McGowen v. Montes, 152 N.E.3d 654; 2020 Ind. App. LEXIS 335; 2020 WL 4516816
Court of Appeals of Indiana
August 6, 2020, Decided; August 6, 2020, Filed
Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CT-1707
152 N.E.3d 654 *; 2020 Ind. App. LEXIS 335 **; 2020 WL 4516816
Eric McGowen and Vision Logistics, Inc., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Bradley Montes, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT: Christopher G. Stevenson, Wilson Kehoe Winningham LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana; Kyle E. Cray, Kisti Good Risse, Bennett Boehning & Clary LLP Lafayette, Indiana; ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, Brian A. Karle, Sarah M. Wyatt, Ball Eggleston PC, Lafayette, Indiana.
Friedlander, Senior Judge.
P1 Eric McGowen and Bradley Montes were injured in a vehicle accident after McGowen stopped at the scene of a prior vehicle accident and Montes collided with his vehicle. McGowen sued Montes, and Montes sued McGowen and McGowen’s employer, Vision Logistics, Inc.
P2 In this interlocutory appeal, the parties cross-appeal the trial court’s rulings on their cross-motions for summary judgment, in which the court determined that a dispute of material fact remains to be decided at trial. We affirm in part but also reverse [**2] in part and remand because we conclude there are no disputes of material fact and McGowen and Vision are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
P3 On the morning of November 4, 2016, before the sun had risen, there was heavy fog in rural Tippecanoe County. McGowen was driving a semi-tractor (without a trailer) owned by his employer, Vision, on a two-lane county road. Traffic was sparse, but McGowen drove at thirty-five to forty miles per hour, well below the speed limit of fifty miles per hour, due to poor visibility. As he drove east, McGowen saw a truck in a ditch on the side of the road. The truck was upright and its headlights were on, pointing at McGowen’s semi as he approached. The truck’s roof, windshield, and hood were heavily damaged. McGowen also saw another vehicle stopped in the road near the truck, but that vehicle drove off as McGowen approached. McGowen speculated that there had been a two-car accident, and the other vehicle was leaving the scene.
P4 McGowen saw a man, later identified as Ryan Patton, “kind of wandering around” the truck. Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 40. McGowen thought Patton “was drunk at first” or possibly injured. Id.
P5 McGowen stopped [**3] his semi in the road. He kept his foot on the brake, rather than shifting the semi’s transmission to park. The semi’s rear brake lights activated automatically when the driver pressed on the brake pedal. McGowen checked his side mirrors as he slowed to a halt, but he did not see any sign of vehicles approaching from behind.
P6 McGowen rolled down the passenger window and asked Patton, “Are you okay?” Id. Patton climbed up to the semi’s passenger-side window and responded, “Yeah.” Id. Next, McGowen asked Patton if he wanted McGowen to call 911. Patton responded, “Yeah, if you don’t mind.” Id.
P7 Rebecca Higgins was traveling westbound on the same road and she saw the headlights of McGowen’s semi, stopped in the road. She pulled past the semi, parked on the side of the road opposite the semi, and activated her hazard lights. She saw Patton’s truck after she had passed the semi. Higgins also saw the semi’s brake lights.
P8 Meanwhile, Montes was also driving east on the same county road. Higgins saw Montes’ car traveling in her direction. She activated her vehicle’s high beams to warn Montes, but he did not slow down. Higgins also rolled down her window, waved her arms, and yelled, but Montes [**4] still did not slow down. He instead collided with the rear of McGowen’s semi, without braking, immediately after Patton had asked McGowen to call 911. McGowen estimated no more than fifteen to thirty seconds had elapsed from the time he stopped until the time Montes struck the semi. Another vehicle that was also traveling east on the [*657] road, behind Montes, saw McGowen’s semi and stopped before hitting Montes’ car.
P9 Both McGowen and Montes suffered injuries from the collision. Montes later recalled seeing the rear of McGowen’s semi prior to the collision, but he was unsure of the distance at which he first saw it.
P10 This case began on August 24, 2017, when McGowen sued Montes, claiming negligence.1 Montes filed an answer, counter-sued McGowen for negligence, and sued Vision as a third-party defendant, alleging McGowen had been working for Vision at the time of the collision.
P11 In January 2019, McGowen and Vision filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to determine that they were immune from Montes’ negligence claims under Indiana Code section 34-30-12-1 (2008), also known as the Good Samaritan Law (“GSL”). Montes responded to the motion and filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, asserting [**5] the GSL did not apply to McGowen’s conduct.
P12 After a hearing, the trial court issued an order determining: (1) there is no dispute of material fact that McGowen was rendering emergency care, for purposes of the GSL, when he stopped and offered to call 911; but (2) there is a dispute of material fact as to whether McGowen’s act in stopping on the road amounted to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct, for purposes of the GSL. The court granted in part and denied in part McGowen and Vision’s motion for summary judgment, and denied Montes’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment.
P13 Montes, McGowen, and Vision asked the trial court to certify its order for interlocutory review. The court granted the motion. Next, both sides separately asked the Court to accept this appeal. The Court granted the motions, and this appeal followed.
1. Standard of Review
HN1 P14 Summary judgment orders are reviewed de novo, applying the same standard of review as the trial court. AM General LLC v. Armour, 46 N.E.3d 436 (Ind. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence designated by the parties demonstrates “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).
HN2 P15 The [**6] movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000 (Ind. 2014). If the movant bears its burden, then the nonmovant must present contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact. Id. All evidence must be construed in favor of the nonmovant. Mahan v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 862 N.E.2d 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
HN3 P16 Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter our standard of review. Alexander v. Linkmeyer Dev. II, LLC, 119 N.E.3d 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Instead, we consider each motion separately to determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mahan, 862 N.E.2d 669.
P17 In addition, this case requires us to review the trial court’s application of the GSL. HN4 Interpretation of a statute is a question of law reserved for the courts and, as is the case for a summary judgment order, is reviewed under a de novo standard. Ind. State Bd. of Educ. v. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 865 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
2. The Good Samaritan Law
(a) This section does not apply to services rendered by a health care provider (as defined in IC 34-18-2-14 or IC 27-12-2-14 before its repeal) to a patient in a health care facility (as defined in IC 27-8-10-1).
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), a person who comes upon the scene of an emergency or accident, complies with IC 9-26-1-1.5, or is summoned to the scene of an emergency or accident and, in good faith, gratuitously renders emergency care at the scene [**7] of the emergency or accident is immune from civil liability for any personal injury that results from:
(c) This subsection applies to a person to whom IC 16-31-6.5 applies. A person who gratuitously renders emergency care involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator is immune from liability for any act or omission not amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct if the person fulfills the requirements set forth in IC 16-31-6.5.
(d) This subsection applies to an individual, business, or organization to which IC 16-31-6.5 applies. An individual, business, or organization that allows a person who is an expected user to use an automatic external defibrillator of the individual, business, or organization to in good faith gratuitously render emergency care is immune from civil liability for any damages resulting from an act or omission not amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct by the user or for acquiring [**8] or providing the automatic external defibrillator to the user for the purpose of rendering the emergency care if the individual, business, or organization and the user fulfill the requirements set forth in IC 16-31-6.5.
(e) A licensed physician who gives medical direction in the use of a defibrillator or a national or state approved defibrillator instructor of a person who gratuitously renders emergency care involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator is immune from civil liability for any act or omission of the licensed physician or instructor if the act or omission of the licensed physician or instructor:
P19 The GSL has rarely been addressed by Indiana’s appellate courts. HN5 The statute’s grant of immunity from civil liability under certain circumstances limits a claimant’s right to bring suit, “in derogation of the common law.” Beckerman v. Gordon, 614 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), reh’g denied, 618 N.E.2d 56 (1993), trans. denied. We strictly construe such statutes against limitations on the right to sue. Id.
HN6 P20 When applying a statute to a case, “our first task is to give its words their clear and plain [**9] meaning, while considering the structure of the statute as a whole.” City of Lawrence Utils. Serv. Bd. v. Curry, 68 N.E.3d 581, 585 (Ind. 2017). If a statute contains clear and unambiguous language, it is not subject to judicial interpretation. Yates v. Kemp, 979 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. 2012).
3. Cross-Appeal: Emergency Care
P21 We first address Montes’ cross-appeal claim because, if it is meritorious, it would be dispositive of the appeal. He argues the trial court should have granted his motion for partial summary judgment because McGowen was not rendering emergency care for purposes of the GSL when he stopped at the accident scene to ask if Patton was okay and whether he should call 911. Montes argues that the GSL applies only to “persons actively participating in rendering care or assistance,” Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Br. p. 15, and not to people in McGowen’s situation.2 He further argues the facts demonstrate there was no emergency at the time McGowen stopped his semi.
HN7 P22 The General Assembly has defined the phrase “gratuitously renders emergency care,” as set forth in the GSL, in relevant part:
Ind. Code § 34-6-2-51 (1999). This statute focuses on the element of gratuitousness and does not address what conduct, other than the use of a defibrillator, meets the definition of emergency care.
P23 Similarly, Indiana’s prior cases applying the GSL have not sought to define “emergency care.” In McKinney v. Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc., 597 N.E.2d 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied, a panel of this Court was asked to determine whether a vehicle that was disabled due to a flat tire, where the driver was uninjured, was an “accident” for purposes of the Samaritan Law. The panel determined that those circumstances did not amount to an accident, and the person who stopped to change the flat tire was not immune from civil suit under the GSL. In Beckerman, 614 N.E.2d 610, this Court was similarly asked to determine whether the circumstances of that case amounted to an “accident” for purposes of the GSL. A doctor had been called to a house to treat an ill person, who subsequently died from a heart attack. This Court concluded the victim’s medical condition was not a “sudden calamitous event,” and the GSL did not provide immunity from suit. Id. at 613.
