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It is hard to understand the law because there are so many variations of the law and fifty different states with laws. It is harder to understand the law when the person explaining it to you is not a lawyer or worse, wrong.

It is hard to understand the law because there are so many variations of the law and fifty different states with laws. It is harder to understand the law when the person explaining it to you is not a lawyer or worse, wrong.

You don’t go to law school for fun. Law school is NOT fun. You go to law school to understand how the law works. Law School is just the first step. You must study and understand what is going on to understand an area of the law.

If you did not go to law school, and you need legal help, ask a lawyer.

I got a question the other day from a client. He was preparing to give a speech to a group of lodge owners and wanted to make sure he was going to say the right thing about the Good Samaritan Act. He had read a lot of websites and particularly one website and thought he understood the issues.

He did not. Neither did the websites. In fact, one of the websites, which was based on the course and book he had just taken described what the Good Samaritan law was based for that course. The course, book and class were wrong too.

My client was off, and the website was wrong. The problem is the wrong was enough to get you in trouble as a professional, program college or business.

You really need to beware of non-lawyers telling you what the law says.

First, there is not one Good Samaritan Law, there are at least fifty, in reality, there are more than 150. Each state has its own Good Samaritan law. Many states have many different laws covering rescue, first aid, AED use, the Heimlich maneuver and other aspects of providing support to injured people without becoming liable.

Everyone explains the Good Samaritan law as you are not liable if you help someone in need and are not paid for that help. Sort of.

All the following are requirements from different state Good Samaritan laws. You are covered…

  • If you have the right training
    • Some states list the training you must have
    • You follow the standards of a specific training organization (dependent upon the state).
      • American Red Cross
      • American Heart Association
      • National Safety Council
      • National Ski Patrol
      • Boy Scouts of America
      • A course as determined by the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene
      • Department of Public Health
      • director of health
      • mining enforcement and safety administration of the bureau of mines of the department of interior
      • Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services
  • If you don’t act outside the scope of your training
  • You act like a reasonable or ordinary prudent person
  • If you are not being paid for your services
  • You are not in a hospital or in some states on hospital grounds
  • You are a member of an organization that exists to provide emergency services
  • You act in good faith
  • You have been called to act by the county sheriff
  • You are paid but not to provide first aid, only to provide public services
  • You did not act willfully, wantonly or recklessly or by gross negligence
  • The care is provided at the scene of the accident
  • You are at work
  • You are not at work
  • You’ve been trained in the use of the AED
  • You’ve been trained in the use of the epinephrine
  • You are not the one that caused the injury or placed the person in peril
  • Or you have not obtained consent

You are NOT covered by Good Samaritan Laws in some states if….

  • “…or when incidental to a business relationship existing between the employer or principal of the person rendering such care…”
  • Shall not apply if the care inures to your employer
  • Where the person has not consented to the care
  • Are working as a guide or outfitter
    • Whether or Not you are being paid as a guide
      • If you are required to have 1st aid you are not covered
    • Whether or Not being paid as a physician
      • But some states allow you to be paid later as a physician
  • You placed the person in peril
    • Meaning any part of the trip as a guide

Just look at the requirement that the care be rendered at the scene of the accident. You are helping someone get out of the backcountry, and you adjust their band aid, away from the accident scene. In man states you are not covered by the state Good Samaritan act.

As a Guide are you covered by the Good Samaritan Act? NO!

My client’s confusion was the fine line between compensation for your services, and compensation as a guide or employee, because you are paid to provide first aid. Meaning as a guide, who may or may not be required to provide first aid or have first aid training, are you covered under the Good Samaritan law, if you provide first aid training to one of your guests. In most cases no.

There is no Good Samaritan coverage if:

    You are employed and part of your job is to provide first aid

        Because you are required to have a level of first aid training

        The industry requires people to be trained in first aid

    The guest knows you are trained in first aid and relies on that knowledge you gave them

    The landowner or river owner requires it under a permit or concession

    You placed the guest in the peril that caused the injury.

        You picked the location where the guide is fishing

        You picked the route up the mountain

    You told the guest to follow the map you gave them on the ride or hike

You are a guide, and you took the client out; you are not covered by the Good Samaritan laws in most states.

You are a guide, the definition meaning you will take care of the client.

And the issues above are not changed in the Outdoor Recreation Industry by using Independent Contractors. In all cases, the guide and the outfitter are liable.

Consequently, a website, class or book cannot in one paragraph tell you whether your actions are going to be covered by the Good Samaritan law.

I hope you are covered by the Good Samaritan law, but find out for sure.

Do Something

It sucks but getting legal advice from someone other than attorney does not work.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

Copyright 2018 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision on duty to have and use an AED defines how statutes are to be interpreted and when liability can attach and cannot attach to a statute.

The law that creates a safe harbor from civil liability for being a Good Samaritan does not create a duty to act. There still is no legal requirement to act as a Good Samaritan, however, if you do, you cannot be sued.

Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc, 571 Pa. 580; 812 A.2d 1218; 2002 Pa. LEXIS 2832

State: Pennsylvania, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Plaintiff: Jerry Atcovitz and Roslyn Atcovitz

Defendant: Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc, Jkst, Inc. and Gulph Mills/Jkst Tennis Club, Inc., Lafayette Ambulance Rescue Squad I

Plaintiff Claims: whether a tennis club owes a duty of care to its members to acquire and maintain an automated external defibrillator, hereinafter “AED,” on its premises for emergency use

Defendant Defenses: No duty

Holding: for the defendant Tennis Club

Year: 2002

The plaintiff was playing tennis at the defendant tennis club. While playing he suffered a stroke which was secondary to a heart attack. Within one minute tennis club, members started CPR on the plaintiff and ten minutes later an ambulance arrived. The ambulance administered defibrillation and transported the plaintiff to the hospital.

The plaintiff had a history of heart problems for twenty years, including a previous heart attack and bypass surgery. The tennis club did not know of the plaintiff’s medical history.

