New Jersey Supreme Court holds the Rescue Doctrine only applies to rescuing people and not property unless rescuing the property saves people.

Family sues after wife is injured attempting to rescue neighbor’s dog. Supreme court holds rescuing a dog does not qualify under the rescue doctrine.

Samolyk v. Berthe (N.J. 2022)

State: New Jersey; Supreme Court of New Jersey

Plaintiff: Ann Samolyk and John Samolyk

Defendant: Dorothy Berthe, III, Defendant, and Ilona Destefanis and Robert Destefanis

Plaintiff Claims: Rescue Doctrine

Defendant Defenses:

Holding: For the Defendants

Year: 2022

Summary

The rescue doctrine in New Jersey can only be used to recover for injuries sustained when rescuing a person. Rescuing property, in this case a dog, does not apply.

Facts

This matter arises from injuries sustained by plaintiff Ann Samolyk while trying to rescue a dog owned by defendants Ilona and Robert DeStefanis. Ann’s[1] husband, John Samolyk, filed a civil action against defendants, as Ann’s guardian ad litem, alleging defendants were liable under the rescue doctrine by negligently allowing their dog to fall or jump into the canal that borders their property, prompting Ann to dive into the water to prevent the dog from drowning. The complaint also included a per quod claim by John seeking compensation for any loss or impairment of his spouse’s services, society, and companionship due to injuries Ann sustained as a proximate result of defendants’ negligence.

The parties are neighbors in Forked River, an unincorporated bayfront community within Lacey Township. Their homes are situated on a canal. In the evening of July 13, 2017, defendants’ dog fell or jumped into the canal that snakes around the rear area of this shore community. Ann claimed she heard someone calling for help to rescue their dog that had fallen into the canal.[2] A report filed by a Lacey police officer describes the incident as “a report of a dog swimming in the lagoon.” The report states that Ann “entered the lagoon to rescue the dog.” The dog “was removed from the lagoon,” without any apparent harm, by defendants’ son and a family friend. Regrettably, Ann was found “unconscious on a floating dock.” In response to defendants’ interrogatories, plaintiffs allege Ann sustained neurological and cognitive injuries as a result of the incident.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The basic claim of the plaintiff was

“Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that defendants “invited the rescue because the dog was in peril, . . . [and Ann] would not [have] jump[ed] in the lagoon and [nearly] drown[ed] but for the dog being in there and people screaming about having to rescue the dog.”

The rescue doctrine allows an injured rescuer to recover damages from the person who placed another in peril or placed themselves in peril.

The rescue doctrine established in Wagner was originally limited to situations “where three persons are involved, i.e., one party by his culpable act has placed another person in a position of imminent peril which invites a third person, the rescuing plaintiff, to come to his aid.” New York courts later expanded the rescue doctrine “to encompass a two-party situation where the culpable party has placed himself in a perilous position which invites rescue.”

The New Jersey Supreme Court found the claims of the plaintiff wanted to expand the rescue doctrine to the injuries received from rescuing property.

In this appeal, we are asked to expand the scope of the rescue doctrine to include those who voluntarily choose to expose themselves to significant danger in an effort to safeguard the property of another. We decline to modify the rescue doctrine to incorporate such a far-reaching departure from the fundamental principles embedded in Wagner.

Several states have expanded the rescue doctrine to cover property; however, the NJ Supreme Court declined to extend the doctrine in New Jersey. Unless the property being rescued would result in saving a human life, the rescue doctrine could not be used to recover for injuries of the rescuer.

Against this analytical backdrop, we decline to expand the rescue doctrine to include injuries sustained to protect property, except in settings in which the plaintiff has acted to shield human life.

The court then wrote an example of how the rescue doctrine could be used in a case like this.

Following that line of reasoning, plaintiffs’ cause of action would have survived a motion for summary judgment had she jumped into the canal after defendants’ dog as a simultaneous reaction to seeing a child of tender years running after the animal and quickly approaching the edge of the dock. In that hypothetical situation, Ann’s actions to protect the child from imminent danger by rescuing the dog may have been reasonable and could therefore have served as the basis for a cognizable cause of action under the rescue doctrine.

Here the sole cause of the plaintiff’s injuries came from her desire to rescue property, a dog.

By contrast, the uncontested evidence here shows that Ann’s actions were based solely on her perception of danger to the dog’s life. These nuanced distinctions are intended to acknowledge and reaffirm the public policy underpinning the rescue doctrine in our state, to wit, the protection of human life. Thus, plaintiffs’ complaint was properly dismissed because Ann’s decision to jump into the canal to save the dog’s life does not give rise to a cognizable claim under the rescue doctrine.

So Now What?

The rescue doctrine started out, as stated above that someone who rescued someone who had been placed in peril by another could recover for their injuries from the party at fault, the party that placed the person in peril.

The doctrine has expanded from what once was an attempt to punish those who created problems and reward those who solved the problem to providing money to someone who tried to help.

The rescue doctrine does not apply to commercial guides and outfitters because they have a higher duty to keep their customers safe and as such, no matter how the person came to be in peril; it is the fault of the outfitter or guide and their responsibility to rescue them.

The rescue doctrine is interpreted differently in every state, so make sure you understand it before you attempt to recover for your injuries.

Other cases that talk about the Rescue Doctrine see:

Great analysis of the “Rescue Doctrine” in a ballooning case from South Dakota http://rec-law.us/1HCQ0Px

Jim Moss is an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the outdoor recreation community. He represents guides, guide services, outfitters both as businesses and individuals and the products they use for their business. He has defended Mt. Everest guide services, summer camps, climbing rope manufacturers; avalanche beacon manufactures and many more manufacturers and outdoor industries. Contact Jim at Jim@Rec-Law.us

Jim is the author or co-author of six books about the legal issues in the outdoor recreation world; the latest is Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law.

To see Jim’s complete bio go here and to see his CV you can find it here.

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Samolyk v. Berthe (N.J. 2022)

Posted: April 24, 2023 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, New Jersey, Search and Rescue (SAR), Uncategorized | Tags: New Jersey, New Jersey Supreme Court, Person in Peril, Rescue, Rescue Doctrine, Supreme Court | Leave a comment

Ann Samolyk and John Samolyk, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Dorothy Berthe, III, Defendant,

and Ilona Destefanis and Robert Destefanis, Defendants-Respondents.

No. A-16-21

Supreme Court of New Jersey

June 13, 2022

Argued February 1, 2022

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.

William D. Wright argued the cause for appellants (The Wright Law Firm, attorneys; William D. Wright and David T. Wright, on the briefs).

John Burke argued the cause for respondents (Burke & Potenza, attorneys; John Burke, of counsel and on the brief).

FUENTES, P.J.A.D. (temporarily assigned), writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers whether to expand the common law rescue doctrine to permit plaintiffs to recover damages for injuries sustained as a proximate result of attempting to rescue defendants’ dog.

Plaintiff Ann Samolyk sustained neurological and cognitive injuries when she entered a lagoon in Forked River to rescue her neighbors’ dog, which had fallen or jumped into the water. Samolyk’s husband filed a civil action against defendants, alleging they were liable under the rescue doctrine by negligently allowing their dog to fall or jump into the water, prompting Samolyk to attempt to save the dog.

Neither the Law Division nor the Appellate Division found the doctrine applicable. The Court granted certification. 248 N.J. 518 (2021).

HELD: After reviewing the noble principles that infuse the public policy underpinning this cause of action, the Court declines to consider property, in whatever form, to be equally entitled to the unique value and protection bestowed on a human life. The Court nevertheless expands the rescue doctrine to include acts that appear to be intended to protect property but are in fact reasonable measures ultimately intended to protect a human life.

1. Under the rescue doctrine, “[t]he state that leaves an opening in a bridge is liable to the child that falls into the stream, but liable also to the parent who plunges to its aid.” Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437-38 (N.Y. 1921). The doctrine has also been held to provide a source of recovery to one who is injured while undertaking the rescue of another who has negligently placed himself in peril. Thus, an actor is liable for harm sustained by a rescuer where the conduct of the actor has created a danger only to himself, if at the time of such conduct he should reasonably anticipate that others might attempt to rescue him from his self-created peril, and sustain harm in doing so. The Restatement (Second) of Torts and a majority of states have extended the rescue doctrine to efforts to save property. (pp. 6-11)

2. The Court declines to expand the rescue doctrine to include injuries sustained to protect property, except in settings in which the plaintiff has acted to shield human life. Notwithstanding the strong emotional attachment people may have to dogs, cats, and other domesticated animals, or the great significance some may attribute to family heirlooms, or works of art generally considered as irreplaceable parts of our cultural history, sound public policy cannot sanction expanding the rescue doctrine to imbue property with the same status and dignity uniquely conferred upon a human life. The risk protected by the rescue doctrine is calibrated only by the reasonableness of the actions taken by the rescuer because all human life is equally precious. The same calculation, considering the necessarily subjective attachments to property, would prove untenable. (p. 12)

3. The Court explains that certain preemptive acts that appear to be driven by the protection of property are, at their core, adjuncts to the protection of human life and thus may give rise to a cause of action under the rescue doctrine. By contrast, the uncontested evidence here shows that Samolyk’s actions were based solely on her perception of danger to the dog’s life. The complaint was properly dismissed because the decision to jump into the canal to save the dog’s life does not give rise to a cognizable claim under the rescue doctrine. (pp. 13-14)

AFFIRMED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUDGE FUENTES’s opinion.

OPINION

FUENTES JUDGE (temporarily assigned).

This appeal requires this Court to determine whether to expand the common law rescue doctrine to permit plaintiffs to recover damages for injuries sustained as a proximate result of attempting to rescue defendants’ dog. After reviewing the noble principles that infuse the public policy underpinning this cause of action, we decline to consider property, in whatever form, to be equally entitled to the unique value and protection we bestow on a human life. We nevertheless expand the cognizable scope of the rescue doctrine to include acts that facially appear to be intended to protect property, but are in fact reasonable measures ultimately intended to protect a human life.

This matter arises from injuries sustained by plaintiff Ann Samolyk while trying to rescue a dog owned by defendants Ilona and Robert DeStefanis. Ann’s^[1] husband, John Samolyk, filed a civil action against defendants, as Ann’s guardian ad litem, alleging defendants were liable under the rescue doctrine by negligently allowing their dog to fall or jump into the canal that borders their property, prompting Ann to dive into the water to prevent the dog from drowning. The complaint also included a per quod claim by John seeking compensation for any loss or impairment of his spouse’s services, society, and companionship due to injuries Ann sustained as a proximate result of defendants’ negligence.

The parties are neighbors in Forked River, an unincorporated bayfront community within Lacey Township. Their homes are situated on a canal. In the evening of July 13, 2017, defendants’ dog fell or jumped into the canal that snakes around the rear area of this shore community. Ann claimed she heard someone calling for help to rescue their dog that had fallen into the canal.^[2] A report filed by a Lacey police officer describes the incident as “a report of a dog swimming in the lagoon.” The report states that Ann “entered the lagoon to rescue the dog.” The dog “was removed from the lagoon,” without any apparent harm, by defendants’ son and a family friend. Regrettably, Ann was found “unconscious on a floating dock.” In response to defendants’ interrogatories, plaintiffs allege Ann sustained neurological and cognitive injuries as a result of the incident.

After joinder of issue and the parties’ answers to interrogatories, as well as production of relevant documentary evidence, but before the parties took depositions, the Law Division judge assigned to manage the case directed the parties to file dispositive motions addressing whether plaintiffs raised a cognizable claim under the rescue doctrine.

Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that defendants “invited the rescue because the dog was in peril, . . . [and Ann] would not [have] jump[ed] in the lagoon and [nearly] drown[ed] but for the dog being in there and people screaming about having to rescue the dog.” In rebuttal, defense counsel noted that no court in this State had extended the rescue doctrine to apply to the protection of property. The Law Division judge agreed with defendants’ position. The judge noted he was not empowered “to start defining what level of property is worth risking a human life.”

The Appellate Division reached the same conclusion in an unpublished opinion, noting that “no reported case from any New Jersey court has applied the rescue doctrine to support a cause of action brought by the rescuer of real or personal property against a defendant who, through his negligence, placed the property in peril.”

The Appellate Division’s thoughtful opinion recognized, however, that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 472 (Am. Law Inst. 1965) has extended the rescue doctrine to the protection of property. Plaintiffs also relied on caselaw from our sister states tracking the Restatement’s approach. Although the Appellate Division found that “[s]ome of that authority is persuasive and raises a legitimate question [as to] why the rescue doctrine should be limited to the rescue of another human being,” it nevertheless declined to expand the scope of this common law doctrine in deference to its role as an intermediate appellate court.

This Court granted plaintiffs’ petition for certification to determine whether the rescue doctrine extends to property, specifically here, a dog. 248 N.J. 518 (2021).

II.

The parties rely on the arguments they made before the Appellate Division. Plaintiffs urge this Court to rely on the Restatement, as the majority of our sister states have done, and extend the rescue doctrine to protect property. In response, defendants argue it is unclear whether a majority of states have extended the doctrine to protect property, and they emphasize that New Jersey courts have consistently applied the rescue doctrine to encourage voluntary exposure to danger only to protect human life.

III.

This Court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court. Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511 (2019). We must “consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.” Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); R. 4:46-2(c). The issue before us concerns the development of our state’s common law, a responsibility exclusively entrusted to this Court. See DCPP v. J.R.-R., 248 N.J. 353, 373 (2021).

The rescue doctrine is best described by quoting the words of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, then Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, in Wagner v. International Railway Co.:

Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer. The state that leaves an opening in a bridge is liable to the child that falls into the stream, but liable also to the parent who plunges to its aid.

[133 N.E. 437, 437-38 (N.Y. 1921).]

The rescue doctrine established in Wagner was originally limited to situations “where three persons are involved, i.e., one party by his culpable act has placed another person in a position of imminent peril which invites a third person, the rescuing plaintiff, to come to his aid.” See Provenzo v. Sam, 244 N.E.2d 26, 28 (N.Y. 1968). New York courts later expanded the rescue doctrine “to encompass a two-party situation where the culpable party has placed himself in a perilous position which invites rescue.” Ibid.

The rescue doctrine “has long been a part of our State’s social fabric.” Saltsman v. Corazo, 317 N.J.Super. 237, 248 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting Burns
v. Mkt. Transition Facility, 281 N.J.Super. 304, 310 (App. Div. 1995)). The doctrine has been applied “to situations where the rescuer . . . sues the rescued victim who is either completely, or partially, at fault for creating the peril that invited the rescue.” Id. at 249. The Appellate Division has consistently applied the doctrine to cases where the rescuer is injured when trying to rescue another person. See id. at 247; Blackburn v. Broad St. Baptist Church, 305 N.J.Super. 541, 544-46 (App. Div. 1997); Tornatore v. Selective Ins. Co. of
Am., 302 N.J.Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1997). The first time this Court directly considered the rescue doctrine was in Ruiz v. Mero, a case in which we affirmed the Appellate Division’s opinion, which held that the Legislature abrogated the “firefighters’ rule”^[3] when it adopted N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-21. 189 N.J. 525, 527 (2007). In Ruiz, a unanimous Court upheld the right of a police officer to rely on the rescue doctrine to sue “a commercial landowner for injuries he suffered when quelling a disturbance at the owner’s bar.” Ibid. In the course of explaining the statute’s unambiguous conflict with the firefighters’ rule, Justice Long noted the rescue doctrine was “[d]eeply rooted” in our state’s common law and “provides a source of recovery to one who is injured while undertaking the rescue of another who has negligently placed himself in peril.” Id. at 528-29.

In Estate of Desir v. Vertus, we reviewed the applicability of the rescue doctrine in the context of a “tragic shooting death of an individual by a criminal fleeing from a business.” 214 N.J. 303, 308 (2013). The estate of the victim filed a civil action against the defendant based in part on the rescue doctrine. Ibid. We held the defendant did not negligently create the danger that caused the decedent to come to his aid because the

evolution of the rescue doctrine remains grounded upon essential tort concepts of duty and foreseeability. As the doctrine has been explained, an actor is liable for harm sustained by a rescuer “where the conduct of the actor has created a danger only to himself, if at the time of such conduct he should reasonably anticipate that others might attempt to rescue him from his self-created peril, and sustain harm in doing so.”

[Id at 321 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 445 cmt. d).]

Those cases illustrate that, as the guardians of our state’s common law, this Court has limited the application of the rescue doctrine to reflect the sound public policy Justice Cardozo eloquently described in Wagner.

We acknowledge that the Restatement (Second) of Torts extends the rescue doctrine to property and provides that

[i]t is not contributory negligence for a plaintiff to expose himself to danger in an effort to save himself or a third person, or the land or chattels of the plaintiff or a third person, from harm, unless the effort itself is an unreasonable one, or the plaintiff acts unreasonably in the course of it.

[§ 472 (emphasis added).]

See also Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 44 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining that, “[a]lthough there has been some disagreement, the great majority of courts now apply the [rescue doctrine] to one who tries to rescue the property of another, even when under no duty to do so, and even though the property involved is that of the defendant”).

The Second Restatement, however, acknowledges that “a plaintiff may run a greater risk to his own personal safety in a reasonable effort to save the life of a third person than he could run in order to save the animate or inanimate chattels of his neighbor or even of himself.” § 472 cmt. a. Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm includes the extension to property, noting: “This Section is also applicable to a rescuer of imperiled property, whether that property is owned by another or by the rescuer.” § 32, cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 2010).

A majority of our sister states that have extended the rescue doctrine to cover property have done so in accord with the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See, e.g., Estate of Newton v. McNew, 698 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo.App. 1984) (holding that the doctrine is applicable to property after finding that a “majority of states apply” the doctrine to “one who tries to rescue the property of another”); Neff v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc’y, 529 P.2d 294, 296 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (finding the doctrine applicable to property and noting that “[t]he majority of courts . . . have extended [the doctrine] to include situations where property is in danger of being severely damaged or destroyed”); Henjum v. Bok, 110 N.W.2d 461, 463 (Minn. 1961) (holding that the doctrine is applicable “where an attempt is being made to save human life or property”).

Other jurisdictions have declined to expand the rescue doctrine to include the protection of property. For example, the Missouri Eastern District Court of Appeals held in Welch v. Hesston Corp. that, “[u]nlike a majority of other jurisdictions,” it has consistently declined to extend the rescue doctrine to include the protection of property. 540 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Mo.Ct.App. 1976). The court explained that

[t]he policy basis of the distinction in treatment of rescuers of persons and rescuers of property seems “to rest upon that high regard in which the law holds human life and limb; whereas, when mere property is involved, one may not voluntarily subject another to greater liability than that which he seeks to avert.”

[Id. at 129-30 (quoting Tayer v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 119 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Mo. 1937)).]

IV.

Against this analytical backdrop, we decline to expand the rescue doctrine to include injuries sustained to protect property, except in settings in which the plaintiff has acted to shield human life. We are convinced that any attempt to reform the application of the rescue doctrine to include the protection of property, whether animate or inanimate, realty or chattel, must emanate from our innate instinct to protect human life. Notwithstanding the strong emotional attachment people may have to dogs, cats, and other domesticated animals, or the great significance some may attribute to family heirlooms, or works of art generally considered as irreplaceable parts of our cultural history, sound public policy cannot sanction expanding the rescue doctrine to imbue property with the same status and dignity uniquely conferred upon a human life.

The words uttered by Justice Cardozo describe the contours of a cause of action that tolerates a concomitant degree of harm a plaintiff is reasonably willing to risk and, if necessary, endure to protect a human life. The risk factor is calibrated only by the reasonableness of the actions taken by the rescuer because all human life is equally precious. The same calculation, considering the necessarily subjective attachments to property, would prove untenable.

We are also aware, however, that certain preemptive acts that appear to be driven by the protection of property are, at their core, adjuncts to the protection of human life and thus may give rise to a cause of action under the rescue doctrine. For example, consider a neighbor who reports a fire in a nearby house to the proper authorities, then attempts to squelch the fire based on a reasonable, good faith belief that children or other vulnerable inhabitants may be in immediate danger, or because it appears likely the fire may spread to other occupied properties. Under those circumstances, if the fire was negligently started, the neighbor may have a cognizable basis to invoke the rescue doctrine to recover damages for injuries caused by the preemptive measures taken to limit the intensity of the fire, even if it is later determined there was no actual risk to human life because the house was unoccupied.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUDGE FUENTES’s opinion.

———

Notes:

^[1] We refer to plaintiffs by their first names because they share the same last name. We do not intend any disrespect.

^[2] Although defendants dispute this part of the facts presented to the Law Division, we will accept them as accurate for the purpose of addressing the dispositive legal issue raised by the parties.

^[3] The firefighters’ rule was a common law affirmative defense absolving the owner or occupier of land of liability “to a paid fireman for negligence with respect to the creation of a fire.” Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 273 (1960).

———

Ski Area not liable when skiers leave the ski run and collide with snow making equipment in Michigan.

Posted: October 2, 2022 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Michigan, Ski Area | Tags: fatality, Michigan Michigan Ski Area Safety Act, Michigan SASA, SASA, Schuss Mountain, ski run, Snow Making, Snow Making Equipment | Leave a comment

Litigation ensued because an important term in the Michigan’s Ski Area Safety Act was not defined in the act. What is a ski run?

Round v. Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC (Mich. App. 2022)

State: Michigan; Court of Appeals of Michigan

Plaintiff: Cheryle A. Round, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles R. Round

Defendant: Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC, Schuss Mountain

Plaintiff Claims: negligence action, alleging that defendant failed to comply with duties imposed under the SASA

Defendant Defenses: Release

Holding: For the defendant ski area

Year: 2022

Summary

Lawsuit against a ski area was based on a term in the statute that was not defined, forcing the court to define the term. What is a ski run? The decedent skied into snow making equipment and died. If on the ski run, the equipment must be marked. The equipment was not marked. The court also ruled over and embankment, not on snow and 15-25 feet from the edge of the run, the snow making equipment was not on the ski run.

Facts

On December 21, 2019, plaintiff’s decedent, Charles R. Round, died after allegedly sustaining fatal injuries when he collided with snow-making equipment at Schuss Mountain, a ski area owned and operated by defendant. At the time, Round was participating in an event called the Tannenbaum Blitzen parade whereby volunteer skiers ski down an unlit hill-known as Kingdom Come-at night while carrying lighted torches, eventually getting to the bottom of the hill to light the ski resort’s Christmas tree. Round was leading the parade of skiers-as he had for several years-when he suddenly veered to his left and skied beyond the edge of the ski run. A ski lift was located on the edge of the ski run and, underneath the ski lift, were four permanent snow-making machines installed at various points up the hill. At about the half-way point of the ski hill, Round crossed into this area, collided with a snow-making machine, and sustained severe injuries that proved fatal.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

Pursuant to Michigan’s Ski Area Safety Act, a ski area is not liable for injuries to its patrons for collisions with snow making equipment if the snow making equipment is “properly marked or plainly visible.”

§ 408.342. Duties of skier in ski area; acceptance of dangers.

(2) Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment.

The plaintiff argued the snow making equipment was not marked and had to be marked because it was located on the ski run. The defendant argued that the snow making equipment was not on the ski run. Ski run is not defined by the Michigan’s Ski Area Safety Act. The Michigan Appellate Court then had to use the plain meeting of the terms to derive a definition.

At minimum, the plain meaning of the phrase “ski run” for purposes of the SASA must include a path or route expected to be used for skiing down a hill. Indeed, ski runs are named, designed, constructed, groomed, and designated as the route skiers are to use for skiing down a particular hill. As this Court similarly noted in Rhoda v O’Dovero, Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals: “Although the SASA does not define the terms ‘run,’ ‘slope’ or ‘trail,’ the plain, ordinary and common meanings of these terms encompass the paths a skier or snowboarder takes to get down a hill, including those paths designed and constructed by the ski operator for precisely that purpose.”

The court then went into the depositions presented by the defendant, witnesses who described the location of the snow making equipment when the deceased hit it.

The decedent was found 22′ off the run, over an embankment under the snow gun. It took several repetitions to move the deceased in a toboggan from where he was back up to the ski run.

The court reasoned if the snow gun which the deceased collided with was located on the trail, the other skiers following him would have hit the snow gun also.

The Appellate court sent the case back to the trail court with an order to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case.

So Now What?

Short and sweet, but educational because of the issues the statute left out. Michigan’s Ski Area Safety Act is a combination of a skier safety act and a tramway act. Consequently, it is quite long with little have much to do with how the ski area is to operate. The act has definitions but most deal with the structure of the tramway issues.

When one term, as in this case ski run is used to defined part of a statute, that term needs to be defined, or we end up in a position like this, litigation to define what is a ski run.

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Round v. Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC (Mich. App. 2022)

Posted: October 2, 2022 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Michigan, Ski Area | Tags: fatality, Michigan SASA, Michigan Ski Area Safety Act, Schuss Mountain, ski run, Snow Making Equipment | Leave a comment

Round v. Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC (Mich. App. 2022)

CHERYLE A. ROUND, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF CHARLES R. ROUND, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
v.
TRINIDAD RESORT & CLUB, LLC,Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.

No. 357849

Court of Appeals of Michigan

September 15, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Antrim County Circuit Court LC No. 20-009218-NO

Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Garrett and Yates, JJ.

Per Curiam

Defendant appeals by leave granted^[1] an order denying its motion for summary disposition which asserted that it was entitled to immunity under Michigan’s Ski Area Safety Act (SASA), MCL 408.321 et seq., because plaintiff could not demonstrate noncompliance with a statutory duty; the snow-making equipment that plaintiff’s decedent collided with was not located on the ski run so a warning sign was not required. We agree and reverse.

On June 24, 2020, Round’s wife, Cheryle A. Round, filed this negligence action, alleging that defendant failed to comply with duties imposed under the SASA, including by:

a. Failing to ensure that the snow-making equipment was properly marked or plainly visible to skiers;

b. Failing to properly light the ski area during the event;

c. Failing to mark the snow-making machine with a visible sign or other warning device to warn approaching skiers;

d. Failing to construct or maintain physical barriers to prevent skiers from colliding with the snow-making machine; and

e. Failing to install protective padding around the snow-making machine to prevent serious injuries from collisions.

In response to plaintiff’s complaint, defendant asserted affirmative defenses, including that it was immune and plaintiff’s claim was barred by the SASA. Defendant also filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract, indemnification, and other claims based on the release Round had signed.

On November 2, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (C)(10) as to defendant’s defense of immunity under the SASA. Plaintiff argued that her decedent collided with a snow-making machine that was neither properly marked nor plainly visible during the nighttime event; thus, the SASA did not presume-as set forth under MCL 408.342(2)-that her decedent assumed the risk of being injured in this situation. Defendant responded to plaintiff’s motion arguing, in relevant part, that plaintiff’s decedent assumed the risk of skiing in the event and signed a release to that effect. But, further, defendant owed no duty to mark or make plainly visible the snow-making machine at issue because it was 10 feet tall and was not located on the ski run.

On January 4, 2021, the trial court rendered its decision and order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition holding, in relevant part, that “the injury causing hazard (e.g. the snow-making equipment) was neither properly marked nor plainly visible, [and thus], the Decedent cannot be said to have assumed the inherent risk of the hazard and recovery is not precluded by SASA.”

Defendant filed its application for leave to appeal the trial court’s order which was denied “for failure to persuade the Court of the need for immediate appellate review.” See Round v Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 18, 2021 (Docket No. 356123).

On April 27, 2021, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10), arguing that defendant strictly complied with its duties mandated by the SASA. And contrary to plaintiff’s claims, defendant had no duty under the SASA to light, mark, or pad the snow-making machine at issue because it is undisputed that (1) the ski run was not open to the public when plaintiff’s decedent was fatally injured, (2) the snow-making machine extended more than six feet above the snow surface; it was ten feet above the snow surface, and (3) the snow-making machine was located off of the ski run; it was nine feet away from the groomed edge of the ski run known as Kingdom Come. Moreover, plaintiff’s decedent breached his duties under the SASA to “maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.” MCL 408.341(1). The video evidence showed that plaintiff’s decedent abruptly departed from the ski run without effort to correct his course before striking the snow-making machine. Defendant supported its motion with numerous exhibits, including deposition testimony transcripts, affidavits, an incident report, and photographs.

Plaintiff responded to defendant’s motion for summary disposition arguing, in relevant part, that the trial court already decided that plaintiff’s decedent did not assume the risk in this case, and thus, defendant was not entitled to immunity under the SASA. Further, plaintiff argued, (1) the ski run was open to the public when this incident occurred, (2) the snow-making machine was less than 6 feet above the snow surface when plaintiff’s expert, Stanley Gale, performed a site visit on March 6, 2021, and (3) the snow-making machine was located on the skiable portion of the trail, as Gale also determined, but, in any case, “it is the snow-making operations that must be located on the ski run-not the snow-making equipment itself.” Plaintiff supported her response with exhibits, including Gale’s investigative report.

Defendant replied to plaintiff’s response to its motion for summary disposition, arguing that (1) the ski run was not open to the public at the time of the accident, a fact supported by the deposition testimony of witnesses, the incident report, and even the deposition testimony of plaintiff’s purported expert, Stanley Gale; (2) the snow-making machine extended more than six feet above the snow surface at the time of the accident and Gale’s measurement using only his ski to gauge the distance more than one year after the accident was incompetent to refute defendant’s evidence; and (3) the snow-making machine was not located on the ski run, as even plaintiff’s decedent’s wife, son, and daughter admitted, and as testified to by other witnesses. Defendant supported its response with exhibits, including deposition testimony transcripts.

On June 1, 2021, the trial court heard oral argument on defendant’s motion and the parties argued consistently with their briefs. On June 27, 2021, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition, holding that (1) whether the ski run was open to the public at the time of the accident is irrelevant but, in any case, was a question of fact for the jury considering that not just employees participated in the event; (2) whether the height of the snow-making machine at issue was six feet above the snow surface was a question of fact for the jury because plaintiff’s expert found it to be less than six feet and the machine had been manipulated; and (3) whether the snow-making equipment was located on the ski run was a question of fact for the jury because plaintiff’s expert stated that it was on a skiable portion of the trail. The court did not address defendant’s claim that plaintiff’s decedent breached his duties under MCL 408.341(1) of the SASA to “maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.” Accordingly, the court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed that must be decided by a jury, and thus, defendant’s motion was denied.

On July 16, 2021, defendant filed its application for leave to appeal arguing that preemptory reversal was required but, at minimum, leave to appeal should be granted. The snow-making equipment at issue in this case was not located on a ski run, and thus, defendant owed no duty to mark the snow-making equipment and cannot be held liable for plaintiff decedent’s accident. This Court granted leave to appeal. Round v Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 1, 2021 (Docket No. 357849). On November 8, 2021, while this appeal was pending, plaintiff filed a motion to affirm which this Court denied. Round v Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 24, 2021 (Docket No. 357849).

On appeal, defendant argues that it was entitled to summary disposition because the snow-making equipment at issue was not located on a ski run; thus, defendant had no duty to place a warning sign on that equipment and defendant cannot be held liable for plaintiff’s decedent’s accident. We agree.

A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Hughes v Region VII Area Agency on Aging, 277 Mich.App. 268, 273; 744 N.W.2d 10 (2007). Defendant’s motion for summary disposition was brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (immunity), (C)(8) (failure to state a claim), and (C)(10) (no material factual issue), but was supported by numerous exhibits. Although the trial court did not indicate under which subrule it denied defendant’s motion, the court considered matters outside of the pleadings and so we review the motion as having been denied under MCR 2.116(C)(10). See id.; see also Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich. 429, 434; 526 N.W.2d 879 (1994).

Further, issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Anderson v Pine Knob Ski Resort, Inc, 469 Mich. 20, 23; 664 N.W.2d 756 (2003). Our purpose in reviewing questions of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Echelon Homes, LLC v Carter Lumber Co, 472 Mich. 192, 196; 694 N.W.2d 544 (2005). Our analysis begins by examining the plain language of the statute; if the language is unambiguous, no judicial construction is required or permitted and the statute must be enforced as written, giving its words their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. (citation omitted).

The SASA was enacted in 1962 “in an effort to provide some immunity for ski-area operators from personal-injury suits by injured skiers.” Anderson, 469 Mich. at 23. It delineates duties applicable to ski-area operators and to skiers. As to the duties imposed on skiers, and their acceptance of the associated risks of skiing, MCL 408.342 of the SASA provides, in part:

(2) Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare sports; rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment.

This provision has been referred to as an “assumption-of-risk provision,” and means that a skier has assumed the risk of being injured by these and similar dangers as inherent in the sport of skiing. Rusnak v Walker, 273 Mich.App. 299, 301, 304; 729 N.W.2d 542 (2007). Thus, when a skier’s injury arises from one of these dangers considered to be inherent in the sport of skiing, the ski-area operator is immune from liability unless the ski-area operator violated a specific duty imposed by the SASA that resulted in injury. Id. at 304-305, 313-314; see also Kent v Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc, 240 Mich.App. 731, 742-744; 613 N.W.2d 383 (2000).

Relevant to this case is the immunity related to snow-making equipment. Under MCL 408.342(2), ski-area operators are immune from liability for collisions with snow-making equipment, if that equipment is “properly marked or plainly visible.” Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary disposition which addressed SASA’s immunity provision, MCL 408.342(2). Specifically, plaintiff argued that defendant was not entitled to immunity because plaintiff’s decedent did not assume the risk of skiing into the unmarked and not plainly visible snow-making equipment at issue in this case. The trial court agreed and granted plaintiff’s motion, holding that the snow-making equipment was neither properly marked nor plainly visible, and thus, plaintiff’s decedent cannot be charged with assuming this risk as inherent in the sport of skiing so liability was not precluded under the SASA.

Thereafter, defendant filed the motion for summary disposition at issue here, arguing that the snow-making equipment at issue in this case actually did not have to be “properly marked or plainly visible” because it was not on the ski run; rather, plaintiff’s decedent skied off of the ski run and into an area that was not meant for skiing where he collided with the snow-making equipment. In other words, defendant argued that it breached no duty imposed by the SASA with regard to the snow-making equipment, and thus, could not be held liable for plaintiff’s decedent’s accident.

The duty provision pertaining to snow-making equipment is codified in MCL 408.326a(b) and Mich. Admin Code, R 408.80(2). These provisions address the issue that was not decided by plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, i.e., whether defendant, as the ski-area operator, had a duty to mark the snow-making equipment in this case. If SASA did not require marking this equipment with a warning sign or other device, defendant did not breach any statutory duty to plaintiff and summary disposition in favor of defendant would be appropriate.

MCL 408.326a provides in relevant part:

Each ski area operator shall, with respect to operation of a ski area, do all of the following:

* * *

(b) Mark with a visible sign or other warning device the location of any hydrant or similar fixture or equipment used in snow-making operations located on a ski run, as prescribed by rules promulgated [by the Ski Area Safety Board].

The corresponding administrative rule, Mich. Admin Code, R 408.80, prescribes the conditions under which snow-making equipment must be marked, stating:

(1) When a ski run, slope, or trail is open to the public, the ski area operator shall mark snowmaking devices as stated in this rule.

(2) A ski area operator shall mark the location of any hydrant, snow gun, or similar fixture or equipment which is used in snowmaking operations located on a ski run and which extends less than 6 feet above the snow surface with a caution sign that has contrasting colors. An orange marking disc, with a minimum diameter of 8 inches, may be used as a caution sign. One sign is adequate for all devices within an area 3 feet on either side of the sign and 10 feet in the downhill direction of the ski run from the sign.

The dispositive issue here is whether the snow-making equipment at issue was “located on a ski run,” as set forth in MCL 408.326a(b) and R 408.80(2).^[2] We conclude that it was not. Accordingly, defendant was not in violation of the SASA, and thus, could not be held liable for plaintiff’s decedent’s accident.

The SASA does not define the phrase “ski run.” When a statute does not define a term, it is construed in accordance with its ordinary and generally accepted meaning. Popma v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 446 Mich. 460, 470; 521 N.W.2d 831 (1994). At minimum, the plain meaning of the phrase “ski run” for purposes of the SASA must include a path or route expected to be used for skiing down a hill. Indeed, ski runs are named, designed, constructed, groomed, and designated as the route skiers are to use for skiing down a particular hill. As this Court similarly noted in Rhoda v O’Dovero, Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 24, 2016 (Docket No. 321363), unpub op at 8: “Although the SASA does not define the terms ‘run,’ ‘slope’ or ‘trail,’ the plain, ordinary and common meanings of these terms encompass the paths a skier or snowboarder takes to get down a hill, including those paths designed and constructed by the ski operator for precisely that purpose.”^[3]

In this case, no genuine issue of material fact exists-the snow-making equipment at issue was not located on the path or route expected to be used for skiing down Kingdom Come. The evidence presented by defendant in support of its argument included deposition testimony from witnesses. Plaintiff admitted during her deposition that she saw a video taken the night of the accident and she saw that her decedent actually veered the wrong way before striking the equipment-that had been in the same place for years-which was located off of the ski trail. Rick Van Tongeren, the snow sports school manager at the Shanty Creek Resort, testified that he watched a video taken the night of the incident and plaintiff’s decedent was skiing out of control in the wrong direction, i.e., not on the expected path, and was skiing very fast before the accident.

Mike Moreen, the director of the ski patrol at the Shanty Creek Resort, testified that he was skiing in the parade and was at the back of the lineup when he received a radio call from Fred Hunt that ski patrol was needed “skier’s left off of ski run about halfway down the hill.” When Moreen arrived to help Round, he saw that Round was “in a difficult location down off of the skiing surface, underneath the snow gun, underneath the structure, the stanchion of the snow gun . . . .” Moreen noted that they were “in deep snow” and “were off of the skiing surface quite a ways, several feet.” Round was down an embankment; about 10 to 15 feet away. And after they got Round on the toboggan to remove him from the accident site, “it probably took four or five repetitions to get him from the snow gun up to the skiing surface.”

Mark Durance, a member of the ski patrol at the Shanty Creek Resort, testified that he was skiing in the parade and was the second person from the last in the lineup. When the radio call came in, Durance followed Moreen to the accident site. Round was located about “ten feet or so off the ski run so it’s not a run.” Durance could not really determine Round’s condition “because he was so far off the existing run” that he could barely make observations. Ted Ewald, a ski instructor at Shanty Creek Resort, testified that he was skiing in the parade about 10 people from the front and he saw that “somebody went into the woods . . . .” But he did not see precisely what happened, the actual event; “I saw something in the woods when I skied by there.”

The evidence presented by defendant in support of its motion for summary disposition also included an incident report. The incident report included witness statements. One witness, Michael Casey, who was the third person from the front skiing in the parade, reported that he saw that Round-who was the leader of the parade-at one point seemed to be a lot further away than he should have been, indicating increased speed. He then saw Round “go off the ski hill into the woods.”

The incident report included a drawing of the snow-making machine at issue and depicted measurements taken the day after the accident. The drawing shows that the snow-making machine was located nine feet from the groomed trail; the machine sat between the groomed trail and trees, i.e., a “woods,” that was located 22 feet from the groomed trail; and the machine stood ten feet tall above the snow surface. The drafter of the drawing, Tom Murton, averred in an affidavit that he drew the diagram after the accident and the precise measurements were accurate. Murton also testified in a deposition about his investigation of the accident-including the measurements taken-that occurred the day after the accident. He testified that the snow-making equipment at issue is not part of Kingdom Come’s groomed ski surface or the ski run itself and had been in the same location permanently since at least the mid-1990s when he began working there. Photographs were also submitted in support of defendant’s motion for summary disposition and they show the scene of the accident, including the snow-making machine at issue, and it is clear that the machine was very close to the wooded area and not on the ski run known as Kingdom Come.

In opposition to defendant’s claim that it had no duty to mark the snow-making equipment at issue in this case because it was “not located on a ski run,” plaintiff argued that the machine was located on a skiable portion of the trail. Plaintiff supported that argument with a report from her purported expert, Gale, which stated that the snow-making machine was located on the skiable portion of the trail. But it is unclear as to what Gale considered a “skiable portion of the trail.” At issue here was the path or route expected to be used for skiing down Kingdom Come. Any area where there is snow is likely to be considered by some people as “skiable,” or able to be skied on-even areas that are not expected to be skied on and areas not designed or designated for skiing. We cannot agree with the trial court that Gale’s statement, alone-and which is unsupported by precise measurements or other evidence-is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of disputed fact that warrants a trial. The party filing a motion for summary disposition has the initial burden of supporting its position with documentary evidence and the party opposing that motion must then establish by evidentiary materials that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich. 358, 362; 547 N.W.2d 314 (1996). Defendant provided a plethora of evidence establishing that plaintiff’s decedent did not encounter and collide with the snow-making equipment on the path or route expected to be used for skiing down Kingdom Come. Gale’s claim that the snow-making equipment was located on a “skiable portion of the trail” is not sufficient to establish that it was “located on a ski run,” which would give rise to a duty for defendant to mark that equipment with a caution sign or other warning device.

And most obviously in this case, if the snow-making machine at issue was, in fact, located on the path or route expected to be used for skiing down Kingdom Come-within the contemplation of R 408.80(2), other skiers in the Tannenbaum Blitzen parade would likely have collided with-or at least seen and avoided-that equipment. There is no such evidence. The SASA imposes certain and specific duties on ski-area operators, one of which is to mark the location of snow-making equipment “located on a ski run and which extends less than 6 feet above the snow surface . . . .” Mich. Admin Code, R 408.80(2); see also MCL 408.326a(b). Clearly, snow-making equipment that is located on a ski run and which extends more than 6 feet above the snow surface need not be marked. This balancing of responsibilities recognizes that skiers are charged with exercising care for their own safety by avoiding obvious hazards they might encounter skiing down a hill, and ski-area operators are charged with providing warnings when a hazard that a skier might encounter skiing down a hill is less likely to be obvious. A ski-area operator is not charged by law with the impossible task of making its ski runs or every allegedly “skiable” area at its facility “accident proof.” Ski-area operators are not absolute insurers of safety, particularly with regard to those skiers who intentionally or inadvertently ski off the path or route expected to be used for skiing down a particular hill. This conclusion is consistent with the SASA’s purpose of “promoting safety, reducing litigation and stabilizing the economic conditions in the ski resort industry,” Grieb v Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc, 155 Mich.App. 484, 487; 400 N.W.2d 653 (1986), while at the same time ensures that ski-area operators stay vigilant and responsible for providing reasonably safe skiing conditions in the areas their patrons are invited, and expected, to ski.