P24 The parties cite several cases from other jurisdictions in support of their claims. Those [**11] cases are not particularly helpful here because other states’ Good Samaritan laws are drafted differently from Indiana’s, and the courts applying those statutes have reached differing results. See, e.g., McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, 626 N.W.2d 666, 675 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 2001) (stopping at an accident to ask if assistance is needed can constitute rendering “aid” for North Dakota’s GSL); Howell v. City Towing Assoc., Inc., 717 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (tow truck driver calling his dispatcher after passenger suffered medical emergency did not amount to “emergency care” as defined by Texas’ GSL), writ refused.
P25 In the absence of a statutory definition or prior caselaw, we define “emergency care” in accordance with our principles of statutory application. HN8 Subsection (b)(2) of the GSL distinguishes between medical treatment and other forms [*660] of emergency assistance, providing immunity for persons who “provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care.” Ind. Code § 34-30-12-1(b)(2) (emphasis added). Based on the plain language of the statute, “emergency care” thus encompasses actions other than direct medical treatment. In addition, the Samaritan Law immunizes an “act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person.” Id. In the current case, it is undisputed that McGowen stopped his semi to ask Patton if he [**12] was okay and if McGowen should contact 911. McGowen was thus seeking to arrange medical treatment, as mentioned in the statute.
P26 Montes and amicus curiae argue that, reading the GSL in its entirety, the statute encompasses only medical care or first aid. We disagree. Subsections (c), (d), and (e) of the GSL address the use of a defibrillator to provide medical assistance. The General Assembly clearly knew how to specify medical care, including specific medical treatments, in the GSL. If the General Assembly had intended to specify that “emergency care” meant only medical treatment or first aid, they could have done so. HN9 “We cannot add new words to a statute but are bound to apply statutes as the legislature has written them.” Matter of Supervised Estate of Kent, 99 N.E.3d 634, 639 (Ind. 2018). HN10 We conclude from the unambiguous language of the GSL that stopping and asking if a person who has been involved in an accident needs help is “emergency care.”
P27 Next, Montes argues the scene of the vehicle collision did not qualify as an “objective emergency.” Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Br. p. 13. HN11 The Beckerman court defined an “accident” as a “sudden calamitous event.” Beckerman, 614 N.E.2d at 613. In this case, McGowen arrived on the scene of an automobile accident, possibly a two-car collision. Further, [**13] Patton was wandering around the truck, giving McGowen the impression that he was injured or drunk. This is ample, undisputed evidence of a sudden event, with a potentially injured person, that qualified as an emergency for purposes of the GSL. The trial court did not err in denying Montes’ motion for partial summary judgment.
4. Gross Negligence and Willful and Wanton Misconduct
HN12 P28 The GSL provides that a person is not shielded from civil liability if the person’s acts or omissions while providing emergency care amounted to “gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.” Ind. Code § 34-30-12-1. The trial court determined there was a dispute of material fact as to whether McGowen’s conduct was grossly negligent or willful or wanton. McGowen and Vision argue that the undisputed facts establish that his acts did not meet either standard, and they conclude the trial court should have granted their motion for summary judgment in its entirety.
P29 The General Assembly has frequently used the phrases “gross negligence” and “willful or wanton misconduct” in statutes granting immunity from civil damages. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 21-44.5-2-6 (2019) (administration of auto-injectable epinephrine); Ind. Code § 31-33-6-2 (2018) (reporting child abuse or neglect); [**14]
Ind. Code § 10-17-13.5-7 (2018) (physicians’ administration of hyperbaric oxygen treatments to veterans). We have not found a statutory definition of those terms for purposes of the GSL, and the parties have not directed us to any.
HN13 P30 The Indiana Supreme Court has defined gross negligence as “‘[a] conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of . . . the consequences to another party.'” N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. [*661] Sharp, 790 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind. 2003) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1057 (7th ed. 1999)). A finding of gross negligence is predicated on a showing of negligence, as it is the intentional failure to perform a duty in reckless disregard of the consequences. York v. Fredrick, 947 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.
P31 In Miller v. Indiana Department of Workforce Development, 878 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), Miller was driving his employer’s truck when he stopped at a stop sign. Upon driving into the intersection, he collided with a vehicle approaching from his right side. Miller’s employer terminated him after the collision, citing a provision of a labor agreement that permitted instant termination for “gross negligence.” Id. at 350.
P32 Miller sought unemployment benefits, and he appealed the denial of his request. HN14 A panel of this Court applied the definition of gross negligence set forth above, noting “the question of whether an act or omission constitutes gross negligence is generally [**15] a question of fact, [but] the question may become one of law if ‘the facts are undisputed and only a single inference can be drawn from those facts.'” Id. at 356 (quoting Sharp, 790 N.E.2d at 466). The Court concluded that Miller’s failure to use due care when entering the intersection after stopping at the stop sign was “negligent, but not grossly negligent.” Id. at 357.
P33 In this case, the undisputed facts establish that McGowen was driving at only thirty-five to forty miles per hour when he stopped his semi in the road at the scene of an accident. McGowen did not put his semi in park but merely pressed on the brake, activating his rear brake lights. He was unaware of any vehicles behind him. McGowen asked Patton if he was okay and whether he should call 911, immediately before Montes collided with the rear of the semi. McGowen stated, without contradiction, that only fifteen to thirty seconds elapsed between him stopping his semi and being rear-ended by Montes. These circumstances resemble at worst the mere negligence at issue in Miller, rather than the reckless disregard for others that characterizes gross negligence.
P34 Montes claims there are several material disputes of fact that justify the trial court’s partial denial [**16] of McGowen and Vision’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of gross negligence. We disagree. He points to evidence that McGowen could have pulled off the road, contradicting Montes’ statement during a deposition that there was no space for his semi along the side of the road. This fact is immaterial due to the short duration of the stop prior to the collision and McGowen’s choice to not put the semi in park, allowing him to move on quickly if needed.
P35 There is also a dispute as to whether McGowen activated his vehicle’s hazard lights after stopping, in the brief interval before Montes collided with him. This factual dispute is also immaterial because it is undisputed that McGowen’s brake lights activated when he stopped, and: (1) the brake lights override the hazard lights, and (2) the brake lights are as bright as the hazard lights.
P36 Finally, Montes claims McGowen violated numerous traffic regulations and commercial driver standards when he stopped in the road. HN15 Even if McGowen’s acts were contrary to statutes, “violation of a statutory duty creates a presumption of negligence that may be rebutted.” Sandberg Trucking, Inc. v. Johnson, 76 N.E.3d 178, 188-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). A presumption of negligence is dissimilar to a presumption of gross negligence. [**17] We conclude that there is no dispute [*662] of material fact as to whether McGowen was grossly negligent.
HN16 P37 Turning to willful or wanton conduct, such conduct consists of two elements: “(1) the defendant must have knowledge of an impending danger or consciousness of a course of misconduct calculated to result in probable injury; and (2) the actor’s conduct must have exhibited an indifference to the consequence of his conduct.” Witham v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 561 N.E.2d 484, 486 (Ind. 1990). “The distinction between constructive willfulness and mere negligence depends on the actor’s state of mind.” McKeown v. Calusa, 172 Ind. App. 1, 6-7, 359 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1977).
P38 In Frybarger v. Coffelt, 180 Ind. App. 160, 387 N.E.2d 104 (1979), a passenger in Coffelt’s car died when Coffelt chose to race another driver on a two-lane highway at night and collided with a third car attempting to turn left across the highway. On appeal, the passenger’s estate argued that the trial court erred in determining Coffelt’s conduct did not meet the definition of willful or wanton misconduct. A panel of this Court concluded that, although Coffelt was racing at night at a high rate of speed, a dip in the road made it impossible for him to see the car in time to avoid striking it, and there was no evidence of any other reckless behavior by Coffelt. The Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that [**18] Coffelt had not behaved willfully and wantonly.
P39 In the current case, the standard of review is different, but McGowen’s conduct is far less reckless than Coffelt’s. On a dark, foggy morning, McGowen drove on a two-lane county road at thirty-five to forty miles per hour due to poor visibility. He came to a stop when he saw Patton and the wrecked truck along the side of the road, pressing on the brake rather than shifting into park. McGowen checked his side mirrors as he slowed to a halt, but he did not see any sign of approaching vehicles. He barely had time to ask Patton if he was okay and whether he should call 911 when Montes collided with the back of the semi. During McGowen’s deposition, when asked if he was concerned that stopping on the road may have been hazardous, he stated, “I was more concerned about [Patton]. I thought it was a two-car accident.” Appellants’/Cross-Appellees’ App. Vol. II, p. 104. There is no evidence that McGowen was indifferent to the results of his conduct. Rather, the undisputed facts demonstrate McGowen was aware of dangerous road conditions and attempted to drive carefully while rendering aid to Patton. As a matter of law, McGowen’s conduct did not [**19] meet the standard of willful or wanton misconduct. The trial court erred in denying in part McGowen and Vision’s motion for summary judgment, because they are entitled to the protection of the Good Samaritan Law.
Everyone tells you, you must have a Risk Management Plan. One of the first things a plaintiff is going to look at in a lawsuit is a Risk Management plan. So we have a document that is a two-edged sword to help and possibly hurt your business. What do you do?
Risk management plans or Emergency Action Plans, Emergency Response Plans, or many others such as names, are put together as procedures to follow when you have a problem. People expect you to have a Risk Management plan and people expect you to follow your Risk Management plan. Failing to follow your Risk Management plan can create liability for your business.
