It is hard to understand the law because there are so many variations of the law and fifty different states with laws. It is harder to understand the law when the person explaining it to you is not a lawyer or worse, wrong.

It is hard to understand the law because there are so many variations of the law and fifty different states with laws. It is harder to understand the law when the person explaining it to you is not a lawyer or worse, wrong.

You don’t go to law school for fun. Law school is NOT fun. You go to law school to understand how the law works. Law School is just the first step. You must study and understand what is going on to understand an area of the law.

If you did not go to law school, and you need legal help, ask a lawyer.

I got a question the other day from a client. He was preparing to give a speech to a group of lodge owners and wanted to make sure he was going to say the right thing about the Good Samaritan Act. He had read a lot of websites and particularly one website and thought he understood the issues.

He did not. Neither did the websites. In fact, one of the websites, which was based on the course and book he had just taken described what the Good Samaritan law was based for that course. The course, book and class were wrong too.

My client was off, and the website was wrong. The problem is the wrong was enough to get you in trouble as a professional, program college or business.

You really need to beware of non-lawyers telling you what the law says.

First, there is not one Good Samaritan Law, there are at least fifty, in reality, there are more than 150. Each state has its own Good Samaritan law. Many states have many different laws covering rescue, first aid, AED use, the Heimlich maneuver and other aspects of providing support to injured people without becoming liable.

Everyone explains the Good Samaritan law as you are not liable if you help someone in need and are not paid for that help. Sort of.

All the following are requirements from different state Good Samaritan laws. You are covered…

  • If you have the right training
    • Some states list the training you must have
    • You follow the standards of a specific training organization (dependent upon the state).
      • American Red Cross
      • American Heart Association
      • National Safety Council
      • National Ski Patrol
      • Boy Scouts of America
      • A course as determined by the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene
      • Department of Public Health
      • director of health
      • mining enforcement and safety administration of the bureau of mines of the department of interior
      • Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services
  • If you don’t act outside the scope of your training
  • You act like a reasonable or ordinary prudent person
  • If you are not being paid for your services
  • You are not in a hospital or in some states on hospital grounds
  • You are a member of an organization that exists to provide emergency services
  • You act in good faith
  • You have been called to act by the county sheriff
  • You are paid but not to provide first aid, only to provide public services
  • You did not act willfully, wantonly or recklessly or by gross negligence
  • The care is provided at the scene of the accident
  • You are at work
  • You are not at work
  • You’ve been trained in the use of the AED
  • You’ve been trained in the use of the epinephrine
  • You are not the one that caused the injury or placed the person in peril
  • Or you have not obtained consent

You are NOT covered by Good Samaritan Laws in some states if….

  • “…or when incidental to a business relationship existing between the employer or principal of the person rendering such care…”
  • Shall not apply if the care inures to your employer
  • Where the person has not consented to the care
  • Are working as a guide or outfitter
    • Whether or Not you are being paid as a guide
      • If you are required to have 1st aid you are not covered
    • Whether or Not being paid as a physician
      • But some states allow you to be paid later as a physician
  • You placed the person in peril
    • Meaning any part of the trip as a guide

Just look at the requirement that the care be rendered at the scene of the accident. You are helping someone get out of the backcountry, and you adjust their band aid, away from the accident scene. In man states you are not covered by the state Good Samaritan act.

As a Guide are you covered by the Good Samaritan Act? NO!

My client’s confusion was the fine line between compensation for your services, and compensation as a guide or employee, because you are paid to provide first aid. Meaning as a guide, who may or may not be required to provide first aid or have first aid training, are you covered under the Good Samaritan law, if you provide first aid training to one of your guests. In most cases no.

There is no Good Samaritan coverage if:

    You are employed and part of your job is to provide first aid

        Because you are required to have a level of first aid training

        The industry requires people to be trained in first aid

    The guest knows you are trained in first aid and relies on that knowledge you gave them

    The landowner or river owner requires it under a permit or concession

    You placed the guest in the peril that caused the injury.

        You picked the location where the guide is fishing

        You picked the route up the mountain

    You told the guest to follow the map you gave them on the ride or hike

You are a guide, and you took the client out; you are not covered by the Good Samaritan laws in most states.

You are a guide, the definition meaning you will take care of the client.

And the issues above are not changed in the Outdoor Recreation Industry by using Independent Contractors. In all cases, the guide and the outfitter are liable.

Consequently, a website, class or book cannot in one paragraph tell you whether your actions are going to be covered by the Good Samaritan law.

I hope you are covered by the Good Samaritan law, but find out for sure.

Do Something

It sucks but getting legal advice from someone other than attorney does not work.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

Copyright 2018 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529

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Did a Federal District Court in New Hampshire allow a release to bar a minor’s claims? Maybe, but only by omission, not by intent I believe.

This decision also looks at requiring initials in a release. Stupid move to require initials in any document, it just creates an argument for the plaintiff and requires more time on the defendant’s part to review the signed document.

Lizzol v. Brothers Property Management Corporation, Et. Al., 2016 DNH 199; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150427

State: New Hampshire, United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire

Plaintiff: Jennifer Lizzol, Michael Lizzol, and T.G.,

Defendant: Brothers Property Management Corporation, Out Back Kayak, Inc., and Martin Welch,

Plaintiff Claims: negligence, including negligent training and supervision, vicarious liability, bystander liability, and loss of consortium

Defendant Defenses: Release

Holding: For the Defendant

Year: 2016

This case has two important articles regarding release law. The first is whether a plaintiff can sign away a minor’s right to sue. The results of the decision are yes; however, the issue was never argued or discussed in the decision.

The second is the use of places to initial in a release. The court ruled them of no value. However, because two of the plaintiff’s had not initialed certain sections, it allowed the plaintiff to argue those sections were not valid. Get rid of places to initial in your release because not all courts will rule this way.

The plaintiffs were a husband, wife and minor child who had booked a vacation at the defendant resort. As part of that vacation, they booked  a snowmobile (snow machine in the decision) instructions and tour. The booking was done online and occurred as soon as the plaintiff’s checked into the resort.

The snowmobile tours were run by a third party, also a defendant, Out Back Kayak, Inc. This defendant was not named on the release as a party to be protected. Upon arriving at the tour the plaintiffs were instructed to pick out a helmet and sign the release.

