party. However, many outfitters and recreation businesses do repair items.

Repairing an item may bring the outfitter into the trial under a product liability claim in many states. The outfitter by making repairs has entered into the stream of commerce between the manufacturer and the end user. The outfitter is no longer a user of the product, but a manufacturer of the product.

Remember there are some items you should never repair or that may be illegal to repair.

PFD’s cannot be repaired by law. Climbing harnesses or any other item where the failure would result in catastrophic injury or death or where the manufacturing process is protected by statute or standard should never be repaired.

The reformation issue was stupid. The cost of printing one set of releases on tan paper and the other on white would have eliminated this problem. Other examples would be putting the page numbers on the bottom right of one release and the center or top of the other. Locating the logo of the defendant in a different location on each release would have worked. Anything to that any employee can recognize that they are using the wrong release.

Some day there will be a horseback riding case that does not involve a slipping saddle. Why there still are, is a mystery to me, and I grew up with horses.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn

If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.

Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

To Purchase Go Here:

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Email: Jim@Rec-Law.US

By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

Messer v. Hi Country Stables Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2675, 2013 WL 93183

Posted: September 29, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Colorado, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Colorado, Customers, Hi Country Stables Corporation, Horse, horse-back, Horseback Ride, Inc., lease, Manufacturer, mutual, Negligence, Product liability, Release, ride, Rocky Mountain National Park, Saddle, Slipping Saddle, Sombrero Ranches, Stables, Trail, Trail Ride, Waiver, Wanton, Wilful, Willful and Wanton, Willful and Wanton Conduct | Leave a comment

Messer v. Hi Country Stables Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2675, 2013 WL 93183

United States District Court for the District of Colorado

January 8, 2013, Decided; January 8, 2013, Filed

Civil Action No. 11-cv-01500-WJM-MJW

Reporter

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2675 *; 2013 WL 93183

ALVA MESSER, Plaintiff, v. HI COUNTRY STABLES CORPORATION, Defendant.

Prior History: Messer v. Hi Country Stables Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170499 (D. Colo., Nov. 30, 2012)

Counsel: [*1] For Alva Messer, Plaintiff: Donald L. Salem, Feldmann Nagel, LLC-Denver, Denver, CO.

For Hi Country Stables Corporation, Defendant, Counter Claimant: Kenneth H. Lyman, Malcolm S. Mead, Hall & Evans, LLC-Denver, Denver, CO.

For Alva Messer, Counter Defendant: Donald L. Salem, Michael G. Bryan, Feldmann Nagel, LLC-Denver, Denver, CO.

Judges: William J. Martinez, United States District Judge.

Opinion by: William J. Martinez

Opinion

AMENDED ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF. No. 41.) Plaintiff Alva Messer (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Response to this Motion (ECF No. 42.) and Defendant Hi Country Stables Corporation (“HCS” or “Defendant”) has filed a Reply. (ECF No. 45.) The Motion is ripe for adjudication.

Having reviewed the briefs and the relevant portions of the record, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND¹

A. Factual Background

On July 16, 2009, Plaintiff Alva Messer purchased a guided horseback ride from Hi County [*2] Stables. (ECF No. 41 at 3.) Defendant HCS operates commercial horse-back riding at Glacier Creek Stables in Rocky Mountain National Park (“RMNP”). (ECF No. 41 at 7.) HCS is one of two equestrian companies owned by Rex Walker. (Id.) The other equestrian company is Sombrero Ranches, Inc. (“SRI”). (Id.) Before beginning any guided horseback ride, both companies require customers to sign an exculpatory contract, titled “Release” (hereafter “the Release” or “Release Forms”). (Id.) The Release Forms for HCS and SRI are identical, except for the name of the company being released from liability. (Id. at 4.) The Release Forms for HCS and SRI are printed in tablets containing 100 tear-away forms per tablet. Once printed, the printing company delivers the tablets to the offices of HCS and SRI. (Id.)

At the start of the 2009 riding season, one tablet of Release Forms labeled SRI was placed in a box of office supplies for delivery to HCS. (Id. at 5.) For reasons that are unexplained by Defendant, those same Release Forms—which Released SRI from liability—were used by HCS at Glacier Creek Stables on July 16, 2009. (Id. at 5; see also, Exh. C, Walker Dep. at 29:13 – 30:5.)

Typically, when customers [*3] arrive at HCS, they are informed that they must sign a Release. (Id. at 6; Exh. D, Marshall Dep. at 29.) Amongst other employees at HCS, Dallas Marshall informs customers that they are required to sign the Release and “mark their riding ability.” (Id.)

When the Messers arrived at HCS on July 16, 2009, Marshall followed her normal practice and informed the Messers of the Release. (Id.) She also requested that they indicate their riding ability, which Plaintiff did. (Id.) Following this, and before commencing the guided horseback ride, Plaintiff signed the Release. (Id.) The Release expressly provides that the customer “understands. . .the specific risks. . .arising from riding a horse. . .and that the [customer] nevertheless intentionally agree[s] to assume these risks.” (ECF No. 41, Exh. A.)

After signing the Release, Plaintiff entered the corral where she was assigned her horse before commencing the trail ride. (Id. at 8; see also, Exh B, Alva Messer Dep. at 35:16-24). The wrangler who led the guests on Plaintiff’s trail ride was Terry Humphrey. (Id.)

Plaintiff encountered problems with her saddle during the trail ride which required adjustment by Plaintiff and Humphrey. (ECF No. 41, [*4] Exh. B, Alva Messer Dep. at 49:1 – 50:1; Exh., Humphrey Dep. at 44:18-25; 45:7 – 46:1; 47:13-22; Exh. F, Donald Messer Dep. at 22:10-17).²

At the midway point, the Messer group stopped to take a rest break. (ECF No. 41, Exh. B, Alva Messer Dep. at 47:10-20). Plaintiff encountered further problems with her saddle—including slippage of the saddle to the horse’s right. (ld. at 50:2-9)

Sometime later, as Plaintiff’s horse was stepping down a “rock stair” in the trail, Plaintiff fell off the right side of the horse (the “Incident.”) (ECF No. 42, Exh. E, Humphrey Dep. at 54:15- 55:10; Exh. F, Donald Messer Dep. at 27:1- 28:6.) Plaintiff allegedly sustained serious injuries and economic loss resulting from the Incident. (ECF No.1 at ¶¶ 14 and 57.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A fact is “material” if under [*5] the relevant substantive law it is essential to proper disposition of the claim. Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997). In analyzing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)). With this approach of resolving factual ambiguities against the moving party, the Court, as it should, thus favors the right to a trial. See Houston v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co ., 817 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir. 1987).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant’s instant Motion seeks reformation of the Release and moves for summary judgment as to the Plaintiff’s claims—including: negligence; product liability; and, wilful and wanton conduct. If granted, Defendant argues that the Release should bar the negligence and product liability claims. The Court will first address [*6] this issue.

A. Effect of the Release on the Negligence and Product Liability Claims

1. Reformation

Defendant seeks to reform the Release to reflect the true intent of the parties by substituting the name HCS for SRI. (ECF No. 41 at 22.)

Reformation of a contract is an “equitable remedy, and the formulation of such remedy rests with the court’s discretion.” May v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80849, 2006 WL 3218852 at *2-3 (D. Colo. 2006, November 6, 2006). “Reformation of a written instrument is appropriate only when the instrument does not represent the true agreement of the parties and the purpose of reformation is to give effect to the parties’ actual intentions.” Maryland Cas. Co. v. Buckeye Gas Prod. Co., 797 P.2d 11, 13 (Colo. 1990).³ Mutual mistake of a contract provides grounds for reformation if the written instrument “does not express the true intent or agreement of the parties.” Segelke v. Kilmer, 145 Colo. 538, 360 P.2d 423, 426-27 (Colo. 1961).

An “essential prerequisite to a court’s power to reform a contract on the ground [*7] of mutual mistake is the existence of a prior agreement that represents the actual expectations of the parties and provides the basis upon which a court orders reformation.” Maryland Cas. Co., 797 P.2d at 13. Prior agreement must be found from the evidence presented, which must be “clear and unequivocal”, and appropriate under the “circumstances.” Id .
See also, Segelke 360 P.2d at 426-27.

Here, Defendant asserts that the intent of the Release was to bind Plaintiff Alva Messer and Defendant HCS. Defendant contends that reference to SRI on the Release was a mutual mistake and that SRI should be substituted with HCS. The Court agrees. This holding is supported by Plaintiff Messer’s own testimony, which clearly reflects the parties’ common understanding of the signed document and shows acknowledgment by Plaintiff that the Release was, in fact, releasing HCS – not SRI. Such testimony is found in the following passage:

Q. You were told it was a release, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And did you have any conception or understanding of what that meant?

A. Well, I assume a release is to release the people, you know, the stables.

Q. And when you were presented this at Hi Country Stables, was it your understanding [*8] that you were releasing Hi Country [Stables]?

A. Correct.

(Messer Deposition at 32:3-22).

Because the above testimony is clear and unequivocal, the Court finds that it reflects the parties’ true intentions of the Release that the contract was between Plaintiff Messer and Defendant HCS.

Additionally, Plaintiff signed the Release at a location owned by HCS immediately before embarking on a trail ride guided by HCS employees. (ECF No. 41, Exh A.) Given that Plaintiff signed the document at HCS, it is difficult to see how the Release was intended to apply to any entity other than HCS.

Accordingly, the Court finds that there was mutual mistake at the time the Release was entered into. Mutual intent of the parties was to enter into an agreement whereby HCS would be released from certain claims. This provides the equitable basis to grant the relief. The Court orders that the name “Sombrero Ranches, Inc.” (SRI) be deleted and substituted with “Hi Country Stables” (HCS) in the Release.

2. Application of Release to Plaintiff’s Negligence Claim

As the Court has found that the Release should be reformed, the next issue is whether the Release shields Defendant from Plaintiff’s negligence claim. For the [*9] reasons below, the Court concludes that it does.

As to the first factor, Colorado law is clear that businesses engaged in recreational services do not perform services that implicate [*10] a public duty. This favors Defendant’s position as to the validity of the Release. Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 469 (Colo. 2004).

With respect to the second factor, the Court similarly finds for Defendant because horse-back riding is “not an essential service.” Hamill v. Cheley Colorado Camps, 262 P.3d 945, 949-50 (Colo. App. 2011) Horse-back riding is one of choice, not necessity.

As to third factor, this also cuts in favor of Defendant since there is no evidence to suggest that the Release was entered into unfairly. Instead, Plaintiff signed the Release “in consideration for the opportunity” to ride the trail led by HCS wranglers. (ECF No. 41, Exh A.) Plaintiff also indicated her riding ability. This suggests that she had ample time to review the Release and become familiar with its conditions. It is these facts, amongst others, that rebut any notion that the Release was unfair. Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F. Supp. 472, 474-475 (D. Colo. 1992).

With respect to the fourth factor, the Court looks to the language of the Release to elicit its intent. The Court must determine “whether the intent of the parties was to extinguish liability and whether [*11] this intent was clearly and unambiguously expressed.” Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 785 (Colo. 1989). Here, the test is met since the Release specifically uses the word “negligence” throughout the document. Reference to the word negligence expressly indicated that HCS would not be liable for such claims. Also, like the release in Jones, the Release in this case similarly points to the “specific risks” of property and personal injury damage that may “arise out of negligence.” Jones, 623 P.2d at 376. Such language serves to reinforce the intent of the Release and thatPlaintiff agreed to “assume such risks” during the course of the HCS led trail-ride. (ECF No. 41, Exh. A.)

In sum, the Court concludes that the Release shields Defendant from Plaintiff’s negligence claim. To the extent that Defendant’s Motion is directed towards that claim, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.⁵

3. Application of the Release to Plaintiff’s Strict Product Liability Claims

In addressing whether the Release applies to Plaintiff’s product liability claims, the Court finds this result is controlled by existing case law: Boles v. Sun Ergoline, 223 P.3d 724, 727-728 (Colo. 2010). That case held that an agreement releasing “a manufacturer from strict products liability for personal injury, in exchange for nothing more than an individual consumer’s right to have or use the product, necessarily violates the public policy of this jurisdiction and is void.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court holds that this passage has equal application here. As distinct from the negligence claim, Boles provides that the Release does not shield Defendant from the strict product liability claims.

Alternatively, Defendant argues that the broad language of the Release covers product liability claims. [*13] Clause 2 provides: “that [the Customer] know[s] and understand[s] that horse riding . . . risks of . . . including the risk that [HCS]. . . may act negligently in . . . preparing or maintaining the horse . . . equipment or premises . . .” (ECF No. 41 Exh A.) Nothing in Clause 2 suggests that the Release covers claims which involve “leasing” or “manufacturing” saddles used in conjunction with Defendant’s trail rides, which would give rise to a products liability claim. Because exculpatory agreements are strictly construed against the party seeking exception, Defendant’s argument that the Release bars this claim must fail. Barker v. Colorado Region-Sports Car Club, 35 Colo. App. 73, 532 P.2d 372, 377 (Colo. App., 1974.)⁶

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s product liability claims are not barred by the HCS Release.⁷

B. Merits of the Product Liability Claims

Defendant also moves for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s product liability claim. In these claims, Plaintiff alleges (1) that HCS leased a defective saddle to Plaintiff by placing it in the “stream of commerce” and (2) that HCS manufactured a defective saddle that was used by Plaintiff (ECF No. 41 at 35; ECF No. 25 at ¶ ¶ 36-55.)⁸ Defendant offers two alternative arguments below as to why grant of summary judgment is justified with respect to these claims. The Court will address each in turn.

1. Horse-Back Riding by HCS is a Service and Does Not Give Rise to Products Liability

Defendant contends that summary judgment should be granted on Plaintiff’s product liability claims because the primary purpose of the contract was the provision of a service—not a product. This, Defendant contends, does not give rise to liability in tort. (ECF No. 41 at 37.) See, Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels , 655 P.2d 822, 828 (Colo. 1982)

To buttress its position, Defendant relies on Kaplan v. C Lazy U Ranch, 615 F. Supp. 234 (D. Colo. 1985). There, Judge John L. Kane of this District Court refused to treat “a saddled horse, or a ride on a horse with a saddle” as a product. Id . at 238. Judge Kane held that it was incongruent with strict product liability doctrine and cited several cases that have refused to extend the concept of strict liability to “persons rendering services.”⁹
Id . at 238 n.3. Defendant asserts that Kaplan has equal application here.

Plaintiff seeks to distinguish Kaplan by making specific reference to “SADDLE EQUIPMENT” in the Complaint. (See ECF No. 25 at ¶ ¶ 36- 51.) Plaintiff seeks to separate the saddle from the horse, and attempt to succeed on that basis.

The Court finds Kaplan persuasive. Like that case, the Court holds that a saddle (on a horse) is not a product—particularly in the context of horse-back riding services. The Court further finds Plaintiff’s distinction is misplaced because it fails to appreciate that the saddle was incidental to the primary purpose of the contract. Plaintiff entered into a contract for a guided five-hour horse back ride through RMNP. This service primarily relied upon a horse (which is not a product) and a saddle (which incidental to that service).¹⁰ Without a product, the product liability claims cannot succeed. Yarbro 655 P.2d at 828.

Because the saddle was only incidental to the contract for services, Plaintiff has failed to show a “trial [*17] worthy” issue as to her product liability claims. Harper v. Mancos Sch. Dist. RE-6, 837 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1223-24 (D.Colo.2011).

2. Use of the Saddle Did Not Constitute a Lease

In the alternative, Defendant argues that summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiff’s product liability claims because it is not a “seller”of a product. That is, Defendant does not fall within the definition of “seller” under the statute because Defendant is not a “lessor” of products, nor a “manufacturer”. See generally, C.R.S. § 13-21-401; Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., 206 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2000).¹¹ Again, the Court agrees.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, the Court finds that Defendant does not “lease” saddles to its customers. Plaintiff signed a Release “in consideration for the opportunity to ride” a horse through RMNP. (ECF No. 41, Exh A.) The “opportunity to ride” does not create a lease. Its use is too short. Nor does it constitute ownership of the saddle itself.

Moreover, HCS cannot be considered a manufacturer because it does not manufacture saddles. (ECF No. 41, Exh. G, Humphrey [*18] Dep. at ¶11; Exh H, Walker Dep. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff argues that the “offside billet [of the saddle] is a product and that it became defective while in the course of it distribution from the original manufacturer through Defendant to her as the consumer.” (ECF No. 42 at 34-35). The Court treats this as an admission that Defendant never manufactured the billet. It also supports the finding that no product is involved in the present case.

Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of fact as to whether Defendant leased or manufactured a saddle. Thus, Defendant’s Motion as to both of the product liability claims is granted.

3. Plaintiff’s Argument re Blueflame Gas

Plaintiff argues that Defendant placed a defective saddle “in the course of the distribution process” and is, therefore, liable for product liability. (ECF No. 42 at 33. (emphasis added.)) In support, Plaintiff heavily relies on Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984). There, the defendant purchased propane from Diamond Shamrock. Defendant then transported and sold the propane directly to residential customers. A gas explosion occurred at a residential home. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, strict liability [*19] based Defendant’s failure to odorize the propane, making it a defective product. The Supreme Court held that a defective product must have arisen at the time of manufacture or “in the course of the distribution process” to the plaintiff. Id . at 590.

The Court is not compelled to find in Plaintiff’s favor based on Blueflame.¹² The saddle in this case was not sold to Plaintiff. The saddle was not part of a distribution process. And, unlike the customers in Blueflame, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not permitted to pursue her product liability claim based on a “distribution process” theory.

Therefore, in addition to the reasons addressed above, Plaintiff’s reliance on Blueflame does not save her product liability claims from summary judgment.

C. Merits of the Wilful and Wanton Claim

Plaintiff’s claim for wilful and wanton conduct is trial worthy. First, a waiver cannot release wilful tortfeasors (alleged or otherwise). The Release has no bearing [*20] on this claim. Barker v. Colorado Region Sports Car Club, 35 Colo. App. 73, 532 P.2d 372, 377 (Colo. 1974).

Second, willful and wanton conduct requires a mental state “consonant with purpose, intent and voluntary choice.” Brooks v. Timberline Tours, 127 F.3d 1273, 1276 (10th Cir. 1997). Because key facts going to this mental state are disputed, Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For example, Plaintiff contends that Humphrey did not perform the number of saddle “checks” he asserts. (Alva Messer Dep. at 43:4-44:18; 48:3-11; 48:21-49:17.) Plaintiff also disputes whether Humphery noticed the “saddle rolling to the right” during the trail ride. (Id.) These examples reflect material facts ripe for jury determination. If the jury credits Plaintiff’s testimony on these points, it could reasonably find that Defendant’s actions were wilful and wanton.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has shown a genuine dispute of material fact as to her wilful and wanton conduct claim. As to this claim, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. See Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp ., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2001).

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:

1. Defendant’s [*21] Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 41) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;

2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and product liability;

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s negligence and product liability claims;

4. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s wilful and wanton claim; and

5. Trial will proceed solely on Plaintiff’s willful and wanton claim, as previously scheduled, on March 11, 2013.

Dated this 8th day of January, 2013

BY THE COURT:

/s/ William J. Martinez

William J. Martinez

United States District Judge

Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Statute

Posted: May 14, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Pennsylvania | Tags: comparative negligence, contributory negligence, Doctrine of Voluntary Assumption of the Risk, downhill skiing, Intentional Tort, Joint Liability, Negligence, Off Road, Off-Road Vehicle, Off-Road Vehicle Riding, Voluntary Assumption of the Risk | 4 Comments

Pennsylvania Statutes

42 Pa.C.S. JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

Part VII CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS

Chapter 71 GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 7102 Comparative negligence

(a) General rule.–In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.

(a.1) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution.

(1) Where recovery is allowed against more than one person, including actions for strict liability, and where liability is attributed to more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of that defendant’s liability to the amount of liability attributed to all defendants and other persons to whom liability is apportioned under subsection (a.2).

(2) Except as set forth in paragraph (3), a defendant’s liability shall be several and not joint, and the court shall enter a separate and several judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against each defendant for the apportioned amount of that defendant’s liability.

(3) A defendant’s liability in any of the following actions shall be joint and several, and the court shall enter a joint and several judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the total dollar amount awarded as damages:

(i) Intentional misrepresentation.

(ii) An intentional tort.

(iii) Where the defendant has been held liable for not less than 60% of the total liability apportioned to all parties.

(iv) A release or threatened release of a hazardous substance under section 702 of the act of October 18, 1988 (P.L. 756, No. 108) , known as the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act.

(v) A civil action in which a defendant has violated section 497 of the act of April 12, 1951 (P.L. 90, No. 21), known as the Liquor Code.

(4) Where a defendant has been held jointly and severally liable under this subsection and discharges by payment more than that defendant’s proportionate share of the total liability, that defendant is entitled to recover contribution from defendants who have paid less than their proportionate share. Further, in any case, any defendant may recover from any other person all or a portion of the damages assessed that defendant pursuant to the terms of a contractual agreement.

(a.2) Apportionment of responsibility among certain nonparties and effect. –For purposes of apportioning liability only, the question of liability of any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party. A person whose liability may be determined pursuant to this section does not include an employer to the extent that the employer is granted immunity from liability or suit pursuant to the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L. 736, No. 338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act. An attribution of responsibility to any person or entity as provided in this subsection shall not be admissible or relied upon in any other action or proceeding for any purpose. Nothing in this section shall affect the admissibility or nonadmissibility of evidence regarding releases, settlements, offers to compromise or compromises as set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Nothing in this section shall affect the rules of joinder of parties as set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

(b) Deleted by 2011, June 28, P.L. 78, No. 17, § 1, imd. effective.

(b.3) Off-road vehicle riding./para>

(1) Off-road vehicle riding area operators shall have no duty to protect riders from common, frequent, expected and nonnegligent risks inherent to the activity, including collisions with riders or objects.

(2) The doctrine of knowing voluntary assumption of risk shall apply to all actions to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property brought against any off-road vehicle riding area operator.

(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed in any way to abolish or modify a cause of action against a potentially responsible party other than an off-road vehicle riding area operator.

(1) The General Assembly finds that the sport of downhill skiing is practiced by a large number of citizens of this Commonwealth and also attracts to this Commonwealth large numbers of nonresidents significantly contributing to the economy of this Commonwealth. It is recognized that as in some other sports, there are inherent risks in the sport of downhill skiing.

(2) The doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk as it applies to downhill skiing injuries and damages is not modified by subsections (a) and (a.1).

(c.2) Savings provisions.–Nothing in this section shall be construed in any way to create, abolish or modify a cause of action or to limit a party’s right to join another potentially responsible party.

(d) Definitions.–As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:

“Defendant or defendants.” Includes impleaded defendants.

“Off-road vehicle.” A motorized vehicle that is used off-road for sport or recreation. The term includes snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, motorcycles and four-wheel drive vehicles.

“Off-road vehicle riding area.” Any area or facility providing recreational activities for off-road vehicles.

“Off-road vehicle riding area operator.” A person or organization owning or having operational responsibility for any off-road vehicle riding area. The term includes:

(1) Agencies and political subdivisions of this Commonwealth.

(2) Authorities created by political subdivisions.

(3) Private companies.

“Plaintiff.” Includes counter claimants and cross-claimants.

Cite as 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102

History. 1978, April 28, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 10(89), effective June 27, 1978. Amended 1980, Oct. 5, P.L. 693, No. 142, § 222(a), effective in 60 days; 1982, Dec. 20, P.L. 1409, No. 326, art. II, § 201, effective in 60 days; 2002, June 19, P.L. 394, No. 57, § 2, effective in 60 days; 2004, July 15, P.L. 736, No. 87, § 5, imd. effective; 2011, June 28, P.L. 78, No. 17, § 1, imd. effective.

Kabogoza v. Blue Water Boating, Inc., et al.,

Posted: October 9, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Legal Case, Paddlesports, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: assumption of the risk, Gross negligence, Leash, Negligence, PFD, Release, Rental, Stand Up Paddleboard, SUP, Surivors, Wrongful Death | Leave a comment

Kabogoza v. Blue Water Boating, Inc., et al.,

Mary Bacia Kabogoza, on behalf of herself and the Estate of Davies Khallit Kabogoza, Plaintiff,

Blue Water Boating, Inc., et al., Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-02722-JAM-KJN

United States District Court, E.D. California

April 5, 2019

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND DECLARING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOOT

JOHN A. MENDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

On October 9, 2018, Mary Kabogoza (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Blue Water Boating, Inc., Skip Abed, and ten “Roe” defendants (“Defendants”). Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff brought a wrongful death claim on her own behalf, and a survival action for negligence on behalf of her deceased husband, Davies Kabogoza. Compl. ¶¶ 8-17. She amended the complaint a month later to replace the negligence claim with a claim for gross negligence. See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 22-29, ECF No. 4. Plaintiff properly invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction and admiralty jurisdiction. FAC ¶ 1 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1333).[1]

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss both of Plaintiff’s claims. Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 6. Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion, and filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss and Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Cross-Mot.”), ECF No. 8. Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s motion. Opp’n to Cross-Mot. and Reply (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 9. Plaintiff, however, never filed a reply to Defendants’ opposition.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In April 2017, Davies Kabogoza and his friend, Laura Tandy, rented stand-up paddleboards from Defendant Blue Water Boating. FAC ¶ 6. Kabogoza had rented paddleboards from this rental company before. FAC ¶ 7. He was familiar with the staff, but had never told them that he could not swim. FAC ¶ 14.

Kabogoza and Tandy signed a rental agreement before taking out the paddleboards. FAC ¶ 18. The one-page agreement included several general and SUP-specific safety rules, along with a release of liability. FAC, Ex. A. Upon signing the agreement, the rental company-per Kabogoza’s request-gave him and Tandy intermediate-level paddleboards and belt-pack flotation devices. FAC ¶¶ 7, 10, 15. Regular life vests were also available, but Defendants allow their customers to choose between the two options. FAC ¶ 14. Belt-pack flotation devices are “very popular” among paddle boarders, but customers often wear them incorrectly, with the flotation portion of the device facing backwards. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Kabogoza was wearing his incorrectly at the time of the accident. FAC. ¶ 13.

Defendants also gave its customers the option of using a paddleboard leash. FAC ¶ 16. Defendant Skip Abed, the owner of Blue Water Boating, told an investigator that 9 out of 10 times, customers do not want a leash. Id. Neither Kabogoza nor Tandy used a leash while paddleboarding. FAC ¶ 19.

Shortly after Kabogoza and Tandy began using their paddleboards in the Santa Barbara Harbor, the wind increased, and the water became choppy. FAC ¶ 9. Tandy was in front of Kabogoza when she heard a splash behind her. Id. When she turned around, she saw that Kabogoza had fallen off his board, and was struggling to keep his head above water. Id. Tandy was unable to reach Kabogoza and prevent him from drowning. Id. A dive team later found his body at the bottom of the ocean in about 30 feet of water. Id. When the divers found him, Kabogoza’s flotation device was attached to his waist, but in the backwards position. FAC ¶ 12. An inspection revealed that the device was in “good working order.” Id.

II. OPINION

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

1. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A court will dismiss a suit if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court “must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is not, however, “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. A court may consider documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint if no party questions the documents’ authenticity. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005).

2. Analysis

a. Choice of Law

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction as well as its diversity jurisdiction. A claim arising in admiralty is governed by federal admiralty law. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996). Ordinarily, a court may not supplement maritime law with state law when the state’s law “will not work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law.” Id. at 207 (quoting Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921)). However, admiralty law does not provide a cause of action for wrongful death or survival suits independent of the remedies provided by state law. Id. at 206. Thus, in admiralty, “state statutes provide the standard of liability as well as the remedial regime” for wrongful death and survival actions. Id. To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims arise under the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, California law applies.

When a claim arises out of the court’s diversity jurisdiction, the court applies the substantive law of the forum state. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). But if the dispute is covered by a valid choice-of-law clause, the laws of the contractually-designated state applies. PAE Government Services, Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the law of the forum and the law designated by the rental agreement’s choice-of-law clause are the same. See FAC, Ex. A. California law applies to the claims arising out of this Court’s diversity jurisdiction.

b. Gross Negligence

Plaintiff has not stated a claim for gross negligence. Gross negligence is defined as “the want of even scant care or an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.” Id. (quoting Kearl v. Board of Med. Quality Assurance, Cal.App.3d 1040, 1052-53 (1986). The California Supreme Court has emphasized “the importance of maintaining a distinction between ordinary and gross negligence, ” and disposing of cases on that bases “in appropriate circumstances.” City of Santa Barbara, 41 Cal.4th at 766.