The heart attack and stroke left the defendant unable to concentrate or think, is unable to walk or get out of bed and requires assistance in all aspects of his life.

The plaintiff and his wife sued the defendant tennis club for not having an AED and not using it: “…had [Gulph Mills] possessed an AED device and used it on [Atcovitz] promptly, his injuries would have been significantly less and; therefore, that [Gulph Mills] is liable to him for damages.”

The plaintiff’s moved for summary judgment to prevent the defendant from asserting the defenses. The defendant then cross filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted. The case was appealed and the Pennsylvania Appellate court, called the Superior Court, reversed. The case was then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Between the incident that plaintiff suffered and the decision by the trial court to dismiss the Pennsylvania legislature passed an AED Good Samaritan Act. The Appellate court based some of the reasoning for its decision on the AED Good Samaritan Act the legislature passed.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The court started out by defining the specific issues it would look at as well as the procedural definitions it must follow. This provides a clear look at how Pennsylvania courts make decisions.

The Supreme Court first reviewed the standard of review the court must use. “Our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or clearly abused its discretion.”

The court then reviewed under Pennsylvania law the requirements for granting a motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The reviewing court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party.   When the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, a trial court may properly enter summary judgment.

The court then defined the elements necessary to successfully plead a negligence claim under Pennsylvania.

The elements necessary to plead an action in negligence are: (1) the existence of a duty or obligation recognized by law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a failure on the part of the defendant to conform to that duty, or a breach thereof; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage suffered by the complainant.

The court then further defined the element of duty in a negligence case. “A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.

This definition was supported by the definition of duty in a legal treatise, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts. This is the book referenced by courts in defining the law.

These are shifting sands, and no fit foundation. There is a duty if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution, is what we make it. Duty is only a word with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily begs the essential question. When we find a duty, breach and damage, everything has been said. The word serves a useful purpose in directing attention to the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, rather than the causal sequence of events; beyond that it serves none. In the decision whether or not there is a duty, many factors interplay: The hand of history, our ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall. In the end, the court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the mores of the community, “always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind.”

The bad news issue the law changes as everything else in the US changes, Public policy and public opinion are just some of the factors that affect the law. The good news is the law attempts to stay current with the changing issues facing the law. Albeit a lot slower than most might wish, but it does change. “Thus, the legal concept of duty is necessarily rooted in often amorphous public policy considerations, which may include our perception of history, morals, justice, and society.”

The care as defined by a legal duty was further broken down by the court.

In Althaus, this Court enunciated several discrete factors, derived from the aforementioned principles, that our courts are to balance  [HN6] in determining whether a common law duty of care exists: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the actor’s conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution.

Thus the court takes in other issues in looking at determining how a case is to be decided, however, the law and prior decisions come first. Making a change requires major commitment by the courts to go down a different path and dismiss the prior cases leading down the old path. Consequently, you rarely see these changes, what you do see is slight modifications of the direction the path is taking.

Major changes are left to the legislature to respond more quickly to the issues facing the public. In this case, the court looked at the legislatures’ intent in creating an AED Good Samaritan Act.

…the overall public interest in the proposed solution. The Legislature’s enactments and the ensuing regulations reveal that acquisition, maintenance, and use of an AED, along with AED training requirements, are highly regulated. Where our lawmakers have so thoroughly considered the statewide application and implications of a subject, this Court must refrain from imposing additional requirements upon that legislation.

The appellate court used the newly enacted AED Good Samaritan Act to hold the defendant liable. The Supreme Court looked at the act differently in relation to this decision. The Supreme Court saw the act as proof that the legislature intended the issues surrounding AEDs was highly regulated. “Rather, they are relevant to demonstrate that the acquisition, maintenance, and use of an AED, along with AED training requirements, are highly regulated.”

When reviewing an act, the information within the law enacted by the legislature is the only information that can be reviewed. Anything not included in the act is therefore excluded from the analysis. “We must infer that,  [HN11] under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of a specific matter in a statute implies the exclusion of other matters.

The AED Act provides immunity for trained AED users and immunity for untrained users who use an AED in good faith.

The AED Good Samaritan Act, which was adopted two years after Atcovitz sustained his injuries, provides civil immunity for trained users of AEDs and requires that  [HN12] “expected users shall complete training in the use of an AED. . . .” As an exception to that general rule, the AED Good Samaritan Act also provides civil immunity to untrained individuals who, in good faith, use an AED in an emergency as an ordinary, reasonably prudent individual would do under the same or similar circumstances. Significantly, the AED Good Samaritan Act defines “good faith” as including “a reasonable opinion that the immediacy of the situation is such that the use of an AED should not be postponed until emergency medical services personnel arrive or the person is hospitalized.”

The act, consequently, only creates a safe harbor for using an AED. It does not create liability for someone who does not use an AED.

Thus, the AED Good Samaritan Act merely creates an exception for imposing liability on an untrained individual who uses an AED in limited emergency situations; it does not authorize its use by any such individual.

In addition, it does not indicate that the Legislature aimed to dispense with the regulations governing the training and use of AEDs. Simply, the existence of a civil immunity provision for Good Samaritans who use an AED in an emergency situation cannot impose a duty on a business establishment to ac-quire, maintain, and use such a device on its premises.

The act cannot, then be used to create liability for not using an AED; it only removes liability for someone who does use an AED.

Neither the EMS Act nor the AED Good Samaritan Act imposed a duty upon Gulph Mills to acquire, maintain, and use an AED. Appellees do not cite any other case, statute, or regulation that would have imposed such a duty on Gulph Mills at the time of Atcovitz’s injuries in January 1996. Because Gulph Mills did not owe a duty to carry an AED, Appellees could not have established a prima facie claim of negligence.

There was a dissenting opinion, in this case. The dissent agreed with the majority opinion; it disagreed on how broad the decision was and thought several of the issues should be sent back for review by the trial court.

So Now What?