Mountain View Grand employee, who told them to quickly pick out helmets and sign a two-page document that bore the following heading:

Snow Machine Tour




(the “Release”). The Lizzols felt rushed during the process, see, e.g., Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment, Exh. C. at p. 3, but both Jennifer and Michael had an opportunity to review the Release, and each signed and initialed it. (Jennifer executed the release on behalf of her minor son, T.G.). [Emphasize added]

The release had five sections, Section A through E, which had to be initialed. The mother did not initial two sections and the father did not initial one section.

The Release includes five lettered paragraphs that provide tour participants with a designated space in which to place his or her initials, thereby confirming that he or she understands and acknowledges the following:


Id. Jennifer did not initial Paragraph B or Paragraph D, and Michael did not initial Paragraph B. [Emphasize added]

The plaintiff’s received a few minutes of instruction on how to steer brake and operate the snow machines then the tour took off. The plaintiff husband and wife were riding together right behind the guide, and their son was farther back in the line.

The guide told everyone he would not exceed twenty miles per hour. The guide exceeded the self-imposed speed limit immediately and continued to speed. The plaintiff mother was driving the snow machine, and she quickly fell behind and was lost. While attempting to follow the tracks of the guide, she lost control of the machine which flipped and she and her husband fell down an embankment.

Jennifer and Michael rode on a two-person snow machine, with Jennifer operating the vehicle. They were directly behind Welch in the line of snowmobiles. Their son, T.G., rode by himself and was farther back in the line. Welch drove rather quickly during the tour, and far exceeded the self-imposed 20 miles per hour speed limitation he had announced earlier. Jennifer did not keep pace, and, as Welch increased his speed during the second half of the tour, Jennifer lost sight of him. Jennifer attempted to follow Welch’s tracks in the snow, but, in doing so, lost control of the snowmobile, which left the path and flipped over. Jennifer, Michael, and the snow machine fell down a steep embankment that was approximately seventy-five feet high.

The plaintiff’s later learned that numerous customers complained about the guide driving too fast. One manager of the resort asked the husband if the guide had been driving too fast. plaintiff’s later learned that numerous customers complained about the guide driving too fast. One manager of the resort asked the husband if the guide had been driving too fast.

The plaintiffs later learned that other customers may have complained that Welch drove too quickly during earlier snow machine tours. After the accident, Mountain View Grand manager, Chris Diego, asked Michael if Welch had been “going too fast again.”

The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the release. The court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

In making its decision reviewed here the court first looked at the requirements for releases in New Hampshire. New Hampshire has three requirements to make a release enforceable.

Exculpatory contracts are enforceable if: “(1) they do not violate public policy; (2) the plaintiff understood the import of the agreement or a reasonable person in [plaintiff’s] position would have understood the import of the agreement; and (3) the plaintiff’s claims fall within the contemplation of the parties when they executed the contract.”

The plaintiff first argued the release did not apply because the release language looked at renting the equipment and did not contemplate the guide’s failure to act reasonably.

Altogether, they say, the impression is given that the Release applies only to injuries inherent to snow machine activity and the use of snow machine equipment, but not to harm resulting from an instructor’s or guide’s failure to act with reasonable care.

However, the court did not find this argument persuasive because releases are reviewed applies the common meaning to the words in the release and as long as the language is clear and specifically indicates the intent of the parties it will be upheld.

Under applicable New Hampshire law, courts examine the language of a release and “give the language used by the parties its common meaning and give the contract itself the meaning that would be attached to it by a reasonable person.” “As long as the language of the release clearly and specifically indicates the intent to release the defendant from liability for personal injury caused by the defendant’s negligence, the agreement will be upheld.”

However, any doubt in the language as to whether the plaintiff agreed to assume the risk, and the release would not be enforced.

However, a defendant “will not be released from liability when the language of the contract raises any doubt as to whether the plaintiff has agreed to assume the risk of a defendant’s negligence.

The language in the release was broad in reach, detailed and clear and as such upheld against this argument of the plaintiff.

The language of the Release unarguably applies to claims or suits based on the negligence of Mountain View Grand owners, employees, officers or agents. The Release does not qualify or limit the “negligence” being released in any way, nor is the Release ambiguous in that regard. [Emphasize added for further discussion.]

A reasonable person “would have contemplated that the agreements released the defendants from any negligence, not just from negligence inherent” in snowmobiling.

The next argument was another that would not have gone in favor of the defendants in many states. The actual party that employed the guide, OBK, was not a named defendant in the release. However, case law in New Hampshire had held that parties protected by a release did not necessarily have to be named in the release. (This is an exception to the rule! Do not rely upon this when writing your release.)

Under New Hampshire law, the release need not specifically name the parties to be protected by only provide functional identification of the parties.

An exculpatory contract need not specifically identify the defendant by name.” “However, the contract must at least provide a functional identification of the parties being released.”

In this release enough of an agency relationship was covered in the release to protect the defendant OBK.

…the Release here makes evident that it pertains not just to the furnishing and use of equipment associated with the snow machine activity, but also to the furnishing of services associated with that activity.

The initial issue was next reviewed. The plaintiff made a great argument to void the sections of the release not initialed by the plaintiff.

Plaintiffs next argue that, even if the Release does encompass the claims at issue, it is still not enforceable against Jennifer, because she failed to initial paragraphs B and D of the Release. Plaintiffs characterize the lettered paragraphs as “several distinct exculpatory clauses” that they were required to agree to separately, and which, as structured, give the impression that “the participant might agree to certain terms, but not others.

However, the court found the concluding language of the release encompassed the entire agreement and by signing the release right below that language the plaintiff agreed to the entire agreement.

Jennifer Lizzol’s failure to initial paragraphs B and D of the Release does not render the Release or those paragraphs unenforceable against her. The same general analysis applies to Michael Lizzol’s failure to initial Paragraph B of the Release.

The first requirement for a valid release under New Hampshire law is that does not violate public policy. This was the last argument raised by the plaintiff and reviewed in the court’s decision. Under New Hampshire law, a release must not violate public policy.

“A defendant seeking to avoid liability must show that the exculpatory agreement does not contravene public policy; i.e., that no special relationship existed between the parties and that there was no other disparity in bargaining power.” “‘A special relationship exists when “the defendant is a common carrier, innkeeper or public utility, or is otherwise charged with a duty of public service.'” Additionally, a release may be against public policy if, among other things, “it is injurious to the interests of the public, violates some public statute, or tends to interfere with the public welfare or safety.”