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed because it is barred by the assumption-of-risk doctrine. Mot. at 9-11. The Court disagrees. To the extent that the claim is arising out of the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, maritime tort law does not adopt California’s approach to this doctrine. Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc., 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 568-69 (1995). Assumption of risk, be it express or implied, may not serve as a bar to claims that arise under admiralty law. Id. at 568 (“Numerous federal cases have held in a variety of contexts that assumption of [] risk is not permitted as an affirmative defense in admiralty law.”). While true that California law governs the standard of liability and the remedial regime for survival actions, Defendants do not identify any cases to suggest that Yamaha likewise intended state law to modify the defenses available in admiralty. To the extent that Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim arises under the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, assumption of risk does not bar the action.

Assumption of risk likewise does not preclude Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim arising under the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. Although California law recognizes assumption of risk as a bar to recovery under some circumstances, it does not allow a party to release itself from liability for gross negligence. City of Santa Barbara v. Super. Ct., 41 Cal.4th 747, 779 (2007). To the extent that Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim arises under the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, assumption of risk, again, does not bar the action. For the same reason, the exculpatory clause in Defendants’ rental agreement does not bar Plaintiff’s survival action for gross negligence. So long as the allegations in the complaint support a plausible claim for relief, Plaintiff’s claim must survive Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

But even when accepted as true, Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a plausible gross negligence claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ gross negligence is reflected in the following omissions:

• Failing to ask Kabogoza about his swimming abilities before renting him a paddleboard;

• Failing to warn Kabogoza of the danger of using and/or misusing the paddleboard and belt-pack flotation device;

• Failing to ensure that Kabogoza was leashed to the paddleboard while using it; and

• Failing to ensure that Kabogoza knew how to use the paddleboard and belt-pack flotation device.

FAC ¶ 25.[2]

These omissions, when viewed in light of the circumstances surrounding this incident, might give rise to a colorable negligence claim had Kabogoza not released Defendants of liability. But they do not rise to the level of culpability found in the cases Plaintiff cites where gross negligence claims survived motions to dismiss. See Cross-Mot. at 10-11. In City of Santa Barbara, the court found that the plaintiff’s claim for gross negligence properly fell outside the defendant’s exculpatory clause when a young girl with epilepsy drowned at defendant’s camp for developmentally-disabled children. 41 Cal.4th at 751-52. The girl’s parents had told the city that their daughter was prone to seizures while in the water and required constant supervision. Id. at 752. Even so, a camp supervisor- knowing the girl had suffered from a seizure less than an hour earlier-diverted her attention while the child was swimming. Id. The girl had a seizure and drowned. Id.Mayall v. USA Water Polo,Inc., 909 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2018) and Lewis v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, No. 1:07-cv-00497-OWW-GSA, 2009 WL 426595 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2009) involved similarly culpable omissions.

The defendants here differ from the defendants in City of Santa Barbara, Mayall, and Lewis in several important respects. First, Defendants knew that Kabogoza had safely engaged in paddleboarding before. FAC ¶ 9. Unlike in City of Santa Barbara, where defendant knew the decedent had a history of having seizures in the water; Mayall, where defendant knew water-polo players were dangerously returning to play after suffering concussions; and Lewis, where the employee knew he was leading beginner snowmobilers, Defendants had no reason to know that Kabogoza was at an increased risk of harm. In fact, Defendants knew that he had a history of safely participating in this activity. FAC ¶ 9. Kabogoza rented paddleboards from Blue Water Boating on up to three previous occasions. Id.

Furthermore, Defendants equipped all of their customers with safety information and safety equipment regardless of their skill level. FAC ¶¶ 6, 16. Defendants made sure that each renter signed a rental agreement that included clear safety instructions about the products it rented. FAC, Ex. A. Defendants gave each of their customers flotation devices to protect against the inherent and inevitable risk of falling into the ocean. FAC ¶ 6. They also made paddleboard leashes available to all their customers even though nine out of ten renters opted not to use them. FAC ¶ 16.

Plaintiff makes much of the fact that Defendants did not ask about each customer’s swimming abilities or require each customer to have use a leash. FAC ¶ 25; Cross-Mot. at 11. Nor did Defendants specifically work with its customers to ensure they were correctly using the flotation devices. FAC ¶ 25; Cross-Mot. at 11. Rental companies can, of course, always do more to ensure that their customers have the safest possible experience. And when those companies’ rentals involve the level of risk that gives way to this sort of tragedy, they likely should. But the law does not task the Court with answering that question today. Here, the question is whether Defendants acted with “a ‘want of even scant care’ or ‘an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.’ ” Based on Plaintiff’s pleadings, the Court cannot find that they did.

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim without prejudice.

c. Wrongful Death

Plaintiff has not stated a wrongful death claim. Nor did she meaningfully oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim. California law governs wrongful death claims regardless of whether the claim arises under the court’s diversity or admiralty jurisdiction. Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. At 206-07. To support a claim of negligent wrongful death under California law, “a plaintiff must establish the standard elements of negligence: defendants owed a duty of care; defendants breached their duty; and defendants’ breach caused plaintiff’s injury.” Hayes v. Cnty.of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Wright v. City of Los Angeles, 219 Cal.App.3d 318, 344 (1990)).

A wrongful death action-unlike claims brought under the state’s survival statute-belong to the decedent’s heirs, not to the decedent. Madison v. Super. Ct., 203 Cal.App.3d 589, 596 (1988). All the same, “a plaintiff in a wrongful death action is subject to any defenses which could have been asserted against the decedent.” Id. at 597. These defenses include a decedent’s decision “to waive the defendant’s negligence and assume all risks.” Id.

Here, Kabogoza signed a rental agreement where he expressly assumed the risks of paddleboarding and released Defendants of liability. FAC, Ex. A. To the extent that the assumption-of-risk and exculpatory clauses purport to release Defendants from liability for ordinary negligence, they are valid. See FAC, Ex. A. See also City of Santa Barbara, 41 Cal.4th at 755-58; Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal.4th 296, 319-21 (1992). And as already discussed, Plaintiff does not make a showing of gross negligence that would bring her wrongful death action outside the rental agreement’s scope.

The rental agreement precludes Plaintiff from making out a claim of ordinary negligence. To the extent that her wrongful death claim is predicated on Defendants’ ordinary negligence, the Court dismisses it with prejudice.

B. Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

The Court has dismissed the gross negligence claim covered by Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The arguments raised in Plaintiff’s motion are, therefore, moot.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Plaintiffs elect to amend their complaint with respect to these claims, they shall file a Second Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days of this Order. Defendants’ responsive pleading is due twenty (20) days thereafter. Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to the extent that it is based on Defendants’ ordinary negligence.

The Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on her gross negligence claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

———

Notes:

[1] This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for February 19, 2019.

[2] Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants breached a duty to Kabogoza by failing to safely manufacture the paddleboard and flotation device, and by failing to timely issue recalls of the defective products. FAC ¶ 25. But to date, Plaintiff has not joined any manufacturers or distributors as defendants.

New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students

Posted: August 1, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Camping, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, First Aid, Insurance, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Medical, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Sea Kayaking, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Swimming, Whitewater Rafting, Zip Line | Tags: Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Desk Reference, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, Good Samaritan Statutes, Hang gliding, Insurance, James H. Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Law, Legal Case, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, Outdoor Industry, Outdoor recreation, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Reference Book, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Reward, Risk, Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Textbook, Whitewater Rafting, zip line | Leave a comment

“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry

Denver based James H. Moss, JD, an attorney who specializes in the legal issues of outdoor recreation and adventure travel companies, guides, outfitters, and manufacturers, has written a comprehensive legal guidebook titled, “Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law”. Sagamore Publishing, a well-known Illinois-based educational publisher, distributes the book.

Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.

“There was nothing out there that looked at case law and applied it to legal problems in outdoor recreation,” Moss explained. “The goal of this book is to provide sound advice based on past law and experience.”

The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

While written as a college-level textbook, the guide also serves as a legal primer for executives, managers, and business owners in the field of outdoor recreation. It discusses how to tackle, prevent, and overcome legal issues in all areas of the industry.

The book is organized into 14 chapters that are easily accessed as standalone topics, or read through comprehensively. Specific topics include rental programs, statues that affect outdoor recreation, skiing and ski areas, and defenses to claims. Mr. Moss also incorporated listings of legal definitions, cases, and statutes, making the book easy for laypeople to understand.

PURCHASE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Cases

Introduction

Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview

Risk

Perception versus Actual Risk

Risk v. Reward

Risk Evaluation

Risk Management Strategies

Humans & Risk

Risk = Accidents

Accidents may/may not lead to litigation

How Do You Deal with Risk?

How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?

Negative Feelings against the Business

Risk, Accidents & Litigation

No Real Acceptance of the Risk

No Money to Pay Injury Bills

No Health Insurance

Insurance Company Subrogation

Negative Feelings

Litigation

Dealing with Different People

Dealing with Victims

Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit

Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits

Emergency Medical Services

Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation

Employees

How Do You Handle A Victim?

Dealing with Different People

Dealing with Victims

Legal System in the United States

Courts

State Court System

Federal Court System

Other Court Systems

Laws

Statutes

Parties to a Lawsuit

Attorneys

Trials

Law

Torts

Negligence

Duty

Breach of the Duty

Injury

Proximate Causation

Damages

Determination of Duty Owed

Duty of an Outfitter

Duty of a Guide

Duty of Livery Owner

Duty of Rental Agent

Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader

In Loco Parentis

Intentional Torts

Gross Negligence

Willful & Wanton Negligence

Intentional Negligence

Negligence Per Se

Strict Liability

Attractive Nuisance

Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence

Product Liability

Contracts

Breach of Contract

Breach of Warranty

Express Warranty

Implied Warranty

Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose

Warranty of Merchantability

Warranty of Statute

Detrimental Reliance

Unjust Enrichment

Liquor Liability

Food Service Liability

Damages

Compensatory Damages

Special Damages

Punitive Damages

Statutory Defenses

Skier Safety Acts

Whitewater Guides & Outfitters

Equine Liability Acts

Legal Defenses

Assumption of Risk

Express Assumption of Risk

Implied Assumption of Risk

Primary Assumption of Risk

Secondary Assumption of Risk

Contributory Negligence

Assumption of Risk & Minors

Inherent Dangers

Assumption of Risk Documents.

Assumption of Risk as a Defense.

Statutory Assumption of Risk

Express Assumption of Risk

Contributory Negligence

Joint and Several Liability

Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue

Why do you need them

Exculpatory Agreements

Releases

Waivers

Covenants Not to sue

Who should be covered

What should be included

Negligence Clause

Jurisdiction & Venue Clause

Assumption of Risk

Other Clauses

Indemnification

Hold Harmless Agreement

Liquidated Damages

Previous Experience

Misc

Photography release

Video Disclaimer

Drug and/or Alcohol clause

Medical Transportation & Release

HIPAA

Problem Areas

What the Courts do not want to see

Statute of Limitations

Minors

Adults

Defenses Myths

Agreements to Participate

Parental Consent Agreements

Informed Consent Agreements

Certification

Accreditation

Standards, Guidelines & Protocols

License

Specific Occupational Risks

Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators

College & University Issues

Animal Operations, Packers

Equine Activities

Canoe Livery Operations

Tube rentals

Downhill Skiing

Ski Rental Programs

Indoor Climbing Walls

Instructional Programs

Mountaineering

Retail Rental Programs

Rock Climbing

Tubing Hills

Whitewater Rafting

Risk Management Plan

Introduction for Risk Management Plans

What Is A Risk Management Plan?

What should be in a Risk Management Plan

Risk Management Plan Template

Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan

Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters

Building Fire & Evacuation

Dealing with an Emergency

Insurance

Theory of Insurance

Insurance Companies

Deductibles

Self-Insured Retention

Personal v. Commercial Policies

Types of Policies

Automobile

Comprehension

Collision

Bodily Injury

Property Damage

Uninsured Motorist

Personal Injury Protection

Non-Owned Automobile

Hired Car

Fire Policy

Coverage

Liability

Named Peril v. All Risk

Commercial Policies

Underwriting

Exclusions

Special Endorsements

Rescue Reimbursement

Policy Procedures

Coverage’s

Agents

Brokers

General Agents

Captive Agents

Types of Policies

Claims Made

Occurrence

Claims

Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements

Bibliography

Index

The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

What is a Risk Management Plan and What do You Need in Yours?

Posted: July 25, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Activity / Sport / Recreation, Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Avalanche, Camping, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, First Aid, Health Club, Indoor Recreation Center, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Medical, Minors, Youth, Children, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Playground, Racing, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Scuba Diving, Sea Kayaking, Search and Rescue (SAR), Ski Area, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Snow Tubing, Sports, Summer Camp, Swimming, Triathlon, Whitewater Rafting, Youth Camps, Zip Line | Tags: #ORLawTextbook, #ORRiskManagment, #OutdoorRecreationRiskManagementInsurance&Law, #OutdoorRecreationTextbook, @SagamorePub, Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, General Liability Insurance, Good Samaritan Statutes, Guide, Hang gliding, http://www.rec-law.us/ORLawTextbook, Insurance, Insurance policy, James H. Moss, James H. Moss J.D., Jim Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Liability insurance, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, OR Textbook, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Law, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Outfitter, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, risk management plan, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Textbook, Understanding, Understanding Insurance, Understanding Risk Management, Whitewater Rafting, zip line | Leave a comment

Everyone has told you, you need a risk management plan. A plan to follow if you have a crisis. You‘ve seen several and they look burdensome and difficult to write. Need help writing a risk management plan? Need to know what should be in your risk management plan? Need Help?

This book can help you understand and write your plan. This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you plan is a workable plan, not one that will create liability for you.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2 U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3 Risk 25

Chapter 4 Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5 Law 57

Chapter 6 Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7 PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8 Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9 Minors

Chapter 10 Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11 Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12 Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13 Rental Programs

Chapter 14 Insurance

$99.00 plus shipping

Need a Handy Reference Guide to Understand your Insurance Policy?

Posted: July 18, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Avalanche, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, Health Club, Indoor Recreation Center, Insurance, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Minors, Youth, Children, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Scuba Diving, Sea Kayaking, Ski Area, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Snow Tubing, Sports, Summer Camp, Swimming, Whitewater Rafting, Youth Camps, Zip Line | Tags: #ORLawTextbook, #ORRiskManagment, #OutdoorRecreationRiskManagementInsurance&Law, #OutdoorRecreationTextbook, @SagamorePub, Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, General Liability Insurance, Good Samaritan Statutes, Guide, Hang gliding, http://www.rec-law.us/ORLawTextbook, Insurance, Insurance policy, James H. Moss, James H. Moss J.D., Jim Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Liability insurance, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Law, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Outfitter, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Whitewater Rafting, zip line | Leave a comment

This book should be on every outfitter and guide’s desk. It will answer your questions, help you sleep at night, help you answer your guests’ questions and allow you to run your business with less worry.

Chapter 1 Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2 U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3 Risk 25

Chapter 4 Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5 Law 57

Chapter 6 Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7 PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8 Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9 Minors

Chapter 10 Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11 Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12 Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13 Rental Programs

Chapter 14 Insurance

$99.00 plus shipping

Morgan, et al., v. Water Toy Shop, Inc., et al., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61546

Posted: July 15, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Legal Case, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Rivers and Waterways | Tags: Admiralty Jurisdiction, Inc., Jet Skis, Maritime Law, Negligence, Negligence per se, Personal Watercraft, Puerto Rican Law, Puerto Rico, Release, vicarious liability, Waiver, Water Toy Shop | Leave a comment

Morgan, et al., v. Water Toy Shop, Inc., et al., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61546

Jasmine Nicole Morgan, et al., Plaintiffs,

Water Toy Shop, Inc., et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 16-2540 (PAD)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

March 30, 2018

OPINION AND ORDER

PEDRO A. DELGADO HERNÁNDEZ, United States District Judge

This case arises out of a tragic accident, a collision between two jet skis -one ridden by plaintiffs Jasmin Nicole Morgan and Jarita Kennedy, and the other by Mark A. Castro- in the territorial waters of Puerto Rico (Docket No. 1).[1] In essence, the complaint alleges that: (1) Castro was grossly negligent in operating the jet ski, seriously injuring plaintiffs (id. at ¶ 51); and (2) Water Toy Shop, Inc., Acosta Water Sports, Inc., and Axel Acosta, who rented the jet skis, did not adequately train Castro to operate the jet ski, and as owners of the jet ski that Castro was riding are liable for the damages claimed. Id.

Before the court is defendants Water Toy Shop’s, Axel Acosta’s and Ironshore Indemnity, Inc.’s “Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof” (Docket No. 52), which plaintiffs opposed (Docket No. 61). Defendants replied (Docket Nos. 69), and plaintiffs surreplied (Docket No. 73). For the reasons explained below, the motion is GRANTED and plaintiffs’ claims against the appearing defendants DISMISSED.[2]

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party. A fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 782 (1st Cir. 2011)(quoting Rodríguez-Rivera v. Federico Trilla Regional Hosp. of Carolina, 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2008)).

In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 115 (citations omitted). There is no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, and no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood . Greenburg v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987). The court may, however, safely ignore conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

II. UNCONTESTED FACTS[3]

Plaintiffs are residents of Washington, D.C. See, Docket No. 52-1, “Statement of Uncontested Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment” (“SUMF” at ¶ 1). While vacationing in Puerto Rico, they rented a jet ski from Archie Jet Ski Rental (SUMF ¶ 4), the name used to advertise Water Toy Shop and Acosta Water Sports, two separate corporations that operate different jet ski rental stands in the Isla Verde beach area in Carolina, Puerto Rico. See, PSUMF at ¶ 6 and defendants’ response at Docket No. 69-1 pp. 26-27.[4] Water Toy owned the jet skis involved in the accident, and operated the stand where the jet skis were rented. SUMF ¶ 5; PSUMF ¶¶ 14, 6, 36.

In order to rent the jet ski, both plaintiffs signed a “Personal Watercraft Rental Operations Release of Liability, Waiver of Claims, Express Assumption of Risk and Indemnity Agreement” (“Rental Agreement”) and a “Declaration of Fitness to Operate Personal Watercraft” (“Declaration of Fitness”). SUMF ¶ 7, ¶10.[5] The Rental Agreements read as follows:

PERSONAL WATERCRAFT RENTAL OPERATIONS RELEASE OF LIABILITY, WAIVER OF CLAIMS, EXPRESS ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT

Please and be certain you understand the implications of signing. Express Assumption of Risk Associated with use of rental of Personal Watercraft and Related Activities I,, do hereby affirm and acknowledge that I have been fully informed of the inherent hazards and risks associated with motorized (e.g., jet ski) or non-motorized (e.g., kayak) and related water sport activities to which I am about to engage, including but not limited to:

1) changing water flow, tides, currents, wave action, and ship’s wakes;

2) collision with any of the following:

a) other participants,

b) the watercraft,

c) other watercraft,

d) man made or natural objects,

e) shuttle boat;

3) wind shear, inclement weather, lightning, variances and extremes of wind, weather and temperature;

4) my sense of balance, physical condition, ability to operate equipment, swim and/or follow directions;

5) collision, capsizing, sinking, or other hazard that may result in wetness, injury, exposure to the elements, hypothermia, impact of the body upon the water, injection of water into my body orifices, and/or drowning;

6) the presence of insects and marine life forms;

7) equipment failure or operator error;

8) heat or sun related injuries or illnesses, including sunburn, sun stroke or dehydration;

9) fatigue, chill and/or reaction time and increased risk of accident.

I specifically acknowledge that I read, understand and agree to abide by the Personal Watercraft Operational instructions at all times and that I have been trained in the safe use of watersport equipment to my complete satisfaction, and I am physically/mentally able to participate in the water sport activities to which I am about to engage.

I specifically waive any defense insofar as this contract is concerned that may arise as a result of any state or local law and/or regulation or policy that may impact its enforceability.

RELEASE OF LIABILITY, WAIVER OF CLAIMS AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT.

In consideration of being allowed to participate in the above-described activities, as well as the use of any of the facilities and the use of the equipment of the below listed releases, I hereby agree as follows:

1) To waive and release any and all claims based upon negligence, active or passive, with the exception of intentional, wanton, or willful misconduct that I may have in the future against all of the following named persons or entities herein referred to as releasees.

Water Toy Shop, Inc. Owner (Company and/ or Individual)

___ (Scheduled Personal Watercraft)

___ (Scheduled Shuttle Boat (if applicable)

2) To release the releasees, their officers, directors, employees, representatives, agents, and volunteers, and vessels from any liability and responsibility whatsoever and for any claims or causes of action that I, my estate, heirs, executors, or assigns may have for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death arising from the above activities, whether caused by active or passive negligence of the releassees or otherwise, with the exception of gross negligence. By executing this document, I agree to hold the releases harmless and indemnify them in conjunction with any injury or loss of life that may occur as a result of engaging in the above activities.

3) By entering into this agreement, I am not relying on any oral or written representation or statements made by the releasees, other than what is set forth in this Agreement.

I hereby declare that I am of legal age and am competent to sign this Agreement or, if not, that my parent or legal guardian shall sign on my behalf and that my parent or legal guardian is in complete understanding and concurrence with this Agreement.

I have read this Agreement, understand it, and I agree to be bound by it. SUMF at ¶¶ 8, 20 (bold emphasis in the original, underlined emphasis added).[6] The Declarations of Fitness state: “by signing this form I still choose to participate in the activity with the rental property and agree to waive all responsibilities to all the above mentioned parties concerning any consequences that would result from my actions.” SUMF at ¶ 9.[7] Morgan did not read the contents of the Rental Agreement and Declaration of Fitness before signing them, or at any time before boarding the rented jet ski, despite having around one hour to spare between the time she signed the documents and when she boarded the jet ski.[8] Neither did she ask Water Toy personnel anything about the document. SUMF at ¶ 11.

Before Castro was allowed to rent the jet ski, he was asked for his I.D. in order to verify that he was old enough to rent a jet ski, which he was; he signed a Rental Agreement and Declaration of Fitness; and was informed of the boundaries within which he could ride, the applicable speed limit and to stay clear of other people. SUMF at ¶ 13, 15.[9] To that end, Mr. Héctor Peralta informed Castro the price for the jet ski ride; explained that he could only ride between the ESJ Tower and the Water Club Hotel; warned him stay away from the swimming area; told him to go slow until he passed the buoys; cautioned him not to get close to a nearby natural reserve and to stay away from other objects or persons because jet skis don’t have breaks; described how the jet skis worked; let him know that when his time was up an employee would let him know; and provided him copy of a Rental Agreement and Declaration of Fitness, explaining their contents and having him sign them. SUMF at ¶ 16.[10]

Additionally, Mr. Jonathan Pérez informed Castro of the boundaries he had to observe whilst riding, by pointing out the ESJ Tower, the Water Club Hotel and the buoys; told him not to ride too far away so that help could get to him straight away in case something happened; warned him not to go over five miles per hour as he left the buoys area in front of the Water Toy stand and when he rode back to it to return his jet ski; and asked him to stay far away from people to avoid any accident. SUMF at ¶ 17.[11] Plaintiffs were taking a break in their jet ski, drifting next to the buoys in front of the Water Toy stand, when Castro’s jet ski collided with theirs at high speed, without warning. SUMF at ¶ 19.

III. DISCUSSION

A. General Principles

Plaintiffs claim defendants are liable to them under Puerto Rico law (Docket No. 61, pp. 2-3), which defendants deny (Docket No. 51, p. 1), stating that general principles of maritime law rather than local law apply in this case, and under those principles they are not liable. Id. at p. 2. Because this case “involves a watercraft collision on navigable waters, it falls within admiralty’s domain.” Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996). With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law. Id. Federal maritime law may be supplemented by state law to the extent that it “would not disturb the uniformity of maritime law.” Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738 (1961).

In maritime law, “the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who are on board for purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests [e.g., passengers] the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case.” Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959); Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 845 F.2d 347, 353 (1st Cir. 1988)(under maritime law, “a carrier owes a duty of exercising reasonable care towards its passengers under the circumstances”). The degree of required care must be in proportion to the apparent risk. See, Muratone, 845 F.3d at 353 (discussing concept)(citing Prosser, Law of Torts, Section 34, at 180 (4th ed. 1971)).

Plaintiffs contend that defendants are directly and vicariously liable under Puerto Rico law because Congress allowed Puerto Rico to adopt liability standards inconsistent with maritime law (Docket No. 61 at pp. 12-20). Congress can alter, qualify, or supplement admiralty law as it sees fit, provided it neither excludes a thing that falls clearly within the admiralty and maritime law nor includes a thing that clearly falls without, as long as the statute is coextensive with and operates uniformly in the whole of the United States. See, Zych v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the Seabird, 19 F.3d 1136, 1140 (7th Cir. 1994)(examining congressional power to revise and supplement maritime law).

However, Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory of the United States. See, Maysonet-Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43, 53 (1st Cir. 2003)(so describing Puerto Rico). It belongs to, but is not part of the United States, a category considered “foreign … in a domestic sense.” See, United States v. Lebrón-Cáceres, 157 F.Supp.3d 80, 88 & n.11 (D.P.R. 2016)(discussing Puerto Rico’s territorial status)(quoting Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287, 341-342, 346-347 (1901)). Accordingly, “… Congress can, pursuant to the plenary powers conferred by the Territorial Clause [U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2], legislate as to Puerto Rico in a manner different from the rest of the United States.” U.S. v. Rivera-Torres, 826 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir. 1987).[12]

In 1917, Congress enacted Puerto Rico’s second organic act, commonly known as the Jones Act, 39 Stat. 951, Act of March 2, 1919.[13] Under Section 37 of the Jones Act, the legislative authority of Puerto Rico extended “to all matters of a legislative character not locally inapplicable.” In turn, Section Eight read:

The harbor areas and navigable streams and bodies of water and submerged lands underlying the same in and around the island of Puerto Rico and the adjacent islands and waters, owned by the United States on March 2, 1917, and not reserved by the United States for public purposes, are placed under the control of the government of Puerto Rico … All laws of the United States for the protection and improvement of the navigable waters of the united States and the preservation of the interests of navigation and commerce, except so far as the same may be locally inapplicable, shall apply to said island and waters to its adjacent islands and waters.

Both provisions were reenacted as part of the Federal Relations Act. See, 48 U.S.C. §§ 749 and 821.[14] Interpreting and applying them in the context of admiralty and maritime law, the First Circuit held in Guerrido v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 234 F.2d 349 (1956), that the rules of admiralty and maritime law of the United States “are presently in force in the navigable waters of the United States in and around the island of Puerto Rico to the extent that they are not locally inapplicable either because they were not designed to apply to Puerto Rican waters or because they have been rendered inapplicable to these waters by inconsistent Puerto Rican legislation, ” provided that legislation does not “supplant a rule of maritime law which Congress in the exercise of its constitutional power has made applicable to Puerto Rican waters.” Id. at p. 355 (Emphasis added).[15] In line with Garrido, plaintiffs argue that defendants authorized Castro to operate the jet ski, and as a result, are liable for the resulting damages under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 §§ 5141-5142, and Puerto Rico Law 430 of December 21, 2000, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 12 §§ 1401-1411 (Docket No. 61, pp. 4-7, 15-20). Because it is undisputed that Water Toy owned and rented the jet skis, unless otherwise stated the court circumscribes the discussion of potential liability to that entity.

B. Puerto Rico Law

Article 1802 imposes liability for personal acts, not for acts of others, providing in part that “a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.” P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141. See, Burgos-Oquendo v. Caribbean Gulf Refining Corp., 741 F.Supp. 330, 332 (D.P.R. 1990)(discussing concept). To establish liability, the plaintiff must show: (i) a duty of care requiring defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (ii) breach of that duty; (iii) damages; and (iv) a causal connection between the breach and the damages. See, De-Jesús-Adorno v. Browning Ferris Industries of Puerto Rico, Inc., 160 F.3d 839, 842 (1st Cir. 1995)(so explaining).

In general, the duty of care is defined by the tenet that one must act as would a prudent and reasonable person under the same circumstances. See, Vázquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 504 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2007)(so observing). This includes complying with statutes, regulations, and ordinances relevant to the action. See, Sánchez v. Seguros Triple S, Inc., 687 F.Supp.2d 6, 9 (D.P.R. 2010)(setting forth and applying formulation). The standard applies to those who operate businesses for profit, commanding them to exercise reasonable care toward business invitees. See, Calderón-Ortega v. U.S., 753 F.3d 250, 252 (2014)(recognizing obligation).

