Good Samaritan law used to prove injured Samaritan was not liable for automobile accident where he stopped to render aid.

In this Indiana case, the Indiana Good Samaritan law is tested to determine if actions not defined as first aid, still are immune from liability under the law.

McGowen v. Montes, 152 N.E.3d 654; 2020 Ind. App. LEXIS 335; 2020 WL 4516816

State: Indiana, Court of Appeals of Indiana

Plaintiff: Bradley Montes

Defendant: Eric McGowen and Vision Logistics, Inc.

Plaintiff Claims: Negligence and Gross Negligence

Defendant Defenses: Indiana Good Samaritan Law

Holding: for the defendants

Year: 2020

Summary

A truck driver pulled over to check on what appeared to be an injured man in a two-car accident. While asking the man if he was OK or needed medical help the plaintiff collided with the stopped truck. The truck driver could not be sued because the actions of the truck driver in checking on the condition of a person, appearing to be injured was protected by the Indiana Good Samaritan law.

Facts

On the morning of November 4, 2016, before the sun had risen, there was heavy fog in rural Tippecanoe County. McGowen was driving a semi-tractor (without a trailer) owned by his employer, Vision, on a two-lane county road. Traffic was sparse, but McGowen drove at thirty-five to forty miles per hour, well below the speed limit of fifty miles per hour, due to poor visibility. As he drove east, McGowen saw a truck in a ditch on the side of the road. The truck was upright and its headlights were on, pointing at McGowen’s semi as he approached. The truck’s roof, windshield, and hood were heavily damaged. McGowen also saw another vehicle stopped in the road near the truck, but that vehicle drove off as McGowen approached. McGowen speculated that there had been a two-car accident, and the other vehicle was leaving the scene.

P4 McGowen saw a man, later identified as Ryan Patton, “kind of wandering around” the truck. McGowen thought Patton “was drunk at first” or possibly injured.

P5 McGowen stopped his semi in the road. He kept his foot on the brake, rather than shifting the semi’s transmission to park. The semi’s rear brake lights activated automatically when the driver pressed on the brake pedal. McGowen checked his side mirrors as he slowed to a halt, but he did not see any sign of vehicles approaching from behind.

McGowen rolled down the passenger window and asked Patton, “Are you okay?” Id. Patton climbed up to the semi’s passenger-side window and responded, “Yeah.” Id. Next, McGowen asked Patton if he wanted McGowen to call 911. Patton responded, “Yeah, if you don’t mind.”

Rebecca Higgins was traveling westbound on the same road and she saw the headlights of McGowen’s semi, stopped in the road. She pulled past the semi, parked on the side of the road opposite the semi, and activated her hazard lights. She saw Patton’s truck after she had passed the semi. Higgins also saw the semi’s brake lights.

Meanwhile, Montes was also driving east on the same county road. Higgins saw Montes’ car traveling in her direction. She activated her vehicle’s high beams to warn Montes, but he did not slow down. Higgins also rolled down her window, waved her arms, and yelled, but Montes still did not slow down. He instead collided with the rear of McGowen’s semi, without braking, immediately after Patton had asked McGowen to call 911. McGowen estimated no more than fifteen to thirty seconds had elapsed from the time he stopped until the time Montes struck the semi. Another vehicle that was also traveling east on the road, behind Montes, saw McGowen’s semi and stopped before hitting Montes’ car.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

Indiana’s Good Samaritan Laws are spread-out through the Indiana statutes and cover all sorts of individual actions. This happens for several reasons; one judge has narrowly interpreted the original law so that a new statute is added to cover the interpretation of the judge or an individual doesn’t understand the law and believe they need special protection and have the power and money to get it.

In this, case, the court focused on the central Good Sam Law, or GSL as the court identified it, § 34-30-12-1. Because Indiana has so many possibly conflicting statutes, the court tried to eliminate the statutes that did not apply, which, in and of itself, makes the case difficult to read and understand. The court stops its analysis of the Good Samaritan laws and looks at the claims of the defendant as to whether the action of the defendant occurred in an emergency.

§ 34-30-12-1. Gratuitously rendered emergency care; immunity

(a) This section does not apply to services rendered by a health care provider (as defined in IC 34-18-2-14 or IC 27-12-2-14 before its repeal) to a patient in a health care facility (as defined in IC 27-8-10-1).

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), a person who comes upon the scene of an emergency or accident, complies with IC 9-26-1-1.5, or is summoned to the scene of an emergency or accident and, in good faith, gratuitously renders emergency care at the scene of the emergency or accident is immune from civil liability for any personal injury that results from:

(1) any act or omission by the person in rendering the emergency care; or

(2) any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person;

except for acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

(c) This subsection applies to a person to whom IC 16-31-6.5 applies. A person who gratuitously renders emergency care involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator is immune from liability for any act or omission not amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct if the person fulfills the requirements set forth in IC 16-31-6.5.

(d) This subsection applies to an individual, business, or organization to which IC 16-31-6.5 applies. An individual, business, or organization that allows a person who is an expected user to use an automatic external defibrillator of the individual, business, or organization to in good faith gratuitously render emergency care is immune from civil liability for any damages resulting from an act or omission not amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct by the user or for acquiring or providing the automatic external defibrillator to the user for the purpose of rendering the emergency care if the individual, business, or organization and the user fulfill the requirements set forth in IC 16-31-6.5.

(e) A licensed physician who gives medical direction in the use of a defibrillator or a national or state approved defibrillator instructor of a person who gratuitously renders emergency care involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator is immune from civil liability for any act or omission of the licensed physician or instructor if the act or omission of the licensed physician or instructor:

(1) involves the training for or use of an automatic external defibrillator; and

(2) does not amount to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

The defendant truck driver stopped in the road to see if there had been a car accident and to see if the injured driver needed help. The court found the actions of the defendant truck driver fell within the law. Checking to see if someone needed help was covered as providing emergency care.

Based on the plain language of the statute, “emergency care” thus encompasses actions other than direct medical treatment. In addition, the Samaritan Law immunizes an “act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person.” In the current case, it is undisputed that McGowen stopped his semi to ask Patton if he was okay and if McGowen should contact 911. McGowen was thus seeking to arrange medical treatment, as mentioned in the statute

The plaintiff argued that the Good Samaritan law only applied to the application of first aid to a person, thankfully the court disagreed.

If the General Assembly had intended to specify that “emergency care” meant only medical treatment or first aid, they could have done so. “We cannot add new words to a statute but are bound to apply statutes as the legislature has written them.” Matter of Supervised We conclude from the unambiguous language of the GSL that stopping and asking if a person who has been involved in an accident needs help is “emergency care.”

The plaintiff also argued the actions of the truck driver in stopping to aid where gross, willful and wanton negligence. Gross negligence in Indiana is defined as:

The Indiana Supreme Court has defined gross negligence as “‘[a] conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of . . . the consequences to another party.'” A finding of gross negligence is predicated on a showing of negligence, as it is the intentional failure to perform a duty in reckless disregard of the consequences.

The court found stopping at the scene of an accident in the way that occurred in this case was barely negligence, if that, and not gross negligence.

Willful and wanton conduct in Indiana is:

Turning to willful or wanton conduct, such conduct consists of two elements: “(1) the defendant must have knowledge of an impending danger or consciousness of a course of misconduct calculated to result in probable injury; and (2) the actor’s conduct must have exhibited an indifference to the consequence of his conduct.” “The distinction between constructive willfulness and mere negligence depends on the actor’s state of mind.”

The court in an attempt to point out the futility of the plaintiff’s case stated that driving on a two-lane road in fog at a high rate of speed was closer to willful and wanton conduct than stopping on the road to help someone.

The court then reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the defendants motion for summary judgment be granted.

So Now What?

Although a very confusing automobile case, this decision has far-reaching effects for the outdoor industry.

  1. Indiana’s Good Samaritan law is to be interpreted broadly to included acts that are more than first aid.
  2. The definitions of gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence are clearly defined.

Having a Good Samaritan law that has a broad definition of what constitutes protection under the law is great. In outdoor recreation cases, many times rescue of the injured puts greater risk on both the injured and the rescuer. Putting your life in danger to save another should not be justification to be sued.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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McGowen v. Montes, 152 N.E.3d 654; 2020 Ind. App. LEXIS 335; 2020 WL 4516816

McGowen v. Montes, 152 N.E.3d 654; 2020 Ind. App. LEXIS 335; 2020 WL 4516816

Court of Appeals of Indiana

August 6, 2020, Decided; August 6, 2020, Filed

Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CT-1707

Reporter

152 N.E.3d 654 *; 2020 Ind. App. LEXIS 335 **; 2020 WL 4516816

Eric McGowen and Vision Logistics, Inc., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Bradley Montes, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Prior History:  [**1] Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court. The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, Judge. Trial Court Cause No. 79D02-1708-CT-138.

Counsel: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES; William B. Weiler, John A. Masters, Langhenry Gillen Lundquist & Johnson, LLC, Munster, Indiana.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT: Christopher G. Stevenson, Wilson Kehoe Winningham LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana; Kyle E. Cray, Kisti Good Risse, Bennett Boehning & Clary LLP Lafayette, Indiana; ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, Brian A. Karle, Sarah M. Wyatt, Ball Eggleston PC, Lafayette, Indiana.

Judges: Friedlander, Senior Judge. May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

Opinion by: Friedlander

Opinion

[*656] 
Friedlander, Senior Judge.

P1 Eric McGowen and Bradley Montes were injured in a vehicle accident after McGowen stopped at the scene of a prior vehicle accident and Montes collided with his vehicle. McGowen sued Montes, and Montes sued McGowen and McGowen’s employer, Vision Logistics, Inc.