The plaintiff’s relied on the “disparity of bargaining power” argument to claim the release violated New Hampshire public policy. “”Where there is a disparity in bargaining power, the plaintiff may not be deemed to have freely chosen to enter into the contract.” However, the court found this would not work.

Here, the plaintiffs were “under no physical or economic compulsion to sign the release,” and “[s]ince the defendants’ service is not an essential one, the defendants had no advantage of bargaining strength” over the plaintiffs or others who sought to participate in the snowmobile lesson and tour.

The plaintiff’s also argued public policy was violated because they were fraudulent induced to sign the release based upon the knowledge that the guide drove too fast.

Plaintiffs assert that defendants had prior knowledge that Welch generally drove too quickly when conducting snow machine tours, and, notwithstanding that knowledge, failed (negligently) to take reasonable steps to ensure that Welch conducted the tours safely. Plaintiffs further contend that they were induced to sign the Release based upon defendants’ false assurances that the lesson and tour would be conducted in a safe manner, with adequate instruction, and at a safe speed. Relying on those assurances, plaintiffs signed the Release. Plaintiffs argue that, at the very least, whether the defendants made assurances (and omissions) regarding the nature of the snow machine tour with conscious indifference to the truth, and whether the plaintiffs justifiably relied upon those statements when signing the Release, are disputed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.

Fraud in the inducement is a valid defense to contracts and releases. (Remember Marketing Makes Promises Risk Management has to Pay For) to prove fraud in the inducement the plaintiffs must prove:

As the parties seeking to invalidate the Release on fraudulent inducement grounds, plaintiffs bear a substantial burden: they “must establish that the other party made a representation with knowledge of its falsity or with conscious indifference to its truth with the intention to cause another to rely upon it. In addition, the party seeking to prove fraud must demonstrate justifiable reliance.”

However, the plaintiffs could produce no facts to support fraud, an intentional act so to speak on the part of the defendants to support their argument.

Because plaintiffs have not produced sufficient evidence from which a finder of fact could conclude that the defendants knowingly made fraudulent representations to them, they have not established that a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to whether their execution of the Release was fraudulently induced, and is therefore ineffective.

The Release is valid and enforceable, and it encompasses the plaintiffs’ bystander liability claim as well as their negligence claims.

For those reasons, the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed, and the case closed.

So Now What?

There are several important points made in this decision.

Whether or not the court intended for the release to be valid against the claims of the minor is not known. A defendant was probably a minor, and his claims were dismissed based upon the signature on a release signed by his mother.  However, this is not a strong enough decision to rely upon at this time.

The statement by the court that the language of the release “does not qualify or limit the “negligence” being released in any way…” is important. So often releases are written with the intent to soften the effect in the mind of the writer or the release is inadvertently written in a way that limits the value of the release. Write a release as broadly as possible and allow the court to restrict it. Why do the court’s job in advance and eliminate a possible defense you may have to a claim.

The final issue is initials. GET RID OF INITIALS in your release. They have no value. You need a signature at the end of the contract and nothing else. The only value initials provide is to the plaintiff to make an argument that a place on the release that is not initialed should void the release or at least void that section of the release.

This case would probably have a different outcome in another jurisdiction.

If you are interested in having me write your release, fill out this Information Form and Contract and send it to me.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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Poorly written release and allegation of duress push whitewater rafting ligation to Pennsylvania Appellate court.

Release probably not written by an attorney, signed in one state for rafting in another state and probably one where the economics suggest an insurance company is playing plaintiff.

Mcdonald v. Whitewater Challengers, Inc., 2015 PA Super 104; 116 A.3d 99; 2015 Pa. Super. LEXIS 232

State: Pennsylvania

Plaintiff: Erin Mcdonald

Defendant: Whitewater Challengers, Inc., and Whitewater Challengers Outdoor Adventure Center, T/D/B/A Whitewater Challengers, Inc.

Plaintiff Claims: a. Failing to provide a river guide / instructor in plaintiff’s boat;

b. Failing to provide a properly inflated raft;

c. Failing to advise Plaintiff on the grade and / or class of the whitewater rapids;

d. Failing to properly instruct Plaintiff on how to safely and effectively maneuver fast and difficult rapids; and

e. Allowing an unsafe number of inexperienced rafters to operate a raft.

Defendant Defenses: Release

Holding: For Defendants

Year: 2015

The plaintiff was a teacher at a school that brought 72 kids whitewater rafting with the defendant on the Lehigh River. The school was located, and the plaintiff lived in New York. The defendant was located and the Lehigh River, where the rafting occurred, was in Pennsylvania.

While still at work two days before the trip her supervisor handed a release which she signed. The release had a venue clause which means any lawsuit must be in Pennsylvania but not a jurisdiction clause.

While rafting the plaintiff’s boat struck a rock ejecting the plaintiff from the raft which injured her.

The plaintiff and defendant filed various motions prior to trial. The plaintiff wanted New York law to apply because she had signed the release in New York and was from New York. (The plaintiff wanted the suit brought under New York law because New York does not recognize releases. See States that do not Support the Use of a Release.) The defendant wanted Pennsylvania law to apply, which generally upholds releases.

The court ruled against both parties and denied the release because the plaintiff made an allegation that she was forced to sign the release (duress) therefore, the release should be void. The trial court approved a motion to appeal these issues prior to trial and the appellate court accepted the appeal.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The plaintiff started her argument with three theories on the location where the release was signed was the proper jurisdiction for interpreting the law, New York.  

The plaintiff also argued that because the defendant did not have a jurisdiction clause in its release, then obviously the defendant wanted New York law to apply.

Finally, she argued that because her medical bills and treatment would be generated and done in New York that law should apply.

She maintains that because she signed the release in New York, the contract was formed in New York. As a New York resident, McDonald asserts she is entitled to the benefit of New York law. McDonald claims that if Whitewater intended for Pennsylvania law to apply, then it should have included such a clause in its release. She points out that most of her medical treatment occurred in New York and that the New York State Insurance Fund has an interest in recouping her lost wages and medical expenses.

The court started its examination of the law to be applied by first looking at whether tort law or contract law applied. Tort law is the law of injuries and has different requirements to prove jurisdictional issues than contract law, which is what a release is. The court found that contract law applied without much analysis on how it came to that decision.

The court then looked at how a conflict of law’s decision was to be made by the courts when deciding in a contract basis where the contract is silent on the issue of jurisdiction.