The first problem is, during an emergency, you don’t have time to run get the book and see what to do next.
A Risk Management Plan must:
- Be Understood
- Not come back to haunt you.
Your front line employees will not know or remember a complicated Risk Management plan. They need to either be able to reference or respond with very few steps. Your front-line employees are also going to be the face of your Risk Management plan because they will be the ones to discover the problem and start to implement the plan.
Risk Management plans developed and understood by management are job security, not litigation prevention programs.
A Risk Management plan is not a management-level plan. It is a plan for the people who will be using it. Those employees making the phone calls, dealing with the problems and helping the victims are the people who must know and be able to execute the plan.
The next major issue I find with Risk Management plans is, the plan is written to cover every possible scenario. If you start today when you sell your business or retire you still won’t be done writing down everything that can go wrong with your business. Once you get that type of plan done, the emergency will be over or your business will no longer exist by the time you find the solution or response in your plan.
Write a plan that works so you can enjoy your work, not an anchor that drags you down each day.
As soon as you start writing your Risk Management plan you need to start editing and updating your plan.
As an example: You write a plan based on employees who have been with you for a while, you trust and can respond to about everything the correct way. A couple of years later, you have new employees who have no idea what to do. Your Risk Management plan has to be written to work with both types of employees.
State and Federal regulations are going to change; your insurance is going to change, and you are going to change. Consequently, your Risk Management plan must be flexible enough to work, without being re-written, to deal with changes, If not you’ll never leave your office, you’ll just be constantly dealing with changes to the plan, let alone ever dealing with an emergency.
When has “Business as Usual” actually been true in your business?
- The biggest failure of a Risk Management plan is they are too complicated and consequently, only the person who wrote the plan can follow it. Your plan must work for your employees; Not your risk manager, your lawyer or your insurance and never just for your industry.
- Write your plan to be used, not to be a way to use your imagination about what could possibly go wrong.
- You cannot write a plan that covers every scenario. If you could it would occupy one entire wall of your office in three Ring Binders.
And even then you plan will not cover everything. So why waste the time, energy and money in trying to write a plan that covers everything. You can’t. Inevitably, it is not going to cover the problem that you are having. It just seems to work that way.
I’ve yet to see a Risk Management plan that was written to cover the emergency that actually occurred.
You need a plan that:
- Can be remembered and executed by all your employees.
- Each employee’s part of the plan can be easily carried with them for reference.
- The employee has access to and the information necessary to communicate the need for the plan and their responsibilities under the plan.
- The plan works for every incident possible.
Your plan for the front-line employees should fit on a 3X5 card on one side’
- The other side of the plan has phone numbers of the people that employee is supposed to contact to activate the plan (or radio channels).
- The other side of the plan has phone numbers of the people that employee is supposed to contact to activate the plan (or radio channels).
- The only person who may have more of a plan than on a 3X5 card is going to be the person at the top to work on follow up.
- Basically, an employee’s plan is going to be stop the bleeding, stabilize, call 911, and call the supervisor.
- Your plan must be something that can be executed without referring to anything for more than 30 seconds.
Your Risk Management plan must be written by your company, which means every person in the company, understood by every person and executable by everyone. Anything more is just going to be ignored when EMS, USFS or any other responding agency comes on the scene but used against you in court.
I love Risk Management plans written by management. They train employees in the plan, with the employees wondering if the people writing the plan have ever seen the work they do. Risk management plans need to be dirty because the people who have to follow the plans should be writing them, and they don’t have an office to keep the plan clean.
Risk Management Plans only work if the people executing the Plan Know How to Work.
Quit writing and re-writing your plan and start training your employees on what to do if something does not go as planned.
Score 1 Point for Each Correct Answer
- You have a Risk Management Plan.
- Employees know there is a Risk Management Plan.
- The Employees know the Risk Management Plan.
- Employees know their position & responsibility in the Risk Management Plan.
- Employees know the responsibilities of the person above and below them in the Risk Management Plan.
- The Employees carry their responsibilities in the Risk Management Plan with them.
- The Employees carry with them all information they need to communicate if there is a problem to the necessary people in the Risk Management Plan.
- The Risk Management Plan has been updated in the past 12 months.
- The Employees have been trained in the Risk Management Plan in the past 12 months.
- A mock disaster has been held using the Risk Management Plan.
- You have identified a team to deal with the human issues of an incident after the incident is under control.
- Senior Managers have gone through the same training and drills as the employees.
- You have not had to use the Risk Management Plan.
Grading your plan!
0-1 Point: Lock the doors and go home now.
2-5 Points: Prepare to lose a lawsuit
6-9 Points Good, but you can do better.
10-12 Points Not bad! Impressive
13 Points Excellent
Your score is important; however, it may not be the biggest issue you face you’re your Risk Management plan. The biggest problem facing outdoor recreation and adventure travel businesses is not the issue of having a plan. It is creating a plan that is workable, able to be used by employees and one that will NOT haunt you later.
Risk Management is education, not paperwork!
What do you think? Leave a comment.
Copyright 2018 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
By Recreation Law Recemail@example.com James H. Moss
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer,
Under California law, you assume the risk of getting hit by a toboggan being towed by a snowmobile while snowboarding.Posted: January 15, 2018
Both sides of this case created problems for themselves, and both sides stretched their credibility. In the end, it was easy for the plaintiff to lose because of that credibility gap created by the facts and when those facts were reported.
Plaintiff: Dominique Forrester
Defendant: Sierra at Tahoe
Plaintiff Claims: General Negligence are Claims for Breach of Statutory Duty; Negligence Per Se; Gross Negligence and/or Reckless Conduct; and/or Common Carrier Liability
Defendant Defenses: assumption of the risk
Holding: for the defendant
Snowboarder loses suit claiming a toboggan being towed by a snowmobile hit him on a beginner slope. By reporting the incident after he left the resort, he created a credibility issue.
In the end, getting hit by a toboggan being towed by a snowmobile is a risk you assume when skiing in California.
The facts in a case like this are always screwy to begin with and in my opinion, screwy from both sides of the litigation. The plaintiff and a friend were snowboarding. The plaintiff was filming his friend doing jumps. After the last jump, the plaintiff snowboarded toward the bottom which was on a beginner run waiting for his friend. While waiting, he heard someone yell, and he was hit by a toboggan. He hit his head suffering injuries. The plaintiff thought he saw a ski patroller driving away with the toboggan attached to the snowmobile. The fall broke some of his equipment also.
His friend saw the incident and stated that the driver was wearing a different uniform from what the plaintiff reported. Neither of them saw lights nor a flag on the snowmobile.
The plaintiff and his friend did not report the injury but drove home. On the way home they decided the plaintiff should call Sierra. He did and got a recording machine. He then started vomiting.
The next day the plaintiff hurt all over. Eventually, he was diagnosed with a concussion, a whiplash and disc degeneration.
The plaintiff called the ski area the next day and was told there was no one for him to talk to. He was to call back Wednesday. Wednesday, he called back and filed a report.
Forrester called Sierra again on Monday morning. He was told there was no one with whom he could discuss the incident and to call back on Wednesday. He called Wednesday and spoke with Evan MacClellan, the risk manager. MacClellan completed an incident report based on the phone call. The report described the injury as occurring at the bottom of Broadway near the terrain park. The report described that Forrester was hit by a “snowmobile” (patroller), got up after the incident, and did not report it. On the way home he started to vomit and went to the hospital the next day. The report listed Medina as a witness and included his telephone number.
The same day the plaintiff contacted an attorney.
The ski area investigated the claim. No ski patrollers or terrain park employees knew of any collision with a toboggan and a snowboarder.
MacClellan spoke with the ski patrol and terrain park employees about Forrester’s claim. None of the ski patrollers on duty that day or others with whom they spoke recalled any accident or collision. Both MacClellan and the general manager, John Rice, were suspicious of the claim; in 37 years in the ski industry, Rice had never seen a report made days after the incident. MacClellan did not call Medina, although Forrester had identified him as a witness. MacClellan could not determine that the accident actually took place. He first learned that Forrester claimed the collision was with a towed toboggan rather than the snowmobile itself after Forrester’s deposition.
Obviously, the ski area felt that no collision or accident had occurred. The case went to trial, and the plaintiff lost because the jury found he had assumed the risk of injuries.
Normally, juries like judges are asked to assemble, to a limited extent, the facts upon which they base their decision. In this case that was not done.
As we noted earlier, this case is unusual among liability cases in general because the collision itself was in dispute. Because the jury was not asked to make any preliminary factual findings, we cannot even assume that it found a collision occurred. We know only that the jury found Sierra did not unreasonably increase the inherent risk of snowboarding by its conduct on the day in question–whatever its conduct was found to be.
The plaintiff appealed the decision.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The court first looked into the issues surrounding the snowmobile. The defendant kept a checklist that was to be completed each day before the snowmobile was ridden. The checklist was not kept after it was completed.
Sierra requires its snowmobile drivers to follow a safety checklist and check lights, brakes, and other functions before a snowmobile is taken out. The checklist is a written form detailing the items to be checked and the name of the person taking out the snowmobile. The checklist is discarded daily unless an entry triggers a need for snowmobile maintenance. Due to this practice of discarding the checklist daily, no attempt was made to find the checklists for March 7, and the driver of the snowmobile allegedly involved in the accident was never found.
The day in question was one of the busiest of the year. The ski area employees testified that it was so buy, it would have been impossible to drive a snowmobile through the crowd on the slope in question.