P2 In this interlocutory appeal, the parties cross-appeal the trial court’s rulings on their cross-motions for summary judgment, in which the court determined that a dispute of material fact remains to be decided at trial. We affirm in part but also reverse [**2]  in part and remand because we conclude there are no disputes of material fact and McGowen and Vision are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

P3 On the morning of November 4, 2016, before the sun had risen, there was heavy fog in rural Tippecanoe County. McGowen was driving a semi-tractor (without a trailer) owned by his employer, Vision, on a two-lane county road. Traffic was sparse, but McGowen drove at thirty-five to forty miles per hour, well below the speed limit of fifty miles per hour, due to poor visibility. As he drove east, McGowen saw a truck in a ditch on the side of the road. The truck was upright and its headlights were on, pointing at McGowen’s semi as he approached. The truck’s roof, windshield, and hood were heavily damaged. McGowen also saw another vehicle stopped in the road near the truck, but that vehicle drove off as McGowen approached. McGowen speculated that there had been a two-car accident, and the other vehicle was leaving the scene.

P4 McGowen saw a man, later identified as Ryan Patton, “kind of wandering around” the truck. Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 40. McGowen thought Patton “was drunk at first” or possibly injured. Id.

P5 McGowen stopped [**3]  his semi in the road. He kept his foot on the brake, rather than shifting the semi’s transmission to park. The semi’s rear brake lights activated automatically when the driver pressed on the brake pedal. McGowen checked his side mirrors as he slowed to a halt, but he did not see any sign of vehicles approaching from behind.

P6 McGowen rolled down the passenger window and asked Patton, “Are you okay?” Id. Patton climbed up to the semi’s passenger-side window and responded, “Yeah.” Id. Next, McGowen asked Patton if he wanted McGowen to call 911. Patton responded, “Yeah, if you don’t mind.” Id.

P7 Rebecca Higgins was traveling westbound on the same road and she saw the headlights of McGowen’s semi, stopped in the road. She pulled past the semi, parked on the side of the road opposite the semi, and activated her hazard lights. She saw Patton’s truck after she had passed the semi. Higgins also saw the semi’s brake lights.

P8 Meanwhile, Montes was also driving east on the same county road. Higgins saw Montes’ car traveling in her direction. She activated her vehicle’s high beams to warn Montes, but he did not slow down. Higgins also rolled down her window, waved her arms, and yelled, but Montes [**4]  still did not slow down. He instead collided with the rear of McGowen’s semi, without braking, immediately after Patton had asked McGowen to call 911. McGowen estimated no more than fifteen to thirty seconds had elapsed from the time he stopped until the time Montes struck the semi. Another vehicle that was also traveling east on the  [*657]  road, behind Montes, saw McGowen’s semi and stopped before hitting Montes’ car.

P9 Both McGowen and Montes suffered injuries from the collision. Montes later recalled seeing the rear of McGowen’s semi prior to the collision, but he was unsure of the distance at which he first saw it.

P10 This case began on August 24, 2017, when McGowen sued Montes, claiming negligence.1 Montes filed an answer, counter-sued McGowen for negligence, and sued Vision as a third-party defendant, alleging McGowen had been working for Vision at the time of the collision.

P11 In January 2019, McGowen and Vision filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to determine that they were immune from Montes’ negligence claims under Indiana Code section 34-30-12-1 (2008), also known as the Good Samaritan Law (“GSL”). Montes responded to the motion and filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, asserting [**5]  the GSL did not apply to McGowen’s conduct.

P12 After a hearing, the trial court issued an order determining: (1) there is no dispute of material fact that McGowen was rendering emergency care, for purposes of the GSL, when he stopped and offered to call 911; but (2) there is a dispute of material fact as to whether McGowen’s act in stopping on the road amounted to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct, for purposes of the GSL. The court granted in part and denied in part McGowen and Vision’s motion for summary judgment, and denied Montes’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

P13 Montes, McGowen, and Vision asked the trial court to certify its order for interlocutory review. The court granted the motion. Next, both sides separately asked the Court to accept this appeal. The Court granted the motions, and this appeal followed.

1. Standard of Review

HN1[] P14 Summary judgment orders are reviewed de novo, applying the same standard of review as the trial court. AM General LLC v. Armour, 46 N.E.3d 436 (Ind. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence designated by the parties demonstrates “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

HN2[] P15 The [**6]  movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000 (Ind. 2014). If the movant bears its burden, then the nonmovant must present contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact. Id. All evidence must be construed in favor of the nonmovant. Mahan v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 862 N.E.2d 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

HN3[] P16 Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter our standard of review. Alexander v. Linkmeyer Dev. II, LLC, 119 N.E.3d 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Instead, we consider each motion separately to determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mahan, 862 N.E.2d 669.

P17 In addition, this case requires us to review the trial court’s application of the GSL. HN4[] Interpretation of a statute is a question of law reserved for the courts and, as is the case for a summary judgment order, is reviewed under a de novo standard. Ind. State Bd. of Educ. v. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 865 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

 [*658] 
2. The Good Samaritan Law

P18 The GSL provides:

(a) This section does not apply to services rendered by a health care provider (as defined in IC 34-18-2-14 or IC 27-12-2-14 before its repeal) to a patient in a health care facility (as defined in IC 27-8-10-1).

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), a person who comes upon the scene of an emergency or accident, complies with IC 9-26-1-1.5, or is summoned to the scene of an emergency or accident and, in good faith, gratuitously renders emergency care at the scene [**7]  of the emergency or accident is immune from civil liability for any personal injury that results from:

(1) any act or omission by the person in rendering the emergency care; or

(2) any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person;

except for acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

(c) This subsection applies to a person to whom IC 16-31-6.5 applies. A person who gratuitously renders emergency care involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator is immune from liability for any act or omission not amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct if the person fulfills the requirements set forth in IC 16-31-6.5.

(d) This subsection applies to an individual, business, or organization to which IC 16-31-6.5 applies. An individual, business, or organization that allows a person who is an expected user to use an automatic external defibrillator of the individual, business, or organization to in good faith gratuitously render emergency care is immune from civil liability for any damages resulting from an act or omission not amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct by the user or for acquiring [**8]  or providing the automatic external defibrillator to the user for the purpose of rendering the emergency care if the individual, business, or organization and the user fulfill the requirements set forth in IC 16-31-6.5.

(e) A licensed physician who gives medical direction in the use of a defibrillator or a national or state approved defibrillator instructor of a person who gratuitously renders emergency care involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator is immune from civil liability for any act or omission of the licensed physician or instructor if the act or omission of the licensed physician or instructor:

(1) involves the training for or use of an automatic external defibrillator; and

(2) does not amount to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

Ind. Code § 34-30-12-1.

P19 The GSL has rarely been addressed by Indiana’s appellate courts. HN5[] The statute’s grant of immunity from civil liability under certain circumstances limits a claimant’s right to bring suit, “in derogation of the common law.” Beckerman v. Gordon, 614 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), reh’g denied, 618 N.E.2d 56 (1993), trans. denied. We strictly construe such statutes against limitations on the right to sue. Id.

HN6[] P20 When applying a statute to a case, “our first task is to give its words their clear and plain [**9]  meaning, while considering the structure of the statute as a whole.” City of Lawrence Utils. Serv. Bd. v. Curry, 68 N.E.3d 581, 585 (Ind. 2017). If a statute contains clear and unambiguous language, it is not subject to judicial interpretation. Yates v. Kemp, 979 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. 2012).

 [*659] 
3. Cross-Appeal: Emergency Care

P21 We first address Montes’ cross-appeal claim because, if it is meritorious, it would be dispositive of the appeal. He argues the trial court should have granted his motion for partial summary judgment because McGowen was not rendering emergency care for purposes of the GSL when he stopped at the accident scene to ask if Patton was okay and whether he should call 911. Montes argues that the GSL applies only to “persons actively participating in rendering care or assistance,” Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Br. p. 15, and not to people in McGowen’s situation.2 He further argues the facts demonstrate there was no emergency at the time McGowen stopped his semi.

HN7[] P22 The General Assembly has defined the phrase “gratuitously renders emergency care,” as set forth in the GSL, in relevant part:

[t]he giving of emergency care (including the use of an automatic external defibrillator):

(1) that was volunteered without legal obligation on the part of the person rendering the emergency care; and

(2) for [**10]  which the person rendering the emergency care does not expect remuneration.

Ind. Code § 34-6-2-51 (1999). This statute focuses on the element of gratuitousness and does not address what conduct, other than the use of a defibrillator, meets the definition of emergency care.

P23 Similarly, Indiana’s prior cases applying the GSL have not sought to define “emergency care.” In McKinney v. Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc., 597 N.E.2d 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied, a panel of this Court was asked to determine whether a vehicle that was disabled due to a flat tire, where the driver was uninjured, was an “accident” for purposes of the Samaritan Law. The panel determined that those circumstances did not amount to an accident, and the person who stopped to change the flat tire was not immune from civil suit under the GSL. In Beckerman, 614 N.E.2d 610, this Court was similarly asked to determine whether the circumstances of that case amounted to an “accident” for purposes of the GSL. A doctor had been called to a house to treat an ill person, who subsequently died from a heart attack. This Court concluded the victim’s medical condition was not a “sudden calamitous event,” and the GSL did not provide immunity from suit. Id. at 613.

P24 The parties cite several cases from other jurisdictions in support of their claims. Those [**11]  cases are not particularly helpful here because other states’ Good Samaritan laws are drafted differently from Indiana’s, and the courts applying those statutes have reached differing results. See, e.g., McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, 626 N.W.2d 666, 675 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 2001) (stopping at an accident to ask if assistance is needed can constitute rendering “aid” for North Dakota’s GSL); Howell v. City Towing Assoc., Inc., 717 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (tow truck driver calling his dispatcher after passenger suffered medical emergency did not amount to “emergency care” as defined by Texas’ GSL), writ refused.

P25 In the absence of a statutory definition or prior caselaw, we define “emergency care” in accordance with our principles of statutory application. HN8[] Subsection (b)(2) of the GSL distinguishes between medical treatment and other forms  [*660]  of emergency assistance, providing immunity for persons who “provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care.” Ind. Code § 34-30-12-1(b)(2) (emphasis added). Based on the plain language of the statute, “emergency care” thus encompasses actions other than direct medical treatment. In addition, the Samaritan Law immunizes an “act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person.” Id. In the current case, it is undisputed that McGowen stopped his semi to ask Patton if he [**12]  was okay and if McGowen should contact 911. McGowen was thus seeking to arrange medical treatment, as mentioned in the statute.