In turn, Article 1803 codifies a special type of vicarious liability, a type of liability based in part on the acts or omissions of others. See, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5142. To that end, it states that the obligation imposed by Article 1802 “is demandable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom …[the defendant is] responsible, ” including under that rubric the liability of the father or mother for damages caused by minor children; of guardians for the damage cause by the person under their authority who live with them; of employers for the damage caused by an employee acting in the course of his employment; of masters or directors of arts and trades for damage caused by their pupils or apprentices; and of the Government of Puerto Rico under certain pre-established circumstances. Id. The enumeration is taxative, not of an exemplary nature. See, Burgos-Oquendo, 741 F.Supp. at 333 (so acknowledging). Imposition of vicarious liability in other instances must be anchored in alternate precepts or legislation, like Law 430. See, id. (dismissing complaint brought against lessor under Article 1803 in absence of provision establishing responsibility in the lessor for actions of the lessee).

At common law, vicarious liability implies that by reason of some preexisting relation between two parties, one of them may be held automatically liable to a third party for the negligence of the other even if he is free from fault. See, Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts, West Publishing Co., 1984, p. 499 (explaining concept). The doctrine applies in admiralty unless excluded by statute. See, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, supra at p. 188 (so noting). In that context, the negligence of employees is imputed to the owner of the vessel upon a finding of master-servant relationship, but in absence of that relationship, the shipowner is not liable in personam for the negligence of persons to whom the vessel is entrusted. Id. Under Article 1803, however, liability does not attach if the defendant shows that he employed the diligence expected of a good father of family, the bonus pater familias, to prevent the damage. Id. Diligence is predicated on how a prudent and reasonable man would have acted in connection with the obligations arising from the situations enumerated in Article 1803. See, Pueblo v. Rivera Rivera, 23 P.R. Offic. Trans. 641, 1989 WK 607294, *§ V (Rebollo López, J., concurring)(analyzing standard).

By contrast, Law 430 operates much like vicarious liability does at common law, providing in part that “[t]he owner of any ship or navigation vessel shall be responsible for damages caused when operating any of these, with fault or negligence, and when it is operated or under control of any person who, with the main purpose of operating or allowing it to be operated by a third party, obtains possession of it through express or tacit authorization of the owner.” P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 12 § 1406(6)(h). By extension, it imposes liability on the principal -the vessel’s owner- for the damages caused by the wrongful operation of the vessel when that vessel has been operated with the owner’s express or tacit authorization, irrespective of whether the owner has acted -in the words of Article 1803 of the Civil Code- with the diligence of a good father of family to avoid the damage.

As enacted, the provision is preempted by the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq., because it conflicts with the negligence standard set in the federal statute. See, In the Matter of Rockaway Jet Ski, LLC, 2016 WL 8861617, *603-*604, (holding New York’s Navigation Act § 48 preempted by Limitation Act, as it imposes vicarious liability on the owners of personal watercrafts if the watercraft is operated by a person who used it with the owner’s permission, irrespective of the owner’s wrongdoing)(quoting In re Hartman, 2020 WL 1529488, *4 n.10 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2010)(to the extent the claimant argues that the jet ski owner is strictly liable under state law, the claim is preempted because the state’s strict liability standard directly conflicts with the negligence standard of the Limitation Act)). For the same reason, so too here. And given that the Limitation Act applies in Puerto Rico, [16] its preemptive effect comports with Garrido, banning reliance on Law 430 to impose vicarious liability on the vessel owner in the absence of the owner’s negligence.

Against this background, plaintiffs argue that Water Toy Shop violated Law 430 in: (1) operating an illegal additional kiosk a quarter of a mile east of the area specified in the permit issued by the Puerto Rico Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”); (2) renting a jet ski that was not expressly identified in the permit; (3) using a rental ski as a patrol boat operated by a licensed individual who nevertheless had not received the required first aid training; (4) operating a rental stand without a valid navigation license; (5) keeping defective records lacking customers’ identification, addresses, tag of the jet ski used and date and time it was returned; and (6) renting skis without informing customers of navigation rules, safety briefing and prohibited activities (Docket No. 61 at pp. 5-7), making it liable for the collision and resulting damages. But merely violating a statute or regulation is not a synonym for liability in Puerto Rico, since in order for liability to attach, there must be a causal relationship – adequate cause – between the violation and the damages. See, González v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Authority, 1993 WL 525644, *8 (D.P.R. Nov. 23, 1993)(so holding)(citing Pacheco v. A.F.F., 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. 367 (1982)).[17]

Adequate cause is not an event in the absence of which the damage would not have occurred, but that which in general experience causes it. See, Cárdenas Mazán v. Rodríguez Rodríguez, 125 D.P.R. 702, 710 (1990) (so stating); Ganapolsky v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 446, 447-448 (1st Cir. 1998)(accidental injury to plaintiff’s left foot resulting from tripping on a two-inch step at entrance to men’s room in a theater not adequate cause of gangrene requiring foot’s amputation, as the infection that lead to the gangrene normally does not arise from tripping on a step). As such, causation is a function of foreseeability, requiring plaintiff to show that the injury was reasonably foreseeable. See, Marshall v. Pérez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845, 847 (1st Cir. 1987)(discussing foreseeability as part of the “causal nexus” element of tort action); Vázquez-Filipetti, 504 F.3d at 49 (highlighting centrality of foreseeability to a successful tort claim).[18]

Within this framework, that violations may have occurred in connection with items (1) to (5)-an unsubstantiated assumption at best- is not causally linked to Castro’s crashing of his jet ski onto plaintiffs’, for there is no evidence in the record showing it was foreseeable for a reasonable person to anticipate that a jet-ski collision would result from those violations.[19] Foreseeability cannot be established through the simple fact that an accident occurred. Id. (so recognizing).[20]The situation is no different in admiralty. See, Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 363 (1st Cir. 2004)(dismissing claim in admiralty for lack of proof that under the circumstances, there was a reasonable possibility that compliance with the regulatory standard would have prevented the accident).[21]

Water Toy’s obligation to provide Castro with an oral or written orientation on the navigation rules the Commissioner of Navigation of Puerto Rico prepared in accordance with Law 430 stands on a different footing, as it directly implicates the provision of information necessary to safely operate the jet ski. See, Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 42-45 (2d Cir. 2004)(distinguishing between statutory or regulatory provisions naturally and logically linked to maritime safety and those not so linked). The uncontested facts, however, show that Water Toy did provide adequate training to Castro in connection with the operation of the jet ski as well as of the applicable navigation rules. See, SUMF at ¶ 15-17. And the Rental Agreement Castro executed additionally confirms that he: (1) was fully informed of the inherent risks associated with jet skis; (2) understood and agreed to abide by the personal watercraft operational instructions he was given; and (3) was trained in the safe use of water sport equipment to his complete satisfaction. All in all, the record does not sustain a finding of liability against Water Toy deriving from a negligent act causally connected to the damages claimed.

C. Waivers

Beyond the issue of liability, plaintiffs executed a waiver precluding liability as to Water Toy and Axel Acosta – Water Toy’s sole owner and president, representative and agent – except for gross negligence, which the complaint only imputed to Castro. Plaintiffs attack the waiver, essentially characterizing it as unenforceable (Docket No. 61, at pp. 20-31). Voluntary waivers of liability for negligence in maritime activities are enforceable provided they: (1) are consistent with public policy; (2) do not configure a contract of adhesion; and (3) are drafted in clear and unambiguous language. See, Olmo v. Atlantic City Parasail, 2016 WL 1704365, *9 (D.N.J. April 28, 2016)(articulating and applying test)(citing Olivelli v. Sappo Corp., Inc., 225 F.Supp.2d 109, 116 (D.P.R. 2002)). By these standards, the waivers that plaintiffs signed are valid and enforceable.

First, exculpatory clauses waiving liability for negligence in maritime recreational activities are consistent with public policy. See, Cobb v. Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, LLC, 933 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1299 (D. Nevada 2013)(so acknowledging); Olmo, 2016 WL 1704365, at *10 (same).[22] Thus, parties may enter into agreements to allocate risks inherent in those activities, allowing operators to contractually disclaim liability for their own negligence. See, Brozyna v. Niagara Gorge Jetboarding, Ltd., 2011 WL 4553100, *4-*5 (W.D. N.Y. Sept. 29, 2011)(explaining exculpatory waivers).[23] Relying on In the Matter of Rockaway Jet Ski LLC, 2016 WL 8861617, however, plaintiffs argue the waiver violates public policy because it has been invoked to prevent them from asserting negligence claims based on the violation of Law 430, a safety statute which, at bottom, does not contain a waiver authorization clause (Docket No. 61, at pp. 23, 27).

In Rockaway, the court evaluated whether an exculpatory clause can release negligence claims premised on the violation of a state safety statute, New York Navigation Law 73(a)(2), which (1) required businesses renting personal watercraft to provide a video or in-water demonstration of how to safely operate watercraft; and (2) prohibited those businesses from renting a personal watercraft to an individual unless that individual demonstrated ability to (i) operate the personal watercraft, and (ii) use applicable safety equipment. Id. at *595-*596. The court surveyed relevant caselaw, finding that some jurisdictions considering the same question did not permit parties to waive negligence claims premised on the violation of safety statutes, whereas other jurisdictions permitted the waivers. Id. at *598-*599. It sided with the former, noting “the apparent absence of an established admiralty rule on this question, ” (id. at *601); that statutory violations amount to negligence per se; and that waivers of a negligence per se claim violate public policy. Id. at *602.

Applying the reasoning to Law 430, the only statutory item involving safety is the one requiring information to safely operate the jet ski. But renting out a jet ski without taking steps to provide for its safety operation falls within the realm of negligence regardless of whether it is statutorily required. See, In re Hartman, 2010 WL 1529488, *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2010)(no need to resort to state safety statute to establish negligence in case originating in jet ski accident, because irrespective of statute, ski owner owed plaintiff a duty of care). And as pointed out above, those actions may be waived. See, Waggoner, 141 F.3d at *8-*9 (rejecting argument that exculpatory clause in recreational boat rental contract violated public policy based in part on Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ explanation that “a party to a contract can ordinarily exempt himself from liability for harm caused by his failure to observe the standards of reasonable care imposed by the law of negligence”). Moreover, although Law 430 imposes vicarious liability, that type of liability is less about boat safety and more about ensuring compensation for injured parties. See, Rockaway, 2016 WL 8861617 at *604 (so observing in validating waiver to protect vessel owner from vicarious liability imposed by state navigation law). In the end, Law 430 does not prohibit waivers, and neither does public policy.

Second, adhesion contracts are “take it or leave it” contracts with no opportunity for negotiation between parties with unequal bargaining power. Id. at *6 (delineating elements of adhesion). The definition does not fit waivers used in connection with voluntary recreational pursuits rather than rendition of essential services such as medical care, where courts would be more likely to find that a contract of adhesion exists. See, Olmo, 2016 WL 1704365 at *10 (so recognizing). For the same reason, liability waivers for voluntary recreational activities in navigable waters are not considered adhesion contracts, as the plaintiff has the option of signing or turning around and declining to do business with the defendant. Id. (waiver in case involving parasailing and related activities). So too here, for plaintiffs were free to choose another jet ski rental company or leave the beach without ridding a jet ski at all. See Olivelli, 225 F.Supp.2d at 110-11, 118-120 (waiver of liability not considered adhesion contract in part because scuba diving is a strictly voluntary recreational pursuit and deceased was free to decline defendant’s services if she did not wish to assent to the terms of the waiver); Brozyna, 2011 WL 4553100 at *6 (same with respect to jetboating excursion, as plaintiff had to option to decline to participate in the excursion); Murley ex rel. Estate of Murley v. Deep Explorers, Inc., 281 F.Supp.2d 580, 589-590 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)(if scuba diver did not agree to or understand any of the clauses of the release, he was free to write “VOID” or decline defendant’s services).[24]

Third, the waivers are clear and unambiguous. Their language (1) identified the specific risks inherent to and associated with riding a jet ski;[25] (2) explained and highlighted the fact that, by executing the Agreement, plaintiffs waived and released any and all claims based upon negligence against Water Toy, its officers, directors, employees, representatives, agents, and volunteers and vessels; and (3) stated that plaintiffs accepted responsibility for the consequences of riding the rented jet skis. The language should have put plaintiffs on notice of its legal significance and effect. Murley, 281 F.Supp.2d at 580-581, 591 (validating liability release with similar characteristics in dismissing action arising out of scuba diving accident that resulted in diver’s death). Even more, both plaintiffs and Castro signed the Agreements before boarding their respective jet skis, acknowledging that they (1) were fully informed of the hazards and risks associated with the jet ski and related water sports activities, including collision with other participants or watercrafts; (2) read, understood, and agreed to abide by the “Personal Watercraft Operational” instructions at all times; (3) were trained in the safe use of watersports equipment to their complete satisfaction; and (4) were physically and mentally able to participate in the water sports activities.

Fourth, plaintiffs are college-educated U.S. citizens, who were interested in participating in a recreational, hazardous maritime activity, one conditioned upon the jet ski’s owner and renter being released from liability as set forth in the waivers, a condition plaintiffs voluntarily agreed to.[26] Plaintiffs state that Ms. Morgan signed the documents without reading them (Docket No. 61-1 at ¶ 11). Nonetheless, the defendant is entitled to rely in good faith upon the reasonable appearance of consent that plaintiff created. See, Chieco v. Paramarketing, Inc., 228 A.D.2d 462, 643 N.Y.S.2d 668 (2d Dept. 1996)(holding release and waiver for paragliding lesson valid despite plaintiff’s allegation that he did not read or understand the document), cited in Murley, 281 F.Supp.2d at 591; Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 217-218 (West 2000) (discussing defendant’s reasonable reliance on plaintiff’s acts and words to infer binding consent). Private and uncommunicated reservations to a waiver does not subject defendant to liability. See, Dan B. Dobbs, supra (so noting). Therefore, plaintiffs cannot escape the consequences of their voluntary decisions, bypassing the contracts they signed to avoid the legal consequences of their free choice, for there is no evidence of deceit, violence or intimidation exerted on plaintiffs to coerce or wrongfully induce them to sign the waivers, or that they did so by mistake, thinking they were signing something else. See, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 3404 (codifying elements voiding consent under Puerto Rico law, to include violence, intimidation, deceit and error); Cutchin v. Habitat Curacao-Maduro Dive Fanta-Seas, Inc., 1999 WL 33232277, *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 1999)(applying pre-accident waiver to dismiss action arising from diving accident, as there was no evidence showing that plaintiff was coerced to sign the document); Murley, 281 F.Supp.2d at 590 (dismissing suit based on scuba diver’s death in part because there was no evidence that defendants procured release by fraud or that deceased signed release under duress); .

Plaintiffs posit the waivers mention negligence but not fault, and cannot bar their action because the complaint alleges that their damages result from defendants’ “fault” or “negligence” (Docket No. 61 at p. 25). These terms have specific meanings in the civil code context of Puerto Rico law. See, CMI Capital Market Investment, LLC v. González-Toro, 520 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2008)(so recognizing). Fault consists in the failure to exercise due diligence, the use of which would have prevented the wrongful result, and requires the execution of a positive act causing a damage to another person different from the one who executed it. Id. Negligence supposes an omission producing the same effect as fault (id.), predicated as with fault, on the failure to exercise due diligence. See, Sánchez v. Esso Standard Oil de Puerto Rico, Inc., 2010 WL 3069551, *4 (D.P.R. Aug. 2, 2010)(discussing terms). Both concepts “have in common that the act be executed or the omission incurred without an injurious intent, ” González-Toro, 520 F.3d at 64, and for the same reason, have been described as “faces of the same coin.” Sánchez, 2010 WL 3069551 a *4 (quoting Gierbolini v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 4 P.R. Offic. Trans. 1197, 1201 (1976).

On this reading, it is apparent that to the extent the waiver mentions negligence it necessarily contemplates the failure to exercise due diligence, the same operative feature underlying fault, reflecting the waiver’s reference to both active and passive negligence. See, Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 971 (1st Cir. 1991)(“An actor is at fault, or negligent, when he fails to exercise due diligence to prevent foreseeable injury”)(emphasis added). Even more, plaintiffs’ factual allegations are couched in negligence, not fault. See, Complaint, ¶ 30 (“As a consequence of the accident caused by the negligence of all defendants, … [Ms. Morgan] has suffered mental anguish, physical injuries and scars;” ¶ 43 (“As a consequence of the accident caused by the negligence of all defendants,, , [Ms. Kennedy] has suffered mental anguish, and physical injuries”).

Plaintiffs allege the waiver does not mention Axel Acosta, the insurance company, or Acosta Water Sports (Docket No. 61, pp. 27-28). Nonetheless, the waiver expressly releases Water Toy Shop’s officers, directors, and agents, and Axel Acosta is Water Sports’ president and resident agent (Docket No. 61-1 at ¶ 23). In addition, the insurance company’s exposure is linked to that of its insured. If the action fails as to Water Toy Shop and Axel Acosta, there is no viable claim against their insurer. Acosta Water Sports would not benefit from the waiver, though, as it is not one of the releases. Only one conclusion follows: the waivers and releases are valid, and must be enforced except as to Acosta Water Sports.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 52) is GRANTED and the claims against Water Toy, Axel Acosta and Ironshore Indemnity DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Since it is uncontested that Acosta Water Sports is not the owner of the jet skis at issue, and did not seem to have incurred in any wrongdoing related to the accident, plaintiffs shall show cause, by April 20, 2018 as to why their claims against Acosta Water Sports should not be dismissed as well. In their motion, plaintiffs shall include relevant caselaw arising out of analogous facts and procedural settings in support of their position.

SO ORDERED.

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Notes:

[1] Collisions have been described as “the most feared catastrophe of every mariner.” Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, Vol. 2, 103 (West 5th ed. 2011).

[2] Castro was sued and served with process, but failed to appear and the Clerk entered default against him (Docket No. 77).

[3] Except otherwise noted, the facts included in this section are drawn from the parties’ Local Rule 56 submissions (Docket No. 52-1, Docket No. 61-1, Docket No. 69-1). Local Rule 56 is designed to “relieve the district court of any responsibility to ferret through the record to discern whether any material fact is genuinely in dispute.” CMI Capital Market Investment, LLC v. Gonzalez-Toro, 520 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008). It requires a party moving for summary judgment to accompany its motion with a brief statement of facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs and supported by citations to the record, that the movant contends are uncontested and material. Local Rule 56(b) and (e). The opposing party must admit, deny, or qualify those facts, with record support, paragraph by paragraph. Id. 56(c), (e). The opposing party may also present, in a separate section, additional facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs. Id. 56(c). While the district court may “forgive” a violation of Local Rule 56, litigants who ignore the rule do it “at their peril.” Mariani-Colón v. Department of Homeland Sec. ex rel. Chertoff, 511 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir. 2007).

[4] At his deposition, Axel Acosta explained that these corporations operate separately, with their own permit and insurance. Their personnel, however, is interchangeably used. See, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3 at p. 84, lines: 6-20. Water Toy Shop owns the stand adjacent to the San Juan Hotel, whereas Acosta Water Sports owns the stand adjacent to the Intercontinental Hotel. See, PSUMF ¶¶ 6, 36.

[5] Plaintiffs stated they were rushed into signing the documents. However, that do not contest the fact that both of them signed the documents. Moreover, the deposition testimony submitted in support of their contention does not prove that they were rushed to sign documents, but that they “were rushing” (Defendants’ Exh. 2 at p. 94). At any rate, in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs seem to have abandoned the “rushing” characterization of the events, focusing instead on the alleged invalidity of the releases (Docket No. 61 at pp. 20-29).

[6] Plaintiffs’ explanation as to who gave them the documents does not controvert the language of the Rental Agreements that each plaintiff signed. Their undeveloped and unsupported contention as to the “content and admissibility of the documents” – without any analysis, case law or support whatsoever – does not contest the statement either.

[7] The “disputed” and generalized statement made by plaintiffs “as to the content and admissibility of the documents” does not contest the language of the Rental Agreement and Declaration of Fitness.

[8] Plaintiff testified during her deposition that “thirty to forty five maybe an hour” elapsed (Docket No. 52-3 at p. 100, lines 14-17).

[9] Plaintiffs “disputed” this statement as follows: “Disputed as to hearsay and admissibility of the documents. With the exception of the witness testimonies, Defendants have not yet produced a single piece of evidence that can confirm the identity, address or telephone number of the person who caused the collision, someone allegedly named Mark Castro.” See, Docket No. 61-1. But in addition to the general language disputing this statement, plaintiffs provided no discussion or authority in support of the argument. As such, the statement is deemed admitted. See, U.S. v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)(“It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones”). Moreover, their “dispute” language does not comply with Local Rule 56 either. See also, Natal-Pérez v. Oriental Bank & Trust, —F.3d.—-, 2018 WL 618598, *1-*2 (D.P.R. January 30, 2018)(explaining what constitutes a proper denial or qualification under Local Rule 56).

[10] Plaintiffs’ denial does not comply with Local Rule 56. This time, they refer the court’s attention to certain portions of plaintiffs’ Exhibit 6. But nothing in those pages serve to properly controvert defendants’ SUMF ¶ 16. Therefore, the statement is deemed admitted.

[11] Plaintiffs did not admit, deny or qualify this statement as required by Local Rule 56. Moreover, their explanation does not contest this statement.

[12] The Territorial Clause gives Congress authority to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” As a territorial entity subject to congressional authority under the Territorial Clause, Puerto Rico nevertheless boasts “a relationship to the United States that has no parallel in … [United States’] history.” Puerto Rico v. Sánchez-Valle, —U.S.—-, 136 S.Ct. 1863, 1876 (2016). In a well-documented and comprehensive commentary, “Why Puerto Rico Does Not Need Further Experimentation With Its Future: A Reply To The Notion of ‘Territorial Federalism’, ” 131-3 Harvard Law Review Forum (January 2018), Juan R. Torruella examines the different phases of Puerto Rico’s territorial relationship with the United States, divided into what the author has labeled “the four ‘experiments’ in the colonial governance of Puerto Rico by the United States.” Id. at pp. 65-66.

[13] For a description of the main features of the Jones Act, see, Lebrón-Cáceres, 157 F.Supp.3d at 92. Juan R. Torruella, supra, focuses on the historical context of the statutory enactment. The first organic act, known as the Foraker Act, 31 Stat. 77-86, had been enacted in 1900, two years after the United States invaded Puerto Rico during the Hispanic American War. It established a civilian government in the territory, replacing the military government that had exerted control over Puerto Rico from October 1898. See, Lebrón-Cáceres, 157 F.Supp.3d at 91-92 & n.17 (sketching statute); Juan R. Torruella, supra (surveying historical setting).

[14] Lebrón-Cáceres, 157 F.Supp.2d at 92-93, 99-101, and Juan R. Torruella, supra, provide useful information about this statute.

[15] Gustavo A. Gelpí, “Maritime Law in Puerto Rico, An Anomaly in a Sea of Federal Uniformity, ” published as part of The Constitutional Evolution of Puerto Rico and Other U.S. Territories (1898-Present), Interamerican University of Puerto Rico, Metropolitan Campus (2017), p. 57, discusses Garrido and other judicial decisions in light of the interplay between Federal maritime law and Puerto Rico.

[16] See, Aponte v. Caribbean Petroleum, 141 F.Supp.3d 166, 171 (D.P.R. 2015)(applying Limitation Act in Puerto Rico).

[17] The term “adequate cause” is similar to “proximate cause.” See, Rodríguez v. Puerto Rico, 825 F.Supp.2d 341, 347 (D.P.R. 2011)(so noting)(citing Tokyo Marine and Fire Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Pérez &Cia. de Puerto Rico, Inc., 142 F.3d 1, 7 &n. 5 (1st Cir. 1998)(referring to Puerto Rico decisions explaining adequate cause)).

[18] Foreseeability allows courts to reconcile physical or natural cause and effect relationships with the causation necessary to establish civil liability. See, González, 1993 WL 525644 at *4 (so explaining). If that were not so, “damages following a breach … [would] be linked to each other in an endless chain of events.” Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Arrillaga-Torrens, 212 F.Supp.3d 312, 353 (D.P.R. 2016).

[19] At the most, those alleged violations would warrant administrative sanctions under Section 1407 of Law 430. Yet there is no evidence that the DRN sanctioned, fined, suspended or revoked Water Toy’s permit for those reasons.

[20] See also, Marshall, 828 F.2d at 848 (comparing Negrón v. Orozco, 113 D.P.R. 921 (1983)(finding Puerto Rico Police liable for a shooting death in a police station because intervening act, though criminal and intentional, was reasonably foreseeable) with Rivera v. Cruz, 87 J.T.S. 51(1987)(no liability since defendant had no reason to anticipate the criminal act)).

[21] Poulis-Minott measured liability against the so-called Pennsylvania Rule, pursuant to which if a plaintiff in admiralty establishes both that the defendant breached a statutory duty and the breach is relevant to the causal question, the defendant assumes the burden of proving that its breach could not have caused plaintiff’s damages. See, Poulis-Minott, 388 F.3d at 363 (describing Pennsylvania Rule). The Rule aims to enforce strict compliance with maritime regulations pertaining to the safe operation of ships. Id. So to invoke it, the plaintiff must show a relationship between the regulatory violation and the injury. Id. Plaintiffs never invoked the Pennsylvania Rule, but assuming they had done so, there is no evidence linking a safety-related statutory violation with the accident.

[22] Public policy does prohibit a party to a maritime contract to shield itself contractually from liability for gross negligence. See, Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Southwest Marine, 194 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 1999)(discussing issue). The prohibition does not apply here, because as pointed out in the text, the complaint only raised gross negligence allegations as to Castro.

[23] Congress could block the enforceability of these waivers like it did in 46 U.S.C. § 183(c), which prohibits a vessel owner from limiting its liability for its own negligence when carrying passengers between ports of the United States or from a port of the United States to a foreign port. But that provision applies only to common carriers. See, Waggoner v. Nags Head Water Sports, Inc., 141 F.3d 1162, *5-*6 (4th Cir. 1998)(unpublished)(so holding). No common carrier was involved in the case sub judice.

[24] Still and all, “adhesion does not imply nullity of contract” in Puerto Rico. Nieves v. Intercontinental Life Ins. Co. of Puerto Rico, 964 F.2d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 1992). If the wording of the contract is explicit and its language clear, its terms and conditions are binding on the parties. Id. As will be discussed, the waivers here satisfy this requirement.

[25] Those risks included (1) changing water flow, tides, currents, wave action, and ship’s wakes; (2) collision with any of the following: a) other participants, b) the watercraft, c) other watercraft, d) man made or natural objects, e) shuttle boat; (3) wind shear, inclement weather, lightning, variances and extremes of wind, weather and temperature; (4) my sense of balance, physical condition, ability to operate equipment, swim and/or follow directions; (5) collision, capsizing, sinking, or other hazard that may result in wetness, injury, exposure to the elements, hypothermia, impact of the body upon the water, injection of water into my body orifices, and/or drowning; (6) the presence of insects and marine life forms; (7) equipment failure or operator error; (8) heat or sun related injuries or illnesses, including sunburn, sun stroke or dehydration; (9) fatigue, chill and/or reaction time and increased risk of accident.

[26] Morgan had signed similar documents in order to rent jet skis before the accident. At the time of the accident, she had a Bachelor’s degree in Biology, and Kennedy had a High School diploma with one year of nursing school. SUMF at ¶ 2.

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Marino v. Morrison, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 10971, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 10971, 2016 NY Slip Op 31876(U

Posted: July 15, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Legal Case, New York | Tags: All Terrain Vehicle, assumption of the risk, ATV, Doctrine of Primary Assumption of the Risk, Infant, Minor, Negligence, New York, Primary Assumption of the Risk | Leave a comment

Marino v. Morrison, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 10971, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 10971, 2016 NY Slip Op 31876(U

Michael Marino, an infant under the age of 18, by his Mother and Natural Guardian, Elena Marino, and Elena Marino, Individually, Plaintiffs,

Richard Morrison, Jr, Carmela Morrison and Richard Bedrosian, Defendants.