First understand there is a difference between what is moral, ethical and legal. My job is not to help you decide those issues. My job is to help you understand the law when you are faced with the issues. You can be morally and ethically right and be sued and lose. You can have no morals or ethics and be sued and lose. How you balance those aspects of your life, how you approach the issues you face in your life is not the subject of these articles. How the law applies to the facts set forth in the specific cases may affect your choices is what the article is about.

The good news is the decision prevents lawsuits for not having an AED or using an AED in Pennsylvania.

This case also defines how it would look at the reverse. If the law restricted the use of a device, the application of the law would not only allow for civil liability but possibly criminal liability also.

clip_image002What do you think? Leave a comment.

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By Recreation Law           Rec-law@recreation-law.com     James H. Moss

 

 

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Pennsylvania Good Samaritan Act

Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes

Title 42.  Judiciary and Judicial Procedure

Part VII.  Civil Actions and Proceedings

Chapter 83.  Particular Rights and Immunities

Subchapter C.  Immunities Generally

42 Pa.C.S. § 8331 (2016)

§ 8331.  Medical good Samaritan civil immunity.

(a) General rule. —

Any physician or any other practitioner of the healing arts or any registered nurse, licensed by any state, who happens by chance upon the scene of an emergency or who arrives on the scene of an emergency by reason of serving on an emergency call panel or similar committee of a county medical society or who is called to the scene of an emergency by the police or other duly constituted officers of a government unit or who is present when an emergency occurs and who, in good faith, renders emergency care at the scene of the emergency, shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such physician or practitioner or registered nurse in rendering the emergency care, except any acts or omissions intentionally designed to harm or any grossly negligent acts or omissions which result in harm to the person receiving emergency care.

(b) Definition. —

As used in this section “good faith” shall include, but is not limited to, a reasonable opinion that the immediacy of the situation is such that the rendering of care should not be postponed until the patient is hospitalized.

HISTORY: Act 1976-142 (S.B. 935), P.L. 586, § 2, approved July 9, 1976, See section of this act for effective date information.

NOTES:

EDITOR’S NOTES.

Section 2 of Act 1976-142 enacted new subchapter C, “Immunities Generally.”

1. Neither the Emergency Medical Services Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §§ 6921 to 6938, nor the AED Good Samaritan Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8331.2, imposed a duty upon a tennis club to acquire, maintain, and use an automated external defibrillator, as defined in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8331.2(f), and summary judgment was properly entered against a tennis player who suffered a stroke while playing tennis and sought damages for the club’s negligence in failing to have a defibrillator available for such an emergency. Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580, 812 A.2d 1218, 2002 Pa. LEXIS 2832 (Pa. 2002).

2. Good Samaritan statute did not apply to a situation where a doctor received a telephone call from a hospital and provided advice for treatment of a hospitalized patient who was suffering from respiratory difficulties; the statute did not provide the doctor with a defense to an action resulting from the death of the patient and the doctor’s summary judgment motion was denied. The Good Samaritan statute did not apply because the doctor was not at the scene of an emergency, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 8331(a), and § 8331(b) implied that the statute did not apply to hospitalized patients. Phebus v. UPMC Horizon, 71 Pa. D. & C.4th 513, 2005 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 68 (Pa. County Ct. 2005).

3. Neither the Emergency Medical Services Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §§ 6921 to 6938, nor the AED Good Samaritan Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8331.2, imposed a duty upon a tennis club to acquire, maintain, and use an automated external defibrillator, as defined in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8331.2(f), and summary judgment was properly entered against a tennis player who suffered a stroke while playing tennis and sought damages for the club’s negligence in failing to have a defibrillator available for such an emergency. Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580, 812 A.2d 1218, 2002 Pa. LEXIS 2832 (Pa. 2002).

4. Good Samaritan statute did not apply to a situation where a doctor received a telephone call from a hospital and provided advice for treatment of a hospitalized patient who was suffering from respiratory difficulties; the statute did not provide the doctor with a defense to an action resulting from the death of the patient and the doctor’s summary judgment motion was denied. The Good Samaritan statute did not apply because the doctor was not at the scene of an emergency, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 8331(a), and § 8331(b) implied that the statute did not apply to hospitalized patients. Phebus v. UPMC Horizon, 71 Pa. D. & C.4th 513, 2005 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 68 (Pa. County Ct. 2005).

5. Neither the Emergency Medical Services Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §§ 6921 to 6938, nor the AED Good Samaritan Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8331.2, imposed a duty upon a tennis club to acquire, maintain, and use an automated external defibrillator, as defined in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8331.2(f), and summary judgment was properly entered against a tennis player who suffered a stroke while playing tennis and sought damages for the club’s negligence in failing to have a defibrillator available for such an emergency. Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580, 812 A.2d 1218, 2002 Pa. LEXIS 2832 (Pa. 2002).

3943. 14-246 Pennsylvania Transaction Guide–Legal Forms § 246.31, Division 1 Individuals and Families, Standard of Care Owed by Health Care Providers.

3944. 38 P.L.E. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS § 25, Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia, Acts or Omissions Constituting Malpractice, Copyright 2013, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.


Pennsylvania AED Good Samaritan Act

Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes

Title 42.  Judiciary and Judicial Procedure

Part VII.  Civil Actions and Proceedings

Chapter 83.  Particular Rights and Immunities

Subchapter C.  Immunities Generally

42 Pa.C.S. § 8331.2 (2016)

§ 8331.2.  Good Samaritan civil immunity for use of automated external defibrillator.

(a) General rule. —

Any person who in good faith acquires and maintains an AED or uses an AED in an emergency shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by an individual using the AED, except if acts or omissions intentionally designed to harm or any grossly negligent acts or omissions result in harm to the individual receiving the AED treatment.

(b) Requirements. —

Any person who acquires and maintains an AED for use in accordance with this section shall:

(1) Ensure that expected AED users receive training pursuant to subsection (c).

(2) Maintain and test the AED according to the manufacturer’s operational guidelines.