P26 Montes and amicus curiae argue that, reading the GSL in its entirety, the statute encompasses only medical care or first aid. We disagree. Subsections (c), (d), and (e) of the GSL address the use of a defibrillator to provide medical assistance. The General Assembly clearly knew how to specify medical care, including specific medical treatments, in the GSL. If the General Assembly had intended to specify that “emergency care” meant only medical treatment or first aid, they could have done so. HN9[] “We cannot add new words to a statute but are bound to apply statutes as the legislature has written them.” Matter of Supervised Estate of Kent, 99 N.E.3d 634, 639 (Ind. 2018). HN10[] We conclude from the unambiguous language of the GSL that stopping and asking if a person who has been involved in an accident needs help is “emergency care.”

P27 Next, Montes argues the scene of the vehicle collision did not qualify as an “objective emergency.” Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Br. p. 13. HN11[] The Beckerman court defined an “accident” as a “sudden calamitous event.” Beckerman, 614 N.E.2d at 613. In this case, McGowen arrived on the scene of an automobile accident, possibly a two-car collision. Further, [**13]  Patton was wandering around the truck, giving McGowen the impression that he was injured or drunk. This is ample, undisputed evidence of a sudden event, with a potentially injured person, that qualified as an emergency for purposes of the GSL. The trial court did not err in denying Montes’ motion for partial summary judgment.

4. Gross Negligence and Willful and Wanton Misconduct

HN12[] P28 The GSL provides that a person is not shielded from civil liability if the person’s acts or omissions while providing emergency care amounted to “gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.” Ind. Code § 34-30-12-1. The trial court determined there was a dispute of material fact as to whether McGowen’s conduct was grossly negligent or willful or wanton. McGowen and Vision argue that the undisputed facts establish that his acts did not meet either standard, and they conclude the trial court should have granted their motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

P29 The General Assembly has frequently used the phrases “gross negligence” and “willful or wanton misconduct” in statutes granting immunity from civil damages. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 21-44.5-2-6 (2019) (administration of auto-injectable epinephrine); Ind. Code § 31-33-6-2 (2018) (reporting child abuse or neglect); [**14] 
Ind. Code § 10-17-13.5-7 (2018) (physicians’ administration of hyperbaric oxygen treatments to veterans). We have not found a statutory definition of those terms for purposes of the GSL, and the parties have not directed us to any.

HN13[] P30 The Indiana Supreme Court has defined gross negligence as “‘[a] conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of . . . the consequences to another party.'” N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v.  [*661]  Sharp, 790 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind. 2003) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1057 (7th ed. 1999)). A finding of gross negligence is predicated on a showing of negligence, as it is the intentional failure to perform a duty in reckless disregard of the consequences. York v. Fredrick, 947 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

P31 In Miller v. Indiana Department of Workforce Development, 878 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), Miller was driving his employer’s truck when he stopped at a stop sign. Upon driving into the intersection, he collided with a vehicle approaching from his right side. Miller’s employer terminated him after the collision, citing a provision of a labor agreement that permitted instant termination for “gross negligence.” Id. at 350.

P32 Miller sought unemployment benefits, and he appealed the denial of his request. HN14[] A panel of this Court applied the definition of gross negligence set forth above, noting “the question of whether an act or omission constitutes gross negligence is generally [**15]  a question of fact, [but] the question may become one of law if ‘the facts are undisputed and only a single inference can be drawn from those facts.'” Id. at 356 (quoting Sharp, 790 N.E.2d at 466). The Court concluded that Miller’s failure to use due care when entering the intersection after stopping at the stop sign was “negligent, but not grossly negligent.” Id. at 357.

P33 In this case, the undisputed facts establish that McGowen was driving at only thirty-five to forty miles per hour when he stopped his semi in the road at the scene of an accident. McGowen did not put his semi in park but merely pressed on the brake, activating his rear brake lights. He was unaware of any vehicles behind him. McGowen asked Patton if he was okay and whether he should call 911, immediately before Montes collided with the rear of the semi. McGowen stated, without contradiction, that only fifteen to thirty seconds elapsed between him stopping his semi and being rear-ended by Montes. These circumstances resemble at worst the mere negligence at issue in Miller, rather than the reckless disregard for others that characterizes gross negligence.

P34 Montes claims there are several material disputes of fact that justify the trial court’s partial denial [**16]  of McGowen and Vision’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of gross negligence. We disagree. He points to evidence that McGowen could have pulled off the road, contradicting Montes’ statement during a deposition that there was no space for his semi along the side of the road. This fact is immaterial due to the short duration of the stop prior to the collision and McGowen’s choice to not put the semi in park, allowing him to move on quickly if needed.

P35 There is also a dispute as to whether McGowen activated his vehicle’s hazard lights after stopping, in the brief interval before Montes collided with him. This factual dispute is also immaterial because it is undisputed that McGowen’s brake lights activated when he stopped, and: (1) the brake lights override the hazard lights, and (2) the brake lights are as bright as the hazard lights.

P36 Finally, Montes claims McGowen violated numerous traffic regulations and commercial driver standards when he stopped in the road. HN15[] Even if McGowen’s acts were contrary to statutes, “violation of a statutory duty creates a presumption of negligence that may be rebutted.” Sandberg Trucking, Inc. v. Johnson, 76 N.E.3d 178, 188-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). A presumption of negligence is dissimilar to a presumption of gross negligence. [**17]  We conclude that there is no dispute  [*662]  of material fact as to whether McGowen was grossly negligent.

HN16[] P37 Turning to willful or wanton conduct, such conduct consists of two elements: “(1) the defendant must have knowledge of an impending danger or consciousness of a course of misconduct calculated to result in probable injury; and (2) the actor’s conduct must have exhibited an indifference to the consequence of his conduct.” Witham v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 561 N.E.2d 484, 486 (Ind. 1990). “The distinction between constructive willfulness and mere negligence depends on the actor’s state of mind.” McKeown v. Calusa, 172 Ind. App. 1, 6-7, 359 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1977).

P38 In Frybarger v. Coffelt, 180 Ind. App. 160, 387 N.E.2d 104 (1979), a passenger in Coffelt’s car died when Coffelt chose to race another driver on a two-lane highway at night and collided with a third car attempting to turn left across the highway. On appeal, the passenger’s estate argued that the trial court erred in determining Coffelt’s conduct did not meet the definition of willful or wanton misconduct. A panel of this Court concluded that, although Coffelt was racing at night at a high rate of speed, a dip in the road made it impossible for him to see the car in time to avoid striking it, and there was no evidence of any other reckless behavior by Coffelt. The Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that [**18]  Coffelt had not behaved willfully and wantonly.

P39 In the current case, the standard of review is different, but McGowen’s conduct is far less reckless than Coffelt’s. On a dark, foggy morning, McGowen drove on a two-lane county road at thirty-five to forty miles per hour due to poor visibility. He came to a stop when he saw Patton and the wrecked truck along the side of the road, pressing on the brake rather than shifting into park. McGowen checked his side mirrors as he slowed to a halt, but he did not see any sign of approaching vehicles. He barely had time to ask Patton if he was okay and whether he should call 911 when Montes collided with the back of the semi. During McGowen’s deposition, when asked if he was concerned that stopping on the road may have been hazardous, he stated, “I was more concerned about [Patton]. I thought it was a two-car accident.” Appellants’/Cross-Appellees’ App. Vol. II, p. 104. There is no evidence that McGowen was indifferent to the results of his conduct. Rather, the undisputed facts demonstrate McGowen was aware of dangerous road conditions and attempted to drive carefully while rendering aid to Patton. As a matter of law, McGowen’s conduct did not [**19]  meet the standard of willful or wanton misconduct. The trial court erred in denying in part McGowen and Vision’s motion for summary judgment, because they are entitled to the protection of the Good Samaritan Law.

P40 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions to grant McGowen and Vision’s motion for summary judgment.

P41 Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.


Indiana Good Samaritan Laws

Indiana Good Samaritan Laws

Contents

§ 9-26-1-1.5. Duties of passenger of vehicle involved in accident resulting in injury or entrapment; violation    2

§ 16-31-6-1. Emergency medical technician services    3

§ 16-31-6-1. Emergency medical technician services    4

§ 16-31-6-2. Use of defibrillators    4

§ 16-31-6-2.5. Use of overdose intervention drugs; civil immunity    4

§ 16-31-6-3. Advanced life support; liability    5

§ 16-31-6-4. Life support provided in connection with disaster emergency    6

§ 16-31-6.5-2. Exemptions This chapter does not apply to the following:    6

§ 16-31-6.5-3. “Defibrillator” defined    6

§ 16-31-6.5-4. Duties of person or entity acquiring defibrillator    7

§ 16-31-6.5-5. Notice of acquisition and location of defibrillator    7

§ 16-31-6.5-6. Contact with ambulance service provider following use of defibrillator    7

§ 16-31-9-4. Civil UabiUty    7

§ 34-30-4-2. Volunteer or volunteer director; immunity    8

§ 34-30-4-3. Liability of organizations or entity    8

§ 34-30-12-1. Gratuitously rendered emergency care; immunity    8

§ 34-30-12-2. Gratuitously rendered cardiopulmonary resuscitation; immunity    9

§ 34-30-13-1. Voluntary health care; immunity for providing    10

§ 34-30-13-1.5. Immunity for providing medical direction concerning emergency medical services    10

§ 34-30-13-2. Liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct    10

§ 34-30-13.5-1. Immunity    11

§ 34-30-13.5-2. Liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct    12

§ 34-30-13.5-3. Immunity of facility    12

§ 34-30-13.5-4.    13

§ 34-30-18-1. Negligent operation of motor vehicle; vicarious civil liability    13