In this case, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition because defendant had no duty under the SASA to mark the location of the snow-making equipment that plaintiff’s decedent collided with, allegedly causing his fatal injuries. There is no genuine issue of fact that the snow-making equipment was not located on the ski run, i.e., the path or route expected to be used for skiing down Kingdom Come. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision. This matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition and dismissing this case.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

———

Notes:

^[1]
Round v Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 1, 2021 (Docket No. 357849).

^[2] To the extent plaintiff argues that it was the snow-making operations that must be on the ski run and not the snow-making equipment itself, we reject that argument as inconsistent with the plain language of MCL 408.326a(b) and R 408.80(2).

^[3] Although not binding precedent, a court may consider unpublished opinions for their instructive or persuasive value. Cox v Hartman, 322 Mich.App. 292, 307; 911 N.W.2d 219 (2017).

———

Round v. Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC (Mich. App. 2022)

Posted: September 26, 2022 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Michigan, Ski Area | Tags: fatality, Michigan, Michigan Ski Area Safety Act, SASA, ski area, ski run, Snow Making, Snow Making Equipment | Leave a comment

Round v. Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC (Mich. App. 2022)

CHERYLE A. ROUND, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF CHARLES R. ROUND, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
v.
TRINIDAD RESORT & CLUB, LLC,Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.

No. 357849

Court of Appeals of Michigan

September 15, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Antrim County Circuit Court LC No. 20-009218-NO

Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Garrett and Yates, JJ.

Per Curiam

On June 24, 2020, Round’s wife, Cheryle A. Round, filed this negligence action, alleging that defendant failed to comply with duties imposed under the SASA, including by:

a. Failing to ensure that the snow-making equipment was properly marked or plainly visible to skiers;

b. Failing to properly light the ski area during the event;

c. Failing to mark the snow-making machine with a visible sign or other warning device to warn approaching skiers;

d. Failing to construct or maintain physical barriers to prevent skiers from colliding with the snow-making machine; and

e. Failing to install protective padding around the snow-making machine to prevent serious injuries from collisions.

(2) Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare sports; rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment.

MCL 408.326a provides in relevant part:

Each ski area operator shall, with respect to operation of a ski area, do all of the following:

* * *

The corresponding administrative rule, Mich. Admin Code, R 408.80, prescribes the conditions under which snow-making equipment must be marked, stating:

(1) When a ski run, slope, or trail is open to the public, the ski area operator shall mark snowmaking devices as stated in this rule.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

———

Notes:

^[1]
Round v Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 1, 2021 (Docket No. 357849).

^[3] Although not binding precedent, a court may consider unpublished opinions for their instructive or persuasive value. Cox v Hartman, 322 Mich.App. 292, 307; 911 N.W.2d 219 (2017).

———

The path down from the road to a river is an open and obvious danger that the plaintiff assumes before walking down the path.

Posted: June 27, 2022 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, New York, Paddlesports, Rivers and Waterways | Tags: assumption of the risk, Battenkill River, Battenkill river Sports & Campground, Common Carrier, River Tubing, Tubing | Leave a comment

Plaintiff worked hard to come up with any possible legal theory to win.

Rooney v. Battenkill River Sports & Campground Holding Co. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)

State: New York; Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

Plaintiff: Jessica Rooney

Defendant: Battenkill River Sports & Campground Holding Company, LLC

Plaintiff Claims: Negligence

Defendant Defenses: Assumption of the Risk

Holding: For the Defendant

Year: 2022

Summary

Plaintiff sued for injuries she received while walking down a path to the river to go tubing. Defendant tube rental company proved the risks were open and obvious, and the plaintiff assumed the risks.

Facts

In July 2018, plaintiff sustained injuries when she slipped on a rock located on an access path while attempting to access the Battenkill River to go water tubing.

This is a case out of New York so the facts are few, and the decision is short.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

Not all the legal arguments made by the plaintiff are going to be discussed here. The case is easy to read, and you understand them on your own.

The plaintiff was walking down an embankment to the river, which was not owned by the tubing company, when she fell. She sued for negligence and argued the defendant owed her a high duty of care because the defendant was a common carrier.

The trail court adopted that position and upheld the plaintiffs’ claims on that theory; however, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims because she assumed the risk causing her injury. The plaintiff appealed. The appellate court did not review the common carrier question.

(It would be extremely rare and unlikely that any transportation that was incidental to the recreational activity and only taking people from the shop to the put in would be found to be a common carrier by any court in any state.)

The duty of the defendant in this situation is to exercise reasonable care to make sure the conditions are as safe as they appear. The defendant has a duty to search for unknown risks that may not be obvious to the guest. Meaning any risk that is visible is assumed by the guest, those risks that are hidden are not assumed by the guest.

The duty owed under these circumstances is a duty to exercise care to make the conditions as safe as they appear to be. If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has performed its duty”

The court found that the defendant had met its burden and showed there were no hidden risks and the risks the plaintiff encountered were open and obvious.

Given this evidence, we find that defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law that plaintiff, who had prior experience water tubing and who had on a prior occasion used the same access path, assumed the inherent risk of her injuries. The risk of falling on uneven and rocky terrain while traversing the river’s embankment to access the river is a commonly appreciated and an obvious risk inherent in and arising out of the nature of the sport of river tubing…

Under New York law, when the defendant meets this threshold then the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to prove the defendant hid the risks or made the risk greater than they appeared.

Thus, the burden shifted to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant concealed or unreasonably enhanced the danger, engaged in reckless or intentional conduct or created conditions that were unique and not inherent in river water sports activities

The plaintiff failed to do so in two different ways. First, the plaintiff was unable to prove the defendant had anything to do with the path leading to the water, or that the path was in terrible condition with hidden dangers. Second, the plaintiff walked the same path in prior years without incident when tubing.

The court then summed up its analysis on why the plaintiff could not overcome her burden.

“One who engages in water sports assumes the reasonably foreseeable risks inherent in the activity” and it is foreseeable that, in order to gain access to the river, plaintiff needed to traverse down an uneven embankment consisting of rock and gravel. Although plaintiff encountered less than optimal conditions on the river embankment access path in July 2018, the risk of falling on the natural, rocky terrain is interwoven with and inherent in the sport of river water tubing and therefore was assumed by her. Plaintiff’s vague and equivocal testimony that defendant unreasonably increased the risk of traversing the path was insufficient to create a question of fact. Moreover, although plaintiff testified that there was no warning sign at the access point, a warning sign is unnecessary as “[t]he duty to warn… does not extend to open and obvious dangers – particularly those encompassing natural geographic phenomena which can readily be observed by those employing the reasonable use of their senses”

So Now What?

In New York, it is always an issue as to whether or not an activity will fall within the purview of New York General Obligations Law § 5-326 which prohibits a place of amusement from using a release. Several courts have interpreted New York General Obligations Law § 5-326 to mean a physical place and so a river may not qualify. However, based on several other decisions it might be worth putting release language into a written agreement for guests to sign.

At the very least, the defendant could use an assumption of risk agreement where the agreement points out the risk of tubing, including accessing the river, reinforce those risks in a safety talk and protect from more than the inherent risks of tubing.

It might not bring closure any quicker; however, it might deter a plaintiff from starting a case to begin with.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

Rooney v. Battenkill River Sports & Campground Holding Co. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)

Posted: June 27, 2022 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, New York, Paddlesports, Rivers and Waterways | Tags: Access Path, assumption of the risk, Battenkill River, Battenkill River Sports & Campground Holding Company, Open and Obvious, River Tubing, Tubing | Leave a comment

Rooney v. Battenkill River Sports & Campground Holding Co. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)

Jessica Rooney, Appellant-Respondent,
v.
Battenkill River Sports & Campground Holding Company, LLC, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 2022-02606

Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

April 21, 2022

Calendar Date:February 10, 2022

Basch & Keegan, LLP, Kingston (Derek J. Spada of counsel), for appellant-respondent.

Mark D. Goris, Cazenovia, for respondent-appellant.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald and McShan, JJ.

Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.

Cross appeals from an order of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), entered July 1, 2021 in Rensselaer County, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In July 2018, plaintiff sustained injuries when she slipped on a rock located on an access path while attempting to access the Battenkill River to go water tubing. Plaintiff subsequently commenced this negligence action against defendant, the company that rented her the tube and shuttled her by van to the river’s access point. Following joinder of issue and discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the basis that defendant did not owe or breach any duty to plaintiff and that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. Plaintiff opposed the motion arguing, among other things, that defendant was a common carrier and, as such, it owed a duty of care to maintain the access path. Supreme Court found that defendant operated as a common carrier, and that questions of fact existed as to whether the embankment’s access path was primarily used for defendant’s business and whether defendant assumed a duty of care. Nevertheless, Supreme Court granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint, finding that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applied to bar plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appeals and defendant cross appeals from those portions of the order that found defendant to be a common carrier and that questions of fact exist as to whether defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care. ^[1]

The gravamen of plaintiff’s contention is that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk is inapplicable here because, although she had traversed the at-issue access path on a prior occasion, such activity is not an inherent risk associated with water tubing. “Under the assumption of risk doctrine, a person who elects to engage in a sport or recreational activity consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation” (Schorpp v Oak Mtn., LLC, 143 A.D.3d 1136, 1137 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Morgan v State of New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 484-485 [1997]; Thompson v Windham Mtn. Partners, LLC, 161 A.D.3d 1366, 1366 [2018]; Youmans v Maple Ski Ridge, Inc., 53 A.D.3d 957, 958 [2008]). “The duty owed under these circumstances is a duty to exercise care to make the conditions as safe as they appear to be. If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has performed its duty” (Youmans v Maple Ski Ridge, Inc., 53 A.D.3d at 958 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

In support of its motion, defendant submitted photographs ^[2] of the access path used by plaintiff and the particular rock that plaintiff identified as the one on which she slipped. Defendant also relied on the depositions of plaintiff and Suzanne Piekarz, the daughter of defendant’s owner. Plaintiff’s testimony confirmed that she had previously used the same access path on a prior water tubing excursion. Piekarz, who has worked at the business since she was a child, testified that the access path consisted of dry dirt and was not particularly rocky, and that the business did not own or maintain the river’s embankment access path. Her testimony also revealed that customers were warned by posted and written materials to walk and not run to the river, and that they assumed the risk for all river water activities, including one sign, which read:” you assume risk of injury and/or death when participating in river activities .” Given this evidence, we find that defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law that plaintiff, who had prior experience water tubing and who had on a prior occasion used the same access path, assumed the inherent risk of her injuries. The risk of falling on uneven and rocky terrain while traversing the river’s embankment to access the river is a commonly appreciated and an obvious risk inherent in and arising out of the nature of the sport of river tubing (see Sara W. v Rocking Horse Ranch Corp., 169 A.D.3d 1342, 1343-1344 [2019]; Martin v State of New York, 64 A.D.3d 62, 64 [2009], lv denied 13 N.Y.3d 706 [2009]; Youmans v Maple Ski Ridge, Inc., 53 A.D.3d at 959).

Thus, the burden shifted to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant concealed or unreasonably enhanced the danger, engaged in reckless or intentional conduct or created conditions that were unique and not inherent in river water sports activities (see Morgan v State of New York, 90 N.Y.2d at 487). Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she previously rented a tube from defendant on two prior occasions and that she was taken by shuttle van to an access point, including on one occasion to the same access point where the accident occurred. Plaintiff recalled receiving documentation to fill out, viewing some warning signs at or near the rental office and receiving some general instructions during the shuttle van ride, but she did not recall any specific discussions, warnings or instructions regarding the access point or how to traverse from the shuttle van down to the river’s embankment access path to the river. Plaintiff described the river’s embankment access path as a narrow, rocky path that was difficult to navigate while holding a tube. Plaintiff stated that she was wearing flip flops and did not know what caused her to fall. Lastly, plaintiff asserted that when she went river tubing in 2017, the river embankment access path was a much smoother surface consisting of hard packed dirt and gravel.

“One who engages in water sports assumes the reasonably foreseeable risks inherent in the activity” Sartoris v State of New York, 133 A.D.2d 619, 620 [1987] [citation omitted]), and it is foreseeable that, in order to gain access to the river, plaintiff needed to traverse down an uneven embankment consisting of rock and gravel. Although plaintiff encountered less than optimal conditions on the river embankment access path in July 2018, the risk of falling on the natural, rocky terrain is interwoven with and inherent in the sport of river water tubing and therefore was assumed by her. Plaintiff’s vague and equivocal testimony that defendant unreasonably increased the risk of traversing the path was insufficient to create a question of fact. Moreover, although plaintiff testified that there was no warning sign at the access point, a warning sign is unnecessary as “[t]he duty to warn… does not extend to open and obvious dangers – particularly those encompassing natural geographic phenomena which can readily be observed by those employing the reasonable use of their senses” (Arsenault v State of New York, 96 A.D.3d 97, 101 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). In view of the foregoing, we find that Supreme Court’s award of summary judgment to defendant dismissing the complaint was proper (see Martin v State of New York, 64 A.D.3d at 65; Youmans v Maple Ski Ridge, Inc., 53 A.D.3d at 959-960).

Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Aarons and McShan, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

ORDERED that the cross appeal is dismissed, without costs.

———

Notes:

^[1] As Supreme Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, defendant is not aggrieved by Supreme Court’s July 2021 order (see CPLR 5511), and defendant’s cross appeal must therefore be dismissed (see Matter of Village Green Hollow, LLC v Assessor of the Town of Mamakating, 145 A.D.3d 1134, 1135 n 2 [2016]; Maldonado v DiBre, 140 A.D.3d 1501, 1503 n 3 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 908 [2016]). Although defendant’s arguments are properly before us as alternative grounds for affirmance, our decision renders them academic (see Ford v Rifenburg, 94 A.D.3d 1285, 1285 n 1 [2012]; McCormick v Bechtol, 68 A.D.3d 1376, 1378 n 2 [2009], lv denied 15 N.Y.3d 701 [2010], cert denied 562 U.S. 1063 [2010]).

^[2] Said photographs reflect the position and size of the rock, neither of which is particularly remarkable, and confirm plaintiff’s contention that the rocks located on this river access path were “not even.”

———

Trampoline Court Safety Act

Posted: November 15, 2021 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Indoor Recreation Center, Michigan | Tags: #TrampolineParks, assumption of the risk, Duty to Warn, Michigan Trampoline Safety Act, Trampoline | 1 Comment

§ 691.1731. Short title

This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘trampoline court safety act’.”

Mich. Comp. Laws 691.1731 Short title (Michigan Compiled Laws (2021 Edition))

§ 691.1733. Operator; duties

An operator shall do all of the following:

(a) Post the duties of trampoliners and spectators as prescribed in this act and the duties, obligations, and liabilities of operators as prescribed in this act in conspicuous places.

(b) Comply with the safety standards specified in ASTM F2970 – 13, “Standard Practice for Design, Manufacture, Installation, Operation, Maintenance, Inspection and Major Modification of Trampoline Courts” published in 2013 by the American society for testing and materials.

(d) Maintain the stability and legibility of all required signs, symbols, and posted notices.

(Added by 2014, Act 11,s 3, eff. 2/18/2014.)…

Mich. Comp. Laws 691.1733 Operator; duties (Michigan Compiled Laws (2021 Edition))

§ 691.1735. Trampoliner; duties

While in a trampoline court, a trampoliner shall do all of the following:

(a) Maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.

(b) Read and follow all posted signs and warnings.

(d) Not run on trampolines, over pads, or on platforms.

(e) Refrain from acting in a manner that may cause injury to others.

(f) Not participate in a trampoline court when under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

(g) Properly use all trampoline court safety equipment provided.

(h) Not participate in a trampoline court if he or she has a preexisting medical condition, a bone condition, a circulatory condition, a heart or lung condition, a back or neck condition, high blood pressure, or a history of spine, musculoskeletal, or head injury, if he or she has had recent surgery, or if she may be pregnant.

(i) Remove inappropriate attire, including hard, sharp, or dangerous objects, such as buckles, pens, purses, or badges.

(j) Conform with or meet height, weight, or age restrictions imposed by the operator to use or participate in the trampoline court activity.

(k) Avoid crowding or overloading individual sections of the trampoline court.

(l) Use the trampoline court within his or her own limitations, training, and acquired skills.

(m) Avoid landing on the head or neck. Serious injury, paralysis, or death can occur from that activity.

(Added by 2014, Act 11,s 5, eff. 2/18/2014.)

Redmond v. Spring Loaded I, LLC, 349683Court of Appeals of Michigan, May 06, 2021

Redmond v. Spring Loaded I, LLC, 349683Court of Appeals of Michigan, May 06, 2021

Scott Redmond, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Spring Loaded I, LLC, and Spring Loaded III, LLC, Defendants,

and

Spring Loaded II, LLC, doing business as Airtime Trampoline-Sterling Heights, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 349683

Court of Appeals of Michigan

May 6, 2021

UNPUBLISHED

Macomb Circuit Court LC No. 2016-004272-NO

Before: Gleicher, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Riordan, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this tort action, plaintiff appeals as of right the circuit court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, Spring Loaded II, LLC (Spring Loaded II), under MCR 2.116(C)(10).[ 1] We affirm.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, a 47 year-old, 275 pound man, sustained a severe ankle injury while jumping on a trampoline at a facility owned and operated by Spring Loaded II. Plaintiff’s injury was captured on a surveillance camera. Spring Loaded II’s trampoline court facility is a large room filled with trampolines that are connected to one another by padded frames. Plaintiff’s injury occurred as he attempted to jump from one trampoline to another. He gained momentum to hurdle a two-foot-wide section of padding by jumping near the edge of the trampoline. In doing so, his ankle buckled and he fell onto the trampoline. Although he was in close proximity to the padding, it does not appear that he touched the padding when he landed.

Plaintiff sought to recover damages from Spring Loaded II under a negligence theory and for Spring Loaded II’s alleged failure to comply with the Trampoline Court Safety Act, MCL 691.1731 et seq. After engaging in discovery, Spring Loaded II filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The circuit court granted Spring Loaded II’s motion and this appeal followed.

II STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 159; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. Id. at 160. When considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citation omitted). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

The circuit court properly granted Spring Loaded II’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

A. THE TRAMPOLINE COURT SAFETY ACT

Plaintiff argues that summary disposition was inappropriate because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Spring Loaded II violated the Trampoline Court Safety Act and whether the alleged violations caused plaintiff’s injury.[ 2] We disagree.

The Trampoline Court Safety Act prescribes duties and liabilities of trampoline court operators and individuals who use trampoline courts. MCL 691.1737 provides that “[a] trampoliner, spectator, or operator who violates this act is liable in a civil action for damages for the portion of the loss or damage that results from the violation.” Thus, in order to recover under MCL 691.1737, a party must establish both a violation of the Trampoline Court Safety Act and causation. Under MCL 691.1733(b), a trampoline court operator shall “[c]omply with the safety standards specified in ASTM[3] F2970-13, ‘Standard Practice for Design, Manufacture, Installation, Operation, Maintenance, Inspection and Major Modification of Trampoline Courts’ published in 2013 by the American society for testing and materials.”

Plaintiff argues that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Spring Loaded II’s failure to develop and communicate patron size restrictions to employees and patrons violated ASTM F2970-13 §§ 6, 9.1, 16.21, 16.22, and A.1.1.4 as well as ASTM F770-11 §§ 4.2 and 4.2.1, thereby causing plaintiff’s injury. However, ASTM F2970-13 § 6 applies only to “designers/engineers or manufacturers” of trampolines and § A.1.1.4 applies only to manufacturers. Spring Loaded II is an operator of a trampoline court facility and plaintiff presented no evidence that Spring Loaded designed or manufactured the trampoline.

ASTM F2970-13 § 9.1 requires trampoline manufacturers to furnish operating and maintenance information to trampoline court operators, and ASTM F2970-13 § 9.2 requires trampoline court operators to permanently affix the operating and maintenance information in a visible location in the trampoline court. ASTM F2970-13 § 9.2.5 requires the operating and maintenance information to include the “[m]aximum total patron weight per trampoline bed and per trampoline court.” Spring Loaded II conceded that the information plate was not posted in the trampoline court facility, and explained that the omission was due to the manufacturer’s failure to provide an information plate for that trampoline. However, even if a reasonable trier of fact could find that Spring Loaded II violated ASTM F2970-13 § 9.1 by failing to post the information plate, no reasonable trier of fact could find that the omission caused plaintiff’s injury. Under ASTM F2970-13 § 6.8.[ 3], trampoline manufacturers are generally required to design trampolines that are able to support users weighing 300 pounds and plaintiff testified in his deposition that he weighed approximately 275 pounds on the date of his injury. Thus, plaintiff would not have been informed that he exceeded the maximum user weight even if the information plate had been posted. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present any evidence that he would not have used the trampolines if the information plate had been posted.[ 4]

ASTM F2970-13 § 16.21 provides that the operator of a trampoline court facility “may deny entry to the device to any person, if in the opinion of the owner/operator the entry may cause above normal exposure to risk of discomfort or injury to the person who desires to enter . . . .” ASTM F2970-13 § 16.22 provides that “[t]rampoline court attendants should be given guide[]lines on the special considerations concerning patron size, and patrons with physical or mental disabilities or impairments . . . .” However, the word “may” indicates that ASTM F2970-13 § 16.21 is a discretionary provision and does not require trampoline court operators to deny entry to individuals that may have above normal exposure of risk to discomfort or injury. Moreover, plaintiff presented no evidence that any employees at Spring Loaded II believed plaintiff to be at an above normal risk of injury and considered exercising their discretion to deny entry to plaintiff. Furthermore, although Spring Loaded II should have given trampoline court attendants guidelines on the special considerations concerning patron size, ASTM F2970-13 § 16.22 did not require Spring Loaded II to do so in the instant matter. See In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond, 496 Mich. 320, 328; 852 N.W.2d 747 (2014) (noting that the significance of a statutory amendment changing “should” to “shall” is that the statute becomes mandatory). Therefore, no reasonable trier of fact could find that Spring Loaded II violated ASTM F2970-13 §§ 16.21 or 16.22 by not advising its attendants regarding any risks associated with a 275 pound patron. In addition, the language in ASTM F770-11 §§ 4.2 and 4.2.1 is almost identical to the language in ASTM F2970-13 §§ 16.21 and 16.22, and therefore, that plaintiff’s arguments with respect to those provisions fail for the same reasons.

Plaintiff next argues that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Spring Loaded II violated ASTM F2970-13 §§ 6.1 and 14.2, as well as ASTM F770-11 §§ 4.1, 8.1, and 8.3, by failing to develop and communicate information regarding the risks associated with jumping near the edge of the trampoline bed or the risks associated with jumping from one trampoline to another, thereby causing plaintiff’s injury. We disagree.

ASTM F2970-13 § 6.1 applies to designers, engineers, and manufacturers of trampolines, and as previously stated, plaintiff presented no evidence that Spring Loaded II was anything other than an operator of a trampoline facility. Additionally, ASTM F2970-13 § 14.2 requires trampoline court owners and operators to “notify the appropriate manufacturer(s) of any known incident as specified in Practice F770-11 Section 8.3.” F770-11 § 8.3 requires notification of incidents that result in a serious injury within seven days of the occurrence of the incident and incorporates F770-11 § 8.1, which states that owners and operators should complete an incident report including information regarding the injury. The use of the word “should” indicates that completing an incident report in accordance with F770-11 § 8.1 is discretionary. See In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond, 496 Mich. at 328 (noting that the significance of a statutory amendment changing “should” to “shall” is that the statute becomes mandatory). Additionally, Spring Loaded II’s obligation to notify the manufacturer of plaintiff’s injury could not have arisen until after plaintiff’s injury occurred. Thus, even assuming Spring Loaded II failed to notify the trampoline manufacturer of plaintiff’s injury, no reasonable trier of fact could find that the failure to do so caused plaintiff’s injury. Similarly, F770-11 § 4.1 requires owners and operators to “read and become familiar with the contents of the manufacturer’s recommended operating instructions and specifications, when received[, ]” and to prepare an “operating fact sheet” that shall be made available to trampoline court attendants. F770-11 § 4.1 does not mandate providing any information to patrons, and plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the manufacturer’s recommended operating instructions addressed an increased risk associated with jumping near the edge of a trampoline or jumping from one trampoline to another. Thus, no reasonable trier of fact could find that Spring Loaded II’s alleged failure to provide an operating fact sheet to trampoline court attendants caused plaintiff’s injury.

B. DUTY TO WARN

Plaintiff argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Spring Loaded II breached its duty to warn plaintiff of the risks associated with jumping on a trampoline at higher weights or the risks associated with jumping from one trampoline to another. We disagree.

MCL 691.1736 provides: An individual who participates in trampolining accepts the danger that inheres in that activity insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries that result from collisions with other trampoliners or other spectators, injuries that result from falls, injuries that result from landing on the trampoline, pad, or platform, and injuries that involve objects or artificial structures properly within the intended travel of the trampoliner that are not otherwise attributable to the operator’s breach of his or her common[-]law duties.

The surveillance video shows that plaintiff’s injury occurred just before he attempted to jump from one trampoline to another. Plaintiff jumped on the trampoline in order to gain momentum to traverse a small section of padded frame that joined the two trampolines. While jumping near the padded section, but before traversing the frame, plaintiff’s ankle buckled and he fell onto the trampoline. Based upon the surveillance video, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff accepted the inherent danger of sustaining an injury from landing on the trampoline or trampoline pad. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot recover unless his injury was otherwise attributable to Spring Loaded II’s breach of its common-law duties. MCL 691.1736.

Plaintiff contends that product sellers have a duty to transmit safety-related information when they know or should know that the buyer or user is unaware of the information, and this duty may be attributed to a successor in possession of the product. Plaintiff posits that Spring Loaded II had a duty to transmit safety-related information to its patrons regarding the increased risks associated with patron weight and jumping from one trampoline to another because Spring Loaded II was a successor in possession of trampolines. In support of this premise, plaintiff relies upon Foster v Cone-Blanchard Mach Co, 460 Mich. 696, 707; 597 N.W.2d 506 (1999), in which our Supreme Court held that “in certain circumstances a successor may have an independent duty to warn a predecessor’s customer of defects in a predecessor’s product.” However, plaintiff failed to present any evidence that there were defects in the trampoline, and therefore, plaintiff’s reliance on Foster is misplaced. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Spring Loaded II had a duty to warn in this regard.

Moreover, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding causation because plaintiff failed to present any evidence that he would not have used the trampolines if he had been warned about the increased risk of injury associated with higher weight or jumping from one trampoline to another.[ 5]

IV. CONCLUSION

The circuit court properly granted Spring Loaded II’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Accordingly, we affirm.

Gleicher, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part)

Plaintiff Scott Redmond sustained a devastating ankle injury when he landed improperly on a trampoline. Redmond brought a negligence claim against defendant Spring Loaded II, LLC, the owner and operator of the trampoline park where the accident occurred. The Trampoline Safety Act, MCL 691.1731 et seq., governs Redmond’s claim. The act imposes certain safety standards on trampoline manufacturers and operators, but also limits liability through an assumption of the risk provision, as follows: An individual who participates in trampolining accepts the danger that inheres in that activity insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries that result from collisions with other trampoliners or other spectators, injuries that result from falls, injuries that result from landing on the trampoline, pad, or platform, and injuries that involve objects or artificial structures properly within the intended travel of the trampoline are that are not otherwise attributable to the operator’s breach of his or her common law duties. [MCL 691.1736.] [1]

Despite this provision, if an injured plaintiff establishes a violation of one of the specific duties of care imposed under the act, the plaintiff may recover damages to the extent that the defendant’s violations caused the injury. MCL 691.1737; see also Rusnak v Walker, 273 Mich.App. 299, 304; 729 N.W.2d 542 (2006) (construing virtually identical language in the in the Ski Area Safety Act, MCL 408.321 et seq.).

The majority holds that defendant did not violate any of the specific safety standards set forth in the act, and I agree. Unfortunately for trampoline users, few of the safety standards referenced in the act apply to trampoline court operators. But despite that plaintiff’s claim for damages arising from defendant’s alleged safety standard violations must fail for the reasons discussed by the majority, I would hold that plaintiff’s common-law failure to warn claim survives.

Plaintiff alleges that his injury occurred when he landed on the foam padding between two trampolines as he attempted to jump from one trampoline to the other, and that defendant failed to warn of the danger of jumping from trampoline to trampoline. The majority rejects that plaintiff landed on the foam padding. According to the majority’s interpretation of a surveillance video, “[a]lthough he was in close proximity to the padding, it does not appear that he touched the padding when he landed.”

I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the video, and I further object to the majority’s usurpation of the fact-finding role reserved to the jury. I have watched the video at least a dozen times, and it appears to me that a portion of Redmond’s foot did, in fact, come in contact with the foam padding. It is a close question: a paradigmatic issue of fact. The video was created from a single camera pointed in a single direction. It captures only one angle of view. It is impossible to discern from the video exactly where Redmond’s foot landed as he completed his final jump. Redmond testified that he landed on the foam padding, and the video does not blatantly contradict his testimony. For that reason, the majority errs by finding otherwise. See Scott v Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-381; 127 S.Ct. 1769; 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Redmond, a question of fact exists regarding where his foot made contact. For summary disposition purposes, we must assume that Redmond landed on the pad between trampolines, as he testified, rather than on the trampoline itself.

Plaintiff’s expert witness, Dr. Marc Rabinoff, authored a lengthy report detailing the dangers of jumping from one trampoline to another. He explained that “[t]rampolines are not designed to have persons jump on the edge of the trampoline bed near the frame,” and generally “are not designed for lateral movement, including the lateral movement required to jump from one bed, over the frame, and on to another bed.” Dr. Rabinoff opined that “there is a substantial increase in the risk of injury to persons who jump on the edge of the trampoline bed near the frame or who are jumping laterally from one trampoline bed to another.” He stressed: Notably, there is nothing inherent about a trampoline park that requires a user to jump near the edge of a trampoline bed. Nor is there anything inherent about a trampoline park that requires a user to jump from one trampoline bed over the frame and padding and on to another trampoline bed.

Dr. Rabinoff concluded that “the proximity of the trampoline beds, coupled with the absence of any signage prohibiting the practice, supports the conclusion that jumping from one bed to another was promoted by the owner/operator at the time of Mr. Redmond’s injury,” and that Spring Loaded failed to warn “that jumping near the edge of the trampoline bed, or using the trampoline for lateral propulsion, or jumping over the frame from one trampoline bed to another, materially increased the risks to users beyond the risk that is normally associated with jumping on a single trampoline bed.”

Based on Dr. Rabinoff’s testimony, I would hold that Redmond has established a jury question regarding whether jumping from one trampoline to another is an inherent risk of the activity. If it is not, Redmond did not accept a risk of injury by attempting this maneuver, and should be entitled to present his negligence claim to a jury.

My analysis considers the language of MCL 691.1736, which states that “obvious and necessary dangers” that “inhere[]” in the sport of trampolining include “injuries that result from collisions with other trampoliners or other spectators, injuries that result from falls, injuries that result from landing on the trampoline, pad, or platform, and injuries that involve objects or artificial structures properly within the intended travel of the trampoline that are not otherwise attributable to the operator’s breach of his or her common law duties.” I am aware that this Court has applied the last antecedent canon in interpreting a similarly worded statute in the Roller Skating Safety Act, MCL 445.1721 et seq., holding that the Legislature meant to eliminate a cause of action for a breach of a common-law duty only when an “object or artificial structure” is in the path of travel. Dale v Beta-C, Inc, 227 Mich.App. 57, 69; 574 N.W.2d 697 (1997) (“[W]e hold that the only enumerated risk that is limited by an operator’s breach of a common-law duty is for injuries ‘which involve objects or artificial structures properly within the intended travel of the roller skater.’ “).

In my view, Dale improperly applied the last antecedent canon, and this Court should not make the same mistake in the context of the statute now at issue. Our Supreme Court has cautioned that “the last antecedent rule should not be applied if ‘something in the statute requires a different interpretation’ than the one that would result from applying the rule.” Dye v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, 504 Mich. 167, 192; 934 N.W.2d 674 (2019), quoting Hardaway v Wayne Co, 494 Mich. 423, 428; 835 N.W.2d 336 (2013). “[T]he last antecedent rule does not mandate a construction based on the shortest antecedent that is grammatically feasible; when applying the last antecedent rule, a court should first consider what are the logical metes and bounds of the ‘last’ antecedent.” Hardaway, 494 Mich. at 429.

A natural construction of the language of MCL 691.1736 suggests that the clause “that are not otherwise attributable to the operator’s breach of his or her common law duties” qualifies the term “injuries” and should be applied to all forms of trampolining “injuries,” rather than being artificially limited to the statute’s final clause. [2] Indisputably, common-law duties of care attend to all facets of trampolining, including the conduct of “other trampoliners or other spectators,” maintenance and inspection of the “trampoline, pad, or platform,” and the substance of the warnings owed to trampoliners at a commercially operated trampoline park. It makes no sense, logically or linguistically, that the Legislature would carve out a single aspect of trampolining for common-law application, leaving the others unaffected.

In Dale, 227 Mich.App. at 69, this Court’s analysis centered on the absence of a comma at the end of the last “injuries” clause: “Proper syntax provides that commas usually set off words, phrases, and other sentence elements that are parenthetical or independent.” The absent comma, the Court ruled, meant that the phrase “not otherwise attributable to the operator’s breach of his or her common law duties” applies only to the last clause. Id. at 68-69. I cannot agree that punctuation is decisive, particularly when the sense of the paragraph leads to a different conclusion than would be dictated by a rigid application of the last antecedent rule. “When the sense of the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding or succeeding sections, the word or phrase will not be restricted to its immediate antecedent.” 2A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Constructions (7th ed), § 47.33.

The context of MCL 691.1736 supports that all four described forms of trampolining injuries (resulting from “collisions with other trampoliners or other spectators,” “falls,” “landing on the trampoline, pad, or platform,” and those that involve “objects or artificial structures properly within the intended travel of the trampoliner”) are inherent risks of the activity unless they are “otherwise attributable to the operator’s breach of his or her common law duties.” That “duties” is plural reinforces my view that the term applies to more than just the final form of injury. See, e.g., Duffy v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 490 Mich. 198, 221; 805 N.W.2d 399 (2011). I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition and would remand for trial regarding whether Redmond accepted an inherent risk when he attempted to jump from one trampoline to the next, and whether a common-law duty required defendant to warn him of the risks of that activity.

Notes:

[ 1] Spring Loaded I, LLC, Spring Loaded II, LLC, and Spring Loaded III, LLC are separate franchises of an entity named Airtime International, and are owned by the parent company Spring Loaded LLC. Spring Loaded I, LLC and Spring Loaded III, LLC were dismissed from the case below and are not part of this appeal.

[ 2] Plaintiff argues in his reply brief that the issue of causation was not properly before the circuit court because it was not raised by Spring Loaded II when seeking summary disposition. We disagree. Under MCR 2.116(G)(4), “[a] motion under subrule (C)(10) must specifically identify the issues as to which the moving party believes there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Spring Loaded II addressed the issue of proximate cause in its April 17, 2019 supplemental brief in support of its motion for summary disposition. Specifically, Spring Loaded II rebutted the opinion of plaintiff’s expert that Spring Loaded II’s failure to develop and communicate weight restrictions contributed to plaintiff’s injuries. Spring Loaded II argued that the expert’s opinion regarding causation was mere speculation and plaintiff’s injury was caused solely by plaintiff’s improper landing technique rather than any alleged violation of the Trampoline Court Safety Act.

[ 3] ASTM is an acronym for the American Society for Testing and Materials.

[ 4] Although plaintiff stated in an affidavit that he would not have used the trampolines if he had been warned about the increased risk of injury associated with higher weight, plaintiff’s affidavit was filed as part of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration after the circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of Spring Loaded II. When reviewing an order granting or denying summary disposition, we consider only the evidence that was properly presented to the trial court in deciding the motion. Village of Edmore v Crystal Automation Sys Inc, 322 Mich.App. 244, 262; 911 N.W.2d 241 (2017). We will not consider evidence on appeal that was first presented in a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Innovative Adult Foster Care, Inc v Ragin, 285 Mich.App. 466, 474 n 6; 776 N.W.2d 398 (2009). Thus, we do not consider plaintiff’s affidavit here.

[ 5] Although plaintiff stated in an affidavit that he would not have used the trampolines if he had been warned about the increased risks, plaintiff’s affidavit was filed after the circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of Spring Loaded II. Thus, we will not consider it in this appeal. Village of Edmore, 322 Mich.App. at 262; Innovative Adult Foster Care, Inc, 285 Mich.App. at 474 n 6.

[1] In Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 39-40; 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965), the Michigan Supreme Court eliminated the assumption of the risk defense in tort cases. The Trampoline Safety Act resurrects the doctrine in trampoline-associated negligence claims.

[2] By way of reminder, here is the language. I have highlighted the words leading to the mosty natural reading: An individual who participates in trampolining accepts the danger that inheres in that activity insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries that result from collisions with other trampoliners or other spectators, injuries that result from falls, injuries that result from landing on the trampoline, pad, or platform, and injuries that involve objects or artificial structures properly within the intended travel of the trampoline are that are not otherwise attributable to the operator’s breach of his or her common law duties. [MCL 691.1736.]

Michigan Trampoline Statute protects Trampoline Operator from claims that he violated ANSI standards.

Posted: November 15, 2021 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Indoor Recreation Center, Michigan | Tags: #TrampolineParks, ANSI, assumption of the risk, Failure to Warn, Indoor Trampoline Park, Michigan Trampoline Safety Act, Trampoline | Leave a comment

Statute did not require nor did the ANSI requirement state that the defendant trampoline park needed to tell the plaintiff, he was too fat and unskilled to jump on the trampoline.

Redmond v. Spring Loaded I, LLC, 349683Court of Appeals of Michigan, May 06, 2021

State: Michigan

Plaintiff: Scott Redmond

Defendant: Spring Loaded I, LLC, and Spring Loaded III, LLC, Defendants, and Spring Loaded II, LLC, doing business as Airtime Trampoline-Sterling Heights

Plaintiff Claims: Failure to comply with Michigan’s Trampoline Court Safety Act, MCL 691.1731 et seq.

Defendant Defenses: It complied with the Michigan’s Trampoline Court Safety Act, MCL 691.1731 et seq.

Holding: For the Defendant

Year: 2021

Summary

A 47-year-old 275 man was injured while attempting to jump from one trampoline to another at the defendant’s trampoline facility. He claimed the defendant had a duty to warn him of the risks and failed to follow ANSI standards.

The court found the plaintiff assumed the risks, so there was no duty to warn and ANSI standards were created for manufacturers and designers of trampolines, not operators.

Facts

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

This is simply an interpretation of a surveillance video and the application of a statute to what the court saw on the video. The statute is the Michigan Trampoline Court Safety Act, § 691.1731 et. seq.

§ 691.1731. Short title This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘trampoline court safety act’.”

Mich. Comp. Laws 691.1731 Short title

§ 691.1733. Operator; duties

An operator shall do all of the following:

(a) Post the duties of trampoliners and spectators as prescribed in this act and the duties, obligations, and liabilities of operators as prescribed in this act in conspicuous places.

(c) Maintain the trampoline court according to the safety standards cited in subdivision (b).

(d) Maintain the stability and legibility of all required signs, symbols, and posted notices.

§ 691.1735. Trampoliner; duties

While in a trampoline court, a trampoliner shall do all of the following:

(a) Maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.

(b) Read and follow all posted signs and warnings.

(c) Avoid bodily contact with other trampoliners or spectators.

(d) Not run on trampolines, over pads, or on platforms.

(e) Refrain from acting in a manner that may cause injury to others.

(f) Not participate in a trampoline court when under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

(g) Properly use all trampoline court safety equipment provided.

(i) Remove inappropriate attire, including hard, sharp, or dangerous objects, such as buckles, pens, purses, or badges.

(j) Conform with or meet height, weight, or age restrictions imposed by the operator to use or participate in the trampoline court activity.

(k) Avoid crowding or overloading individual sections of the trampoline court.

(l) Use the trampoline court within his or her own limitations, training, and acquired skills.

(m) Avoid landing on the head or neck. Serious injury, paralysis, or death can occur from that activity.

The simple analysis of the plaintiff’s argument is the ANSI code which applies to the manufacturing of Trampolines was not met by the defendant, and the defendant did not pass on required notices established by the code to the plaintiff.

The first issue was defendants failed to pass on the size restrictions that ANSI requirements might require. The court denied this argument by stating the ANSI code applied to manufacturers not trampoline owners or operators.

However, ASTM F2970-13 § 6 applies only to “designers/engineers or manufacturers” of trampolines and § A.1.1.4 applies only to manufacturers. Spring Loaded II is an operator of a trampoline court facility and plaintiff presented no evidence that Spring Loaded designed or manufactured the trampoline.

The next issue was ANSI required an operation’s plate to be firmly affixed to the trampoline. The defendant argued there was no operation’s plate because the trampoline did not come with one. The operation’s information was to include the maximum size of someone allowed on the trampoline. At the time of his injury, the plaintiff testified in his deposition; he weighed 275 pounds.