(3) Provide instruction requiring the user of the AED to utilize available means to immediately contact and activate the emergency medical services system.

(4) Assure that any appropriate data or information is made available to emergency medical services personnel or other health care providers as requested.

(c) Training. —

For purposes of this section, expected AED users shall complete training in the use of an AED consistent with American Red Cross, American Heart Association or other national standards as identified and approved by the Department of Health in consultation with the Pennsylvania Emergency Health Services Council.

(d) Obstruction of emergency medical services personnel. —

Nothing in this section shall relieve a person who uses an AED from civil damages when that person obstructs or interferes with care and treatment being provided by emergency medical services personnel or a health professional.

(e) Exception. —

Any individual who lacks the training set forth in subsection (c) but who has access to an AED and in good faith uses an AED in an emergency as an ordinary, reasonably prudent individual would do under the same or similar circumstances shall receive immunity from civil damages as set forth in subsection (a).

(f) Definitions. —

As used in this section, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:

“Automated external defibrillator” or “AED.” –A portable device that uses electric shock to restore a stable heart rhythm to an individual in cardiac arrest.

“Emergency.” –A situation where an individual is believed to be in cardiac arrest or is in need of immediate medical attention to prevent death or serious injury.

“Good faith.” –Includes a reasonable opinion that the immediacy of the situation is such that the use of an AED should not be postponed until emergency medical services personnel arrive or the person is hospitalized.

HISTORY: Act 1998-126 (H.B. 1897), P.L. 949, § 11, approved Dec. 15, 1998, eff. Jan. 1, 1999; Act 2012-125 (S.B. 351), P.L. 1081, § 1, approved July 5, 2012, eff. in 60 days.

NOTES:

AMENDMENT NOTES.

The 2012 amendment rewrote (a); deleted “not be liable for civil damages provided that the person” at the end of the introductory language of (b); rewrote (c), which formerly read: “For purposes of this section, expected AED users shall complete training in the use of an AED provided by the American National Red Cross or the American Heart Association or through an equivalent course of instruction approved by the Department of Health in consultation with a technical committee of the Pennsylvania Emergency Health Services Council”; deleted (e); in (f), substituted “or is” for “and” in the definition of “Emergency”; and made related changes.

Go back to the top of LexisNexis (R) NotesCASE NOTES

1. Trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of a tennis club in a negligence action by a stroke victim because neither the Emergency Medical Services Act nor the Good Samaritan Act imposed a duty upon the club to acquire, maintain, and use an automated external defibrillator. Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580, 812 A.2d 1218, 2002 Pa. LEXIS 2832 (Pa. 2002).

2. Unpublished decision: Court recommended the affirmance of its decision granting judgment to a health club in an executor’s suit brought after the club’s patron collapsed and died after suffering sudden cardiac arrest while exercising at the club. While the executor maintained that the club had a duty to have an automated external defibrillator (AED) on its premises, the court rejected this contention, noting that, under binding state supreme court precedent, a sports club had no duty under the Emergency Medical Services Act or the Good Samaritan Act to acquire, maintain, or use an AED. Goldin v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., 2011 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 54 (Pa. C.P.), aff’d, 38 A.3d 931, 2011 Pa. Super. LEXIS 5470 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).

3946. Definitions, see20 Pa.C.S. § 5483.

3947. 28 Pa. Code § 1051.2(2014), PART EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES.

3948. 28 Pa. Code § 1051.51(2014), PART EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES.

3949. 36 P.L.E. NEGLIGENCE § 2, Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia, Duty To Exercise Care, Copyright 2013, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

3950. 6-LIV Remick’s Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court Practice § 54.01, CHAPTER LIV Health Care, Living Wills, Health Care Agents and Representatives, and Out-of-Hospital Nonresuscitation Act.

 


Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc, 571 Pa. 580; 812 A.2d 1218; 2002 Pa. LEXIS 2832

Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc, 571 Pa. 580; 812 A.2d 1218; 2002 Pa. LEXIS 2832

Jerry Atcovitz and Roslyn Atcovitz, H/W, v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc, Jkst, Inc. and Gulph Mills/Jkst Tennis Club, Inc., Lafayette Ambulance Rescue Squad I; appeal of: Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., Jkst, Inc. and Gulph Mills/Jkst Tennis Club

No. 29 EAP 2001

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

571 Pa. 580; 812 A.2d 1218; 2002 Pa. LEXIS 2832

April 8, 2002, Argued

December 20, 2002, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered January 16, 2001, at No. 3061 EDA 1999, reversing and remanding the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division, entered September 13, 1999, at No. 1357 January Term 1998. Trial Court Judge: Flora Barth Wolf, Judge. Intermediate Court Judges: Joseph A. Del Sole, President Judge, Joseph A. Hudock and Correale F. Stevens, JJ.

Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 2001 PA Super 16, 766 A.2d 1280, 2001 Pa. Super. LEXIS 16 (2001).

DISPOSITION: Reversed. Trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Gulph Mills affirmed.

COUNSEL: For Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., APPELLANT: Lucien R. Tharaud, Esq.

For Gulph Mills/JKST Tennis Club, Inc., APPELLANT: Charles W. Craven, Esq.

For Jerry Atcovitz and Rosyln Atcovitz, h/w, APPELLEE: Alfred Anthony Brown, Esq. and J. Craig Currie, Esq.

JUDGES: BEFORE: ZAPPALA, C.J., AND CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR AND EAKIN, JJ. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAPPALA. Mr. Justice Cappy files a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Nigro files a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Saylor joins.

OPINION BY: ZAPPALA

OPINION

[**1220] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAPPALA [*583]

We granted allowance of appeal in this case to determine whether a tennis club owes a duty of care to its members to acquire and maintain an automated external defibrillator, hereinafter “AED,” on its premises for emergency use. 1 For the reasons that follow, we hold that such clubs do not owe a duty to have an AED available on their premises.

1 An AED is [HN1] “[a] portable device that uses electric shock to restore a stable heart rhythm to an individual in cardiac arrest.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8331.2(f).