No. 2016-31876

Index No. 10-11831

CAL. No. 15-00738OT

Supreme Court, Suffolk County

September 8, 2016

Unpublished Opinion

MOTION DATE 9-15-15

ADJ. DATE 3-1-16

SURIS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. Attorney for Plaintiffs.

JOHN T. McCARRON, PC Attorney for Defendant C. Morrison.

PENINO & MOYNIHAN, LLP Attorney for Defendant Bedrosian.

PRESENT: Hon. PETER H. MAYER, Justice

PETER H. MAYER, J.S.C.

Upon the reading and filing of the following papers in this matter: (1) Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause by defendant Carmela Morrison, dated August 19, 2015, and supporting papers; (2) Notice of Cross Motion by defendant Richard Bedrosian, dated August 19, 2015, and supporting papers; (3) Affirmation in Opposition by plaintiffs, dated December 1, 2015, and supporting papers; (4) Reply Affirmations by defendants, dated February 28, 2016 and January 4, 2016, and supporting papers; (and after hearing counsels’ oral arguments in support of and opposed to the motion); and now

UPON DUE DELIBERATION AND CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT of the foregoing papers, the motion is decided as follows: it is

ORDERED that the motion (seq. 001) by defendant Carmela Morrison and the motion (seq, 002) by defendant Richard Bedrosian are consolidated for purposes of this determination; and it is

ORDERED that the motion by defendant Carmela Morrison for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion by defendant Richard Bedrosian for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against him is granted.

This action was commenced by plaintiff to recover damages for injuries infant plaintiff Michael Marino allegedly sustained as a result of an accident involving an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on July 28. 2009. The complaint alleges that Mr. Marino was a passenger on the rear seat of the ATV, that he was caused to be ejected from the ATV, and that the accident took place on property located behind the address known as 29 Buckingham Drive, Dix Hills, New York. Elena Marino individually asserts a derivative claim for loss of love, services, companionship, and household support. Defendant Richard Bedrosian asserts cross claims against defendant Richard Morrison, Jr., who has tailed to appear in this action.

Defendant Carmela Morrison now moves for summary judgment in her favor on the grounds that she is exempt from liability pursuant to General Obligations Law §9-103. that Mr. Marino assumed the risk inherent in the activity, and that plaintiffs lack knowledge as to the location of the alleged accident or the manner in which it occurred. In support of her motion, Ms. Morrison submits copies of the pleadings and transcripts of the deposition testimony of Michael Marino, Richard Bedrosian, and herself.

Defendant Richard Bedrosian also moves for summary judgment in his favor on the grounds that he is exempt from liability pursuant to General Obligations Law § 9-103, plaintiffs lack knowledge as to the location of the alleged accident or die maimer in which it occurred, and he had no knowledge that Mr. Marino was present on his property, and Mr. Marino assumed the risk inherent in the activity. In support of his motion, he submits copies of the pleadings and transcripts of the deposition testimony of himself and Michael Marino.

At his deposition, infant plaintiff Michael Marino testified that, on the date in question, he was 15 years old and was spending time at the house of his school friend, Richie Morrison. Mr. Marino indicated that Mr. Morrison’s father purchased an ATV for Mr. Morrison “a few years” prior, which was parked on the premises next to a shed. Mr. Marino explained that he, Mr. Morrison, and Mr. Morrison’s cousin were waiting for a few friends to arrive at Morrison’s house. Mr. Marino testified that at some point, after it had gotten dark outside and when Mr. Morrison’s parents were not home, Mr. Morrison and his cousin began drinking liquor they had stolen from Mr. Morrison’s parents’ liquor cabinet, Mr. Marino explained that the young men had been playing video games in Mr. Morrison’s basement for a number of hours, but eventually went into the backyard, at which time Mr. Morrison and Mr. Morrison’s cousin began driving the ATV in question around the backyard of the premises. Mr. Marino, upon being offered a ride on the ATV, stated that he climbed aboard and sat behind Mr. Morrison and that neither one of them wore a helmet. Mr. Marino testified that after he sat down on the ATV, Mr. Morrison began driving it on the premises and the next thing he remembers is waking up in a basement with people “picking branches out of [his] head.” He stated that although they started out riding the ATV in Mr. Morrison’s backyard, due to his losing consciousness he is unable to identify exactly where the accident took place. Mr. Marino testified that he later came to learn from “mutual friends” that the accident occurred due to the ATV’s brakes failing, the ATV hitting something, and he and Mr. Morrison being thrown off the ATV. Mr. Marino further testified that he was later informed by his friend, Peter Frisina, that he, too, was injured in a similar way on that same ATV.

Regarding his experience with ATVs. Mr. Marino testified that his father owned one and he had both driven it and been a passenger on it “since [he] was young, ” Mr. Marino stated that neither Carmela Morrison nor Richard Bedrosian ever gave him permission to ride on Mr. Morrison’s ATV, and that neither parent was aware of any alcohol consumption by the young men.

At her deposition, Carmela Morrison testified that her partner, Richard Bedrosian, owns the subject premises. She further testified that she was not home at the time of the alleged ATV accident, but was told by various parties that, contrary to plaintiffs’ allegations, Mr. Marino had been the driver of the ATV and that her son was the rear passenger. Ms. Morrison indicated that she had taken her son and Mr. Marino to the beach earlier in the day with Mr. Marino’s mother’s permission. She stated that at approximately 6:00 p.m., after they all had returned to the subject premises, she left the house in order to attend a networking event. She explained that she asked Mr, Marino if his mother was coming to pick him up and he said “yes.” She informed him that he was welcome to stay to eat some pizza that she had recently ordered. She testified that she then left the young men at the premises with Mr. Morrison’s 20-year-old sister, Kristina, who was preparing to go out and was not present at the time of the accident. Carmela Morrison indicated that at approximately 8:00 p.m. she received a call saying that there had been an accident at the premises and she went home immediately. When asked whether her son obtained permission from her to use the ATV on the date in question, she replied “[a]bsolutely not.” Regarding prior accidents involving the ATV, Ms. Morrison testified that a few months prior to the date in question, Mr. Morrison’s friend, Peter, was driving it, fell off of it, and sustained scratch to his face. She further testified that after Peter’s fall, she “took the key and gave it to Bedrosian and said T don’t want this ATV used at alt.'”

At his deposition, Richard Bedrosian testified that he is the owner of the subject premises, but does not know exactly where the accident in question occurred, although he was told by his girlfriend, Carmela Morrison, that it happened “off property, ” on state land behind his backyard. He stated that his property is approximately 1.9 acres in size, completely fenced, with the backyard consuming % of that land. Of that backyard, he explained, Vi of it is ungroomed woods. Regarding the ATV in question, Mr. Bedrosian testified that it was a Christmas gift from Mr. Morrison’s biological father, defendant Richard Morrison, Jr., to Mr. Morrison, which he received approximately seven months before the accident. Mr. Bedrosian testified that he strongly disapproved of the ATV being on his property, but was told by Mr. Morrison’s father that he had no place to store it. Mr. Bedrosian indicated that Mr. Morrison would occasionally drive it around the backyard in circles or into the wooded area, but that Mr. Morrison’s father promised Mr. Bedrosian that he would take Mr. Morrison to off-premises locations to ride it and, based on that proviso, Mr. Bedrosian allowed the ATV to be stored on his property. Mr. Bedrosian testified that Mr. Morrison was forbidden from operating it if he or Carmela Morrison were not home.

Regarding the date in question, Mr. Bedrosian testified that he was told by Carmela Morrison, Mr. Morrison, and Tony Yacende that Mr. Marino was the driver of the ATV at the time and that Mr. Morrison was the passenger. Also, Mr. Bedrosian explained that no one was permitted to operate the ATV on the date in question because he had taken its only key and put it in a desk in his home office- a location that was “off limits to everybody.”

A party moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 26 NY3d 40, 19 N.Y.S.3d 488 [2015]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923 [1986]). If the moving party produces the requisite evidence, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action (Nomura, supra; see also Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 499, 942 N.Y.S.2d 13 [2012]). Mere conclusions or unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to raise a triable issue (Daliendo v Johnson, 147 A.D.2d 312, 543 N.Y.S.2d 987 [2d Dept 1989]). In deciding the motion, the Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Nomura, supra; see also Ortiz v. Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 N.Y.3d 335, 339, 937 N.Y.S.2d 157 [2011]).

It is axiomatic that for a plaintiff to recover against a defendant in a negligence action, plaintiff must prove defendant owed plaintiff a duty and that the breach of that duty resulted in the injuries sustained by plaintiff (see Lugo v Brentwood Union Free School Dist, 212 A.D.2d 582, 622 N.Y.S.2d 553 [2d Dept 1995]; Kimbar v.Estis, 1 N.Y.2d 399, 153 N.Y.S.2d 197 [1956]).

“The doctrine of primary assumption of risk provides that a voluntary participant in a sporting or recreational activity consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of die sport generally and flow from such participation” (Shivers v Elwood Union Free Sch. Dist, 109 A.D.3d 977, 978 [2d Dept 2013] [internal quotation omitted]; see Trupia v Lake George Cent. School Dist, 14 N.Y.3d 392, 901 N.Y.S.2d 127 [2010]; Morgan v State of New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421 [1997]). “A plaintiff is barred from recovery for injuries which occur during voluntary sporting or recreational activities if it is determined that he or she assumed the risk as a matter of law” (id at 978; see Leslie v. Splish Splash at Adventureland, 1 A.D.3d 320, 766 N.Y.S.2d 599 [2d Dept 2003]; Morgan v State of New York, supra). “It is not necessary to the application of the doctrine that the injured plaintiff should have foreseen the exact manner in which the injury occurred so long as he or she is aware of the potential for injury of the mechanism from which the injury results” (Cruz v Longwood Cent Sch. Dist., 110 A.D.3d 757, 758, 973 N.Y.S.2d 260 [2d Dept 2013] [internal quotation omitted]).

“There is … a duty by a parent to protect third parties from harm resulting from [his or her] infant child’s improvident use of a dangerous instrument, at least, and perhaps especially, when the parent is aware of and capable of controlling its use” (Nolechek vGesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 336, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 [1978]), “Parents are permitted to delegate to their children the decision to participate in dangerous activities, but they are not absolved from liability for harm incurred by third parties when the parents as adults unreasonably, with respect to such third parties, permit their children to use dangerous instruments” (id. at 339). “In order for a third-party claim of this kind against a parent or guardian . . . negligence must be alleged and pleaded with some reasonable specificity, beyond mere generalities” (LaTorre v Genesee Mgmt, 90 N.Y.2d 576, 584, 665 N.Y.S.2d 1 [1997]).

Defendants Carmela Morrison and Richard Bedrosian, both relying on nearly identical arguments in support of their motions, have established a prima facie case of entitlement to summary judgment by offering sufficient proof that Mr. Marino voluntarily assumed die risks inherent in riding an ATV (see Shivers v Elwood Union Free Sch. Dist., supra; see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., supra). Moving defendants proved that Mr. Marino voluntarily boarded the ATV, either as a driver or a passenger, having possessed significant prior experience with such machines. Further, there is nothing in the record indicating that Mr. Marino did not have full awareness of Mr. Morrison’s consumption of alcohol, if true, the weather and lighting conditions, and the landscaping of the backyard prior to riding on the ATV. Even if the Court were to assume, for the purposes of this decision, that Mr. Morrison’s consumption of alcohol, or some other factor, exceeded the level of risk Mr. Marino can be said to have assumed, plaintiffs have not proven the manner in which Mr. Marino allegedly sustained his injuries or even that Mr. Marino’s injuries were sustained on Mr. Bedrosian’s property. Accordingly, moving defendants, having established their entitlement to summary judgment on the ground of Mr. Marino’s primary assumption of the risk, the Court need not reach defendants’ other arguments.

Defendant having established a prima facie case entitlement to summary judgment, the burden shifted to plaintiff to raise an issue of fact necessitating a trial (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., supra). Plaintiffs argue that: (1) General Obligations Law § 9-103 does not apply to the facts of this case; (2) that enhanced risks were present at the time of Mr. Marino’s alleged injury, which he cannot be expected to assume; and (3) defendants owed a duty of care to Mr. Marino and failed to supervise him properly. In opposition, plaintiffs submit a copy of the Bill of Particulars and Michael Marino’s own affidavit.

Generally, “a plaintiff who suffers from amnesia as the result of the defendant’s conduct is not held to as high a degree of proof in establishing [his or her] right to recover for [his or her] injuries as a plaintiff who can describe the events in question” (Menekou v Crean, 222 A.D.2d 418, 419, 634 N.Y.S.2d 532 [2d Dept 1995]; Sawyer v Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 328, 502 N.Y.S.2d 696 [1986]; Santiago v Quattrociocchi, 91 A.D.3d 747, 937 N.Y.S.2d 119 [2d Dept 2012]). However, in order to invoke that lower burden of proof, plaintiff must not only make a prima facie case, but must also submit an expert’s affidavit demonstrating the amnesia through clear and convincing evidence (Menekou v Crean, supra). Plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden here. Therefore, plaintiffs’ attempts to raise triable issues will be evaluated in the usual manner (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., supra).

As Richie Morrison, Tony Yacende, and Peter Frisina have not been deposed, the Court must decide this matter solely on the three deposition transcripts and single affidavit submitted by the parties herein. The undisputed facts can be summarized as follows: (I) Mr. Bedrosian owned the subject premises, but was unaware of Mr. Marino’s presence there at the time of the incident; (2) Mr. Marino, Mr. Morrison, and Mr. Yacende were unsupervised for a period of time on the evening in question; (3) Mr. Marino voluntarily rode on an ATV while not wearing protective equipment; (4) Mr. Marino was knocked unconscious at some point in the evening and awoke in a basement surrounded by friends and his father; (5) Mr. Marino was transported to the hospital via ambulance; (6) Peter Frisina sustained an injury while riding the subject ATV on an occasion prior to plaintiffs alleged injuries; and (7) Ms. Morrison and Mr. Bedrosian took the keys for the ATV away from Mr. Morrison and forbade Mr, Morrison using the ATV after Peter Frisina’s injury.

Here, plaintiffs rely almost entirely on hearsay not subject to any exception, in an attempt to raise triable issues. Any reference by plaintiffs’ counsel to “defective” brakes is unfounded and speculative (see Daliendo v Johnson, supra). Further, plaintiffs have failed to provide any proof as to the mechanism of Mr. Marino’s alleged injury (see Passaro v Bouquio, 79 A.D.3d 1114, 914 N.Y.S.2d 905 [2d Dept 2010]}. Based upon the admissible, non-hearsay evidence submitted, it is just as likely that Mr. Marino jumped from the moving ATV; took an uneventful ride on the ATV, then attempted to climb a tree and fell to the ground; or was hit in the head by some unknown object, causing him to become unconscious, as it is that the ATV crashed and he was thrown from it. Furthermore, the “dangerous instrument” exception is inapplicable here, as plaintiffs have not submitted evidence that movants gave Mr. Morrison permission to use the ATV or supplied him with access to it (see Nolechek v Gesuale, supra). Instead, uncontroverted evidence has been submitted that movants took affirmative steps to deny use of the ATV to Richie Morrison.

Accordingly, the motions by defendants Carmela Morrison and Richard Bedrosian for summary judgment in their favor dismissing the complaint against them is granted.

New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students

Posted: July 11, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Camping, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, First Aid, Insurance, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Medical, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Sea Kayaking, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Swimming, Whitewater Rafting, Zip Line | Tags: Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Desk Reference, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, Good Samaritan Statutes, Hang gliding, Insurance, James H. Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Law, Legal Case, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, Outdoor Industry, Outdoor recreation, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Reference Book, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Reward, Risk, Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Textbook, Whitewater Rafting, zip line | Leave a comment

“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry

Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.

The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

PURCHASE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Cases

Introduction

Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview

Risk

Perception versus Actual Risk

Risk v. Reward

Risk Evaluation

Risk Management Strategies

Humans & Risk

Risk = Accidents

Accidents may/may not lead to litigation

How Do You Deal with Risk?

How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?

Negative Feelings against the Business

Risk, Accidents & Litigation

No Real Acceptance of the Risk

No Money to Pay Injury Bills

No Health Insurance

Insurance Company Subrogation

Negative Feelings

Litigation

Dealing with Different People

Dealing with Victims

Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit

Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits

Emergency Medical Services

Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation

Employees

How Do You Handle A Victim?

Dealing with Different People

Dealing with Victims

Legal System in the United States

Courts

State Court System

Federal Court System

Other Court Systems

Laws

Statutes

Parties to a Lawsuit

Attorneys

Trials

Law

Torts

Negligence

Duty

Breach of the Duty

Injury

Proximate Causation

Damages

Determination of Duty Owed

Duty of an Outfitter

Duty of a Guide

Duty of Livery Owner

Duty of Rental Agent

Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader

In Loco Parentis

Intentional Torts

Gross Negligence

Willful & Wanton Negligence

Intentional Negligence

Negligence Per Se

Strict Liability

Attractive Nuisance

Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence

Product Liability

Contracts

Breach of Contract

Breach of Warranty

Express Warranty

Implied Warranty

Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose

Warranty of Merchantability

Warranty of Statute

Detrimental Reliance

Unjust Enrichment

Liquor Liability

Food Service Liability

Damages

Compensatory Damages

Special Damages

Punitive Damages

Statutory Defenses

Skier Safety Acts

Whitewater Guides & Outfitters

Equine Liability Acts

Legal Defenses

Assumption of Risk

Express Assumption of Risk

Implied Assumption of Risk

Primary Assumption of Risk

Secondary Assumption of Risk

Contributory Negligence

Assumption of Risk & Minors

Inherent Dangers

Assumption of Risk Documents.

Assumption of Risk as a Defense.

Statutory Assumption of Risk

Express Assumption of Risk

Contributory Negligence

Joint and Several Liability

Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue

Why do you need them

Exculpatory Agreements

Releases

Waivers

Covenants Not to sue

Who should be covered

What should be included

Negligence Clause

Jurisdiction & Venue Clause

Assumption of Risk

Other Clauses

Indemnification

Hold Harmless Agreement

Liquidated Damages

Previous Experience

Misc

Photography release

Video Disclaimer

Drug and/or Alcohol clause

Medical Transportation & Release

HIPAA

Problem Areas

What the Courts do not want to see

Statute of Limitations

Minors

Adults

Defenses Myths

Agreements to Participate

Parental Consent Agreements

Informed Consent Agreements

Certification

Accreditation

Standards, Guidelines & Protocols

License

Specific Occupational Risks

Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators

College & University Issues

Animal Operations, Packers

Equine Activities

Canoe Livery Operations

Tube rentals

Downhill Skiing

Ski Rental Programs

Indoor Climbing Walls

Instructional Programs

Mountaineering

Retail Rental Programs

Rock Climbing

Tubing Hills

Whitewater Rafting

Risk Management Plan

Introduction for Risk Management Plans

What Is A Risk Management Plan?

What should be in a Risk Management Plan

Risk Management Plan Template

Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan

Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters

Building Fire & Evacuation

Dealing with an Emergency

Insurance

Theory of Insurance

Insurance Companies

Deductibles

Self-Insured Retention

Personal v. Commercial Policies

Types of Policies

Automobile

Comprehension

Collision

Bodily Injury

Property Damage

Uninsured Motorist

Personal Injury Protection

Non-Owned Automobile

Hired Car

Fire Policy

Coverage

Liability

Named Peril v. All Risk

Commercial Policies

Underwriting

Exclusions

Special Endorsements

Rescue Reimbursement

Policy Procedures

Coverage’s

Agents

Brokers

General Agents

Captive Agents

Types of Policies

Claims Made

Occurrence

Claims

Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements

Bibliography

Index

The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

A well-written release is not enough; you have to present it to the participant in a way that the participant knows what they are signing.

Posted: July 1, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: New York, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Agreement to Arbitrate, Arbitration clause, Clickwrap, Motion to Compel Arbitration, Negligence, Release, Salmon Ladder, Tough Mudder, Wavier | 1 Comment

Then you have to present the information to the court, so the court clearly sees what the participant saw, same size, same way, same color.

Citation: Scotti and Russo v. Tough Mudder Incorporated and Tough Mudder Event Production Incorporated, 97 N.Y.S.3d 825, 63 Misc.3d 843

State: New York; Supreme Court of New York, Kings

Plaintiff: Richard E. Scotti and Joseph Russo

Defendant: Tough Mudder Incorporated and Tough Mudder Event Production Incorporated

Plaintiff Claims: Negligence

Defendant Defenses: Arbitration Agreement and Release

Holding: For the Plaintiff

Year: 2019

Summary

A release is not a piece of paper to be written on a whim and thrown on line. Here the court blasted the defendant because the release was presented on-line in a bad way, and it was presented in court in a worse way.

Releases, Indemnification Agreements, Arbitration Agreements, etc., must be noticed to the consumer. Meaning the consumer MUST understand they are signing a legal agreement, they have to them be used online in a way that the consumer or guest has no doubt that they are signing one, and you must be able to prove that.

Besides, New York does not allow the use of a release!

Facts

The plaintiffs were both injured in a Tough Mudder event on the salmon ladder. The plaintiff’s sued and the defendant Tough Mudder answered and filed this motion to compel arbitration. The release contained an arbitration clause.

The release signed by the participants was signed online. The participants went through a registration page, part of which was a window where the release was contained. To read the release, you had to scroll through the window separately from the rest of the page. The release was in a window in the page.

The defendant attempted to prove the release was valid by presenting an affidavit of the Manager of Customer relations and black-and-white copies of the page and a separate copy of the release. The court did not have a copy of the page as it was seen by the participants.

The box that held the release did not show the entire document unless the reader scrolled through the center window. What the court received in its copy of the page, obviously only showed the small part of the release that was visible when the page was printed.

The agreement was labeled:

ASSUMPTION OF RISK, WAIVER OF LIABILITY, AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT PARTICIPANTS: READ THIS DOCUMENT CAREFULLY BEFORE ACCEPTING. THIS DOCUMENT HAS LEGAL CONSEQUENCES AND WILL AFFECT YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND WILL ELIMINATE YOUR ABILITY TO BRING FUTURE LEGAL ACTIONS

Not identified in the heading and located several pages into the release was an arbitration provision.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The judge shredded the defense in an efficient point by point denial of the defendant’s defenses for two reasons. They did a lousy job of setting up the documents to be signed online, and they did a worse job of presenting that information to the court.

The court first looked at the motion to compel arbitration. To compel arbitration the party wanting arbitration must:

It is well settled that “[a] party to an agreement may not be compelled to arbitrate its dispute with another unless the evidence establishes the parties’ clear, explicit and unequivocal agreement to arbitrate”. When one party seeks to compel the other to arbitrate any disputes between them, the court must first determine whether the parties made a valid arbitration agreement. The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of establishing that an agreement to arbitrate exists

Whether or not the online agreement was valid is based on the specific facts of the situation.

The question of whether there is agreement to accept the terms of an on-line contract turns on the particular facts and circumstances. Courts generally look for evidence that a website user had actual or constructive notice of the terms by using the website. Where the person’s alleged consent is solely online, courts seek to determine whether a reasonably prudent person would be put on notice of the provision in the contract, and whether the terms of the agreement were reasonably communicated to the user

The court then went into an analysis of the four types of online consumer contracts: “(a) browsewrap; (b) clickwrap; (c) scrollwrap; and (d) sign-in-wrap.” Each type of agreement has different requirements to be valid.

Browsewrap exists where the online host dictates that assent is given merely by using the site. Clickwrap refers to the assent process by which a user must click “I agree,” but not necessarily view the contract to which she is assenting. Scrollwrap requires users to physically scroll through an internet agreement and click on a separate “I agree” button in order to assent to the terms and conditions of the host website. Sign-in-wrap couples assent to the terms of a website with signing up for use of the site’s services….

The court then found, because the defendants’ document was so bad, that this agreement was a clickwrap agreement. Since the printed copy of the webpage only showed a small part of the release, the court found it could only be a clickwrap agreement.

Here, the PWCR at issue appears to be a click-wrap agreement as identified in Berkson in that the clickable box is located directly below the scrollable text box that allegedly contained the full text of the agreement. Only by scrolling down in the text box would the user see all of the terms of the PWCR, including the arbitration clause at issue. However, the user could proceed to complete the registration process without necessarily scrolling down through the text box to view the full document, thereby rendering it a click-wrap agreement. At oral argument, counsel for defendants claimed that it was a scrollwrap agreement, as it was not possible to click “I agree” without scrolling through the agreement, but there is nothing in the record to support this claim.

For clickwrap agreements to be valid:

“[a] court cannot presume that a person who clicks on a box that appears on a … screen has notice of all contents not only of that page but of other content that requires further action (scrolling, following a link, etc.) … The presentation of the online agreement matters: Whether there was notice of the existence of additional contract terms presented on a webpage depends heavily on whether the design and content of that webpage rendered the existence of terms reasonably conspicuous…. Clarity and conspicuousness of arbitration terms are important in securing informed assent.”

Thus, on a motion to compel arbitration, a valid agreement to arbitrate exists where the notice of the arbitration provision was reasonably conspicuous, and manifestation

The court simply found the “plaintiffs did not have actual notice of the arbitration provision at issue in this case.”

As cited in a recent decision, Corwin v. NYC Bike Share, LLC, 238 F.Supp.3d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) “a user’s clicking of a box is not, without more, sufficient to signal their assent to any contract term. The touchstone in most courts’ analysis of the enforceability of clickwrap contracts turns on whether the website provided ‘reasonably conspicuous notice that [users] are about to bind themselves to contract terms’ ”

For the online agreement to be valid, the agreement must:

First, terms of use should not be enforced if a reasonably prudent user would not have had at the very least inquiry notice of the terms of the agreement. Second, terms should be enforced when a user is encouraged by the design and content of the website and the agreement’s webpage to examine the terms, such as when they are clearly available through a hyperlink. Third terms should not be enforced when they are “buried at the bottom of a webpage or tucked away in obscure corners.”

The courts review of what was presented to the court was simple and a slam against the defendants.

And then the court piled on the defense for doing a lousy job of presenting the information to the court.

The court stated the important sections of the agreement needed to be identified so anyone reading the agreement would understand the importance of those sections. The court pointed out the heading identified the agreement as a release, but did not identify the agreement as containing an arbitration clause.

The court then slammed the door shut on the release itself because it violated GOL § 5-326.

§ 5-326. Agreements exempting pools, gymnasiums, places of public amusement or recreation and similar establishments from liability for negligence void and unenforceable

The court threw out both the release, and the arbitration clause within the release. In a footnote, the court stated it’s holding was in line with other decisions.

[1] It seems defendants conduct similar events all over the United States. There are two other actions pending in Kings County Supreme Court against defendants, and in both actions, defendants motions to compel arbitration were denied, albeit on different grounds.

So Now What?

This was not a case where the court wanted to make sure the defendant lost. This was a case where the defendant did a lousy job.

Microsoft gets away with this type of release and online crap because they are offering contracts where damages are the contract value; what you are paying for the software.

When you are dealing with torts, where thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars are on then a simple click or shrink wrap agreement will not suffice.

Create this page in such a way you can show it to the court.

Then have a click at the bottom that states the participant understands they are giving up certain legal rights. Then have the participant click to go to the payment page. The credit card information verifies the participant is who they say they are because of the credit card agreements.

Finally, when you send the person their receipt for signing up for the event, include a paragraph stating they also signed a release and possible a link to the release.

Quit hiding legal documents and put them out there and in front of your participants, guests and customers.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn

If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.

Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

To Purchase Go Here:

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Email: Jim@Rec-Law.US

By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

Scotti and Russo v. Tough Mudder Incorporated and Tough Mudder Event Production Incorporated, 97 N.Y.S.3d 825, 63 Misc.3d 843

Posted: June 30, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Legal Case, New York, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Agreement to Arbitrate, Arbitration clause, Clickwrap, Negligence, online, Release, Salmon Ladder, Tough Mudder, Waiver | Leave a comment

Scotti and Russo v. Tough Mudder Incorporated and Tough Mudder Event Production Incorporated, 97 N.Y.S.3d 825, 63 Misc.3d 843

97 N.Y.S.3d 825

63 Misc.3d 843

Richard E. Scotti and Joseph Russo, Plaintiffs,

Tough Mudder Incorporated and Tough Mudder Event Production Incorporated, Defendants.