The court then reviewed the evidence of the competing expert witnesses, both of whom offered testimony that at best seems stretched and will be ignored here and was ignored a lot by the court.
The court then reviewed the defenses offered by the ski area, starting with Primary Assumption of the Risk.
“Primary assumption of risk is a complete bar to recovery. It applies when, as a matter of law, the defendant owes no duty to guard against a particular risk of harm.” “Primary assumption of risk occurs where a plaintiff voluntarily participates in a sporting event or activity involving certain inherent risks. For example, an errantly thrown ball in baseball or a carelessly extended elbow in basketball are considered inherent risks of those respective sports.”
Ski areas and other operators, sponsors and instructors of recreational activities have no duty to eliminate the risk. They do have a duty not to increase the risk beyond those inherent in the sport. The court based on this analysis looked at whether a toboggan is an inherent risk of skiing and boarding and found it was.
We first address the threshold question of whether unwanted contact with a snowmobile is, in general, an inherent risk of snowboarding. We conclude that it is.
On at least two occasions, this court has found a collision with resort equipment at a ski resort to be an inherent risk of the sport.
In both examples, the court compared the collisions to collisions with stationary objects, a lift tower and a tree.
The court looked at the facts in this case and concluded the incident was a collision with a toboggan, rather than a toboggan hitting a snowboarder. I suspect the facts in the two cases the court reviewed would have different conclusions if the lift tower or the tree had hit the skiers?
To reach this conclusion, the court went back to the statements of the experts of both the plaintiff and the defendant who testified that snowmobiles were a standard practice in the sport of skiing.
There are many inherent risks of injury and emergency in skiing and snowboarding, and snowmobiles are used to respond quickly to injuries as well as to other emergencies such as lift malfunctions requiring evacuation, fire, gas leaks, and altercations. It appears to us that the use of snowmobiles on the ski slopes at ski resorts is at least as necessary to the sport as the snowmaking equipment in Souza or the directional signs acknowledged as “necessary” in Van Dyke v. S.K.I. Ltd.
The court then also looked at Secondary Assumption of Risk.
The term “assumption of risk” has been “used in connection with two classes of cases: those in which the issue to be resolved was whether the defendant actually owed the plaintiff a duty of care (primary assumption of risk), and those in which the defendant had breached a duty of care but where the issue was whether the plaintiff had chosen to face the risk of harm presented by the defendant’s breach of duty (secondary assumption of risk). In the latter class of cases, we concluded; the issue could be resolved by applying the doctrine of comparative fault, and the plain-tiff’s decision to face the risk would not operate as a complete bar to recovery. In such a case, the plaintiffs knowing and voluntary acceptance of the risk functions as a form of contributory negligence.
The court held that discussing secondary assumption of risk was not necessary in this case because the jury found the defendant was not liable because of primary assumption of the risk.
The plaintiff also argued that an evidentiary ruling should have been made in the plaintiff’s favor because the defendant failed to keep the snowmobile checklist. The rules and laws of what evidence should be kept or can be destroyed to have changed dramatically in the past twenty years, and this area of law is a hot bed of litigation and arguments.
However, the court moved around this issue because the checklist was destroyed every day. The defendant gave the plaintiff a list of the possible drivers of snowmobiles at the resort. Because the checklist was only used by the first driver, and the snowmobile could have been ridden by someone other than the driver who completed the checklist, the court found it was not critical to the case. The plaintiff request of the information had occurred after the checklist had been destroyed as was the habit for the defendant.
So Now What?
First being hit by an object being towed by a snowmobile inbounds in California is an assumed risk. This is the first case f this type I have found. Every other case where the defendant has been held not liable because of assumption of the risk at a ski area was based on the skier or boarder hitting a fixed object.
Second, credibility maybe all you have in some cases. Consequently, you never want to stretch or destroy your credibility, and you do not want your experts to do the same.
Last, if you are hurt at a resort, get help at the resort. Some of the plaintiff’s injuries might have been mitigated if treated immediately.
However, all the above issues could be crap, if the jury ruled not because they believed the plaintiff assumed the risk, but because they did not believe the plaintiff at all.
Copyright 2017 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
By Recreation Law Recfirstname.lastname@example.org James H. Moss
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #SkiLaw, snowmobile, collision, ski, inherent risk, snowboarding, sport, checklist, toboggan, driver, ski resort, skiing, unreasonably, assumption of risk, slope, secondary, emergency, resort, ski area, skier, hit, snowboarder, patroller, patrol, risks inherent, instructional error, lift, discarded, siren, suppression, tower,
Dominique Forrester, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Sierra at Tahoe, Defendant and Respondent.
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5204
July 27, 2017, Opinion Filed
NOTICE: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 8.1115(a), PROHIBITS COURTS AND PARTIES FROM CITING OR RELYING ON OPINIONS NOT CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED, EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BY RULE 8.1115(b). THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED FOR THE PURPOSES OF RULE 8.1115.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Review denied by Forrester v. Sierra at Tahoe, 2017 Cal. LEXIS 7927 (Cal., Oct. 11, 2017)
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] Superior Court of El Dorado County, No. PC20120138.
CORE TERMS: snowmobile, collision, ski, inherent risk, snowboarding, sport, checklist, toboggan, driver, ski resort, skiing, unreasonably, assumption of risk, slope, secondary, emergency, resort, ski area, skier, hit, snowboarder, patroller, patrol, risks inherent, instructional error, lift, discarded, siren, suppression, tower
JUDGES: Duarte, J.; Butz, Acting P. J., Mauro, J. concurred.
OPINION BY: Duarte, J.
Plaintiff Dominique Forrester was injured while snowboarding at defendant ski resort Sierra-at-Tahoe (Sierra) on March 7, 2010. He claimed he was hit by a toboggan, that in turn was being towed by a snowmobile, while on a beginner slope. The trial court found assumption of the risk applied to the claim, and the case went to the jury to answer the question of whether Sierra unreasonably increased the risk to Forrester above that already inherent in the sport of snowboarding. By a vote of 10 to 2, the jury answered “no.”
On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in ruling that primary assumption of the risk applied to this case, and instructing the jury accordingly. Plaintiff argues a collision with a snowmobile is not an inherent risk of snowboarding. He further contends the court incorrectly instructed the jury on secondary assumption of the risk, and erred in refusing to instruct on the willful suppression of evidence.
As we will explain, this case is unusual among liability cases in general because the very existence of the alleged accident–the collision itself–was [*2] and remains in dispute. We first conclude that unwanted contact with a snowmobile (here encompassing a towed toboggan), on a ski slope at a ski resort, is indeed an inherent risk of snowboarding. Although Forrester argues the particular alleged circumstances of the operation of the snowmobile on the day of the incident took the collision outside the boundaries of inherent risk, that issue was tendered to the jury and the jury found Sierra did not unreasonably increase the risks already inherent in snowboarding
We assume instructional error on secondary assumption of the risk but find no prejudice, and conclude that the evidence did not support an instruction on willful suppression of the evidence.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Alleged Accident
On Sunday, March 7, 2010, Forrester met his high school friend, Franklin Medina, for a day of snowboarding at Sierra. That day was the busiest of the year, with about 6,370 people at the resort. Forrester described himself as an intermediate snowboarder who does not perform jumps. He did not wear ear buds or ear phones while snowboarding and did not recall ever seeing a snowmobile in a ski area before that [*3] day.
At about 3:30 or 4:00 p.m., Forrester was filming Medina doing jumps. After the last jump, Medina snowboarded down the run to wait for Forrester. The bottom area of the ski run is known as Broadway; it is a beginner run near the teaching area and close to the lodge.
According to Forrester, as he began to snowboard down Broadway, he heard someone yell “hey.” He tried to turn around and was hit in the back of the legs. He went airborne and landed on his bottom and then hit his head. His goggles cut his face. He was hurt and dizzy. The snowmobile was 30 yards away when Forrester first saw it, and the driver “took off.” Forrester thought the driver’s jacket was orange or red, but he was not sure. He assumed only ski patrollers, who wear orange-red jackets, operated snowmobiles. He thought the snowmobile driver was wearing a beanie. Forrester did not hear the snowmobile. After the collision, Forrester slid down the mountain, and some other snowboarders asked if he was okay. He did not realize his equipment was broken until he later responded to special interrogatories.
Medina claimed he saw the incident, and that the snowmobile was in front of Forrester’s path and pulling a toboggan. [*4] He saw the toboggan clip Forrester’s feet and “take him out.” The snowmobile was going two or three times faster than Forrester. Forrester took his equipment off and walked down the mountain. Medina claimed the driver of the snowmobile was wearing a black and purple vest like the ones worn by terrain park employees (rather than the orange and red jacket described by Forrester). Medina did not see any lights on the snowmobile and did not notice a flag, nor did he hear a siren.
Forrester did not report the accident, but tried to “walk off” the injury. On the way home Forrester and Medina discussed that Forrester had been hit and decided they should call Sierra. Forrester called just after 5:00 p.m. and got an answering machine. Forrester began vomiting and they stopped in Placerville where Medina took pictures of his face. Medina drove Forrester home.
The next day, Monday, Forrester hurt all over his body, including a bad headache. He went to his doctor who ordered a CT scan, the results of which were normal. Over the next few days, Forrester’s back began to hurt. He was diagnosed with a concussion and a whiplash back injury. Forrester was later diagnosed with disc degeneration with a [*5] prognosis of ongoing pain.