[***2] On January 16, 1996, Jerry Atcovitz suffered a stroke, secondary to a heart attack, while playing tennis at the Gulph Mills Tennis Club. 2 Within a minute of his collapse, two tennis club members administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation and called for an ambulance. Approximately ten minutes later, emergency medical technicians arrived and administered a series of defibrillation shocks with an AED and transported Atcovitz to a hospital. 3 Although he survived the incident, Atcovitz “sustained severe and permanent injuries, including anoxic encephalopathy with multiple permanent central nervous system disorders. He is no longer able to think or concentrate, is no longer able to walk or get out of bed unassisted, and requires assistance in virtually every aspect of his life.” R. 42a-43a.

2 Atcovitz was then sixty-four years old and had a twenty-year history of heart problems, including a previous heart attack and bypass surgery. Appellees do not assert that Gulph Mills had knowledge of such history.

3 Atcovitz did not respond to any of the AED shocks administered by the emergency medical technicians, but did subsequently respond to a transcutaneous pacemaker. From this, Gulph Mills remarks that Atcovitz was suffering from “atrial fibrillation,” as opposed to “ventricular fibrillation.” Thus, Gulph Mills implies that, even if Atcovitz would have received electrical defibrillation immediately after he collapsed, it would not have had any beneficial effect. Appellant’s Br. at 6; see also R. 30a, 147a-149a. This Court, however, must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in reviewing a grant of summary judgment. Thus, we must operate under the assumption that earlier use of an AED would have mitigated Atcovitz’s injuries.

[***3] [*584] Appellees, Jerry Atcovitz and his wife, Roslyn, sued Gulph Mills for negligence in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. 4 Specifically, they claimed that, “had [Gulph Mills] possessed an AED device and used it on [Atcovitz] promptly, his injuries would have been significantly less and, therefore, that [Gulph Mills] is liable to him for damages.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2. In its defense, Gulph Mills asserted that, at the time of Atcovitz’s injury, its employees would not have been permitted by law to use an AED.

4 Atcovitz also sued Lafayette Ambulance Rescue Squad, but the parties eventually agreed to dismissal of the rescue squad with prejudice. R. 111a-112a.

In an attempt to preclude Gulph Mills from asserting its defense, Appellees moved for partial summary judgment, which the trial court denied. Immediately prior to trial, however, Appellees orally moved for reconsideration of their motion. At the same time, Gulph Mills cross-moved [**1221] for summary judgment. 5 The trial court granted Gulph Mills’s [***4] cross-motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. The court based its grant of summary judgment on the Emergency Medical Services Act, 6 hereinafter the “EMS Act,” and the regulations issued pursuant thereto. The court concluded that, at the time of Atcovitz’s injury, Gulph Mills’s employees were legally prohibited from using an AED. Thus, the court held that Gulph Mills “cannot be held negligent for failure to use the device.” Trial Ct. Op. at 4.

5 The Superior Court, citing Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2, reproved the trial court for considering a motion for summary judgment on the day of trial. Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 2001 PA Super 16, 766 A.2d 1280, 1281 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001). The court’s admonition, however, seemed to overlook that the parties had agreed to reconsideration of Appellees’ motion and consideration of Gulph Mills’s cross-motion. R. 8a-14a. Indeed, the motions presented a pure question of law that would avoid the time and expense of trial if Gulph Mills prevailed, which, ultimately, it did.

6 Act of July 3, 1985, P.L. 164, No. 45, § 1, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 6921- 6938.

[***5] Appellees filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment. See Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 2001 PA Super 16, 766 A.2d 1280, [*585] 1281 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001). The court opined that the trial court’s reliance on the EMS Act was inappropriate because it was designed for and aimed at the administration of emergency services by trained and licensed professionals. As the EMS Act did not contain any provision addressing emergency actions by untrained lay persons, i.e., Gulph Mills’s employees, the court concluded that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment could not be supported by reference to the EMS Act or its implementing regulations.

The court also addressed the effect of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8331.2, hereinafter the “AED Good Samaritan Act,” which provides “Good Samaritan civil immunity” for use of an AED in certain instances. It specifically provides immunity for untrained individuals who, in good faith, use an AED in an emergency as an ordinary, reasonably prudent individual would do under the same or similar circumstances. Id. at § 8331.2(e). Although the [***6] AED Good Samaritan Act was enacted after Atcovitz’s injuries, the court found that its passage evinced the Legislature’s desire that use of AEDs not be restricted solely to trained professionals. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Gulph Mills’s motion for summary judgment. See Atcovitz, 766 A.2d at 1282. Subsequently, Gulph Mills petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal, which we granted. See Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 566 Pa. 656, 782 A.2d 541 (Pa. 2001) (table).

[HN2] This Court’s scope of review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary. Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 563 Pa. 359, 761 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa. 2000). Our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or clearly abused its discretion. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2; see also Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 565 Pa. 571, 777 A.2d 418, 429 (Pa. 2001). [***7] [*586] The reviewing court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Basile, 761 [**1222] A.2d at 1118. When the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, a trial court may properly enter summary judgment. Id. (citing Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 666 A.2d 245, 248 (Pa. 1995)).

[HN3] The elements necessary to plead an action in negligence are: (1) the existence of a duty or obligation recognized by law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a failure on the part of the defendant to conform to that duty, or a breach thereof; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage suffered by the complainant. Orner v. Mallick, 515 Pa. 132, 527 A.2d 521, 523 (Pa. 1987) (citing Morena v. South Hills Health Sys., 501 Pa. 634, 462 A.2d 680, 684 n.5 (Pa. 1983)); see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30 at 164 (5th ed. 1984). Here, we must focus our analysis on [***8] the threshold element of duty. 7 Only therein may we resolve the fundamental question of whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct.