§ 34-30-18-2. Liability of volunteers    14

§ 34-30-18-3. Liability of contributors    14

§ 34-30-19-1. Intentional, wanton, or reckless behavior    14

§ 34-30-19-2. Negligent operation of motor vehicle; licensed individuals; vicarious civil liability    14

§ 34-30-19-3. Liability of volunteers    14

§ 34-30-19-4. Liability of governmental entities, employees, and agents    15

§ 34-30-29-1. Immunity from civil liability; forcible entry of a motor vehicle    15

§ 34-30-29-2. Conditions necessary for immunity from civil liability; forcible entry of a motor vehicle    15

§ 36-8-23-3. Good Samaritan statute applies to fast responders    16

Title 9. MOTOR VEHICLES Article 26. ACCIDENTS AND ACCIDENT REPORTS Chapter 1. DUTIES OF DRIVERS, OWNERS, AND PASSENGERS AND ACCIDENT REPORTS

§ 9-26-1-1.5. Duties of passenger of vehicle involved in accident resulting in injury or entrapment; violation

(a) If:

(1) the operator of a motor vehicle is physically incapable of determining the need for or rendering assistance to any injured or entrapped person as required under section 1.1(a)(3) of this chapter;

(2) there is another occupant in the motor vehicle at the time of the accident who is:

(A) at least:

(I) fifteen (15) years of age and holds a learner’s permit issued under IC 9-24-7-1 or a driver’s license issued under IC 9-24-11; or

(ii) eighteen (18) years of age; and

(B) capable of determining the need for and rendering reasonable assistance to injured or entrapped persons as provided in section 1.1(a)(3) of this chapter; and

(3) the other occupant in the motor vehicle knows that the operator of the motor vehicle is physically incapable of determining the need for or rendering assistance to any injured or entrapped person; the motor vehicle occupant referred to in subdivisions (2) and (3) shall immediately determine the need for and render reasonable assistance to each person injured or entrapped in the accident as provided in section 1.1(a)(3) of this chapter.

(b) If there is more than one (1) motor vehicle occupant to whom subsection (a) applies, it is a defense to a prosecution of one

(1) motor vehicle occupant under subsection

(a) that the defendant reasonably believed that another occupant of the motor vehicle determined the need for and rendered reasonable assistance as required under subsection (a).

(c) A person who knowingly or intentionally violates this section commits a Class C misdemeanor.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 9-26-1-1.5 History.

Amended by P.L. 188-2015, SEC. 100, eff. 7/1/2015.

Amended by P.L. 217-2014, SEC. 105, eff. 1/1/2015.

Amended by P.L. 125-2012, SEC. 293, eff. 7/1/2012.

As added by P.L. 126-2008, SEC.4.

Chapter 6. Immunity From Liability

Article 31. Emergency Medical Services

§ 16-31-6-1. Emergency medical technician services

(a)    A certified emergency medical responder, a certified emergency medical technician, a certified advanced emergency medical technician, or a licensed paramedic who provides emergency medical services to an emergency patient is not liable for an act or omission in providing those services unless the act or omission constitutes gross negligence or willful misconduct. If the certified emergency medical services provider is not liable for an act or omission, no other person incurs liability by reason of an agency relationship with the certified emergency medical services provider.

(b)    This section does not affect the liability of a driver of an ambulance for negligent operation of the ambulance.

(c)    Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b), a certified emergency medical technician, a certified advanced emergency medical technician, or a licensed paramedic who provides emergency medical services is not liable for transporting any person to an appropriate health care facility when the certified emergency medical technician, the certified advanced emergency medical technician, or the licensed paramedic makes a good faith judgment that the emergency patient or the emergency patient’s primary caregiver lacks the capacity to make an informed decision about the patient’s:

(1)    safety; or

(2)    need for medical attention; and the emergency patient is reasonably likely to suffer disability or death without the medical intervention available at the facility.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 16-31-6-1

History. Amended by P.L. 166-2021, SEC. 2, eff. 7/1/2021.

Amended by P.L. 113-2020, SEC. 2, eff. 7/1/2020.

Amended by P.L. 77-2012, SEC. 46, eff. 7/1/2012.

As added by P.L. 2-1993, SEC.14. Amended by P.L. 205-2003, SEC.33.

Note: This section is set out more than once. See also IC 16-31-6-1, effective until 7/1/2021.

§ 16-31-6-1. Emergency medical technician services

(a) A certified emergency medical responder, a certified emergency medical technician, a certified advanced emergency medical technician, or a licensed paramedic who provides emergency medical services to an emergency patient is not liable for an act or omission in providing those services unless the act or omission constitutes gross negligence or willful misconduct. If the certified emergency medical services provider is not liable for an act or omission, no other person incurs liability by reason of an agency relationship with the certified emergency medical services provider.

(b) This section does not affect the liability of a driver of an ambulance for negligent operation of the ambulance.

(c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b), a certified emergency medical technician, a certified advanced emergency medical technician, or a licensed paramedic who provides emergency medical services is not liable for transporting any person to an appropriate health care facility when the certified emergency medical technician, the certified advanced emergency medical technician, or the licensed paramedic makes a good faith judgment that the emergency patient or the emergency patient’s primary caregiver lacks the capacity to make an informed decision about the patient’s:

(1) safety; or

(2) need for medical attention; and the emergency patient is reasonably likely to suffer disability or death without the medical intervention available at the facility.

§ 16-31-6-2. Use of defibrillators

(a)    Except for an act of gross negligence or willful misconduct, a certified emergency medical responder who uses an automatic or semiautomatic defibrillator on an emergency patient according to the training procedures established by the commission under IC 16-31-2-9 is immune from civil liability for acts or omissions when rendering those services.

(b)    If the emergency medical responder is immune from civil liability for the emergency medical responder’s act or omission, a person who has only an agency relationship with the emergency medical responder is also immune from civil liability for the act or omission.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 16-31-6-2

History. Amended by P.L. 166-2021, SEC. 3, eff. 7/1/2021.

Amended by P.L. 77-2012, SEC. 47, eff. 7/1/2012.

As added by P.L. 2-1993, SEC.14.

Note: This section is set out more than once. See also IC 16-31-6-2, effective until 7/1/2021.

§ 16-31-6-2.5. Use of overdose intervention drugs; civil immunity

(a)    Except for an act of gross negligence or willful misconduct, an advanced emergency medical technician, a community corrections officer, an emergency medical responder, an emergency medical technician, a firefighter or volunteer firefighter, a law enforcement officer, a paramedic, or a probation officer who administers an overdose intervention drug according to standards established by:

(1)    the department or agency that oversees the individual’s employment in providing emergency medical services; or

(2)    the commission under IC 16-31-2-9 ;

to an individual suffering from an overdose is immune from civil liability for acts or omissions when administering the drug.

(b)    If:

(1)    an advanced emergency medical technician;

(2)    a community corrections officer;

(3)    an emergency medical responder;

(4)    an emergency medical technician;

(5)    a firefighter or volunteer firefighter;

(6)    a law enforcement officer;

(7)    a paramedic; or

(8)    a probation officer;

is immune from civil liability for the individual’s act or omission when administering an overdose intervention drug, a person who has only an agency relationship with the advanced emergency medical technician, community corrections officer, emergency medical responder, emergency medical technician, firefighter or volunteer firefighter, law enforcement officer, paramedic, or probation officer is also immune from civil liability for the act or omission.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 16-31-6-2.5

History. Amended by P.L. 4-2018, SEC. 3, eff. 7/1/2018.

Amended by P.L. 32-2015, SEC. 6, eff. 4/17/2015.

Added by P.L. 156-2014, SEC. 9, eff. 3/26/2014.

§ 16-31-6-3. Advanced life support; liability

An act or omission of a paramedic or an advanced emergency medical technician done or omitted in good faith while providing advanced life support to a patient or trauma victim does not impose liability upon the paramedic or advanced emergency medical technician, the authorizing physician, the hospital, or the officers, members of the staff, nurses, or other employees of the hospital or the local governmental unit if the advanced life support is provided:

(1)    in connection with an emergency;

(2)    in good faith; and

(3)    under the written or oral direction of a licensed physician; unless the act or omission was a result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 16-31-6-3

History. Amended by P.L. 166-2021, SEC. 4, eff. 7/1/2021.

Amended by P.L. 77-2012, SEC. 48, eff. 7/1/2012.

As added by P.L. 2-1993, SEC.14. Amended by P.L. 205-2003, SEC.34.

Note: This section is set out more than once. See also IC 16-31-6-3, effective until 7/1/2021.

§ 16-31-6-4. Life support provided in connection with disaster emergency

(a) This section does not apply to an act or omission that was a result of gross negligence or willful or intentional misconduct.

(b) An act or omission of a paramedic, an advanced emergency medical technician, an emergency medical technician, or a person with equivalent certification or licensure from another state that is performed or made while providing advanced life support or basic life support to a patient or trauma victim does not impose liability upon the paramedic, the advanced emergency medical technician, an emergency medical technician, the person with equivalent certification or licensure from another state, a hospital, a provider organization, a governmental entity, or an employee or other staff of a hospital, provider organization, or governmental entity if the advanced life support or basic life support is provided in good faith:

(1) in connection with a disaster emergency declared by the governor under IC 10-14-3-12 in response to an act that the governor in good faith believes to be an act of terrorism (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-329 ); and

(2) in accordance with the rules adopted by the Indiana emergency medical services commission or the disaster emergency declaration of the governor.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 16-31-6-4 History. Amended by P.L. 114-2012, SEC. 40, eff. 7/1/2012.

Amended by P.L. 77-2012, SEC. 49, eff. 7/1/2012. As added by P.L. 156-2001, SEC.3.

Amended by P.L. 2-2003, SEC.53; P.L. 205-2003, SEC.35; P.L. 97-2004, SEC.64.

§ 16-31-6.5-2. Exemptions This chapter does not apply to the following:

(1) A licensed physician.

(2) A hospital, an ambulatory outpatient surgical center, an abortion clinic, or a birthing center.