Reporting the Accident
Forrester called Sierra again on Monday morning. He was told there was no one with whom he could discuss the incident and to call back on Wednesday. He called Wednesday and spoke with Evan MacClellan, the risk manager. MacClellan completed an incident report based on the phone call. The report described the injury as occurring at the bottom of Broadway near the terrain park. The report described that Forrester was hit by a “snowmobile (patroller),” got up after the incident, and did not report it. On the way home he started to vomit and went to the hospital the next day. The report listed Medina as a witness and included his telephone number.
Forrester contacted an attorney the same day he spoke with MacClellan. Forrester sent MacClellan a written report, in which he stated he “was involved in a collision with a Sierra Ski Patrol Officer (Ski Patroller) whom [sic] was driving a snow mobile, towing a stretcher. . . . The Ski Patroller was apparently attempting to cross from my left, which was behind me (I have a ‘regular’ board stance), across my face, to the right of me when he collided into me from my blind side. As a result I flew over [*6] him and crashed very hard into the mountain. I suffered a head injury, as well as whiplash, and subsequently blacked out for a short period of time.” The statement continued that Forrester did not see the “patroller” and heard no sirens; he heard only a brief “hey” right before the impact. His friend Medina had witnessed the collision and could not believe it; other snowboarders asked if Forrester was okay, but the ski patrol did not.
MacClellan spoke with the ski patrol and terrain park employees about Forrester’s claim. None of the ski patrollers on duty that day or others with whom they had spoken recalled any accident or collision. Both MacClellan and the general manager, John Rice, were suspicious of the claim; in 37 years in the ski industry, Rice had never seen a report made days after the incident. MacClellan did not call Medina, although Forrester had identified him as a witness. MacClellan could not determine that the accident actually took place. He first learned that Forrester claimed the collision was with a towed toboggan rather than the snowmobile itself after Forrester’s deposition.
The Lawsuit and Trial
Forrester brought suit against Sierra for general negligence and [*7] premises liability. The complaint stated: “Included in the Cause of Action for General Negligence are Claims for Breach of Statutory Duty; Negligence Per Se; Gross Negligence and/or Reckless Conduct; and/or Common Carrier Liability.” Forrester took some theories of liability “off the table” and the trial court granted defendant’s motion for nonsuit as to others. As we explain in more detail, post, the matter was submitted to the jury as an assumption of the risk case, with the jury asked to determine whether Sierra unreasonably increased the inherent risks of snowboarding
Sierra requires its snowmobile drivers to follow a safety checklist and check lights, brakes, and other functions before a snowmobile is taken out. The checklist is a written form detailing the items to be checked and the name of the person taking out the snowmobile. The checklist is discarded on a daily basis unless an entry triggers a need for snowmobile maintenance. Due to this practice of discarding the checklist daily, no attempt was made to find the checklists for March 7, and the driver of the snowmobile allegedly involved in the accident was never found. At trial, Sierra stipulated that anyone [*8] driving a snowmobile at the resort that day would have been employed by Sierra. The checklist would not necessarily reveal the identity of the driver of the snowmobile in any event, because once the snowmobile is checked out others may use it without completing a new checklist. Sierra maintains no record showing who is using a snowmobile at a particular time on a specific date.
A snowmobile is a loud machine; its sound is comparable to a motorcycle or lawnmower. The flashing lights are always on if the snowmobile is running, but the siren can be turned on and off. It is against Sierra’s policy to operate a snowmobile without a siren when guests are present. The snowmobile has an attached fiberglass pole with a flag atop, to aid in visibility. March 7, 2010, was a peak day and there was a blackout on the use of snowmobiles in the ski areas except for emergencies. Rice defined emergencies as ski patrol rescue, lift evacuation, a fire or gas leak on the hill, and to carry law enforcement to an altercation. There were no documented emergencies the day of the incident. MacClellan testified that with 6,000 people on the ski slopes, it would be “virtually impossible” to drive a snowmobile [*9] through the Broadway area.
The ski patrol uses orange toboggans for rescue, which are stored in different locations on the mountain and used to transport injured guests. Patrollers take them uphill by chair lift or by snowmobile. Snowmobiles are rarely used to take a toboggan down the mountain; usually a patroller skis them down. Snowmobiles do not tow injured guests in a toboggan.
In addition to medical experts, plaintiff called a ski safety consultant and an accident reconstructionist. Richard Penniman testified as an expert on ski area mountain operations. He testified it was below industry standard to have a snowmobile on the ski slopes when a large number of people are present. On a run like Broadway that is designed for beginners, it was very dangerous to have anything present other than skiers and snowboarders. It was below the industry standard to use the Broadway area as a snowmobile route. Penniman added snowmobiles are only a convenience and a ski resort can operate without them. He conceded, however, that it was standard practice for ski areas to use snowmobiles and agreed they were extremely useful in an emergency where the risk they create might be worth [*10] it. He agreed with the policy of Sierra-at-Tahoe not to use snowmobiles on busy days except in the case of an emergency. In Penniman’s opinion, Sierra’s conduct in operating a snowmobile the day of the incident increased the risk of injury to skiers and snowboarders.
Jesse Wobrock, an accident reconstructionist and bioengineer, prepared an animation of the accident. He testified the accident had “an injury mechanism for both the lumbar spine and the traumatic brain injury.” The damage to Forrester’s left binding was consistent with the height of the toboggan, as was the orange color transfer on the binding. Wobrock testified the physical evidence corroborated the eyewitness testimony. In his opinion, the snowboard went between the tread of the snowmobile and the toboggan; the toboggan ran over the snowboard.
John Gardiner, a forensic engineer and biomechanic, testified for the defense. He opined there was neither consistent testimony nor sufficient physical evidence to conclude what occurred that day. Gardiner testified that if Forrester’s left binding made contact with a toboggan, the contact occurred at the rear portion of the toboggan. If the contact had been near the [*11] front of the toboggan, the snowboard would have hit the treads of the snowmobile and caused damage; there was no evidence of damage to the front of the snowboard. In Gardiner’s opinion, the force involved in Forrester’s fall would not have caused a lumbar disc injury and a concussion. Gardiner also testified that Medina’s view of the accident would have been obstructed by the snowmobile and its driver and that Wobrock’s animation of the incident was inconsistent with the laws of physics and Forrester’s testimony.
The defense pointed out the many inconsistencies between Medina’s deposition and his trial testimony, such as where he dropped off Forrester, whether Forrester wore a helmet, Forrester’s level of skill on a snowboard, the time they finished snowboarding, and whether Medina saw the snowmobile before the collision. Medina had changed his story only after talking to Forrester. The defense argued the differences between the testimony of Medina and Forrester as to the color of the snowmobile, the clothing of the driver, the location of the accident, and the timing showed that Forrester failed to carry his burden of proof as to what happened. The defense questioned how Forrester [*12] could fail to see or hear the snowmobile and offered three possibilities: (1) the collision had not happened; (2) Forrester was not paying attention; or (3) Forrester saw the snowmobile, but not the toboggan and tried to cut behind. The defense argued number three was the most reasonable and Forrester did not report the accident because he felt it was his fault.
As relevant here, the court instructed the jury as follows:
“[CACI No.] 410. Dominique Forrester claims he was harmed while participating in snowboarding at the snow — at the Sierra at Tahoe Ski resort. To establish this claim Dominique Forrester must prove all of the following:
“1. That Sierra at Tahoe was the owner of the ski resort and that its employee was operating the snowmobile in issue in this case. Sierra at Tahoe admits that it is the owner of the ski resort and only its employee would have had access to and would have been operating a snowmobile on the ski resort.
“2. Dominique Forrester must also prove that Sierra at Tahoe unreasonably increased the risk to Dominique Forrester over and above those inherent in snowboarding;
“3. And Dominique Forrester must prove that Dominique Forrester was harmed; and lastly [*13]
“4. That Sierra at Tahoe’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Dominique Forrester’s harm.
“[Modified CACI No.] 405. Sierra at Tahoe claims that Dominique contributed to his harm. To succeed on this claim, Sierra at Tahoe must prove the following:
“1. That Dominique Forrester assumed the risks that led to his injury; and
“2. That Dominique Forrester’s assumption of those risks was a substantial factor in causing his harm.
“If Sierra at Tahoe proves the above, Dominique Forrester’s damages are reduced by your determinations of the percentage of Dominique Forrester’s responsibility. I will calculate the actual reduction.”
Verdict and Motion for New Trial
During deliberations, the jury asked for a definition of “unreasonable” and to have Rice’s testimony about reports of emergencies that day reread. With the parties’ approval, the court responded to the first request as follows: “‘Unreasonable’ – is conduct that is contrary to conduct that a prudent person would exercise in the same or similar circumstances e.g. conduct that is careless, irrational, foolish, unwise, senseless, immoderate, exorbitant or arbitrary under the circumstances.”
By a vote of 10 to 2, the jury found Sierra did [*14] not unreasonably increase the risks to Forrester over and above those inherent in snowboarding in a ski area. Because the jury’s answer to this first question was “no,” it did not answer any additional questions contained in the verdict forms.
Forrester moved for a new trial, contending assumption of the risk did not apply to the case, there were evidentiary errors, and the court erred in not instructing on suppression of evidence. The court denied the motion.1
1 The record does not contain an order denying the motion. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 660, if there was no order, the effect is a denial of the motion.
Assumption of the Risk
A. The Law
“Primary assumption of risk is a complete bar to recovery. It applies when, as a matter of law, the defendant owes no duty to guard against a particular risk of harm.” (Gregory v. Cott (2014) 59 Cal.4th 996, 1001, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 331 P.3d 179.) “Primary assumption of risk occurs where a plaintiff voluntarily participates in a sporting event or activity involving certain inherent risks. For example, an errantly thrown ball in baseball or a carelessly extended elbow in basketball are considered inherent risks of those respective sports.” (Wattenbarger v. Cincinnati Reds, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 746, 751, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732.)