…the first step in a choice of law analysis under Pennsylvania law is to determine whether [an actual] conflict exists between the laws of the competing states. If no [actual] conflict exists, further analysis is unnecessary. An actual conflict exists if “there are relevant differences between the laws.

The analysis of what law applies; New York or Pennsylvania is extensive. If only one state would be harmed (the interests of the party from that state), then the issue is a false conflict. If the interests of both states would be harmed (the residents of both states would be harmed) by the decision, then the issue is a true conflict issue. “In such a situation, the court must apply the law of the state whose interests would be harmed if its law were not applied.”

A third situation would exist if the parties of neither state would be harmed. This is called a “neither jurisdiction” issue. This occurs when the law of both states is identical.

In sum, in Pennsylvania, a conflict-of-law analysis not involving a statutory or contractual choice of law clause, first requires determining whether the laws in question actually conflict. If relevant differences between the laws exist, then we next classify the actual conflict as a “true conflict,” “false conflict,” or “unprovided-for conflict.”

Instantly, a New York statute voids clauses immunizing recreational facilities from liability for negligence because they violate New York’s public policy. Pennsylvania, however, recognizes the validity of such exculpatory clauses when they govern voluntary and hazardous recreational activities.

The court determined that this is a true conflict case where both parties would be harmed, based on their desire for the jurisdiction to be applied in their state.

The next issue once a true conflict has been determined is for the court to determine who (what state) would be harmed the most by a decision. “We thus ascertain whether New York “or Pennsylvania has the greater interest in the application of its law to the question now before us.

The actual analysis came down to how the court looked at the issues.

But, comparable to the insurance policy in Walter, the instant release was executed for the purpose of protecting Whitewater, a Pennsylvania business that “had the right to expect that [the release] conformed to [Pennsylvania] law and that the laws of [Pennsylvania] would apply in interpreting the [release].” “[I]t seems only fair to permit” Whitewater to rely on Pennsylvania law when it acted within Pennsylvania. Whitewater should not be placed in jeopardy of liability exceeding that created by Pennsylvania law just because McDonald is a visitor from New York, a state offering higher protection.

The court decided that the law of Pennsylvania would apply. Because the activity where the accident occurred giving rise to the litigation occurred in Pennsylvania the court determined Pennsylvania law would control.

After carefully weighing the sovereign interests at stake, which include contacts establishing the significant relationships with each sovereign, we hold that Pennsylvania has the greater interest in the application of its law to this case.

The court then went into the analysis of the plaintiff’s claim the release should be thrown out because it was signed under duress.

[McDonald] had testified in her deposition that on May 17, 2006, the Headmaster of the School of the Holy Child handed the Release form to [McDonald], while she was between classes and walking through the school hallway and told her to sign it, since she would be one of the chaperones for the students on the rafting trip.

[McDonald] alleges she signed the Release form without reading it.

The plaintiff stated she did not read the release; however, because she had been on a previous whitewater trip.

The plaintiff next argued that she had no choice but to sign the release because it was required by her job. The court then looked at the issues the plaintiff faced in her annual performance evaluations and found that she would not suffer financially if she had not gone on the trip, therefore, she could not claim she was forced to sign the release.

The defendant argued that it did not compel or force the plaintiff to sign the release. If anyone did, her employer did. Since her employer was not a party to the contract, the release, then there could not be any duress.

To constitute duress or business compulsion there must be more than a mere threat which might possibly result in injury at some future time, such as a threat of injury to credit in the indefinite future. It must be such a threat that, in conjunction with other circumstances and business necessity, the party so coerced fears a loss of business unless he does so enter into the contract as demanded.

Because the defendant was not the party “forcing” the plaintiff to sign she could walk away from the release.

Instantly, we frame Whitewater’s question as whether one party to a contract can invoke duress when that duress was allegedly imposed by a non-party and not by the other party to the contract. More precisely, we examine whether McDonald can void the release by claiming the School of the Holy Child economically compelled her to sign the release with Whitewater. McDonald’s presumption is that economic compulsion, i.e., duress, by a non-party to a contract can be “transferred.”

Because the plaintiff was free to walk away from the rafting trip and consequently, the release, the court agreed with the defendant and found there was no duress. “It follows that the School of the Holy Child could not elicit the assent of McDonald by duress.”

Nor did the plaintiff ever claim that the defendant compelled her to sign the release, the only party that a claim of duress against whom the claim could be found. The defendant provided recreational services, which are not something that a claim of duress can be used.

Because a release is not a contract of adhesion, the plaintiff was not forced to sign it.

Thus, an exculpatory clause is not typically analyzed within the framework of whether it is a contract of adhesion. (“The signer is under no compulsion, economic or otherwise, to participate, much less to sign the exculpatory agreement, because it does not relate to essential services, but merely governs a voluntary recreational activity.”).

The court found that the plaintiff could not be compelled by anyone and was not compelled by the defendant to sign the release.

The court then looked at whether the release was viable under Pennsylvania law.

It is generally accepted that an exculpatory clause is valid where three conditions are met. First, the clause must not contravene public policy. Secondly, the contract must be between persons relating entirely to their own private affairs and thirdly, each party must be a free bargaining agent to the agreement so that the contract is not one of adhesion.

If the release is found to be valid, it must still be examined under Pennsylvania to see if it meets four more tests.

…unless the language of the parties is clear that a person is being relieved of liability for his own acts of negligence. In interpreting such clauses we listed as guiding standards that: 1) the contract language must be construed strictly, since exculpatory language is not favored by the law; 2) the contract must state the intention of the parties with the greatest particularity, beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no inference from words of general import can establish the intent of the parties; 3) the language of the contract must be construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking immunity from liability; and 4) the burden of establishing the immunity is upon the party invoking protection under the clause.

The court looked at Pennsylvania law and found releases were valid for inherently dangerous sporting activities.

Regarding the first element needed for a valid exculpatory clause, Pennsylvania courts have affirmed exculpatory releases for “skiing and other inherently dangerous sporting activities,” such as snowtubing and motorcycle racing. Other activities include automobile racing, paintballing, and whitewater rafting. Thus, Pennsylvania courts have held exculpatory clauses pertaining to inherently dangerous sporting activities do not “contravene any policy of the law.”

The court also found the release would be valid if it was between two parties for their own private affairs.