The court struck this argument down because the failure to post the plate was not the cause of the plaintiff’s injury. There must be a causal connection, proximate cause, to prove negligence. Generally, the court found trampolines are designed to hold 300 lbs., so that would not have changed the issues with the plaintiff since he weighed less than the design of the trampoline. Finally, there was no argument by the plaintiff that if the information were posted, he would not have used the trampoline.

However, even if a reasonable trier of fact could find that Spring Loaded II violated ASTM F2970-13 § 9.1 by failing to post the information plate, no reasonable trier of fact could find that the omission caused plaintiff’s injury. Under ASTM F2970-13 § 6.8.[ 3], trampoline manufacturers are generally required to design trampolines that are able to support users weighing 300 pounds and plaintiff testified in his deposition that he weighed approximately 275 pounds on the date of his injury. Thus, plaintiff would not have been informed that he exceeded the maximum user weight even if the information plate had been posted. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present any evidence that he would not have used the trampolines if the information plate had been posted.

The plaintiff argued the defendant violated an ANSI standard for:

…failing to develop and communicate information regarding the risks associated with jumping near the edge of the trampoline bed or the risks associated with jumping from one trampoline to another, thereby causing plaintiff’s injury.

Again, the court struck this down because the ANSI standard was for designers and manufacturers not operators. The standard argued by the plaintiff that was not met also had a duty to inform the manufacture of any incident within seven days of the incident which was not done in this case. Again, the failure to notify the manufacture of the incident within seven days was not the cause of the plaintiff’s injury.

The plaintiff next argued the defendant had a duty to warn of the risks of jumping on a trampoline when you were fat or the risks of jumping from one trampoline to another.

The court found the defendant did not have a duty to warn of jumping on a trampoline near the edge or jumping from one trampoline to another. The statute states “An individual who participates in trampolining accepts the danger that inheres in that activity insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary.” An assumption of the risk statement set out in the statute. Based on the video, the plaintiff clearly accepted the risks of his actions and as such assumed the risk requiring no duty to warn on the part of the defendant.

The plaintiff argued:

However, this argument fails because it speaks to defects in the product. In this case, there were no defects in the trampoline that caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

There was a dissent in the decision. The dissenting judge agreed with the majority that there was no violation of the Michigan Trampoline Safety Act. However, the dissent did believe that there was a valid failure to warn claim. This argument stems from the dissenting judges view of the video where he believes the plaintiff’s toe touched the foam padding at the edge of the trampoline, leading to a requirement on the part of the defendant to warn patrons of jumping from mat to mat. Because the dissenting judge viewed the video differently than from the majority, he felt that factual issues should be allowed to go to the jury.

However, the dissent is just that, a minority opinion and the majority opinion is the way the decision is handled.

The circuit court properly granted Spring Loaded II’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Accordingly, we affirm.

So Now What?

The defendant should immediately post notices of the dangers of jumping from trampoline to trampoline and other risks. Just because the defendant won the appeal does not mean that the dissent is not an important legal analysis that can be ignored.
1. Included in those warnings should be one about fitness and weight of anyone jumping.
The defendant should use a release. A release in Michigan would have stopped this lawsuit sooner or might have prevented it from starting.
I would even post the Michigan Trampoline Safety Act duties required of a patron, and the risks accepted by a patron.

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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

Inherent Risk is the part of any sport and is assumed by participants when undertaking the activity.

Posted: May 31, 2021 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Wyoming | Tags: Fresh Snow, Inherent Risk, Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, skiing, Stump, Wyoming, Wyoming Recreation Safety Act | Leave a comment

A ski trunk just beneath the surface of fresh snow is an inherent risk of skiing in Wyoming.

Standish v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corporation

State: Wyoming, 10^th Circuit Court of Appeals

Plaintiff: Thomas A. Standish, IV; Meghan Keiter

Defendant: Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corporation

Plaintiff Claims: Negligence and Loss of Consortium

Defendant Defenses: Inherent Risk as identified under the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act

Holding: For the Defendant Ski Area

Year: 2021

Summary

While skiing in an ungroomed area at Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, Thomas Standish was injured when his right ski struck a six-and-a-half-foot stump covered with freshly fallen snow. Standish and his wife brought a negligence lawsuit against Jackson Hole Mountain Resort (“Jackson Hole”) to recover for his injuries.

Jackson Hole moved for summary judgment, contending the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act (WRSA) limited Jackson Hole’s liability because Standish’s injury was a result of an “inherent risk” of alpine skiing. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that a tree stump covered by fresh snow was an inherent risk of skiing for which the WRSA precludes liability. We agree with that conclusion. Thus, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

Facts

In January 2017, California residents Thomas Standish and his then-fiancée, Megan Keiter, traveled to Jackson Hole Mountain Resort as part of a “bucket list” ski trip. From January 8 through 10-the three days prior to Standish’s arrival-Jackson Hole had received about 27 inches of new snow, and on the morning of January 11, Jackson Hole received an additional 18 inches of snow. Over these four days, the mid-mountain depth of the snow increased from 56 to 80 inches.

On January 11, the couple purchased ski passes for Jackson Hole. The backs of these “J Cards” bear language indicating that the pass-holder “acknowledges that participation in any and all winter recreation activities at [Jackson Hole], including . . . skiing . . . involves SUBSTANTIAL AND INHERENT RISKS, HAZARDS, AND DANGERS THAT MAY RESULT IN SERIOUS INJURY, DEATH or damages to property.” Aplt. App. 41. The couple first skied a few groomed runs. They then ventured down an off-piste run near the Thunder Chairlift line, with Standish-the more experienced skier-leading the way. “Off-piste” is a term for a ski run or area that is ungroomed and left in its natural state. See Roberts v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp., 884 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 2018). About halfway down the mountain, Standish’s right ski hit the top of a six-and-a-half-foot-tall tree stump that was covered with about two inches of fresh snow. His ski came off on impact, and he broke multiple bones in his right leg.

Standish underwent surgery, receiving fourteen screws, two metal plates, and a bone graft. After returning to California a few days later, Standish suffered a pulmonary embolism, a common complication resulting from serious fractures. This required anti-coagulation injections in his abdomen for several months. Because of Standish’s long recovery, he and Keiter pushed their wedding back from June to September 2017. They also sold their business because Standish was unable to work during his recovery.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

This is a simple case that explains the issues between the two major types of risk as identified under the law, inherent and non-inherent risks. The Wyoming Recreation Safety Act defines for Wyoming what is an inherent risk.

“Inherent risk” with regard to any sport or recreational opportunity means those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational opportunity;

An inherent risk is a risk that if removed from the activity, would change the activity such that it would not be the same. Or looking at inherent risks another way, remove the inherent risks and the sport would not really exist.

Hitting things under the snow, no matter how they look when the snow is gone, is an inherent risk of skiing.

When a statute defines the inherent risks of an activity, the judge is able to determine in advance if the defendant owes a duty to the injured plaintiff. If the inherent risks are not defined by statute, then a jury decides whether the risk incurred by the plaintiff was inherent, unless the risk is obviously inherent.

Most states that have specific statutes covering outdoor recreation activities do so by listing the risks of the activity and by law makes those inherent so an injured party cannot sue for their injuries. As an example, the Colorado Skier Safety Act has a long list of what is an inherent risk of skiing in Colorado.

(3.5) “Inherent dangers and risks of skiing” means those dangers or conditions that are part of the sport of skiing, including changing weather conditions; snow conditions as they exist or may change, such as ice, hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow, and machine-made snow; surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds, cliffs, extreme terrain, and trees, or other natural objects, and collisions with such natural objects; impact with lift towers, signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, water pipes, or other man-made structures and their components; variations in steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or grooming operations, including but not limited to roads, freestyle terrain, jumps, and catwalks or other terrain modifications; collisions with other skiers; and the failure of skiers to ski within their own abilities. The term “inherent dangers and risks of skiing” does not include the negligence of a ski area operator as set forth in section 33-44-104 (2). Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the liability of the ski area operator for injury caused by the use or operation of ski lifts.

Obviously, since jumps, machine made snow, extreme terrain, lift towers, signs, posts, fences, hydrants, etc. are natural and only on the slope because of the acts of man, those risks are not naturally, inherent. However, since the act defines them as inherent, they now are and cannot be used by an injured plaintiff to make a claim.

The Wyoming Recreation Safety Act covers a multitude of sports, not just skiing and does not list the risks that are inherent. Consequently, the act does not do anything to provide any greater protection than existed in the common law. Therefore, each judge or jury makes the determination if the risk complained of by the plaintiff was inherent in the sport.

Under Wyoming law and the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act removes any duty, the first element to prove negligence, of the defendant to the plaintiff if the risk is inherent.

In other words, because the WRSA provides that a participant has assumed certain risks that are inherent to the activity, the recreational provider typically owes no duty for inherent risks of an activity. In sum, a recreational “provider has no duty to eliminate, alter, or control the inherent risks of an activity, and any person who chooses to take part in a sport or recreational opportunity assumes all inherent risks [that] are associated with that opportunity.”

Under the WRSA, a reasonableness standard is applied to determine if the risk complained of is inherent.

I]f reasonable minds cannot differ as to whether or not a given set of factual circumstances involve an ‘inherent risk’ of skiing (in this particular instance, we are concerned with skiing, or fill in the blank as the case might be), then the protections of the [W]RSA apply, and the litigation of that controversy must come to an end.

Applying that reasonableness standard, the courts looked at the uncontested facts.

Here, the operative facts are undisputed. The mountain had received 45 inches of fresh snow in the four days prior to the accident. The accident took place in an off-piste-and therefore ungroomed-area. Standish’s injury was caused by a collision with the top of the stump, which was lightly covered with the fresh snow and thus not visible to Standish. The stump had been cut to a height of six-and-a-half feet at some point in the past to mitigate some problem.

The court found that the stump was an inherent risk of skiing “…we conclude that encountering a snow-covered stump in an ungroomed area is an inherent risk of alpine skiing.”

A key component of this analysis was the run was off-piste and ungroomed. If the stump was located on a groomed run, the review and conclusion would have been different. The conclusion would have also been different if an employee of the defendant had told the plaintiff’s that the run was safe or free from hazards.

The court concluded:

Standish’s accident was the result of an unfortunate confluence of a stump, an ungroomed run, and the spectacular snow levels of the previous days. The combination of these factors is an inherent risk of skiing, a sport as thrilling as it can be risky. And the WRSA reflects this by limiting the duty owed by an entity offering access to such a sport. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Jackson Hole on the basis of the WRSA.

So Now What?

The great thing about this article is the courts clear expression of what constitutes an inherent risk. If the risk is inherent, you cannot sue the defendant because you automatically assume those risks when you engage in the sport.

The second is the risk might not have been inherent if the run was not off-piste. The risk would definitely not have been inherent if the plaintiff had been told by an employee of the defendant that there were no risks.

This second issue is, the cause of many lawsuits when the statements of the employee changes or removes any risk management issues the defendant has in place. Marketing makes promises Risk Management has to pay for.

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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

Standish v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corporation

Posted: May 31, 2021 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Wyoming | Tags: assumption of the risk, Inherent Risk, Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, skiing, WRSA, Wyoming, Wyoming Recreation Safety Act | 1 Comment

Thomas A. Standish, IV; Meghan Keiter, Plaintiffs – Appellants,

Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corporation, Defendant-Appellees.

No. 20-8045

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

May 14, 2021

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WYOMING (D.C. NO. 1:19-cv-00004-KHR)

Gary L. Shockey, Gary Shockey Law, Casper, Wyoming, for Appellants.

James K. Lubing (Nathan D. Rectanus with him on the brief), Lubing Law Group, Jackson, Wyoming, for Appellee.

Before TYMKOVICH, KELLY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge.

I. Background

In January 2017, California residents Thomas Standish and his then-fiancee, Megan Keiter, traveled to Jackson Hole Mountain Resort as part of a “bucket list” ski trip. From January 8 through 10-the three days prior to Standish’s arrival-Jackson Hole had received about 27 inches of new snow, and on the morning of January 11, Jackson Hole received an additional 18 inches of snow. Over these four days, the mid-mountain depth of the snow increased from 56 to 80 inches.[ 1]

On January 11, the couple purchased ski passes for Jackson Hole. The backs of these “J Cards” bear language indicating that the pass-holder “acknowledges that participation in any and all winter recreation activities at [Jackson Hole], including . . . skiing . . . involves SUBSTANTIAL AND INHERENT RISKS, HAZARDS, AND DANGERS THAT MAY RESULT IN SERIOUS INJURY, DEATH or damages to property.” Aplt. App. 41. The couple first skied a few groomed runs. They then ventured down an off-piste run near the Thunder Chairlift line, with Standish-the more experienced skier-leading the way. “Off-piste” is a term for a ski run or area that is ungroomed and left in its natural state. See Roberts v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp., 884 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 2018). About halfway down the mountain, Standish’s right ski hit the top of a six-and-a-half-foot-tall tree stump that was covered with about two inches[ 2] of fresh snow. His ski came off on impact, and he broke multiple bones in his right leg.

In January of 2019, Standish and Keiter brought this diversity suit in the District of Wyoming against Jackson Hole, alleging negligence and loss of consortium, respectively. During discovery, the parties were unable to ascertain when, why, or by whom the tree had been cut. In a deposition, Jackson Hole’s risk safety and environmental manager agreed that the stump had been cut at some point in the past, but no individuals or departments he talked to had any recollection or knowledge of cutting that tree. When asked why it was cut in the way it had been-that is, over six feet high-the manager suggested “it had been cut down during the winter to mitigate a hazard, like the tree blowing over or growing in a particular way that may have been identified to be a hazard.” Aple. App. 63. In October 2019, the stump was cut down completely, apparently as a result of the accident and the ongoing litigation.

Jackson Hole moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court concluded that Wyoming law provided immunity from the inherent risks of skiing, including unmarked objects on ungroomed runs-even objects like trees that have been partially cut.

II. Analysis

Standish makes two arguments about why the district court erred in granting summary judgment. First, he contends that the question of whether a subsurface, cut tree in an off-piste area is an inherent risk of alpine skiing should have been submitted to a jury. Second, Standish argues the district court improperly considered inadmissible facts in granting summary judgment. We address each in turn.

A. Inherent Risk

1. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Roberts, 884 F.3d at 971. Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

Because this diversity suit arises out of Wyoming, we “must ascertain and apply state law to reach the result the Wyoming Supreme Court would reach if faced with the same question.” Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000). In doing so, “we rely foremost on decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court, and then on ‘other state court decisions, federal decisions, and the general weight and trend of authority.'” Roberts, 884 F.3d at 972 (quoting Sapone v. Grand Targhee, Inc., 308 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir. 2002)). We review the district court’s determination of state law de novo. Cooperman, 214 F.3d at 1164.

2. The Wyoming Recreation Safety Act

Common-law tort principles typically guide our analysis of personal-injury claims brought on the basis of negligence. When bringing a negligence claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently assert that “(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care; (2) the defendant breached the duty of care; (3) the breach proximately caused injury to the plaintiff; and (4) the injury is compensable by money damages.” Dimickv. Hopkinson, 422 P.3d 512, 521 (Wyo. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

But in enacting the WRSA, the Wyoming legislature chose to insulate recreational providers from some types of personal-injury claims. In relevant part, the WRSA[ 3] provides that [a]ny person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is legally responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or other persons or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(a). And a recreational provider “is not required to eliminate, alter or control the inherent risks within the particular sport or recreational opportunity.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(b).

a. Duty Under the WRSA

The WRSA limits the first negligence element: duty. Specifically, the WRSA “codifies the common-law concept of primary assumption of the risk,” which limits the recreational provider’s duty to a participant. Roberts, 884 F.3d at 972; see also Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 565 (Wyo. 1995) (“[T]he assumption-of-risk terminology [in the WRSA] is intended to limit the duty which a provider owes to a participant.”). “When primary assumption of the risk applies, as it does under the WRSA, ‘the legal result is that the defendant is simply relieved of the duty which would otherwise exist.'” Roberts, 884 F.3d at 972 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68, at 481 & n.lO (5th ed. 1984)). In other words, because the WRSA provides that a participant has assumed certain risks that are inherent to the activity, the recreational provider typically owes no duty for inherent risks of an activity. In sum, a recreational “provider has no duty to eliminate, alter, or control the inherent risks of an activity, and any person who chooses to take part in a sport or recreational opportunity assumes all inherent risks [that] are associated with that opportunity.” Halpern, 890 P.2d at 565.

The district court generally decides whether the defendant owed a duty as a matter of law, see Halpern, 890 P.2d at 565, but the jury typically decides whether a particular risk is an inherent one, see Beckwith v. Weber, 277 P.3d 713, 722 (Wyo. 2012). In the context of whether a hazard is an inherent risk, the “level of factual specificity required . . . will often but not always preclude summary judgment on the duty question.” Creel v. L &L, Inc., 287 P.3d 729, 737 (Wyo. 2012). So “when genuine issues of material fact exist, it is proper to present the issue to the jury of whether a risk is inherent to a particular activity.” Halpern, 890 P.2d at 566. But in the absence of genuine issues of material fact, “the district court may decide as a matter of law that the provider does not owe a duty to the participant.” Roberts, 884 F.3d at 973 (quoting Halpern, 890 P.2d at 566); see also Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp. v. Rohrman, 150 P.3d 167, 168 (Wyo. 2006) (“If the court can say that, given that evidence, this is an ‘inherent risk’ and reasonable minds cannot differ about that, then summary judgment is appropriate.”).

b. Inherent Risk

The central question here is whether the plaintiff’s injury was the result of an inherent risk of a particular activity. If the injury was caused by an inherent risk, then the recreational provider owes no duty to “eliminate, alter, or control it[, ]” and the entry of summary judgment is appropriate. Rohrman, 150 P.3d at 168.

The WRSA defines “inherent risk” as “those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational opportunity.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122; see also Cooperman, 214 F.3d at 1166 (discussing definitions of “characteristic,” “intrinsic,” and “integral”). But the WRSA-unlike some other states’ recreational liability statutes-does not list examples of inherent risks. Rather, “[w]hat an ‘inherent risk’ means in any given set of circumstances is a variable that the Wyoming Legislature included in the statute by design.” Muller v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, 139 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Wyo. 2006), opinion after certified question answered sub nom. Muller v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp., 210 Fed.Appx. 792 (10th Cir. 2006).

In order to determine what is an inherent risk under the WRSA, the Wyoming Supreme Court has explained a “reasonableness” inquiry should guide courts. Rohrman, 150 P.3d at 170. So, the “central concern … is what ‘reasonable persons’ will view as inherent risks.” Id. “[I]f reasonable minds cannot differ as to whether or not a given set of factual circumstances involve an ‘inherent risk’ of skiing (in this particular instance we are concerned with skiing, or fill in the blank as the case might be), then the protections of the [W]RSA apply, and the litigation of that controversy must come to an end.” Id.

The Wyoming Supreme Court has pointed to several sources of guidance for determining what reasonable persons would view as inherent risks of an activity. One is, of course, jury deliberations on the particular facts of a case. See Rohrman, 150 P.3d at 170. Others are safety experts and experienced skiers.[ 4]Id. But the sources most discussed by the Court in this context are analogous statutes from similarly-situated states. See Rohrman, 150 P.3d at 170-72; Muller, 139 P.3d at 1166-67. In Rohrman, the Court held that reference to analogous statutes-for example, from Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah-is “a meaningful source of guidance in explaining the inherent risks of skiing to any fact finder.” Rohrman, 150 P.3d at 172.

The explicit citation to these statutes, and the reference to other similar state statutes, is meant to be an expansive guide for courts considering the inherent risk question. For one, the texts of all three analogous state statutes included in Rohrman have non-exhaustive lists of inherent risks of skiing. Each of the three has broad language that includes, for example, trees and forest debris, subsurface conditions, and man-made structures. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-44-103(3.5) (2021); N.M. Stat. § 24-15-10 (2021); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-402 (2021). For another, the court expressly did not constrain itself to these lists, stating “those statutes are not the exclusive source of guidance and the factual variations are, in some senses, infinite.” Rohrman, 150 P.3d at 172.[ 5]

In particular, the court’s reference to analogous statutes is significant at the summary judgment stage. In situations with novel or contested facts, of course, the question of reasonableness-that is, whether reasonable minds cannot differ over what is an inherent risk-is appropriate for consideration by the fact-finder, not for determination as a matter of law by the court. But when there are no genuine disputes of material fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court has explicitly held that “[u]nder Wyoming’s statutory construct, which is much broader than that of Colorado, such items as those included in Colorado’s statute may, as a matter of law, be inherent risks of the recreational activity of skiing.” Muller, 139 P.3d at 1167 (emphasis added). “[I]n such cases[, ] a trial court may grant a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment based on the [W]RSA.” Id. In other words, a court may look to the enumerated inherent risks in Colorado’s statute to hold that a particular risk is an inherent one as a matter of law. 3. The Risk to Standish

The district court determined that skiing into an unmarked six-and-a-half-foot-tall tree on an off-piste run-which had been previously altered by Jackson Hole and which was submerged and made invisible by recent, heavy snow fall-was an inherent risk of skiing. We agree with both the framing of the inherent risk and the district court’s conclusion.

With regard to the risk’s framing, we have previously acknowledged “we can not look at the risk in a vacuum.” Cooperman, 214 F.3d at 1167. Rather, “we must evaluate the risk at the greatest level of specificity permitted by the factual record.” Id. Here, the operative facts are undisputed. The mountain had received 45 inches of fresh snow in the four days prior to the accident. The accident took place in an off-piste-and therefore ungroomed-area. Standish’s injury was caused by a collision with the top of the stump, which was lightly covered with the fresh snow and thus not visible to Standish. The stump had been cut to a height of six-and-a-half feet at some point in the past to mitigate some problem. The district court’s inherent-risk framing did not employ any disputed facts and accurately captures the facts of the case. Neither party appears to contest this framing on appeal. We therefore adopt this framing of the risk.

With this specific factual scenario in mind, we conclude that encountering a snow-covered stump in an ungroomed area is an inherent risk of alpine skiing. Everyone familiar with the sight of the intertwining runs of a ski area knows that cutting and otherwise managing trees is necessary for the runs’ creation and upkeep. The vast majority of ski-able terrain simply could not exist in the first instance without the ministrations of sawyers and forest managers. And the forested setting of ski areas means that trees may sometimes fall or otherwise present hazards. As the risk safety and environmental manager for Jackson Hole indicated in his deposition, trees can be altered or “removed for various reasons.” Aple. App. 63. These can include creating more space for skiing in a particular run or glade or mitigating a hazard, such as a “tree blowing over or growing in a particular way that may have been identified to be a hazard.” Aple. App. 63. The height at which the tree in this case was cut could have been a function of a high snow-level during winter, or it could have resulted from a decision to cut just below a particular hazard in any season (i.e., the tree broke or became unstable above that height). Whatever the reason, the ability to act to mitigate hazards and cut trees that pose a risk to skiers-or to create new runs or vary the terrain-is essential to effectively managing a ski area.

Moreover, this accident occurred in an off-piste area, in which unmarked obstacles are frequent and inevitable. “[W]e cannot ignore the nature of the run on which he encountered [the stump] and the inherent risks that run presents.” Roberts, 884 F.3d at 976 (discussing an accident in an off-piste area). And a changing level of the snow-which here was, by chance, just enough to render the stump invisible-is another inherent risk of skiing. Variable snow conditions are intrinsic to the mountainous setting of ski resorts in the American West. See, e.g., Kopeikin v. Moonlight Basin Mgmt., LLC, 981 F.Supp.2d 936, 945 (D. Mont. 2013) (“Skiing presents a multitude of dangers and hazards. Notwithstanding an operator’s efforts to tame it, skiing takes place on essentially wild terrain, on a mighty mountain, with fluctuation in weather and snow conditions that constantly change.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Consequently, all reasonable people understand that the combination of encountering the remnant stumps of forest-management practices and of changing snow levels at a ski area is an inherent risk of alpine skiing.

Furthermore, the Wyoming Supreme Court has explicitly held that because the WRSA is a broader statutory scheme than Colorado’s analogous law, “such items as those included in Colorado’s statute may, as a matter of law, be inherent risks of the recreational activity of skiing.” Muller, 139 P.3d at 1167 (emphasis added). Colorado’s statute expressly includes stumps-whether snow-covered or not-as inherent risks. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-44-103(3.5) (‘”Inherent dangers and risks of skiing’ means those dangers or conditions that are part of the sport of skiing, including . . . surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds, cliffs, extreme terrain, and trees, or other natural objects, and collisions with such natural objects . . . .”).[ 6] And other states include subsurface stumps or forest debris as inherent risks in their analogous statutes, including Utah, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-402 (stumps); New Mexico, see N.M. Stat. § 24-15-10 (“trees or other forms of forest growth or debris”); Idaho, see Idaho Code § 6-1106 (2021) (same); and Montana, see Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-702 (2021) (stumps).[ 7]

Similarly, Colorado’s statute-as well as, for example, Utah’s, Idaho’s, and Montana’s-also includes changing snow conditions and levels as inherent risks. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-44-103; Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-702; Utah Code § 78B-4-402; Idaho Code § 6-1106; see also Fleury v. IntraWest Winter Park Operations Corp., 372 P.3d 349, 351 (Colo. 2016) (holding an in-bounds avalanche qualifies as an inherent risk of skiing because it is a “changing condition” of snow). The depth of the snow in this case is as integral to the accident as the height of the stump. Any less snow, and the stump would have been visible; any more, and Standish would have passed over the top unharmed. Given that there are no genuine disputes of material facts in this case, holding that a snow-covered stump in an off-piste area is an inherent risk of alpine skiing comports with Wyoming Supreme Court precedent.

This conclusion aligns with both our precedent and public policy. In Cooperman, a Tenth Circuit panel considered whether a slipping saddle that was loosely cinched by the recreational provider is an inherent risk of horseback riding. See Cooperman, 214 F.3d at 1168. Cinching a saddle, explained the panel, “is done by hand, and not with scientific precision,” so “a provider must make a judgment call as to how tight or loose to cinch the saddle.” Id. “This imprecision in the cinching of the saddle is characteristic or typical of and therefore inherent in the sport of horseback riding.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The same is true for managing forests. Ski-area managers must make judgment calls about whether and how to cut a tree that has become a hazard. In winter, the height at which a tree is cut is as imprecise and judgment-based as cinching a saddle: it can be cut too tall or too short, and the risk of its being covered lightly with the next snow fall-or being exposed by snow melt-is characteristic of ever-changing mountain conditions at ski areas. So, too, in the summer: a tree could be cut at any height to mitigate a hazard, and a forest manager could decide to leave the stump remnant for a variety of reasons (e.g., impossibility of removal based on terrain, concerns about slope destabilization or damage, or ecological concerns about surrounding flora or fauna). Forest management, just as the saddle-cinching in Cooperman, is based on best practices-not exact practices-and the resulting risks are inherent to skiing in a forested ski area.

In a more recent case, this court held that encountering subsurface boulders-and the gaps between them-in an off-piste ski area in changing snow conditions is an inherent risk of skiing. See Roberts, 884 F.3d at 976. The panel in Roberts noted that a “critical distinction has emerged in the case law between a provider’s failure to control inherent risks (which is no longer actionable)[] and actions that affirmatively enhance existing risks (which remain actionable).” Id. at 975. Because subsurface boulders are an inherent risk of skiing in an off-piste area, and because Jackson Hole had done nothing to affirmatively enhance the existing risk of the boulders, the panel reasoned, the WRSA limited Jackson Hole’s liability, and summary judgment was appropriate. See id. at 977.

To reach this conclusion, the Roberts panel relied on Creel and Dunbar. See id. at 975-76. The outcomes in both Creel and Dunbar rest on the actions of the employees or agents of the recreational provider affirmatively enhancing existing risks. In Creel, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the danger of being struck with a golf ball is an inherent risk of attending a golf tournament-but the employee who encouraged the golfer to hit despite the golfer’s concern about spectators in the way affirmatively enhanced the existing risk of stray golf balls. See Creel, 287 P.3d at 739. In Dunbar, the Tenth Circuit panel concluded encountering a half-pipe in a terrain park is an inherent risk of skiing-but the “delphic statements” of the employee on how to safely exit the terrain park affirmatively enhanced the existing risks posed by the terrain park features. Dunbar v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp., 392 F.3d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir. 2004).

Not so here. Had a Jackson Hole employee represented to Standish that this particular run was groomed or free of obstacles, Jackson Hole might have created a jury question that the resort somehow enhanced the risk of an accident. See, e.g., Roberts, 884 F.3d at 976 (The plaintiff “was not directed to [the area where the accident occurred] by an employee offering ‘delphic statements’ about its safety; in fact advanced skiers in search of fresh untracked and unconsolidated powder are attracted to off-piste terrain . . . because it is ungroomed, untamed, and provided the types of natural obstacles that distinguish such runs from those frequented by less talented skiers.” (quoting Dunbar, 392 F.3d at 1153; emphasis in original)).

But there are no facts in this case to suggest anything of the sort. “[T]here is a difference between the consequences of conduct chosen by [the skier], and risks that are inherent to that choice.” Dunbar, 392 F.3d at 1151. Standish knew that unmarked obstacles could and would exist in this off-piste area, and he chose to proceed down this more-advanced run. Nor did Standish present any evidence that cutting the tree at this particular height affirmatively enhanced the risk or took it “outside the realm of inherent risk.” Creel, 287 P.3d at 737. What made the stump’s height hazardous was the snow level on January 11-and changing snow levels are undoubtedly an inherent risk of mountain recreation. Consequently, the district court properly found that Jackson Hole did not enhance the already-existing risk of the stump.

The outcome in Roberts further supports our decision here. In that case, Roberts’s expert-who had concluded that subsurface boulders were not an inherent risk of off-piste skiing-“put the cart before the horse” by faulting Jackson Hole for not placing warning signs above the area. Roberts, 884 F.3d at 976-77′. But this targeted the element of breach without establishing the existence of a duty in the first place. Id. at 977. Conclusory statements that the boulders that had caused Roberts’s injuries were not inherent risks of skiing were insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Id.

The same is true of the expert testimony Standish presents. As the district court noted, Standish’s expert addressed how Jackson Hole breached the duty it supposedly owed Standish by not removing the remnant stump. But a snow- covered stump is itself an inherent risk of alpine skiing, and the expert’s testimony does not address what action by Jackson Hole takes the stump “outside the realm of inherent risk.” Creel, 287 P.3d at 737. The expert’s claim that “[t]he act of removing the top part of the tree was an affirmative act by the Resort which created the risk encountered by Mr. Standish” is unavailing. Aplt. App. 33. If that were true, then every tree cut by Jackson Hole’s forest managers would present a non-inherent risk to skiing-depending on the snow level on a particular day. And the expert’s claim that Jackson Hole’s “failure to finish the job . . . substantially enhanced the risk created by the Resort” improperly imposes a duty on Jackson Hole to remove completely the stumps made by its forest management. Neither the Wyoming legislature nor any court has imposed such a duty on ski areas. And given the Wyoming Supreme Court’s express embrace of the inherent risks in Colorado’s statute, including stumps, the expert testimony fails to preclude summary judgment.[ 8]

This conclusion also aligns with public policy. To hold that Jackson Hole has a duty to cut trees to a particular level or to remove stumps entirely would disincentivize recreational managers from attempting to mitigate hazards for their guests. If a fallen tree in an off-piste area is an inherent hazard of skiing, and cutting it off below the break creates a non-inherent risk, a ski area manager might decide to simply leave the fallen tree so as not to potentially incur liability. The WRSA is meant to limit the liability of recreational providers so that they can, in their judgment, both manage and offer sometimes-risky recreational opportunities.

Moreover, the standard that would arise from the opposite conclusion here would be untenable. Suppose a tree falls in an off-piste ski area during the winter and needs to be cut. The tree is cut to just above the current snow level, 70 inches. For the next week, the snow melts, leaving about 10 inches of the stump exposed and clearly visible to skiers. But then 11 inches of fresh snow falls, just covering the exposed stump. To conclude that the ski area is then liable for a skier’s collision with that stump would expose the ski area to liability the WRSA is clearly meant to limit. In other words, to hold that the WRSA does not preclude liability in this case would impose a duty on ski areas to never allow a tree stump be the same height as the current level of the snow-even in off-piste areas. We decline to reach such a conclusion.

* * *

B. Consideration of Inadmissible Facts

Standish also argues that, in evaluating the motion for summary judgment, the district court improperly considered facts that would be inadmissible before a jury. His argument is based on the district court’s discussion of the factual context of analogous and precedential cases-including, for example, Creel, Dunbar, Cooperman, and Roberts. See Aplt. Br. at 12-14.

While we review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 1998), we review a district court’s findings of law and entry of summary judgment de novo. See Roberts, 884 F.3d at 971. It is true that a district court may consider only admissible evidence from a record in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See Johnson v. Weld Cty., Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1209 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is well settled in this circuit that we can consider only admissible evidence in reviewing an order granting summary judgment.” (quoting Wright-Simmons, 155 F.3d at 1268)).

But in discussing these cases, the district court here was not making an evidentiary ruling about whether the facts of cases like Creel and Cooperman would be presented to a jury at trial. Rather, it was making a determination of law. In discussing the facts of these analogous cases, the district court was engaging in classic legal analysis: comparing the facts of Standish’s case with the factual context of other inherent-risk cases under the WRSA. See, e.g., Aplt. App. 54 (discussing the facts of Roberts to evaluate Standish’s claims); Aplt. App. 58 (discussing Dunbar to determine Standish’s claim of risk-creation).

To have erred here, the district court would have had to consider facts about Standish ‘s case that were not in the record or would have been otherwise inadmissible before a jury. The district court did not do so, and we reject Standish’s argument.

III. Conclusion

Thomas Standish’s injuries from his accident were severe and painful. This case provides a somber reminder of skiing’s risks to those who enjoy the sport. But Wyoming law does not provide recourse against Jackson Hole for Standish’s accident. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s entry of summary judgment.

———

Notes:

[ 1] Though the numbers do not add up precisely, this fact is undisputed. The discrepancy may be due to the variance in measurements between lift-base depth and mid-mountain depth, as well as other environmental factors like wind.

[ 2] The district court came to this number by subtracting the height of the tree (78 inches) from the approximate depth of snow (80 inches). Neither party contests this finding on appeal.

[ 3] On July 1, 2017, Wyoming’s Ski Safety Act went into effect. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123.2 (2020). This Act takes ski-area skiing out of the purview of the WRSA. In other words, now the Ski Safety Act, rather than the WRSA, sets out the statutory scheme for actions based on skiing at a ski area. But as the district court found, the parties in this case agree the Ski Safety Act is inapplicable to this case because the accident occurred before the law became effective.

[ 4] Though the WRSA is not limited to skiing, many of the precedential cases in this context are results of skiing accidents. Any reference in this opinion to skiing, as opposed to other recreational activities, is merely a reflection of this body of precedent and the particular facts of this case.

[ 5] Though Wyoming’s recent Ski Safety Act is not applicable to this case, see note 3, the Wyoming legislature, in passing the Act, has since provided a definition of “inherent risks” of skiing in a ski area. In doing so, Wyoming’s law now more closely resembles these analogous state statutes. The Ski Safety Act provides that “Inherent risk” with regard to skiing in a ski area means those dangers or conditions which are part of the sport of skiing, including: (A) Changing weather conditions; (B) Falling or surface snow conditions, whether natural or man-made, as they exist or change; (C) Surface or subsurface conditions including bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds, cliffs, extreme terrain, trees or other natural objects; (D) Collisions or impacts with natural objects such as the objects specified in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph including encounters with wildlife; (E) Impact with ski lift towers, signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, water pipes or other man-made structures and their components . . .; (F) Variations in steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of ski trail or feature design, or snowmaking or grooming operations such as roads, freestyle terrain, jumps and catwalks or other terrain modifications; and (G) Collisions with other skiers.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123.2 (2020) (emphasis added).

[ 6] While the other items in this list are all generally natural, the plain meaning of stump indicates a tree that has been cut. See, e.g., Stump, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stump (defining “stump” as “the part of a plant and especially a tree remaining attached to the root after the trunk is cut”); Stump, Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/view/ Entry/192144 (defining “stump” as “[t]he portion of the trunk of a felled tree that remains fixed in the ground; also, a standing tree-trunk from which the upper part and the branches have been cut or broken off). And the remainder of Colorado’s inherent-risks list includes man-made items, including “impact with lift towers, signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, water pipes, or other man-made structures and their components,” and “terrain modifications.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-44-103(3.5).

[ 7] So, too, does Wyoming’s new Ski Safety Act, which went into effect about six months after Standish’s accident. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123.2 (including “stumps” as inherent risks of skiing).

[ 8] Standish’s argument that the expert represented the views of at least “one reasonable person” and thus precluded summary judgment, is similarly unavailing. The reasonableness inquiry to determine whether something is an inherent risk of an activity requires, of course, consideration of the inherent risk itself. But, again, Standish’s expert does not discuss or espouse any non-conclusory opinion on the inherent risk of a subsurface stump in an off-piste area; rather, his conclusion is based on Jackson Hole’s failure to remove it. This merely assumes that such a stump is not an inherent risk. Further, the mere existence of a contrary expert opinion-particularly a conclusory expert opinion-does not preclude summary judgment. See Roberts, 884 F.3d at 977.

Do Releases Work? Should I be using a Release in my Business? Will my customers be upset if I make them sign a release?

Posted: May 18, 2021 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Activity / Sport / Recreation, Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Avalanche, Camping, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, First Aid, Health Club, Indoor Recreation Center, Insurance, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Medical, Minors, Youth, Children, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Playground, Racing, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Scuba Diving, Sea Kayaking, Search and Rescue (SAR), Ski Area, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Snow Tubing, Sports, Summer Camp, Swimming, Triathlon, Whitewater Rafting, Youth Camps, Zip Line | Tags: #ORLawTextbook, #ORRiskManagment, #OutdoorRecreationRiskManagementInsurance&Law, #OutdoorRecreationTextbook, @SagamorePub, Accidents, Angry Guest, Dealing with Claims, General Liability Insurance, Guide, http://www.rec-law.us/ORLawTextbook, Injured Guest, Insurance policy, James H. Moss J.D., Jim Moss, Liability insurance, OR Textbook, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Law, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Outfitter, RecreationLaw, Risk Management, risk management plan, Textbook, Understanding, Understanding Insurance, Understanding Risk Management, Upset Guest | Leave a comment

These and many other questions are answered in my book Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Insurance and Law.

Releases, (or as some people incorrectly call them waivers) are a legal agreement that in advance of any possible injury identifies who will pay for what. Releases can and to stop lawsuits.

This book will explain releases and other defenses you can use to put yourself in a position to stop lawsuits and claims.

This book can help you understand why people sue and how you can and should deal with injured, angry or upset guests of your business.

This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you keep your business afloat and moving forward.

You did not get into the outdoor recreation business to worry or spend nights staying awake. Get prepared and learn how and why so you can sleep and quit worrying.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview

Chapter 2 U.S. Legal System and Legal Research

Chapter 3 Risk 25

Chapter 4 Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue

Chapter 5 Law 57

Chapter 6 Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation

Chapter 7 Pre-injury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases

Chapter 8 Defenses to Claims

Chapter 9 Minors

Chapter 10 Skiing and Ski Areas

Chapter 11 Other Commercial Recreational Activities

Chapter 12 Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities

Chapter 13 Rental Programs

Chapter 14 Insurance

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Artwork by Don Long donaldoelong@earthlink.net

Risk Management in Action combined with the proof people assumed the risk.

Posted: March 8, 2021 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk | Tags: assumption of the risk, Crocodiles, Risk Management, Survivor, Television | Leave a comment

Survivor films and shows contestants being given warnings about crocodiles in Guatemala.

The article Find Out How ‘Survivor’ Production Prepared for a Wrongful Death Lawsuit reveals that during the filming of Survivor Guatemala, the contestants were cavalier about the native crocodiles. Fearing for the safety of the contestants and the resulting outcry if a contestant was eaten survivor gathered the contestants together and filmed them being warned about the crocodiles.

The only non-contestant ever seen on the show is the producer and host Jeff Probst. However, for this segment, they brought in and filmed a crocodile expert who explained to the contestants the danger’s crocodiles posed.

For more on the issue or Survivor Guatemala see:

Find Out How ‘Survivor’ Production Prepared For a Wrongful Death Lawsuit

Survivor Quarantine Questionnaire: Brooke Struck on surviving crocodile attacks in Guatemala

“Previously on Survivor” – Season 11 – Survivor: Guatemala — The Maya Empire

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Quite Interesting to see how real life intersects with entertainment and how it is handled.

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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

South Dakota in Federal District Court decision seems to allow a release to stop the claims for a minor.

Posted: October 19, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Risk Management, Snow Tubing, South Dakota | Tags: appreciated, assumption of the risk, bottom, Careless, Collisions, deliberate, depo, descended, descent, genuine, Gross negligence, Guests, Negligence, nonmoving, Reckless, recommends, Release, Resort, Slope, slower, Snow Tubbing, State of Mind, station, tear, top, Tubbing, tube, tubers, Wanton, Willful and Wanton | 2 Comments

Release was effective in stopping ordinary negligence claims; however, the gross negligence claims were allowed to continue.