(3) A person providing health care in a hospital, an ambulatory outpatient surgical center, an abortion clinic, or a birthing center licensed under IC 16-21.

(4) A person or entity certified under IC 16-31-3.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 16-31-6.5-2

History. As added by P.L. 24-1998, SEC.1.

Amended by P.L. 96-2005, SEC.12.

§ 16-31-6.5-3. “Defibrillator” defined

As used in this chapter, “defibrillator” means an automatic external defibrillator.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 16-31-6.5-3

History. As added by P.L. 24-1998, SEC.1.

§ 16-31-6.5-4. Duties of person or entity acquiring defibrillator

A person or entity acquiring a defibrillator shall ensure that the defibrillator is maintained and tested according to the manufacturer’s operational guidelines.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 16-31-6.5-4

History. As added by P.L. 24-1998, SEC.1. Amended by P.L. 74-2006, SEC.4.

§ 16-31-6.5-5. Notice of acquisition and location of defibrillator

A person or entity in possession of a defibrillator shall notify the:

(1)    ambulance service provider that serves the area where the person or entity is located; or

(2)    emergency medical services commission;

of the acquisition and location of the defibrillator.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 16-31-6.5-5

History. As added by P.L. 24-1998, SEC.1.

§ 16-31-6.5-6. Contact with ambulance service provider following use of defibrillator

A person who uses a defibrillator is required to contact:

(1)    the ambulance service provider; or

(2)    a fire department that provides ambulance service;

for the area as soon as practicable following the use of the defibrillator.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 16-31-6.5-6

History. As added by P.L. 24-1998, SEC.1.

Article 31. EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES

Chapter 9. EMERGENCY CHOKE SAVING METHODS

§ 16-31-9-4. Civil UabiUty

(a)    A person is not obligated to remove, assist in removing, or attempt to remove food from another person’s throat. A person who in good faith gratuitously removes, assists in removing, or attempts to remove food from another person’s throat in an emergency occurring at a food service establishment is not liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission by the person providing the emergency assistance unless the act or omission amounts to willful or wanton misconduct.

(b)    The owner or operator of a food service establishment is not liable for any civil damages that result from an act or omission by a person rendering or attempting the emergency assistance if there is an approved placard posted in the food service establishment.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 16-31-9-4

History. As added by P.L. 2-1993, SEC.14.

Chapter 4. CHARITIES: IMMUNITY OF CERTAIN VOLUNTEER DIRECTORS

§ 34-30-4-2. Volunteer or volunteer director; immunity

(a)    This section does not apply to a health care provider (as defined in IC 34-18-2-14).

(b)    An individual who:

(1)    serves as a volunteer or volunteer director of:

(A)    a nonprofit corporation operating under IC 12-29-3-6;

(B)    an agency providing services under IC 12-12-3; or

(C)    a nonprofit organization that is exempt from federal taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code; and

(2)    exercises reasonable care in the performance of the individual’s duties as a volunteer or a volunteer director of an entity described in subdivision (1);

is immune from civil liability arising out of the performance of those duties.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-4-2

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26. Amended by P.L. 38-2005, SEC.1.

§ 34-30-4-3. Liability of organizations or entity

This chapter does not affect the civil liability of the entity a qualified director serves.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-4-3

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26.

Chapter 12. HEALTH CARE: IMMUNITY OF PERSONS RENDERING EMERGENCY FIRST AID

§ 34-30-12-1. Gratuitously rendered emergency care; immunity

(a) This section does not apply to services rendered by a health care provider (as defined in IC 34-18-2-14 or IC 27-12-2-14 before its repeal) to a patient in a health care facility (as defined in IC 27-8-10-1).

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), a person who comes upon the scene of an emergency or accident, complies with IC 9-26-1-1.5, or is summoned to the scene of an emergency or accident and, in good faith, gratuitously renders emergency care at the scene of the emergency or accident is immune from civil liability for any personal injury that results from:

(1) any act or omission by the person in rendering the emergency care; or

(2) any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person;

except for acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

(c) This subsection applies to a person to whom IC 16-31-6.5 applies. A person who gratuitously renders emergency care involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator is immune from liability for any act or omission not amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct if the person fulfills the requirements set forth in IC 16-31-6.5.

(d) This subsection applies to an individual, business, or organization to which IC 16-31-6.5 applies. An individual, business, or organization that allows a person who is an expected user to use an automatic external defibrillator of the individual, business, or organization to in good faith gratuitously render emergency care is immune from civil liability for any damages resulting from an act or omission not amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct by the user or for acquiring or providing the automatic external defibrillator to the user for the purpose of rendering the emergency care if the individual, business, or organization and the user fulfill the requirements set forth in IC 16-31-6.5.

(e) A licensed physician who gives medical direction in the use of a defibrillator or a national or state approved defibrillator instructor of a person who gratuitously renders emergency care involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator is immune from civil liability for any act or omission of the licensed physician or instructor if the act or omission of the licensed physician or instructor:

(1) involves the training for or use of an automatic external defibrillator; and

(2) does not amount to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-12-1

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26. Amended by P.L. 1-1999, SEC.73; P.L. 84-2003, SEC.1 and P.L. 91-2003, SEC.1; P.L. 74-2006, SEC.5; P.L. 126-2008, SEC.11.

Chapter 12. HEALTH CARE: IMMUNITY OF PERSONS RENDERING EMERGENCY FIRST AID

§ 34-30-12-2. Gratuitously rendered cardiopulmonary resuscitation; immunity

(a)    This section applies to a person who has successfully completed a course of training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation according to the standards recommended by the Division of Medical Sciences, National Academy of Sciences – National Research Council.

(b)    This section does not apply to acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

(c)    An act or omission of the person while attempting to administer cardiopulmonary resuscitation, without pecuniary charge, to any person who is an apparent victim of acute cardiopulmonary insufficiency shall not impose any liability upon the person attempting the resuscitation.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-12-2

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26.

Chapter 13. HEALTH CARE: IMMUNITY OF PERSONS PROVIDING VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE

§ 34-30-13-1. Voluntary health care; immunity for providing

Except as provided in section 2 of this chapter, a person who meets the following criteria is immune from civil liability resulting from any act or omission relating to the provision of health care services:

(1)    Has licensure to provide health care services under Indiana law.

(2)    Voluntarily provides without compensation health care services under IC 36-1-14.2 within the scope of the person’s license to another person.

(3)    Provides the health care services at any medical clinic or health care facility that provides health care services without charge and that:

(A)    purchases professional liability insurance under IC 36-1-14.2; or

(B)    is covered under 42 U.S.C. 233.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-13-1

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26. Amended by P.L. 116-2005, SEC.3.

§ 34-30-13-1.5. Immunity for providing medical direction concerning emergency medical services

Except as provided in section 2 of this chapter, a physician licensed under IC 25-22.5 is immune from civil liability resulting from an act or omission related to the provision of medical direction concerning emergency medical services (as defined in IC 16-18-2-110) within the scope of the physician’s license, if the physician provides medical direction concerning emergency medical services:

(1)    to a person who is certified under IC 16-31 to provide the emergency medical services; and

(2)    without compensation.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-13-1.5

History. As added by P.L. 101-2006, SEC.37.

§ 34-30-13-2. Liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct

A person who provides health care services as described in this chapter is not immune from civil liability if the damages resulting from the provision of the health care services resulted from the person’s gross negligence or willful misconduct.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-13-2

History. Amended by P.L. 161-2015, SEC. 5, eff. 7/1/2015.

As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26.

§ 34-30-13.5-1. Immunity

(a)    This subsection does not apply during a period of a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19, if the state of disaster emergency was declared after February 29, 2020, and before April 1, 2022. Except as provided in section 2 of this chapter, a person who meets the following criteria may not be held civilly liable for an act or omission relating to the provision of health care services in response to an event that is declared a disaster emergency under IC 10-14-3-12, regardless of whether the provision of health care services occurred before or after the declaration of a disaster emergency:

(1)    Has a license to provide health care services under Indiana law or the law of another state.

(2)    Provides a health care service:

(A)    within the scope of the person’s license to another person; and

(B)    at a location where health care services are provided during an event that is declared as a disaster.

(b)    This subsection applies during a period of a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19, if the state of disaster emergency was declared after February 29, 2020, and before April 1, 2022. Except as provided in section 2 of this chapter, the following apply to the provision of health care services arising from a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19:

(1)    A person providing health care services or emergency medical services, whether in person or through telemedicine services permitted by IC 25-1-9.5, at a facility or other location where health care services or emergency medical services are provided may not be held civilly liable for an act or omission relating to the provision or delay of health care services or emergency medical services arising from a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19.

(2)    An employer, including an agency that provides or arranges health care services or emergency medical services, of a person described in subdivision (1) may not be held civilly liable for an act or omission relating to the provision or delay of health care services or emergency medical services arising from a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19.

(c)    This subsection applies during a period of a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19, if the state of disaster emergency was declared after February 29, 2020, and before April 1, 2022. The following do not constitute gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, fraud, or intentional misrepresentation under this chapter if arising from a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19:

(1)    Providing services without required personal protective equipment caused by:

(A)    a shortage; or

(B)    an inability to timely acquire personal protective equipment;

in response to or arising from a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19.

(2)    Providing services without access to adequate or reliable testing for COVID-19, even if the COVID-19 testing that was used received emergency use authorization from the federal Food and Drug Administration.

(3)    Using equipment, medicine, or supplies to treat or help prevent the transmission of COVID-19 in a manner that is not approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration.

(4)    Providing services that are outside of an individual’s expertise or specialty but within the individual’s scope of practice under IC 16 or IC 25.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-13.5-1

History. Amended by P.L. 166-2021, SEC. 16, eff. 3/1/2020.

As added by P.L. 138-2006, SEC.13.

§ 34-30-13.5-2. Liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct

A person described in this chapter is not immune from civil liability if the damages resulting from the act or omission relating to the provision or delay of the health care services resulted from the person’s gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, fraud, or intentional misrepresentation.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-13.5-2

History. Amended by P.L. 166-2021, SEC. 17, eff. 3/1/2020.