7 Appellees argue that the issue of duty was not considered by the lower courts and, therefore, may not be addressed by this Court. Appellees’ Br. at 4-5 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 302). Instead, Appellees assert that “the sole question under review is whether the law of this Commonwealth, at the time of Mr. Atcovitz’s cardiac arrest in January of 1996, made it illegal for Gulph Mills to have and use an [AED].” Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Appellees’ characterization of the issue is too narrowly focused. Gulph Mills’s illegality defense is a subsidiary argument of the broader issue of duty, i.e., whether there was no duty because carrying an AED would have been illegal. Thus, the issue properly before this Court’s plenary review remains whether Gulph Mills owed a duty of care to Atcovitz to acquire and maintain an AED on its premises for emergency use.

[***9] [HN4] “A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.” Law of Torts, supra, § 53 at 356. This Court has embraced [*587] an oft-quoted passage articulating the considerations that underlie the concept of common law duty:

These are shifting sands, and no fit foundation. There is a duty if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution, is what we make it. Duty is only a word with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily begs the essential question. When we find a duty, breach and damage, everything has been said. The word serves a useful purpose in directing attention to the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, rather than the causal sequence of events; beyond that it serves none. In the decision whether or not there is a duty, many factors interplay: The hand of history, our ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall. In the end the court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the mores of the [***10] community, “always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind.”

D. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 15 (1953) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)); Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen, 562 Pa. 547, 756 A.2d 1166, 1169 (Pa. 2000); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672, 681 (Pa. 1979). Thus, [HN5] the legal concept of duty is necessarily rooted in often amorphous public policy considerations, which may include our perception of history, morals, justice, and society. Althaus, [**1223] 756 A.2d at 1169 (citing Gardner v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 524 Pa. 445, 573 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Pa. 1990)).

In Althaus, this Court enunciated several discrete factors, derived from the aforementioned principles, that our courts are to balance [HN6] in determining whether a common law duty of care exists: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the actor’s conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability [***11] of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution. Althaus, 756 A.2d at 1169. [*588] Within this construct, we must resolve whether Gulph Mills owed a duty to Atcovitz to acquire and maintain an AED.

Here, our analysis turns upon the fifth Althaus factor, i.e., the overall public interest in the proposed solution. The Legislature’s enactments and the ensuing regulations reveal that acquisition, maintenance, and use of an AED, along with AED training requirements, are highly regulated. Where our lawmakers have so thoroughly considered the statewide application and implications of a subject, this Court must refrain from imposing additional requirements upon that legislation.

Looking first to the EMS Act, the Legislature aspired [HN7] “to assure readily available and coordinated emergency medical services of the highest quality to the people of Pennsylvania.” 35 P.S. § 6922(a). To accomplish this purpose, the Secretary of Health is required [HN8] “to plan, guide, assist and coordinate the development of areawide emergency medical services systems into a unified Statewide [***12] system and to coordinate the system with similar systems in neighboring states.” 35 P.S. § 6925(a). For that reason, [HN9] the Department of Health has adopted comprehensive regulations implementing the provisions of the EMS Act, including regulations establishing the qualifications, duties, and certification procedures for those involved in providing emergency medical services. See 28 Pa. Code §§ 1001.1- 1015.2. Similar to the EMS Act, the stated purpose of the regulations [HN10] “is to plan, guide, assist and coordinate the development of regional EMS systems into a unified Statewide system and to coordinate the system with similar systems in neighboring states, and to otherwise implement the Department’s responsibilities under the act consistent with the Department’s rulemaking authority.” Id. at § 1001.1.

To achieve these goals, the EMS Act and its implementing regulations explicitly classify and identify the capacities, training requirements, and qualifications of individuals who are authorized to deliver emergency medical services. See, e.g., 35 P.S. § 6931 (delineating [***13] emergency medical services personnel). Although the Superior Court’s observation [*589] that the EMS Act and its regulations do not specifically refer to the use of AEDs by untrained individuals is correct, we do not agree with the court’s conclusion that the EMS Act and its regulations are irrelevant to the issue of whether Gulph Mills had a duty to use an AED on its premises. Rather, they are relevant to demonstrate that the acquisition, maintenance, and use of an AED, along with AED training requirements, are highly regulated. Indeed, the implication of the Legislature’s exclusion of untrained laypersons from the EMS Act and its regulations is to preclude unqualified and untrained individuals from administering emergency medical services using an AED. We must infer that, [HN11] under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of a specific matter in a statute implies the exclusion of other matters. Pane v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Highways, 422 Pa. 489, 222 A.2d 913, 915 (Pa. 1966) (citing Cali v. City of Philadelphia, 406 Pa. 290, 177 A.2d 824, 832 (Pa. 1962)). It [**1224] would be absurd for the governmental system charged with rendering [***14] effective emergency medical care to hinder the delivery of that care using AEDs through the system, while ordinary citizens would be duty-bound to acquire, maintain, and use AEDs free from any regulation by the Department of Health.

Likewise, the Superior Court also misconstrued the AED Good Samaritan Act as evincing the Legislature’s intention that the EMS Act should not restrict the use of AEDs to trained professionals. The AED Good Samaritan Act, which was adopted two years after Atcovitz sustained his injuries, provides civil immunity for trained users of AEDs and requires that [HN12] “expected users shall complete training in the use of an AED. . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8331.2(a), (c). [HN13] As an exception to that general rule, the AED Good Samaritan Act also provides civil immunity to untrained individuals who, in good faith, use an AED in an emergency as an ordinary, reasonably prudent individual would do under the same or similar circumstances. Id. at § 8331.2(e). Significantly, the AED Good Samaritan Act defines [HN14] “good faith” as including “a reasonable opinion that the immediacy of the situation is such that the use of an AED should not be postponed [***15] until emergency [*590] medical services personnel arrive or the person is hospitalized.” Id. at § 8331.2(f).