Reed v. Union Resort, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225856, 2018 WL 8332583

State: South Dakota, United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, Western Division

Plaintiff: Brad Reed, Individually and as Joint Limited Conservators of I.R., a Minor; and Tara Reed, Individually and as Joint Limited Conservators of I.R., a Minor

Defendant: Union Resort, LLC, dba Mystic Miner

Plaintiff Claims: negligence and gross negligence

Defendant Defenses: Release

Holding: For both plaintiff and defendant, but proceeding to trial

Year: 2018

Summary

The minor child was injured on a tubing hill when her tube stopped in the middle of the hill, and she was hit and injured by her brother coming after her. The release the parents signed stopped the ordinary negligence claim but under South Dakota, law did not stop a claim for gross negligence.

There was no discussion in the decision as to whether the release stopped the claims of the minor child, the injured plaintiff. It just seemed to be taken for granted by the court, or at least not argued by the plaintiffs.

Facts

On March 13, 2015, Brad and Tara Reed brought their children to the defendant’s resort near Lead, South Dakota, for an afternoon of recreational snow tubing.1 The resort was owned and operated by Union Resort, LLC, dba Mystic Miner. Among the Reeds’ children with them that day was seven-year-old I.R. Accompanying the Reeds were another couple and Alex, a social worker from the Philippines.

Upon arriving shortly before noon, the Reed party entered the lodge area where customers are required to check in and purchase admission tickets for the resort. The Reeds purchased snow tubing day passes for themselves and their children, including I.R. As a condition of allowing I.R. to use the resort, Union required the Reeds to agree to a written release of liability. The Reeds signed the release and printed the names of each of their children, including I.R., as participants.

The Reeds understood the document was a release of liability agreement and that, by signing, they would be relinquishing certain unspecified rights. They did not ask any questions about the release. The release informed resort participants that tubing activities are extremely hazardous and can result in personal injury. The Reeds understood that tubing carried with it a degree of risk, including risk of trauma to the head, and that I.R. would be exposed to this risk.

After signing the release and paying the admission fee, the Reeds and their kids received individual tickets for the tube park. Those tickets included additional warnings.

At the resort, there are numerous bright red signs that provide instructions and warnings to participants. Among the messages on some of the signs was a warning that collisions with other tubers was one of the dangers of tubing. Other signs instructed the tubers to follow the attendant’s instructions and to wait for the attendant’s signal before starting [down the tube run]. The Reeds do not recall whether they saw or read any of these signs.

The Reeds were directed to select tubes from the resort’s selection of tubes, which they did. Defendant had approximately 50 to 70 tubes in inventory at the time, but there is no evidence how many of these tubes had already been selected by prior guests. No employee of defendant selected the tubes for the Reeds. Several defendant employees testified at their depositions that it was a practice at the resort to leave tubes with tears in the bottoms in circulation for guests to use. The employees explained that such tubes were slower and slower equated to safer in their minds.

During the Reeds’ stay at the resort, they went down the tube runs approximately 15 to 20 times. Two of the four tube runs at the resort were open that day. During the Reeds’ runs, there were two defendant employees at the bottom of the tube runs assisting guests with the tow rope (which towed guests to the top of the run).

On approximately two of the Reeds’ 15-20 tubing runs, there was a young man at the top of the tube runs who also appeared to be a resort employee with a radio in his possession. However, the young man never monitored the tube runs, never gave instructions to tubers, and never staged tubers going down the tube runs. “Staging” means controlling the entry of guests onto the tube runs to ensure that the prior tuber has finished the run and cleared the area before the next tuber is allowed to begin his or her descent. There was no staging and, instead, tubers decided themselves when to begin their descent, a situation Brad Reed described as a “free-for-all.”

At approximately 2 p.m., the Reeds decided to take one last run down the tube runs before leaving the resort. Up to this point, the Reeds had experienced no concerns or incidents. Up to this final run, I.R. had always completed her run down the slope as part of a group or with one of her parents. On the final run, she asked to be allowed to go down the tube run by herself, to which her parents agreed. Mrs. Reed told I.R. they would go down the run together, parallel to each other in each of the two open tube runs. At this point, Alex was directly behind I.R. in line for the same tube lane. Mr. Reed was behind Alex in the same line.

Once both lanes were clear, Mrs. Reed and I.R. began their descents. Mrs. Reed went all the way down the run, but I.R.’s tube stopped approximately 3/4 of the way down the slope. While I.R. was stopped, Alex began her descent before I.R. cleared the lane. When Alex’s tube reached I.R.’s tube, they collided. No defendant employee told Alex to begin her descent, but no defendant employee was present at the top of the run to tell her, instruct her, or prevent her from beginning her descent until I.R. cleared the lane.

From the top of the slope, Mr. Reed testified Alex should have been able to see I.R. had not cleared the lane had Alex been paying attention. Mr. Reed himself was able to observe the collision from his vantage point at the top of the slope.

After the accident, the Reeds observed an approximately 8-inch hole in the bottom of I.R.’s tube that had filled with snow. Defendant asserts it was its policy to stow the tubes under the deck each night and to pull them out the next day for guests’ use. Defendant asserts employees were directed to observe the tubes for significant tears or defects and to remove defective tubes during this process. However, several defendant employees testified they left tubes with tears in their bottoms in rotation for guest use because the tears would slow the tuber down as they descended the slope. Employees believed a slower descent was a safer descent.

If a lightweight child descended the slope with a tube with a tear in it, sometimes the tube would stop mid-way down the slope and a defendant employee would have to walk up the slope to retrieve the child. In such an instance, the defendant employee at the bottom of the slope would radio the employee at the top and tell them to stop sending guests down the slope until the child was retrieved and taken to the bottom.

No photograph was taken of I.R.’s tube at the beginning of the day, after the accident, or at any other time on the day of the accident. It is unknown if the tear in the bottom of her tube was there from the start of the day or whether the tear occurred during the Reeds’ use of the tube that day. The Reeds mixed and mingled the various tubes they checked out, so several members of the Reeds’ group could have used the accident tube at various times of the day.

The accident tube was the only tube checked out by the Reed group that had a tear in it. The Reeds did not notice the tear until after I.R.’s injury. The Reeds did not inform anyone at the resort about the tear in the tube after the accident occurred. There is no evidence that any defendant employee had specific knowledge that the Reeds had checked out a tube with a tear in it on the day of the accident, though defendant employees had general knowledge that such tubes were often retained in inventory because they were perceived to be “safer” because they were slower.

From the beginning of the 2010-11 season through the end of the 2014-15 season, defendant had incident reports of 17 collisions of tubers. During that same time frame, there were 72 total incident reports.3 Several of these collisions between tubers occurred within a few weeks and, in two examples, a few days, of I.R.’s collision. Specifically, there were 5 incident reports involving collisions between tubers going down the tube lane between December 30, 2014, and February 27, 2015. None of defendant’s incident reports record whether a hole in a tube contributed to the incident.

Defendant maintains that it had a proper protocol of having at least one employee at the top of the tube run and one employee at the bottom of the tube run at all times. The employee at the top of the tube run was supposed to “stage” the tubers going down. The employee at the bottom of the tube run would retrieve items lost by tubers going down the slope (hats, mittens, etc.) and also retrieve guests whose tubes stopped without fully descending the slope.

The Reeds assert defendant was chronically understaffed and that defendant made a deliberate decision not to station an employee at the top of the tube run the day of I.R.’s accident. Defendant asserts the Reeds have no evidence to support the assertion that the decision not to station an employee at the top of the tube run was a deliberate decision.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The plaintiff’s conceded that the release barred their claims for negligence, the first count in their complaint. That left the issue of whether the release barred their claims for gross negligence and whether they had pled enough facts to support a gross negligence claim.

Gross negligence under South Dakota law is the same as willful and wanton conduct:

Under South Dakota law, the phrase “gross negligence” is synonymous with the phrase “willful and wanton misconduct.” Both phrases refer “to a category of tort that is different in kind and characteristics than negligence.” Negligence occurs when one acts with an “unreasonable risk of harm to another.” Willful and wanton misconduct requires a risk of harm that is “substantially greater than that which is necessary to make the conduct negligent.” The threatened harm “must be an easily perceptible danger of death or substantial physical harm.”

The major difference between ordinary negligence and gross negligence is the mental state of the defendant.

In addition, proof of a negligence claim focuses on the ordinary standard of care, while a gross negligence claim focuses on the defendant’s mental state. A defendant acts willfully and wantonly when it knows or has reason to know at the time of its actions of the dire risk and proceeds without concern for the safety of others. The standard does not require proof of intent to harm, but it does “partake to some appreciable extent … of the nature of a deliberate and intentional wrong.” Gross negligence requires “an affirmatively reckless state of mind.” There must be “a conscious realization that a serious physical injury was a probable, as distinguished from a possible (ordinary negligence), result of such conduct.”

That creates a two-step test to determine if the defendant was grossly negligent.

Summarizing the above case law, gross negligence is distinguished from ordinary negligence by two factors. The risk of harm must be greater for gross negligence—whereas under ordinary negligence, the risk of harm can be anything from negligible harm to death, the risk of harm for gross negligence must be death or serious harm. Secondly, the likelihood that harm will come about, phrased in terms of the defendant’s state of mind, must be greater. For example, if there is a 10 percent chance some harm will happen and the defendant fails to take steps to ensure that harm does not come about, he is merely negligent. If there is an 85 percent chance serious harm or death will happen and the defendant fails to take steps to ensure the harm does not occur, he has acted willfully and wantonly or with gross negligence.

The court’s analysis of the chance of the harm occurring is a way of looking at the differences between ordinary and gross negligence that I have never seen before.

The court looked at the facts as presented by both sides and found both lacking the information the court felt would prove the plaintiff’s case. However, the court made this statement.

Under the law of gross negligence, South Dakota has recognized a plaintiff will rarely have direct evidence of the defendant’s state of mind. Rather, state of mind must be inferred from the circumstances. Id. Also, under the law of summary judgment, all inferences from the facts must be made in favor of the nonmoving party, Both sources of law, then, support taking the Reeds’ view of the inference to be drawn from the fact that defendant was chronically understaffed and did not have an employee stationed at the top of the tube run at the time of I.R.’s accident.

So, with the inferences created by the plaintiffs about the state of mind of the tubing hill, the court held that there was enough information plead to allow the gross negligence claim to continue.

The court then looked at the assumption of the risk argument made by the defendant. There was no case law in South Dakota stating that assumption of the risk was a defense to gross negligence, so the court held that assumption of the risk would not stop the gross negligence claim.

So Now What?

What did not arise in this case is whether the release stopped the claims of the minor child. The case was captioned as the parents suing on behalf of their minor child. In that regard, the release would bar the claims of the parents. However, this is a different way of suing on behalf of a minor, not away normally done in most states any more.

Also, this is a decision by a Federal District Court applying South Dakota law so, whether a not a release stops a minor’s claims is probably still up in the air until the South Dakota Supreme Court decides the issue.

However, it is a decision to lean on if you have participants who are minors in your program.

The other issues are classic situations where the defendant looks at a situation one way as a positive for patrons but the injured patron is able to turn the situation around and use it as a club against the defendant. Torn tubes were regarded by the defendant as good because they were slower than the other tubes. However, a torn tube is not a product that is 100%, in the condition it was received from the manufacturer. It was a defective product. So, the plaintiff was able to show the defendant was derelict in using them.

If they placed the tubes in a different location with a sign that said, slower tubes it might have been helpful.

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Nevada Appellate court voids release because statements made between the riders & the mechanical bull operator creates a requirement to maneuver the bull in an easy fashion which voided the release. Plaintiff also claimed battery from the actions of the defendant.

Posted: September 7, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Nevada, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Ambiguity, assumption of the risk, Battery, broken, clarify, contractual, contradict, Conversation, convey, corners, Easy Ride, exact, exculpatory, extrinsic, free-fall, genuine, intensity, Mechanical bull, negotiation, Nevada, parol, Parol evidence rule, quotation, re-write, Release, ride, simulator, thrown, trier, unambiguous, undisputed, unexpected, verbal, violent, waived, Waiver | Leave a comment

A strong and well written dissent argued to enforce the release on general contract principals.

Kuchta v. Opco, 2020 Nev. App. Unpub. LEXIS 549, 2020 WL 3868434

State:
Nevada, Court of Appeals of Nevada

Plaintiff: Joseph Kuchta

Defendant: Sheltie Opco, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company, d/b/a John Ascuaga’s Nugget, d/b/a Gilley’s Nightclub; and Wolfhound Holdings, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company

Plaintiff Claims: Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Negligent Hiring and Respondent Superior, Negligent Supervision, Negligent Entrustment, and Battery

Defendant Defenses: Release

Holding: For the Plaintiff

Year: 2020

Summary

Bar patrons wanted to ride the mechanical bull. Before doing so they made the bull operator agree to an easy ride. After one of the riders was thrown and suffered an injury, they sued saying the agreement between the operator and the riders for an easy ride voids the release. The Nevada Court of Appeals agreed.

Facts

While socializing with friends at Gilley’s Nightclub in Sparks, Nevada, a bar owned by respondent Sheltie Opco, Kuchta and his friends observed an employee riding a mechanical bull. As the employee was riding the bull, another employee used a joystick to control the bull’s movements. After the employee demonstrated how easy and non-challenging it was to engage safely in a slow ride, she stepped off the bull.

Sometime later that night, Kuchta and his friends were considering riding the bull. Kuchta’s group approached the same employee, who they had watched ride the bull earlier, and who was now operating the joystick and controlling the ride. Two different people within the group that Kuchta was part of conversed with the employee about riding the mechanical bull.

Viewing all factual allegations in a light most favorable to Kuchta, his friends told the employee that each person in their group wanted an easy ride, which based on a difficulty scale of one to ten, they described as a two (with one meaning not moving at all), which the employee said she could provide. The friends indicated that everyone in the group was a novice and wanted a ride similar to the ride the employee had demonstrated. Furthermore, they told the employee that everyone should be able to step off the bull once the ride concluded, just as the employee had been able to do earlier that night after her ride. The employee agreed to provide the type of a ride Kuchta’s group requested. Thus, Kuchta’s and the employee’s understandings and expectations regarding Kuchta’s ride were that it would be easy, at a level two or at a low speed, and that Kuchta would be able to dismount after the ride was finished.

Before any person could ride the mechanical bull, however, Gilley’s required each patron to sign a previously prepared Assumption of Risk, Release, Indemnity, and Medical Treatment Authorization Agreement (Agreement), also known as a written waiver. The Agreement listed potential risks and possible injuries involved in riding the bull, including broken bones, and also released Sheltie Opco from any and all liability for injuries or negligence that occur from all risks, both known and unknown. Kuchta signed the Agreement, although the record does not reveal when it was signed in relation to the conversations described above.

According to Kuchta, once on the bull, the ride was initially slow, as had been requested. However, after approximately 20 seconds, the operator significantly increased the speed and violence of the bull’s movements. Kuchta was thrown from the bull and suffered a fractured pelvis.

Kuchta sued Sheltie Opco alleging: negligence, negligence per se, negligent hiring and respondent superior, negligent supervision, negligent entrustment, and battery. Sheltie Opco moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing there was no genuine issue of fact because Kuchta expressly assumed the risks of the ride and consented to the battery when he signed the Agreement before riding the bull. The district court granted Sheltie Opco’s motion for summary judgment finding that Kuchta expressly assumed the risks of riding the bull by signing the Agreement, including consenting to the touching that was the basis for his battery claim.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The basic issue that pops up in this case is the conversation between the operator of the mechanical bull and the plaintiff who set the conditions for the plaintiff to ride the bull. Normally, verbal agreements are void and only the paper agreements are valid when a contract is signed. This is called the Parol Evidence rule. Oral statements made prior to the signing of the written agreement are of no value in interpreting the contract. Only the information contained in the four corners of the paperwork are reviewed.

This is a scary issue because any statement made by your staff could be used to defeat a release.

Kuchta argues that he did not expressly assume the risk because the operator specifically agreed to provide the requested slow ride (i.e., an intensity of two out of ten) and the operator instead ultimately conducted a wild ride exceeding his expectations.

Does a conversation between a customer and an employee, (or staff member) change a release? More importantly, does it create a modification of the experience so that the release does not cover the risk. Normally no, but in this case, Yes.

The court then looked at the requirements for a valid release under Nevada’s law.

(1) Contracts providing for immunity for liability for negligence must be construed strictly since they are not favorite[s] of the law . . . (2) such contracts must spell out the intention of the party with the greatest particularity . . . and show the intent to release from liability beyond doubt by express stipulation and no inference from the words of general import can establish it . . . (3) such contracts must be construed with every intendment against the party who seeks immunity from liability . . . (4) the burden to establish immunity from liability is upon the party who asserts such immunity . . . .

Taken as a whole, the requirements are not different in most states. However, the Nevada Appellate court looked further at the requirements to determine whether the plaintiff did assume the risk. Where the risks identified in the release or known by the plaintiff.

However, our inquiry does not stop here as it pertains to the waiver’s validity; we must determine whether Kuchta expressly assumed the risks contemplated by the waiver.

In Nevada, releases are looked at as proof, the plaintiff assumed the risk. These are one-way courts look at releases; however, it is a minority view. The release must then contain the necessary language for the defendant to prove the plaintiff knew and assumed the risk that caused his or her injury.

The court has combined, under Nevada’s law, the relationship of contract, the release, and the risks outlined or assumed by contract in the release. Meaning, not only must you agree not to sue, the risks you assume must be specific in the release.

“Express assumption of risk[‘s] . . . vitality stems from a contractual undertaking that expressly relieves a putative defendant from any duty of care to the injured party; such a party has consented to bear the consequences of a voluntary exposure to a known risk.”

A release under Nevada’s law is an express assumption of risk agreement. Express meaning written.

Generally, “[a]ssumption of the risk is based on a theory of consent.” For a party to assume the risk there are two requirements. “First, there must have been voluntary exposure to the danger. Second, there must have been actual knowledge of the risk assumed.” Actual knowledge of the danger by the party alleged to have assumed the risk is the essence of the express assumption of risk doctrine.

The plaintiff in this case did not consent to the ride he was given, even though he signed away his right to sue. The failure of the defendant to prove the plaintiff assented to the ride he received, which was not in the written release, was cause for the release to fail, possibly.

To determine whether the party signing had actual knowledge of the risks assumed, courts must consider “[(1)] the nature and extent of the injuries, [(2)] the haste or lack thereof with which the release was obtained, and [(3)] the understandings and expectations of the parties at the time of signing.”

The first two requirements were met in this case. However, the third requirement was not met. The plaintiff did not have an understanding or expectations of the parties at the time the release was signed.

These conflicting allegations create a genuine dispute of material fact as to the expectations of the parties and as to whether the bull operator’s conduct failed to meet those expectations. Because Kuchta and Sheltie Opco each presented consistent and conflicting facts regarding both parties’ expectations of the ride, and knowledge of the risks involved in a level two-of-ten or easy ride, a trier of fact should have resolved this issue. Thus, the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Sheltie Opco as to Kuchta’s negligence claims.

No party, who signs a release, expects to be injured or killed. So, this third requirement is different. No guest signs the release with an understanding they can’t sue. They sign the release because it is part of the paperwork needed to engage in the activity. If you made the effort to make sure the person signing the release understood the expectations of them from you when signing the release, many might not.

So, this decision in Nevada does not void releases. It does, however, create an additional requirement in the relationship between your guests and your operations. The risks the client is undertaking must be known and assumed by the plaintiff prior to undertaking the activity. That risk must be expressed in the release.

The second argument the plaintiff made that the court undertook was the battery claim. Most people understand the TV term assault and battery as a criminal charge. However, battery has been an intentional tort for centuries. “A battery is an intentional and offensive touching of a person who has not consented to the touching.”

In this case, the touching is not an actual contact between the plaintiff and the defendant but causing the plaintiff to be “touched” by the landing surface which caused his injury.

The court looked at this intentional tort as greater than normal negligence.

“[G]eneral clauses exempting the defendant from all liability for negligence will not be construed to include intentional or reckless misconduct, or extreme and unusual kinds of negligence, unless such intention clearly appears.”

This phrase is quite interesting. Like all other states, a release does not cover intentional, reckless, or extreme conduct on the part of the defendant. At the same time, the court seemed to open the idea that a release under Nevada’s law could stop a claim for intentional, reckless, or extreme conduct if it was intentional and clear in the release.

Because there was a conflict between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the facts surrounding the battery, the Appellate court found the motion for summary judgment should not have been granted.

The dissent in this case would have upheld the release based on basic contract law. The dissent sets out a thorough review of contract law in Nevada.

Summing up, what 500 years of contract law tell us is this:

(1) a contract means what its words say and an unambiguous contract “will be enforced as written”;

(2) what the contractual words say is what they objectively convey in their ordinary sense regardless of what the parties might have personally thought or intended in their heads;

(3) the final contract supersedes all earlier verbal negotiations;

(4) parol evidence may only be used to clarify a term that is ambiguous, and an ambiguity does not arise merely because the parties disagree on what they think the contract means;

(5) parol evidence may never be used to contradict an express term of a contract, whether the contract is integrated or not;

(6) parol evidence may never consist of earlier negotiations inconsistent with the final contract, whether the final document is integrated or not;

(7) when there is no dispute regarding what the words of the contract consist of (and there is no dispute regarding what any parol evidence admitted to clarify an ambiguity actually is), and the only remaining dispute is over what those undisputed words and parol evidence mean, then all that remains is a pure question of law for the court.

The dissent specifically focused on the Parol Evidence Rule which in most cases have prevented the conversation between the patrons and the mechanical bull operator from being offered into evidence.

The court voided the release and allowed the intentional tort of battery to proceed.

So Now What?

This upends release law in Nevada. Your release must be able to prove the guest understood the risks they may encounter, All of the risks.

Any statements made by your staff, could alter your release, worse, alter the understanding of the release or the risks, creating an issue that will have to go to trial to determine.

Bringing an intentional tort into a lawsuit is another game changer. Raft guides that intentional hit a rock, bump a boat, or even flip a boat will create liability in Nevada for any injury their customers receive.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn

If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.

Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

To Purchase Go Here:

Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law

Email: Jim@Rec-Law.US

By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

ride, parol, ambiguity, conversation, verbal, negotiation, battery, broken, contradict, thrown, contractual, unambiguous, corners, genuine, exculpatory, extrinsic, clarify, violent, intensity, simulator, convey, exact, undisputed, unexpected, free-fall, quotation, re-write, waived, trier

Tuttle v. Heavenly Valley, L.P., 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 814, 2020 WL 563604

Posted: August 27, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Legal Case, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: aggravated, Assumption of Risk Doctrine, assumption of the risk, comparative fault, fault, grossly, invited, italics, jurors, Lawsuit, misconduct, Primary Assumption of Risk, recreational, Release, Resort, secondary, Secondary Assumption of Risk, Skier, skiing, Snow, snowboarding, Sport, Terrain park, unambiguously, Waiver | Leave a comment

Tuttle v. Heavenly Valley, L.P., 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 814, 2020 WL 563604

Tuttle v. Heavenly Valley, L.P.

Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three

February 5, 2020, Opinion Filed

G056427

Reporter

2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 814 *; 2020 WL 563604

GRANT TUTTLE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. HEAVENLY VALLEY, L.P., Defendant and Respondent.

Notice: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 8.1115(a), PROHIBITS COURTS AND PARTIES FROM CITING OR RELYING ON OPINIONS NOT CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED, EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BY RULE 8.1115(b). THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED FOR THE PURPOSES OF RULE 8.1115.

Subsequent History: Request denied by Tuttle v. Heavenly Valley, L.P., 2020 Cal. LEXIS 2940 (Cal., Apr. 29, 2020)

Prior History: [*1] Appeal from a judgment and post judgment orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Ct. No. 30-2015-00813230, Nathan R. Scott, Judge.

Disposition: Affirmed.

Counsel: The Simon Law Group, Thomas J. Conroy; Williams Iagmin and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Steven R. Parminter, Patrick M. Kelly and John J. Immordino for Defendant and Respondent.

Judges: DUNNING, J.^*, BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J., MOORE, J. concurred.

Opinion by: DUNNING, J.

Opinion

INTRODUCTION

Skier and Heavenly Valley season passholder Dana Tuttle died after she and a snowboarder collided at Heavenly Valley’s resort in South Lake Tahoe. Tuttle’s spouse and sons sued Heavenly Valley and the snowboarder.¹ Defendant asserted as defenses the doctrines of primary assumption of the risk, on the ground Tuttle’s accident was the result of the inherent risks of skiing, and express assumption of the risk, based on Tuttle’s signed release of all claims and liability for defendant’s negligence.

The trial court determined as a matter of law the release was unambiguous and covered Tuttle’s accident. Despite these conclusions, the jury was still asked to decide whether defendant “unreasonably increased the risks . . . over and above [*2] those inherent in the sport of skiing.” The jury found defendant did, but unanimously agreed defendant did not act with gross negligence. Finding Tuttle and defendant each 50 percent at fault, the jury awarded plaintiffs substantial damages.

A judgment in plaintiffs’ favor typically would have followed as a matter of course unless defendant formally moved for, and was granted, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). However, the trial court determined the jury’s factual finding that defendant was not grossly negligent, coupled with its legal conclusion that the release provided a complete defense to plaintiffs’ lawsuit, compelled entry of a judgment in defendant’s favor, even without a posttrial JNOV motion.

Plaintiffs appeal, but do not challenge the jury instructions, the special verdict form, or the finding that defendant did not act with gross negligence. Plaintiffs urge this court to (1) review the release do novo and conclude it does not cover Tuttle’s accident, (2) hold the release violates public policy, (3) find that defendant invited errors in the special verdict form and jury instructions and forfeited the opportunity for entry of judgment in its favor without first [*3] formally moving for JNOV, and (4) order a new trial. We find no error, however, and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Release

On September 2, 2013, Tuttle purchased a season ski pass from defendant and executed a release.² The release begins with an all-capital advisement: “WARNING, ASSUMPTION OF RISK, RELEASE OF LIABILITY INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT PLEASE READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING. THIS IS A RELEASE OF LIABILITY WAIVER OF CERTAIN LEGAL RIGHTS.” Salient provisions of the release are found in paragraphs 1, 2, 5, 6, and 13.

In paragraph 1, Tuttle acknowledged snow skiing “can be HAZARDOUS AND INVOLVES THE RISK OF PHYSICAL INJURY AND/OR DEATH.” In paragraph 2, she “ASSUME[D] ALL RISKS . . . known or unknown, inherent or otherwise [associated with skiing at the resort, including] falling; slick or uneven surfaces; surface and subsurface snow conditions; . . . variations in terrain; design and condition of man-made facilities and/or terrain features; . . . [and] collisions.” Paragraph 5 advised: “The description of the risks listed above is not complete and participating in the Activities may be dangerous and may also include risks which are inherent and/or which cannot be reasonably [*4] avoided without changing the nature of the Activities.”

Paragraph 6 included Tuttle’s express agreement “NOT TO SUE AND TO RELEASE [DEFENDANT] FROM ALL LIABILITY . . . for . . . injury or loss to [her], including death.” This paragraph specifically advised that Tuttle was releasing all “CLAIMS BASED ON [DEFENDANT’S] ALLEGED OR ACTUAL NEGLIGENCE . . . .” In paragraph 13, Tuttle agreed the release was “binding to the fullest extent permitted by law . . . on [her] heirs, next of kin, executors and personal representatives.”

II.

The Accident and the Lawsuit

The accident occurred on December 21, 2013. Snowboarder Anthony Slater was proceeding out of defendant’s terrain park and collided with skier Tuttle after their respective trails merged. The impact of the collision propelled Tuttle into a tree. Tuttle died the following morning. Factors that potentially contributed to the accident included defendant’s signage, fencing, crowd control the day of the accident, Tuttle’s ski path, and Slater’s speed.

Plaintiffs sued defendant and Slater.³ Defendant raised the defenses of implied and express assumption of the risk: (1) “any injury, loss or damage purportedly sustained . . . by Plaintiffs was directly [*5] and proximately caused and contributed to by risks which are inherent to the activity in which Plaintiffs participated”; (2) “Plaintiffs either impliedly or expressly relieved Defendant of its duty, if any, to Plaintiffs by knowingly assuming the risk of injury”; and (3) defendant “is entitled to defense and indemnity of each and every cause of action alleged in the Complaint pursuant to the release agreement signed by Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs’ representative or agent.”

III.

The Jury Trial

The jury trial spanned five weeks.⁴ The week before jury selection, the parties stipulated to a special verdict form that posed two liability questions: (1) whether defendant “unreasonably increased the risks to Tuttle over and above those inherent in the sport of skiing” and (2) whether defendant was grossly negligent. The special verdict form further instructed the jury that if it answered “yes” to either question, it was to make findings regarding the amount of damages and allocation of fault. Before the final witness concluded his testimony, the trial court confirmed that counsel was not making any changes to the special verdict form.

The following day, at the close of evidence and outside the [*6] jurors‘ presence, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict and defendant’s renewed motion for nonsuit.⁵ The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ argument the release was fatally ambiguous with regard to the risks involved in the accident. Given the absence of competent extrinsic evidence regarding the release, the trial court determined its interpretation presented a legal question for the court: “So I will construe the release, relying on its plain language. I find that it is not ambiguous. It covers the risks here, most notably in paragraph 2 where it covers risks regarding design and collision, and later where it notes that the risks include injury, including death.”

In the trial court’s own words, the finding as a matter of law that the release unambiguously discharged defendant from liability for its own ordinary negligence meant “we still have questions for the jury about whether the contract was entered into and whether the defendant[] committed gross negligence that cannot be released. For these reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict is denied.”

The rulings prompted defendant’s counsel to suggest additional jury instructions and a revision to the [*7] special verdict form might be necessary to address the fact issues surrounding Tuttle’s execution of the release. The following colloquy then ensued: “[Plaintiffs’ counsel]: Your Honor I’ll shortcut the whole thing. With the court’s ruling, I’ll stipulate to the formation of the contract and proceed with the verdict form as is, so no need for additional instructions. [¶] [Defendant’s counsel]: I’m sorry. To be clear, we have a stipulation that the contract existed and that the contract included the release and waiver language? [¶] [Plaintiffs’ counsel]: Right. The release and—release of liability and waiver was executed—existed and was executed. That’s the stipulation. [¶] [Defendant’s counsel]: Accepted, your Honor. [¶] The Court: So stipulated.” (Italics added.)

At this point, the jurors returned to the courtroom. The trial court read the jury instructions, and plaintiffs’ counsel began his closing argument. He had this to say about the release: “What we’re talking about here, the liability of the resort does not fall under this release. And you are not going to be asked any questions on the verdict form about the release. Yeah, [Tuttle] signed one, and she understood the inherent [*8] risks of skiing, and that’s what the release
releases. It does not release gross negligence. It does not release what we’re talking about.”

At the beginning of the afternoon session, before defendant’s closing argument, the trial court and counsel met again outside the jurors’ presence to discuss the stipulation concerning the release. Plaintiffs’ counsel maintained the jury should not hear about the stipulation. When the trial court repeated its concern the jury could “end up finding that the release was not valid” and invited counsel to revisit the special verdict form, plaintiffs’ counsel replied there was no need as “the release in evidence releases
negligence. And the questions on the verdict form go [] to gross negligence, and—this doesn’t have to do with the release, but the increase of unreasonable risk.” Defendant’s counsel remarked the “dialogue this morning, your Honor, was prompted in part by the plaintiffs’ desire not to have to modify further the special verdict form.” Plaintiffs’ counsel concurred: “Right.” Counsel then agreed the stipulation would not be read to the jury.

Closing arguments continued. Defendant’s counsel did not mention the release in his closing argument. [*9] Neither did plaintiffs’ counsel in his rebuttal argument. There, he referred to the special verdict form and told the jurors, “[a]t the end of the day, it’s a simple exercise. That jury form . . . . [¶] . . . If you perceive wrong on the part of [defendant], you tick those two boxes. And there’s two of them—you tick them both. Procedurally, you tick the one about increased unreasonable risk, and then you tick the one about gross negligence. If you perceive wrong, that’s what you do.”

The jury was never told the release provided a complete defense to defendant’s ordinary negligence.

IV.

The Special Verdict

As to defendant, the special verdict form included three liability questions, three damages questions, and three comparative fault/apportionment of liability questions. The liability questions read as follows:

“3. Did Heavenly Valley do something or fail to do something that unreasonably increased the risks to Dana Tuttle over and above those inherent in the sport of skiing?

“Yes X No __

“4. Was Heavenly Valley grossly negligent in doing something or failing to do something that caused harm to Dana Tuttle?

“Yes __ No X

“If you answered ‘Yes’ to either question 3 or 4, then answer question [*10] 5. [¶] If you answered ‘No’ to both questions 3 and 4, and also answered ‘No’ to either question 1 or 2, then sign and return this verdict form. You do not need to answer any more questions.

“If you answered ‘Yes’ to both questions 1 and 2, and answered ‘No’ to both questions 3 and 4, insert the number ‘0’ next to Heavenly Valley’s name in question 11, skip question 5, and answer questions 6-11.

“5. Was Heavenly Valley’s conduct a substantial factor in causing harm to Dana Tuttle?

“Yes X No __”

Because the jury answered “yes” to question 5, it was instructed to answer the remaining questions. The jury determined plaintiffs’ damages were $2,131,831, with Tuttle and defendant sharing equal responsibility.

Immediately after polling the jurors, the trial court asked plaintiffs’ counsel to prepare the judgment and submit it the next morning. The trial court then thanked and discharged the jury without objection from trial counsel. No one noted on the record that express assumption of the risk was a complete defense to the jury’s verdict.

Entry of a Defense Judgment

At the trial court’s direction, plaintiffs’ counsel prepared a proposed judgment awarding plaintiffs $1,065,915.50, plus costs and [*11] interest. Defendant objected on the basis the jury found defendant was not grossly negligent and the release provided “a complete and total defense to this entire lawsuit and Plaintiffs should take nothing.”⁶

After briefing and a hearing, the trial court sustained defendant’s objection to plaintiffs’ proposed judgment. In its March 9, 2018 order, the trial court reiterated its finding as a matter of law that Tuttle’s release “clearly, unambiguously, and explicitly released defendant from future liability for any negligence against Dana Tuttle.” The trial court explained its earlier finding concerning the scope of the release still left open fact questions as to whether Tuttle knowingly accepted the release agreement and, if she did, whether defendant acted with gross negligence. With the parties’ stipulation that Tuttle knowingly executed the release and the jury’s factual finding that defendant did not act with gross negligence, the trial court further explained there was only one legal conclusion: “[D]efendant has prevailed on the express assumption issue and ‘negate[d] the defendant’s duty of care, an element of the plaintiff’s case.'”

The trial court acknowledged “the structure” of [*12] the special verdict form erroneously directed the jury to continue to answer questions on damages after finding defendant had not been grossly negligent. The trial court found, however, the jury’s specific finding that defendant did not act with gross negligence was not inconsistent with, but instead overrode, the award of damages.

The trial court did not invite defendant to file a motion for JNOV or call for the filing of such a motion on its own initiative. Instead, it entered judgment in favor of defendant.

VI.

Plaintiffs’ Post judgment Motions

The defense judgment reiterated the jury’s special verdict findings and stated in relevant part: “It appearing that by reason of those special verdicts, and the Court’s interpretation of the terms of the legal contract in Decedent Dana Tuttle’s season ski pass agreement, and [the] legal conclusions as set forth in that certain Order entered on March 9, 2018, Defendants Heavenly Valley L.P., and Anthony Slater are entitled to judgment on Plaintiffs’ complaint.” (Some capitalization omitted.)

Plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 663 on the ground the judgment was not consistent with the special verdict and adversely affected plaintiffs’ [*13] substantial rights. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial, on the grounds there was insufficient evidence defendant had not acted with gross negligence,⁷ the special verdict was “hopelessly contradictory” because the jury’s gross negligence finding imposed no liability, but its apportionment of fault between Tuttle and defendant did, and defendant invited errors.

The trial court denied plaintiffs’ post judgment motions. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

The Release Covered Tuttle’s Accident.

The trial court found as a matter of law that defendant’s release was not ambiguous and covered Tuttle’s accident. Our review of the release is de novo. (Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 748, 754, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177.) No extrinsic evidence concerning the meaning of the release was presented in the trial court, so “the scope of a release is determined by [its] express language.” (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1357, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197 (Benedek).)

Rather than a straightforward argument the trial court erred as a matter of law in interpreting the release, plaintiffs contend the release was narrow in scope and applied only to risks inherent in the sport of snow skiing. But a release that applies only to the inherent risks of a sport is the legal equivalent of no release at all. [*14] (Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1490, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471 (Cohen); Zipusch v. LA Workout, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1291, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 704 (Zipusch).) To understand the distinction, we detour briefly to discuss the doctrines of implied and express assumption of the risk.

Overview: Assumption of the Risk

The California Supreme Court’s decision in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 834 P.2d 696 (Knight)⁸ and its progeny have established that a ski resort operator is not liable for injuries caused by risks inherent in the sport of snow skiing.⁹ Instead, pursuant to the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, participants in active sports assume responsibility for injuries sustained as a result of the sport’s inherent risks. (Id. at p. 321.) Stated another way, the defendant owes no duty of care to protect the plaintiff from the inherent risks of an active sport. (Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1367, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Allan).) Because no duty of care is owed and the plaintiff has assumed the risk of injury, no release is necessary to absolve a defendant of liability when a plaintiff is injured as the result of an inherent risk in an active sport such as skiing.

A ski resort operator “still owe[s] a duty, however, not to increase the risks of injury beyond those that are inherent in the sport. This distinction is closely tied to the policy underlying the finding of no duty, i.e., there should be no liability imposed [*15] which would chill normal participation or fundamentally alter the nature of the sport, but liability may be appropriate where the risk is not ‘inherent’ in the sport.” (Allan, supra , 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1367, italics omitted.) This is the doctrine of secondary assumption of the risk, and it is an exception to the complete defense of primary assumption of risk. (Knight, supra , 3 Cal.4th at p. 308.)

Comparative fault principles apply in secondary assumption of the risk cases. The trier of fact considers the “plaintiff’s voluntary action in choosing to engage in an unusually risky sport, whether or not the plaintiff’s decision to encounter the risk should be characterized as unreasonable” and weighs it against the defendant’s breach of the duty not to increase the risks beyond those inherent in the active sport. (Knight, supra , 3 Cal.4th at p. 314.) Where a plaintiff’s “injury has been caused by both a defendant’s breach of a legal duty to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s voluntary decision to engage in an unusually risky sport, application of comparative fault principles will not operate to relieve either individual of responsibility for his or her actions, but rather will ensure that neither party will escape such responsibility.” (Ibid.; see Allan, supra , 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1367.)

A different analysis applies when a skier [*16] signs a written release that expressly holds the ski operator harmless for its own negligence. This triggers the doctrine of express assumption of the risk. Unlike secondary assumption of the risk, but like primary assumption of the risk, the doctrine of express assumption of the risk provides a complete defense in a negligence action.

However, unlike both implied primary and secondary assumption of the risk, which focus on risks inherent in an active sport like skiing, express assumption of the risk focuses on the agreement itself. A valid release “operates to relieve the defendant of a legal duty to the plaintiff with respect to the risks encompassed by the agreement and, where applicable, to bar completely the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (Knight, supra , 3 Cal.4th at p. 309, fn. 4, italics added.) The legal issue in an express assumption of the risk case “‘is not whether the particular risk of injury appellant suffered is inherent in the recreational activity to which the Release applies [citations], but simply the scope of the Release.'” (Hass, supra , 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 27.)

Additionally, a plaintiff does not need to have “‘specific knowledge of the particular risk that ultimately caused the injury. [Citation.] If a release of all liability is given, the [*17] release applies to any negligence of the defendant [so long as the negligent act that results in injury is] “‘reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is given.'” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] As we have said, ‘[t]he issue is not whether the particular risk of injury is inherent in the recreational activity to which the release applies, but rather the scope of the release.'” (Cohen, supra , 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485; see Allan, supra , 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374 [courts will enforce a skier’s agreement “to ‘shoulder the risk’ that otherwise might have been placed” on the ski resort operator].)

There is an outer limit to the scope of a release from liability for one’s own negligence in the recreational sports context: As a matter of public policy, if a skier proves the operator unreasonably increased the inherent risks to the level of gross negligence, express assumption of the risk is no longer a viable defense; and the operator will be liable for damages notwithstanding the existence of a valid release of liability for ordinary negligence. (See City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 777, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 161 P.3d 1095 (Santa Barbara).)

To recap, snow skiing has inherent risks, and a ski operator does not owe skiers any duty to protect against them. If a skier is injured as a result of a risk inherent in the sport, [*18] the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk provides a complete defense to a lawsuit against the ski operator. But a ski resort operator owes a duty not to unreasonably increase the risks beyond those inherent in the sport. If a ski operator breaches this duty, the doctrine of secondary assumption of the risk makes the ski resort liable to an injured skier on a comparative fault basis. If the skier executes a release that absolves the ski resort operator of liability for the operator’s negligence, the release is a complete defense, provided the ski operator did not act with gross negligence. That is to say, the ski operator is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the skier has signed a valid release and the ski operator’s conduct, although negligent, was not grossly negligent.

Analysis

The parties stipulated Tuttle executed the release with full knowledge of its content; consequently, the validity of the release is not before us. The jury unanimously agreed defendant’s conduct did not constitute gross negligence, and plaintiffs do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support that finding; thus, no public policy considerations preclude its enforcement. Our only [*19] concern is “‘whether the release in this case negated the duty element of plaintiffs’ causes of action.'” (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 708, 719, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234.) If so, it applied to any ordinary negligence by defendant. (Benedek, supra , 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357.)

Defendant’s release did precisely that. Tuttle assumed “ALL RISKS associated with [skiing], known or unknown, inherent or otherwise.” She also agreed not to sue defendant and to release it “FROM ALL LIABILITY . . . BASED ON [DEFENDANT’S] ALLEGED OR ACTUAL NEGLIGENCE.” No more was required.