With respect to the second element, our Supreme Court held “[t]he validity of a contractual provision which exculpates a person from liability for his own acts of negligence is well settled if the contract is between persons relating entirely to their own private affairs.”

The court then examined the release and found it spells out the intention of the parties with particularity and shoes the intent of the parties to release the defendant from liability.

The court held the release was enforceable.

So Now What?

This case is long but brings up some interesting arguments to void releases and does a good job of explaining Pennsylvania law on releases.

First the argument that by leaving a specific clause out of a release is proof the person offering the release agrees to the lack of the clause is very scary. Most releases out there leave out a lot. I signed one the other day for an activity that left out both a jurisdiction and venue clause. I signed the release in Nevada where activity occurred. If injured, I would be allowed to sue the California Corporation in Nevada because by not putting the clause in the release it agreed to jurisdiction different from the venue clause.

Thankfully, this argument did not fly. However, it will be picked up in the future and used more often. You cannot tell when a judge or appellate panel will adopt it.

The duress argument is also valid. Duress cannot occur for recreational activities because like the public policy argument, the guest is free to walk away and loses nothing necessary for life. The duress argument is another one that might be brought when the person on the trip is therefore, more than their own enjoyment.

If they are an employee or volunteer of a church or other youth group, if they are required to do public service if they have an employer who wants them to participate, the argument is valid for duress; however, the wrong defendant is being sued. The duress must be brought by the person you are suing to void the release, not the person who made you sign it.

At the same time, it brings up the argument that this might be a subrogation claim brought by the plaintiff’s health insurance carrier or possibly worker’s compensation carrier. If the plaintiff was successful in arguing that the whitewater rafting, trip was part of her employment her injuries, lost wages, and other expenses would be covered by worker’s compensation. Her worker’s compensation insurance carrier then using the subrogation clause in the policy would have the right to sue any party that was the cause for the injuries.

A defense available to the plaintiff also bars any claims made by the insurer when applying the subrogation clause to sue. So a release signed by the plaintiff stops her lawsuit and also here insurer’s lawsuit.

Not having an enforceable jurisdiction clause in a release sent this litigation from the trial court to the appellate court and back again. In this case, it took nine years from the date of the accident, May 2006, and seven years from the start of the lawsuit, July 2008, for the case to be settled. The addition of “and jurisdiction” to the release would have probably ended the case before it got started.

Think about the stress of dealing with a lawsuit against you for seven years.

If you think, the analysis is painful to read, it is. The decision is 27 pages long. There is an entire semester of class on this one subject in law school called “Choice of Laws.” The analysis each time one party claims the lawsuit should be somewhere else or the law applied to the case should be other states not the state where the lawsuit is, is extensive. These cases also take forever.

A case where a person died on a river trip in Arizona was brought in Texas. Six years after the death the Texas Supreme Court sent the case to Arizona where it started all over again. Moki Mac River Expeditions, v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569; 2007 Tex. LEXIS 188; 50 Tex. Sup. J. 498

Of note in the decision but not brought out in the decision was the fact the defendant does not put a guide in every boat on this section of the Lehigh River. One of the claims made by the plaintiff was “a. Failing to provide a river guide / instructor in [McDonald’s] boat;…

For more articles on Jurisdiction and Venue see:

A Recent Colorado Supreme Court Decision lowers the requirements to be brought into the state to defend a lawsuit.                                                                                           

Buy something online and you may not have any recourse if it breaks or you are hurt

Four releases signed and all of them thrown out because they lacked one simple sentence!

Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection clauses) are extremely important in your releases.

Jurisdiction in Massachusetts allows a plaintiff to bring in Salomon France to the local court.

Shark Feeding Death triggers debate                                                        

The legal relationship created between manufactures and US consumers

This case is a summer camp lawsuit and the decision looks at venue and jurisdiction; however the complaint alleges medical malpractice against a camp!                         

What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn


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Church was not liable for injuries on a canoe trip because the church did not control the land along the river.

There can be no negligence if there is no duty; no control means no duty.

Clark, v. Lumbermans Mutual Insurance Company, 465 So. 2d 552; 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12832; 10 Fla. L. Weekly 596

State: Florida, Court of Appeal of Florida, First District

Plaintiff: John Clark

Defendant: Lumbermans Mutual Insurance Company and Orange Park Assembly of God

Plaintiff Claims: duty to warn of the shallowness of the water in the beach area, failed to determine in advance the safe and unsafe areas to swim along the St. Mary’s River, and failed to point out proper sites for swimming and diving by the trip members, failed to adequately supervise the canoeing trip

Defendant Defenses: No duty

Holding: for the defendant

Year: 1985

This is a simple and sad case. A church organized a canoe trip through a livery. One of the obvious benefits of a summer canoe trip was swimming and playing in the water. The plaintiff and his friend in their canoe got to a beach first, beached their canoe and dove into the water.

The friend dove into the water first, and the plaintiff followed in the same direction and dove second. The plaintiff’s dive was different, not a shallow dive. He broke his neck and rendered himself a quadriplegic.

There were no obstructions in the water where the accident occurred and the 21-year-old plaintiff was knowledgeable about water sports and activities.

The plaintiff sued the church and the church’s insurance company. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The canoe livery was not part of this suit, and it is unknown if they were ever defendants. This appeal followed.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The basics of the plaintiff’s claims were the defendant church organized the trip. Therefore, they were responsible of all aspects of the trip. That control allegedly included the land along the trip as well as the participants. The plaintiff was 21 and argued the church was in control of him, even though he acted without the church’s knowledge or consent and before the “church” through an assistant minister arrived on the scene.

The court first went through the steps under Florida’s law to determine the requirements to dismiss a case. Motions to dismiss are rarely granted.

In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action, the defendant must show either no negligence on his part proximately resulting in injury to the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injury. 

Negligence requires more than the mere occurrence of an accident.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant church was in control of the trip, acting as a guide for the trip and by allowing he to access the beach was liable as a landowner for the beach. The plaintiff argued defendant church constructively possessed the beach.

The court did not accept this argument because the plaintiff arrived at the beach first and before the leader of the trip; the assistant minister who was a paid employee, arrived minutes later. Upon the “church’s” arrival no one tried to exercise defacto control over the beach or the activity which argued was control over the beach.

The next argument was the church was liable for not making sure the beach was safe. However, the plaintiff found the beach and dove without the church’s permission. On top of that, there were not obstructions in the river, which would make the beach or river unsafe.