As added by P.L. 138-2006, SEC.13.

§ 34-30-13.5-3. Immunity of facility

(a)    This subsection does not apply during a period of a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19, if the state of disaster emergency was declared after February 29, 2020, and before April 1, 2022. A facility or other location that is providing health care services in response to an event that is declared as a disaster emergency may not be held civilly liable for an act or omission relating to the provision of health care services in response to that event by a health professional licensed to provide the health care service under Indiana law or the law of another state if the person is acting during an event that is declared as a disaster emergency, regardless of whether the provision of health care services occurred before or after the declaration of a disaster emergency.

(b)    This subsection applies during a period of a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19, if the state of disaster emergency was declared after February 29, 2020, and before April 1, 2022. A facility or other location, including a location used to provide emergency medical services or used to provide telemedicine services permitted under IC 25-1-9.5, that provides health care services or emergency medical services in response to or arising from a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19 may not be held civilly liable for an act or omission relating to the provision of health care services with respect to which an individual providing health care services, a provider, an agent, or an employee are not liable under this chapter.

(c)    This subsection applies during a period of a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19, if the state of disaster emergency was declared after February 29, 2020, and before April 1, 2022. An individual or an entity that:

(1)    has a financial interest in;

(2)    serves on the board of directors of; or

(3)    provides management or administrative services for;

a facility or other location that provides health care services or emergency medical services in response to or arising from a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19 may not be held civilly liable for an act or omission described in subsection (b).

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-13.5-3

History. Amended by P.L. 166-2021, SEC. 18, eff. 3/1/2020.

As added by P.L. 138-2006, SEC.13.

§ 34-30-13.5-4.

This section applies during a period of a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19, if the state of disaster emergency was declared after February 29, 2020, and before April 1, 2022. If a claim described in this chapter is:

(1)    a claim for injury or death resulting from medical malpractice; and

(2)    not barred by the immunity provided under this chapter; the claimant is required to comply with all of the provisions of IC 34-18 (medical malpractice act).

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-13.5-4

History. Added by P.L. 166-2021, SEC. 19, eff. 3/1/2020.

Chapter 18. Sports: Immunity of Persons Involved in the Special Olympics

§ 34-30-18-1. Negligent operation of motor vehicle; vicarious civil liability

(a)    This chapter does not grant immunity from civil damages that are proximately caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.

(b)    This chapter does not affect the vicarious civil liability of the entity that the individual serves.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-18-1

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26.

§ 34-30-18-2. Liability of volunteers

An individual who, without compensation, contributes personal time to the Special Olympics is not liable for civil damages as a result of a negligent act or omission of the individual arising from that contribution.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-18-2

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26.

§ 34-30-18-3. Liability of contributors

A person who contributes only money to the Special Olympics is not liable for civil damages as a consequence of a negligent act or omission of an individual described in section 2 of this chapter solely because of that contribution.

Cite
as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-18-3

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26.

§ 34-30-19-1. Intentional, wanton, or reckless behavior

This chapter does not grant immunity from civil liability to a person who engaged in intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless behavior.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-19-1

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26.

§ 34-30-19-2. Negligent operation of motor vehicle; licensed individuals; vicarious civil liability

(a)    This chapter does not grant immunity from civil damages that are proximately caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.

(b)    This chapter does not apply to an individual who is registered, certified, or licensed under IC 25.

(c)    This chapter does not affect the vicarious civil liability of the entity the individual serves.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-19-2

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26.

§ 34-30-19-3. Liability of volunteers

A volunteer is not liable for civil damages that are proximately caused by a negligent act or omission in the personal services provided by:

(1)    the volunteer; or

(2)    another person selected, trained, supervised, or otherwise under the control of the volunteer;    in the course of a sports or leisure activity.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-19-3

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26.

§ 34-30-19-4. Liability of governmental entities, employees, and agents

A governmental entity and the employees and agents of a governmental entity are not liable for civil damages that are proximately caused by:

(1)    the negligent selection, training, or supervision of a volunteer providing personal services in the course of a sports or leisure activity; or

(2)    a negligent act or omission in the personal services provided by:

(A)    the volunteer; or

(B)    another person selected, trained, supervised, or otherwise under the control of the volunteer;

in the course of a sports or leisure activity.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-19-4

History. As added by P.L. 1-1998, SEC.26.

§ 34-30-29-1. Immunity from civil liability; forcible entry of a motor vehicle

(a)    A person whose conduct conforms to subsection (b) is immune from civil liability for any damage resulting from the forcible entry of a motor vehicle for the purpose of removing a child from the motor vehicle.

(b)    Subsection (a) applies to a person if the person:

(1)    determines that a motor vehicle is locked or that there is no other reasonable method for a child to exit the motor vehicle;

(2)    has a good faith belief that forcible entry into the motor vehicle is necessary because a child is in imminent danger of suffering harm if not immediately removed and, based on the circumstances known to the person at the time, the belief is reasonable;

(3)    contacts a local law enforcement agency, fire department, or 911 dispatcher before forcibly entering the motor vehicle, if practicable, or as soon as possible thereafter;

(4)    uses no more force than necessary to enter the motor vehicle and remove the child; and

(5)    remains with the child in a safe location near the entered motor vehicle until a law enforcement officer arrives.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-29-1

History. Added by P.L. 132-2015, SEC. 3, eff. 7/1/2015.

§ 34-30-29-2. Conditions necessary for immunity from civil liability; forcible entry of a motor vehicle

Section 1 of this chapter does not grant immunity from civil liability to a person who:

(1)    renders aid to a child beyond what is authorized in section 1 of this chapter; or

(2)    exercises gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 34-30-29-2

Article 8. PUBLIC SAFETY

Chapter 23. COMMUNITY FAST RESPONDERS

§ 36-8-23-3. Good Samaritan statute applies to fast responders

IC 34-30-12-1 (the good Samaritan statute) applies to a community fast responder.

Cite as (Casemaker) IC 36-8-23-3

History. Added by P.L. 70-2012, SEC. 2, eff. 7/1/2012.


New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students

“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry

Denver based James H. Moss, JD, an attorney who specializes in the legal issues of outdoor recreation and adventure travel companies, guides, outfitters, and manufacturers, has written a comprehensive legal guidebook titled, “Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law”. Sagamore Publishing, a well-known Illinois-based educational publisher, distributes the book.

Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.

There was nothing out there that looked at case law and applied it to legal problems in outdoor recreation,” Moss explained. “The goal of this book is to provide sound advice based on past law and experience.”

The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

While written as a college-level textbook, the guide also serves as a legal primer for executives, managers, and business owners in the field of outdoor recreation. It discusses how to tackle, prevent, and overcome legal issues in all areas of the industry.

The book is organized into 14 chapters that are easily accessed as standalone topics, or read through comprehensively. Specific topics include rental programs, statues that affect outdoor recreation, skiing and ski areas, and defenses to claims. Mr. Moss also incorporated listings of legal definitions, cases, and statutes, making the book easy for laypeople to understand.

PURCHASE

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Cases

Introduction

Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview

Risk

    Risk

        Perception versus Actual Risk

        Risk v. Reward

        Risk Evaluation

    Risk Management Strategies

        Humans & Risk

        Risk = Accidents

        Accidents may/may not lead to litigation

    How Do You Deal with Risk?

    How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?

    Negative Feelings against the Business

Risk, Accidents & Litigation

        No Real Acceptance of the Risk

        No Money to Pay Injury Bills

        No Health Insurance

        Insurance Company Subrogation

        Negative Feelings

Litigation

    Dealing with Different People

    Dealing with Victims

        Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit

        Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits

    Emergency Medical Services

    Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation

        Employees

        How Do You Handle A Victim?

        Dealing with Different People

        Dealing with Victims

Legal System in the United States

    Courts

        State Court System

        Federal Court System

        Other Court Systems

    Laws

    Statutes

    Parties to a Lawsuit

    Attorneys

    Trials

Law

    Torts

        Negligence

            Duty

            Breach of the Duty

            Injury

            Proximate Causation

            Damages

        Determination of Duty Owed

        Duty of an Outfitter

        Duty of a Guide

        Duty of Livery Owner

        Duty of Rental Agent

        Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader

        In Loco Parentis

    Intentional Torts

    Gross Negligence

    Willful & Wanton Negligence

    Intentional Negligence

    Negligence Per Se

    Strict Liability

    Attractive Nuisance

    Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence

    Product Liability

    Contracts

        Breach of Contract

        Breach of Warranty

        Express Warranty

        Implied Warranty

            Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose

            Warranty of Merchantability

            Warranty of Statute

    Detrimental Reliance

    Unjust Enrichment

    Liquor Liability

    Food Service Liability

    Damages

        Compensatory Damages

        Special Damages

        Punitive Damages

Statutory Defenses

    Skier Safety Acts

    Whitewater Guides & Outfitters

    Equine Liability Acts

 

Legal Defenses

    Assumption of Risk

        Express Assumption of Risk

        Implied Assumption of Risk

        Primary Assumption of Risk

        Secondary Assumption of Risk

    Contributory Negligence

    Assumption of Risk & Minors

    Inherent Dangers

    Assumption of Risk Documents.

        Assumption of Risk as a Defense.

        Statutory Assumption of Risk

        Express Assumption of Risk

    Contributory Negligence

    Joint and Several Liability

Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue

    Why do you need them

    Exculpatory Agreements

        Releases

        Waivers

        Covenants Not to sue

    Who should be covered

    What should be included

        Negligence Clause

        Jurisdiction & Venue Clause

        Assumption of Risk

        Other Clauses

        Indemnification

            Hold Harmless Agreement

        Liquidated Damages

        Previous Experience

        Misc

            Photography release

            Video Disclaimer

            Drug and/or Alcohol clause

            Medical Transportation & Release

                HIPAA

        Problem Areas

    What the Courts do not want to see

Statute of Limitations

        Minors

        Adults

Defenses Myths

    Agreements to Participate

    Parental Consent Agreements

    Informed Consent Agreements

    Certification

    Accreditation

    Standards, Guidelines & Protocols

    License

Specific Occupational Risks

    Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators

        College & University Issues

    Animal Operations, Packers

        Equine Activities

    Canoe Livery Operations

        Tube rentals

Downhill Skiing

Ski Rental Programs

Indoor Climbing Walls

Instructional Programs

Mountaineering

Retail Rental Programs

Rock Climbing

Tubing Hills

Whitewater Rafting

Risk Management Plan

    Introduction for Risk Management Plans

    What Is A Risk Management Plan?