Defendant’s use of the phrase, “inherent or otherwise” did not create any ambiguity or confusion. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has recognized, “[t]he term ‘otherwise,’ when ‘paired with an adjective or adverb to indicate its contrary’ . . . is best understood to mean ‘NOT.’ Webster’s Third New Int’l. Dictionary 1598 (2002). The plain language and meaning of the phrases therefore reflect a clear intent to cover risks that are not inherent to skiing.” (Brigance v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc. (10th Cir. 2018) 883 F.3d 1243, 1256-1257.)

Plaintiffs’ contention that defendant’s release “bears many similarities to the release” in Cohen, supra , 159 Cal.App.4th 1476 misses the mark. The plaintiff in Cohen fell from a rented horse on a guided trail ride. She sued the stable, alleging its employee, the trail guide, negligently [*20] and “unexpectedly provoke[d] a horse to bolt and run without warning” (id. at p. 1492), causing her to lose control of her horse (id. at p. 1482). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s written agreement “‘to assume responsibility for the risks identified herein and those risks not specifically identified.'” (Id. at p. 1486, italics omitted.)

The Court of Appeal reversed. The Cohen majority noted “the trial court apparently granted summary judgment on the theory that the risks ‘not specifically identified’ in the Release include the risk that misconduct of respondent or its employee might increase a risk inherent in horseback riding.” (Cohen, supra , 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1486-1487, italics omitted.) This interpretation was erroneous because the stable’s agreement did not explicitly advise that the plaintiff was releasing the defendant from liability for the defendant’s negligence. Although a release is not required to use “the word ‘negligence‘ or any particular verbiage . . . [it] must inform the releasor that it applies to misconduct on the part of the releasee.” (Id. at pp. 1488-1489.) The release in Cohen used the word “negligence” only once, in reference to the plaintiff’s negligence, not that of the defendant. The stable’s release [*21] also did not “indicate that it covers any and all injuries arising out of or connected with the use of respondent’s facilities.” (Id. at p. 1489.)

Having found the release ineffective to trigger the doctrine of express assumption of the risk, the Cohen majority turned to the doctrines of implied assumption of the risk, i.e., it focused on the inherent risks of horseback riding. Summary judgment could not be granted on that basis, either, because a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the trail guide acted recklessly and increased the inherent risks of a guided horseback ride. (Cohen, supra , 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1494-1495.)

Here, in contrast, Tuttle assumed all risks associated with her use of defendant’s facilities and expressly released defendant from all liability for its negligence. That language applied to ordinary negligence by defendant and provided a complete defense to plaintiffs’ lawsuit, so long as defendant’s conduct did not constitute gross negligence. (Knight, supra , 3 Cal.4th at pp. 308-309, fn. 4.)

The release in Zipusch, supra , 155 Cal.App.4th 1281 mirrors the one in Cohen, but not the one in this case. As in Cohen, the plaintiff in Zipusch did not agree to assume the risk of negligence by the defendant gym. Accordingly, the agreement was ineffective as an express release; and the issue for the Court [*22] of Appeal was whether the plaintiff’s injury was the result of an inherent risk of exercising in a gym, in which case the primary assumption of the risk doctrine would apply, or whether it was the result of the gym increasing the inherent risks of exercise, in which case the secondary assumption of the risk doctrine would apply. (Id. at pp. 1291-1292.)

Hass, supra , 26 Cal.App.5th 11 is instructive. Plaintiffs cite Hass in their opening brief, but do not attempt to distinguish it, even though the release in Hass is similar to the one Tuttle signed. The analysis in Hass applies in this case.

In Hass, the plaintiffs’ decedent suffered a fatal cardiac arrest after finishing a half marathon organized and sponsored by the defendant. His heirs sued for wrongful death. The Court of Appeal held that cardiac arrest is an inherent risk of running a race, but a triable issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant acted with gross negligence in failing to provide timely and adequate emergency medical services. (Hass, supra , 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 18.)

Addressing the release, Hass held: “By signing the Release in the instant case, we conclude that [the decedent] intended both to assume all risks associated with his participation in the race, up to and including the risk [*23] of death, and to release [the defendant] (on behalf of himself and his heirs) from any and all liability with respect to any injuries he might suffer as a result of his participation. This was sufficient to block the [plaintiffs’] wrongful death claim for ordinary negligence.”¹⁰ (Hass, supra , 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 27.)

Our independent examination of defendant’s release convinces us Tuttle assumed all risks that might arise from skiing at defendant’s resort, including risks created by defendant’s ordinary negligence. With a valid release and no gross negligence by defendant, the issue of inherent risk was no longer relevant. (Willhide-Michiulis v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 344, 353, 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 [where the doctrine of express assumption of risk applies, implied assumption of the risk is no longer considered].)

II.

Enforcement of the Release Does not Violate California’s Public Policy.

Plaintiffs next argue the release‘s exculpatory language violates California’s public policy. The linchpin of their argument is that defendant’s act of unreasonably increasing the inherent risk of an active sport was neither ordinary negligence nor gross negligence, but a separate category of “aggravated” negligence.

Plaintiffs argue Santa Barbara, supra , 41 Cal.4th 747 “left open the question of whether public policy precludes the contractual release [*24] of other forms of ‘aggravated’ misconduct, in addition to gross negligence.” (Some capitalization omitted.) The argument is raised for the first time on appeal; it has no merit.

In Santa Barbara, a parent signed an agreement releasing the defendants from liability for “‘any negligent act'” related to her child’s participation in summer camp. (Santa Barbara, supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 750.) The child drowned. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the release, and the appellate court denied defendants’ petition for writ of mandate challenging that ruling. (Id. at p. 753.) The sole issue before the Supreme Court was “whether a release of liability relating to recreational activities generally is effective as to gross negligence.” (Id. at p. 750.)

The defendants argued California law, specifically Civil Code section 1668,¹¹ impliedly allowed recreational activity releases to be enforced against a claim of gross negligence. (Santa Barbara, supra , 41 Cal.4th at pp. 762-763.) At the time, no published California decision “voided[] an agreement purporting to release liability for future gross negligence.” (Id. at p. 758.) The Santa Barbara majority turned to out-of-state authorities and rejected the defendants’ position based on public policy principles. (Id. at pp. 760-762.)

References in Santa Barbara to “aggravated [*25] wrongs” (a term used by Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 68, p. 484) (Santa Barbara, supra , 41 Cal.4th at pp. 762, 765, 776) and “aggravated misconduct” (id. at pp. 760, 762, 777, fn. 54) do not suggest a new species of negligence that might affect a liability release for recreational activities. Rather, those phrases encompassed misconduct that included gross negligence and willful acts. (Id. at p. 754, fn. 4.) As the majority held, “the distinction between ‘ordinary and gross negligence‘ reflects ‘a rule of policy’ that harsher legal consequences should flow when negligence is aggravated instead of merely ordinary.” (Id. at p. 776.) With a valid release, “a theory of gross negligence, if supported by evidence showing the existence of a triable issue, is the only negligence-based theory that is potentially open to [the] plaintiffs.” (Santa Barbara, supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 781.)

Here, no public policy considerations preclude the enforcement of defendant’s recreational activity release that exculpated it from liability for its own ordinary negligence. (Knight, supra , 3 Cal.4th at p. 309, fn. 4.)

III.

The Trial Court did not Err by Entering Judgment in Favor of Defendant.

Plaintiffs argue the trial court should have entered judgment in their favor regardless of the jury’s finding concerning gross negligence because the jury made findings on damages and apportioned fault [*26] between Tuttle and defendant. They contend the responsibility to seek a JNOV or some other post judgment remedy should have fallen to defendant, not plaintiffs. But once the trial court determined the special verdict was not inconsistent and Tuttle’s express release provided a complete defense as a matter of law, entry of a defense judgment was proper. Even if the trial court erred in entering a defense judgment without a formal motion for JNOV, any error was harmless.

Legal Principles Governing Special Verdicts

A special verdict must include “conclusions of fact as established by the evidence . . . [so] that nothing shall remain to the Court but to draw from them conclusions of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 624.) A special verdict is not a judgment. (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1331-1332, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 219, 223 P.3d 77.) If a special verdict includes findings on inconsistent theories, the findings on the legal theory that does not control the outcome of the litigation “may be disregarded as surplusage.” (Baird v. Ocequeda (1937) 8 Cal.2d 700, 703, 67 P.2d 1055.) Additionally, “where no objection is made before the jury is discharged, it falls to ‘the trial judge to interpret the verdict from its language considered in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions.'” (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equip. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456-457, 72 Cal. Rptr. 217, 445 P.2d 881; see Zagami, Inc. v. James A. Crone, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1091-1092, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 235.)

The Trial Court’s Ruling

As noted, the jury [*27] was discharged before the parties raised an issue concerning the special verdict form and the jury’s findings. The trial court recognized and fulfilled its duty to interpret the special verdict: “After [this] court rejected several unilateral proposals, the parties stipulated to a special verdict form. . . . But they did so before the court construed the release in response to defendant’s nonsuit motion and before the parties stipulated Ms. Tuttle entered into the release. [¶] Thus, the form presented only two questions addressing the assumption of the risk. Question #3 asked whether defendant unreasonably increased the inherent risks of skiing. Question #4 asked whether defendant acted with gross negligence. [¶] The answer ‘NO’ to either Question #3 or #4 exonerates defendant. Answering ‘No’ to Question #3 would foreclose the only relevant exception to the primary assumption defense. Answering “NO’ to Question #4 would foreclose the only relevant exception to the express assumption defense. [¶] But the form allowed the jurors to answer ‘YES’ to one question and ‘NO’ to [the] other one and continue to answer questions, including determining and allocating damages.” (Italics and bold [*28] omitted.)

The trial court further explained: “Here, the specific finding that defendant did not act with gross negligence controls over the general award of damages. The jury was properly instructed with the definition of gross negligence. The jury received percipient and expert testimony that, if credited, showed defendant did not act with gross negligence. The parties argued whether defendant [did] or did not act with gross negligence. The answer ‘NO’ to Question #4 unambiguously shows the jury found defendant did not act with gross negligence. That resolved the only factual question on the express assumption issue in favor of defendant. [¶] . . . [¶] The award of damages is not a hopeless inconsistency so much as it is mere surplusage once the court honors the jury’s unambiguous finding that defendant acted without gross negligence and draws the legal conclusion—a conclusion that [the] jury was not asked to draw—that the release covers these claims and effects an express assumption of the risk.”

The trial court also correctly concluded the “jury’s findings on Question[] #3 and Question #4 [were not] irreconcilable. The concept of unreasonably increasing inherent risks is distinct [*29] from the concept of gross negligence. In a particular case, the same facts that show an unreasonable increase in the inherent risks may also show gross negligence. [Citation.] Overlap is possible, [but not] necessary. In this case, the jury found no such overlap. There is no inconsistency in defendant losing on the primary assumption issue but prevailing on the express assumption issue. And that, after five weeks of trial, is what happened here.”

Analysis

A validly executed express release of liability for a defendant’s ordinary negligence means the only viable theory for a judgment in a plaintiff’s favor is if the defendant acted with gross negligence. (Santa Barbara, supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 781.) There is no inconsistency between findings that a defendant is ordinarily negligent by unreasonably increasing the inherent risks of snow skiing, but not grossly negligent. A finding of gross negligence would necessarily mean a defendant unreasonably increased the inherent risks of snow skiing, so that comparative fault principles apply. But an express release, coupled with an undisputed factual finding that a defendant did not act with gross negligence, necessarily results in a defense judgment. Accordingly, Question No. 3 concerning [*30] whether defendant unreasonably increased the inherent risk should have been removed from the special verdict form.

Also, the special verdict form should have instructed the jury that if it found defendant was not grossly negligent, it should not answer the remaining questions. The jury’s compliance with the trial court’s instructions and consequent damages-related findings were surplusage, but did not create an inconsistency with its finding that defendant did not act with gross negligence. The trial court correctly entered judgment in favor of defendant based on the dispositive finding of no gross negligence. The trial court’s explanation of its ruling demonstrates the trial court’s application of the correct legal principles in doing so.

In their appellate opening brief, plaintiffs argue defendant forfeited any objection to the special verdict form because it (1) failed to object to the special verdict before the jury was discharged; (2) invited the erroneous instructions in the special verdict form because it had participated in drafting it; and (3) failed to bring “a statutorily authorized post-trial motion” challenging the special verdict form. Although the special verdict form [*31] should have been amended before deliberations, there is no issue of forfeiture or invited error on defendant’s part.

The parties jointly agreed on the wording of the special verdict form. Any fault in the drafting cannot be assigned to one side over the other, and all parties bear responsibility for the erroneous directions in the stipulated special verdict form. Nothing in the record suggests the special verdict form or the objection to entry of a plaintiffs’ judgment was the product of gamesmanship. (See Lambert v. General Motors (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1183, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 657.)

Additionally, plaintiffs’ trial strategy to stipulate to Tuttle’s knowing execution of the release was wise: Evidence Tuttle understood the release was overwhelming. As part of the discussion pertaining to the parties’ stipulation, however, both the trial court and defendant’s trial counsel questioned the adequacy of the special verdict form. But plaintiffs’ trial counsel maintained the special verdict form was fine “as is” and persuasively argued against making any changes or advising the jury of the stipulation. This meant the doctrine of implied secondary assumption of the risk was not relevant unless the jury found defendant acted with gross negligence.

We agree the procedural [*32] aspects surrounding the entry of the defense judgment on what appeared to be a plaintiffs’ verdict were unconventional; but the bottom line is once the jury found no gross negligence, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under these circumstances, it would have been a waste of resources to require defendant, or the trial court on its own initiative, to formally notice a motion for JNOV (Code Civ. Proc., § 629, subd. (a)).

Even if we found the procedure to have been erroneous, the error would have been procedural, not substantive; and, plaintiffs have not demonstrated the likelihood of a different outcome. (See Webb v. Special Electric, Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 179, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 460, 370 P.3d 1022 [because the defendant “did not have a complete defense as a matter of law, the entry of JNOV was unjustified [on the merits]. In light of this conclusion, we need not reach plaintiffs’ claims of procedural error”].) Defendant had a complete defense; there is no reasonable probability the trial court would have denied a formal JNOV motion.

Plaintiffs argue they relied on the state of the special verdict form in making the decision to stipulate to the validity of the release agreement. Plaintiffs suggest defendant, by agreeing to the special verdict form, tacitly stipulated to a deviation from [*33] the applicable law to allow plaintiffs to recover damages based solely on a finding defendant had unreasonably increased the inherent risk, notwithstanding the existence of a valid, applicable release. Such an argument is without support in the law. It is also belied by the record. As already discussed, both defendant’s counsel and the trial court raised questions concerning the special verdict form once the parties stipulated to Tuttle’s execution of the release. Plaintiffs’ trial counsel maintained there should be no changes in the jury instructions or the special verdict form.

IV.

Plaintiffs are not Entitled to a New Trial.

Plaintiffs argued in their motion for new trial that the special verdict was “hopelessly contradictory” and, consequently, against the law. Plaintiffs also asserted there were errors in the special verdict form, they “excepted to” those errors, but then were penalized because “the jury’s finding of unreasonably increased inherent risk has ex post facto been deemed insufficient to impose liability on Defendant Heavenly Valley.” Although plaintiffs did not claim instructional error in the trial court, they complained the modified version of CACI No. 431,¹² to which they agreed, [*34] misled the jurors into thinking they could find defendant liable if they found it unreasonably increased the inherent risk of skiing or if they found it acted with gross negligence.

On appeal, plaintiffs ask this court to reverse the denial of their motion for a new trial. They fail to cite applicable authorities to support their arguments. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Instead, they contend “the trial court changed the rules of the game only after the game had already been played, leaving the parties and their counsel without the opportunity to satisfy those new rules, and robbing the jury of the ability to assess all viable liability options.” Plaintiffs add they stipulated to Tuttle’s execution of the release “in reliance on the wording of the then existing Special Verdict form, which . . . made clear that a finding of gross negligence was only one of two disjunctive liability paths, and was not necessary to impose liability against Heavenly. As a consequence, [plaintiffs] . . . were . . . induced into a stipulation concerning that issue in light of the wording of the existing Special Verdict form, an unfair sequence which the trial court itself acknowledged worked against [plaintiffs].” This characterization [*35] misstates the record.

First, the trial court made legal rulings throughout trial when called upon to do so. The trial court did not change any of its pronouncements of law after the trial concluded. The record shows the trial court gave the parties every opportunity to revisit the jury instructions and special verdict form before they were given to the jury.

Second, although the trial court described the sequence of events, it did not suggest the events were unfair or “worked against” plaintiffs. As discussed ante, when the trial court denied defendant’s renewed motion for nonsuit, it advised counsel the jury must decide whether Tuttle actually executed the release. Because neither side proposed jury instructions or questions on the special verdict form addressing the issue of contract formation, defendant’s counsel suggested they should revisit both the jury instructions and the special verdict form. Plaintiffs’ trial counsel immediately stipulated to Tuttle’s execution of the release and advised he would “proceed with the verdict form as is.” This statement calls into question plaintiffs’ claim they were induced into entering into the stipulation.

Third—and significantly—plaintiffs’ [*36] counsel did not discuss disjunctive liability paths in his closing arguments. Instead, plaintiffs’ counsel focused on the evidence and urged the jury to find gross negligence: “What we’re talking about here, the liability of the resort does not fall under this release. And you are not going to be asked any questions on the verdict form about the release. Yeah, [Tuttle] signed one, and she understood the inherent risks of skiing, and that’s what the release
releases. It does not release gross negligence. It does not release what we’re talking about.”

The jury unanimously found defendant did not act with gross negligence. The jury’s function is to make ultimate findings of fact, and it is the trial court’s responsibility to apply the law to the relevant findings of fact. Nothing in the special verdict form misled the jury with regard to the factors it should consider in making any particular finding. We conclude the trial court correctly applied the law and entered judgment accordingly.

DISPOSITION

The judgment and post judgment orders are affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on appeal.

DUNNING, J.^*

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

MOORE, J.

Kuchta v. Opco, 2020 Nev. App. Unpub. LEXIS 549, 2020 WL 3868434

Posted: August 19, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Legal Case, Nevada, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Ambiguity, Battery, broken, clarify, contractual, contradict, Conversation, convey, corners, exact, exculpatory, extrinsic, free-fall, genuine, Gilley's Nightclub, intensity, Mechanical bull, negotiation, Nevada, parol, Parol Evidence, quotation, re-write, Release, ride, simulator, thrown, trier, unambiguous, undisputed, unexpected, verbal, violent, waived | Leave a comment

Kuchta v. Opco, 2020 Nev. App. Unpub. LEXIS 549, 2020 WL 3868434

Court of Appeals of Nevada

July 8, 2020, Filed

No. 76566-COA

Reporter

2020 Nev. App. Unpub. LEXIS 549 *; 2020 WL 3868434

Joseph Kuchta, an Individual, Appellant, vs. Sheltie Opco, LLC, A Nevada Limited Liability Company, d/b/a John Ascuaga’s Nugget, d/b/a Gilley’s Nightclub; and Wolfhound Holdings, Llc, A Delaware Limited Liability Company, Respondents.

Notice: NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. PLEASE CONSULT THE NEVADA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE FOR CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.

Judges: [*1] Gibbons, C.J., Bulla, J. TAO, J., dissenting.

Opinion by: Gibbons

Opinion

ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND

Joseph Kuchta appeals a district court order granting Sheltie Opco, LLC’s (Sheltie Opco) motion for summary judgment in a tort action. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Scott N. Freeman, Judge.

Viewing all factual allegations in a light most favorable to Kuchta, his friends told the employee that each person in their group wanted an easy [*2] ride, which based on a difficulty scale of one to ten, they described as a two (with one meaning not moving at all), which the employee said she could provide. The friends indicated that everyone in the group was a novice and wanted a ride similar to the ride the employee had demonstrated. Furthermore, they told the employee that everyone should be able to step off the bull once the ride concluded, just as the employee had been able to do earlier that night after her ride. The employee agreed to provide the type of a ride Kuchta’s group requested. Thus, Kuchta’s and the employee’s understandings and expectations regarding Kuchta’s ride were that it would be easy, at a level two or at a low speed, and that Kuchta would be able to dismount after the ride was finished.

Before any person could ride the mechanical bull, however, Gilley’s required each patron to sign a previously prepared Assumption of Risk, Release, Indemnity, and Medical Treatment Authorization Agreement (Agreement), also known as a written waiver. The Agreement listed potential risks and possible injuries involved in riding the bull, including broken bones, and also released Sheltie Opco from any and all liability for [*3] injuries or negligence that occur from all risks, both known and unknown. Kuchta signed the Agreement, although the record does not reveal when it was signed in relation to the conversations described above.

Kuchta sued Sheltie Opco alleging: negligence, negligence per se, negligent hiring and respondent superior, negligent supervision, negligent entrustment, and battery. Sheltie Opco moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing there was no genuine issue of fact because Kuchta expressly assumed the risks of the ride and consented to the battery when he signed the Agreement before riding the bull. The district court granted Sheltie Opco’s motion for summary judgment finding that Kuchta expressly assumed the risks of riding the bull by signing the Agreement, including consenting to the touching that was the basis for his battery claim.

On appeal, Kuchta argues that the district court erred in granting summary [*4] judgment because even though he signed the Agreement, under the doctrine of express assumption of risk, there are genuine issues of fact. He further contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Sheltie Opco on his battery claim because battery is not covered by the Agreement. We agree that under the facts of this case, genuine issues of material fact remain as to Kuchta’s negligence and battery claims, and therefore, we reverse and remand.

Standard of review

We review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and all other evidence on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “A factual dispute is genuine when the evidence is such that a rational trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1031.

The district court erred by granting summary judgment to Sheltie Opco on the negligence claims

Kuchta argues that he did not expressly assume the risk because the operator specifically agreed to provide the requested slow ride (i.e., an intensity [*5] of two out of ten) and the operator instead ultimately conducted a wild ride exceeding his expectations. Sheltie Opco argues that the Agreement was a valid written waiver and that Kuchta understood the risks when he got on the bull. Specifically, he understood that the bull could “jerk[ ] and spin[ ] violently and unexpectedly” resulting in “broken bones.” And, as counsel for Sheltie Opco pointed out at oral argument, Kuchta could have declined to ride the bull if he had any concerns about the possibility of injury as fully explained in the Agreement. Moreover, no one forced Kuchta to sign the Agreement and ride the bull.

In Nevada, an exculpatory agreement is a “valid exercise of the freedom of contract.” Miller v. A&R Joint Venture, 97 Nev. 580, 582, 636 P.2d 277, 278 (1981). Though generally enforceable, exculpatory clauses in a contract must meet four standards before a party seeking to enforce the clause can be absolved of liability:

(1) Contracts providing for immunity for liability for negligence must be construed strictly since they are not favorite[s] of the law . . . (2) such contracts must spell out the intention of the party with the greatest particularity . . . and show the intent to release from liability beyond doubt by express stipulation [*6] and no inference from the words of general import can establish it . . . (3) such contracts must be construed with every intendment against the party who seeks immunity from liability . . . (4) the burden to establish immunity from liability is upon the party who asserts such immunity . . . .

Agric. Aviation Eng’g Co. v. Bd. of Clark Cty. Comm’rs, 106 Nev. 396, 399-400, 794 P.2d 710, 712-13 (1990) (quoting Richard’s 5 & 10, Inc. v. Brooks Harvey Realty Inv’rs , 264 Pa. Super. 384, 399 A.2d 1103, 1105 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)).

Looking to the Agreement’s exculpatory clause, it warns that any ride participant will:

FULLY RELEASE FROM ALL LIABILITY ARISING FROM MY PARTICIPATION IN THE MECHANCIAL BULL RIDING PROGRAM the Nugget Hotel and Casino, Gilley’s, and their respective owners . . . . I AGREE NEVER TO SUE ANY RELEASEE . . . for any cause of action arising from my participation in the MECHANICAL BULL RIDING PROGRAM . . . . ALL PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT APPLY IRRESPECTIVE OF AND EVEN IN THE CASE OF [ ] NEGLIGENCE. . . .

Even when strictly construed, the language in the Agreement expressly states, with particularity, Sheltie Opco’s intent to release itself and others designated from any and all liability. The Agreement also specifically states that Sheltie Opco would be released from liability for any negligence on its part that may occur while a person rides the mechanical bull, Further, [*7] the parties concede that Kuchta voluntarily signed the Agreement, which included the exculpatory clause.

However, our inquiry does not stop here as it pertains to the waiver‘s validity; we must determine whether Kuchta expressly assumed the risks contemplated by the waiver. Renaud v. 200 Convention Ctr. Ltd., 102 Nev. 500, 501,102 Nev. 500, 728 P.2d 445, 446 (1986) (analyzing an exculpatory waiver under the doctrine of express assumption of the risk).¹ “Assumption of the risk is based on a theory of consent.” Id.

Next, reviewing the Agreement’s express waiver, it warns in relevant part:

There is a significant risk that I will be seriously injured as a result of my participating in the MECHANICAL BULL RIDING PROGRAM, including permanent paralysis, head injury, broken neck, other broken bones and death, whether or not I am thrown from or fall from the MECHANICAL BULL . . . . I KNOWINGLY AND FREELY ASSUME ALL RISKS ARISING FROM MY PARTICIPATION IN THE MECHANICAL BULL RIDING PROGRAM, including all risks to my life, health, safety and property, both known and unknown.

“Express assumption of risk[‘s] . . . vitality stems from a contractual undertaking that expressly relieves a putative defendant [*8] from any duty of care to the injured party; such a party has consented to bear the consequences of a voluntary exposure to a known risk.” Mizushima v. Sunset Ranch, Inc., 103 Nev. 259, 262, 737 P.2d 1158, 1159 (1987), overruled on other grounds by Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, LLC , 124 Nev. 213, 180 P.3d 1172 (2008). Generally, “[a]ssumption of the risk is based on a theory of consent.” Renaud, 102 Nev. at 501, 728 P.2d at 446. For a party to assume the risk there are two requirements. “First, there must have been voluntary exposure to the danger. Second, there must have been actual knowledge of the risk assumed.” Id. Actual knowledge of the danger by the party alleged to have assumed the risk is the essence of the express assumption of risk doctrine. Id. To determine whether the party signing had actual knowledge of the risks assumed, courts must consider “[(1)] the nature and extent of the injuries, [(2)] the haste or lack thereof with which the release was obtained, and [(3)] the understandings and expectations of the parties at the time of signing.” Id. at 502, 728 P.2d at 446 (emphasis added).

Here, Kuchta’s injuries were severe, but were injuries a person would associate with being thrown from a bull. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Kuchta was rushed into signing the exculpatory agreement. However, the third factor weighs heavily in Kuchta’s favor. According [*9] to Kuchta’s responses to Sheltie Opco’s interrogatories,² the bull operator was told that they all wanted a slow ride, similar to the ride the operator had while demonstrating the use of the bull.³ Kuchta and former co-plaintiff Rebecca Bodnar both alleged in their responses to Sheltie Opco’s interrogatories that their rides on the bull started gently before the bull operator significantly increased the intensity, leading them to suffer injury. The bull ride operator, in an affidavit, states that she did not “operate the bull in a fashion that was intended to exceed Plaintiffs’ expectations of how intense the bull’s motions would be,” thereby suggesting that expectations had been set for Kuchta’s ride that may have been different than those described in the waiver.⁴

These conflicting allegations create a genuine dispute of material fact as to the expectations of the parties and as to whether the bull operator’s conduct failed to meet those expectations.⁵ Because Kuchta and Sheltie Opco each presented consistent and conflicting facts regarding [*10] both parties’ expectations of the ride, and knowledge of the risks involved in a level two-of-ten or easy ride, a trier of fact should have resolved this issue.⁶ Thus, the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Sheltie Opco as to Kuchta’s negligence claims.⁷

The district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Sheltie Opco on Kuchta’s battery claim

Kuchta argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Sheltie Opco on his battery claim because the Agreement did not contemplate gross negligence or intentional misconduct. Sheltie Opco contends that uncontroverted facts show that Kuchta consented to any conduct resulting from the bull ride, and thus, summary judgment was appropriate on his battery claim.

“A battery is an intentional and offensive touching of a person who has not consented to the touching . . . .” Humboldt Gen. Hosp. v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 132 Nev. 544, 549, 376 P.3d 167, 171 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[G]eneral clauses exempting the defendant from all liability for negligence will not be construed to include intentional or reckless misconduct, or extreme and unusual kinds of negligence, unless such intention [*11] clearly appears.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B cmt. d (1965).

Here, Kuchta consented to a bull ride, but he claims he only consented to a mild ride, and therefore, any contact associated with a mild ride was allowed and could not be a battery. However, if the ride went beyond a mild ride, then there is a material question of fact as to the nature of the ride and to whether Kuchta consented to the resulting physical contact as the result of the unexpectedly rough ride. Further, Kuchta presented facts from two interrogatory responses that the bull rider intentionally increased the intensity of the bull machine, possibly attempting to throw him from the bull despite his understanding that the ride would be of mild intensity.⁸ Sheltie Opco provided an affidavit from the bull ride operator that stated that she did not intentionally increase the intensity of the bull ride beyond Kuchta’s expectations (which could also imply that she did in fact increase the intensity and understood his expectations). Viewing these assertions in a light most favorable to Kuchta, the nonmoving party, a rational trier of fact could find that the bull operator committed a battery by intentionally increasing the speed of the ride thereby deliberately [*12] failing to meet the agreed upon expectations.⁹

Based on the parties’ conflicting factual assertions, it was inappropriate for the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of Sheltie Opco, as the trier of fact should resolve the conflict. Thus, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Sheltie Opco as to Kuchta’s battery claim. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.¹⁰

/s/ Gibbons, C.J.

Gibbons

/s/ Bulla, J.

Bulla

Dissent by: TAO

Dissent

TAO, J., dissenting:

Although ostensibly arising from a personal injury suit, the only question at issue in this appeal is whether Kuchta’s tort claims were contractually waived, which presents a question of contract law. The majority reverses by concluding that a genuine issue of fact exists under NRCP 56. But this can only be true if the scope of the waiver contract isn’t limited to its express words, but rather depends upon Kuchta’s verbal testimony, proffered during a deposition many months after the fact, regarding his intentions — even though those supposed intentions are contained nowhere in the contractual words and actually [*13] contradict those words. Respectfully, I dissent.

Liability waivers must mean something in Nevada, even if they might be allowed to mean less in other states. What Nevada has always represented is the opportunity to try things that aren’t available anywhere else. One hundred fifty years ago, it was the chance to strike gold and silver ore in the desert. Then it became the chance to strike it rich on a roulette wheel or a slot machine. But more and more nowadays, it’s the chance to experience an adventure that you simply can’t have anywhere else. With an economy now driven largely by tourism, what Nevada offers are things that other states and cities do not. Gambling, of course. Concerts, shows, and world-class restaurants also. Convention space, surely. Quick marriages and no-fault divorces too. But, also, the chance, for some, to engage in derring-do — to fly a fighter plane in aerial combat; to ride a zipline over city streets and steep canyons; to engage in gun battles armed with simunition; to skydive 30,000 feet to the desert; to swim with dolphins in their habitat; to fire a real machine gun or ride in an armored tank; to bungee jump from a tower; to ride a roller-coaster suspended [*14] 500 feet in the air; to race luxury cars around a track at breakneck speed. One could argue that mining and gaming aren’t our real stock in trade, but rather novelty.

But with some novel experiences comes some level of danger. Jumping out of an airplane is an activity fraught with risk no matter how carefully the parachute was packed. There’s no way to entirely eliminate all of the risk from ziplines, bungee jumps, and rafting through whitewater rapids. If Nevada intends to remain the premier tourist destination in a fast-evolving and competitive world, then our law must permit some proprietors to operate businesses that are, at least at some level, inherently risky and dangerous. If we ever lose our reputation for remaining on the cutting edge, then there’ll be no more reason for millions of tourists to visit. And if that day ever comes, Nevada will no longer be what it always has been.

Liability waivers thus serve an important role in a state like ours: they allow proprietors to stay on the cutting edge by allowing them to operate with some level of risk, so long as they take the time to apprise their customers of those risks. Here, Kuchta signed a written liability waiver whose terms [*15] unambiguously cover the precise injuries he suffered (broken bones) and the precise way he incurred them (being thrown) using the precise apparatus (a mechanical bull) that the waiver precisely addressed. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that this waiver barred his tort claims.

Let’s briefly summarize the facts and the arguments that Kuchta makes in appealing from the district court’s order. I’ll return to analyze these arguments later in more detail, so for now just a synopsis will do. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Kuchta, he contends that he and his friends arrived at Gilley’s, watched a demonstration of the mechanical bull, and then spoke with the ride operator who verbally agreed to provide him with a ride that equated to a difficulty level of 2 out of 10. The majority describes Kuchta’s testimony as follows:

Viewing all factual allegations in a light most favorable to Kuchta, his friends told the employee that each person in their group wanted an easy ride, which based on a difficulty scale of one to ten, they described as a two (with one meaning not moving at all), which the employee said she could provide. The friends indicated that everyone [*16] in the group was a novice and wanted a ride similar to the ride the employee had demonstrated. Furthermore, they told the employee that everyone should be able to step off the bull once the ride concluded, just as the employee had been able to do earlier that night after her ride. The employee agreed to provide the type of a ride Kuchta’s group requested. (Order, page 2).

Kuchta and his friends then ate dinner. After dinner, they decided to get a ride, and Kuchta signed a written waiver stating as follows:

I AM FULLY INFORMED OF ALL RISKS ARISING FROM MY PARTICIPATION IN THE MECHANICAL BULL RIDING PROGRAM, including the risks described in this paragraph. The mechanical bull jerks and spins violently and unexpectedly. There is a significant risk that I will be seriously injured . . . [i]ncluding permanent paralysis, head injury, broken neck, other broken bones, and death, whether or not I am thrown from or fall.

Note that, by signing this, Kuchta acknowledged that the mechanical bull “jerks and spins violently and unexpectedly” and that riding it created a “significant risk” of injury from being “thrown,” including “broken bones.” Note also that this isn’t a generic catch-all waiver that [*17] purports to cover the entire panoply of any kind of negligence that could conceivably occur on the premises, such as wet floors, rotten food, or debris falling from the roof. Quite to the contrary, it’s a narrow waiver that specifically covers one thing and one thing only, the mechanical bull and nothing else. After signing the waiver and mounting the bull, Kuchta was thrown from the bull in the very way that the waiver warned might happen, suffering one of the very injuries (broken bones) that the waiver warned might result. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that the waiver covered Kuchta’s injuries.

On appeal, Kuchta argues that the words of the written waiver do not mean what they seem to so plainly say, not because any words of the waiver actually agree with him, but rather because when the ride operator verbally agreed to provide a level 2 ride, he changed Kuchta’s understanding and expectations” regarding the meaning of the waiver. But as the cliche goes, apples are not oranges, and here the verbal conversation had nothing to do with the waiver. Note what’s omitted from even the majority’s summary of the verbal conversation: any mention of the waiver whatsoever. [*18] Just because the ride operator verbally agreed to try to provide a level 2 ride does not mean that he legally changed the waiver so that it only covered a level 2 ride and nothing more. Indeed, the truth at the heart of this case is that nobody (not even Kuchta) contends that the verbal discussion between Kuchta and the ride operator constituted a negotiation of the waiver; everyone agrees that it was only a conversation about the kind of ride Kuchta wanted. What Kuchta requested was a particular kind of ride, not a particular kind of waiver.

Kuchta tries to bootstrap the conversation about the ride into the contract about the waiver by arguing that it’s “parol evidence” regarding his “understanding and expectations” of what the contract covered. But a verbal conversation about the kind of ride Kuchta requested isn’t “parol evidence” for two reasons: first, the verbal conversation occurred before Kuchta signed the waiver, which means that the written contract supersedes any and all earlier alleged negotiations. Second, the kind of ride he requested isn’t a term of the waiver contract. The kind of ride he wanted, and the kind of ride he agreed to waive, are two very different things, [*19] only one of which was ever the subject of the written waiver contract. Kuchta argues that merely because the ride he got was not the ride he requested, it fell outside of the scope of the waiver. But the waiver says nothing remotely like that.

The proper analysis here is to compare the ride he got to the plain words of the waiver. The very question in this case (not the answer, but the question) is whether the ride that Kuchta actually got was encompassed within the scope of the waiver that he signed. Kuchta tries to mix up the question with its answer, and make it all a circularity, by arguing that the waiver must only cover the ride he asked for. But nothing in the written waiver (and nothing in the verbal conversation either) indicates that the scope of waiver was supposed to be a moving target that ratcheted up or down to whatever kind of ride Kuchta personally wanted and, likewise, ratchets up or down for every other customer who requests a different level of ride. Reading the contract that way means that it lacks any fixed or objective meaning whatsoever but instead changes its meaning for each different customer even though the words themselves remain exactly the same, reducing [*20] the contract to nothing more than a Rorshach ink blot having no intrinsic meaning apart from what any reader wants to see in it.

But this isn’t how contract law tells us to read a contract. The district court interpreted the contract correctly as a matter of law according to the objective meaning of its words – and I would affirm.

II.

Here’s how contract law actually works and how this appeal should have been analyzed.

To start with, it’s well-settled that interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law, not a question of fact. Redrock Valley Ranch, LLC v. Washoe County, 127 Nev. 451, 460, 254 P.3d 641, 647 (2011). Disputes regarding the scope and meaning of a contract do not preclude summary judgment because such disputes present pure questions of law for the court, not the jury, to resolve. “[I]n the absence of ambiguity or other factual complexities, contract interpretation presents a question of law that the district court may decide on summary judgment.” Galardi v. Naples Polaris LLC, 129 Nev. 306, 309, 301 P.3d 364, 366 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

So, if there is no dispute over what the words of a contract consist of, and the only dispute is over what those words mean, the court is presented with a question of law that it may dispose of on summary judgment. Here, there are no factual disputes that a jury must sort [*21] out. The parties do not dispute what words the written waiver consists of; Kuchta does not, for example, contend that any pages are missing or any clauses are blurry or incomplete. The parties also do not dispute what the words of the verbal conversation between Kuchta and the ride operator consist of; accept what Kuchta says to be true and agree with him that the operator agreed to try to provide a level 2 ride. There may exist some disagreement over what legal effect those words may have, if any; but there is no dispute regarding what the words of the conversation were. There are thus no factual disputes, only legal ones. The only thing left in dispute is what those words (both the undisputed words of the document and the undisputed words of the verbal conversation) mean about the scope of the waiver, which is a pure question of law that we must answer ourselves in this appeal de novo. May v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668, 672, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2005).

To answer that purely legal question, we start with the words of the contract. Bielar v. Washoe Health Sys., Inc., 129 Nev. 459, 465, 306 P.3d 360, 364 (2013). “A basic rule of contract interpretation is that ‘[e]very word must be given effect if at all possible.’ Id., 306 P.3d at 364. (quoting Musser v. Bank of Am., 114 Nev. 945, 949, 964 P.2d 51, 54 (1998) (alteration in original). Those words will either be unambiguous, or they will be ambiguous. Am. First Fed. Credit Union v. Soro, 131 Nev. 737, 739, 359 P.3d 105, 106 (2015). If the [*22] words are unambiguous, then we look no farther than the four corners of the written document for its meaning. Id., 359 P.3d at 106. The court “has no authority to alter the terms of an unambiguous contract.” Canfora v. Coast Hotels and Casinos, Inc., 121 Nev. 771, 776, 121 P.3d 599, 603 (2005). Rather, an unambiguous contract “will be enforced as written.” Am. First Fed. Credit Union, 131 Nev. at 739, 359 P.3d at 106. “[T]he words of the contract must be taken in their usual and ordinary signification.” Traffic Control Svcs., Inc. v. United Rentals Northwest, Inc., 120 Nev. 168, 174, 87 P.3d 1054., 120 Nev. 168, 87 P.3d 1054, 1058 (2004). Only if the words are ambiguous do we venture outside of the document itself to examine such extrinsic things as parol evidence and settled rules of construction in order to determine the intent of the parties. M.C. Multi-Family Dev., LLC v. Crestdale Assocs., Ltd., 124 Nev. 901, 913-14, 193 P.3d 536, 544-45 (2008). An ambiguity must be inherent within the contractual term itself, and “does not arise simply because the parties disagree on how to interpret their contract.” Galardi, 129 Nev. at 309, 301 P.3d at 366.

Kuchta contends that the conversation regarding the level 2 ride must be considered “parol evidence” of contractual meaning. But “parol evidence” is only admissible when some contractual term is facially ambiguous. “The parol evidence rule does not permit the admission of evidence that would change the contract terms when the terms of a written agreement are clear, definite, and unambiguous.” Ringle v. Bruton, 120 Nev. 82, 91, 86 P.3d 1032, 1037 (2004). Further, even when such an ambiguity exists, courts can utilize parol evidence to [*23] clear up what those ambiguous words mean but they cannot use parol evidence “to add to, subtract from, vary, or contradict” the words of the contract itself. M.C. Multi-Family Dev., LLC,124 Nev. at 913-14, 193 P.3d at 544-45. “[P]arol evidence may not be used to contradict [express] terms.” Galardi, 129 Nev. at 309, 301 P.3d at 366 (Quoting Kaldi v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 117 Nev. 273, 281, 21 P.3d 16, 21 (2001)). Thus, even when admissible (i.e., only when there’s an ambiguity), parol evidence is only meaningful to the extent that it clarifies and does not contradict or re-write the plain words of the contract itself. Id. And this is true whether the final document is integrated or not: if a contract is integrated then it may neither be supplemented nor contradicted by any additional evidence of any kind. If a contract is not integrated, then it may be supplemented by “consistent additional terms” but it still may never be contradicted by any extrinsic evidence. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts § 3-2, “The Parol Evidence Rule”, 135-36 (3d ed. 1987) (text cited as authority in Matter of Kern, 107 Nev. 988. 991, 107 Nev. 988, 823 P.2d 275, 277 (1991).