The court also looked at the age of the plaintiff. The plaintiff “possessed sufficient maturity to appreciate the danger, and was not in a dependency relationship with the appellee church.”

Another argument was the one that created concern and interest. “Appellant also maintains that the church assumed a duty of due care by voluntarily acting as a “tour guide” in organizing and conducting the canoeing trip upon which appellant was injured…”

A prior case Florida case on appeal had held a tour service liable for the accident that occurred in a museum because they had the ability to check out where the tour was going. This legal theory is based on “an action undertaken for the benefit of another, even if performed gratuitously, must be performed in accordance with the duty to exercise due care.”

The court held that the tour company was a common carrier in the other decision, and it did not apply in this case because the circumstances did not create a duty on the part of the church. The liability of a common carrier is the highest owed to a party. Common carriers are usually defined as airlines, trains those transportation services where the customer has no ability to protect themselves or control their situation. The court also found:

Even assuming, arguendo, that the church owed a duty of adequate supervision to appellant, the breach of which would render it liable for ordinary negligence, appellant can be barred from recovery if his own action in diving into the shallow water was the sole proximate cause of his accident.

This statement sounds like an assumption of the risk argument, but is actually a duty statement. There is no liability, unless there is a duty. There cannot be a duty when one is acting on one’s own. “A plaintiff is barred from recovering damages for loss or injury caused by the negligence of another only when the plaintiff’s negligence is the sole legal cause of the damage.”

So Now What?

Sad when a young man spends the rest of his live in a wheel chair. However, the actions that caused his injuries were solely those of his own doing.

The argument that you are a guide when you undertake to organize a trip was interesting. A lot of this would hinge on how you are accomplishing this, what you were saying to get the trip put together. It is important when creating outings or trips like this to identify the responsibilities of the parties. Identify in advance, who is responsible for what. You should always identify that adults are always responsible for themselves.

That division of responsibility is best explained in writing and accepted in writing by the customer. That document is normally called a release.

The way you outline the responsibilities you or the organization you represent when you start organizing a trip will create the duties you will owe. The younger the people on the trip, (kids), and the more the people rely on your statements, the greater the chance you will be held to a duty. If you imply you are creating a duty, then you have created a duty and you will be liable for breaching that duty.

The bigger issue is the assigning of a greater duty by the courts based upon the type of tour being offered. You need to identify in advance that your actions in moving your customers from one location to the activity are done as part of the activity, not as a common carrier. Your liability in the transportation is incidental to the activity, or you may be held to a higher standard of care for all parts of the activity.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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Clark, v. Lumbermans Mutual Insurance Company, 465 So. 2d 552; 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12832; 10 Fla. L. Weekly 596

Clark, v. Lumbermans Mutual Insurance Company, 465 So. 2d 552; 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12832; 10 Fla. L. Weekly 596

John Clark, Appellant, v. Lumbermans Mutual Insurance Company and Orange Park Assembly of God, Appellees

No. AU-168

Court of Appeal of Florida, First District

465 So. 2d 552; 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12832; 10 Fla. L. Weekly 596

March 7, 1985

COUNSEL: Adam H. Lawrence of Lawrence & Daniels, Miami; and Brent M. Turbow, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Charles Cook Howell, III of Howell, Liles, Braddock & Milton, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

JUDGES: Smith, L., J. Mills and Nimmons, JJ., concur.



[*553] John Clark, plaintiff below, appeals a final summary judgment in favor of the appellees in this negligence action. After an examination of the whole record, we conclude that no interpretation of the undisputed material facts would support a finding of liability for negligence on the part of the appellee Orange Park Assembly of God (hereinafter “church”). We affirm.

The following facts, taken from depositions filed in this cause, are germane to this appeal. Appellant suffered a broken neck and was rendered a quadriplegic during a diving accident on the St. Mary’s River, located in Nassau County, Florida. The accident occurred during a canoe trip and picnic sponsored, planned and conducted by the appellee church. The church had hired Mr. Gary Hines to be its “minister of youth.” Hines, [**2] a paid, full-time employee of the church, was to direct and coordinate the activities of the church’s youthful members. The trip in question took place June 13, 1981. Its logistics were planned and coordinated by Hines. Approximately 40 to 50 people, including appellant, ultimately participated in the trip. Appellant, a high school graduate, was twenty-one years of age at the time of his injury. He was, in his own words, in excellent health, a good swimmer who was familiar with various water sports.

On the day of appellant’s accident, trip members were transported by church bus and van to a canoe rental establishment located on the St. Mary’s River called the Canoe Outpost. Hines did not attempt extensive instructions to trip members regarding canoe operation or the physical characteristics of the river they were about to traverse. Trip members were instructed by Hines that suitable beaches for swimming existed on the river; however, Hines acknowledged that he had not made inquiries prior to the trip as to the location or suitability of any of the river’s beaches.

During the trip, appellant and a canoeing companion, Lee Brannen, sighted what they thought was a suitable place [**3] for swimming, and beached their canoes. Brannen testified that he ran out into the water approximately three steps and then executed a shallow, racing-type dive into the water, which was approximately chest deep on Brannen, who was six feet one inch tall. Brannen testified he felt it would be “crazy” to attempt a “deep dive,” as he had not yet ascertained the exact depth of the water. Appellant then attempted to execute a similar dive, following what both he and Brannen testified was essentially the same path Brannen had taken in making his dive. Both testified that appellant’s dive differed from Brannen’s. Brannen testified that appellant had not run as far into the water as Brannen had, and that appellant jumped somewhat higher prior to the dive in a manner Brannen characterized as a “piking” of appellant’s body, with the result that appellant’s head and arms preceded the rest of his body into the water. Unfortunately, the result of appellant’s attempted dive was a broken neck and consequent paralysis. The record is unclear as to what, exactly, caused appellant’s injuries, since appellant was unable to state categorically that he hit his head on the river bottom as a result [**4] of his dive. However, all deponents testified that the river bottom area where appellant dove was clear of obstructions.

Appellant instituted the pending action alleging, among other things, that the appellee church had violated its duty to warn of the shallowness of the water in the beach area, where appellant had attempted his dive, failed to determine in advance the safe and unsafe areas to swim along the [*554] St. Mary’s River, and failed to point out proper sites for swimming and diving by the trip members. Appellant also alleged that the church had failed to adequately supervise the canoeing trip.