Thus, the AED Good Samaritan Act merely creates an exception for imposing liability on an untrained individual who uses an AED in limited emergency situations; it does not authorize its use by any such individual. Indeed, the exception expresses that personnel under the EMS Act are the preferred users of AEDs: it applies only to instances where emergency medical services personnel are unavailable. In addition, it does not indicate that the Legislature aimed to dispense with the regulations governing the training and use of AEDs. Simply, the existence of a civil immunity provision for Good Samaritans who use an AED in an emergency situation cannot impose a duty on a business establishment to acquire, maintain, and use such a device on its premises. 8

8 Even if the AED Good Samaritan Act imposed a duty upon Gulph Mills to carry an AED, it would not control this case. The Legislature did not adopt it until two years after Atcovitz sustained his injuries

[***16] Neither the EMS Act nor the AED Good Samaritan Act imposed a duty upon Gulph Mills to acquire, maintain, and use an AED. Appellees do not cite any other case, statute, or regulation that would have imposed such a duty on Gulph Mills at the time of Atcovitz’s injuries in January 1996. Because Gulph Mills did not owe a duty to carry an AED, Appellees could not have established a prima facie claim of negligence. See Orner, 515 Pa. 132, 527 A.2d 521. Thus, there was no genuine issue of material fact and Gulph Mills was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Basile, 563 Pa. 359, 761 A.2d 1115. We reverse the order of the Superior Court and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Gulph Mills.

Mr. Justice Cappy files a concurring opinion.

Mr. Justice Nigro files a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Saylor joins.

CONCUR BY: CAPPY

CONCUR

CONCURRING OPINION

MR. JUSTICE CAPPY

I join the majority opinion to the extent that it holds that we must balance the factors in Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. [*591] Cohen, 562 Pa. 547, 756 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 2000). After evaluating all five factors, I agree [***17] that no duty exists here.

DISSENT BY: NIGRO

DISSENT

[**1225] DISSENTING OPINION

MR. JUSTICE NIGRO

While I do not necessarily disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a tennis club does not owe a duty to its members to acquire and maintain an automated external defibrillator (“AED”) on its premises for emergency use, that issue is not before us here. The only issue that the Superior Court considered below was whether the Emergency Medical Services Act, 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 6921- 6938, and the Department of Health regulations promulgated pursuant to that Act specifically prohibited Appellants from using an AED. Concluding that they did not, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellants on the basis of those authorities. Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 2001 PA Super 16, 766 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“Although we make no finding on the ultimate merits of [plaintiffs’] claim, we find that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment on the basis of the statutes and regulations cited.”) As I agree [***18] with the Superior Court’s conclusion in that regard, I would affirm the Superior Court’s order and remand the case to the trial court to consider in the first instance whether there is any basis on which to conclude that Appellants owed a duty to Appellees.

Mr. Justice Saylor joins the dissenting opinion.


Colorado has a new Epinephrine law allowing most outdoor programs the ability to stock and administer epinephrine without criminal liability

That means recreation camps, colleges and universities, day care facilities, youth sports leagues, amusement parks, restaurants, places of employment, ski areas, and sports arenas can carry epinephrine.

NOTE: The governor signed this measure on 5/14/2015.

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HOUSE BILL 15-1232

BY REPRESENTATIVE(S) Ginal and Landgraf, Buckner, Esgar, Fields, Mitsch Bush, Pettersen, Primavera, Rosenthal, Ryden, Salazar, Tyler, Vigil, Williams, Young, Hullinghorst; also SENATOR(S) Todd and Martinez Humenik, Kefalas, Kerr, Newell.

CONCERNING THE EMERGENCY USE OF EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS BY AUTHORIZED ENTITIES, AND, IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, MAKING AN APPROPRIATION.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:

SECTION 1. In Colorado Revised Statutes, add article 47 to title 25 as follows:

ARTICLE 47 Use of Epinephrine Injectors by Authorized Entities

25-47-101.  Definitions. AS USED IN THIS ARTICLE:

(1)  “ADMINISTER MEANS TO DIRECTLY APPLY AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR TO THE BODY OF AN INDIVIDUAL.

(2)  “AUTHORIZED ENTITY MEANS AN ENTITY OR ORGANIZATION, OTHER THAN A SCHOOL DESCRIBED IN SECTION 22-1-119.5, C.R.S., OR A HOSPITAL LICENSED OR CERTIFIED PURSUANT TO SECTION 25-1.5-103 (1) (a)

(I) (A) OR 25-1.5-103 (1) (a) (II), AT WHICH ALLERGENS CAPABLE OF CAUSING ANAPHYLAXIS MAY BE PRESENT. THE TERM INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO RECREATION CAMPS, COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, DAY CARE FACILITIES, YOUTH SPORTS LEAGUES, AMUSEMENT PARKS, RESTAURANTS, PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT, SKI AREAS, AND SPORTS ARENAS.

(3)  “EMERGENCY PUBLIC ACCESS STATION OR “EPAS” MEANS A LOCKED, SECURE CONTAINER USED TO STORE EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS FOR USE UNDER THE GENERAL OVERSIGHT OF A MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL, WHICH ALLOWS A LAY RESCUER TO CONSULT WITH A MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL IN REAL TIME BY AUDIO, TELEVIDEO, OR OTHER SIMILAR MEANS OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION. UPON AUTHORIZATION OF THE CONSULTING MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL, AN EPAS MAY BE UNLOCKED TO MAKE AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR AVAILABLE.

(4)  “EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR MEANS A SINGLEUSE DEVICE USED FOR THE AUTOMATIC INJECTION OF A PREMEASURED DOSE OF EPINEPHRINE INTO THE HUMAN BODY.

(5)  “HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONER MEANS A PERSON AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO PRESCRIBE ANY DRUG OR DEVICE, ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS OR HER AUTHORITY.

(6) “MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL MEANS A PHYSICIAN OR OTHER PERSON AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE LAW TO PRESCRIBE DRUGS IN THIS STATE OR ANOTHER STATE.

(7)  “PHARMACIST HAS THE MEANING SET FORTH IN SECTION 12-42.5-102 (28), C.R.S.