No. 2019-29098

522905/17

Supreme Court of New York, Kings

March 29, 2019

[97 N.Y.S.3d 828] Plaintiffs were represented by Brandon Michael Cruz THE BONGIORNO LAW FIRM, PLLC. Address

Defendants were represented by Joshua Cash WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP Address

Opinion

Debra Silber, J.

Defendants Tough Mudder Incorporated and Tough Mudder Event Production Incorporated move for an order, pursuant to CPLR 7501 and 7503(a), to compel arbitration and to stay this action pending resolution of the arbitration proceeding. For the reasons which follow, the motion is denied.

Background and Procedural History

This personal injury action stems from an accident which occurred on July 23, 2016, when the plaintiffs Richard E. Scotti (Scotti) and Joseph Russo (Russo) (collectively, plaintiffs) participated in the “Tough Mudder,” a physically challenging obstacle course event (hereinafter, the TM Event), which took place at 1303 Round Swamp Road, Old Bethpage, New York. Defendants Tough Mudder Incorporated and Tough Mudder Event Production Incorporated (collectively, “Tough Mudder”) are the business entities that organized the TM Event. Plaintiffs commenced the within action on or about November 17, 2017 against Tough Mudder alleging that they each sustained injuries as a result of defendants’ negligent operation of an activity at the event, referred to as the “salmon ladder.” Tough Mudder joined issue on or about December 20, 2017, with the service of a Verified Answer. In their answer, Tough Mudder denied all material allegations and asserted various affirmative defenses, including that the plaintiffs’ action is barred by the participation/registration agreement, which included an arbitration clause.

Tough Mudder now moves, pursuant to CPLR 7501 and 7503, to compel arbitration, arguing that the plaintiffs are barred from pursuing the instant action in this Court because they each waived the right to sue by virtue of agreeing to arbitrate any “disputes, controversies, or claims” arising out of their participation in the TM event. Tough Mudder claims that the plaintiffs each entered into an agreement to arbitrate all claims related to their participation in the TM Event when they completed an on-line internet registration form. In support of this contention, Tough Mudder has submitted the sworn affidavit of Jenna Best, the Manager of Customer Relations for Tough Mudder Incorporated (Affirmation of Joshua Cash, Exhibit C). Best avers that she is fully familiar with the TM Event on-line registration process as it existed in 2016 when the plaintiffs registered for the TM Event at issue.[1] Tough Mudder has submitted copies of the on-line registration forms that the plaintiffs allegedly completed for the TM Event (Cash Affirmation, Exhibit D). Best states that, during the on-line registration process, the plaintiffs were required to scroll down to a section containing the “Participant Waiver and Course Rules” (hereinafter, PWCR), a document version of which has been submitted herein (Cash Affirmation, Exhibit F). She contends that the full text of the PWCR was contained in a box on the screen, which could be read by scrolling down in the text box. Best contends that the initial visible content of the scrollable box, which preceded the full PWCR document, which could be read in its entirety by scrolling down, read as follows:

“Participant Waiver: Tough Mudder Incorporated

Best claims the PWCR contained the following “Mediation and Arbitration” provision:

Mediation and Arbitration: In the event of a legal issue, I agree to engage in good faith efforts to mediate any dispute that might arise. Any agreement reached will be formalized by a written contractual agreement at that time. Should the issue not be resolved by mediation, I agree that all disputes, controversies, or claims arising out of my participation in the TM event shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the applicable rules of the American Arbitration Association then in effect. The costs of such action shall be shared equally by the parties.

I further acknowledge and agree that any question, issue or dispute as to the arbitrability of any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of my participation in the TM event, will be submitted to an arbitrator in accordance with the applicable rules of the American Arbitration Association then in effect. The Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association are available on-line at http://www.adr.org (Cash Affirmation, Exhibit F).

Below the box containing the scrollable PWCR was another box next to the statement: “I agree to the above waiver.” Best avers that it was necessary for the plaintiffs, or any other registrant, to click on the box to indicate his or her consent to the PWCR in order for the registrant to complete his or her registration for the TM Event. According to Best, the internet registration form cannot proceed to the payment page, and registration cannot be completed, until the registrant checks the box indicating his or her consent to the PWCR (Cash Affirmation, Exhibit D at ¶ 5). She further avers that both plaintiffs did in fact click on the box indicating their consent to the PWCR, as otherwise they would not have been able to participate in the TM Event (id at ¶ 6). Based upon the foregoing, Tough Mudder contends that the plaintiffs agreed to the terms of the on-line waiver, which included the arbitration clause and, therefore, are barred from pursuing the instant action. In opposition, plaintiffs argue that the arbitration provision at issue is unenforceable because Tough Mudder has failed to establish that they actually agreed to it. In this regard, plaintiffs point out that the web page where the PWCR was located contained a text box that did not show the entire document. In order to read the full PWCR, including the arbitration provision, plaintiffs contend it would have been necessary to scroll down through many screens of text using the arrows on the right-hand side of the text box. The PWCR fills seven single-spaced pages of text (Exhibit F to Cash Affirmation). Plaintiffs further argue that Tough Mudder has failed to proffer any evidence that either plaintiff actually signed/checked the consent box, or any evidence identifying the computers or electronic devices from which their respective registrations were completed.

Plaintiffs additionally argue that the arbitration clause in the PWCR is unenforceable because it contains a conflicting provision regarding disputes. Plaintiffs point out that the PWCR contains a clause entitled “Venue and Jurisdiction” located several paragraphs before the “Mediation and Arbitration” clause, which states [Exhibit F, Page 3]:

I understand that if legal action is brought, the appropriate state or federal trial court for the state in which the TM Event is held has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction and that only the substantive laws of the State in which the TM Event is held shall apply.

Plaintiffs argue that this provision clearly conflicts with the arbitration clause located many lines of type below it, thereby rendering it void and unenforceable.

Finally, plaintiffs argue that the entire PWCR agreement, including the purported arbitration provision, is unenforceable because the “Waiver of Liability for Ordinary Negligence” clause (on page three of the PWCR as Exhibit F) violates General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-326, which prohibits contracts between the owner or operator of any “place of amusement or recreation” from exempting such owner or operator from “liability for damages caused by or resulting from the negligence of the owner, operator or person in charge of such establishment.” In this regard, plaintiffs contend that Tough Mudder’s operation of the TM Event obstacle course was clearly operated as “a place of amusement or recreation” within the meaning of GOL § 5-326. Since the plaintiffs paid a fee to use the obstacle course and were injured while engaged in that activity, they argue that GOL § 5-326 renders the entire waiver of liability clause, and all remaining provisions of the PWCR, including the arbitration clause, void and unenforceable.

In reply, Tough Mudder points out that the plaintiffs do not dispute that they each did in fact register for the TM Event. In addition, Tough Mudder argues that GOL § 5-326 is not applicable herein and, therefore, does not invalidate the waiver or any other PWCR provision. In this regard, Tough Mudder maintains that the TM Event is distinguishable from the “recreational” activities intended to be covered under the statute, such as horseback riding, auto racing, cycling and skiing, which Tough Mudder characterizes as being “relaxed and undemanding” activities, which “do not necessitate any research or physical preparation.” Tough Mudder argues that the TM Event is distinguishable from the foregoing activities in that it is “a rigorous and grueling athletic competition that requires proper training and dedication” (Cash Reply Affirmation, at ¶ 8). Tough Mudder further argues that TM Events are “unique to their participants,” and pose risks and challenges exclusive to obstacle courses, thereby rendering such events completely distinct from the recreational activities engaged in by the “general public” as contemplated by GOL § 5-326.

In addition, Tough Mudder points out that the PWCR contains a “Severability” provision which states, in relevant part, as follows:

“I understand and agree that this … Waiver of Liability … is intended to be as broad and inclusive as is permitted by the state in which the TM Event is held and that if any provision shall be found to be … void, or for any reason unenforceable, then that provision shall be severed from this Agreement and does not affect the validity and enforceability of any remaining provisions.”

[97 N.Y.S.3d 831] In light of the foregoing provision, Tough Mudder argues that, in the event a clause is deemed unenforceable, it does not invalidate any of the remaining provisions of the PWCR, including the arbitration clause at issue.

Tough Mudder also argues that the “Venue and Jurisdiction” clause is not contradicted by the “Mediation and Arbitration” clause, as the latter clause only mandates arbitration regarding disputes “arising out of [one’s] participation in the TM event …” Therefore, Tough Mudder contends that there are clearly certain circumstances when a state or federal trial court would be the appropriate venue for claims that do not arise out of one’s participation in the TM Event. However, since plaintiffs’ claims do arise out of their participation, Tough Mudder maintains that arbitration of this matter is required.

Discussion

It is well settled that “[a] party to an agreement may not be compelled to arbitrate its dispute with another unless the evidence establishes the parties’ clear, explicit and unequivocal agreement to arbitrate” (God’s Battalion of Prayer Pentecostal Church, Inc. v. Miele Assocs., LLP, 6 N.Y.3d 371, 812 N.Y.S.2d 435, 845 N.E.2d 1265 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeMatter of Robert Stigwood Org. [Atlantic Recording Corp.], 83 A.D.2d 123, 126, 443 N.Y.S.2d 726 [1981] ). When one party seeks to compel the other to arbitrate any disputes between them, the court must first determine whether the parties made a valid arbitration agreement (seeHarriman Group v. Napolitano, 213 A.D.2d 159, 162, 623 N.Y.S.2d 224 [1995] ). The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of establishing that an agreement to arbitrate exists (seeSeneca Ins. Co. v. Secure— Southwest Brokerage, 294 A.D.2d 211, 212, 741 N.Y.S.2d 690 [2002]; Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roseboro, 247 A.D.2d 379, 380, 667 N.Y.S.2d 914 [1998] ). The court must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. (Nicosia v. Amazon.com Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 229 [2d Cir. 2016] ).

“The creation of online contracts ‘has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract’ ” (Resorb Networks, Inc. v. YouNow.com, 51 Misc.3d 975, 981, 30 N.Y.S.3d 506 [Sup.Ct. N.Y. County 2016] quoting Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 [2d Cir. 2004] ). The question of whether there is agreement to accept the terms of an on-line contract turns on the particular facts and circumstances. Courts generally look for evidence that a website user had actual or constructive notice of the terms by using the website (seeSchnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 [2d Cir. 2012] ). Where the person’s alleged consent is solely online, courts seek to determine whether a reasonably prudent person would be put on notice of the provision in the contract, and whether the terms of the agreement were reasonably communicated to the user (id. at 120; see Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F.Supp.2d 829, 833, 835 [S.D.N.Y. 2012]; Starke v. Gilt Groupe, Inc., 2014 WL 1652225, *2, *3, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58006, *6-7 [S.D.N.Y. 2014]; Jerez v. JD Closeouts, LLC, 36 Misc.3d 161, 168, 943 N.Y.S.2d 392 [Nassau Dist. Ct. 2012] ). In Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002), the court emphasized that “[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility” (id. at 35; seeStarke v. Squaretrade, Inc., No. 16-CV-7036 [NGG], 2017 WL 3328236, at *5 [E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017], affd 913 F.3d 279 [2d Cir. 2019] ).

In Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F.Supp.3d 359, 394-403 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), the four “general types of online consumer contracts

are identified as (a) browsewrap; (b) clickwrap; (c) scrollwrap; and (d) sign-in-wrap.” As explained by Judge Weinstein in Berkson:

Here, the PWCR at issue appears to be a click-wrap agreement as identified in Berkson in that the clickable box is located directly below the scrollable text box that allegedly contained the full text of the agreement. Only by scrolling down in the text box would the user see all of the terms of the PWCR, including the arbitration clause at issue. However, the user could proceed to complete the registration process without necessarily scrolling down through the text box to view the full document, thereby rendering it a click-wrap agreement. At oral argument, counsel for defendants claimed that it was a scrollwrap agreement, as it was not possible to click “I agree” without scrolling through the agreement, but there is nothing in the record to support this claim.[2]

A party may be bound to a click wrap agreement by clicking a button declaring assent, so long as the party is given a “sufficient opportunity to read the … agreement, and assents thereto after being provided with an unambiguous method of accepting or declining the offer.” (Serrano v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 863 F.Supp.2d 157, 164 [E.D.N.Y. 2012]; see alsoWhitt v. Prosper Funding LLC, 15— CV— 136, 2015 WL 4254062, at *4 [S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2015]; Kai Peng v. Uber Techs., Inc., 237 F.Supp.3d 36, 47-48 [E.D.N.Y. 2017]; Berkson, 97 F.Supp.3d at 397). However, as stated by Judge Koeltl in Applebaum v. Lyft, Inc., 263 F.Supp.3d at 466,

Thus, on a motion to compel arbitration, a valid agreement to arbitrate exists where the notice of the arbitration provision was reasonably conspicuous, and manifestation [97 N.Y.S.3d 833] of assent is unambiguous as a matter of law (seeSpecht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28 [2d Cir. 2002] ). Therefore, issue herein is whether Tough Mudder’s website registration screen put a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the relevant terms of the PWCR, particularly the arbitration clause at issue (seeApplebaum, 263 F.Supp.3d at 465). Insofar as it turns on the reasonableness of notice, the enforceability of a web-based agreement is clearly a fact-intensive inquiry (id. ; seeMeyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 76 [2d Cir. 2017], citing Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 124 [2d Cir. 2012] ).

Here, plaintiffs did not have actual notice of the arbitration provision at issue in this case. However, plaintiffs can still be bound by the contractual terms if there is inquiry notice of the terms and plaintiffs “assent[ed] to [the terms] through the conduct that a reasonable person would understand to constitute assent” (Plazza v. Airbnb, Inc., 289 F.Supp.3d 537, 548 [S.D.N.Y. 2018]; see alsoNicosia, 834 F.3d at 233). A person is on inquiry notice if a “reasonably prudent offeree would be on notice of the terms at issue” (Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 120 [” ‘[I]nquiry notice’ is ‘actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry’ “] quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 27 n.14 [2d Cir. 2002] ).

As cited in a recent decision, Corwin v. NYC Bike Share, LLC, 238 F.Supp.3d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) “a user’s clicking of a box is not, without more, sufficient to signal their assent to any contract term. The touchstone in most courts’ analysis of the enforceability of clickwrap contracts turns on whether the website provided ‘reasonably conspicuous notice that [users] are about to bind themselves to contract terms’ ” (Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 [2d Cir. 2002] [Sotomayor, J.] ). In many cases, this becomes a fact-intensive inquiry because “electronic agreements fall along a spectrum in the degree to which they provide notice, and it is difficult to draw bright-line rules because each user interface differs from others in distinctive ways (Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F.Supp.3d 408, 420 [S.D.N.Y. 2016] ). In Meyer, a putative class action claiming price-fixing, the district court found that adequate notice was not given to plaintiff of mandatory arbitration when he registered to use Uber. The screen had a hyperlink to the agreement, but plaintiff did not need to click on it to register as a user. Then, after clicking on it, you needed to click further to read the Terms of Service and the arbitration provision was at the bottom of page seven. This was determined to be a “browsewrap” agreement. The Second Circuit, on appeal,[3] determined that the issue was whether the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the arbitration provision by virtue of the hyperlink on the screen, under California Law, and determined that adequate notice was given. The panel reversed the district court, finding the motion to compel arbitration should have been granted.

The court further notes that on-line agreements may be revised from time to time, so not only must the court determine whether the party seeking to enforce such an agreement has provided the version seen by the other party at the time the contract was made, but whether the court in any seemingly on point case cited actually rendered its decision based on the same version of the agreement (seePlazza v. Airbnb, 289 F.Supp.3d 537 [S.D.N.Y. 2018] [archived computer code for 2009 sign-up screen provided to court, along with screen shots of Terms of Service] ).

In Berkson, supra, Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York, surveying cases from federal courts nationwide, provided a useful set of parameters to guide a court’s inquiry. First, terms of use should not be enforced if a reasonably prudent user would not have had at the very least inquiry notice of the terms of the agreement (Berkson, 97 F.Supp.3d at 401 [citingNguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 [9th Cir. 2014] ). Second, terms should be enforced when a user is encouraged by the design and content of the website and the agreement’s webpage to examine the terms, such as when they are clearly available through a hyperlink. Third terms should not be enforced when they are “buried at the bottom of a webpage or tucked away in obscure corners.” Special attention should be paid to whether the site design brings the consumer’s attention to “material terms that would alter what a reasonable consumer would understand to be her default rights when initiating an online [transaction],” and, in appropriate cases, such terms should not be enforced even when the contract is otherwise enforceable. “When contractual terms as significant as … the right to sue in court are accessible only via a small and distant hyperlink … with text about agreement thereto presented even more obscurely, there is a genuine risk that a fundamental principle of contract formation will be left in the dust: the requirement for a manifestation of mutual assent” (Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F.Supp.3d at 421-22 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). A broad exculpatory clause waiving liability for negligence would also certainly qualify as a material term and one that alters a contracting party’s commonly-understood rights.

Here, the court finds that Tough Mudder has failed to establish that the webpage, as it existed in 2016 when the plaintiffs registered for the TM Event, provided reasonable notice of the relevant term (the arbitration provision) of the PWCR. In fact, Tough Mudder has failed to set forth sufficiently detailed evidence as to how its on-line registration webpage appeared to the plaintiffs, or other users/registrants, during the relevant time period. In this regard, the court finds that the affidavit by Ms. Best holds little evidentiary value, as she does not set forth the basis of her personal knowledge of Tough Mudder’s on-line registration process at the time the plaintiffs registered, or of her familiarity with the applicable computer generated documents (seeGogos v. Modell’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 87 A.D.3d 248, 253-254, 926 N.Y.S.2d 53 [2011] ). Additionally, absent from her affidavit is any indication that she was even employed by Tough Mudder at the relevant time period.

In addition, the court notes that the purported copies of the plaintiffs’ respective on-line registration forms (screen shots) submitted by Tough Mudder (Exhibit D) are black and white copies of poor quality, the text of which is in an extremely small font size and is barely legible. Tough Mudder has not proffered any color copies of any screen shots depicting its on-line registration process. In addition, the full text of the PWCR, as provided by Tough Mudder, is not a screen shot but a black and white document, consisting of seven pages of single-spaced language, all in the same font and size, with no underlined, hyperlinked or bolded terms. In order to view the “Mediation and Arbitration” clause, the plaintiffs, by using the arrows inside the text box, needed to scroll down significantly beyond what is initially visible, to page four of the seven-page single-spaced PWCR document. The court additionally notes that, as with the entire document, the arbitration provision is neither underlined, bolded nor hyperlinked. Further, since this court has only been provided with a black and white document, not screen shots, it is unable to discern how the subject arbitration clause actually appeared to the user. Indeed, “[i]n the context of web-based contracts, [courts] look to the design and content of the relevant interface to determine if the contract terms were presented to the offeree in a way that would put her [or him] on inquiry notice of such terms” (Starke v. Squaretrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 289-90 [2d Cir. 2019] citing Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 [9th Cir. 2014] and Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 23 [2d Cir. 2002] [where court refused to enforce terms of use that “would have become visible to plaintiffs only if they had scrolled to the next screen”] ). Here, Tough Mudder’s submissions with respect to the “design and content” of its website and the relevant terms of the PWCR, especially the arbitration clause, are woefully inadequate.

The court further notes that the initially visible portion of the on-line text box containing the scrollable PWCR has an all-caps header stating: “ASSUMPTION OF RISK, WAIVER OF LIABILITY, AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT PARTICIPANTS: READ THIS DOCUMENT CAREFULLY BEFORE ACCEPTING. THIS DOCUMENT HAS LEGAL CONSEQUENCES AND WILL AFFECT YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND WILL ELIMINATE YOUR ABILITY TO BRING FUTURE LEGAL ACTIONS.” However, while this header specifically draws the user’s attention to certain specified provisions (i.e., Assumption of Risk, Waiver of Liability and Indemnity) which appear at the beginning of the document (on pages one and three), it makes no reference to the arbitration provision, which appears on page four of the seven-page PWCR document.

Additionally, the court notes that the “Venue and Jurisdiction” clause, which appears on page three of the PWCR states that if “legal action is brought, the appropriate state or federal trial court for the state in which the TM Event is held has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction….” This provision clearly conflicts with the arbitration clause at issue, which mandates that all claims “arising out of [one’s] participation in the TM Event shall be submitted to binding arbitration….” Given that the plaintiffs would have viewed (in the scrollable text box) the “Venue and Jurisdiction” provision first, the court finds it highly unlikely that they would have been placed on inquiry notice of the arbitration provision, which appeared on a subsequent page in the agreement. As noted above, the party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of establishing that an agreement to arbitrate exists (see Seneca Ins. Co. v. Secure— Southwest Brokerage, 294 A.D.2d at 212, 741 N.Y.S.2d 690), which Tough Mudder has failed to do. Under the circumstances presented here, the court finds that the arbitration provision was not sufficiently conspicuous to place the plaintiffs on inquiry or constructive notice and, therefore, is not enforceable (seeSpecht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d at 32; Applebaum, 263 F.Supp.3d at 465). Further, due to the conflicting provisions regarding litigation and arbitration, the arbitration provision is void due to ambiguity. Accordingly, Tough Mudder’s motion to stay the action and compel arbitration is denied.

General Obligations Law § 5-326

As to plaintiffs’ argument that the waiver and release provision set forth in the PWCR [Exhibit F Page 3] is invalid pursuant to GOL § 5-326, the court agrees. That statute protects consumers from the effect of form releases printed on membership applications and similar documents when such releases are offered in connection with the use of a “place of amusement or recreation” for which a fee is paid (GOL § 5-326; seeRogowicki v. Troser Mgt., 212 A.D.2d 1035, 623 N.Y.S.2d 47 [1995]; Blanc v. Windham Mtn. Club, 115 Misc.2d 404, 454 N.Y.S.2d 383 [1982], affd 92 A.D.2d 529, 459 N.Y.S.2d 447 [1983] ). The terms of this statute apply to the plaintiffs herein, who paid a fee to use Tough Mudder’s obstacle course, which, contrary to Tough Mudder’s assertion, is a place of recreation (seeLeftow v. Kutsher’s Country Club Corp., 270 A.D.2d 233, 234, 705 N.Y.S.2d 380 [2000] ). Indeed, the nature of the TM Event as described by Tough Mudder — a rigorous, athletic competition requiring proper training — is comparable to the other activities, such as horseback riding, auto racing, cycling and skiing, which have been held to be covered by GOL § 5-326. Furthermore, Tough Mudder’s assertion that, unlike the TM Event, such activities are “relaxed and undemanding” and “do not necessitate any research or physical preparation” is an inaccurate and absurd distinction. Thus, the PWCR’s waiver provision, waiving defendants’ liability for “ordinary negligence” violates GOL § 5-236 and is therefore void (seeGarnett v. Strike Holdings LLC, 64 A.D.3d 419, 882 N.Y.S.2d 115 [2009] [applying § 5— 326 where plaintiff paid a fee to use the recreational facility]; Alibey v. Tough Mudder Inc., 2018 WL 5298473, at *2 [Sup.Ct., Kings County, Oct. 24, 2018]; Hansen v. Tough Mudder, Inc., [Sup Ct Kings Co. 2018, Ind. 515072/15] ).

However, as Tough Mudder correctly argues, the unenforceable provisions of the PWCR do not nullify the entire agreement. Where an agreement consists partially of an unlawful objective, “the court may sever the illegal aspect and enforce the legal one, so long as the illegal aspects are incidental to the legal aspects and are not the main objective of the agreement.” (Mark Hotel LLC v. Madison Seventy-Seventh LLC, 61 A.D.3d 140, 143, 872 N.Y.S.2d 111 [2009] ). “[W]hether the provisions of a contract are severable depends largely upon the intent of the parties as reflected in the language they employ and the particular circumstantial milieu in which the agreement came into being.” (Matter of Wilson’s Estate, 50 N.Y.2d 59, 65, 427 N.Y.S.2d 977, 405 N.E.2d 220 [1980] ).

Here, the waiver of liability provision in the PWCR releasing Tough Mudder from liability, as well as the arbitration clause, are severable from the remainder of the PWCR agreement on the ground that the unenforceable provisions are incidental to the legal aspects and not the main objective of the agreement. Further, the severability provision in the PWCR reflects the intent of the parties that the legal provisions of the agreement be severed from any provisions determined to be void and unenforceable.

Conclusion

For the reasons state above, Tough Mudder’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the action is denied.

The parties are directed to appear on May 1, 2019 in the Intake Part for a Preliminary Conference.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Notes:

[2] In any event, as the court states in Meyer v. Uber Tech., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2017).: Classification of web-based contracts alone, however, does not resolve the notice inquiry. See Juliet M. Moringiello and William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 Md. L.Rev. 452, 466 (2013) (“Whether terms are classified as clickwrap says little about whether the offeree had notice of them.”). Insofar as it turns on the reasonableness of notice, the enforceability of a web based agreement is clearly a fact-intensive inquiry. SeeSchnabel, 697 F.3d at 124.

[3] Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2017)

Kang v. LA Fitness, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179934, 2016 WL 7476354

Posted: May 2, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Health Club, Legal Case, New Jersey, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Chin Dip, deceit, Duty to Perform, English, Exculpatory Agreement, Exculpatory clause, fitness, Fitness Center, font, Gym, Health club, LA Fitness, Mutual Assent, Negligence, New Jersey Plaint Language Law, or misrepresentation, plain language, Plain Language Act, Plain Language Law, Public Interest, Public Policy, Release, Small Type, Summary judgment, ud, Unconscionability, Unconscionable, Unequal Bargaining Power | Leave a comment

Kang v. LA Fitness, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179934, 2016 WL 7476354

Soon Ja Kang Plaintiff,

LA Fitness, LA Fitness of South Plainfield, John Does 1-5, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 2:14-cv-07147 (KSH) (CLW)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

December 29, 2016

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J.

Before the Court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the validity and enforceability of an exculpatory clause in a fitness center membership agreement with plaintiff. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the liability waiver to be valid and enforceable and defendants’ motion is granted.

I. Background

Fitness International, LLC d/b/a LA Fitness (incorrectly designated as LA Fitness of South Plainfield) (“LA Fitness”) operates a fitness facility located in Piscataway, NJ. See Final Pretrial Order Stipulation of Facts (“SOF”) (D.E. 19), at ¶ 1. On December 30, 2013, plaintiff Soon Ja Kang went to LA Fitness with her husband to sign up for membership. Id. at ¶ 2. The membership agreement she signed states in relevant part:

IMPORTANT: RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY. You hereby acknowledge and agree that use by Member and/or Member’s minor children of LA Fitness’ facilities, services, equipment or premises, involves risks of injury to persons and property, including those described below, and Member assumes full responsibility for such risks. In consideration of Member and Member’s minor children being permitted to enter any facility of LA Fitness (a “Club”) for any purpose including, but not limited to, observation, use of facilities, services or equipment, or participation in any way, Member agrees to the following: Member hereby releases and holds LA Fitness, its directors, officers, employees, and agents harmless from all liability to Member, Member’s children and Member’s personal representatives, assigns, heirs, and next of kin for any loss or damage, and forever gives up any claim or demands therefore, on account of injury to Member’s person or property, including injury leading to the death of Member, whether caused by the active or passive negligence of LA Fitness or otherwise, to the fullest extent permitted by law, while Member or Member’s minor children are in, upon, or about LA Fitness’ premises or using any LA Fitness facilities, services or equipment. Member also hereby agrees to indemnify LA Fitness from any loss, liability, damage or cost LA Fitness may incur due to the presence of Member or Member’s children in, upon or about the LA Fitness premises or in any way observing or using any facilities or equipment of LA Fitness whether caused by the negligence of Member(s) or otherwise. You represent (a) that Member and Member’s minor children are in good physical condition and have no disability, illness, or other condition that could prevent Member(s) from exercising without injury or impairment of health, and (b) that Member has consulted a physician concerning an exercise program that will not risk injury to Member or impairment of Member’s health. Such risk of injury includes (but is not limited to): injuries arising from use by Member or others of exercise equipment and machines; injuries arising from participation by Member or others in supervised or unsupervised activities or programs at a Club; injuries and medical disorders arising from exercising at a Club such as heart attacks, strokes, heat stress, sprains, broken bones, and torn muscles and ligaments, among others; and accidental injuries occurring anywhere in Club dressing rooms, showers and other facilities. Member further expressly agrees that the foregoing release, waiver and indemnity agreement is intended to be as broad and inclusive as is permitted by the law of the State of New Jersey and that if any portion thereof is held invalid, it is agreed that the balance shall, notwithstanding, continue in full force and effect. Member has read this release and waiver of liability and indemnity clause, and agrees that no oral representations, statements or inducement apart from this Agreement has been made.