    What should be in a Risk Management Plan

    Risk Management Plan Template

    Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan

    Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters

    Building Fire & Evacuation

Dealing with an Emergency

 

Insurance

    Theory of Insurance

    Insurance Companies

    Deductibles

    Self-Insured Retention

    Personal v. Commercial Policies

    Types of Policies

        Automobile

            Comprehension

            Collision

            Bodily Injury

            Property Damage

            Uninsured Motorist

            Personal Injury Protection

            Non-Owned Automobile

            Hired Car

    Fire Policy

        Coverage

        Liability

        Named Peril v. All Risk

    Commercial Policies

    Underwriting

    Exclusions

    Special Endorsements

    Rescue Reimbursement

    Policy Procedures

    Coverage’s

    Agents

    Brokers

        General Agents

        Captive Agents

    Types of Policies

        Claims Made

        Occurrence

    Claims

    Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements

Bibliography

Index

The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

 


What is a Risk Management Plan and What do You Need in Yours?

Everyone has told you, you need a risk management plan. A plan to follow if you have a crisis. You‘ve seen several and they look burdensome and difficult to write. Need help writing a risk management plan? Need to know what should be in your risk management plan? Need Help?

This book can help you understand and write your plan. This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you plan is a workable plan, not one that will create liability for you.

 

                                             Table of Contents

Chapter 1    Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2    U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3    Risk 25

Chapter 4    Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5    Law 57

Chapter 6    Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7    PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8    Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9    Minors

Chapter 10    Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11    Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12    Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13    Rental Programs

Chapter 14    Insurance

               $99.00 plus shipping


Need a Handy Reference Guide to Understand your Insurance Policy?

This book should be on every outfitter and guide’s desk. It will answer your questions, help you sleep at night, help you answer your guests’ questions and allow you to run your business with less worry.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1    Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2    U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3    Risk 25

Chapter 4    Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5    Law 57

Chapter 6    Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7    PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8    Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9    Minors

Chapter 10    Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11    Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12    Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13    Rental Programs

Chapter 14    Insurance

             $99.00 plus shipping


New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students

“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry

Denver based James H. Moss, JD, an attorney who specializes in the legal issues of outdoor recreation and adventure travel companies, guides, outfitters, and manufacturers, has written a comprehensive legal guidebook titled, “Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law”. Sagamore Publishing, a well-known Illinois-based educational publisher, distributes the book.

Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.

There was nothing out there that looked at case law and applied it to legal problems in outdoor recreation,” Moss explained. “The goal of this book is to provide sound advice based on past law and experience.”

The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

While written as a college-level textbook, the guide also serves as a legal primer for executives, managers, and business owners in the field of outdoor recreation. It discusses how to tackle, prevent, and overcome legal issues in all areas of the industry.

The book is organized into 14 chapters that are easily accessed as standalone topics, or read through comprehensively. Specific topics include rental programs, statues that affect outdoor recreation, skiing and ski areas, and defenses to claims. Mr. Moss also incorporated listings of legal definitions, cases, and statutes, making the book easy for laypeople to understand.

PURCHASE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Cases

Introduction

Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview

Risk

    Risk

        Perception versus Actual Risk

        Risk v. Reward

        Risk Evaluation

    Risk Management Strategies

        Humans & Risk

        Risk = Accidents

        Accidents may/may not lead to litigation

    How Do You Deal with Risk?

    How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?

    Negative Feelings against the Business

Risk, Accidents & Litigation

        No Real Acceptance of the Risk

        No Money to Pay Injury Bills

        No Health Insurance

        Insurance Company Subrogation

        Negative Feelings

Litigation

    Dealing with Different People

    Dealing with Victims

        Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit

        Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits

    Emergency Medical Services

    Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation

        Employees

        How Do You Handle A Victim?

        Dealing with Different People

        Dealing with Victims

Legal System in the United States

    Courts

        State Court System

        Federal Court System

        Other Court Systems

    Laws

    Statutes

    Parties to a Lawsuit

    Attorneys

    Trials

Law

    Torts

        Negligence

            Duty

            Breach of the Duty

            Injury

            Proximate Causation

            Damages

        Determination of Duty Owed

        Duty of an Outfitter

        Duty of a Guide

        Duty of Livery Owner

        Duty of Rental Agent

        Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader

        In Loco Parentis

    Intentional Torts

    Gross Negligence

    Willful & Wanton Negligence

    Intentional Negligence

    Negligence Per Se

    Strict Liability

    Attractive Nuisance

    Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence

    Product Liability

    Contracts

        Breach of Contract

        Breach of Warranty

        Express Warranty

        Implied Warranty

            Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose

            Warranty of Merchantability

            Warranty of Statute

    Detrimental Reliance

    Unjust Enrichment

    Liquor Liability

    Food Service Liability

    Damages

        Compensatory Damages

        Special Damages

        Punitive Damages

Statutory Defenses

    Skier Safety Acts

    Whitewater Guides & Outfitters

    Equine Liability Acts

 

Legal Defenses

    Assumption of Risk

        Express Assumption of Risk

        Implied Assumption of Risk

        Primary Assumption of Risk

        Secondary Assumption of Risk

    Contributory Negligence

    Assumption of Risk & Minors

    Inherent Dangers

    Assumption of Risk Documents.

        Assumption of Risk as a Defense.

        Statutory Assumption of Risk

        Express Assumption of Risk

    Contributory Negligence

    Joint and Several Liability

Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue

    Why do you need them

    Exculpatory Agreements

        Releases

        Waivers

        Covenants Not to sue

    Who should be covered

    What should be included

        Negligence Clause

        Jurisdiction & Venue Clause

        Assumption of Risk

        Other Clauses

        Indemnification

            Hold Harmless Agreement

        Liquidated Damages

        Previous Experience

        Misc

            Photography release

            Video Disclaimer

            Drug and/or Alcohol clause

            Medical Transportation & Release

                HIPAA

        Problem Areas

    What the Courts do not want to see

Statute of Limitations

        Minors

        Adults

Defenses Myths

    Agreements to Participate

    Parental Consent Agreements

    Informed Consent Agreements

    Certification

    Accreditation

    Standards, Guidelines & Protocols

    License

Specific Occupational Risks

    Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators

        College & University Issues

    Animal Operations, Packers

        Equine Activities

    Canoe Livery Operations

        Tube rentals

Downhill Skiing

Ski Rental Programs

Indoor Climbing Walls

Instructional Programs

Mountaineering

Retail Rental Programs

Rock Climbing

Tubing Hills

Whitewater Rafting

Risk Management Plan

    Introduction for Risk Management Plans

    What Is A Risk Management Plan?

    What should be in a Risk Management Plan

    Risk Management Plan Template

    Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan

    Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters

    Building Fire & Evacuation

Dealing with an Emergency

 

Insurance

    Theory of Insurance

    Insurance Companies

    Deductibles

    Self-Insured Retention

    Personal v. Commercial Policies

    Types of Policies

        Automobile

            Comprehension

            Collision

            Bodily Injury

            Property Damage

            Uninsured Motorist

            Personal Injury Protection

            Non-Owned Automobile

            Hired Car

    Fire Policy

        Coverage

        Liability

        Named Peril v. All Risk

    Commercial Policies

    Underwriting

    Exclusions

    Special Endorsements

    Rescue Reimbursement

    Policy Procedures

    Coverage’s

    Agents

    Brokers

        General Agents

        Captive Agents

    Types of Policies

        Claims Made

        Occurrence

    Claims

    Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements

Bibliography

Index

The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

 


New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students

“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry

Denver based James H. Moss, JD, an attorney who specializes in the legal issues of outdoor recreation and adventure travel companies, guides, outfitters, and manufacturers, has written a comprehensive legal guidebook titled, “Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law”. Sagamore Publishing, a well-known Illinois-based educational publisher, distributes the book.

Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.

There was nothing out there that looked at case law and applied it to legal problems in outdoor recreation,” Moss explained. “The goal of this book is to provide sound advice based on past law and experience.”

The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

While written as a college-level textbook, the guide also serves as a legal primer for executives, managers, and business owners in the field of outdoor recreation. It discusses how to tackle, prevent, and overcome legal issues in all areas of the industry.

The book is organized into 14 chapters that are easily accessed as standalone topics, or read through comprehensively. Specific topics include rental programs, statues that affect outdoor recreation, skiing and ski areas, and defenses to claims. Mr. Moss also incorporated listings of legal definitions, cases, and statutes, making the book easy for laypeople to understand.

PURCHASE

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Cases

Introduction

Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview

Risk

    Risk

        Perception versus Actual Risk

        Risk v. Reward

        Risk Evaluation

    Risk Management Strategies

        Humans & Risk

        Risk = Accidents

        Accidents may/may not lead to litigation

    How Do You Deal with Risk?

    How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?

    Negative Feelings against the Business

Risk, Accidents & Litigation

        No Real Acceptance of the Risk

        No Money to Pay Injury Bills

        No Health Insurance

        Insurance Company Subrogation

        Negative Feelings

Litigation

    Dealing with Different People

    Dealing with Victims

        Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit

        Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits

    Emergency Medical Services

    Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation

        Employees

        How Do You Handle A Victim?