Here, no term of the written waiver is facially ambiguous. Rather than identify some particular term that might be inherently ambiguous, Kuchta (and the majority) seem to contend instead that the entire contract was effectively re-written through the verbal conversation. [*24] But that’s using “parol evidence” beyond its permissible purpose: not to clarify the meaning of an ambiguous term, but to change the scope and meaning of the entire contract. The majority uses the supposed “parol evidence” not to clarify the written words of the contract, but to make the entire contract mean only what the parol evidence says it means regardless of what the written words actually say. Not to illuminate the written words, but to replace them; not to make the written words clear, but to make them meaningless.

That isn’t how “parol evidence” works. There are several layers of problems here. First, parol evidence can never be used to contradict a writing, whether or not the writing was integrated. Galardi, 129 Nev. at 309, 301 P.3d at 366. Yet that’s exactly what Kuchta proposes. The written words, taken in their “usual and ordinary signification,” are clear. Traffic control Svcs., Inc. v. United Rentals Northwest, inc., 120 Nev. 168, 174, 87 P.3d 1054., 120 Nev. 168, 87 P.3d 1054, 1058 (2004). They expressly inform Kuchta that the ride will be violent with “unexpected” movements that may cause injury, and Kuchta’s signature acknowledges that he understood this. But Kuchta now says that he misunderstood this and the verbal conversation led him to “expect” a less-violent ride that [*25] couldn’t cause injury. This isn’t using extrinsic evidence to clarify the words of a contract; it’s abusing extrinsic evidence to re-write the words of a contract to mean their exact opposite.

Second, the sequence of events matters. As the majority itself notes, the conversation between Kuchta and the rider operator occurred first. Only well after the conversation ended did Kuchta later sign the written waiver. And the law is clear that a written contract supersedes and obliterates all prior negotiations:

“an earlier tentative agreement will be rejected in favor of a later expression. More simply stated, the final agreement made by the parties supersedes tentative terms discussed in earlier negotiations. Consequently, in determining the content of the contract, earlier tentative agreements and negotiations are inoperative.”

Calamari & Perillo, supra at 135. So the verbal conversation isn’t “parol evidence” at all, but rather was nothing more than an early negotiation that never found its way into the written contract and now has no legal importance to what the parties signed later. (This, by the way, is the problem with footnote 2 of the majority’s order, which concludes that the verbal conversation constituted its [*26] own separate contract: if the alleged verbal agreement covered the same subject matter as the signed contract (i.e., it was a negotiation over the waiver rather than the ride), then the earlier unsigned agreement was legally superseded by the later signed writing. If it covered some other subject matter (i.e., it was not a negotiation of the waiver but only covered the ride), then it was not superseded, but it has no relevance to the signed contract. Beyond that, if indeed there existed a contract requiring the operator to provide a level 2 ride, then the failure to do so was a breach of contract, not a tort, and the majority order now thoroughly confuses the standard of care by violating the “fundamental boundary between contract law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy interests of the parties, and tort law, which imposes a duty of reasonable care and thereby [generally] encourages citizens to avoid causing physical harm to others.” Terracon Consultants W., Inc. v. Mandalay Resort Grp., 125 Nev. 66, 206 P.3d 81. 72-73, 125 Nev. 66, 206 P.3d 81, 86 (2009). On remand, should the defendant be held to the words of the alleged oral contract, or the standard of a reasonable person, when only tort claims and no contract claims have been asserted? Good luck sorting that out.).

Third, even assuming [*27] that the verbal conversation is “parol evidence” at all (which it isn’t, but let’s skip past that hurdle), it proves nothing relevant to the waiver contract. Kuchta acknowledged during oral argument that the conversation did not overtly represent a negotiation of the waiver; indeed, the words of the conversation never reference the waiver at all, only the kind of ride Kuchta wanted. Rather, Kuchta only alleges that the conversation affected his “understanding and expectation” of what the waiver contract was supposed to mean. See Renaud v. 200 Convention Cor. Ltd., 102 Nev. 500, 501, 102 Nev. 500, 728 P.2d 445, 446 (1986). What he’s saying is this: the contract must be read to mean not what the words of the document say, but only what he intended them to mean in his mind. But under principles of contract law, whether we read the four corners of an unambiguous contract or whether we look at parol evidence outside of an ambiguous one, what we’re looking for is not “intent” in the sense of the subjective intention of the parties (i.e., what the parties may have thought in their minds), but only the objective meaning conveyed by the words they used in the agreement. “[T]he making of a contract depends not on the agreement of [*28] two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs, not on the parties’ having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.” Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Torres, 97 Nev. 399, 401, 632 P.2d 1155, 1157 (1981) (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted). In the oft-cited words of Holmes, “we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used.” Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 417-18 (1899). “[T]he words of the contract must be taken in their usual and ordinary signification,” not twisted around to mean some personal peculiarity at odds with accepted English usage. Traffic Control Svcs., Inc. v. United Rentals Northwest, Inc., 120 Nev. 168, 174, 87 P.3d 1054, 1058 (2004). That the words of a contract are interpreted objectively according to normal rules of grammar, rather than subjectively according to the parties’ personal thoughts, has been the law for centuries. See Calamari & Perillo, supra, § 2-2, “Offer and Acceptance” at 26. “Objective manifestations of intent of the party should be viewed from the vantage point of a reasonable man in the position of the other party,” not the party alleging that his own words meant something else. Id. Thus, if one party offers to sell his car for $500 and the other says, “I accept,” [*29] a contract is formed because of what they said, not what they thought; once they uttered the objective words of offer, acceptance, and consideration, a contract was created by operation of law. This is true even if one party later claims that he was only kidding. Id. at 27. The inquiry is not into what the parties may have intended in their minds to convey but rather the most reasonable meaning to be given to the words they utilized in the contract itself. The issue is not what Kuchta claims he meant, but what his words objectively conveyed to the other party, and the agreement must be “ascertained from the writing alone” (unless the writing is ambiguous). Oakland-Alameda Cty. Coliseum, Inc. v. Oakland Raiders, Lid., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1049, 243 Cal. Rptr. 300, 304 (Ct. App. 1988). But here, Kuchta proposes the opposite: that we ignore the words of the written document and instead make the contract only mean what was in his mind rather than what everyone signed on paper.

Finally, even if we skip past all of that and assume that parol evidence could be used the way that Kuchta proposes (even though it can’t be, but let’s ignore that for a moment), the content of both the document and the alleged “parol evidence” is wholly undisputed: nobody contests what words were written in the document or spoken during the conversation. [*30] So what we’re left with is only a question of law regarding what those words mean, something that appellate courts are supposed to answer themselves as a matter of law and not leave to the jury. Thus, even if parol evidence was supposedly useable this way (again, ignoring settled principles of contract law), then the appropriate disposition is for us to just say, as a matter of law, whether the waiver contract covers the incident or not, without remanding a pure question of law back to the district court to grapple with during a jury trial. “[I]n the absence of ambiguity or other factual complexities, contract interpretation presents a question of law [appropriate for] summary judgment.” Galardi, 129 Nev. at 309, 301 P.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted).

III.

Summing up, what 500 years of contract law tell us is this:

(1) a contract means what its words say and an unambiguous contract “will be enforced as written”;

(2) what the contractual words say is what they objectively convey in their ordinary sense regardless of what the parties might have personally thought or intended in their heads;

(3) the final contract supersedes all earlier verbal negotiations;

(4) parol evidence may only be used to clarify a term that is [*31] ambiguous, and an ambiguity does not arise merely because the parties disagree on what they think the contract means;

(5) parol evidence may never be used to contradict an express term of a contract, whether the contract is integrated or not;

(6) parol evidence may never consist of earlier negotiations inconsistent with the final contract, whether the final document is integrated or not;

Applying these seven principles leads to an obvious and straightforward outcome. Here, nobody disputes what the words of the written waiver are; there’s not even any dispute about what the words of the “parol evidence” were, only what legal effect those words have or do not have. There’s no dispute that the alleged verbal agreement was never intended to be final, never mentioned the waiver in any way, and occurred before the signing of the written waiver contract. There [*32] is no factual question left to work out. The only question before us is what all of the undisputed evidence means. That’s a pure question of law that we, not the jury, are supposed to answer.

IV.

With no dispute about what words the contract consisted of, what remains is solely a question of contractual interpretation. Redrock Valley Ranch., LLC v. Washoe County, 127 Nev. 451, 460, 254 P.3d 641, 647 (2011).

Here, the written words say that Kuchta waived the right to pursue any liability arising from broken bones that may result from being thrown from the “violent and unexpected” jerking of the mechanical bull. The parol evidence (assuming that the verbal conversation was any such thing) is that Kuchta asked for a level 2 ride and the operator agreed to try to provide one. None of this is in dispute. What does this all mean as a matter of law?

In the context of liability waivers, there are a couple of additional rules of construction to follow. In Nevada, an exculpatory agreement is a “valid exercise of the freedom of contract.” Miller v. A&R Joint Venture, 97 Nev. 580, 582, 636 P.2d 277, 278 (1981). Though generally enforceable, exculpatory clauses in a contract must meet four standards before a party seeking to enforce the clause can be absolved of liability:

(1) Contracts providing for immunity for liability for negligence must be construed [*33] strictly since they are not favorite[s] of the law . . . ; (2) such contracts must spell out the intention of the party with the greatest particularity . . . and show the intent to release from liability beyond doubt by express stipulation and no inference from the words of general import can establish it . . . (3) such contracts must be construed with every intendment against the party who seeks immunity from liability . . . (4) the burden to establish immunity from liability is upon the party who asserts such immunity . .

Agric. Aviation Eng’g Co. v. Bd. of Clark Cty. Comm’rs,, 106 Nev. 396, 399400, 794 P.2d 710, 712-13 (1990) (quoting Richard’s 5 & 10, Inc. v. Brooks Harvey Realty Inv’rs , 264 Pa. Super. 384, 399 A.2d 1103, 1105 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)).

Here, all four requirements are met. Indeed, the majority seems to fully agree, as it does not conclude that the waiver contract is invalid or illegal, only that some dispute of facts exists regarding its meaning. So everyone agrees that the contract is valid; the only disagreement is over what it covers or does not cover.

It seems pretty clear to me that, whatever else this agreement covers, it covers what happened to Kuchta. Kuchta alleges in his lawsuit that, due to the unexpected and violent jerking of the bull, he was thrown and suffered broken bones. In other words, the appellant alleges that he suffered the exact injury (broken [*34] bones) from the exact outcome (being thrown from the bull) caused by the exact movement (unexpected and violent jerking) expressly warned about in the waiver. Kuchta’s “parol evidence” (assuming it is any such thing) only shows that he asked for a level 2 ride, not that he asked for the waiver to only encompass a level 2 ride, so it tells us nothing about what the terms of the waiver contract were. The legal answer seems clear to me: Kuchta waived the right to sue for his injuries.

This all seems obvious under settled principles of contract law. So how does the majority come to a different conclusion? By reading Renaud v. 200 Convention Ctr. Ltd., 102 Nev. 500, 501, 102 Nev. 500, 728 P.2d 445, 446 (1986) in an astonishingly broad way that demolishes and re-writes much of existing contract law in Nevada.

Based upon Renaud, Kuchta argues (and the majority agrees) that summary judgment was inappropriate. But I don’t read Renaud the way that either Kuchta or the majority do. There are two ways to read what Renaud supposedly says. The first is to read it broadly to overrule virtually the entirety of Nevada contract law in a way that requires reversal of this appeal. The second is to read it narrowly in a way that fits in quite [*35] nicely with existing principles of Nevada contract law, but requires affirmance of this appeal. The majority chooses the former, but I think it’s the latter.

Before we get to the larger questions, here are some preliminary observations about Renaud. First, it’s a 1986 case decided under the old summary judgment standard that was expressly overruled in Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 731, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005), under which summary judgment could only be granted if no reasonable doubt exists that the plaintiff must lose and the “truth” is “clear.” See In re Hilton Hotel , 101 Nev. 489, 492, 706 P.2d 137, 138 (1985) (overruled by Wood). Indeed, the opinion hinges on the overruled pre-Wood language: “summary judgment is appropriate only when it is quite clear what the truth is.” Renaud, 728 P.2d at 446. It seems pretty clear to me that, just because summary judgment was improper in Renaud under the old standard — a standard that made summary judgment pretty much impossible to obtain, which is exactly why it was overruled, see Wood , 121 Nev. at 729-32, 121 P.3d at 1029-31 — that says nothing about whether we should follow its reasoning under the very different standard that exists today.

Second, the facts of Renaud are quite different than the facts of this case in a way that seriously undermines its relevance. The liability waiver at issue in Renaud was a blanket one that “purported [*36] to exculpate Flyaway of any liability for negligence that might occur while [plaintiff] was on its premises.” 102 Nev. at 501, 728 P.2d at 446. The plaintiff contended that this release failed to apprise her of any specific risk associated with the free-fall simulator that injured her, a contention that was obviously quite true as the waiver failed to identify any particular risk of injury or even mention the simulator at all. Indeed, the waiver in Renaud consisted of the very “words of general import” that the Nevada Supreme Court disapproved in the four-prong test articulated in Agric. Aviation Eng’g Co., 106 Nev. at 399-400, 794 P.2d at 712-13. Consequently, summary judgment was inappropriate (especially under the old pre-Wood standard) because a serious question existed whether the waiver apprised the plaintiff of the particular risks specifically associated with the free-fall simulator when it never even mentioned the simulator or any risks at all. There’s no other way the case could have come out (which is probably why Renaud was so unimportant that it was issued as an unsigned per curiam opinion). If a waiver fails to even mention the apparatus that caused the injury, then there exists a dispute right on the face of the waiver itself as to what risks it identifies when the [*37] waiver itself says barely anything at all one way or the other. Under principles of contract law alone, let alone tort law, such a waiver contains a facial ambiguity necessitating the evaluation of parol evidence to determine what the contract was supposed to cover or not cover. See M.C. Multi-Family Dei , 124 Nev. at 913-14, 193 P.3d at 544-45. Thus, under either contract law or tort law, whenever a waiver is facially vague and unclear, summary judgment was inappropriate because the waiver clearly failed to apprise the plaintiff of any risks in particular.

But that’s not anything like the case at hand. In stark contrast to Renaud, the release at issue here was far from a blanket one purporting to absolve the landowner from “all” unspecified and unnamed potential liability in some vague and incredibly generic way without bothering to identify what those risks were. Rather, the release here was narrowly and specifically targeted to the mechanical bull that described its operation and listed its particular hazards in detail, including the very injuries (broken bones from being thrown) that the plaintiff actually suffered. Indeed, the waiver covered nothing but the mechanical bull, and only people wishing to ride the mechanical bull were required [*38] to sign it; patrons wishing only to have a drink at the bar weren’t required to sign it and weren’t asked to waive anything.

So there exist very different sets of facts between Renaud and this appeal. But the question becomes what that means: does Renaud apply only to vague blanket waivers that fail to identify any particular risks, or does it articulate a standard that broadly applies to all waivers including the narrow targeted one at issue here?

VI.

Renaud observes that two things are required for a plaintiff to have assumed the risk of an injury: “First, there must have been voluntary exposure to the danger. Second, there must have been actual knowledge of the risk assumed.” Renaud, 102 Nev. at 501, 728 P.2d at 446. To determine whether the party signing a liability waiver had actual knowledge of the risks assumed, courts must consider “the nature and extent of the injuries, the haste or lack thereof with which the release was obtained, and the understandings and expectations of the parties at the time of signing.” Id. at 502, 728 P.2d at 446.

The majority agrees that the first two factors strongly favor affirmance, but concludes that summary judgment is not warranted as to the third because factual disputes exist. In other words, the majority interprets [*39] this language as a standalone three-part test that must be satisfied regardless of how detailed the language of the waiver happens to be. It becomes a test that exists apart from and outside of the contract itself, under which the words of the contract itself have no independent legal significance but are reduced to merely being one small piece of evidence among other evidence tending to prove the three prongs of the test. In addition to making it a standalone test, the majority interprets the three-part test as fundamentally factual. It becomes an inquiry focused upon what was said between the Kuchta and the ride operator regardless of what the waiver itself said or didn’t say within its four corners; and when those understandings and expectations are disputed, summary judgment cannot be granted.

Indeed, that’s how the majority order is structured: it recites the written words of the waiver on page 6, but then after launching into Renaud, it never cites those words again — they just disappear from the analysis for the rest of the order — instead only concluding that the third prong of the three-part test was factually disputed in a way having nothing to do with those words.

Well, that’s [*40] one way to read Renaud. But it’s not how I read it, and here’s why: it deeply conflicts with long-settled principles of contract law.

Here’s the problem in a nutshell. If Renaud sets forth the standalone fact-based test that the majority proposes, then it requires the court to always, every single time, look outside of the four corners of the waiver to investigate the parties’ understandings and expectations, whether the words of the contract are ambiguous or not. And that judicial investigation must include superseded earlier negotiations that would otherwise be evidence of nothing under contract law. Maybe summary judgment could still sometimes still be granted if no dispute exists regarding that evidence; but the evidence must always be admitted and at least considered in some way whether there was any textual ambiguity in the contract or not. That’s a major re-writing of contract law, which starts with the fundamental proposition that contracts are enforced as written based upon the words contained within their four corners, and going outside of them is the exception, not the rule, an exception that only arises in the event of an ambiguity.

And there’s more. If Renaud is indeed the [*41] standalone factual test that Kuchta proposes, then courts must always admit extrinsic evidence whether or not it qualifies as admissible “parol evidence” in contract law. Beyond that, here’s what the court would use that extrinsic evidence to do: not to clear up the meaning of an ambiguity in the text (because under this test no such ambiguity would be required as a trigger anyway), but to determine what the parties thought and expected the waiver contract to mean in the first place regardless of the words used. But this violates the idea that “[t]he making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs, not on the parties’ having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.” Hotel Riviera, 97 Nev. at 401, 632 P.2d at 1157 (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Kuchta reads Renaud as requiring the exact opposite: courts must read contracts not according to their words, but rather according to the personal “understandings and expectations of the parties at the time of signing.” It replaces the objective test of contract law with an entirely subjective approach that focuses not upon the plain and ordinary meaning [*42] of the words of the document that everyone signed but, instead, upon what everyone thought regardless of the written words that they agreed upon. The old rule has long been that “we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used,” Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 417-18 (1899), and “the words of the contract must be taken in their usual and ordinary signification,” Traffic Control Svcs., 120 Nev. at 174, 87 P.3d at 1058. But the majority’s new rule is that we ask not what words were used, but only what the parties imagined in their heads.

This is revolutionary. Make no mistake about how far-reaching this is. But it’s the only way to reverse summary judgment here, because all of the factual disputes that Kuchta (and the majority) point to lie entirely outside of the four corners of the written contract and consist entirely of a prior, superseded verbal conversation that nobody even asserts was a negotiation of the waiver contract itself. And those supposed factual disputes serve not to clarify a term of the contract, but to contradict those terms.

In short, Kuchta and the majority read Renaud as supplanting (or at least [*43] creating an unprecedented major exception to) settled law: when it comes to liability waivers, courts do something entirely different than they’ve done with every other contract since the time of Blackstone.

That’s an incredibly broad reading of Renaud. But accepting it is the only way to reverse summary judgment in this case, because if we apply traditional contract law and stay within the four corners of the waiver itself — or, alternatively, even if we concede some kind of ambiguity but limit ourselves to parol evidence consistent with the written words in order to clarify the written words — Kuchta must lose. For what Kuchta now claims he believed about the waiver comes very close to representing the exact opposite of what its written words actually say: the written waiver says that the movements of the bull are “violent” and “unexpected” and may cause injury, but Kuchta now asserts that he had a specific expectation that the ride would be non-violent and could not cause injury.

VII.

Let’s ask a practical question: under this standard, what kind of trial will this be? The answer is: not one in which the jury will be instructed to honor the written words of the waiver contract even [*44] if the words are clear and unambiguous. If any parol evidence is deemed admissible in the event of ambiguity, not one in which the jury will be instructed to consider only parol evidence that doesn’t flatly contradict the written words or re-write the entire contract. In sum, not one in which the words of the contract matter much at all.

Instead, the trial will consist (as the interrogatory responses and deposition testimony before us currently do) of dueling, uncorroborated, and self-serving testimony regarding a single verbal conversation that occurred years ago that was never memorialized and never referenced in any way in the final writing, one that Kuchta himself agrees was not a negotiation of the terms of the waiver. In weighing that conversation, the jury will be asked to determine not what contractual terms Kuchta agreed to and signed, but only what inner thoughts he secretly harbored at the time.

VIII.

I don’t read Renaud that way. It’s a two-page unsigned per curiam opinion, and nothing in it suggests that it was meant to broadly overrule so much clear and established law. It’s axiomatic that we do not read statutes as if Legislatures decided to “hide elephants in mouseholes.” [*45] Whitman v. American Trucking Association, 531 U.S. 457, 468, 121 S. Ct. 903, 149 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2001). I doubt that we ought to read Renaud as if the Nevada Supreme Court intended to do exactly that.

Instead, I read Renaud as saying something much simpler that overrules nothing and fits very happily within existing tenets of contract law. Courts must determine whether a waiver warns of the risk and injury at issue, just as Renaud says they must; but they do so within the context of settled law by examining the terms of the waiver itself. If the words of the waiver contain a sufficient warning, then no extrinsic evidence is needed and the inquiry stops there because the contract must be interpreted according to the four corners of its text as a matter of law. Only if the waiver is ambiguous as to what is covered can the court go outside of the four corners of the document to examine parol evidence to clear up the ambiguity.

Renaud itself was a straightforward application of this simple idea. In it, the waiver at stake was so generically written that it fails to mention the free-fall simulator at all, much less describe any particular injuries that could occur from using it. Thus, the written contract itself was silent on whether it covered either the plaintiffs particular injury or the [*46] risk that inflicted that injury. In that event, established principles of contract law dictate that the written waiver could either be read as ambiguous regarding whether it covered the free-fall simulator, or it could also be read, as a matter of law, as not covering the free-fall simulator. In the first instance, parol evidence must be considered to resolve the ambiguity and, in the second instance, any evidence of a waiver, if there was one, must exist entirely outside of the written contract in the form of an oral contract. Either way, and especially under the old pre-Wood standard for granting summary judgment, summary judgment was not warranted because no such evidence had been presented or considered.

So I read Renaud not as some sweeping and revolutionary holding inconsistent with contract law in any way, but as a simple and straightforward application of clearly established law. If a waiver is so poorly worded or generic as to be ambiguous, then summary judgment cannot be granted absent consideration of parol evidence. On the other hand, if the written waiver is sufficiently clear and precise that its terms convey that there was “voluntary exposure to the danger as well as [*47] actual knowledge of the risk assumed” — including that “the nature and extent of the injuries” were of the kind warned about in the waiver, and the ‘understandings and expectations of the parties at the time of signing” are clearly conveyed in the document — then the only question presented is one of contract interpretation (a question of law). If the written words meet all of these tests, then as a matter of law the waiver operates to bar any claim arising from any injury specifically warned of in the waiver. Renaud, 102 Nev. at 501, 728 P.2d at 446.

Consequently, summary judgment was properly granted in this case. The waiver is specific and precise, there are no ambiguities in it, and it covered the very injuries suffered by the very means warned about in the waiver. I would conclude as a matter of law that summary judgment was properly granted as the only question before us is one of contract interpretation, which presents a pure question of law. The only factual “disputes” that appellant cites relate to inadmissible extrinsic evidence lying outside of the contract that both pre-dates and contradicts the writing, and therefore are neither “genuine” nor “material.” See Wood , 121 Nev. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1029 (“A factual dispute is genuine when the evidence is [*48] such that a rational trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”). See
NRCP 56 (summary judgment warranted when plaintiff not “entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). I would affirm and respectfully dissent.

/s/ Tao, J.

Tao

Pennsylvania No Duty Rule stops lawsuit by underage rider.

Posted: May 18, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Minors, Youth, Children, Pennsylvania | Tags: appreciated, assume a risk, Assumption of risk, assumption of the risk, comparative negligence, cross-motions, Dirt Bike, Doctrine of Assumption of the Risk, Duty of care, injuries, Jump, material fact, minors, negligence claim, No Duty, No Duty Rule, Off Road, operators, parental consent, parties, plaintiffs', rider's, riding, Risks, skiing, Summary judgment, track | Leave a comment

A minor with 12 years of riding and competing on dirt bikes could not sue the commercial operation after crashing on the course.

Hawkins v. Switchback MX, LLC, 339 F. Supp. 3d 543, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155249

State: Pennsylvania; United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

Plaintiff: Kameron Hawkins and Amber Lynn Durbin

Defendant: Switchback MX, LLC d/b/a Switchback Raceway

Plaintiff Claims: negligence and negligence per se

Defendant Defenses: Pennsylvania No Duty Rule (Assumption of the Risk)

Holding: For the Defendant

Year: 2019

Summary

The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act specifically identifies downhill skiing and off-road riding as exempt from the comparative negligence act. In both those sports, the participant assumes the risk of their injuries due from the inherent risks of the sports.

Facts

Hawkins [plaintiff] began riding a dirt bike at the age of five or six.. He learned the ins and outs of dirt bike [motorized] riding from his father, who raced dirt bikes and often brought Hawkins to spectate at off-road races Hawkins began participating in races himself at “a young age” and even secured sponsorships. He testified that he was aware of the dangers of riding dirt bikes from early on in his experience, that his father instructed him to avoid jumps that “you don’t think you can handle,” and that he wore protective gear to guard against the risk of injury. He acknowledges that dirt bike riding is “a dangerous sport,” that “you could get hurt” on a dirt bike, and that a fall could cause “injury . . . or even death.” Despite his protective measures, Hawkins has suffered injuries in the past riding a dirt bike. Hawkins had been to Switchback on three prior occasions: once as a spectator, once as pit crew member for his friend Jonathan Franjko, and once as a rider.

The events preceding Hawkins’ accident on January 9, 2016 are disputed by the parties and not fully explored in the Rule 56 record. According to Hawkins, he arrived at Switchback with several friends and met with Brader, who asked them whether they had been to Switchback before. Hawkins relayed that, after the group responded affirmatively, Brader told them to sign in, accepted their payment, and provided them with wristbands to attach to their helmets to indicate they had been authorized to ride. He denied ever being asked to present identification and did not recall being asked his age.

Switchback’s account diverges considerably. According to Brader, Hawkins entered the indoor facility on January 9, 2016 with Franjko, who had a Switchback membership card. Brader did not recognize Hawkins and thought he appeared to be under the age of 18. Brader reported that he told Hawkins he needed to “take home a waiver and fill it out” and that he had to “bring [the waiver] out next time and join us another day.” Brader does not recall Hawkins signing in on Switchback’s sign-in sheet for January 9, 2016, but testified that he told Hawkins he “could not ride” without waiver and consent forms on file. Brader also testified that he does not know how Hawkins ultimately came to access the track on January 9, 2016. It is undisputed that Durbin did not execute a parental consent form allowing Hawkins to participate in dirt bike riding at Switchback.

On January 9, 2016, Hawkins somehow gained access Switchback’s indoor dirt bike racing track. Hawkins “attempted a jump, without enough speed,” on one of the track’s “table top jumps,” which caused the frame of his dirt bike to hit the ground and “flip [the] bike and Hawkins over.” According to Brader, it was only after this wreck that he became aware that Hawkins had accessed the track. Brader testified that Hawkins “didn’t look right” and that he offered to call an ambulance. Franjko confirmed that Brader asked “a couple times” whether Hawkins wanted medical attention. Hawkins left Switchback’s facility with his friends without receiving medical attention. Hawkins was subsequently treated for injuries including a lacerated kidney and pancreas, trauma to his spleen, a broken hip, a concussion, and post-concussion syndrome. The accident occurred four months before Hawkins’ 18th birthday.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The court first reviewed the requirements to prove a negligence claim in Pennsylvania.

Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must prove the “four basic elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages. That is, plaintiffs must prove: (1) the existence of a legal duty requiring a certain standard of conduct; (2) breach of that duty by the defendant; (3) a causal connection between defendant’s breach and plaintiffs’ injury; and (4) actual loss or damages.

The court then reviewed the claims of the plaintiff as whether the defendant owed a duty to the minor plaintiff because the plaintiff assumed the risk of his injuries.

The defendant’s position was it had no duty to protect the plaintiff because of the inherent risk set out in the “no duty” rule in the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act.

The plaintiff’s response to that argument was the negligence of the defendant was in allowing the plaintiff to access the track.

The court looked at the conflicting arguments by next reviewing assumption of the risk as applied in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act eliminated the defense of assumption of the risk in all areas except two when it enacted the statute. The two exemptions were downhill skiing and off-road vehicle riding. Meaning in those two situations, the no-duty rule retained the defense of assumption of the risk. The defendant has no duty to protect the plaintiff from the inherent risks of the sport of downhill skiing or off-road riding.

The court then reviewed whether assumption of the risk applied to minors. That is “the court must ask what the “particular minor plaintiff knows, sees, hears, comprehends, and appreciates” with respect to the risk involved.”

Under Pennsylvania law, to prove assumption:

…the court must find that the plaintiff (1) “consciously appreciated the risk” attending the activity, (2) assumed the risk of injury by nonetheless engaging in the activity, and (3) sustained an injury that was “the same risk of injury that was appreciated and assumed.”

A factor in determining whether or not a minor assumed the risk is the minor’s age and experience. In this case that worked for the defendant because the minor was only four months from turning eighteen at the time of the accident and had been riding for twelve years.

The court then defined inherent risk as a risk “which “cannot be removed without altering the fundamental nature” of the activity.”

The court broke down the inherent risks of off-road riding as identified in the statute, to see if the plaintiff’s injury landing on a table-top jump was inherent to the sport.

Common sense dictates that the risk of a fall or collision that does not involve another rider or object is equally inherent in the activity. Indeed, Hawkins’ own experience bears this out—he testified that his accident on January 9, 2016, was not his first; that he knew from personal experience that attempting jumps carried a certain risk; and that he wore protective gear in an attempt to mitigate that risk. We find that the risk of suffering serious injury when attempting a dirt bike jump is one which “cannot be removed without altering the fundamental nature” of dirt bike riding and is thus inherent in the activity.

We further conclude that reasonable persons could not debate whether Hawkins appreciated and knowingly assumed that risk. Hawkins was nearly 18 years old at the time of the accident and had been riding dirt bikes for more than 12 years. He was a vastly experienced rider. He was well aware that dirt bike riding carried the risk of serious injury and even death. Indeed, Hawkins acknowledged that a dirt bike presents a certain danger “even when the bike’s on the ground.” Given this unequivocal record testimony, we have little difficulty finding that this particular rider—plaintiff Kameron Hawkins—knew, appreciated, and assumed the risks attending off-road dirt bike riding.

For these reasons, the court found the minor, because of his age and experience assumed the risk of his injuries, and the defendant was not liable for those injuries because of the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act.

So Now What?

Assumption of the risk in most states is the only defense you have to injuries a minor receives. Unless your state has a specific statute that identifies your activity as one with inherent risk a person assumes, you need to prove the minor in your case assumed those risks.

To do that you must maximize all the avenues to educate and document that education of a minor, in fact, all participants in your activity or business.

Post videos of your activity showing crashes, flips and falls on your website and social media. Point out possible risks on your site and social media. Then confirm in some way that the minor observed that information.

You can go so far as to ask the minor and/or the minor’s parents of their experience in the sport. Have they participated in the sport before, seen it on TV, participated for how many years, etc.

A release is your best defense to a lawsuit, but for minors, in those states where releases are not valid and or minors, assumption of the risk is your best and sometimes only defense.

For more information see:

States that allow a parent to sign away a minor’s right to sue

States that do not Support the Use of a Release

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

Hawkins v. Switchback MX, LLC, 339 F. Supp. 3d 543, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155249

Posted: May 14, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Pennsylvania | Tags: appreciated, assume a risk, Assumption of risk, assumption of the risk, comparative negligence, cross-motions, Dirt Bike, Doctrine of Assumption of the Risk, Duty of care, injuries, Jump, material fact, minors, Motorcross, negligence claim, No Duty, No Duty Rule, Off Road, operators, parental consent, parties, plaintiffs', rider's, riding, Risks, skiing, Summary judgment, Switchback, track, Voluntary Assumption of the Risk | 2 Comments

Hawkins v. Switchback MX, LLC, 339 F. Supp. 3d 543, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155249

United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

September 12, 2018, Decided; September 12, 2018, Filed

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-1719

Reporter

KAMERON HAWKINS and AMBER LYNN DURBIN, Plaintiffs v. SWITCHBACK MX, LLC d/b/a SWITCHBACK RACEWAY, Defendant

Counsel: [**1] For KAMERON HAWKINS, &, AMBER LYNN DURBIN, Plaintiffs: George R. Farneth , II, LEAD ATTORNEY, The Farneth Law Group, LLC, Wellsburg, WV.

For SWITCHBACK MX, LLC, doing business as, SWITCHBACK RACEWAY, Defendant: Michael John Pawk, Lutz & Pawk, Butler, PA.

Judges: Christopher C. Conner, Chief United States District Judge.

Opinion by: Christopher C. Conner

Opinion

[*545] MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Kameron Hawkins (“Hawkins”) suffered injuries after he unsuccessfully attempted a jump while riding a dirt bike on an indoor course at defendant Switchback Raceway (“Switchback”). Hawkins and his mother, plaintiff Amber Lynn Durbin (“Durbin”), commenced this diversity action advancing three negligence claims against Switchback under Pennsylvania law. Before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History1

This personal injury lawsuit arises from physical injuries suffered by Hawkins following a dirt bike accident at Switchback’s off-road riding and racing facility in Butler, Pennsylvania. Switchback promotes and stages dirt bike races for participants of all skill levels. (Doc. 28 ¶ 1; Doc. 32 ¶ 2). Switchback’s website articulates [**2] its waiver and consent policy as follows:

Dirtbike/ATV riding is dangerous. Accidents, injuries, and even death can occur. Ride at your own risk! All riders must sign a waiver before they will [be] permitted to ride. Minors will be required to have parental consent. During practice, there are limited to no flaggers. Please, ride safely.

There is no trespassing on Switchback property. Anyone caught trespassing will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

All minors that come without their legal parents they must have a NOTARIZED waiver to be able to ride. NO EXCEPTIONS.

(Doc. 30-9 at 1). Switchback’s track manager, Mark Brader (“Brader”), testified that, [*546] pursuant to this policy, a minor is not be permitted to ride without a signed parental consent form and waiver. (Brader Dep. 29:5-18, 42:13-21).2 He also testified that it was his responsibility to ensure that minors did not misrepresent their age or otherwise engage in efforts to improperly gain access to the track. (Id. at 56:4-8; see also Doc. 28 ¶ 10).

Hawkins began riding a dirt bike at the age of five or six. (Doc. 32 ¶ 4). He learned the ins and outs of dirt bike riding [**3] from his father, who raced dirt bikes and often brought Hawkins to spectate at off-road races. (See id. ¶¶ 7-9; Hawkins Dep. 20:5-22:4 (“Hawkins Dep.”)). Hawkins began participating in races himself at “a young age” and even secured sponsorships. (Doc. 32 ¶ 6). He testified that he was aware of the dangers of riding dirt bikes from early on in his experience, that his father instructed him to avoid jumps that “you don’t think you can handle,” and that he wore protective gear to guard against the risk of injury. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8; Hawkins Dep. 21:20-22:21, 38:22-39:25, 133:3-12, 147:18-148:6). He acknowledges that dirt bike riding is “a dangerous sport,” that “you could get hurt” on a dirt bike, and that a fall could cause “injury . . . or even death.” (Hawkins Dep. 25:17-26:4, 38:13-21, 39:14-25, 147:18-148:6). Despite his protective measures, Hawkins has suffered injuries in the past riding a dirt bike. (Doc. 32 ¶ 14; see also Hawkins Dep. 38:22-39:25, 133:3-12). Hawkins had been to Switchback on three prior occasions: once as a spectator, once as pit crew member for his friend Jonathan Franjko (“Franjko”), and once as a rider. (Doc. 32 ¶ 28).

The events preceding Hawkins’ accident on January [**4] 9, 2016 are disputed by the parties and not fully explored in the Rule 56 record. According to Hawkins, he arrived at Switchback with several friends and met with Brader, who asked them whether they had been to Switchback before. (Hawkins Dep. 49:5-12). Hawkins relayed that, after the group responded affirmatively, Brader told them to sign in, accepted their payment, and provided them with wristbands to attach to their helmets to indicate they had been authorized to ride. (See id.) He denied ever being asked to present identification and did not recall being asked his age. (Id. at 133:13-23).

Switchback’s account diverges considerably. According to Brader, Hawkins entered the indoor facility on January 9, 2016 with Franjko, who had a Switchback membership card. (See Brader Dep. 56:9-18). Brader did not recognize Hawkins and thought he appeared to be under the age of 18. (See id. at 56:19-57:2). Brader reported that he told Hawkins he needed to “take home a waiver and fill it out” and that he had to “bring [the waiver] out next time and join us another day.” (Id. at 56:23-57:6). Brader does not recall Hawkins signing in on Switchback’s sign-in sheet for January 9, 2016, but testified that he [**5] told Hawkins he “could not ride” without waiver and consent forms on file. (Id. at 76:12-77:1). Brader also testified that he does not know how Hawkins ultimately came to access the track on January 9, 2016. (Id. at 91:12-16). It is undisputed that Durbin did not execute a parental consent form allowing Hawkins to participate in dirt bike riding at Switchback. (Doc. 28 ¶ 12).

On January 9, 2016, Hawkins somehow gained access Switchback’s indoor dirt bike racing track. (See Doc. 28 ¶ 13; Doc. [*547] 32 ¶¶ 1, 13, 31). Hawkins “attempted a jump, without enough speed,” on one of the track’s “table top jumps,” which caused the frame of his dirt bike to hit the ground and “flip [the] bike and Hawkins over.” (Doc. 32 11 13, 31). According to Brader, it was only after this wreck that he became aware that Hawkins had accessed the track. (See Brader Dep. 57:4-11). Brader testified that Hawkins “didn’t look right” and that he offered to call an ambulance. (Id. at 82:10-83:12). Franjko confirmed that Brader asked “a couple times” whether Hawkins wanted medical attention. (See Franjko Dep. 58:12-59:1). Hawkins left Switchback’s facility with his friends without receiving medical attention. (See Doc. 28 [**6] ¶ 17; Doc. 39 ¶ 17). Hawkins was subsequently treated for injuries including a lacerated kidney and pancreas, trauma to his spleen, a broken hip, a concussion, and post-concussion syndrome. (Doc. 28 ¶ 18). The accident occurred four months before Hawkins’ 18th birthday. (See Doc. 32 ¶ 3).

Hawkins and Durbin commenced this lawsuit on November 15, 2016, asserting one claim of negligence each and one claim of negligence per se together. Plaintiffs contend that Switchback violated its internal policies and its legal duty of care by failing to ensure that Hawkins, a minor, did not access its facility without parental consent. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on each of the plaintiffs’ claims. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden of proof tasks the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. Pappas v. City of Lebanon , 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The court is to view [**7] the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Thomas v. Cumberland County , 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). This evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the non-moving party on the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action proceed. See Pappas , 331 F. Supp. 2d at 315.

Courts are permitted to resolve cross-motions for summary judgment concurrently. See Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Johnson v. Fed. Express Corp., 996 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (M.D. Pa. 2014); 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 2015). When doing so, the court is bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party with respect to each motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Lawrence , 527 F.3d at 310 (quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968)).

III. Discussion

Pennsylvania substantive law governs the negligence claims raised by the plaintiffs in this diversity action. See Maghakian v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 353, 358 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Chamberlain v. Giampapa , 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must prove the “four basic [*548] elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages.” Perez v. Great Wolf Lodge of the Poconos LLC , 200 F. Supp. 3d 471, 478 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting Loughran v. Phillies , 2005 PA Super 396, 888 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)). That is, plaintiffs must prove: (1) the existence of a legal duty requiring a certain standard of conduct; (2) breach of that duty by the defendant; (3) a causal connection between defendant’s breach and plaintiffs’ injury; and (4) actual loss or damages. Id. (quoting Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563 F.3d 38, 61 (3d Cir. 2009)).

The parties’ [**8] cross-motions for summary judgment concenter on two disputes: first, whether Switchback owed a legal duty of care to Hawkins in view of the no-duty rule set forth in Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102, and second, whether Hawkins assumed the risk of injury, negating any duty of care, by engaging in an activity which he understood to be dangerous.3

A. Duty of Care

The parties offer competing perspectives of the applicable duty of care. Switchback maintains that it had no duty to protect Hawkins from risks inherent in off-road dirt bike riding. Switchback invokes the no-duty rule set forth in Pennsylvania’s Comparative Negligence Act, which provides that an operator of an off-road vehicle riding area—such as Switchback—”shall have no duty to protect riders from common, frequent, expected and nonnegligent risks inherent to the activity, including collisions with riders or objects.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102(b.3)(1). Switchback avers that the possibility of falling and suffering injury while engaged in off-road riding is an inherent, expected risk of the activity, and that the no-duty rule forecloses liability in this case.