LA Fitness Moving Br., Exh. E (D.E. 22-7).

Kang and her husband do not read or understand English, but their daughter was present to translate for them when they signed up. See SOF, at ¶¶ 4-5. Kang signed a membership agreement. She did not initial next to the waiver and liability provision in her membership agreement; however, her husband was asked to initial next to the same provision in his membership agreement, and he did so. Id. at ¶ 6.

On December 31, 2013, Kang was injured while working out on a chin/dip assist pull up machine at LA Fitness’s Piscataway location. See SOF, at ¶¶ 2, 7. She filed the instant action on September 29, 2014 in state court, and LA Fitness filed a notice of removal in this Court on November 14, 2014 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction (D.E. 1). The complaint alleges that Kang was injured as a result of negligence on the part of LA Fitness. Id. Prior to completion of expert discovery, LA Fitness moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the waiver and liability provision bars the instant action. The motion was fully briefed. (D.E. 22, 25, 26).

The Court makes its decision on the paper.

II. Discussion

A. Standard

Summary judgment is warranted where the moving party demonstrates that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c). The parties have conducted discovery on the circumstances surrounding the formation of Kang’s membership agreement and, as set forth in the analysis below, all facts relevant to the enforceability of the waiver provision are essentially undisputed as set forth in the Final Pretrial Order Stipulation of Facts (D.E. 19). In determining whether the waiver provision is enforceable as a matter of law, the Court “view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to [Kang] and draw[s] all justifiable, reasonable inferences in [her] favor.” Sgro v. Bloomberg L.P., 331 F.Appx. 932, 937 (3d Cir. 2009).

B. Analysis

Pursuant to the release and waiver of liability provision in her membership agreement, Kang released and held LA Fitness harmless for all injuries she might suffer “whether caused by the active or passive negligence of LA Fitness or otherwise, ” while she was “in, upon, or about LA Fitness’ premises or using any LA Fitness facilities, services or equipment.” LA Fitness Moving Br., Exh. E (D.E. 22-7). As her negligence claim for an injury allegedly sustained while using a piece of workout equipment at an LA Fitness facility clearly falls within the ambit of the liability waiver, the issue becomes whether the waiver itself is enforceable against Kang on the facts of this case.

In Stelluti v. Casapenn Enterprises, LLC, 408 N.J.Super. 435, 454 (App. Div. 2009), aff’d, 203 N.J. 286 (2010), the New Jersey Appellate Division addressed the enforceability of exculpatory releases in fitness center membership agreements:

Such a release is enforceable only if: (1) it does not adversely affect the public interest; (2) the exculpated party is not under a legal duty to perform; (3) it does not involve a public utility or common carrier; or (4) the contract does not grow out of unequal bargaining power or is otherwise unconscionable.

Id. The third factor is inapplicable here, because LA Fitness is not a public utility or common carrier. See Kang Opp. Br., at p. 6. The Court analyzes the remaining Stelluti factors in turn.

1. Does the Exculpatory Clause Adversely Affect the Public Interest?

LA Fitness argues that the exculpatory clause in this case does not adversely affect the public interest because it is “a facility that encourages New Jersey’s public policy promoting physical fitness.” LA Fitness Moving Br., at p. 6. Noting the important policy objective of promoting public health, the Stelutti court held:

[W]e are satisfied that, at least with respect to equipment being used at the club in the course of an exercise class or other athletic activity, the exculpatory agreement’s disclaimer of liability for ordinary negligence is reasonable and not offensive to public policy.

Stelluti, 408 N.J.Super. at 459. The Court agrees with the analysis in Stelluti and finds that the exculpatory clause here does not adversely affect the public interest, at least to the extent that it purports to exculpate LA Fitness with respect to acts or omissions amounting to ordinary negligence.

Kang argues that public policy promoting physical fitness “cannot counteract the other public policy reasons that are in place to protect against improper liability waivers.” Kang Opp. Br., at p. 7. To that end, she argues that the release in this case violates the New Jersey Plain Language Act, which states that “[a] consumer contract entered into on or after the effective date of this amendatory and supplementary act shall be written in a simple, clear, understandable and easily readable way.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:12-2. Specifically, Kang argues that the small font size and margins in the contract are such that “[s]omeone who can read and understand English would be substantially confused by this agreement[.]” Kang Opp. Br., at p. 8.

To determine whether the waiver provision violates the Plain Language Act, the Court turns to the plain language of the act itself. Section 56:12-10 provides:

To insure that a consumer contract shall be simple, clear, understandable and easily readable, the following are examples of guidelines that a court . . . may consider in determining whether a consumer contract as a whole complies with this act:

(1) Cross references that are confusing;

(2) Sentences that are of greater length than necessary;

(3) Sentences that contain double negatives and exceptions to exceptions;

(4) Sentences and sections that are in a confusing or illogical order;

(5) The use of words with obsolete meanings or words that differ in their legal meaning from their common ordinary meaning;

(6) Frequent use of Old English and Middle English words and Latin and French phrases.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:12-10. Section 56:12-10 further provides:

The following are examples of guidelines that a court . . . may consider in determining whether the consumer contract as a whole complies with this act:

(1) Sections shall be logically divided and captioned;

(2) A table of contents or alphabetical index shall be used for all contracts with more than 3, 000 words;

(3) Conditions and exceptions to the main promise of the agreement shall be given equal prominence with the main promise, and shall be in at least 10 point type.

Id. A Court has discretion as to how much consideration should be given to the above-listed statutory guidelines in finding a violation of the act. See Boddy v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Companies, 334 N.J.Super. 649, 655 (App. Div. 2000).

Reviewing Kang’s membership agreement in light of the above guidelines, the Court finds that the waiver provision does not violate the New Jersey Plain Language Act. The waiver provision does not contain any cross references, nor does it contain any double negatives or exceptions to exceptions. It does not contain words with obsolete meanings, nor is it clouded by the use of Old English, Middle English, Latin or French phrases. And Kang does not argue-nor does the Court find-that the sentences of the waiver provision are set forth in a confusing or illogical order.

Instead, Kang argues that the waiver provision violates the Plain Language Act because “[t]he size of the font (print) is about size 8, whereas the standard size used in everyday documents is size 12[, ]” and because “[t]he margins on the sides of the pages are about 0.5 inch . . . reflecting the intentions of the drafter to squeeze in additional words.” Kang Opp. Br., at p. 8. However, applying the above guidelines, the Court does not find that the waiver provision in this case is any less prominent that the remainder of the agreement. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:12-10b(3). To the contrary, the waiver and liability provision is the only clause in the membership agreement preceded by a title in all caps (“IMPORTANT: RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY”), and it is the only clause that is fully enclosed by a border, creating a visual separation between the waiver and the rest of the agreement.

The Court finds that the waiver provision in this case does not offend public policy under Stelluti and does not otherwise violate the New Jersey Plain Language Act.

2. Is LA Fitness Under a Legal Duty To Perform?

LA Fitness argues that its relationship with Kang does not create any duties prescribed by statute or regulation. See LA Fitness Moving Br., at pp. 6-8. New Jersey courts have found liability waivers to be invalid as against public policy where they conflict with legislatively imposed duties. For example, in Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank, 138 N.J.Super. 112, 118 (App. Div. 1975), the court found it against public policy for a bank to exculpate itself from liability or responsibility for negligence in the performance of its function as a night depository service, in part due to the “extensive statutory regulations covering every phase of the banking business[.]” Id. at 118. Similarly, in McCarthy v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 48 N.J. 539, 543 (1967), the New Jersey Supreme Court held a liability waiver invalid as against public policy because it purported to contract away safety requirements prescribed by statute dealing with motor vehicle racing. See id. at 543 (“[t]he prescribed safety requirements may not be contracted away, for if they could be the salient protective purposes of the legislation would largely be nullified”).

Kang argues that “although there are no statutes specific to fitness centers, there are several national associations that have established standards that apply to the fitness industry[.]” Kang Opp. Br., at pp. 8-9. However, there is no indication that these national standards apply with the force of law in New Jersey so as to constitute public policy of the state. Kang further argues that the Stelluti court acknowledged the well-established duties of care that New Jersey business owners owe to patrons that enter their premises. See Kang Opp. Br., at p. 8. However, as noted above in Part B.1. supra, Stelluti expressly held that fitness center liability waivers such as the one at issue here do not violate public policy at least to the extent that they exculpate for ordinary negligence. Stelluti, 408 N.J.Super. at 459. The Court finds that LA Fitness is not under any legal duty that precludes its reliance on the liability waiver in this case.

3. Does the Contract Grow Out of Unequal Bargaining Power or is it Otherwise Unconscionable?

With respect to the final Stelluti factor, Kang argues that the waiver: (1) was not the product of mutual assent; and (2) is unconscionable as a term in a contract of adhesion. See Kang Opp. Br., at pp. 10-14. The Court addresses both arguments in turn.

a. Mutual Assent

Kang argues that the waiver was invalid for lack of mutual assent, based upon the following assertions: (1) Neither Kang nor her husband speaks English; (2) LA Fitness knew as much, as the Kangs’ daughter was present to translate; (3) an LA Fitness employee explained the contract duration and payment terms to the Kangs’ daughter, but did not explain the liability waiver to her; (4) only Kang’s husband was asked to initial next to the waiver provision in his membership agreement, but no one explained to him what he was initialing; and (5) no employee went over the waiver provision with Kang or her daughter. See Kang Opp. Br., at pp. 10-11. Accordingly, Kang argues that she did not “clearly, unequivocally, and decisively surrender[ ] her rights” as is required for a valid waiver. Id. at p. 11.

The Court finds these arguments unavailing. As an initial matter, Kang’s inability to speak English does not bar her from becoming contractually bound. Notwithstanding the fact that her daughter was present to translate, New Jersey courts have unequivocally held that in the absence of fraud, one who signs an agreement is conclusively presumed to understand and assent to its terms and legal effect:

In the absence of fraud or imposition, when one fails to read a contract before signing it, the provisions are nevertheless binding, and the party is conclusively presumed to understand and assent to its terms and legal effect . . . . Even illiterate individuals have been held bound by a signed contract in the absence of misrepresentation. One who signs a document in those circumstances should know its contents or have it read (or otherwise have the contents made known) to him or her.

Statewide Realty Co. v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., 259 N.J.Super. 59, 73 (Law. Div. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Herrera v. Twp. of S. Orange Vill., 270 N.J.Super. 417, 423, 637 (App. Div. 1993) (enforcing release agreement in the absence of fraud, notwithstanding testimony by plaintiff that she did not understand the release because she could not read English).

Under the New Jersey case law cited above, absent allegations of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation which Kang does not make here, she is conclusively presumed to have understood and assented to the membership agreement’s terms-including the waiver-and legal effect. See Stelluti v. Casapenn Enterprises, LLC, 203 N.J. 286, 305 (2010) (“Although Stelluti argues that she did not know what she was signing, she does not claim that she signed the waiver form as the result of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Therefore, the trial court was well within reason to presume that she understood the terms of the agreement . . . and the finding to that effect is unassailable.”)

Nor does the fact that LA Fitness may not have explained the waiver to her or her daughter preclude enforcement. See Stelluti v. Casapenn Enterprises, LLC, 203 N.J. 286, 301- 02 (2010) (enforcing exculpatory clause while giving plaintiff benefit of inference that “Powerhouse may not have explained to Stelluti the legal effect of the contract that released Powerhouse from liability”).

Finally, the Court is not aware of, nor has Kang cited, any requirement that she must have initialed the waiver provision for that clause to be enforceable against her. While she did not initial the waiver provision, she did sign the membership agreement containing it. In the absence of fraud, that is enough to bind her to its terms. See Statewide, 259 N.J.Super. at 73.

b. Unconscionability

Kang also argues that even if the waiver is found to be enforceable, the Court should invalidate it as a contract of adhesion. “[T]he essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed form, without the opportunity for the ‘adhering’ party to negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars.” Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 127 N.J. 344, 353, 605 A.2d 681, 685 (1992). Kang’s unconscionability argument is essentially an amalgamation of all of her arguments summarized above: that as someone who does not speak English she lacked the sophistication to understand the terms to which she was agreeing, LA Fitness knew that she was in no position to understand those terms, she did not initial next to the waiver provision, the waiver is one-sided and printed on a standard form agreement, and she was not in a position to negotiate the terms of the agreement. Kang Opp. Br., at pp. 12-14.

Notably, not all contracts of adhesion are unenforceable. In Stelluti, the New Jersey Supreme Court held:

Here, Powerhouse’s agreement was a standard pre-printed form presented to Stelluti and other prospective members on a typical ‘take-it-or-leave-it basis.’ No doubt, this agreement was one of adhesion. As for the relative bargaining positions of the parties, . . . we assume that Stelluti was a layperson without any specialized knowledge about contracts generally or exculpatory ones specifically. Giving her the benefit of all inferences from the record, including that Powerhouse may not have explained to Stelluti the legal effect of the contract that released Powerhouse from liability, we nevertheless do not regard her in a classic ‘position of unequal bargaining power’ such that the contract must be voided. As the Appellate Division decision noted, Stelluti could have taken her business to another fitness club, could have found another means of exercise aside from joining a private gym, or could have thought about it and even sought advice before signing up and using the facility’s equipment. No time limitation was imposed on her ability to review and consider whether to sign the agreement. In sum, although the terms of the agreement were presented ‘as is’ to Stelluti, rendering this a fairly typical adhesion contract in its procedural aspects, we hold that the agreement was not void based on any notion of procedural unconscionability.

Stelluti v. Casapenn Enterprises, LLC, 203 N.J. 286, 301-02 (2010).

Like the defendant in Stelluti, Kang was a layperson without any specialized knowledge of exculpatory contracts, and the Court gives her the benefit of the inference that LA Fitness did not explain the legal effect of the waiver provision to her. However, also like the defendant in Stelluti, Kang was not under any undue pressure to execute the agreement and she could have sought advice before signing. Indeed, her daughter was present to translate. As noted above, the fact that Kang does not speak English does have any legal effect on the contract’s enforceability. Thus, in accordance with Stelluti, the Court finds that although the LA Fitness membership agreement may have been offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis, it is not void on the basis of unconscionability.

Because the exculpatory clause does not offend public policy, the Court finds it to be valid and enforceable. Accordingly, LA Fitness’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted, and the clerk of the court is direct to close this case. An accompanying Order will be filed.

Barth v. Blue Diamond, LLC (d/b/a Blue Diamond MX Park),

Posted: May 1, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Delaware, Legal Case, Mountain Biking, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Affirmative Defense, Analysis, Assumption of risk, assumption of the risk, bicycle, Bicycle Race, Business Invitee, Cycling, Doctrine of Primary Assumption of the Risk, Express Consent, Genuine Issue of Material Fact, Inherent Risks, material fact, Membership, Mountain Bike Race, Negligence, Primary Assumption of Risk, Primary Assumption of the Risk, Race Course, recklessness, Release, Secondary Assumption of Risk, Secondary Assumption of the Risk, Waiver | 1 Comment

Barth v. Blue Diamond, LLC (d/b/a Blue Diamond MX Park),

Scott Barth, Plaintiff,

Blue Diamond, LLC (d/b/a Blue Diamond MX Park), a Delaware corporation, The East Coast Enduro Association, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, and Delaware Enduro Riders, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants.

C.A. No. N15C-01-197MMJ

Superior Court of Delaware

November 29, 2017

Submitted: November 17, 2017

Motions for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Primary Assumption of Risk

Batholomew J. Dalton, Esq., Laura J. Simon, Esq., Dalton & Associates, Larry E. Coben, Esq. (Argued), Gregory S. Spizer, Esq., Anapol Weiss, Attorneys for Plaintiff Scott Barth

Michael J. Logullo, Esq. (Argued), Rawle & Henderson LLP Attorney for Defendants The East Coast Enduro Association, Inc. and Delaware Enduro Riders, Inc.

George T. Lees III, Esq., Logan & Petrone, LLC Attorney for Defendant Blue Diamond, LLC

OPINION

The Honorable Mary M. Johnston.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT

In this Opinion, the Court considers an apparent issue of first impression in Delaware. The question is whether the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies in certain risky or dangerous sports-related activities in the absence of an express waiver of liability. This is a personal injury case. The plaintiff, Scott Barth, suffered serious injuries during an off-road dirt-bike race. Barth alleges that the race’s course was owned by Defendant Blue Diamond, LLC (“Blue Diamond”), co-sponsored by Defendant Delaware Enduro Riders (“DER”), and overseen by Defendant East Coast Enduro Association, Inc. (“ECEA”). Barth alleges that the Defendants’ negligent and reckless failure to properly mark the race’s course caused his injuries. Prior to the race, Barth signed a release of liability form.

DER and ECEA filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Barth’s allegations of recklessness, which Blue Diamond adopted. DER and ECEA also jointly filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, while Blue Diamond separately filed its own. At the hearing on the motions, this Court denied the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding recklessness, particularly as to, among others things, “the adequacy of signage” and “the adequacy of warnings on the course.”[1] The Court declined to rule from the bench as to the Motions for Summary Judgment, instead instructing the parties to make additional submissions limited to the issue of the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, the central grounds for the three defendants’ motions.

DER and ECEA argue they are entitled to summary judgment for two reasons. First, Barth signed a waiver releasing them from liability. Second, Barth assumed the risk inherent in an off-road dirt-bike race. In its separate motion, Blue Diamond makes the same two arguments and adds a third-Barth was a member of the Blue Diamond Riding Club, and Blue Diamond did not owe Barth the same duty it would owe a common law business invitee, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is granted only if the moving party establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and judgment may be granted as a matter of law.[2] All facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.[3] Summary judgment may not be granted if the record indicates that a material fact is in dispute, or if there is a need to clarify the application of law to the specific circumstances.[4] When the facts permit a reasonable person to draw only one inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter of law.[5] If the non- moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, yet “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, ” then summary judgment may be granted against that party.[6]

ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Barth signed a release of liability and, separately, because Barth assumed the risk of participating in the race. Both of these arguments are properly analyzed within the framework of the doctrine of primary assumption of risk.

In Delaware, “primary assumption of the risk is implicated when the plaintiff expressly consents ‘to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone.'”[7] When primary assumption of risk exists, “the defendant is relieved of legal duty to the plaintiff; and being under no legal duty, he or she cannot be charged with negligence.”[8]

The Waiver Form Released the Defendants from Liability for Negligence, not Recklessness

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment under a theory of express primary assumption of risk. Before participating in the race, Barth signed a release titled, “RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY, ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT.” It states that Barth:

HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES, AND COVENANTS NOT TO SUE . . . racing associations, sanctioning organizations … track operators, track owners … herein referred to as “Releasees, ” FROM ALL LIABILITY TO THE UNDERSIGNED . . . FOR ANY AND ALL LOSS OR DAMAGE . . . ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THE EVENT(S), WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE.

Barth asserts that the entire waiver agreement is unenforceable as an invalid contract due to lack of consideration. He further contends that even if the agreement is enforceable, it does not release Defendants from liability for recklessness.

To be enforceable under Delaware law, releases of liability “must be crystal clear and unequivocal” and “unambiguous, not unconscionable, and not against public policy.”[9] Barth does not (and cannot) argue that the waiver form at issue does not meet this standard. In Lynam v. Blue Diamond LLC, this Court found a virtually identical release form valid.[10]

Barth instead argues that the form is unenforceable due to lack of consideration. Barth bases his argument on this Court’s finding in Devecchio v. Delaware Enduro Riders, Inc.[11] In Devecchio, this Court deemed a waiver of liability unenforceable due to lack of consideration when the form stated that riders agreed to inspect the course, but the defendants admitted that, under the race’s sanctioning body’s rules, the riders were not allowed to inspect the course before the race. [12]

As in Devecchio, the release here contains an agreement that the race participants “have or will immediately upon entering any of such RESTRICTED AREAS, and will continuously thereafter, inspect the RESTRICTED AREAS . . ., “[13] Unlike in Devecchio, however, no sanctioning body’s rule barred Defendants from performing an inspection of the course.

Instead, the rule in this case stated: “Participants are allowed to walk or bicycle the course prior to the event-with the club’s permission.” Barth argues that, despite this distinction, Devecchio should apply because Barth was never given permission or made aware of his responsibility to inspect the course. Notably, however, Barth never asked for permission to inspect the course. That Barth hypothetically may not have received permission to perform the inspection is not dispositive. Barth cannot claim he was denied permission if he never asked for it. Additionally, the “failure to apprise himself of, or otherwise understand the language of a release that he is asked to sign is insufficient as a matter of law to invalidate the release.”[14] The Court finds that Barth’s own failure to perform a permissive part of the agreement does not make the waiver invalid.

Pursuant to Lynam, however, the form exculpates the Defendants’ negligence, not recklessness. As in Lynam, the form here provides for a release of liability caused by “THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE ‘RELEASEES’ OR OTHERWISE.” As this Court determined in Lynam, “such [exculpatory] agreements [that expressly exempt defendants from liability for their negligent conduct] generally are not construed to cover the more extreme forms of negligence, described as willful, wanton, reckless or gross, and to any conduct which constitutes an intentional tort.”[15]

The Court finds that the waiver form releases the defendants from their liability for negligence, but not for recklessness.

Implied Primary Assumption of Risk Does Not Bar a Claim of Recklessness

It is undisputed that primary assumption of risk applies when the plaintiff signs a valid release of liability form.[16] But because Defendants argue that primary assumption of risk exists in addition to and independent of the waiver form, the Court must determine whether-and if so, how-to apply the defense beyond an express written agreement to waive liability.

Delaware courts have noted, paradoxically, that “depending upon the situation at hand, express consent may be manifested by circumstantial words or conduct.”[17]The illogic of “express consent” being “manifested by circumstantial words or conduct” can be resolved with the conclusion that Delaware recognizes an implied primary assumption of risk doctrine.[18]

Case law suggests that courts should find an implied primary assumption of risk only with respect to certain activities. Delaware cases have noted that primary assumption of risk commonly applies to “sports-related activities that ‘involv[e] physical skill and challenges posing significant risk of injury to participants in such activities, and as to which the absence of such a defense would chill vigorous participation in the sporting activity and have a deleterious effect on the nature of the sport as a whole.'”[19] Examples of such sports-related activities include:

(1) being a spectator at a sporting event such as a baseball or hockey game or tennis match where projectiles may be launched into the audience; (2) participating in a contact sporting event; (3) bungee jumping or bungee bouncing; (4) operating a jet-ski, or engaging in other noncompetitive water sports such as water-skiing, tubing, or white-water rafting; (5) drag racing; and (6) skydiving.[20]

The nature of the activity is pertinent to an analysis of primary assumption of risk. Otherwise, in the absence of a waiver of liability, the dangerousness of the activity would be irrelevant. The case law therefore suggests that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies to certain sports-related activities, even in the absence of an express waiver form. However, though Delaware seems to allow for the application of implied assumption of risk in certain sporting events, no Delaware case has provided a framework for applying the doctrine. This precise issue appears to be one of first impression.

The California case Peart v. Ferro, [21] which this Court cited in support of its observations on the prevalence of primary assumption of risk in dangerous sporting events, [22] provides a means of analysis. Under the Peart framework, courts must examine two things to determine whether an implied primary assumption of risk exists: the nature of the activity and the relationship between the parties.[23]

When examining the nature of the activity, courts consider:

what conditions, conduct or risks that might be viewed as dangerous in other contexts are so integral to or inherent in the activity itself that imposing a duty of care would either require that an essential aspect of the sport be abandoned, or else discourage vigorous participation therein. In such cases, defendants generally do not have a duty to protect a plaintiff from the inherent risks of the sport, or to eliminate all risk from the sport.[24]

In examining the relationship of the parties, the court bears in mind that “the general duty of due care to avoid injury to others does not apply to coparticipants in sporting activities with respect to conditions and conduct that might otherwise be viewed as dangerous but upon examination are seen to be an integral part of the sport itself.”[25]

When analyzed within this framework, implied primary assumption of risk remains distinct from secondary assumption of risk. Secondary assumption of risk has been subsumed by Delaware’s contributory negligence statute.[26] It is therefore no longer available as a complete defense. Secondary assumption of risk exists when “the plaintiffs conduct in encountering a known risk may itself be unreasonable, because the danger is out of proportion to the advantage which he is seeking to obtain.”[27] In contrast, the focus for implied primary assumption of risk remains on the nature of the activity the plaintiff has consented to participate in and the actions of the defendants-not how the conduct of the plaintiff may have contributed to his injuries. Commentators also have noted that implied primary assumption of risk is distinct from secondary assumption of risk.[28]

The Court finds that implied primary assumption of risk is a valid affirmative defense to negligence. Because Barth signed a valid release of liability for Defendants’ negligence, the remaining issue in this case is whether implied primary assumption of risk is a valid affirmative defense to allegations of recklessness as well.

Though defendants do not owe a duty to protect a plaintiff from the risks inherent in an activity to which the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk applies, “defendants do have a duty not to increase the risk of harm beyond what is inherent in the sport through intentional or reckless behavior that is completely outside the range of the ordinary activity in the sport.”[29]

Here, the Court has ruled as a matter of law that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendants recklessly marked the course with inadequate signage. The Court finds there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendants committed reckless conduct which increased the race’s risk of harm.[30] Further, the Court holds that the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk does not insulate a tortfeasor from liability for intentional or reckless conduct. The Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on this issue are denied.

Barth was a Business Invitee for the Race Despite his Blue Diamond Membership

Because Barth’s primary express and implied assumption of risk bar his claims of negligence, the Court need not reach this issue. However, for the sake of completeness, the Court finds that because Barth paid a fee to participate in the race, his relationship with Blue Diamond for the purposes of that event was that of a business invitee. His membership with the Blue Diamond Riding Club had no bearing on his participation in the race.

This fact distinguishes this case from Ketler v. PFPA, LLC, [31] upon which Blue Diamond relies. There, the plaintiff was a member of a fitness center and was injured while using a rowing machine. Because the fitness center was a “private-membership based business, ” the Court found the fitness center did not owe the plaintiff the same duty it “would owe to a common law business invitee or to the public at large.”[32]

In this case, participation in the race was not restricted to members of the Blue Diamond Riding Club. The race was open to any “American Motorcyclist Association Member.” Unlike the fitness center, Blue Diamond invited non-members to the race, and therefore owed participants the duties owed to business invitees.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk does not insulate tortfeasors from liability for intentional or reckless conduct.

DER and ECEA’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court finds that the allegations of negligence against these defendants are barred under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. There remains a genuine issue of material fact as to the allegations of recklessness against these defendants, Blue Diamond’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court finds that the allegations of negligence against this defendant are barred under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. There remains a genuine issue of material fact as to the allegations of recklessness against this defendant. With the dismissal of the negligence allegations, the question of Blue Diamond’s status as a business invitee is moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Notes:

[1] October 3, 2017 Tr. of Motions, 71:12-16.

[2] Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).

[3] Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 58-59 (Del. 1991).

[4] Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).

[5] Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967).

[6] Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

[7] Helm v. 206 Massachusetts Avenue, LLC, 107 A.3d 1074, 1080 (Del. 2014) (quoting Fell v. Zimath, 575 A.2d 267, 267-68 (Del. Super. 1989)).

[8] Id.

[9] Lynam v. Blue Diamond LLC, 2016 WL 5793725, at *3 (Del. Super.).

[10] See id. The release in Lynam read:

I HEREBY RELEASE, DISCHARGE AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE the . . . track owners, [and] owners and lessees of premises used to conduct the Event(s). . . all for the purposes herein referred to as “Releasees, ” FROM ALL LIABILITY TO ME, THE MINOR, [and] my and the minor’s personal representatives . .. FOR ANY AND ALL CLAIMS, DEMANDS, LOSSES, OR DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF INJRY, including, but not limited to, death or damage to property, CAUSED… BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE “RELEASEES” OR OTHERWISE.

[11] 2004 LEXIS 444 (Del. Super.).

[12] Id.

[13] The corresponding clause in Devecchio read:

EACH OF THE UNDERSIGNED . . . acknowledges, agrees and represents that he has, or will immediately upon entering any of such restricted areas, and will continuously thereafter, inspect such restricted areas and all portions thereof which he enters and with which he come in contact, and he does further warrant that his entry upon such restricted area or areas and his participation, if any, in the event constitutes an acknowledgment that he has inspected such restricted area and that he finds and accepts the same as being safe and reasonably suited for the purposes of his use ….