“The primary assumption of risk doctrine rests on a straightforward policy foundation: the need to avoid chilling vigorous participation in or sponsorship of recreational activities by imposing a tort duty to eliminate or [*15] reduce the risks of harm inherent in those activities. It operates on the premise that imposing such a legal duty ‘would work a basic alteration–or cause abandonment’ of the activity.” (Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1148, 1156, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551, 290 P.3d 1158.) “[U]nder the primary assumption of risk doctrine, operators, sponsors and instructors in recreational activities posing inherent risks of injury have no duty to eliminate those risks, but do owe participants the duty not to unreasonably increase the risks of injury beyond those inherent in the activity. (Id. at p. 1162.)
“Snowboarding is a classic example of a sport that requires participants to assume considerable risks.” (Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 577, 603, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 370 (Vine).) Courts have recognized many risks inherent in skiing and snowboarding. “Those risks include injuries from variations in terrain, surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions, moguls, bare spots, rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris. They also include collisions with other skiers, ski lift towers, and other properly marked or plainly visible objects and equipment.” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1202, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863.)
Whether the assumption of risk doctrine applies in a particular case is a question of law.”2 (Amezcua v. Los Angeles Harley-Davidson, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 217, 227, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567.)
2 Although Forrester recognizes the question of whether assumption of the risk applies is a question of law reviewed de novo, he devotes a considerable portion of his briefing to arguing the trial court’s two analyses, first before trial and then on the motion for a new trial, were incorrect. “In reviewing a trial court’s decision, we review the result, not the reasoning.” (Florio v. Lau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 637, 653, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 409.)
B. Application to this Case
As we noted earlier, this case is unusual among liability cases in general because [*16] the collision itself was in dispute. Because the jury was not asked to make any preliminary factual findings, we cannot even assume that it found a collision occurred. We know only that the jury found Sierra did not unreasonably increase the inherent risk of snowboarding by its conduct on the day in question–whatever its conduct was found to be. With this in mind, we turn to Forrester’s first claim of error.
Forrester contends a collision with a snowmobile is not an inherent risk of snowboarding. He argues that although some collisions–such as with trees or other skiers or snowboarders–are inherent risks, the line should be drawn at a collision between an individual and a motorized vehicle. He asserts assumption of the risk has no role in the circumstances he claims were present here: an unmarked snowmobile with no lights, siren or flag, operated by a non-safety employee on a busy beginner slope, contrary to the safety policies of the ski resort.
Sierra counters that the circumstances Forrester claims were present here, outlined immediately above, would have unreasonably increased the risks undertaken by Forrester had the jury found the circumstances were as Forrester alleged. Sierra [*17] argues that it is apparent from the jury’s “no” vote that it found circumstances more closely aligned to those alleged by the defense, such as the absence of any collision (and even the absence of any snowmobile) whatsoever and other facts favorable to Sierra.
We first address the threshold question of whether unwanted contact with a snowmobile is, in general, an inherent risk of snowboarding. We conclude that it is.
On at least two occasions, this court has found a collision with resort equipment at a ski resort to be an inherent risk of the sport.
In Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 8, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Connelly), the plaintiff collided with an unpadded ski lift tower while skiing. In affirming summary judgment for the defendant, we found this risk was inherent in the sport, and the obvious danger of the tower served as its own warning. (Id. at p. 12.) In concluding that contact with the tower was an inherent risk of the sport, the Connelly court relied on Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Associates, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 111, 266 Cal. Rptr. 749, where a skier collided with a tree. Danieley, in turn, relied on a Michigan statute that set forth certain inherent risks of skiing, including both trees and “‘collisions with ski lift towers and their components'” along with properly marked or plainly visible “‘snow-making or snow-grooming [*18] equipment.'” (Id. at p. 123.) “[B]ecause the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act purports to reflect the pre-existing common law, we regard its statutory pronouncements as persuasive authority for what the common law in this subject-matter area should be in California.” (Ibid.)
In Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 262, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389 (Souza), a child skier collided with a plainly visible aluminum snowmaking hydrant located on a ski run. Following Connelly, we affirmed summary judgment for the defendant, finding the snowmaking hydrant was visible and a collision with it was an inherent risk of skiing. (Id. at p. 268.)
A snowmobile is not one of the risks specifically identified in the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act, and we have not found a published case specifically deciding whether a collision on a ski slope with a snowmobile is an inherent risk of skiing or snowboarding. Nevertheless, collision with certain vehicles has been included. While Souza involved only stationary equipment, the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act–which Danieley and Connelly accepted as reflecting the common law–included a collision with snow-grooming equipment as an inherent risk. Thus, collisions with some vehicles are recognized as inherent risks of the sports of skiing and snowboarding.
We recognize that assumption [*19] of the risk applies only to risks that are necessary to the sport. (Souza, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 268.) In Souza, snowmaking equipment was necessary to the sport of skiing because nature had failed to provide adequate snow. (Ibid.) As in Souza, we find the following quote from Verro v. New York Racing Ass’n, Inc. (1989) 142 A.D.2d 396, 400, 536 N.Y.S.2d 262 apt: “As is at least implicit in plaintiff’s argument, if only the risks of ordinary and necessary dangers inherent in a sport are deemed assumed, the doctrine of [primary] assumption of risk . . . would not apply to obvious, known conditions so long as a defendant could feasibly have provided safer conditions. Then, obviously, such risks would not be ‘necessary’ or ‘inherent’. This would effectively emasculate the doctrine, however, changing the critical inquiry . . . to whether the defendant had a feasible means to remedy [the dangers].”
Forrester’s expert Penniman claimed snowmobiles were merely a convenience and a ski resort could operate without them. He also testified, however, that the use of snowmobiles was a standard practice at ski resorts. Although critical of their overuse, Penniman recognized their usefulness in an emergency. He agreed with Sierra’s policy, which permitted snowmobiles to be used on the ski slopes in cases of emergency, [*20] even on the busiest days. Thus Penniman agreed generally that the use of snowmobiles was necessary to ski resorts, although he disputed the specific circumstances under which that use might be warranted.
There are many inherent risks of injury and emergency in skiing and snowboarding, and snowmobiles are used to respond quickly to injuries as well as to other emergencies such as lift malfunctions requiring evacuation, fire, gas leaks, and altercations. It appears to us that the use of snowmobiles on the ski slopes at ski resorts is at least as necessary to the sport as the snowmaking equipment in Souza or the directional signs acknowledged as “necessary” in Van Dyke v. S.K.I. Ltd. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1317, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 775.
At least one unpublished federal case has found a collision with a snowmobile to be an inherent risk of skiing or snowboarding. In Robinette v. Aspen Skiing Co., L.L.C. (D. Colo., Apr. 23, 2009, No. 08-CV-00052-MSK-MJW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34873, affd sub nom. Robinette v. Aspen Skiing Co., L.L.C. (10th Cir. 2010) 363 Fed.Appx. 547, the court found “the specific risk of colliding with a snowmobile being operated by a ski resort employee is necessarily within the ‘risks of skiing/riding.'” (Id. at p. *7.) The court reasoned that since “the legislature has seen fit to specifically enact safety measures to prevent skier-snowmobile collisions, one can [*21] hardly argue that such a collision somehow falls outside of [plaintiff’s] express assumption of ‘all risks of skiing.'”3 (Ibid.)
3 Although California has no similar regulation of snowmobiles at ski slopes, the requirements of the Colorado law are similar to Sierra-at-Tahoe’s policy for snowmobile operation. “All snowmobiles operated on the ski slopes or trails of a ski area shall be equipped with at least the following: One lighted headlamp, one lighted red tail lamp, a brake system maintained in operable condition, and a fluorescent flag at least forty square inches mounted at least six feet above the bottom of the tracks.” (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-44-108, subd. (3).)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not err in ruling that primary assumption of the risk applies in this case and instructing the jury accordingly. To the extent that the evidence showed a snowmobile was operating at the resort and involved in an collision with Forrester that day, its presence and that of related equipment (here apparently a towed toboggan) on the slope was an inherent risk of snowboarding at the resort. However, that risk may well have been unreasonably increased by Sierra if the specific circumstances alleged by Forrester regarding the snowmobile’s use at the time of the alleged collision were believed by the jury. But the jury was presented with a variety of competing scenarios as to what happened at the resort that day. Although we do not know which evidence it credited and which it did not, we know that it did not consider the specific circumstances of the snowmobile’s operation that day to have unreasonably increased the risk already present from the necessary use of snowmobiles at resorts.4
4 The better practice in cases such as this one, where key facts–here even the preliminary fact as to whether there was a collision at all, let alone a collision between a snowboarder and a snowmobile towing a toboggan–are in dispute, is to craft the special verdict form to require the jury to make preliminary factual findings, here such as whether the alleged accident occurred at all and the particulars, if so. (See CACI No. 410, Directions for Use [“There may also be disputed facts that must be resolved by a jury before it can be determined if the doctrine applies”], citing Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 486, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 165 P.3d 581.)