Plaintiffs rejoin that the no-duty rule has no application here. They assert that [**9] this case does not concern a duty to protect patrons from the risks of off-road riding once they have accessed the track, but instead concerns Switchback’s alleged negligence in allowing minors to access its facility in the first instance. Plaintiffs rely on the Armstrong County Court of Common Pleas’ decision in Emerick v. Fox Raceway , 68 Pa. D. & C. 4th 299 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2004), wherein the state court found that off-road riding area operators have a legal duty to develop and follow internal procedures to check a prospective rider’s age and to ensure minor riders do not access their facility without parental consent. Id. at 318. To hold otherwise, the court found, would be “contrary to good public policy.” Id.

Plaintiffs insist that the Emerick decision is on all fours with their claims. The trouble with Emerick is that it fails to engage with or even acknowledge the no-duty rule, which became law on July 15, 2004—a mere six days before the Emerick decision issued. Plaintiffs posit that the lack of discussion of the new rule suggests that the court deemed it inapplicable, given that the case before the court involved policies which allowed a plaintiff to sneak onto the track rather than the conditions of the track itself. Switchback, for its part, insists [**10] that the court was either unaware of the new enactment or deemed it inapplicable because the accident at issue occurred before the statute’s effective date.

We cannot ascribe weight to the Emerick decision when it failed to engage with this transformative legislative enactment. [*549] The court’s opinion expressly states that it is grounded largely in public policy—but the state legislature six days prior explicitly and substantially transformed the Commonwealth’s negligence policy as concerns tort liability for operators of off-road riding areas. In our view, the failure of the Emerick court to account for the no-duty rule severely diminishes its value as precedent. Nonetheless, because we determine infra that the assumption of the risk doctrine negates any duty that Switchback may have had to protect Hawkins, we need not determine, as a matter of law, what duty of care remains for operators of off-road riding areas with respect to minors attempting to access their facilities.

B. Assumption of the Risk

Most tort claims in Pennsylvania are governed by the comparative negligence doctrine. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102(a). But the legislature expressly preserved assumption of the risk as a defense in two categories of activities: [**11] off-road vehicle riding, see id. § 7102(b.3)(2), and downhill skiing, see id. § 7102(c)(2). Specifically, as pertains off-road vehicle riding areas, the Comparative Negligence Act states: “The doctrine of knowing voluntary assumption of risk shall apply to all actions to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property brought against any off-road vehicle riding area operator.” Id. § 7102(b.3)(2). The assumption of the risk doctrine operates to negate any legal duty ascribed to those plaintiffs seek to hold liable: “to the extent the injured plaintiff proceeded in the face of a known danger, he relieved those who may have otherwise had a duty, implicitly agreeing to take care of himself.” Montagazzi v. Crisci , 2010 PA Super 78, 994 A.2d 626, 635 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (citing Carrender v. Fitterer , 503 Pa. 178, 469 A.2d 120, 124 (Pa. 1983)). The doctrine operates as a “no-duty” rule; that is, for those facilities for which the legislature preserved the assumption of the risk defense, the owner or operator “has no duty to protect the user from any hazards inherent in the activity.” Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 607 Pa. 1, 2 A.3d 1174, 1185-86 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted).

Pennsylvania courts apply a subjective standard when determining whether a minor assumed the risk of a given activity. That is, the court must ask what the “particular minor plaintiff knows, sees, hears, comprehends, and appreciates” [**12] with respect to the risk involved. Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP , 550 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Berman v. Phila. Bd. of Educ., 310 Pa. Super. 153, 456 A.2d 545, 550 (Pa. 1983)). To grant summary judgment based on an assumption of the risk defense, the court must find that the plaintiff (1) “consciously appreciated the risk” attending the activity, (2) assumed the risk of injury by nonetheless engaging in the activity, and (3) sustained an injury that was “the same risk of injury that was appreciated and assumed.” Zeidman v. Fisher , 2009 PA Super 161, 980 A.2d 637, 641 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (quoting Hadar v. Avco Corp., 2005 PA Super 326, 886 A.2d 225, 229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)). When reasonable minds could not disagree, the question of assumption of the risk is for the court. See Carrender , 469 A.2d at 124; see also M.D. v. Ski Shawnee, Inc., No. 14-CV-1576, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81392, 2015 WL 3866050, at *4 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 469 cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 1965)).

No court has explored the assumption of the risk doctrine in the context of off-road riding areas following the 2004 amendment to the Comparative Negligence Act. But several courts have interpreted the doctrine as pertains to downhill skiing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that retention of the assumption of the risk doctrine in that context reflects the legislature’s intent that a ski resort [*550] owner owes no duty of care to patrons for any risk “‘inherent’ in downhill skiing.” Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 563 Pa. 501, 762 A.2d 339, 344 (Pa. 2000); see also Bjorgung , 550 F.3d at 268. Knowledge of the inherent risk has been deemed the sine qua non of an assumption of the risk defense. See M.D., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81392, 2015 WL 3866050, at *3. The plaintiff’s age and relative degree of experience [**13] with the activity are relevant in determining whether that particular plaintiff was aware of a given risk. See id. (citing Bjorgung , 550 F.3d 263; Chepkevich , 607 Pa. 1, 2 A.3d 1174; Hughes , 563 Pa. 501, 762 A.2d 339). We can conceive of no reason why these principles, developed in the analogous context of downhill skiing, should not apply with equal force to negligence claims involving off-road riding areas. Compare 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102(b.3)(1)-(2) with id. § 7102(c)(1)-(2).

We must first query whether the risk of falling during a jump and suffering serious injury is inherent in the activity of off-road riding. An “inherent risk” is one which “cannot be removed without altering the fundamental nature” of the activity. Bjorgung , 550 F.3d at 268-69 (quoting Crews v. Seven Springs Mountain Resort , 2005 PA Super 138, 874 A.2d 100, 105 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)). The Comparative Negligence Act identifies “collisions with riders or objects” as risks inherent in off-road riding. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102(b.3)(1). Common sense dictates that the risk of a fall or collision that does not involve another rider or object is equally inherent in the activity. Indeed, Hawkins’ own experience bears this out—he testified that his accident on January 9, 2016, was not his first; that he knew from personal experience that attempting jumps carried a certain risk; and that he wore protective gear in an attempt to mitigate that risk. (Hawkins Dep. 38:22-39:25, 133:3-12, 147:24-148:6). We find that the [**14] risk of suffering serious injury when attempting a dirt bike jump is one which “cannot be removed without altering the fundamental nature” of dirt bike riding and is thus inherent in the activity. See Bjorgung , 550 F.3d at 268-69 (quoting Crews , 874 A.2d at 105).

We further conclude that reasonable persons could not debate whether Hawkins appreciated and knowingly assumed that risk. Hawkins was nearly 18 years old at the time of the accident and had been riding dirt bikes for more than 12 years. He was a vastly experienced rider. He was well aware that dirt bike riding carried the risk of serious injury and even death. Indeed, Hawkins acknowledged that a dirt bike presents a certain danger “even when the bike’s on the ground.” (Hawkins Dep. 92:4-93:2). Given this unequivocal record testimony, we have little difficulty finding that this particular rider—plaintiff Kameron Hawkins—knew, appreciated, and assumed the risks attending off-road dirt bike riding.

Anticipating the defense’s strategy sub judice, plaintiffs contend that a minor cannot ever assume the risk of a particular activity, again invoking Emerick, in which the Armstrong County Court of Common Pleas held that, because a minor plaintiff is incapable of entering into a contract [**15] and cannot expressly waive liability for a given activity, a minor cannot impliedly assume that same risk by his or her actions. Emerick , 68 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 319. The state court provided no precedent in support of this sweeping conclusion. In this respect, Emerick
runs counter to the great weight of authority in the state courts and in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals which have held consistently that a minor is capable of assuming the risk of a dangerous activity. See, e.g., Bjorgung , 550 F.3d at 268-69 (quoting Berman , 456 A.2d at 550); Montagazzi , 994 A.2d at 635-36; Berman , 456 A.2d at 550; see also Johnson v. Walker , 376 Pa. Super. 302, 545 A.2d 947, 949-50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).

[*551] The undisputed Rule 56 record establishes beyond debate that Hawkins knew, appreciated, and assumed the risk of injury attending off-road dirt bike riding. He was an experienced dirt bike rider who was fully aware that attempting a jump on a dirt bike carried with it an inexorable risk of injury. And he proceeded to attempt a jump on Switchback’s indoor track notwithstanding that understood risk. Switchback accordingly had no duty to protect Hawkins on January 9, 2016. We will grant summary judgment to Switchback on Hawkins’ negligence claim. Because Durbin’s claim for economic damages is derivative of Hawkins’ individual claim, we will likewise grant summary judgment to Switchback on Durbin’s claim.

IV. Conclusion

We are [**16] not unsympathetic to the serious injuries suffered by Hawkins. But the unequivocal fact remains that Hawkins—having more than a decade of experience riding on similar off-road tracks—voluntarily engaged in the dangerous sport of dirt bike riding knowing full well the risks of the activity. Switchback is not legally responsible for the injuries that Hawkins suffered at its facility. Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment to Switchback on plaintiffs’ negligence claims. An appropriate order shall issue.

/s/ Christopher C. Conner

Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: September 12, 2018

ORDER & JUDGMENT

AND NOW, this 12th day of September, 2018, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-motions (Docs. 27, 31) for summary judgment, and the parties’ briefs in support of and opposition to said motions, (Docs. 29, 33, 36, 38, 41), and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion (Doc. 27) for summary judgment is DENIED.

2. Defendant’s motion (Doc. 31) for summary judgment is GRANTED as follows:

a. Judgment is ENTERED in favor of defendant and against plaintiffs on [**17] the negligence claims set forth in Counts I and II of plaintiffs’ complaint.

b. The negligence per se claim set forth in Count III of plaintiffs’ complaint is DISMISSED.

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

/s/ Christopher C. Conner

Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: September 12, 2018

Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Statute

Posted: May 14, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Pennsylvania | Tags: comparative negligence, contributory negligence, Doctrine of Voluntary Assumption of the Risk, downhill skiing, Intentional Tort, Joint Liability, Negligence, Off Road, Off-Road Vehicle, Off-Road Vehicle Riding, Voluntary Assumption of the Risk | 4 Comments

Pennsylvania Statutes

42 Pa.C.S. JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

Part VII CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS

Chapter 71 GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 7102 Comparative negligence

(a) General rule.–In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.

(a.1) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution.

(1) Where recovery is allowed against more than one person, including actions for strict liability, and where liability is attributed to more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of that defendant’s liability to the amount of liability attributed to all defendants and other persons to whom liability is apportioned under subsection (a.2).

(2) Except as set forth in paragraph (3), a defendant’s liability shall be several and not joint, and the court shall enter a separate and several judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against each defendant for the apportioned amount of that defendant’s liability.

(3) A defendant’s liability in any of the following actions shall be joint and several, and the court shall enter a joint and several judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the total dollar amount awarded as damages:

(i) Intentional misrepresentation.

(ii) An intentional tort.

(iii) Where the defendant has been held liable for not less than 60% of the total liability apportioned to all parties.

(iv) A release or threatened release of a hazardous substance under section 702 of the act of October 18, 1988 (P.L. 756, No. 108) , known as the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act.

(v) A civil action in which a defendant has violated section 497 of the act of April 12, 1951 (P.L. 90, No. 21), known as the Liquor Code.

(4) Where a defendant has been held jointly and severally liable under this subsection and discharges by payment more than that defendant’s proportionate share of the total liability, that defendant is entitled to recover contribution from defendants who have paid less than their proportionate share. Further, in any case, any defendant may recover from any other person all or a portion of the damages assessed that defendant pursuant to the terms of a contractual agreement.

(a.2) Apportionment of responsibility among certain nonparties and effect. –For purposes of apportioning liability only, the question of liability of any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party. A person whose liability may be determined pursuant to this section does not include an employer to the extent that the employer is granted immunity from liability or suit pursuant to the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L. 736, No. 338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act. An attribution of responsibility to any person or entity as provided in this subsection shall not be admissible or relied upon in any other action or proceeding for any purpose. Nothing in this section shall affect the admissibility or nonadmissibility of evidence regarding releases, settlements, offers to compromise or compromises as set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Nothing in this section shall affect the rules of joinder of parties as set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

(b) Deleted by 2011, June 28, P.L. 78, No. 17, § 1, imd. effective.

(b.3) Off-road vehicle riding./para>

(1) Off-road vehicle riding area operators shall have no duty to protect riders from common, frequent, expected and nonnegligent risks inherent to the activity, including collisions with riders or objects.

(2) The doctrine of knowing voluntary assumption of risk shall apply to all actions to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property brought against any off-road vehicle riding area operator.

(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed in any way to abolish or modify a cause of action against a potentially responsible party other than an off-road vehicle riding area operator.

(1) The General Assembly finds that the sport of downhill skiing is practiced by a large number of citizens of this Commonwealth and also attracts to this Commonwealth large numbers of nonresidents significantly contributing to the economy of this Commonwealth. It is recognized that as in some other sports, there are inherent risks in the sport of downhill skiing.

(2) The doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk as it applies to downhill skiing injuries and damages is not modified by subsections (a) and (a.1).

(c.2) Savings provisions.–Nothing in this section shall be construed in any way to create, abolish or modify a cause of action or to limit a party’s right to join another potentially responsible party.

(d) Definitions.–As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:

“Defendant or defendants.” Includes impleaded defendants.

“Off-road vehicle.” A motorized vehicle that is used off-road for sport or recreation. The term includes snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, motorcycles and four-wheel drive vehicles.

“Off-road vehicle riding area.” Any area or facility providing recreational activities for off-road vehicles.

“Off-road vehicle riding area operator.” A person or organization owning or having operational responsibility for any off-road vehicle riding area. The term includes:

(1) Agencies and political subdivisions of this Commonwealth.

(2) Authorities created by political subdivisions.

(3) Private companies.

“Plaintiff.” Includes counter claimants and cross-claimants.

Cite as 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102

History. 1978, April 28, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 10(89), effective June 27, 1978. Amended 1980, Oct. 5, P.L. 693, No. 142, § 222(a), effective in 60 days; 1982, Dec. 20, P.L. 1409, No. 326, art. II, § 201, effective in 60 days; 2002, June 19, P.L. 394, No. 57, § 2, effective in 60 days; 2004, July 15, P.L. 736, No. 87, § 5, imd. effective; 2011, June 28, P.L. 78, No. 17, § 1, imd. effective.

Convoluted procedural issues at the trial court, created a ripe field for confusion, but the appellate court held the release bard the claims of the plaintiff in the skier v. skier collision where the ski resort was also sued.

Posted: April 20, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: active sport, answered, Assumption of risk, assumption of the risk, Collision, complete defense, Damages, defense counsel, Express Assumption of risk, Express Assumption of the Risk, fault, Gross negligence, Inherent Risk, jurors, jury instructions, matter of law, Ordinary Negligence, parties, plaintiffs', Primary Assumption of the Risk, Public Policy, questions, recreational activity, Release, releases, Risks, secondary assumption, Secondary Assumption of the Risk, Skier, skier v. skier, skiing, snow skiing, snowboarding, special verdict, special verdict form, Sport, Trial court, verdict form | Leave a comment

Once the jury found there was no gross negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the release stopped all other claims of the plaintiff.

Tuttle et al., v. Heavenly Valley, L.P., 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 814, 2020 WL 563604

State: California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division

Plaintiff: Grant Tuttle et al

Defendant: Heavenly Valley, L.P.

Plaintiff Claims: negligence

Defendant Defenses: …implied and express assumption of the risk: (1) any injury, loss or damage purportedly sustained… by Plaintiffs was directly and proximately caused and contributed to by risks which are inherent to the activity in which Plaintiffs participated; (2) Plaintiffs either impliedly or expressly relieved Defendant of its duty, if any, to Plaintiffs by knowingly assuming the risk of injury; and (3) defendant is entitled to defense and indemnity of each and every cause of action alleged in the Complaint pursuant to the release agreement signed by Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs’ representative or agent.

Holding: For the Defendant

Year: 2020

Summary

Reading the case is confusing. A lot of the decision revolves around stipulated jury special verdict form and how the case was decided at the trial level after the jury rendered a verdict. The verdict was sort of in favor of the plaintiff; however, the stipulated part of the proceedings were used by the judge to hold for the defendant.

The plaintiff, deceased, season pass holder was hit on the slopes by a snowboarder. Her family sued the snowboarder and the ski area. The jury held the ski area was negligent but not grossly negligent. Because the deceased plaintiff had signed a release, the release stopped the negligence claims.

Facts

The jury found the plaintiff negligent, but not grossly negligent. The judge then ruled the release removed the duty on the party of the defendant so therefore the defendant was not liable.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The appellate court first looked at the release. The first analysis is what made this case stand out.

You cannot sue, because you assume the inherent risks of a sport. Therefore, a release that only protects the defendant from the inherent risks is worthless, as stated by the court.

To help everyone understand the statement above made by the court, the court reviewed Assumption of the Risk under California law.

The California Supreme Court’s decision in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 (Knight) and its progeny have established that a ski resort operator is not liable for injuries caused by risks inherent in the sport of snow skiing. Instead, pursuant to the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, participants in active sports assume responsibility for injuries sustained as a result of the sport’s inherent risks. Stated another way, the defendant owes no duty of care to protect the plaintiff from the inherent risks of an active sport. Because no duty of care is owed and the plaintiff has assumed the risk of injury, no release is necessary to absolve a defendant of liability when a plaintiff is injured as the result of an inherent risk in an active sport such as skiing.

[Emphasize added]

A ski resort operator still owe[s] a duty, however, not to increase the risks of injury beyond those that are inherent in the sport. This distinction is closely tied to the policy underlying the finding of no duty, i.e., there should be no liability imposed which would chill normal participation or fundamentally alter the nature of the sport, but liability may be appropriate where the risk is not inherent’ in the sport. This is the doctrine of secondary assumption of the risk, and it is an exception to the complete defense of primary assumption of risk.

[Emphasize added]

If a defendant increases the risk to participants, then the defendant is liable for any injury to a participant that occurs because of the increase in risk caused by the defendant. However, a participant may still choose to participate and may still be stopped from suing for injuries received from the increased risk if the participants know of the risks and voluntarily assumes the risk. This is called Secondary Assumption of the Risk.

Comparative fault principles apply in secondary assumption of the risk cases. The trier of fact considers the plaintiff’s voluntary action in choosing to engage in an unusually risky sport, whether or not the plaintiff’s decision to encounter the risk should be characterized as unreasonable and weighs it against the defendant’s breach of the duty not to increase the risks beyond those inherent in the active sport. Where a plaintiff’s injury has been caused by both a defendant’s breach of a legal duty to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s voluntary decision to engage in an unusually risky sport, application of comparative fault principles will not operate to relieve either individual of responsibility for his or her actions, but rather will ensure that neither party will escape such responsibility.

Secondary Assumption of the risk is part of the defenses a release provides to a defendant. However, a release provides broader and more defenses then Secondary Assumption of the risk provides. On top of that, by signing a written document, the risk outlined in the release, if any, are assumed by the participant because the document is (and should be) a release and an Express Assumption of the Risk document.

A different analysis applies when a skier signs a written release that expressly holds the ski operator harmless for its own negligence. This triggers the doctrine of express assumption of the risk. Unlike secondary assumption of the risk, but like primary assumption of the risk, the doctrine of express assumption of the risk provides a complete defense in a negligence action.

Not all court think exactly along these lines when reviewing releases. However, many do and all courts reach the same conclusion, just by different legal analysis.

However, unlike both implied primary and secondary assumption of the risk, which focus on risks inherent in an active sport like skiing, express assumption of the risk focuses on the agreement itself. A valid release operates to relieve the defendant of a legal duty to the plaintiff with respect to the risks encompassed by the agreement and, where applicable, to bar completely the plaintiff’s cause of action. The legal issue in an express assumption of the risk case is not whether the particular risk of injury appellant suffered is inherent in the recreational activity to which the Release applies, but simply the scope of the Release.’

[Emphasize added]

Assumption of the risk is a great defense. However, a release provides a greater defense, a better defense and should, if properly written to incorporate the defenses available in all types of assumption of the risk.

Additionally, a plaintiff does not need to have specific knowledge of the particular risk that ultimately caused the injury. If a release of all liability is given, the release applies to any negligence of the defendant [so long as the negligent act that results in injury is] reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is given.’ we have said, [t]he issue is not whether the particular risk of injury is inherent in the recreational activity to which the release applies, but rather the scope of the release.’ ([courts will enforce a skier’s agreement to shoulder the risk’ that otherwise might have been placed on the ski resort operator].)

There is one caveat with all of this. If they actions of the defendant in changing the risk, increase the risk to the level of gross negligence, a release in most states does not act to bar gross negligence.

As a matter of public policy, if a skier proves the operator unreasonably increased the inherent risks to the level of gross negligence, express assumption of the risk is no longer a viable defense; and the operator will be liable for damages notwithstanding the existence of a valid release of liability for ordinary negligence.

The court then summed up its review of the defenses of assumption of the risk and release.

To recap, snow skiing has inherent risks, and a ski operator does not owe skiers any duty to protect against them. If a skier is injured as a result of a risk inherent in the sport, the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk provides a complete defense to a lawsuit against the ski operator. But a ski resort operator owes a duty not to unreasonably increase the risks beyond those inherent in the sport. If a ski operator breaches this duty, the doctrine of secondary assumption of the risk makes the ski resort liable to an injured skier on a comparative fault basis. If the skier executes a release that absolves the ski resort operator of liability for the operator’s negligence, the release is a complete defense, provided the ski operator did not act with gross negligence. That is to say, the ski operator is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the skier has signed a valid release and the ski operator’s conduct, although negligent, was not grossly negligent.

[Emphasize added]

In reviewing the release the appellate court found it stopped the negligence claims of the plaintiff.

The court then applied its ruling on the release to the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant was grossly negligent.

A validly executed express release of liability for a defendant’s ordinary negligence means the only viable theory for a judgment in a plaintiff’s favor is if the defendant acted with gross negligence. There is no inconsistency between findings that a defendant is ordinarily negligent by unreasonably increasing the inherent risks of snow skiing, but not grossly negligent. A finding of gross negligence would necessarily mean a defendant unreasonably increased the inherent risks of snow skiing, so that comparative fault principles apply. But an express release, coupled with an undisputed factual finding that a defendant did not act with gross negligence, necessarily results in a defense judgment.

The rest of the case then goes on to evaluate the appellate court’s findings and the different way the court came to its ruling at the trial court level.

We agree the procedural aspects surrounding the entry of the defense judgment on what appeared to be a plaintiffs’ verdict were unconventional; however, the bottom line is once the jury found no gross negligence, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The defendant won because the jury did not find the defendant was grossly negligent, and the release stopped all other claims of the plaintiff.

So Now What?

There are several things to learn from this case. The first is the intricacies, procedures and rulings that the trial system has, make any trial a nightmare now days. It is nothing like TV, more like a game of war played out on a board with dozens of books or rules that must be consulted before every move.

The second is the value and power of a release. Even after the plaintiff won the trial, the release came back into to play to defeat the claims of the plaintiff.

Thirdly the education the court provided and copies into this post about assumption of the risk as a defense, the different types of assumption of the risk and how your release should incorporate assumption of the risk.

Make sure your release incorporates assumption of the risk language and is written to protect you in the state where you are doing business for the business you are running.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn

If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.

Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law

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Email: Jim@Rec-Law.US

By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

Soderberg v. Anderson, 922 N.W.2d 200, 2019 Minn. LEXIS 32, 2019 WL 287781

Posted: April 16, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Minnesota, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: assume a risk, Assumption of the Risk Doctrine. Comparative Fault, ball, Blind 180, Collisions, Court of Appeals, district court, Doctrine of Primary Assumption of the Risk, Downhill, flying, Hazard, Hockey, instructor, Minnesota Supreme Court, patron's, Primary Assumption of Risk, recreational, rider's, secondary assumption, Secondary Assumption of Risk, Skating, skier v. skier, skier's, skiing, Snowboarder v. Skier, snowboarding, Snowmobiling, Spectator, Sport, Summary judgment, trick | 2 Comments

Soderberg v. Anderson, 922 N.W.2d 200, 2019 Minn. LEXIS 32, 2019 WL 287781

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 23, 2019, Filed

A17-0827

Reporter

922 N.W.2d 200 *; 2019 Minn. LEXIS 32 **; 2019 WL 287781

Julie A. Soderberg, Respondent, vs. Lucas Anderson, Appellant.

Prior History: [**1] Court of Appeals.

Soderberg v. Anderson, 906 N.W.2d 889, 2018 Minn. App. LEXIS 47 (Minn. Ct. App., Jan. 16, 2018)

Disposition: Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Counsel: James W. Balmer, Falsani, Balmer, Peterson & Balmer, Duluth, Minnesota; and Wilbur W. Fluegel, Fluegel Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Nathan T. Cariveau, Eden Prairie, Minnesota; and John M. Bjorkman, Larson King, LLP, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Brian N. Johnson, Peter Gray, Nilan, Johnson, Lewis, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Ski Areas Association.

Peter F. Lindquist, Jardine, Logan & O’Brien, P.L.L.P., Lake Elmo, Minnesota; and Thomas P. Aicher, Cleary Shahi & Aicher, P.C., Rutland, Vermont, for amicus curiae National Ski Areas Association.

Jeffrey J. Lindquist, Pustorino, Tilton, Parrington & Lindquist, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.

Matthew J. Barber, James Ballentine, Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association for Justice.

Judges: Lillehaug, J., Took no part, Anderson, J.

Opinion by: LILLEHAUG

Opinion

[*201] LILLEHAUG, Justice.

In 2016, a ski area outside Duluth, Spirit [**2] Mountain, was the scene of an accident that caused severe injuries to a ski instructor. While teaching a young student, the instructor was struck by an adult snowboarder performing an aerial trick. The instructor sued the snowboarder for negligence, but the district court dismissed her claim based on the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk, which is a complete bar to tort liability. The court of appeals reversed. Soderberg v. Anderson , 906 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. App. 2018). This appeal requires that we decide, for the first time, whether to extend that doctrine to recreational skiing and snowboarding. We decide not to extend it and, therefore, affirm the court of appeals’ decision, though on different grounds.

FACTS

On the morning of January 3, 2016, appellant Lucas Anderson, age 35, went snowboarding at Spirit Mountain near Duluth. Spirit Mountain welcomes both skiers and snowboarders to enjoy runs marked “easiest,” “more difficult,” and “difficult.” [*202] Anderson considered himself to be an expert snowboarder. He began skiing in elementary school and took up snowboarding when he was 15.

When Anderson snowboarded at Spirit Mountain, he typically warmed up by going down less challenging runs. That morning, Anderson went down part of a “more [**3] difficult” run called Scissor Bill, which merges with an “easiest” run called Four Pipe. As he left Scissor Bill and entered Four Pipe, Anderson slowed down, looked up for other skiers and snowboarders coming down the hill, and proceeded downhill.

Anderson then increased his speed, used a hillock as a jump, and performed an aerial trick called a backside 180. To perform the trick, Anderson—riding his snowboard “regular”—went airborne, turned 180 degrees clockwise, and prepared to land “goofy.”1 Halfway through the trick, Anderson’s back was fully facing downhill. He could not see what was below him.

Respondent Julie Soderberg was below him. A ski instructor employed by Spirit Mountain, she was giving a lesson to a six-year-old child in an area of Four Pipe marked “slow skiing area.” At the moment when Anderson launched his aerial trick, Soderberg’s student was in the center of the run. Soderberg was approximately 10 to 15 feet downhill from, and to the left of, her student. She was looking over her right shoulder at her student.

As Anderson came down from his aerial maneuver, he landed on Soderberg, hitting her behind her left shoulder. Soderberg lost consciousness upon impact. She sustained [**4] serious injuries.

Soderberg sued Anderson for negligence. Anderson moved for summary judgment, arguing that, based on undisputed facts and the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk, he owed Soderberg no duty of care and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted summary judgment in Anderson’s favor.

The court of appeals reversed and remanded. Soderberg , 906 N.W.2d at 894. Based on its own precedent of Peterson ex rel. Peterson v. Donahue , 733 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007), the court of appeals assumed that the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk generally applies to actions between skiers. Soderberg , 906 N.W.2d at 892. The court then held that material fact issues precluded summary judgment as to whether Soderberg appreciated the risk that she could be crushed from above in a slow skiing area, and whether Anderson’s conduct “enlarged the inherent risks of skiing.” Id. at 893-94. Concluding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Anderson, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 894. We granted Anderson’s petition for review and directed the parties to specifically address whether Minnesota should continue to recognize the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk.

ANALYSIS

Anderson argues that he [**5] owed no duty of care to Soderberg based on the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk. HN1[] The doctrine of primary assumption of risk is part of our common law. Springrose v. Willmore , 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827-28 (Minn. [*203] 1971). The application or extension of our common law is a question of law that we review de novo. See Gieseke ex rel. Diversified Water Diversion, Inc. v. IDCA, Inc., 844 N.W.2d 210, 214 (Minn. 2014).

In Springrose, we clarified the distinction between primary and secondary assumption of risk. HN2[] Secondary assumption of risk is an affirmative defense that may be invoked when the plaintiff has unreasonably and voluntarily chosen to encounter a known and appreciated danger created by the defendant’s negligence. Springrose , 192 N.W.2d at 827. Secondary assumption of risk is “an aspect of contributory negligence,” and is part of the calculation of comparative fault. Id.

By contrast, primary assumption of risk is not a defense and applies only in limited circumstances. Daly v. McFarland , 812 N.W.2d 113, 120-21 (Minn. 2012); Springrose , 192 N.W.2d at 827 (explaining that primary assumption of risk “is not . . . an affirmative defense”). Unlike secondary assumption, primary assumption of risk “completely bars a plaintiff’s claim because it negates the defendant’s duty of care to the plaintiff.” Daly , 812 N.W.2d at 119. Therefore, primary assumption of risk precludes liability for negligence, Springrose , 192 N.W.2d at 827, and is not part of the calculation of comparative fault. Primary assumption [**6] of risk “arises ‘only where parties have voluntarily entered a relationship in which plaintiff assumes well-known, incidental risks.'” Bjerke v. Johnson , 742 N.W.2d 660, 669 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Olson v. Hansen , 299 Minn. 39, 216 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Minn. 1974)); see Armstrong v. Mailand , 284 N.W.2d 343, 351 (Minn. 1979) (noting that the application of primary assumption of risk “is dependent upon the plaintiff’s manifestation of consent, express or implied, to relieve the defendant of a duty”).

Here, the parties agree that Soderberg did not expressly assume the risk of being hit by Anderson. So the issue is whether she assumed the risk by implication.

We first considered the applicability of the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk to sporting events in Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n , 122 Minn. 327, 142 N.W. 706 (Minn. 1913), a case in which a spectator at a baseball game was injured by a fly ball. Id. at 707. We rejected the proposition that spectators assume the risk of injury if seated behind the protective screen between home plate and the grandstand. Id. at 707-08. We determined that the ball club was “bound to exercise reasonable care” to protect them by furnishing screens of sufficient size. Id. at 708 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nineteen years later, we held that a spectator assumed the risk of injury of being hit by a foul ball by sitting outside the screened-in area. Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n , 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903, 904 (Minn. 1932). We concluded that the ball club had provided [**7] enough screened-in seating “for the most dangerous part of the grand stand.” Id. We later clarified in Aldes v. Saint Paul Ball Club, Inc., 251 Minn. 440, 88 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. 1958), that HN3[] a baseball patron “assumes only the risk of injury from hazards inherent in the sport, not the risk of injury arising from the proprietor’s negligence.” Id. at 97. Thus, the doctrine applies to “hazards inherent in the sport.” Id.

We applied our flying-baseball cases to flying golf balls in Grisim v. TapeMark Charity Pro-Am Golf Tournament , 415 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. 1987). We held that injury from a flying golf ball was an inherent danger of the sport. Id. at 875. The tournament’s sole duty, we said, was to provide the spectator with “a reasonable [*204] opportunity to view the participants from a safe area.” Id. But we did not say that recreational golfing negligence claims are barred by the doctrine. Nor did we cast doubt on our decision in Hollinbeck v. Downey , 261 Minn. 481, 113 N.W.2d 9, 12-13 (Minn. 1962), which held that if a golfer knows that another person is in the zone of danger, the golfer should either give the other a warning or desist from striking the ball. See Grisim , 415 N.W.2d at 875-76 (distinguishing the facts in Grisim from those in Hollinbeck , 113 N.W.2d at 12-13, and therefore declining to apply Hollinbeck).

We have also extended the doctrine to two forms of ice skating: hockey and figure skating. Flying pucks are part of the inherently dangerous game of hockey, we held in Modec v. City of Eveleth , 224 Minn. 556, 29 N.W.2d 453, 456-57 (Minn. 1947). We stated [**8] that “[a]ny person of ordinary intelligence cannot watch a game of hockey for any length of time without realizing the risks involved to players and spectators alike.” Id. at 455.2

We applied the doctrine to recreational figure skating in Moe v. Steenberg , 275 Minn. 448, 147 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1966), in which one ice skater sued another for injuries arising out of a collision on the ice. Id. at 588. We held that the plaintiff “‘assumed risks that were inherent in the sport or amusement in which she was engaged, such as falls and collisions with other skaters. . . .'” Id. at 589 (quoting Schamel v. St. Louis Arena Corp., 324 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959)). But we excluded from the doctrine skating that is “so reckless or inept as to be wholly unanticipated.” Id. Along the same lines, in Wagner v. Thomas J. Obert Enterprises , 396 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. 1986), we counted roller skating among other “inherently dangerous sporting events” in which participants assume the risks inherent in the sport. Id. at 226. We made clear, however, that “[n]egligent maintenance and supervision of a skating rink are not inherent risks of the sport itself.” Id.

Recreational snowmobiling, though, is a different matter. HN4[] We have consistently declined to apply the doctrine to bar claims arising out of collisions between snowmobilers. In Olson v. Hansen , 299 Minn. 39, 216 N.W.2d 124 (Minn. 1974), we observed that, although snowmobiles can tip or roll, such a hazard “is one that can be successfully [**9] avoided. A snowmobile, carefully operated, is no more hazardous than an automobile, train, or taxi.” Id. at 128. Similarly, we “refused to relieve [a] defendant of the duty to operate his snowmobile reasonably and analyzed the defendant’s conduct under the doctrine of secondary assumption of risk.” Daly v. McFarland, 812 N.W.2d, 113, 120-21 (Minn. 2012) (citing Carpenter v. Mattison , 300 Minn. 273, 219 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Minn. 1974)). In 2012, we reaffirmed that snowmobiling is not an inherently dangerous sporting activity. Id. at 121−22.

The closest we have come to discussing the application of implied primary assumption of risk to recreational downhill skiing was in Seidl v. Trollhaugen, Inc., 305 Minn. 506, 232 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1975). That case involved a claim by a ski area patron who had been struck by a ski instructor. Id. at 239-40. The cause of action arose before Springrose. Id. at 240 n.1. We did not analyze the question of whether the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applied to recreational skiing and snowboarding. See id. at 240 & n.1. Instead, we affirmed the district court’s decision not to submit to the jury, for lack of evidence, the [*205] issue of secondary assumption of risk. Id. at 240-41.

With this case law in mind, we turn now to the question of whether to follow the example of the court of appeals in Peterson , 733 N.W.2d 790, and extend the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk to recreational downhill skiing and snowboarding.3 To do so would relieve [**10] skiers and snowboarders (collectively, “skiers”) of any duty of care owed to others while engaged in their activity. We decide not to do so, for three reasons.

First, although there is no question that skiers can and do collide with one another, the record does not substantiate that injurious collisions between skiers are so frequent and damaging that they must be considered inherent in the sport. As the National Ski Areas Association has recognized through its seven-point Responsibility Code (adopted by Spirit Mountain), skiing and snowboarding contain “elements of risk,” but “common sense and personal awareness can help reduce” them. This recognition counsels against a flat no-duty rule that would benefit those who ski negligently. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, HN5[] “If skiers act in accordance with the rules and general practices of the sport, at reasonable speeds, and with a proper lookout for others on the slopes, the vast majority of contact between participants will be eliminated. The same may not be said of soccer, football, basketball and hockey . . . .” Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 269 Conn. 672, 849 A.2d 813, 832 (Conn. 2004). We relied on similar reasoning in our line of recreational snowmobiling cases, in which we noted that [**11] the hazard “is one that can be successfully avoided.” Olson , 216 N.W.2d at 128.

Second, even though today we do not overrule our precedent regarding flying sports objects and slippery rinks, we are loathe to extend the doctrine of implied primary assumption to yet another activity. HN6[] “The doctrine of assumption of risk is not favored, and should be limited rather than extended.” Suess v. Arrowhead Steel Prods. Co., 180 Minn. 21, 230 N.W. 125, 126 (Minn. 1930). Our most recent case considering implied primary assumption of risk, Daly, reflects that reluctance.4 See 812 N.W.2d at 119-22. Similarly, the nationwide trend has been toward the abolition or limitation of the common-law doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk. See Leavitt v. Gillaspie , 443 P.2d 61, 68 (Alaska 1968); 1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. WLB Grp., Inc., 219 Ariz. 200, 196 P.3d 222, 226-28 (Ariz. 2008); Dawson v. Fulton , 294 Ark. 624, 745 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Ark. 1988); P.W. v. Children’s Hosp. Colo., 364 P.3d 891, 895-99, 2016 CO 6 (Colo. 2016); Blackburn v. Dorta , 348 So. 2d 287, 291-92 (Fla. 1977); Salinas v. Vierstra , 107 Idaho 984, 695 P.2d 369, 374-75 (Idaho 1985); Pfenning v. Lineman , 947 N.E.2d 392, 403-04 (Ind. 2011); Simmons v. Porter , 298 Kan. 299, 312 P.3d 345, 354-55 (Kan. 2013); Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1132-33 (La. 1988); Wilson [*206] v. Gordon , 354 A.2d 398, 401-02 (Me. 1976); Abernathy v. Eline Oil Field Servs., Inc., 200 Mont. 205, 650 P.2d 772, 775-76 (Mont. 1982) (holding that “the doctrine of implied assumption of risk is no longer applicable in Montana”); McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238, 239-41 (N.J. 1963); Iglehart v. Iglehart , 2003 ND 154, 670 N.W.2d 343, 349-50 (N.D. 2003); Christensen v. Murphy , 296 Ore. 610, 678 P.2d 1210, 1216-18 (Or. 1984); Perez v. McConkey , 872 S.W.2d 897, 905−06 (Tenn. 1994); Nelson v. Great E. Resort Mgmt., Inc., 265 Va. 98, 574 S.E.2d 277, 280-82 (Va. 2003); King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 182 W. Va. 276, 387 S.E.2d 511, 517-19 (W. Va. 1989) (modifying the defense “to bring it in line with the doctrine of comparative contributory negligence”); Polsky v. Levine , 73 Wis. 2d 547, 243 N.W.2d 503, 505-06 (Wis. 1976); O’Donnell v. City of Casper , 696 P.2d 1278, 1281−84 (Wyo. 1985).

Third, we are not persuaded that, if we do not apply the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk to recreational downhill skiing and snowboarding, Minnesotans will be deterred from vigorously participating and ski operators will be adversely affected. No evidence in the record suggests that the prospect of negligent [**12] patrons being held liable chills participation in skiing and snowboarding. Logically, it seems just as likely that the prospect of an absolute bar to recovery could deter the participation of prospective victims of negligent patrons.5

Although we decline to further extend the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk, we also decline to overrule our precedent by abolishing the doctrine in its entirety. We ordered briefing on the question of abolition, and we appreciate the well-researched submissions and arguments of the parties and amici. But, as we said in Daly, in which we declined to extend the doctrine to snowmobiling, “‘[w]e are extremely reluctant to overrule our precedent . . . . ‘” 812 N.W.2d at 121 (quoting State v. Martin , 773 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2009)). And we still see a role—limited as it may be—for this common-law doctrine in cases involving the sports to which it has been applied.

Because we decline to extend the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk to recreational downhill skiing and snowboarding, we need not reach the question of whether the court of appeals, which assumed the doctrine applied,6 erroneously concluded that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. Instead, we affirm the court [**13] of appeals’ disposition—reversal and remand—on a different ground.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Under California law, increasing the risk or changing the inherent risk of a sport or race eliminates the defense of assumption of the risk. Defendant found grossly negligent in its course design.

Posted: April 13, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Racing | Tags: Assumption of the Risk Doctrine. Comparative Fault, competitors, cones, contends, crash, elimination, elite, exit, Gross negligence, Inherent Risk, lanes, left turn, map, Marathon, material fact, matter of law, racecourse, racers, Racing, Risks, speed, Sport, street, substantial evidence, Traffic, turn-by-turn, undisputed, vehicle traffic, video, west lane, wheelchair | Leave a comment

Wheel chair racer able to recover from the race organizer when he rode off the course after relying on the map and virtual tour the course director had created.

Blanchette v. Competitor Group, Inc., 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7714, 2019 WL 6167131

State: California: California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Plaintiff: Craig Blanchette

Defendant: Competitor Group, Inc

Plaintiff Claims:

Defendant Defenses:

Holding: For the Plaintiff

Year: 2019

Summary

A wheel chair racer was injured when the course was changed after the wheelchair racer had reviewed the map and the virtual tour of the course. Because the defendant had substantially increased the risk to the racers by changing the course, the defense of assumption of the risk was not available to the defendant.

Facts

Plaintiff Craig Blanchette (Plaintiff), then an elite wheelchair racer, competed in the 2014 San Diego Rock ‘n’ Roll Marathon (Marathon), which was owned and operated by defendant Competitor Group, Inc. (Defendant). During the race, Plaintiff was injured as he attempted a 90 degree left-hand turn, could not complete the turn, went through the orange traffic cones that marked the course boundary, and crashed into a car stopped at a traffic light in a lane outside the course.