[14] Id. This principle also dispenses with the argument that Barth did not have sufficient time to understand the release that he chose to sign.

[15] Id. (quoting W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 68 at 483-84 (5th ed. 1984)).

[16] See Lafate v. New Castle Cty., 1999 WL 1241074 (Del. Super.) (analyzing whether a signed waiver constitutes primary assumption of risk).

[17] Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 882 (Del. Super. 2005) (citing Croom v. Pressley, 1994 WL 466013, at *5 (Del. Super. 1994)).

[18] See id. at 882 n.30 (‘”Primary assumption of risk is akin to express or implied consent… .'” (quoting 57B Am. Jur. 2d. Negligence § 1010)). Storm also quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts at length to explain assumption of risk generally. Id. at 881. That passage described a form of assumption of risk “closely related to” that acquired through “express consent” as one in which:

the plaintiff has entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which he knows to involve the risk, and so is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to relieve the defendant of responsibility, and to take his own chances. Thus a spectator entering a baseball park may be regarded as consenting that the players may proceed with the game without taking precautions to protect him from being hit by the ball. Again the legal result is that the defendant is relieved of his duty to the plaintiff.

Id.; see also McCormick v. Hoddinott, 865 A.2d 523, 529 (Del. Super. 2004) (“In the instant case there appears to be no evidence to support a claim that minor Plaintiff expressly or impliedly assumed any risk; therefore, an affirmative defense of assumption of risk based on primary assumption of risk cannot stand.”) (emphasis added).

[19] Helm, 107 A.3d at 1080 (quoting Storm, 898 A.2d at 883).

[20] Storm, 898 A.2d at 883 (citations omitted). Storm noted, however, that a “common theme” of these activities is that they frequently involve the signing of consent forms, suggesting the Court may have only meant to invoke them as another example of where express consent may apply. Id. However, a “common theme” is not a “common requirement”-spectators at sporting events do not sign releases of liability to view an event. Moreover, courts have found waiver of liability forms enforceable in contexts dissimilar to those listed above. See, e.g., Ketler v. PFPA, LLC, 2015 WL 3540187, at *2 (Del. Super. 2015) (finding a waiver form sufficient to invoke primary assumption of risk when the plaintiff snapped a cable on a rowing machine at the defendant’s gym). The Storm Court would have had no occasion to comment on the nature of the activity if it were not independently meaningful in the analysis.

[21] 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 885, 894 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 2004).

[22] See Storm, 898 A.2d at 883 (citing Peart to define the sort of sports-related activities that typically raise the issue of primary assumption of risk).

[23] Peart, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 894 (citations omitted).

[24] Id.

[25] Id. at 894-95.

[26] Helm, 107 A.3d at 1080 (“[I]t is now accepted in Delaware that the concept of secondary assumption of risk is completely subsumed by the principles of comparative negligence.”).

[27] Fell v. Zimath, 575 A.2d 267, 268 (Del. Super. 1989).

[28] See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A (1979) (distinguishing a description of implied primary assumption of risk from a secondary assumption of risk, “in which the plaintiffs conduct in voluntarily encountering a known risk is itself unreasonable, and amounts to contributory negligence”); 57B Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 1010 (“Primary assumption of risk is akin to express or implied consent, and relieves the defendant of any obligation to exercise care for the injured person’s protection, including situations where an injured person, having knowledge of a hazard, continued voluntarily to encounter it. Secondary assumption of risk is akin to contributory negligence . . . .”).

[29] Peart, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 894.

[30] This conclusion is in line with Delaware decisions that applied similar logic under framework of a different name. See Farrell v. University of Delaware, 2009 WL 3309288, at *3 (Del. Super.) (finding persuasive the New York Supreme Court’s rationale that “[a]lthough [a] rink could not be liable for harms caused by the inherent dangers of skating or by unpreventable events, the court considered assumption of risk inapplicable to injuries resulting from ‘the reckless actions of another skater which the defendant, by adequate supervision, could have prevented.'”(quoting Shorten v. City of White Plains, 637 N.Y.S.2d 791, 796 (N.Y.App.Div.1996)); Lafate v. New Castle Cty., 1999 WL 1241074, at *4 (Del. Super. 1999) (denying summary judgment, in part because “it would not be within the normal expectation of the health risk of playing basketball that a supervising employee would place a metal bar within normal head range between two basketball courts” in spite of an express release of liability).

[31] 2015 WL 3540187 (Del. Super 2015).

[32] Id. at*l.

DeLamar v. Fort Worth Mt. Biker’s Ass’n, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 466

Posted: May 1, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Cycling, Legal Case, Mountain Biking, Texas | Tags: actual knowledge, Adopt a Park, Association, Bike Path, City Park, constructive knowledge, Cycling, Downed Tree, duty, Foreseeability, foreseeability of harm, foreseeable, Fort Worth Mountain Biker's Association, Forth Worth, Gateway, Gateway Park, Gross negligence, Negligence, No Duty, Park, Premises Liability, reasonable care, reasonable foreseeability of harm, Unreasonable Risk of Harm | Leave a comment

DeLamar v. Fort Worth Mt. Biker’s Ass’n, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 466

Norman Delamar, Appellant

Fort Worth Mountain Biker’s Association, Appellee

No. 02-17-00404-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth

January 24, 2019

On Appeal from the 348th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 348-283758-16

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel and Pittman, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Bonnie Sudderth, Chief Justice.

I. Introduction

Appellant Norman DeLamar filed the underlying lawsuit against Appellee Fort Worth Mountain Biker’s Association (the Association) to recover for injuries he sustained when he was knocked off of his mountain bike after he struck a downed tree across a mountain bike trail at Gateway Park (Gateway). Norman claimed that the Association was negligent in failing to properly maintain a safe mountain bike trail as purportedly required by its contractual agreement with the City of Fort Worth (City). The trial court granted summary judgment on Norman’s claims against the Association. We will affirm.

II. Background

On July 12, 2014, Norman was riding his mountain bike on a trail in Gateway, a park owned by the City, when he came upon a downed tree resting across the trail at head level. Although known to be a “really good rider,” Norman asserts that because he did not have time to stop or avoid the tree, the tree “clotheslined” his head and neck and knocked him off of his bicycle, causing him injuries.

Norman sued the City, asserting claims of general negligence and gross negligence. In a single pleading, the City filed an answer and identified the Association as a responsible third party because of an “Adopt-A-Park Agreement” (Contract) that made the Association “responsible for constructing and maintaining the bike trail in question.” Norman then amended his petition and added the Association as a defendant in the suit.[1] Norman asserted that through the Contract, the Association agreed to “assume responsibility for maintenance, construction and safety of the trails,” and as such owed “a duty to protect the general public from dangerous conditions such as falling trees.” Norman claimed that the Association had breached this alleged duty by

• failing to make any effort to ensure that the trees alongside of the bicycle trail were not a danger to cyclists;

• failing to implement any sort of safety procedure with respect to the danger of falling trees in high bicycle (and pedestrian) traffic areas;

• failing to maintain the trails to prevent dangerous conditions from occurring despite knowing the dangers associated with cycling;

• failing to provide cyclists with adequate safeguards, or any safeguards at all, to prevent dangerous conditions from occurring; and

• consciously disregarding the heath of the trees and the danger that they pose.

The Contract provides that the Association “shall perform all work and services hereunder as an independent contractor . . . . [and] shall have exclusive control of, and the exclusive right to control the details of the work performed hereunder[.]” The Contract specifically provides that the Association “shall, at its sole cost and expense, construct and maintain the Trails in accordance with [the] Agreement,” and it defines “trail maintenance” as including, but not limited to, “repairing, replacing, and rebuilding trails or sections of trails that are eroding or in disrepair; pruning of trees; [and] removal of brush[.]” However, the Contract prohibits the Association from “trimming and pruning, until written approval is obtained from the Director [of the Parks and Community Services Department],” and from “remov[ing] any tree without prior written permission from the City Forester.” [Emphasis added.] Finally, the Contract expressly reserves the City’s right to control and access all portions of Gateway: “The City does not relinquish the right to control the management of the Parks, or the right to enforce all necessary and proper rules for the management and operation of the same. The City . . . has the right at any time to enter any portion of the Parks[.]”

The Association answered and then filed a no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment. In its motion, the Association asserted that there was no evidence that

• the Association was negligent as it owed Norman no duty with respect to the condition of the premises; or

• the Association owed a duty to keep the premises in reasonably safe condition, inspect the premise to discover any defects, or to make safe any defect or give an adequate warning of any dangers.

Although the Association clearly challenged the existence of any legal duty it owed to Norman, the Association’s motion primarily argued that Norman’s claim sounded in premises liability rather than general negligence and that he could not artfully plead a general negligence claim when his injuries were caused by a premises defect. Norman filed a response and attached, inter alia, a short affidavit and an expert report from an arborist, Matthew Clemons. In his response, Norman appeared to adopt the Association’s characterization of his claim as one for premises liability and in doing so focused on his status, arguing that he was an invitee. Indeed, Norman’s “Conclusion” sought denial of the summary judgment motions because there was “more than enough credible evidence to find that the [Association] is liable under a premises liability theory for this incident[.]” [Emphasis added.] The Association filed a reply and objected to the expert report from Clemons as inadmissible hearsay.

Following the hearing on the Association’s no evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment, the trial court requested letter briefs and took the matter under advisement. In his letter brief, Norman altered his prior position and for the first time asserted that the Association’s summary judgment theory was flawed because his suit against the Association was based on a general negligence theory, not a premises liability theory. The trial court signed an order sustaining the Association’s objections to Clemons’s expert report and a separate order granting the Association’s no evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment.

On appeal, Norman contends the trial court erred by construing his claim as one for premises liability rather than general negligence and abused its discretion by sustaining the Association’s hearsay objection to Clemons’s report.

III. Norman’s Negligence Claim

A. Standard of Review

The movant for traditional summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). A defendant who conclusively negates at least one essential element of the nonmovant’s cause of action is entitled to summary judgment as to that cause of action. Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). Once the movant has established a right to summary judgment, the nonmovant has the burden to respond to the motion and present to the trial court any issues that would preclude summary judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678-79 (Tex. 1979). The only question is whether an issue of material fact is presented. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).

After an adequate time for discovery, a party without the burden of proof at trial may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Once a no evidence motion has been filed in accordance with Rule 166a(i), the burden shifts to the nonmovant to bring forth evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged evidence. See Macias v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). We review a no evidence motion for summary judgment under the same legal sufficiency standards as a directed verdict. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. 2003). A no evidence motion is properly granted if the nonmovant fails to bring forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 751. If the evidence supporting a finding rises to a level that would enable reasonable, fair-minded persons to differ in their conclusions, then more than a scintilla of evidence exists. Id. A mere scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact, and the legal effect is that there is no evidence. See id.

When reviewing traditional and no evidence summary judgments, we perform a de novo review of the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. See Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). We are not required to ascertain the credibility of affiants or to determine the weight of evidence in the affidavits, depositions, exhibits and other summary judgment proof. See Gulbenkian v. Penn, 252 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1952); Palestine Herald-Press Co. v. Zimmer, 257 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2008, pet. denied).

All grounds in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be presented in writing to the trial court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). “When a trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for the ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of the theories advanced are meritorious.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993).

When a party moves for both a traditional and a no evidence summary judgment, we generally first review the trial court’s summary judgment under the no evidence standard of Rule 166a(i). See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). If the no evidence summary judgment was properly granted, we need not reach arguments under the traditional motion for summary judgment. See id.

B. General Negligence vs. Premises Liability Theories of Recovery

Although premises liability is a form of negligence, “[n]egligence and premises liability claims . . . are separate and distinct theories of recovery, requiring plaintiffs to prove different, albeit similar, elements to secure judgment in their favor.” United Scaffolding, Inc. v. Levine, 537 S.W.3d 463, 471 (Tex. 2017); Clayton W. Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo, 952 S.W.2d 523, 529 (Tex. 1997) (stating that “[b]ecause premises defect cases and negligent activity cases are based on independent theories of recovery, a simple negligence [jury] question . . . cannot support a recovery in a premises defect case”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Roye, 447 S.W.3d 48, 57-58 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. dism’d) (“Because [claimant] was limited to a premises liability theory of recovery, . . . the trial court erred when it submitted an ordinary negligence cause of action against [appellant] to the jury. . . . Accordingly, the jury’s finding that [appellant] was negligent is immaterial and cannot support a judgment against [appellant].”). As our sister court has explained, premises liability is a “special form of negligence in which the duty owed to the plaintiff depends upon the plaintiff’s status on the premises at the time of the incident.” Wyckoff v. George C. Fuller Contracting Co., 357 S.W.3d 157, 163-64 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.) (citing Scott & White Mem’l Hosp. v. Fair, 310 S.W.3d 411, 412 (Tex. 2010)).[2]

While, theoretically, a litigant may maintain causes of action for both general negligence and premises liability, to be viable, the general negligence theory of recovery must be based not upon an injury resulting from the condition of the property, but upon the defendant’s contemporaneous activity. See Mangham v. YMCA of Austin, Texas-Hays Comtys., 408 S.W.3d 923, 929 (Tex. App.-Austin 2013, no pet.); see also W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005) (analyzing claimant’s negligence and premises liability claims together). If the injury is one caused by a premises defect, rather than a defendant’s contemporaneous activity, a plaintiff cannot circumvent the true nature of the premises defect claim by pleading it as one for general negligence. Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 389 (Tex. 2016).

Because the lines between negligent activity and premises liability are “sometimes unclear,” Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 776 (Tex. 2010), determining whether a claim is one for a premises defect or general negligence “can be tricky.” Austin v. Kroger Tex. L.P., 746 F.3d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 2014), certified question answered, 465 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2015). The policy undergirding this distinction is that negligence encompasses a malfeasance theory based on affirmative, contemporaneous conduct that caused the injury, whereas premises liability encompasses a nonfeasance theory based on the owner’s failure to take measures to make the property safe. See Del Lago Partners, 307 S.W.3d at 776; Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. 1998) (explaining negligent activity concerns “simply doing or failing to do what a person of ordinary prudence in the same or similar circumstances would have not done or done” while premises liability concerns the “failure to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a premises condition which the owner or occupier [of land] knows about or in the exercise of ordinary care should know about” and quoting Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 266-67 (Tex. 1992)).

C. Discussion

In his first issue, Norman argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on a premises liability theory when his claims sounded in general negligence: “The Association characterized [my] lawsuit against it as one for premises liability. This argument is flawed because the Association was not the possessor of the premises when [I] was injured[.]” Norman argues that his “petition is fairly constructed as advancing an ordinary negligence claim” because he pleaded that the Association is liable for “failing to employ any procedure to ensure safety from falling trees, and for failing to maintain a safe bike path and the trees along it.” The Association responds that regardless of how Norman pleaded his claim, he is limited to a premises liability theory of recovery because Norman was injured by an unsafe or dangerous condition on the premises-not by contemporaneous negligent activity.[3]

1. Summary Judgment was Not Granted on an Unaddressed Claim Because the Association’s Motion for Summary Judgment Challenged the Existence of a Legal Duty

As a preliminary matter, we consider Norman’s contention that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on his negligence claim when the Association’s motion for summary judgment actually addressed only an unpleaded premises-liability claim. See Chessher v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. 1983) (stating it is reversible error to grant summary judgment on a claim not addressed in the motion). Three of our sister courts have addressed similar instances in which defendants filed summary judgment motions on the theory that the plaintiff had impermissibly pleaded a premises defect claim as a general negligence claim. See Griffin v. Shell Oil Co., 401 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied); Somoza v. Rough Hollow Yacht Club, Ltd., No. 03-09-00308-CV, 2010 WL 2867372, at *4 (Tex. App.-Austin July 20, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); Kalinchuk v. JP Sanchez Construction Co., No. 04-15-00537-CV, 2016 WL 4376628, at *3 (Tex. App.- San Antonio Aug. 17, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

In Griffin, the First District Court of Appeals considered whether “the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Shell and CH2M on his negligent-activity claims because neither Shell nor CH2M sought summary judgment on these claims.” 401 S.W.3d at 157. After stating that a trial court errs by granting more relief requested by disposing of issues not presented to it in the summary judgment motion, the First court analyzed each defendant’s summary-judgment motion and held that based “upon the plain language,” the defendants sought summary judgment “only on [appellant’s] premises-defect claim” and not his negligent activity claim. Id. at 158-59. Thus, the First court reversed summary judgment on appellant’s negligence claim and remanded the case. Id. The First court did note, however, that “[a] legal duty must be established in order for [appellant] to ultimately recover on his negligent-activity claim[, ]” id. at 163 n.4, thus signaling its concern over the viability of appellant’s negligence claim.

In Somoza, the plaintiff had been injured while operating a jet ski when he allegedly ran into a partially submerged steel cable tethered to a floating dock, near the marina owned and operated by a yacht club. Somoza, 2010 WL 2867372, at *1. He filed suit against the yacht club and alleged negligence and premises liability claims. Id. The yacht club filed a hybrid no evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment, asserting, in part, that the plaintiff “has no claim for general negligence . . . because his negligence claim sounds solely in premises liability,” and that the plaintiff has “produced no evidence of the essential elements of duty, breach, or proximate cause.” Id. The trial court granted the motion.

On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals considered the plaintiff’s contention that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on his general negligence claim. Id. at *4. The Third court “assum[ed] without deciding that [the plaintiff] could bring a claim for general negligence despite his failure to allege injury resulting from any contemporaneous activity by the Yacht Club” and nevertheless concluded that “he has still failed to establish the existence of a duty to support a claim in negligence.” Id. at *5.

In Kalinchuk, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against his putative employer for negligence and gross negligence after he was injured at a baseball field renovation site by a section of bleachers that fell on him. 2016 WL 4376628, at *1. The employer moved for traditional and no evidence summary judgment, and alleged, inter alia, that the plaintiff did not have more than a scintilla of evidence to establish the existence of a legal duty. Id. In its motion, the employer relied on cases involving premises liability claims and asserted that the plaintiff purported to state a claim for negligence when his claim was “actually based on the theory of premises liability because he [sought] to recover for an injury allegedly created by a condition on the premises rather than for an injury created as a result of an activity.” Id. at *3. The plaintiff responded that the employer owed him a common law duty to exercise reasonable care and avoid a foreseeable risk of harm. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment. Id.

On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reasoned that “[w]hether [plaintiff’s] claim is a claim for negligence as he argues or a premises liability claim as [employer] contends, the question of whether a duty exists remains the same in that it requires a balancing of interrelated factors that make up the risk-utility balancing test.” Id. After applying the risk-utility balancing test to the facts of the case, the Fourth court concluded that the plaintiff had “failed to produce a scintilla of evidence creating a fact issue to support the existence of [a] legal duty owed to him by [the employer.]” Id. at *3-4.

We do not quarrel with the First court’s strict approach in refusing to read into the summary judgment motion a ground that was not clearly articulated. However, we view the approach by the Third and Fourth courts as allowing for a more expedient disposition while maintaining fidelity to Rule 166a(c)’s requirement that summary judgment motions “state the specific grounds therefor.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Somoza, 2010 WL 2867372, at *5; Kalinchuk, 2016 WL 4376628, at *3-4.

The existence of a legal duty is a threshold issue generally decided as a matter of law. Fort Bend Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. 1991). And even assuming under these facts that Norman could bring a claim for general negligence, the Association in its motion for summary judgment challenged the existence of a legal duty owed to him regarding the downed tree and maintenance of trail safety regardless of whether the duty arose under a premises liability theory based on Norman’s status at the time of the injury or a general negligence theory balancing test.[4] See Kalinchuk, 2016 WL 4376628, at *3-4 (explaining whether the plaintiff’s claim is a claim for negligence as he argued or a premises liability claim as the defendant contended, “the question of whether a duty exists remains the same in that it requires a balancing of interrelated factors that make up the risk-utility balancing test”); cf. Del Lago Partners, 307 S.W.3d at 767 (applying risk-utility balancing factors to determine duty in premises liability case); Wyckoff, 357 S.W.3d at 164 (“General negligence principles apply to a contractor who has left [a] premises in an unsafe condition.”). Therefore, because the summary judgment motion fairly challenged the existence of a legal duty, we reject Norman’s contention that the trial court erred by granting the motion on an unchallenged ground, and we now analyze whether the Association owed Norman a legal duty under a general negligence theory.

2. No Legal Duty Under a General Negligence Theory

The question of legal duty is a “multifaceted issue” requiring courts to balance a number of factors such as the risk and foreseeability of injury, the social utility of the actor’s conduct, the consequences of imposing the burden on the actor, and any other relevant competing individual and social interests implicated by the facts of the case. Tex. Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tex. 2002). “Although the formulation and emphasis varies with the facts of each case, three categories of factors have emerged: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured; and (3) public policy considerations.” Id. at 34. Of these factors, the Supreme Court of Texas has identified “foreseeability as the ‘foremost and dominant consideration’ in the duty analysis.” Id. at 36 (quoting El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987)). “Foreseeability means that a person who possesses ordinary intelligence should have anticipated the danger that his negligent act would create for others.” Midwest Emp’rs Cas. Co. ex rel. English v. Harpole, 293 S.W.3d 770, 779 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.). However, foreseeability alone is not sufficient to impose a duty. Id.

Here, Norman pleaded that the Association contractually assumed “responsibility for maintenance, construction and safety of the trails,” and as such, owed a duty to “protect the general public from dangerous conditions[.]” The record, which contains the Contract and deposition excerpts, evidences the Association’s agreement to, and exercise of, some limited control over the construction and maintenance of Gateway’s bike trails by having monthly meetings to discuss maintenance issues and by building trails in the months between May and October. The summary judgment evidence also provided that the Association holds an annual work day in June to make sure the trails are in “tiptop shape” for their annual “fat tire festival.” This workday consists of going through the entire trail to look for places that needed to be trimmed or pruned.

Lawrence “Larry” Colvin, the Association’s president at the time of Norman’s crash, testified that during the monthly meetings, the Association’s members discussed safety of the trees in general as well as identified certain problem trees to City employees who “were the only ones that [could] operate the chainsaws.” Larry also testified that the Association had once asked the City to close the trail because of “so many trees down,” but that the City refused. Larry testified that the Association worked with Melinda Adams, an “urban forester” with the City, who “[took] a look at the trees.” Although Larry acknowledged that the Association had no “tree safety plan” and had never consulted an arborist, he concluded that even retaining a certified arborist to walk Gateway once a week would still not prevent falling trees in a park “hundreds of thousands of trees.”

Larry’s testimony concerning the existence of “hundreds of thousands of trees” along the mountain bike trail provided proof that the danger of a falling tree was plausible. And in his deposition, Larry acknowledged that the likelihood of falling trees would increase in “an unprecedented drought like we were in in 2014”-the year of Norman’s injury.

However, Norman testified in his deposition that he had ridden the same trail “no more [than] two days” earlier and that he had not seen the downed tree, so it was possible that the tree had fallen only a day or two before his crash. Indeed, Norman conceded that it was possible that the tree could have actually fallen only a few hours before his crash. Moreover, the Contract expressly prohibits the Association from pruning trees without the Director’s prior written approval and expressly prohibits the Association from removing any tree without prior written permission from the Forester. Norman does not direct us to any part of the Contract showing that the Association had agreed to assume a legal duty to maintain the safety of the trails for the general public.

Based on our de novo review of the record, we hold that Norman failed to establish that the Association owed him a legal duty to protect him from the downed tree across the trail that the Association did not cause to fall, that may have fallen only hours-but no later than a day or two-before Norman struck it, and that the Association was not even authorized to unilaterally remove.[5] See Felts v. Bluebonnet Elec. Coop., Inc., 972 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (rejecting complainant’s argument that an electrical co-op’s tree-trimming agreement creating a limited right to trim or clear trees for the purpose of protecting its power lines “created a broader duty to maintain the area for the protection of the general public traveling on the nearby county road”); Jacobs-Cathey Co. v. Cockrum, 947 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, writ denied) (holding that “a defendant’s policy to remedy dangerous conditions he may come across does not impose a legal duty on him to these third parties” and that a defendant bears “no common law duty to remove debris . . . that was left by some other party”); see also J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Tex. Contract Carpet, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 515, 530-32 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009, no pet.) (holding a contractual agreement did not create a legal duty to a third party when the contractual benefit to the third party was not clearly intended by the contract and was merely incidental to the agreement).

Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment on Norman’s negligence and gross negligence claims. See Gonzalez v. VATR Constr., LLC, 418 S.W.3d 777, 789 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) (holding that because summary judgment was proper on negligence claim, it was also proper on gross negligence claim). We overrule Norman’s first issue.

IV. Norman’s Excluded Summary Judgment Evidence

Norman’s second issue challenges the trial court’s decision to sustain the Association’s hearsay objection and strike Matthew Clemons’s report. Norman’s contention is that because he submitted an affidavit from Clemons in which Clemons swore that the attached report was a true and correct copy of the report that he had personally prepared, the report was authenticated, “which overcomes the hearsay problem.” The Association responds that Norman misunderstands its objection, which was that the report was inadmissible hearsay, not that it was not properly authenticated.

A. Standard of Review

A trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Sols., Inc., 464 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. 2015). An appellate court must uphold the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if there is any legitimate basis in the record for the ruling. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). A trial court’s discretion in determining whether an expert is qualified to testify on a matter is broad but not unbounded. In re Commitment of Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296, 307 (Tex. 2012). A trial court abuses its discretion by excluding expert testimony if the testimony is relevant to the issues in the case and is based on a reliable foundation. Id.; State v. Cent. Expressway Sign Assocs., 302 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. 2009) (op. on reh’g).

B. Analysis

Norman attached a short affidavit from Matthew Clemons which stated, in relevant part, as follows:

I certify that the ‘Initial Assessment of Tree Conditions; Gateway Park Mountain Bike Trail’ was prepared on March 21, 2017 for Jackson Davis regarding Norman DeLamar’s bicycle incident, which is attached as an Exhibit to Plaintiff’s Response to Fort Worth Biker’s Association Traditional and No Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment, is a true and correct copy of the report which I personally prepared and provided Mr. Davis.

The March 21, 2017 letter was attached to Norman’s summary judgment response as Exhibit D.

The Association asserts that Clemons’s affidavit (which was not objected to), may authenticate the attached report, but it does not remove the report from the ambit of hearsay. We agree. See Tex. R. Evid. 801, 802; cf. Petty v. Children’s WorldLearning Ctrs., Inc., No. 05-94-00998-CV, 1995 WL 379522, at *5 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 31, 1995, writ denied) (explaining that “[a]uthenticity is separate and apart from qualification as an exception under the hearsay rule”). Further, the report does not obviously fall within any of the exclusions from hearsay (Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)) or exceptions to the rule against hearsay (Tex. R. Evid. 803)-indeed, Norman does not assert any exclusion or exception.

Accordingly, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the Association’s hearsay objection to Clemons’s report, and we overrule Norman’s second issue.

V. Conclusion

Having held that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment on Norman’s negligence and gross negligence claims and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Norman’s expert’s report as inadmissible hearsay, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

—–

Notes:

[1]Norman’s suit against the Association for negligence and gross negligence was eventually severed from his suit against the City.

[2]To prevail on a premises-liability claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the premises by the owner; (2) that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) that the owner did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) that the owner’s failure to use such care proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998), whereas under the common law doctrine of negligence, a plaintiff must prove (1) a legal duty owed by one person to another; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately resulting from the breach. Helbing v. Hunt, 402 S.W.3d 699, 702 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).

[3]The Association asserts it is a “non-possessory interest holder” which is “the legal equivalent of the occupier” of the bike trail portion of Gateway. Put differently, the Association contends it has rights akin to that of an easement holder. See Brookshire Katy Drainage Dist. v. Lily Gardens, LLC, 333 S.W.3d 301, 309 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (“[A]n easement is a nonpossessory interest in another’s property that authorizes its holder to use that property for a particular purpose.”).