        Dealing with Different People

        Dealing with Victims

Legal System in the United States

    Courts

        State Court System

        Federal Court System

        Other Court Systems

    Laws

    Statutes

    Parties to a Lawsuit

    Attorneys

    Trials

Law

    Torts

        Negligence

            Duty

            Breach of the Duty

            Injury

            Proximate Causation

            Damages

        Determination of Duty Owed

        Duty of an Outfitter

        Duty of a Guide

        Duty of Livery Owner

        Duty of Rental Agent

        Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader

        In Loco Parentis

    Intentional Torts

    Gross Negligence

    Willful & Wanton Negligence

    Intentional Negligence

    Negligence Per Se

    Strict Liability

    Attractive Nuisance

    Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence

    Product Liability

    Contracts

        Breach of Contract

        Breach of Warranty

        Express Warranty

        Implied Warranty

            Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose

            Warranty of Merchantability

            Warranty of Statute

    Detrimental Reliance

    Unjust Enrichment

    Liquor Liability

    Food Service Liability

    Damages

        Compensatory Damages

        Special Damages

        Punitive Damages

Statutory Defenses

    Skier Safety Acts

    Whitewater Guides & Outfitters

    Equine Liability Acts

 

Legal Defenses

    Assumption of Risk

        Express Assumption of Risk

        Implied Assumption of Risk

        Primary Assumption of Risk

        Secondary Assumption of Risk

    Contributory Negligence

    Assumption of Risk & Minors

    Inherent Dangers

    Assumption of Risk Documents.

        Assumption of Risk as a Defense.

        Statutory Assumption of Risk

        Express Assumption of Risk

    Contributory Negligence

    Joint and Several Liability

Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue

    Why do you need them

    Exculpatory Agreements

        Releases

        Waivers

        Covenants Not to sue

    Who should be covered

    What should be included

        Negligence Clause

        Jurisdiction & Venue Clause

        Assumption of Risk

        Other Clauses

        Indemnification

            Hold Harmless Agreement

        Liquidated Damages

        Previous Experience

        Misc

            Photography release

            Video Disclaimer

            Drug and/or Alcohol clause

            Medical Transportation & Release

                HIPAA

        Problem Areas

    What the Courts do not want to see

Statute of Limitations

        Minors

        Adults

Defenses Myths

    Agreements to Participate

    Parental Consent Agreements

    Informed Consent Agreements

    Certification

    Accreditation

    Standards, Guidelines & Protocols

    License

Specific Occupational Risks

    Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators

        College & University Issues

    Animal Operations, Packers

        Equine Activities

    Canoe Livery Operations

        Tube rentals

Downhill Skiing

Ski Rental Programs

Indoor Climbing Walls

Instructional Programs

Mountaineering

Retail Rental Programs

Rock Climbing

Tubing Hills

Whitewater Rafting

Risk Management Plan

    Introduction for Risk Management Plans

    What Is A Risk Management Plan?

    What should be in a Risk Management Plan

    Risk Management Plan Template

    Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan

    Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters

    Building Fire & Evacuation

Dealing with an Emergency

 

Insurance

    Theory of Insurance

    Insurance Companies

    Deductibles

    Self-Insured Retention

    Personal v. Commercial Policies

    Types of Policies

        Automobile

            Comprehension

            Collision

            Bodily Injury

            Property Damage

            Uninsured Motorist

            Personal Injury Protection

            Non-Owned Automobile

            Hired Car

    Fire Policy

        Coverage

        Liability

        Named Peril v. All Risk

    Commercial Policies

    Underwriting

    Exclusions

    Special Endorsements

    Rescue Reimbursement

    Policy Procedures

    Coverage’s

    Agents

    Brokers

        General Agents

        Captive Agents

    Types of Policies

        Claims Made

        Occurrence

    Claims

    Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements

Bibliography

Index

The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

 


What is a Risk Management Plan and What do You Need in Yours?

Everyone has told you, you need a risk management plan. A plan to follow if you have a crisis. You‘ve seen several and they look burdensome and difficult to write. Need help writing a risk management plan? Need to know what should be in your risk management plan? Need Help?

This book can help you understand and write your plan. This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you plan is a workable plan, not one that will create liability for you.

 

                                             Table of Contents

Chapter 1    Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2    U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3    Risk 25

Chapter 4    Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5    Law 57

Chapter 6    Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7    PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8    Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9    Minors

Chapter 10    Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11    Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12    Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13    Rental Programs

Chapter 14    Insurance

               $99.00 plus shipping


Need a Handy Reference Guide to Understand your Insurance Policy?

This book should be on every outfitter and guide’s desk. It will answer your questions, help you sleep at night, help you answer your guests’ questions and allow you to run your business with less worry.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1    Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2    U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3    Risk 25

Chapter 4    Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5    Law 57

Chapter 6    Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7    PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8    Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9    Minors

Chapter 10    Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11    Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12    Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13    Rental Programs

Chapter 14    Insurance

             $99.00 plus shipping


New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students

“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry

Denver based James H. Moss, JD, an attorney who specializes in the legal issues of outdoor recreation and adventure travel companies, guides, outfitters, and manufacturers, has written a comprehensive legal guidebook titled, “Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law”. Sagamore Publishing, a well-known Illinois-based educational publisher, distributes the book.

Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.

There was nothing out there that looked at case law and applied it to legal problems in outdoor recreation,” Moss explained. “The goal of this book is to provide sound advice based on past law and experience.”

The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.

While written as a college-level textbook, the guide also serves as a legal primer for executives, managers, and business owners in the field of outdoor recreation. It discusses how to tackle, prevent, and overcome legal issues in all areas of the industry.

The book is organized into 14 chapters that are easily accessed as standalone topics, or read through comprehensively. Specific topics include rental programs, statues that affect outdoor recreation, skiing and ski areas, and defenses to claims. Mr. Moss also incorporated listings of legal definitions, cases, and statutes, making the book easy for laypeople to understand.

PURCHASE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Cases

Introduction

Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview

Risk

    Risk

        Perception versus Actual Risk

        Risk v. Reward

        Risk Evaluation

    Risk Management Strategies

        Humans & Risk

        Risk = Accidents

        Accidents may/may not lead to litigation

    How Do You Deal with Risk?

    How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?

    Negative Feelings against the Business

Risk, Accidents & Litigation

        No Real Acceptance of the Risk

        No Money to Pay Injury Bills

        No Health Insurance

        Insurance Company Subrogation

        Negative Feelings

Litigation

    Dealing with Different People

    Dealing with Victims

        Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit

        Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits

    Emergency Medical Services

    Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation

        Employees

        How Do You Handle A Victim?

        Dealing with Different People

        Dealing with Victims

Legal System in the United States

    Courts

        State Court System

        Federal Court System

        Other Court Systems

    Laws

    Statutes

    Parties to a Lawsuit

    Attorneys

    Trials

Law

    Torts

        Negligence

            Duty

            Breach of the Duty

            Injury

            Proximate Causation

            Damages

        Determination of Duty Owed

        Duty of an Outfitter

        Duty of a Guide

        Duty of Livery Owner

        Duty of Rental Agent

        Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader

        In Loco Parentis

    Intentional Torts

    Gross Negligence

    Willful & Wanton Negligence

    Intentional Negligence

    Negligence Per Se

    Strict Liability

    Attractive Nuisance

    Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence

    Product Liability

    Contracts

        Breach of Contract

        Breach of Warranty

        Express Warranty

        Implied Warranty

            Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose

            Warranty of Merchantability

            Warranty of Statute

    Detrimental Reliance

    Unjust Enrichment

    Liquor Liability

    Food Service Liability

    Damages

        Compensatory Damages

        Special Damages

        Punitive Damages

Statutory Defenses

    Skier Safety Acts

    Whitewater Guides & Outfitters

    Equine Liability Acts

 

Legal Defenses

    Assumption of Risk

        Express Assumption of Risk

        Implied Assumption of Risk

        Primary Assumption of Risk

        Secondary Assumption of Risk

    Contributory Negligence

    Assumption of Risk & Minors

    Inherent Dangers

    Assumption of Risk Documents.

        Assumption of Risk as a Defense.

        Statutory Assumption of Risk

        Express Assumption of Risk

    Contributory Negligence

    Joint and Several Liability

Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue

    Why do you need them

    Exculpatory Agreements

        Releases

        Waivers

        Covenants Not to sue

    Who should be covered

    What should be included

        Negligence Clause

        Jurisdiction & Venue Clause

        Assumption of Risk

        Other Clauses

        Indemnification

            Hold Harmless Agreement

        Liquidated Damages

        Previous Experience

        Misc

            Photography release

            Video Disclaimer

            Drug and/or Alcohol clause

            Medical Transportation & Release

                HIPAA

        Problem Areas

    What the Courts do not want to see

Statute of Limitations

        Minors

        Adults

Defenses Myths

    Agreements to Participate

    Parental Consent Agreements

    Informed Consent Agreements

    Certification

    Accreditation

    Standards, Guidelines & Protocols

    License

Specific Occupational Risks

    Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators

        College & University Issues

    Animal Operations, Packers

        Equine Activities

    Canoe Livery Operations

        Tube rentals

Downhill Skiing

Ski Rental Programs

Indoor Climbing Walls

Instructional Programs

Mountaineering

Retail Rental Programs

Rock Climbing

Tubing Hills

Whitewater Rafting

Risk Management Plan

    Introduction for Risk Management Plans

    What Is A Risk Management Plan?

    What should be in a Risk Management Plan

    Risk Management Plan Template

    Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan

    Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters

    Building Fire & Evacuation

Dealing with an Emergency

 

Insurance

    Theory of Insurance

    Insurance Companies

    Deductibles

    Self-Insured Retention

    Personal v. Commercial Policies

    Types of Policies

        Automobile

            Comprehension

            Collision

            Bodily Injury

            Property Damage

            Uninsured Motorist

            Personal Injury Protection

            Non-Owned Automobile

            Hired Car

    Fire Policy

        Coverage

        Liability

        Named Peril v. All Risk

    Commercial Policies

    Underwriting

    Exclusions

    Special Endorsements

    Rescue Reimbursement

    Policy Procedures

    Coverage’s

    Agents

    Brokers

        General Agents

        Captive Agents

    Types of Policies

        Claims Made

        Occurrence

    Claims

    Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements

Bibliography

Index

The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.