Following a jury trial on one cause of action for gross negligence, the court entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $3.2 million.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The defendant argued at the appellate court that the plaintiff failed to establish gross negligence and that the defendant did not unreasonably increase the risk to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff did not unreasonably increase the risk to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff assumed the risk and could not recover for his injuries.

Under these standards, as we will explain, substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings both that Defendant was grossly negligent (i.e., Plaintiff proved Defendant’s extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care) and that Plaintiff did not assume the risk of the injury he suffered (i.e., Defendant failed to prove that it did not unreasonably increase the risks to Plaintiff over and above those inherent in wheelchair racing)

The court first looked at the issue of whether or not the defendant was grossly negligent.

Ordinary negligence “consists of a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would employ to protect others from harm.” ‘[M]ere nonfeasance, such as the failure to discover a dangerous condition or to perform a duty, ‘” amounts to ordinary negligence.'” In contrast, to establish gross negligence, a plaintiff must prove “either a ‘want of even scant care’ or ‘an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.’

California does not recognize gross negligence.

Rather, as our Supreme Court explained, “the distinction between ‘ordinary and gross negligence’ reflects ‘a rule of policy’ that harsher legal consequences should flow when negligence is aggravated instead of merely ordinary.”

So even though California does not recognize gross negligence as a claim, it is defined as something falling short of reckless disregard of consequences and generates a harsher legal consequence. Whether that is defined as more money is not defined in the decision.

On appeal, the appellate court must look at the facts in favor of the plaintiff. Reviewing the facts and the jury’s decision, the court found there was enough evidence to support the jury’s conclusion. “Defendant’s behavior was an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.”

Although California does not support gross negligence, according to this decision, the court found, the plaintiff proved the defendant was grossly negligent.

The court then looked at assumption of the risk.

Primary assumption of risk, when applicable, “completely bars the plaintiff’s recovery,” whereas secondary assumption of risk” ‘is merged into the comparative fault scheme, and the trier of fact, in apportioning the loss resulting from the injury, may consider the relative responsibility of the parties.'” The presence or absence of duty determines whether an application of the defense will result in a complete bar (primary assumption of the risk) or merely a determination of comparative fault (secondary assumption of the risk).

There is no duty to reduce the inherent risks in sports. Requiring a mitigation of the inherent risks of sports would alter the nature of the game.

The test for whether primary assumption of risk applies is whether the activity” ‘involv[es] an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants… where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity.'” “The test is objective; it ‘depends on the nature of the sport or activity in question and on the parties’ general relationship to the activity’ rather than ‘the particular plaintiff’s subjective knowledge and awareness[.]'”

There are three factors to be determined by the trial court in reviewing the defense of assumption of the risk. “…whether an activity is an active sport, the inherent risks of that sport, and whether the defendant has increased the risks of the activity beyond the risks inherent in the sport.”

The defendant argued it did not do anything to increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff. The defendant defined the risk as: “The pertinent inherent risk was that [P]laintiff would attempt to turn a corner at too high a speed, run off the race course, and crash.”

The court again found the plaintiff’s argument convincing. The actions of the defendant did increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff.

[Defendant] increased the risks inherent in wheelchair racing in multiple ways, including: (1) by failing to indicate on the basic course map provided to all competitors that the outside lane of 11th Avenue (the necessary ‘exit lane’ for a fast-moving wheelchair) would not be available on race day (or by failing to at least direct competitors to its much-heralded turn-by-turn directions for information regarding lane closures); (2) by affirmatively representing to racers through its ‘virtual tour’ that all lanes on 11th Avenue would be available to complete that turn; (3) by removing 13 feet… of the roadway from the critical ‘exit lane’ about an hour before the race began without ever alerting at least the… wheelchair racers to this change; and (4) by [f]ailing to take other necessary precautions (for instance, with announcements, required tours, better barricades, bigger signs, or sufficient spotters) to advise racers of that particularly precarious intersection.”

The bigger issue was the defendant changed the course from what was shown on the map and the virtual tour. The changes made by the defendant occurred where the plaintiff crashed.

According to Plaintiff, an hour before the race began with the wheelchair competitors already at the starting line; Defendant increased the risks by: eliminating the west lane of 11th Avenue, whereas the basic course map and virtual tour video did not indicate the loss of a lane; and allowing vehicle traffic in the west lane of 11th Avenue, where wheelchair racers would ordinarily complete their left turns from B Street, separating the racecourse from vehicle traffic by plastic traffic cones placed 15 feet apart.

Because there was a difference of opinion, because each side had plausible arguments to sort its theory of the case, the facts must be decided by the trier of fact, the jury. Because there was enough evidence to support the jury’s conclusion, the decision of the jury would be upheld on appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant did not meet its burden of establishing, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff assumed the risk of the injuries he sustained by competing as a wheelchair racer at the Marathon.

So Now What?

Simply, the defendant had created a course, mapped it and provided a video tour of the course to the racers. The racer’s relied on the map and video tour of the course. When the course was changed it increased the risk to the racers causing injury.

When you provide information to guests, you must expect them to rely on that information and the information is wrong, you are possibly liable for any injury arising from the changes, or the increased risk of harm to the participants.

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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss

Tuttle et al., v. Heavenly Valley, L.P., 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 814, 2020 WL 563604

Posted: April 9, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: active sport, answered, Assumption of risk, assumption of the risk, Collision, complete defense, Damages, defense counsel, Express Assumption of risk, Express Assumption of the Risk, fault, Gross negligence, Inherent Risk, jurors, jury instructions, matter of law, Ordinary Negligence, parties, plaintiffs', Primary Assumption of the Risk, Public Policy, questions, recreational activity, Release, releases, Risks, secondary assumption, Secondary Assumption of the Risk, Skier, skier v. skier, skiing, snow skiing, snowboarding, special verdict, special verdict form, Sport, Trial court, verdict form | 2 Comments

Tuttle et al., v. Heavenly Valley, L.P., 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 814, 2020 WL 563604

Grant Tuttle et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Heavenly Valley, L.P., Defendant and Respondent.

G056427

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division

February 5, 2020

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Appeal from a judgment and postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 30-2015- 00813230 Nathan R. Scott, Judge. Affirmed.

The Simon Law Group, Thomas J. Conroy; Williams Iagmin and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Steven R. Parminter, Patrick M. Kelly and John J. Immordino for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

DUNNING, J. [*]

INTRODUCTION

Skier and Heavenly Valley season passholder Dana Tuttle died after she and a snowboarder collided at Heavenly Valley’s resort in South Lake Tahoe. Tuttle’s spouse and sons sued Heavenly Valley and the snowboarder.[ 1] Defendant asserted as defenses the doctrines of primary assumption of the risk, on the ground Tuttle’s accident was the result of the inherent risks of skiing, and express assumption of the risk, based on Tuttle’s signed release of all claims and liability for defendant’s negligence.

The trial court determined as a matter of law the release was unambiguous and covered Tuttle’s accident. Despite these conclusions, the jury was still asked to decide whether defendant ;unreasonably increased the risks… over and above those inherent in the sport of skiing. The jury found defendant did, but unanimously agreed defendant did not act with gross negligence. Finding Tuttle and defendant each 50 percent at fault, the jury awarded plaintiffs substantial damages.

Plaintiffs appeal, but do not challenge the jury instructions, the special verdict form, or the finding that defendant did not act with gross negligence. Plaintiffs urge this court to (1) review the release do novo and conclude it does not cover Tuttle’s accident, (2) hold the release violates public policy, (3) find that defendant invited errors in the special verdict form and jury instructions and forfeited the opportunity for entry of judgment in its favor without first formally moving for JNOV, and (4) order a new trial. We find no error, however, and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

THE RELEASE

On September 2, 2013, Tuttle purchased a season ski pass from defendant and executed a release.[ 2] The release begins with an all-capital advisement: WARNING, ASSUMPTION OF RISK, RELEASE OF LIABILITY INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT PLEASE READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING. THIS IS A RELEASE OF LIABILITY WAIVER OF CERTAIN LEGAL RIGHTS. Salient provisions of the release are found in paragraphs 1, 2, 5, 6, and 13.

In paragraph 1, Tuttle acknowledged snow skiing can be HAZARDOUS AND INVOLVES THE RISK OF PHYSICAL INJURY AND/OR DEATH. In paragraph 2, she ASSUME[D] ALL RISKS… known or unknown, inherent or otherwise [associated with skiing at the resort, including] falling; slick or uneven surfaces; surface and subsurface snow conditions;… variations in terrain; design and condition of man-made facilities and/or terrain features;… [and] collisions. Paragraph 5 advised: The description of the risks listed above is not complete and participating in the Activities may be dangerous and may also include risks which are inherent and/or which cannot be reasonably avoided without changing the nature of the Activities.

Paragraph 6 included Tuttle’s express agreement NOT TO SUE AND TO RELEASE [DEFENDANT] FROM ALL LIABILITY… for… injury or loss to [her], including death. This paragraph specifically advised that Tuttle was releasing all CLAIMS BASED ON [DEFENDANT’S] ALLEGED OR ACTUAL NEGLIGENCE…. In paragraph 13, Tuttle agreed the release was binding to the fullest extent permitted by law… on [her] heirs, next of kin, executors and personal representatives.

II.

THE ACCIDENT AND THE LAWSUIT

Plaintiffs sued defendant and Slater.[ 3] Defendant raised the defenses of implied and express assumption of the risk: (1) any injury, loss or damage purportedly sustained… by Plaintiffs was directly and proximately caused and contributed to by risks which are inherent to the activity in which Plaintiffs participated; (2) Plaintiffs either impliedly or expressly relieved Defendant of its duty, if any, to Plaintiffs by knowingly assuming the risk of injury; and (3) defendant is entitled to defense and indemnity of each and every cause of action alleged in the Complaint pursuant to the release agreement signed by Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs’ representative or agent.

III.

THE JURY TRIAL

The jury trial spanned five weeks.[ 4] The week before jury selection, the parties stipulated to a special verdict form that posed two liability questions: (1) whether defendant unreasonably increased the risks to Tuttle over and above those inherent in the sport of skiing and (2) whether defendant was grossly negligent. The special verdict form further instructed the jury that if it answered yes to either question, it was to make findings regarding the amount of damages and allocation of fault. Before the final witness concluded his testimony, the trial court confirmed that counsel were not making any changes to the special verdict form.

The following day, at the close of evidence and outside the jurors’ presence, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict and defendant’s renewed motion for nonsuit.[ 5] The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ argument the release was fatally ambiguous with regard to the risks involved in the accident. Given the absence of competent extrinsic evidence regarding the release, the trial court determined its interpretation presented a legal question for the court: So I will construe the release, relying on its plain language. I find that it is not ambiguous. It covers the risks here, most notably in paragraph 2 where it covers risks regarding design and collision, and later where it notes that the risks include injury, including death.

In the trial court’s own words, the finding as a matter of law that the release unambiguously discharged defendant from liability for its own ordinary negligence meant we still have questions for the jury about whether the contract was entered into and whether the defendant[] committed gross negligence that cannot be released. For these reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict is denied.

The rulings prompted defendant’s counsel to suggest additional jury instructions and a revision to the special verdict form might be necessary to address the fact issues surrounding Tuttle’s execution of the release. The following colloquy then ensued: [Plaintiffs’ counsel]: Your Honor I’ll shortcut the whole thing. With the court’s ruling, I’ll stipulate to the formation of the contract and proceed with the verdict form as is, so no need for additional instructions. [¶] [Defendant’s counsel]: I’m sorry. To be clear, we have a stipulation that the contract existed and that the contract included the release and waiver language? [¶] [Plaintiffs’ counsel]: Right. The release and-release of liability and waiver was executed-existed and was executed. That’s the stipulation. [¶] [Defendant’s counsel]: Accepted, your Honor. [¶] The Court: So stipulated. (Italics added.)

At this point, the jurors returned to the courtroom. The trial court read the jury instructions, and plaintiffs’ counsel began his closing argument. He had this to say about the release: What we’re talking about here, the liability of the resort does not fall under this release. And you are not going to be asked any questions on the verdict form about the release. Yeah, [Tuttle] signed one, and she understood the inherent risks of skiing, and that’s what the release releases. It does not release gross negligence. It does not release what we’re talking about.

At the beginning of the afternoon session, before defendant’s closing argument, the trial court and counsel met again outside the jurors’ presence to discuss the stipulation concerning the release. Plaintiffs’ counsel maintained the jury should not hear about the stipulation. When the trial court repeated its concern the jury could end up finding that the release was not valid and invited counsel to revisit the special verdict form, plaintiffs’ counsel replied there was no need as the release in evidence releases negligence. And the questions on the verdict form go[] to gross negligence, and-this doesn’t have to do with the release, but the increase of unreasonable risk. Defendant’s counsel remarked the dialogue this morning, your Honor, was prompted in part by the plaintiffs’ desire not to have to modify further the special verdict form. Plaintiffs’ counsel concurred: Right. Counsel then agreed the stipulation would not be read to the jury.

Closing arguments continued. Defendant’s counsel did not mention the release in his closing argument. Neither did plaintiffs’ counsel in his rebuttal argument. There, he referred to the special verdict form and told the jurors, [a]t the end of the day, it’s a simple exercise. That jury form…. [¶]… If you perceive wrong on the part of [defendant], you tick those two boxes. And there’s two of them-you tick them both. Procedurally, you tick the one about increased unreasonable risk, and then you tick the one about gross negligence. If you perceive wrong, that’s what you do.

The jury was never told the release provided a complete defense to defendant’s ordinary negligence.

IV.

THE SPECIAL VERDICT

3. Did Heavenly Valley do something or fail to do something that unreasonably increased the risks to Dana Tuttle over and above those inherent in the sport of skiing?

Yes X No __

4. Was Heavenly Valley grossly negligent in doing something or failing to do something that caused harm to Dana Tuttle?

Yes __ No X

If you answered Yes’ to either question 3 or 4, then answer question 5. [¶] If you answered No’ to both questions 3 and 4, and also answered No’ to either question 1 or 2, then sign and return this verdict form. You do not need to answer any more questions.

If you answered Yes’ to both questions 1 and 2, and answered No’ to both questions 3 and 4, insert the number 0′ next to Heavenly Valley’s name in question 11, skip question 5, and answer questions 6-11.

5. Was Heavenly Valley’s conduct a substantial factor in causing harm to Dana Tuttle?

Yes X No __

Because the jury answered yes to question 5, it was instructed to answer the remaining questions. The jury determined plaintiffs’ damages were $2, 131, 831, with Tuttle and defendant sharing equal responsibility.

ENTRY OF A DEFENSE JUDGMENT

At the trial court’s direction, plaintiffs’ counsel prepared a proposed judgment awarding plaintiffs $1, 065, 915.50, plus costs and interest. Defendant objected on the basis the jury found defendant was not grossly negligent and the release provided a complete and total defense to this entire lawsuit and Plaintiffs should take nothing.[ 6]

After briefing and a hearing, the trial court sustained defendant’s objection to plaintiffs’ proposed judgment. In its March 9, 2018 order, the trial court reiterated its finding as a matter of law that Tuttle’s release clearly, unambiguously, and explicitly released defendant from future liability for any negligence against Dana Tuttle. The trial court explained its earlier finding concerning the scope of the release still left open fact questions as to whether Tuttle knowingly accepted the release agreement and, if she did, whether defendant acted with gross negligence. With the parties’ stipulation that Tuttle knowingly executed the release and the jury’s factual finding that defendant did not act with gross negligence, the trial court further explained there was only one legal conclusion: [D]efendant has prevailed on the express assumption issue and negate[d] the defendant’s duty of care, an element of the plaintiff’s case.’

The trial court acknowledged the structure of the special verdict form erroneously directed the jury to continue to answer questions on damages after finding defendant had not been grossly negligent. The trial court found, however, the jury’s specific finding that defendant did not act with gross negligence was not inconsistent with, but instead overrode, the award of damages.

The trial court did not invite defendant to file a motion for JNOV or call for the filing of such a motion on its own initiative. Instead, it entered judgment in favor of defendant.

VI.

PLAINTIFFS’ POSTJUDGMENT MOTIONS

The defense judgment reiterated the jury’s special verdict findings and stated in relevant part: It appearing that by reason of those special verdicts, and the Court’s interpretation of the terms of the legal contract in Decedent Dana Tuttle’s season ski pass agreement, and [the] legal conclusions as set forth in that certain Order entered on March 9, 2018, Defendants Heavenly Valley L.P., and Anthony Slater are entitled to judgment on Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Some capitalization omitted.)

Plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 663 on the ground the judgment was not consistent with the special verdict and adversely affected plaintiffs’ substantial rights. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial, on the grounds there was insufficient evidence defendant had not acted with gross negligence, [ 7] the special verdict was hopelessly contradictory because the jury’s gross negligence finding imposed no liability, but its apportionment of fault between Tuttle and defendant did, and defendant invited errors.

The trial court denied plaintiffs’ postjudgment motions. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

THE RELEASE COVERED TUTTLE’S ACCIDENT.

The trial court found as a matter of law that defendant’s release was not ambiguous and covered Tuttle’s accident. Our review of the release is de novo. (Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 748, 754.) No extrinsic evidence concerning the meaning of the release was presented in the trial court, so the scope of a release is determined by [its] express language. (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1357 (Benedek).)

Rather than a straightforward argument the trial court erred as a matter of law in interpreting the release, plaintiffs contend the release was narrow in scope and applied only to risks inherent in the sport of snow skiing. But a release that applies only to the inherent risks of a sport is the legal equivalent of no release at all. (Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1490 (Cohen); Zipusch v. LA Workout, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1291 (Zipusch).) To understand the distinction, we detour briefly to discuss the doctrines of implied and express assumption of the risk.

OVERVIEW: ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK

The California Supreme Court’s decision in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 (Knight)[ 8] and its progeny have established that a ski resort operator is not liable for injuries caused by risks inherent in the sport of snow skiing.[ 9] Instead, pursuant to the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, participants in active sports assume responsibility for injuries sustained as a result of the sport’s inherent risks. (Id. at p. 321.) Stated another way, the defendant owes no duty of care to protect the plaintiff from the inherent risks of an active sport. (Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1367 (Allan).) Because no duty of care is owed and the plaintiff has assumed the risk of injury, no release is necessary to absolve a defendant of liability when a plaintiff is injured as the result of an inherent risk in an active sport such as skiing.

A ski resort operator still owe[s] a duty, however, not to increase the risks of injury beyond those that are inherent in the sport. This distinction is closely tied to the policy underlying the finding of no duty, i.e., there should be no liability imposed which would chill normal participation or fundamentally alter the nature of the sport, but liability may be appropriate where the risk is not inherent’ in the sport. (Allan, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1367, italics omitted.) This is the doctrine of secondary assumption of the risk, and it is an exception to the complete defense of primary assumption of risk. (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 308.)

Comparative fault principles apply in secondary assumption of the risk cases. The trier of fact considers the plaintiff’s voluntary action in choosing to engage in an unusually risky sport, whether or not the plaintiff’s decision to encounter the risk should be characterized as unreasonable and weighs it against the defendant’s breach of the duty not to increase the risks beyond those inherent in the active sport. (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 314.) Where a plaintiff’s injury has been caused by both a defendant’s breach of a legal duty to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s voluntary decision to engage in an unusually risky sport, application of comparative fault principles will not operate to relieve either individual of responsibility for his or her actions, but rather will ensure that neither party will escape such responsibility. (Ibid.; see Allan, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1367.)

However, unlike both implied primary and secondary assumption of the risk, which focus on risks inherent in an active sport like skiing, express assumption of the risk focuses on the agreement itself. A valid release operates to relieve the defendant of a legal duty to the plaintiff with respect to the risks encompassed by the agreement and, where applicable, to bar completely the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 309, fn. 4, italics added.) The legal issue in an express assumption of the risk case is not whether the particular risk of injury appellant suffered is inherent in the recreational activity to which the Release applies [citations], but simply the scope of the Release.’ (Hass, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 27.)

Additionally, a plaintiff does not need to have specific knowledge of the particular risk that ultimately caused the injury. [Citation.] If a release of all liability is given, the release applies to any negligence of the defendant [so long as the negligent act that results in injury is] reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is given.’ [Citation.]’ [Citation.] As we have said, [t]he issue is not whether the particular risk of injury is inherent in the recreational activity to which the release applies, but rather the scope of the release.’ (Cohen, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485; see Allan, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374 [courts will enforce a skier’s agreement to shoulder the risk’ that otherwise might have been placed on the ski resort operator].)

There is an outer limit to the scope of a release from liability for one’s own negligence in the recreational sports context: As a matter of public policy, if a skier proves the operator unreasonably increased the inherent risks to the level of gross negligence, express assumption of the risk is no longer a viable defense; and the operator will be liable for damages notwithstanding the existence of a valid release of liability for ordinary negligence. (See City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 777 (Santa Barbara).)

ANALYSIS

The parties stipulated Tuttle executed the release with full knowledge of its content; consequently, the validity of the release is not before us. The jury unanimously agreed defendant’s conduct did not constitute gross negligence, and plaintiffs do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support that finding; thus, no public policy considerations preclude its enforcement. Our only concern is whether the release in this case negated the duty element of plaintiffs’ causes of action.’ (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 708, 719.) If so, it applied to any ordinary negligence by defendant. (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357.)

Defendant’s release did precisely that. Tuttle assumed ALL RISKS associated with [skiing], known or unknown, inherent or otherwise. She also agreed not to sue defendant and to release it FROM ALL LIABILITY… BASED ON [DEFENDANT’S] ALLEGED OR ACTUAL NEGLIGENCE. No more was required.

Defendant’s use of the phrase, inherent or otherwise did not create any ambiguity or confusion. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has recognized, [t]he term otherwise,’ when paired with an adjective or adverb to indicate its contrary’… is best understood to mean NOT.’ Webster’s Third New Int’l. Dictionary 1598 (2002). The plain language and meaning of the phrases therefore reflect a clear intent to cover risks that are not inherent to skiing. (Brigance v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc. (10th Cir. 2018) 883 F.3d 1243, 1256-1257.)

Plaintiffs’ contention that defendant’s release bears many similarities to the release in Cohen, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th 1476 misses the mark. The plaintiff in Cohen fell from a rented horse on a guided trail ride. She sued the stable, alleging its employee, the trail guide, negligently and unexpectedly provoke[d] a horse to bolt and run without warning (id. at p.1492), causing her to lose control of her horse (id. at p. 1482). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s written agreement to assume responsibility for the risks identified herein and those risks not specifically identified.’ (Id. at p. 1486, italics omitted.)

The Court of Appeal reversed. The Cohen majority noted the trial court apparently granted summary judgment on the theory that the risks not specifically identified’ in the Release include the risk that misconduct of respondent or its employee might increase a risk inherent in horseback riding. (Cohen, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1486-1487, italics omitted.) This interpretation was erroneous because the stable’s agreement did not explicitly advise that the plaintiff was releasing the defendant from liability for the defendant’s negligence. Although a release is not required to use the word negligence’ or any particular verbiage… [it] must inform the releasor that it applies to misconduct on the part of the releasee. (Id. at pp. 1488 1489.) The release in Cohen used the word negligence only once, in reference to the plaintiff’s negligence, not that of the defendant. The stable’s release also did not indicate that it covers any and all injuries arising out of or connected with the use of respondent’s facilities. (Id. at p. 1489.)

Having found the release ineffective to trigger the doctrine of express assumption of the risk, the Cohen majority turned to the doctrines of implied assumption of the risk, i.e., it focused on the inherent risks of horseback riding. Summary judgment could not be granted on that basis, either, because a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the trail guide acted recklessly and increased the inherent risks of a guided horseback ride. (Cohen, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1494-1495.)

The release in Zipusch, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th 1281 mirrors the one in Cohen, but not the one in this case. As in Cohen, the plaintiff in Zipusch did not agree to assume the risk of negligence by the defendant gym. Accordingly, the agreement was ineffective as an express release; and the issue for the Court of Appeal was whether the plaintiff’s injury was the result of an inherent risk of exercising in a gym, in which case the primary assumption of the risk doctrine would apply, or whether it was the result of the gym increasing the inherent risks of exercise, in which case the secondary assumption of the risk doctrine would apply. (Id. at pp. 1291-1292.)

Hass, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th 11 is instructive. Plaintiffs cite Hass in their opening brief, but do not attempt to distinguish it, even though the release in Hass is similar to the one Tuttle signed. The analysis in Hass applies in this case.

In Hass, the plaintiffs’ decedent suffered a fatal cardiac arrest after finishing a half marathon organized and sponsored by the defendant. His heirs sued for wrongful death. The Court of Appeal held that cardiac arrest is an inherent risk of running a race, but a triable issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant acted with gross negligence in failing to provide timely and adequate emergency medical services. (Hass, supra, 26 Cal.App.5that p. 18.)

Addressing the release, Hass held: By signing the Release in the instant case, we conclude that [the decedent] intended both to assume all risks associated with his participation in the race, up to and including the risk of death, and to release [the defendant] (on behalf of himself and his heirs) from any and all liability with respect to any injuries he might suffer as a result of his participation. This was sufficient to block the [plaintiffs’] wrongful death claim for ordinary negligence. [ 10] (Hass, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 27.)

Our independent examination of defendant’s release convinces us Tuttle assumed all risks that might arise from skiing at defendant’s resort, including risks created by defendant’s ordinary negligence. With a valid release and no gross negligence by defendant, the issue of inherent risk was no longer relevant. (Willhide-Michiulis v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 344, 353 [where the doctrine of express assumption of risk applies, implied assumption of the risk is no longer considered].)

II.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE RELEASE DOES NOT VIOLATE CALIFORNIA’S PUBLIC POLICY.

Plaintiffs next argue the release’s exculpatory language violates California’s public policy. The linchpin of their argument is that defendant’s act of unreasonably increasing the inherent risk of an active sport was neither ordinary negligence nor gross negligence, but a separate category of aggravated negligence. Plaintiffs argue Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th 747 left open the question of whether public policy precludes the contractual release of other forms of aggravated’ misconduct, in addition to gross negligence. (Some capitalization omitted.) The argument is raised for the first time on appeal; it has no merit.

In Santa Barbara, a parent signed an agreement releasing the defendants from liability for any negligent act’ related to her child’s participation in summer camp. (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 750.) The child drowned. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the release, and the appellate court denied defendants’ petition for writ of mandate challenging that ruling. (Id. at p. 753.) The sole issue before the Supreme Court was whether a release of liability relating to recreational activities generally is effective as to gross negligence. (Id. at p. 750.)

The defendants argued California law, specifically Civil Code section 1668, [ 11] impliedly allowed recreational activity releases to be enforced against a claim of gross negligence. (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 762-763.) At the time, no published California decision voided[] an agreement purporting to release liability for future gross negligence. (Id. at p. 758.) The Santa Barbara majority turned to out-of-state authorities and rejected the defendants’ position based on public policy principles. (Id. at pp. 760-762.)

References in Santa Barbara to aggravated wrongs (a term used by Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 68, p. 484) (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 762, 765, 776) and aggravated misconduct (id. at pp. 760, 762, 777, fn. 54) do not suggest a new species of negligence that might affect a liability release for recreational activities. Rather, those phrases encompassed misconduct that included gross negligence and willful acts. (Id. at p. 754, fn. 4.) As the majority held, the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence’ reflects a rule of policy’ that harsher legal consequences should flow when negligence is aggravated instead of merely ordinary. (Id. at p. 776.) With a valid release, a theory of gross negligence, if supported by evidence showing the existence of a triable issue, is the only negligence-based theory that is potentially open to [the] plaintiffs. (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 781.)

III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT.

Plaintiffs argue the trial court should have entered judgment in their favor regardless of the jury’s finding concerning gross negligence because the jury made findings on damages and apportioned fault between Tuttle and defendant. They contend the responsibility to seek a JNOV or some other postjudgment remedy should have fallen to defendant, not plaintiffs. But once the trial court determined the special verdict was not inconsistent and Tuttle’s express release provided a complete defense as a matter of law, entry of a defense judgment was proper. Even if the trial court erred in entering a defense judgment without a formal motion for JNOV, any error was harmless.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING SPECIAL VERDICTS

A special verdict must include conclusions of fact as established by the evidence… [so] that nothing shall remain to the Court but to draw from them conclusions of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 624.) A special verdict is not a judgment. (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1331-1332.) If a special verdict includes findings on inconsistent theories, the findings on the legal theory that does not control the outcome of the litigation may be disregarded as surplusage. (Baird v. Ocequeda (1937) 8 Cal.2d 700, 703.) Additionally, where no objection is made before the jury is discharged, it falls to the trial judge to interpret the verdict from its language considered in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions.’ (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equip. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456-457; see Zagami, Inc. v. James A. Crone, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1091-1092.)

THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING

As noted, the jury was discharged before the parties raised an issue concerning the special verdict form and the jury’s findings. The trial court recognized and fulfilled its duty to interpret the special verdict: After [this] court rejected several unilateral proposals, the parties stipulated to a special verdict form…. But they did so before the court construed the release in response to defendant’s nonsuit motion and before the parties stipulated Ms. Tuttle entered into the release. [¶] Thus, the form presented only two questions addressing the assumption of the risk. Question #3 asked whether defendant unreasonably increased the inherent risks of skiing. Question #4 asked whether defendant acted with gross negligence. [¶] The answer NO’ to either Question #3 or #4 exonerates defendant. Answering No’ to Question #3 would foreclose the only relevant exception to the primary assumption defense. Answering NO’ to Question #4 would foreclose the only relevant exception to the express assumption defense. [¶] But the form allowed the jurors to answer YES’ to one question and NO’ to [the] other one and continue to answer questions, including determining and allocating damages. (Italics and bold omitted.)

The trial court further explained: Here, the specific finding that defendant did not act with gross negligence controls over the general award of damages. The jury was properly instructed with the definition of gross negligence. The jury received percipient and expert testimony that, if credited, showed defendant did not act with gross negligence. The parties argued whether defendant [did] or did not act with gross negligence. The answer NO’ to Question #4 unambiguously shows the jury found defendant did not act with gross negligence. That resolved the only factual question on the express assumption issue in favor of defendant. [¶]… [¶] The award of damages is not a hopeless inconsistency so much as it is mere surplusage once the court honors the jury’s unambiguous finding that defendant acted without gross negligence and draws the legal conclusion-a conclusion that [the] jury was not asked to draw-that the release covers these claims and effects an express assumption of the risk.

The trial court also correctly concluded the jury’s findings on Question[] #3 and Question #4 [were not] irreconcilable. The concept of unreasonably increasing inherent risks is distinct from the concept of gross negligence. In a particular case, the same facts that show an unreasonable increase in the inherent risks may also show gross negligence. [Citation.] Overlap is possible, [but not] necessary. In this case, the jury found no such overlap. There is no inconsistency in defendant losing on the primary assumption issue but prevailing on the express assumption issue. And that, after five weeks of trial, is what happened here.

ANALYSIS

A validly executed express release of liability for a defendant’s ordinary negligence means the only viable theory for a judgment in a plaintiff’s favor is if the defendant acted with gross negligence. (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 781.) There is no inconsistency between findings that a defendant is ordinarily negligent by unreasonably increasing the inherent risks of snow skiing, but not grossly negligent. A finding of gross negligence would necessarily mean a defendant unreasonably increased the inherent risks of snow skiing, so that comparative fault principles apply. But an express release, coupled with an undisputed factual finding that a defendant did not act with gross negligence, necessarily results in a defense judgment. Accordingly, Question No. 3 concerning whether defendant unreasonably increased the inherent risk should have been removed from the special verdict form.

In their appellate opening brief, plaintiffs argue defendant forfeited any objection to the special verdict form because it (1) failed to object to the special verdict before the jury was discharged; (2) invited the erroneous instructions in the special verdict form because it had participated in drafting it; and (3) failed to bring a statutorily authorized post-trial motion challenging the special verdict form. Although the special verdict form should have been amended before deliberations, there is no issue of forfeiture or invited error on defendant’s part.

The parties jointly agreed on the wording of the special verdict form. Any fault in the drafting cannot be assigned to one side over the other, and all parties bear responsibility for the erroneous directions in the stipulated special verdict form. Nothing in the record suggests the special verdict form or the objection to entry of a plaintiffs’ judgment was the product of gamesmanship. (See Lambert v. General Motors (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1183.)

Additionally, plaintiffs’ trial strategy to stipulate to Tuttle’s knowing execution of the release was wise: Evidence Tuttle understood the release was overwhelming. As part of the discussion pertaining to the parties’ stipulation, however, both the trial court and defendant’s trial counsel questioned the adequacy of the special verdict form. But plaintiffs’ trial counsel maintained the special verdict form was fine as is and persuasively argued against making any changes or advising the jury of the stipulation. This meant the doctrine of implied secondary assumption of the risk was not relevant unless the jury found defendant acted with gross negligence.

We agree the procedural aspects surrounding the entry of the defense judgment on what appeared to be a plaintiffs’ verdict were unconventional; but the bottom line is once the jury found no gross negligence, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under these circumstances, it would have been a waste of resources to require defendant, or the trial court on its own initiative, to formally notice a motion for JNOV (Code Civ. Proc., § 629, subd. (a)).

Even if we found the procedure to have been erroneous, the error would have been procedural, not substantive; and, plaintiffs have not demonstrated the likelihood of a different outcome. (See Webb v. Special Electric, Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 179 [because the defendant did not have a complete defense as a matter of law, the entry of JNOV was unjustified [on the merits]. In light of this conclusion, we need not reach plaintiffs’ claims of procedural error].) Defendant had a complete defense; there is no reasonable probability the trial court would have denied a formal JNOV motion.

Plaintiffs argue they relied on the state of the special verdict form in making the decision to stipulate to the validity of the release agreement. Plaintiffs suggest defendant, by agreeing to the special verdict form, tacitly stipulated to a deviation from the applicable law to allow plaintiffs to recover damages based solely on a finding defendant had unreasonably increased the inherent risk, notwithstanding the existence of a valid, applicable release. Such an argument is without support in the law. It is also belied by the record. As already discussed, both defendant’s counsel and the trial court raised questions concerning the special verdict form once the parties stipulated to Tuttle’s execution of the release. Plaintiffs’ trial counsel maintained there should be no changes in the jury instructions or the special verdict form.

IV.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL.

Plaintiffs argued in their motion for new trial that the special verdict was hopelessly contradictory and, consequently, against the law. Plaintiffs also asserted there were errors in the special verdict form, they excepted to those errors, but then were penalized because the jury’s finding of unreasonably increased inherent risk has ex post facto been deemed insufficient to impose liability on Defendant Heavenly Valley. Although plaintiffs did not claim instructional error in the trial court, they complained the modified version of CACI No. 431, [ 12] to which they agreed, misled the jurors into thinking they could find defendant liable if they found it unreasonably increased the inherent risk of skiing or if they found it acted with gross negligence.

On appeal, plaintiffs ask this court to reverse the denial of their motion for a new trial. They fail to cite applicable authorities to support their arguments. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Instead, they contend the trial court changed the rules of the game only after the game had already been played, leaving the parties and their counsel without the opportunity to satisfy those new rules, and robbing the jury of the ability to assess all viable liability options. Plaintiffs add they stipulated to Tuttle’s execution of the release in reliance on the wording of the then existing Special Verdict form, which… made clear that a finding of gross negligence was only one of two disjunctive liability paths, and was not necessary to impose liability against Heavenly. As a consequence, [plaintiffs]… were… induced into a stipulation concerning that issue in light of the wording of the existing Special Verdict form, an unfair sequence which the trial court itself acknowledged worked against [plaintiffs]. This characterization misstates the record.

Second, although the trial court described the sequence of events, it did not suggest the events were unfair or worked against plaintiffs. As discussed ante, when the trial court denied defendant’s renewed motion for nonsuit, it advised counsel the jury must decide whether Tuttle actually executed the release. Because neither side proposed jury instructions or questions on the special verdict form addressing the issue of contract formation, defendant’s counsel suggested they should revisit both the jury instructions and the special verdict form. Plaintiffs’ trial counsel immediately stipulated to Tuttle’s execution of the release and advised he would proceed with the verdict form as is. This statement calls into question plaintiffs’ claim they were induced into entering into the stipulation.

Third−and significantly−plaintiffs’ counsel did not discuss disjunctive liability paths in his closing arguments. Instead, plaintiffs’ counsel focused on the evidence and urged the jury to find gross negligence: What we’re talking about here, the liability of the resort does not fall under this release. And you are not going to be asked any questions on the verdict form about the release. Yeah, [Tuttle] signed one, and she understood the inherent risks of skiing, and that’s what the release releases. It does not release gross negligence. It does not release what we’re talking about.

DISPOSITION

The judgment and post judgment orders are affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J., MOORE, J.

———

Notes:

[*] Retired judge of the Orange Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

[ 1] We refer to Dana Tuttle as Tuttle and to her spouse and sons collectively as plaintiffs. We refer to Heavenly Valley as defendant.

Plaintiffs erroneously identified Heavenly Valley in the complaint as the Vail Corporation. There is no dispute Heavenly Valley is the correct defendant in this case.

[ 2] Tuttle purchased the ski pass online. No actual signature was required; she signed the release by clicking the appropriate box on the electronic form.

[ 3] The jury exonerated Slater from liability. He is not a party to this appeal.

[ 4] The appellate record is lengthy. Given the limited issues before this court, however, we do not recite the trial evidence in detail.

[ 5] The trial court denied defendant’s first nonsuit motion two days earlier. At that time, the trial judge announced he would be prepared to find as a matter of law that colliding with a snowboarder or colliding with a tree is an inherent risk of skiing, but the jury would decide whether defendant unreasonably increased the inherent risk of the sport.

[ 6] Defendant also requested a statement of decision addressing the applicability of primary implied and express assumption of the risk doctrines; the trial court denied the request. The trial court’s denial of this request is not at issue in this appeal.

[ 7] Plaintiffs do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in this appeal.

[ 8] Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296 was a plurality decision authored by Chief Justice George that all members of the court except Justice Kennard subsequently accepted. (Luna v. Vela (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 102, 107, citing Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 491.)

[ 9] Whether a risk is inherent to a particular active sport presents a question of law for the court. (Hass v. RhodyCo Productions (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 11, 23 (Hass).)

[ 10] So it is here. Paragraph 13 of Tuttle’s release also binds her assignees, subrogors, distributors, heirs, next of kin, executors and personal representatives.

A wrongful death action is not a derivative action. Nonetheless, although an individual involved in a dangerous activity cannot by signing a release extinguish his heirs’ wrongful death claim, the heirs will be bound by the decedent’s agreement to waive a defendant’s negligence and assume all risk. (Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 851 852; see Hass, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 25 [In other words, although a decedent cannot release or waive a subsequent wrongful death claim by the decedent’s heirs, that decedent’s express agreement to waive the defendant’s negligence and assume all risks’ acts as a complete defense to such a wrongful death action].)

[ 11] Civil Code section 1668 lists the types of contractual releases that are unenforceable as a matter of public policy (i.e., those exempting anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent). Gross negligence is not on the list.

[ 12] Plaintiffs do not challenge the modified version of CACI No. 431 in this court, either. The modified instruction read: If you find that Heavenly Valley unreasonably increased the inherent risks of snow skiing, or that Heavenly Valley was grossly negligent, and also find that Heavenly Valley’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Dana Tuttle’s harm, then Heavenly Valley is responsible for the harm. Heavenly Valley cannot avoid responsibility just because some other person, condition, or event, including but not limited to Dana Tuttle’s own negligence or the acts of Anthony Slater were also a substantial factor in causing Dana Tuttle’s harm.

———

Recreation Law

It's not what I write, It's what you Learn

New Jersey Supreme Court holds the Rescue Doctrine only applies to rescuing people and not property unless rescuing the property saves people.

Samolyk v. Berthe (N.J. 2022)

Ski Area not liable when skiers leave the ski run and collide with snow making equipment in Michigan.

Round v. Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC (Mich. App. 2022)

Round v. Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC (Mich. App. 2022)

The path down from the road to a river is an open and obvious danger that the plaintiff assumes before walking down the path.

Rooney v. Battenkill River Sports & Campground Holding Co. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)

Trampoline Court Safety Act

Redmond v. Spring Loaded I, LLC, 349683Court of Appeals of Michigan, May 06, 2021

Michigan Trampoline Statute protects Trampoline Operator from claims that he violated ANSI standards.

Inherent Risk is the part of any sport and is assumed by participants when undertaking the activity.

Standish v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corporation

Do Releases Work? Should I be using a Release in my Business? Will my customers be upset if I make them sign a release?

Risk Management in Action combined with the proof people assumed the risk.

South Dakota in Federal District Court decision seems to allow a release to stop the claims for a minor.

Nevada Appellate court voids release because statements made between the riders & the mechanical bull operator creates a requirement to maneuver the bull in an easy fashion which voided the release. Plaintiff also claimed battery from the actions of the defendant.

Tuttle v. Heavenly Valley, L.P., 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 814, 2020 WL 563604

Kuchta v. Opco, 2020 Nev. App. Unpub. LEXIS 549, 2020 WL 3868434

Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Statute

Convoluted procedural issues at the trial court, created a ripe field for confusion, but the appellate court held the release bard the claims of the plaintiff in the skier v. skier collision where the ski resort was also sued.

Soderberg v. Anderson, 922 N.W.2d 200, 2019 Minn. LEXIS 32, 2019 WL 287781

Under California law, increasing the risk or changing the inherent risk of a sport or race eliminates the defense of assumption of the risk. Defendant found grossly negligent in its course design.

Tuttle et al., v. Heavenly Valley, L.P., 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 814, 2020 WL 563604

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35 Years of Outdoor Retailer

Recognized as the Go to Lawyer by the Outdoor Recreation Industry

If you want to book an appointment?

Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Insurance & Law