Appellees moved for summary judgment, asserting that the church breached no legal duty owed the appellant; that appellant had actual knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition of the beach where his accident occurred; and that appellant’s actions constituted the sole proximate cause of his injury. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that the beach area where appellant’s accident occurred contained no latent or unknown dangers; that the appellee church did not breach any legal duty owed the appellant; and that appellant’s actions were the [**5] sole proximate cause of his injury. This appeal followed.

We are governed by certain well known principles applicable in negligence actions. [HN1] Issues of negligence and probable cause will normally be answerable only by a jury, and not by motion for summary judgment, unless the facts adduced “point to but one possible conclusion.” Cassel v. Price, 396 So.2d 258, 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (citations omitted), rev. den. mem., 407 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 1981). In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action, the defendant must show either no negligence on his part proximately resulting in injury to the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injury. Goode v. Walt Disney World Co., 425 So.2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), rev. den. mem., 436 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1983). However, as often stated, “the mere occurrence of an accident does not give rise to an inference of negligence, and is not sufficient for a finding of negligence on the part of anyone.” Cassel v. Price, supra, at 264 (citations omitted). Judged by these standards, we find that the trial court correctly granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment.

[**6] Initially, we find without merit appellant’s attempt to affix liability based upon breach of a duty of due care by the church as a “possessor” or “occupier” of land. Appellant contends that the church, by allowing appellant and other members of the trip to utilize the beach where appellant was injured, constructively “possessed” this portion of the beach area, citing Arias v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 426 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We disagree. In Arias, the plaintiff was injured after a “john boat” in which she was a passenger collided with a partially submerged diving dock located in a lake directly in front of lakefront property owned by a defendant on Lake Hampton, in Bradford County. The defendant in Arias argued that since the land beneath the lake was owned by the state, rather than by the defendant, he was not in a position to exercise control over the land upon which the submerged dock rested, and hence he owed the plaintiff no duty to warn of the hazard. The Arias court rejected this contention, stating:

[HN2] The liability of an occupant of real property for injuries caused by an alleged dangerous defective condition on the premises [**7] depends generally upon his control of the property, regardless of whether he had title thereto, or whether he has a superior right to possession of property which is in the possession and control of another. (citation omitted)

Id. at 1138.

There are no facts in this case which would tend to satisfy the elements of “possession” or “control” which led to the court’s decision in Arias. The facts in Arias were that the nearly submerged dock was located several hundred feet directly in front of the defendant’s lakefront property, and that while it was located in the lake before defendant bought the property, the defendant had modified it by placing a thin shelled cement surface on the dock. The Arias court held that it could not be determined, as a matter of law, that the defendant had “failed to maintain the requisite control over the boat dock.” 426 So.2d at 1138. Here, by contrast, the church had no actual or constructive “presence” at the beach prior to the accident. [*555] Appellant and Brannen were the first two canoeists to reach the beach, and hence “occupy” it. Hines arrived a number of minutes after the appellant and other members of the group, [**8] and made no attempt to exercise “de facto” control over the beach or over activities on the beach.

Moreover, the view that potential liability may exist under facts such as found in Arias is premised upon the existence of a hidden danger of which the land owner or occupier has or should have superior knowledge, as compared to the injured party. Here, no evidence was produced to establish the existence of any hidden dangers at the situs of the accident. It was uncontradicted that the river bottom and the beach contained no rocks or obstructions. Nor can the depth of the water itself have been considered a hidden danger, since both appellant and Brannen testified that they were well aware of its relatively shallow depth. Switzer v. Dye, 177 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965). Appellant testified that he was aware of the danger of diving into shallow water, and was aware that the water depth at the beach where he was injured was indeed properly characterized as shallow. Hence, there existed in the case at bar no “hidden danger” so as to trigger the rule in Arias.

We think the same result is required here if the potential liability of the church is considered in relation [**9] to its duty to investigate the river for dangerous conditions. The “harmful condition” of the beach (assuming, without accepting, the correctness of this characterization by appellant) was recognized and hence was obvious to all who testified below. Therefore, no breach of duty occurred, since the “harmful condition” was in fact obvious to appellant, who indisputably possessed sufficient maturity to appreciate the danger, and was not in a dependency relationship with the appellee church. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. den., 446 U.S. 909, 100 S. Ct. 1836, 64 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1980); cf. Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1982) (school children between the ages of seventeen and eighteen considered to be under an in loco parentis relationship vis-a-vis school officials).

Appellant also maintains that the church assumed a duty of due care by voluntarily acting as a “tour guide” in organizing and conducting the canoeing trip upon which appellant was injured, citing Kaufman v. A-1 Bus Lines, Inc., 416 So.2d 863 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (Kaufman II). There, the plaintiff was injured when she fell off a cat-walk while touring a museum visited by [**10] tour groups sponsored by the defendant. The Third District had previously affirmed the Kaufman trial court’s dismissal of Ms. Kaufman’s initial complaint, but did so without prejudice to her right to file an amended complaint alleging defendant’s actual knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition that caused her injury. Kaufman v. A-1 Bus Lines, Inc., 363 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (Kaufman I). Subsequently, Ms. Kaufman filed an amended complaint alleging that the defendant’s actual knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition causing her injury created a duty to warn on the defendant’s part. The court in Kaufman II found that the defendant could be held liable for negligence while acting as a tour guide, based on the well-known proposition that [HN3] an action undertaken for the benefit of another, even if performed gratuitously, must be performed in accordance with the duty to exercise due care. 416 So. 2d at 864; see also Padgett v. School Board of Escambia County, 395 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

We agree with appellant that a church’s sponsorship and organization of a canoeing trip could give rise to a legal duty to exercise reasonable care in exercising [**11] these responsibilities. Padgett, supra. We observe, however, that Kaufman II is distinguishable from the case at bar due to the Kaufman II defendant’s status as a common carrier. Furthermore, in view of the undisputed evidence concerning the circumstances under which the accident occurred, we do not find it necessary to examine the [*556] extent of the church’s duty in this case, or to categorize the relationship between plaintiff and defendant here, which would otherwise guide our decision in determining whether the church carried its burden of showing the absence of evidence indicating a breach of duty by the church causing injury to appellant, as required to entitle it to summary judgment. 1

1 Cf., Section 768.13, Florida Statutes (1981), the “Good Samaritan Act,” with commercial transactions (Kaufman II, the “tour guide” situation) and dependency relationships (Rupp; schools in an in loco parentis relationship with students).