In arguing that a collision [*22] with a motorized vehicle is not an inherent risk, Forrester relies on out-of-state cases, some unpublished. We find those cases distinguishable or not persuasive. In Verberkmoes v. Lutsen Mountains Corp. (D. Minn. 1994) 844 F.Supp. 1356, a skier collided with an unmarked all terrain vehicle (ATV) parked on or near a groomed trail. The court denied summary judgment for the defendant, finding the hazard of the parked ATV was within the control of the ski resort, not an obvious risk like a lift tower, and not a hidden risk like a snow-covered stump. (Id. at pp. 1358-1359.) Defendant’s “parking of the ATV on the trail during routine maintenance of the ski slope cannot be deemed, as a matter of law, an inherent risk of skiing.” (Id. at p. 1360.) Rather, it was “a danger that reasonable prudence on the part [of defendant] would have foreseen and corrected or at least placed a warning for skiers.” (Id. at p. 1359.) We find Verberkmoes distinguishable, largely because the decision was based on where the ATV was parked; the ski resort could have easily parked it elsewhere or warned against the hazard. Here, the question was whether the resort’s use of snowmobiles on the ski slopes and consequential possibility of contact with snowboarders was an inherent risk of snowboarding.
In Schlumbrecht-Muniz v. Steamboat Ski and Resort Corp. (D. Colo. 2015) 132 F.Supp.3d 1310, the defendant had argued that [*23] a collision with a snowmobile is an inherent danger and risk of skiing. The court had rejected this argument twice before, each time concluding “whether a collision with a snowmobile is an inherent danger or risk of skiing is not necessarily a question of law because what is an inherent danger or risk of skiing is not limited to the circumstances specifically enumerated in the [Ski Safety Act].” (Id. at p. 1316.) The court declined to address the argument again. (Ibid.)
We find this conclusory analysis unhelpful. For the reasons stated ante, we find a collision with a snowmobile is an inherent risk of snowboarding. As to whether this particular collision was the result of the inherent risk, the jury was properly tasked with determining whether Sierra’s operation of the snowmobile unreasonably increased the risk already inherent in snowboarding. This determination governed whether this particular collision was barred by the assumption of the risk doctrine.
Forrester also relies on an unpublished case from the state of Ohio, Coblentz v. Peters 2005 Ohio 1102, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 1073, that found use of a motorized golf cart was not “an actual part of the sport of golf,” so the risk of being struck and injured by a golf cart “is not an ordinary risk of the game.” [*24] (Id. at ¶ 21.) To the limited extent this case is analogous, we decline to apply its narrow analysis to the sport of snowboarding and the associated risk of encountering the resort’s necessary equipment when on the ski slopes. (See Souza, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 269 [finding snowmaking equipment necessary to the sport of skiing].)
As we have noted, unlike many assumption of the risk cases, including those cited ante, here there is a genuine factual dispute as to what happened to Forrester and caused his injuries. The jury needed to resolve this factual dispute in order to determine whether Sierra unreasonably increased the inherent risk. Accordingly, the issue of whether recovery is barred by assumption of the risk could not be determined as a matter of law, such as by a motion for summary judgment, as is often the case. Here, we need not decide if Forrester’s specific collision was an inherent risk, but only the broader question of whether a collision with a snowmobile operated on the ski slopes of a resort is an inherent risk of snowboarding. If so, recovery is still possible if Sierra unreasonably increased the risk by the specific circumstances surrounding its operation of the snowmobile.
“Although defendants generally [*25] have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, it is well established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the sport. Thus, although a ski resort has no duty to remove moguls from a ski run, it clearly does have a duty to use due care to maintain its towropes in a safe, working condition so as not to expose skiers to an increased risk of harm.” (Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 315-316, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 834 P.2d 696.) Numerous cases have pondered the factual question of whether various ski resorts have increased the inherent risks of skiing or snowboarding. (See Vine, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 591 [redesign of snowboarding jump]; Solis v. Kirkwood Resort Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 354, 366, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 [construction of the unmarked race start area on the ski run]; Van Dyke v. S.K.I. Ltd., supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 1317 [placement of signs in ski run].)
Forrester contends that even if the ski patrol’s use of a snowmobile is necessary to support the sport of snowboarding, the evidence here showed the snowmobile was not used for that purpose. Indeed, he claims that because the members of the ski patrol on duty that day denied being involved in a collision, the evidence established that the snowmobile was driven by a non-safety employee. He argues the trial court was required [*26] to resolve factual questions as to whether a member of the ski patrol was using the snowmobile before it determined whether assumption of risk applied.
We disagree with Forrester that the trial court was required to resolve these factual questions before submitting the case to the jury. Resolution of the factual issues as to how and by whom the snowmobile was operated “requires application of the governing standard of care (the duty not to increase the risks inherent in the sport) to the facts of this particular case–the traditional role of the trier of fact.” (Luna v. Vela (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 102, 112, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588.) “Our conclusion it is for the trier of fact to determine whether Vela breached his limited duty not to increase the risks inherent in the sport of volleyball finds solid support in the Supreme Court’s most recent sports injury, primary assumption of the risk decision, Shin v. Ahn, supra, 42 Cal.4th 482 . . . . In Shin the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment brought by a golfer who had struck one of his own playing partners with a tee shot. The court held the primary assumption of the risk doctrine regulates the duty a golfer owes both to playing partners and to other golfers on the course, found being hit by a stray [*27] golf shot was an inherent risk of the sport and concluded ‘golfers have a limited duty of care to other players, breached only if they intentionally injure them or engage in conduct that is “so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.”‘ [Citation.] However, the Court also held whether the defendant had breached that limited duty of care by engaging in reckless conduct was a question for the trier of fact: ‘In determining whether defendant acted recklessly, the trier of fact will have to consider both the nature of the game and the totality of circumstances surrounding the shot. . . . [¶] Many factors will bear on whether a golfer’s conduct was reasonable, negligent, or reckless. . . . [¶] . . . This record is simply too sparse to support a finding, as a matter of law, that defendant did, or did not, act recklessly. This will be a question the jury will ultimately resolve based on a more complete examination of the facts.’ [Citation.]” (Luna, at pp. 112-113.) “In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shin, we conclude as the Luna court did, that resolving the question of whether [defendant] increased the risk of falling is properly decided by the trier [*28] of fact.” (Fazio v. Fairbanks Ranch Country Club (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1062, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566.)
Forrester’s argument about the circumstances of the snowmobile’s use that day is premised upon the jury’s accepting his version of events–that a snowmobile hit him from behind, while driven by a non-safety employee who was not responding to an emergency and who was operating without lights, siren, or flag and contrary to numerous safety policies of Sierra. In short, Forrester assumes that the snowmobile had no legitimate reason to be on Broadway at the time of the incident. But the state of the evidence was such that the jury could decide otherwise. Due to Forrester’s failure to report the accident when it happened, the conflicting testimony of Forrester and Medina, the conflict in expert testimony as to how a collision would have occurred and what caused Forrester’s injuries, and the absence of any independent witness who saw or even heard about the accident, the jury could have rationally concluded the accident did not happen at all. Alternatively, the jury could have concluded that Forrester hit the toboggan out of carelessness or recklessness, Forrester’s injuries were not from the collision, or simply that Forrester failed to prove his version of the accident.
This [*29] case turned in large part on the jury’s assessment of credibility. There was evidence from which the jury could conclude that the incident occurred as described by Forrester and Medina, and that Sierra unreasonably increased its visitors’ inherent risk of a collision with a snowmobile accordingly–because a non-safety employee, not responding to an emergency, drove a snowmobile at significant speed across a beginner run on the busiest day of the year without using lights, siren or a flag, and in contravention of numerous safety policies. These circumstances, or any combination thereof, could certainly constitute an unreasonable increase of the inherent risk by Sierra. Forrester’s theory was tendered to the jury and the jury decided adversely to his argument. Forrester does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.
The trial court did not err in determining assumption of the risk applied and submitting the case to the jury on the question of whether Sierra unreasonably increased the risk inherent in the sport of snowboarding.
Instruction on Secondary Assumption of the Risk
As we set forth ante, the jury was also instructed pursuant to CACI No. 405–the comparative [*30] fault instruction modified by the trial court–as to secondary assumption of the risk. The jury was told that in order for Sierra to succeed on its claim that Forrester contributed to his own harm, Sierra would need to prove both that Forrester assumed the risks that led to his injury and that Forrester’s assumption of those risks was a substantial factor in causing his harm.
The term “assumption of risk” has been “used in connection with two classes of cases: those in which the issue to be resolved was whether the defendant actually owed the plaintiff a duty of care (primary assumption of risk), and those in which the defendant had breached a duty of care but where the issue was whether the plaintiff had chosen to face the risk of harm presented by the defendant’s breach of duty (secondary assumption of risk). [Citation.] In the latter class of cases, we concluded, the issue could be resolved by applying the doctrine of comparative fault, and the plaintiff’s decision to face the risk would not operate as a complete bar to recovery. In such a case, the plaintiff’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of the risk functions as a form of contributory negligence. [Citation.]” (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 103, 75 P.3d 30.)
“Secondary assumption [*31] of risk [arises] where a defendant breaches a duty of care owed to the plaintiff but the plaintiff nevertheless knowingly encounters the risk created by the breach. Secondary assumption of risk is not a bar to recovery, but requires the application of comparative fault principles.” (Connelly, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.)
Forrester contends the special instruction on secondary assumption of the risk was incorrect because it omitted the requirement that a plaintiff “knowingly” or “voluntarily” accept the increased risk, and because the court failed to set it apart from the instruction related to primary assumption of the risk. Forrester contends the error prejudiced him because it confused the jury on the law.
As Sierra does not defend the instruction, we will assume arguendo that it is incorrect for omitting “knowingly” or “voluntarily.” We reject, however, the argument that it was error to instruct on secondary assumption of the risk immediately after instructing in the language of CACI No. 410 on primary assumption of the risk. Each instruction begins by noting the party whose claim the instruction addresses and what each party must prove to succeed on its claim. The two claims are necessarily related. “Nevertheless, in [*32] certain circumstances primary and secondary assumption of risk are intertwined and instruction is required so the jury can properly determine whether the defendant did, in fact, increase the risks inherent in a hazardous sport so that secondary assumption of risk should be considered.” (Vine, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 592.)