[4]Although we do not reach the issue, we believe that Norman’s claim sounds in premises liability in any event. See United Scaffolding, 537 S.W.3d at 472 (“We have recognized that slip/trip-and-fall cases have consistently been treated as premises defect causes of action. In such cases, the plaintiff alleges injury as a result of a physical condition or defect left on the premises, not as a contemporaneous result of someone’s negligence.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 389-90 (citing Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam), a case with injuries caused by a bicycle crash after the cyclist ran over a metal chain stretched across a college campus driveway as illustrating a “quintessential premises defect claim”); Tex. Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 230 (Tex. 2004) (concluding that the “allegation of an injury caused by a tree limb falling on [plaintiff] constitutes an allegation of a condition or use of real property and is an allegation of a premises defect”).

[5]Norman also does not persuade us that we should create a legal duty regarding the downed tree and trail safety based on public policy considerations. See Kalinchuk, 2016 WL 4376628, at *4. Indeed, public policy considerations weigh heavily against imposing such a legal duty on what is essentially a group of volunteer mountain bike enthusiasts who have been granted such limited oversight over the safety of the bike trails, if any.

trail, summary judgment, general negligence, premises liability, premises, trial court, legal duty, no evidence, summary judgment motion, pet, hearsay, grant summary judgment, premises liability theory, mountain bike, balancing, nonmovant, falling, dangerous condition, gross negligence, negligence claim, downed tree, contemporaneous, foreseeability, factors, cause of action, yacht club, scintilla, injuries, bicycle, cases

Lynam v. Blue Diamond LLC, 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 495

Posted: April 25, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Cycling, Delaware, Legal Case, Minors, Youth, Children, Mountain Biking, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: clear and unequivocal, Cycling, Delaware, Dirt Bike, Minor, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Motorcross, Motorcross Track, Negligence, Public Policy, Reckless Conduct, recklessness, Release, Unambigous, Unconscionable, Unequivocal, Waiver | Leave a comment

Lynam v. Blue Diamond LLC, 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 495

Thomas A Lynam, III and Antoinette M. Lynam, as Parents and Natural Guardians of Thomas A. Lynam, IV, a minor,

Blue Diamond LLC and Parkway Gravel Inc. and Houghton’s Amusement Park, LLC

C.A. No. N14C-11-121 RRC

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle

October 4, 2016

Submitted: July 6, 2016

On Defendants Blue Diamond LLC’s and Parkway Gravel, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Tabatha L. Castro, Esquire The Castro Firm, Inc. Attorney for Plaintiffs

Leonard G. Villari, Esquire Villari, Lentz & Lynam, LLC Attorney Pro Hac Vice for Plaintiffs

Marc S. Casarino, Esquire Dana Spring Monzo, Esquire Nicholas Wynn, Esquire White and Williams, LLP Attorneys for Defendants Blue Diamond LLC and Parkway Gravel, Inc.

Dear Counsel:

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before this Court is Defendants Blue Diamond LLC’s and Parkway Gravel, Inc.’s (“Defendants”)[1] Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that minor Thomas Lynam, IV (“Tommy”) was riding his motocross bicycle on Defendants’ motocross track. After riding off a jump, Tommy landed, lost control of his motocross bicycle, and collided with a metal shipping container near the track. Tommy apparently sustained serious injuries. Plaintiffs’ complaint raises one count of “negligence” as a theory for liability.[2]Although not listed as a separate count in their complaint, Plaintiffs allude in their general “negligence” claim to a theory of reckless conduct by Defendants in connection with the operation of the motocross track.

In their motion, Defendants assert that their alleged behavior was, as a matter of fact and law, neither negligent nor reckless. Alternatively, Defendants raise an affirmative defense that they are released from any liability for negligent or reckless conduct due to a release agreement (the “Release”) signed by the Plaintiffs. Additionally, Defendants raise the doctrine of assumption of the risk as a separate affirmative defense as a bar to recovery.

Plaintiffs agree that they released Defendants from liability for Defendants’ own “negligence.” However, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ conduct amounted to recklessness, and that Plaintiffs never released Defendants from liability for their allegedly reckless conduct. In response to Defendants’ claim that Plaintiffs assumed the risk of injury, Plaintiffs contend that the risk of a collision with a metal shipping container was not contemplated at either the signing of the Release or when Tommy began using the facilities.

This Court concludes that the Release was not specifically tailored so as to release Defendants from liability for their allegedly reckless conduct. The Court also finds that the factual record is insufficiently developed to make a legal determination of whether Defendants’ conduct as a matter of law amounted to recklessness. Finally, the Court concludes that it is premature at this juncture to consider Defendant’s affirmative defense. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

II.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 6, 2013, Tommy, then thirteen years old, was riding a motocross bicycle at Blue Diamond Motocross near New Castle. Plaintiffs allege that the track was advertised as being composed of “safe jumps.”[3] While riding, Tommy rode off a jump, made a hard landing, and was unable to stop in time before colliding with a large metal shipping container.

Prior to granting Tommy admission to the Blue Diamond facilities to ride his motocross bicycle, Blue Diamond required Tommy’s father to sign a release agreement. The Release, entitled “Parental Consent, Release and Waiver of Liability, Assumption of Risk and Indemnity Agreement, ” stated that Plaintiffs understood the “risks and dangers of serious bodily injury” posed by motocross and relieved Defendants from liability for their own negligence.[4] The Release also released Defendants from liability for injuries suffered by Plaintiffs through their own negligence.[5]

In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants negligently allowed the container to remain on the premises at an unsafe distance from the motocross track.[6] While Plaintiffs do not specifically allege recklessness as a separate claim for recovery, but rather include it in a single count of “Negligence, ” Plaintiffs’ complaint references reckless conduct as another potential theory of recovery.[7]Plaintiffs, however, now agree that their claims of negligence are barred by the Release.[8] But Plaintiffs assert that the Release did not specifically address or contemplate potential claims against Defendants for “reckless” behavior.[9]

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed.[10] The standard of review in the context of a motion for judgment on the pleadings requires a court to “accept all the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”[11] “The motion will be granted when no material issues of fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”[12] “The standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is almost identical to the standard for a motion to dismiss.”[13]

B. The Parties Agree that the Release Bars Plaintiffs’ Recovery Against Defendants for Any Negligence

Defendants contend that the executed Release bars recovery for negligence. At oral argument on this motion, Plaintiffs agreed (Plaintiffs’ filings were not explicit on this point) that the Release bars recovery for injuries resulting from Defendants’ allegedly negligent conduct.[14] Although Plaintiffs are residents of Pennsylvania, the parties agree that Delaware law applies to the present motion, as Defendants are Delaware businesses and the incident giving rise to the case at bar occurred in Delaware.

Under Delaware law, parties may enter into an agreement that relieves a business owner of liability for injuries to business invitees that result from the owner’s negligent conduct.[15] However, the release must be unambiguous, not unconscionable, and not against public policy. [16] Further, the release must be “‘crystal clear and unequivocal’ to insulate a party from liability for possible future negligence.”[17]

In Ketler v. PFPA, LLC, the Delaware Supreme Court recently determined the validity of a release waiving liability for negligence.[18] The release in Ketler provided:

‘I understand and voluntarily accept this risk and agree that [the defendant] . . . will not be liable for any injury, including, without limitation, personal, bodily, or mental injury . . . resulting from the negligence of [the defendant] or anyone on [the defendant’s] behalf whether related to exercise or not. Accordingly, I do hereby forever release and discharge [the defendant] from any and all claims, demands, injuries, damages, actions, or causes of action.'[19]

The Delaware Supreme Court held that the release was sufficiently clear and unequivocal, and that it expressly released the defendant from any and all causes of actions relating to the defendant’s own negligence.[20] Defendants rely heavily on this case, asserting that it applies to claims of reckless conduct.[21]

The Release that Plaintiffs executed in this case is also sufficiently “clear and unequivocal.” The Release provides:

3. I consent to the Minor’s participation in the Event(s) and/or entry into restricted areas and HEREBY ACCEPT AND ASSUME ALL SUCH RISKS, KNOWN AND UNKNOWN, AND ASSUME ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LOSSES, COSTS, AND/OR DAMAGES FOLLOWING SUCH INJURY, DISABILITY, PARALYSIS OR DEATH, EVEN IF CAUSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE “RELEASEES” NAMED BELOW.

4. I HEREBY RELEASE, DISCHARGE AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE the . . . track owners, [and] owners and lessees of premises used to conduct the Event(s) . . . all for the purposes herein referred to as “Releasees, ” FROM ALL LIABILITY TO ME, THE MINOR, [and] my and the minor’s personal representatives . . . FOR ANY AND ALL CLAIMS, DEMANDS, LOSSES, OR DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF INJRY, including, but not limited to, death or damage to property, CAUSED . . . BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE “RELEASEES” OR OTHERWISE.[22]

Similar to the language at issue in Ketler, the Release expressly states that the signor assumes responsibility for injuries caused by Defendants’ own negligent conduct. The release also expressly states that the Defendants are released from any and all causes of action that may arise from Defendants’ negligent conduct. Accordingly, this Court agrees with the parties that the Release validly exculpates Defendants from liability for their own negligence.

Defendants also rely on Lafate v. New Castle County[23] and Devecchio v. Delaware Enduro Riders, Inc.[24] to support their position that the Release waives claims of reckless conduct. Both Lafate and Devecchio concern agreements that released the tortfeasors from liability for their own negligent conduct. Both cases also discussed whether the language of the releases was sufficiently tailored to release the tortfeasor’s negligent conduct. In Lafate, this Court refused to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on grounds that the release did not clearly and unambiguously release the tortfeasor from claims that it was negligent.[25] In Devecchio, this Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff signed a valid covenant not to sue for injury resulting from the plaintiffs own negligence.[26]

Defendants’ reliance on these cases in light of Plaintiffs’ potential claim of reckless conduct is inapposite. Because the parties have agreed that Defendants are insulated from claims of negligence, the question of whether the release clearly and unambiguously insulates the defendants from liability for their own negligent conduct is moot. Neither the holding in Lafate nor in Devecchio relate to allegations of reckless conduct. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs now assert that Defendant’s conduct was reckless, Lafate and Devecchio are distinguishable from the case at bar.

Finally, the Court considers whether, for purposes of this motion, recklessness is subsumed in negligence, and is therefore barred as a form of negligence. Prosser and Keeton on Torts is particularly informative, providing that “such [exculpatory] agreements [that expressly exempt defendants from liability for their negligent conduct] generally are not construed to cover the more extreme forms of negligence, described as willful, wanton, reckless or gross, and to any conduct which constitutes an intentional tort.”[27] Adopting Prosser and Keeton’s interpretation, this Court finds that although the Release does insulate Defendants from liability for negligent conduct, it does not bar claims of “more extreme forms of negligence, ” such as “reckless” conduct.[28]

C. A Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is Inappropriate at this Juncture in Light of any Undeveloped Claims of Reckless Conduct

Although Tommy’s father’s execution of the Release precludes recovery from Defendants on a theory of “negligence, ” Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants’ conduct was “reckless.” Plaintiffs did not explicitly allege in a separate count of the complaint that Defendant’s conduct was reckless, but Plaintiffs did make it apparent in the complaint that it was an intended theory of liability.[29] In their briefing and at oral argument, Plaintiffs suggested that Defendants, among other things, had been aware of previous collisions with the shipping container, and that their ignorance of these prior incidents amounts to reckless behavior.[30]Accordingly, the Court must determine whether the Release bars Plaintiffs from asserting claims resulting from injuries caused by Defendants’ reckless conduct.

Courts in Delaware have a strong preference for resolving cases on their merits, or at least allowing discovery to proceed such that additional evidence in support of the parties’ contentions can be developed.[31] While this preference is not outcome-determinative, the preference for resolving cases on the merits is a strong factor in determining whether to grant or deny a dispositive motion.

Plaintiffs, at oral argument and in their response to the motion, argue that they are entitled to recovery based on Defendants’ allegedly reckless conduct. The parties agree that this theory is separate from the one count of “negligence” listed in the complaint.[32] The operative language of the Release does not explicitly enumerate or contemplate recklessness as a theory of recovery barred by the Release. Under Delaware law, as provided in Ketler, a release must be “clear and unambiguous” in order to effectively release the business owner from liability.[33]

This Court finds that the language of the release is not “clear and unambiguous” with respect to Defendants’ liability for their own allegedly reckless conduct. In Ketler, the release at issue specifically used the word “negligence, ” and stated that Defendants “will not be liable for any injury, including, without limitation, personal, bodily, or mental injury . . . resulting from the negligence of [the defendants].” The Delaware Supreme Court held that this language satisfied the “clear and unequivocal” standard and upheld the language of the agreement.

Turning to the Release that Plaintiffs executed, this Court finds that the Release is silent as to claims of recklessness. The Release does not mention “reckless” conduct, and instead only expressly refers to injury caused by Defendants’ “negligence.” In the absence of such language, the Release does not clearly and unambiguously exculpate Defendants from liability for their own reckless conduct. Accordingly, the Release does not operate to bar Plaintiffs’ claim of recklessness.[34]

This Court holds that the Release does not bar claims of reckless conduct. This Court expresses no opinion at this juncture as to whether Plaintiffs ultimately can establish claims against for recklessness. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and will grant Plaintiffs leave to conduct further discovery with the option of potentially amending the complaint in support of their contention that Defendants’ conduct was “reckless.”[35]

D. The Court does Not Reach Defendant’s Argument under the Doctrine of Assumption of the Risk

Finally, Defendants’ contend that Plaintiffs assumed the risk of injury from Defendants’ alleged reckless conduct. However, the record has not been sufficiently developed to determine whether Defendants’ conduct was reckless or whether Plaintiffs assumed the risk of injury from Defendants’ allegedly reckless conduct.[36] Accordingly, the Court does not reach this contention at this stage of the litigation.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED. The Court has enclosed an Order establishing a Scheduling Conference in this case.

Very truly yours,

Richard R. Cooch Resident Judge

Notes:

[1] Defendant Houghton’s Amusement Park, LLC did not make an appearance in this case and had a default judgment taken against it on June 21, 2016.

[2]Compl. ¶¶ 79-87.

[3]Compl. ¶ 48.

[4]Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, Ex. A.

[5]Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, Ex. A. Tommy also signed an agreement, titled “Minor’s Assumption of the Risk Acknowledgment, ” that Defendants reference in their motion as another reason they are not liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. However, it appears from the motion and subsequent filings that the release signed by Tommy is only mentioned in passing, and is not relied upon by Defendants. The release signed by Tommy’s father is the determinative release in the case at bar.

[6]Compl. ¶¶ 79-87.

[7]Compl. ¶¶ 49, 51, 77, 87. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that “Defendants’ failure to exercise reasonable care as alleged above comprised outrageous conduct under the circumstances, manifesting a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of the Plaintiffs.” Compl. ¶ 87. The Complaint also alleges that Tommy’s injuries were caused by the “reckless indifference” of Defendants. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 77. Moreover, the Complaint alleges that the track was “reckless[ly] design[ed].” Compl. ¶ 49.

[8]At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel answered in the affirmative when the Court asked “Am I understanding Plaintiffs’ position correctly when I read the papers to say that Plaintiffs are not alleging ordinary negligence, but rather recklessness?” Lynam et al. v. Blue Diamond LLC Motocross et al, C.A. No. N14C-11-121 RRC, at 6 (Del. Super. July 6, 2016) (TRANSCRIPT) [hereinafter Oral Arg. Tr.].

[9] Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, Ex. A.

[10] A judgment on the pleadings is based only upon a review of Plaintiffs’ complaint and Defendants’ answer. However, under Rule 12(c), “If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.” Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(c). In the case at bar, Defendants introduced the two executed releases as exhibits to their motion. However, the releases were not a part of the pleadings. Nevertheless, the parties agree that this motion should be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

[11] Silver Lake Office Plaza, LLC v. Lanard & Axilbund, Inc., 2014 WL 595378, at *6 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2014) (quoting Blanco v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 2012 WL 3194412, at *6 (Del. Super. Aug. 8, 2012)).

[12] Id. (quoting Velocity Exp., Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., 2009 WL 406807, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 4, 2009).

[13] Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[14] See Oral Arg. Tr. at 6.

[15] Ketler v. PFPA, LLC, 132 A.3d 746 (Del. 2016) (upholding “hold harmless” agreements and releases that relieve a proprietor from liability for its own negligent activities).

[16] Id. at 747-48.

[17] Riverbend Cmty., LLC v. Green Stone Eng’g, LLC, 55 A.3d 330, 336 (Del. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Interstate Amiesite Corp., 297 A.2d 41, 44 (Del. 1972)).

[18] Ketler, 132 A.3d at 747.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Oral Arg. Tr. at 14-16.

[22] Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, Ex. A (emphasis added).

[23] 1999 WL 1241074 (Del. Super. Oct. 22, 1999).

[24] 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 444 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2004).

[25] The plaintiff in Lafate was injured by a metal bar used to divide a basketball court. This Court found that while the agreement did “speak[] of ‘any and all injuries which may be suffered by [players] during [their] participation, ‘” the absence of the word “negligence” insufficiently insulated the defendants from liability for their own negligent conduct. Lafate, 1999 WL 1241074, at *4.

[26] In Devecchio, the defendant owned a motorcycle race track that required riders to sign agreements releasing the defendant from liability for injuries resulting from both the riders and the defendant’s negligence. The release pertaining to the defendant’s negligence expressly used the word “negligence.” This Court found that the release using the word “negligence” was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, and therefore insulated the defendant from liability for its own negligent conduct. Devecchio v. Enduro Riders, Inc., 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 444 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2004).

[27] W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 68 at 483-84 (5th ed. 1984)). Delaware courts often rely on Prosser and Keeton on Torts in reaching their conclusions. See, e.g., Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1097 (Del. 1991); Lafate v. New Castle County, 1999 WL 1241074 (Del. Super. Oct. 22, 1999); Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1360 (Del. 1995).

[28] Additionally, the Delaware Civil Pattern Jury Instructions for negligence and recklessness are substantially different. The Delaware Civil Pattern Jury Instruction for negligence provides:

This case involves claims of negligence. Negligence is the lack of ordinary care; that is, the absence of the kind of care a reasonably prudent and careful person would exercise in similar circumstances. That standard is your guide. If a person’s conduct in a given circumstance doesn’t measure up to the conduct of an ordinarily prudent and careful person, then that person was negligent. On the other hand, if the person’s conduct does measure up to the conduct of a reasonably prudent and careful person, the person wasn’t negligent.

Del. Super. P.J.I. Civ. § 5.1 (2003), http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=85928. On the other hand, the Delaware Civil Pattern Jury Instruction for reckless conduct states:

Reckless conduct reflects a knowing disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. It amounts to an “I don’t care” attitude. Recklessness occurs when a person, with no intent to cause harm, performs an act so unreasonable and so dangerous that he or she knows, or should know, that harm will probably result.

Del. Super. P.J.I. Civ. § 5.9 (2003), http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=85928. It is apparent from a comparison of the two different jury instructions that negligence conduct requires a departure from the ordinary standard of care exhibited by the reasonably prudent person, an objective standard. However, in contrast, it appears from the pattern jury instructions that reckless conduct requires a subjective “I don’t care” attitude that evidences an even greater departure from the ordinary standard of care, amounting to an unreasonable conscious disregard of a known risk.

[29] Compl. ¶¶ 49, 51, 77, 87. For example, Plaintiffs allege that “The reckless design of the track, which was intentionally constructed next to the pre-existing intermodal container, requires riders to land from a jump and immediately decelerate in order to execute a 90° right turn.” Compl. ¶ 49. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Tommy’s injuries were “a direct and proximate result of the negligence, carelessness and reckless indifference of Defendants.” Compl. ¶ 77.

[30] Pl.’s Suppl. Resp. in Opp’n to the Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, at 2.

[31] Keener v. Isken, 58 A.3d 407, 409 (Del. 2013); see also Wallace v. Wood, 2007 WL 3331530 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2007); DeSantis v. Chilkotowsky, 2004 WL 2914314, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 18, 2004), Sup. Ct. Civ. R. 56.

[32] Plaintiffs did not plead any explicit claim of recklessness. See, e.g., J.L. v. Barnes, 33 A.3d 902, 916 n.77 (De. 2011) (treating recklessness and gross negligence as interchangeable and noting, “In order for a plaintiff to plead gross negligence with the requisite particularity, the plaintiff must articulate ‘facts that suggest a wide disparity between the process [] used . . . and that which would have been rational.'” J.L. states that a complaint pleading ten pages of facts to support a claim of gross negligence or recklessness was sufficient to meet the pleading standard). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not properly pleaded reckless conduct under Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b). However, the Court need not reach that issue since it will give Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint.

[33] Ketler, 132 A.3d at 747.

[34] Because the Court finds that Defendants’ release does not explicitly bar claims of “reckless” conduct, this Court does not reach the question of whether such a release is potentially permissible under Delaware law. However, this Court notes that other jurisdictions have differing perspectives on whether exculpatory agreements barring claims for recklessness, gross negligence, willful acts, or strict liability are enforceable. See Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Agreement Exempting Operator of Amusement Facility from Liability for Personal Injury or Death of Patron, 54 A.L.R.5th 513 (1997). For example, in Barker v. Colo. Region-Sports Car Club of Am., the Colorado Court of Appeals held that exculpatory agreements can release a party only for simple negligence, and not from willful and wanton negligence. 532 P.2d 372, 377 (Colo.App. 1974). Similarly, in Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii held that a release was invalid with respect to claims of gross negligence and strict liability. 839 F.Supp. 730, 736 (D. Haw. 1993). The above annotation suggests that a common reason to not enforce such an agreement is because they are void against the state’s public policy.

Alternatively, other jurisdictions have upheld agreements that exculpate business owners for reckless conduct or strict liability. For example, in Murphy v. N. Am. River Runners, Inc., the West Virginia Supreme Court discussed the matter, stating:

Generally, in the absence of an applicable safety statute, a plaintiff who expressly and, under the circumstances, clearly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant’s negligent or reckless conduct may not recover for such harm, unless the agreement is contrary to public policy. When such an express agreement is freely and fairly made, between two parties who are in equal bargaining position, and there is no public interest with which the agreement interferes, it will generally be upheld.

412 S.E.2d 504, 508-09 (W.Va. 1991).

[35]Delaware Courts have previously allowed such an amendment to be made. As this Court held in Guy v. Phillips, a party may amend a complaint following additional discovery when the amended count arises out of the same factual basis for the original complaint. 1997 WL 524124 (Del. Super. July 2, 1997).

[36] In support of this defense, the Court notes that Defendants rely solely on Deuley v. DynCorp Int’l, Inc., 2010 WL 704895 (Del. Super. Feb. 26, 2010). However, Deuley is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Deuley, surviving relatives of decedents killed by an improvised explosive device (“IED”) in Afghanistan filed a wrongful death action. As part of the employment agreement, the decedents signed an agreement that provided employees expressly assumed the risk of injury or death. In reaching its conclusion that the decedents assumed the risk of death, the Court found that “when [the decedents] signed the releases, even a poorly informed American had to have appreciated that working in Afghanistan involved the general risk of insurgent or terrorist attacking by an IED.” Deuley, 2010 WL 704895, at *4. “The complaint offers no reason to find that any plaintiff here was probably unaware of the general risk of being injured or killed by a bomb.” Id. In the case at bar, drawing inferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, it is unlikely that Plaintiffs were aware of the risk posed by the shipping container, since they allege that they were unable to inspect the track prior to Tommy using it. Accordingly, Defendants’ reliance on Deuley is inapposite since it could be determined that a collision with the metal shipping container was not contemplated by the Plaintiffs when they signed the Release.

New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students

Posted: April 25, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Camping, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, First Aid, Insurance, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Medical, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Sea Kayaking, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Swimming, Whitewater Rafting, Zip Line | Tags: Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Desk Reference, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, Good Samaritan Statutes, Hang gliding, Insurance, James H. Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Law, Legal Case, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, Outdoor Industry, Outdoor recreation, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Reference Book, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Reward, Risk, Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Textbook, Whitewater Rafting, zip line | Leave a comment

“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry

Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.

The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

PURCHASE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Cases

Introduction

Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview

Risk

Perception versus Actual Risk

Risk v. Reward

Risk Evaluation

Risk Management Strategies

Humans & Risk

Risk = Accidents

Accidents may/may not lead to litigation

How Do You Deal with Risk?

How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?

Negative Feelings against the Business

Risk, Accidents & Litigation

No Real Acceptance of the Risk

No Money to Pay Injury Bills

No Health Insurance

Insurance Company Subrogation

Negative Feelings

Litigation

Dealing with Different People

Dealing with Victims

Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit

Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits

Emergency Medical Services

Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation

Employees

How Do You Handle A Victim?

Dealing with Different People

Dealing with Victims

Legal System in the United States

Courts

State Court System

Federal Court System

Other Court Systems

Laws

Statutes

Parties to a Lawsuit

Attorneys

Trials

Law

Torts

Negligence

Duty

Breach of the Duty

Injury

Proximate Causation

Damages

Determination of Duty Owed

Duty of an Outfitter

Duty of a Guide

Duty of Livery Owner

Duty of Rental Agent

Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader

In Loco Parentis

Intentional Torts

Gross Negligence

Willful & Wanton Negligence

Intentional Negligence

Negligence Per Se

Strict Liability

Attractive Nuisance

Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence

Product Liability

Contracts

Breach of Contract

Breach of Warranty

Express Warranty

Implied Warranty

Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose

Warranty of Merchantability

Warranty of Statute

Detrimental Reliance

Unjust Enrichment

Liquor Liability

Food Service Liability

Damages

Compensatory Damages

Special Damages

Punitive Damages

Statutory Defenses

Skier Safety Acts

Whitewater Guides & Outfitters

Equine Liability Acts

Legal Defenses

Assumption of Risk

Express Assumption of Risk

Implied Assumption of Risk

Primary Assumption of Risk

Secondary Assumption of Risk

Contributory Negligence

Assumption of Risk & Minors

Inherent Dangers

Assumption of Risk Documents.

Assumption of Risk as a Defense.

Statutory Assumption of Risk

Express Assumption of Risk

Contributory Negligence

Joint and Several Liability

Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue

Why do you need them

Exculpatory Agreements

Releases

Waivers

Covenants Not to sue

Who should be covered

What should be included

Negligence Clause

Jurisdiction & Venue Clause

Assumption of Risk

Other Clauses

Indemnification

Hold Harmless Agreement

Liquidated Damages

Previous Experience

Misc

Photography release

Video Disclaimer

Drug and/or Alcohol clause

Medical Transportation & Release

HIPAA

Problem Areas

What the Courts do not want to see

Statute of Limitations

Minors

Adults

Defenses Myths

Agreements to Participate

Parental Consent Agreements

Informed Consent Agreements

Certification

Accreditation

Standards, Guidelines & Protocols

License

Specific Occupational Risks

Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators

College & University Issues

Animal Operations, Packers

Equine Activities

Canoe Livery Operations

Tube rentals

Downhill Skiing

Ski Rental Programs

Indoor Climbing Walls

Instructional Programs

Mountaineering

Retail Rental Programs

Rock Climbing

Tubing Hills

Whitewater Rafting

Risk Management Plan

Introduction for Risk Management Plans

What Is A Risk Management Plan?

What should be in a Risk Management Plan

Risk Management Plan Template

Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan

Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters

Building Fire & Evacuation

Dealing with an Emergency

Insurance

Theory of Insurance

Insurance Companies

Deductibles

Self-Insured Retention

Personal v. Commercial Policies

Types of Policies

Automobile

Comprehension

Collision

Bodily Injury

Property Damage

Uninsured Motorist

Personal Injury Protection

Non-Owned Automobile

Hired Car

Fire Policy

Coverage

Liability

Named Peril v. All Risk

Commercial Policies

Underwriting

Exclusions

Special Endorsements

Rescue Reimbursement

Policy Procedures

Coverage’s

Agents

Brokers

General Agents

Captive Agents

Types of Policies

Claims Made

Occurrence

Claims

Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements

Bibliography

Index

It's not what I write, It's what you Learn

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“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry

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Everyone has told you, you need a risk management plan. A plan to follow if you have a crisis. You‘ve seen several and they look burdensome and difficult to write. Need help writing a risk management plan? Need to know what should be in your risk management plan? Need Help?

This book can help you understand and write your plan. This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you plan is a workable plan, not one that will create liability for you.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2 U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3 Risk 25

Chapter 4 Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5 Law 57

Chapter 6 Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7 PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8 Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9 Minors

Chapter 10 Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11 Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12 Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13 Rental Programs

Chapter 14 Insurance

$99.00 plus shipping

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“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry

The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

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