Even assuming, arguendo, that the church [**12] owed a duty of adequate supervision to appellant, the breach of which would render it liable for ordinary negligence, appellant can be barred from recovery if his own action in diving into the shallow water was the sole proximate cause of his accident. Phillips v. Styers, 388 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), quoting Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973): ” [HN4] A plaintiff is barred from recovering damages for loss or injury caused by the negligence of another only when the plaintiff’s negligence is the sole legal cause of the damage.” We hold that appellant was properly barred from proceeding further with his claim because the evidence below is susceptible to no conclusion other than that he had sufficient intelligence, experience, and knowledge to – and in fact did – both detect and appreciate the physical characteristics of the swimming place in question and the potential danger involved in attempting his shallow water dive. See, Lister v. Campbell, 371 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), Hughes v. Roarin 20’s, Inc., 455 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). 2

2 See, also, Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67, 166 S.E.2d 89 (1969), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 922, 91 S. Ct. 192, 27 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1970) (church and its representatives held not liable for negligent supervision of Sunday school picnic at lake resort during which youth drowned while attempting to swim from platform in deep water back to shore).

[**13] For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below is



Are you a Guide? Great a Great Story to Tell?

My name is Chris Solomon, and I need your very best guide story.

Let me explain:

I’m a contributing editor at Outside magazine, based up in Seattle, and I’m also a frequent writer for the New York Times, Scientific American, Runner’s World and other rags.

Outside has asked me to tackle a large story for spring tentatively entitled, ‘The tales guides tell.’ I’ve had the good fortune to spend some time with guides over the years—both while on assignment and because I have guides who are friends. I know that they have really interesting stories to tell. Simply put, we want to capture the very best of the tales that guides tell each other over beers back at the bar, once their clients have all gone home.

To that end, I’m looking for the hilarious stories. The absurd stories. The X-rated stories. The truly surreal and/or bizarre stories. The heartbreaking tales and maybe even sometimes the tragic stories. I’m not looking for a sort-of entertaining story, I’m looking for the absolute one tale you’ve got that sticks with you above all the others.

I don’t need to tell you that guides—whether fishing- , canoe- , rafting-, mountain-, ski- guides—are the essence of outdoor culture. You are out there more than any of us, dealing not only with Mother Nature, but you’re also out there dealing with true wildlife—which is to say, other human beings.

We want to collect perhaps a dozen or more of the best stories into a large package for a spring issue; they’ll range from small (a few sentences) to large (perhaps 1,500 words), and told in guides’ own words as much as possible… so you’d have a chance to go over the story with me and make sure it sounds right to you.

This idea will only work if I find truly top-shelf anecdotes, though. So I need the VERY BEST that are out there.

And to be clear: My goal is not to embarrass others. I can grant anonymity to clients. I don’t necessarily need to mention employers. I don’t always need to mention who you are—though I do hope to have many of these stories attributed, lest readers think I invented them. In short, if you’ve got an amazing story but your worry is being identified, let’s talk. We can figure something out.

I DON’T need you to write out the whole story! Just give me a sense of what the story is, and why it is so great or compelling. And we could then talk about it over the phone and I can do all the typing/transcribing of your story! Less work for you!

OR, do you know a guide who’s got the best story you’ve ever heard? Tell me who he/she is, and tell me how to reach him. Or put the guide in touch with me: solochris

Thanks so much. Please reply to me in the next few days with maybe just a line or two about your story—and when I could call you to talk about it and jot it down in more detail.

Thanks so much. I really appreciate your help in making this a collection that will even surprise guides with how entertaining and interesting it is.

Thanks so much for your help.

Chris Solomon



347-556-6364 cell

If you throw a throwbag incorrectly (yes there is now a right way and wrong way) that can be used to sue you. It used to be the correct way was the swimmer got the rope; incorrect way swimmer missed the rope.

Yo! Raft guides, ever been sued? New ASTM standard will now make that possible!

Well meaning, hardworking volunteers have no idea how they are helping to create lawsuits but here is the perfect example.

ASTM F1730 – 96(2014)

Standard Guide for Throwing a Water Rescue Throwbag

Active Standard ASTM F1730 | Developed by Subcommittee: F32.02

Book of Standards Volume:13.02

Here is how this standard is explained.

Significance and Use

3.1 This guide establishes a recommended procedure for a throwing rescue to ensure the safety of all water rescuers who may be involved in rescue techniques at a water rescue emergency.

3.2 This water rescue technique can be utilized from land, boat, or any stable platform.

3.3 All persons who are identified as water rescuers shall meet the requirements of this guide.

3.4 This guide is intended to assist government agencies, state, local, and regional organizations; fire departments; rescue teams and others who are responsible for establishing a minimum performance for personnel who respond to water emergencies.

3.5 The procedure outlined in the document may vary with the number and type of victims, and water conditions.

1. Scope

1.1 This guide covers the recommended procedures for throwing a water rescue throwbag.

1.2 This guide is one in a series of water rescue techniques for the water rescuer.

1.3 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety and health practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.

Does this apply to raft guides? I would say yes.

Is a raft guide a “water rescuer” who may be involved in rescue techniques at a water rescue emergency.” If so you have to meet the requirements of this guide.

Do you know the name of a group of people who meet this definition? “…others who are responsible for establishing a minimum performance for personnel….” They are called a jury.

Let’s see how this is a messed up idea.

You were a high school quarterback with a good arm. You can throw a throwbag just like a football with great accuracy.

You are right-handed and standing on shore next to a rock wall. There is not room to throw the throwbag underhanded.

You are on a 12’ raft in the Royal Gorge on the Arkansas River. Does the definition of 3.2, which describes a boat as stable apply to you? Since your boat is not stable should you knot use your throwbag? Are you allowed to throw any way you can, if you are not stable?

Seriously, why is someone writing these things? Can’t they see how broadly this is written and how much damage it will do?

Look, someone is in the river it doesn’t matter if you are throwing the bag backwards, blindfolded standing on one leg in a pink tutu. If you get the rope to the swimmer, that was the correct way!!!


What do you think? Leave a comment.

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Copyright 2014 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law


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By Recreation Law         James H. Moss         #Authorrank

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#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom,, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, ASTM, Throwbag, Throw Rope, Guide, Paddlesports, Whitewater Guide, Raft Guide, Rescuer, Water Rescue, Water Rescuer, American Society of Testing & Material,



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