“Cases like this one, where the plaintiff contends the defendant breached the duty not to increase the risks inherent in a hazardous sporting activity, present both aspects of the assumption of risk doctrine. If the plaintiff fails to show any increase in the inherent risks, or if the trial court determines that the only risks encountered were inherent in the sport, the defendant prevails based on primary assumption of risk. If the jury, properly instructed on the scope of the defendant’s duty, determines the defendant did increase the inherent risk, it then considers the plaintiff’s claim based on secondary assumption of risk as an aspect of the plaintiff’s comparative fault.” (Vine, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 593.)
“[T]here is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’ prejudice applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission. A judgment may not be reversed for instructional error in a civil case [*33] ‘unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 580, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 882 P.2d 298 (Soule).)
“Instructional error in a civil case is prejudicial ‘where it seems probable’ that the error ‘prejudicially affected the verdict.’ [Citations.]” (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 580.) Actual prejudice must be assessed in the context of the entire record using a multifactor test. (Ibid.) “Thus, when deciding whether an error of instructional omission was prejudicial, the court must also evaluate (1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions, (3) the effect of counsel’s arguments, and (4) any indications by the jury itself that it was misled.” (Id. at pp. 580-581.)
Forrester contends the record demonstrates prejudice because there was strong evidence that Sierra increased the risk by its operation of a snowmobile that day, the jury deliberated for two full days, and the request for a definition of “unreasonable” suggests the jury was confused as to the law.
We disagree that the record shows it was “probable” that the instructional error “prejudicially affected the verdict.” (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 580.) As we have discussed, the evidence raised questions [*34] of witness credibility, and the jury was also called upon to consider conflicting expert testimony. The jury heard five days of evidence and deliberated for two days. In that circumstance, the jury’s two days of deliberation may suggest its “conscientious performance of its civic duty, rather than its difficulty in reaching a decision.” (People v. Walker (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 432, 439, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167 [six and one-half hours of deliberation after two and one-half hours of presentation of evidence].) The jury’s request for a definition of “unreasonable” and its request for a reread of evidence as to whether there was an emergency that day indicate the jury was most likely focused on Sierra’s conduct, not Forrester’s.
The most useful guide for the jury in sorting through the issues of primary and secondary assumption of the risk was the verdict form that separated the issues. The verdict form asked six questions; only if the jury answered yes to a question was it to proceed to the next question. The questions were: (1) Did Sierra or its employee unreasonably increase the risks inherent in snowboarding? (2) Was this unreasonable increase in the risks a substantial factor in causing harm to Forrester? (3) What are Forrester’s total damages? (4) Did [*35] Forrester assume the risks that led to his injury? (5) Was that assumption of risk a substantial factor in causing his injury? (6) What percentage of responsibility for Forrester’s harm do you assign to Sierra, to Forrester? The jury answered the first question “no” and therefore did not answer any other questions. Accordingly, the jury never reached the issue of secondary assumption of risk and thus never had to apply the challenged jury instruction. Forrester has failed to show prejudicial instructional error. (See Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 206, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 448 [error to grant new trial due to instructional error when jury never reached issue covered by instruction]; Vahey v. Sacia (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 171, 179-180, 178 Cal. Rptr. 559 [purported instructional error on damages was not prejudicial where jury found the defendant was not negligent and never reached the issue of damages].)
Refusal to Instruct on Willful Suppression of Evidence
At trial, Forrester made much of the fact that the snowmobile’s driver was never identified, which he blamed on Sierra’s failure to retain the daily checklist completed by the driver who had taken out the snowmobile that day. Before trial, Forrester sought to admit Sierra’s special ski permit and winter operation plan from the United States Forest [*36] Service. He argued Sierra was required to maintain the checklist under the document retention policy set forth in that plan. The trial court excluded the document, ruling that whether Sierra had a contractual duty to retain the report was irrelevant, particularly because–given the evidence that the snowmobile could be used by multiple people in the same day–the checklist would not necessarily indicate who was driving a snowmobile at the time of the alleged accident. The court noted that Sierra had provided Forrester with a list of 19 authorized drivers.
Forrester requested that the trial court give CACI No. 204, which provides: “You may consider whether one party intentionally concealed or destroyed evidence. If you decide that a party did so, you may decide that the evidence would have been unfavorable to that party.” The request was based on evidence that MacClellan failed to interview all 19 people authorized to use a snowmobile that day and the destruction of the checklist. The court denied Forrester’s request.
Forrester raised the failure to give CACI No. 204 in his motion for a new trial.
Forrester contends it was error to refuse the requested instruction. For the first time on appeal, he asserts [*37] the snowmobile driver’s leaving the scene of the accident without identifying himself was sufficient evidence to support the instruction. As to the destruction of the checklist, the basis for instruction advanced at trial, Forrester argues there was no evidence the checklist was actually discarded, only that the practice was to discard the checklists daily. He contends he was prejudiced by lack of the instruction because he could not argue the presumption that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to Sierra to offset the inability to identify the driver.
“A party is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case, if it is reasonable and finds support in the pleadings and evidence or any inference which may properly be drawn from the evidence.” (Western Decor & Furnishings Industries, Inc. v. Bank of America (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 293, 309, 154 Cal. Rptr. 287.) An instruction on willful suppression of evidence is appropriate if there is evidence “that a party destroyed evidence with the intention of preventing its use in litigation.” (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1434, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 457.)
First, Forrester did not rely at trial on the theory that evidence was destroyed when the snowmobile driver left without identifying himself. “‘A civil litigant must propose complete instructions in accordance with his or her theory of the litigation [*38] and a trial court is not “obligated to seek out theories [a party] might have advanced, or to articulate for him that which he has left unspoken.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Stevens v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1645, 1653, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525.) Thus we need not consider this new theory first advanced on appeal.
Further, the evidence established the checklist had been discarded shortly after the accident, before Forrester made his complaint. While there was no testimony from the person who discarded the checklist for that day and MacClellan testified he did not know if the specific checklist had been discarded, Rice testified the checklists were thrown out on a daily basis and MacClellan testified he knew they were thrown out shortly after they were filled out.
Forrester relies on Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 861, claiming it is “right on point.” In Ventura, a negligent hiring and supervision case, the trial court gave the instruction at issue here based on testimony of the human resources director about redactions in personnel records and the defendant’s failure to interview certain witnesses during the investigation of plaintiff’s complaints. (Id. at p. 273.) The appellate court found no error, noting “Defendants were free to present the jury with evidence that (as counsel represented to the [*39] court), the redactions were only of telephone numbers, and that the failure to interview certain witnesses was proper, and to argue that evidence to the jury.” (Ibid.)
Ventura is distinguishable. There, the actions that supported the instruction occurred during the investigation of plaintiff’s claim, thus permitting an inference there was destruction of evidence to prevent its use in litigation. Here, the evidence was that the snowmobile checklists were routinely discarded each day long before the incident at issue here, unless information on the checklist triggered a need for maintenance. Because Forrester did not report his accident until multiple days had passed, Sierra did not become aware of Forrester’s claim until after the checklist at issue had been discarded. There was no evidence, either direct or from which the inference could be drawn, that the practice of discarding the checklists daily was intended to forestall their use in litigation.
The trial court did not err in declining to give CACI No. 204 on willful suppression of evidence.5
5 Further, Forrester’s claim of prejudice is unconvincing. The instruction permits the jury to draw the inference that the suppressed evidence would have been unfavorable to the party suppressing it. The checklist would have shown, at most, the name of the snowmobile driver. Sierra stipulated that the driver was one of its employees and provided Forrester with a list of authorized drivers.
The judgment is affirmed. Sierra shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
/s/ Duarte, J.
/s/ Butz, Acting P. J.
/s/ Mauro, J.
§ 409.6. Power of peace officers to close area after avalanche; Unauthorized entry
(a) Whenever a menace to the public health or safety is created by an avalanche, officers of the Department of the California Highway Patrol, police departments, or sheriff’s offices, any officer or employee of the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection designated a peace officer by subdivision (g) of Section 830.2, and any officer or employee of the Department of Parks and Recreation designated a peace officer by subdivision (f) of Section 830.2, may close the area where the menace exists for the duration thereof by means of ropes, markers, or guards to any and all persons not authorized by that officer to enter or remain within the closed area.
If an avalanche creates an immediate menace to the public health, the local health officer may close the area where the menace exists pursuant to the conditions which are set forth above in this section.
(b) Officers of the Department of the California Highway Patrol, police departments, or sheriff’s offices, or officers of the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection designated as peace officers by subdivision (g) of Section 830.2, may close the immediate area surrounding any emergency field command post or any other command post activated for the purpose of abating hazardous conditions created by an avalanche to any and all unauthorized persons pursuant to the conditions which are set forth in this section whether or not that field command post or other command post is located near the avalanche.
(c) Any unauthorized person who willfully and knowingly enters an area closed pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) and who willfully remains within that area, or any unauthorized person who willfully remains within an area closed pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b), after receiving notice to evacuate or leave from a peace officer named in subdivision (a) or (b), shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. If necessary, a peace officer named in subdivision (a) or (b) may use reasonable force to remove from the closed area any unauthorized person who willfully remains within that area after receiving notice to evacuate or leave.
(d) Nothing in this section shall prevent a duly authorized representative of any news service, newspaper, or radio or television station or network from entering the areas closed pursuant to this section.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2015 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
By Recreation Law Recemail@example.comJames H. Moss
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, California, Avalanche, Emergency, Closure, Power to Close Land,