(8)  “PROVIDE MEANS TO SUPPLY ONE OR MORE EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS TO AN INDIVIDUAL.

 

25-47-102.  Stock supply of epinephrine auto-injectors ­emergency administration. (1)  NOTWITHSTANDING ANY PROVISION OF LAW TO THE CONTRARY:

(a) Prescribing to an authorized entity permitted. A HEALTH

CARE PRACTITIONER MAY DIRECT THE DISTRIBUTION OF EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS FROM AN INSTATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG OUTLET TO AN AUTHORIZED ENTITY FOR USE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ARTICLE, AND HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONERS MAY DISTRIBUTE EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS TO AN AUTHORIZED ENTITY; AND

(b)  Authorized entities permitted to maintain supply. AN AUTHORIZED ENTITY MAY ACQUIRE AND STOCK A SUPPLY OF EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS PURSUANT TO A PRESCRIPTION ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS SECTION.

(2)  EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS MUST BE STORED:

(a) IN A LOCATION THAT WILL BE READILY ACCESSIBLE IN AN EMERGENCY;

(b)  ACCORDING TO THE APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE; AND

(c) IN COMPLIANCE WITH ANY ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS THAT MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.

(3)  AN AUTHORIZED ENTITY SHALL DESIGNATE EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS WHO HAVE COMPLETED THE TRAINING REQUIRED BY SECTION 25-47-104 TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STORAGE, MAINTENANCE,CONTROL, AND GENERAL OVERSIGHT OF EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS ACQUIRED BY THE AUTHORIZED ENTITY.

25-47-103. Use of epinephrine auto-injectors. (1)  AN EMPLOYEE OR AGENT OF AN AUTHORIZED ENTITY OR OTHER INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS COMPLETED THE TRAINING REQUIRED BY SECTION 25-47-104 MAY USE EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS PRESCRIBED PURSUANT TO SECTION 25-47-102 TO PROVIDE OR ADMINISTER AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR TO ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO THE EMPLOYEE, AGENT, OR OTHER INDIVIDUAL BELIEVES IN GOOD FAITH IS EXPERIENCING ANAPHYLAXIS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE INDIVIDUAL HAS A PRESCRIPTION FOR AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR OR HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN DIAGNOSED WITH AN ALLERGY, OR TO PROVIDE AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR TO A FAMILY MEMBER, FRIEND, COLLEAGUE, CAREGIVER, OR PERSON WITH A SIMILAR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INDIVIDUAL; AND

(2)  THE ADMINISTRATION OF AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS SECTION IS NEITHER THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE NOR OF ANY OTHER PROFESSION THAT REQUIRES LICENSURE.

25-47-104.  Training. (1)  AN EMPLOYEE, AGENT, OR OTHER INDIVIDUAL MUST COMPLETE AN ANAPHYLAXIS TRAINING PROGRAM BEFORE USING AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR. THE TRAINING MUST BE CONDUCTED BY A NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCED IN TRAINING LAYPERSONS IN EMERGENCY HEALTH TREATMENT OR BY AN INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH MAY APPROVE SPECIFIC ENTITIES OR INDIVIDUALS TO CONDUCT TRAINING OR MAY APPROVE SPECIFIC CLASSES BY INDIVIDUALS OR ENTITIES. THE TRAINING MAY BE CONDUCTED ONLINE OR INPERSON AND, AT A MINIMUM, MUST COVER:

(a) HOW TO RECOGNIZE THE SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS OF SEVERE ALLERGIC REACTIONS, INCLUDING ANAPHYLAXIS;

(b)  THE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE STORAGE AND ADMINISTRATION OF AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR; AND

(c) EMERGENCY FOLLOWUP PROCEDURES.

(2)  THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY THAT CONDUCTS THE ANAPHYLAXIS TRAINING PROGRAM SHALL ISSUE A CERTIFICATE, ON A FORM DEVELOPED OR APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, TO EACH PERSON WHO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETES THE ANAPHYLAXIS TRAINING PROGRAM.

 

25-47-105.  Reporting. AN AUTHORIZED ENTITY THAT POSSESSES AND MAKES AVAILABLE EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS SHALL SUBMIT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ON A FORM DEVELOPED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, A REPORT OF EACH INCIDENT ON THE AUTHORIZED ENTITYS PREMISES THAT INVOLVES THE ADMINISTRATION OF AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR PURSUANT TO SECTION 25-47-103. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SHALL ANNUALLY PUBLISH A REPORT THAT SUMMARIZES AND ANALYZES ALL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO IT UNDER THIS SECTION.

25-47-106.  Emergency public access stations – life-saving allergy medication. (1)  NOTWITHSTANDING ANY LAW TO THE CONTRARY:

 

(a) A MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL MAY PRESCRIBE A STOCK SUPPLY OF EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS TO ANY AUTHORIZED ENTITY FOR STORAGE IN AN EPAS, AND MAY PLACE A STOCK SUPPLY OF EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS IN AN EPAS MAINTAINED BY AN AUTHORIZED ENTITY;

(b) A MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL MAY CONSULT THE USER OF AN EPAS AND MAKE THE EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS STORED IN THE EPAS AVAILABLE TO THE USER; AND

(c) ANY PERSON MAY USE AN EPAS TO ADMINISTER OR PROVIDE AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR TO AN INDIVIDUAL BELIEVED IN GOOD FAITH TO BE EXPERIENCING ANAPHYLAXIS OR TO PROVIDE AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR TO A FAMILY MEMBER, FRIEND, COLLEAGUE, CAREGIVER, OR PERSON WITH A SIMILAR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INDIVIDUAL.

 

(2)  THE USE OF AN EPAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ARTICLE IS NEITHER THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE NOR OF ANY OTHER PROFESSION THAT REQUIRES LICENSURE.

25-47-107. Good samaritan protections – liability. (1)  THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES ARE IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND FROM SUIT IN ANY CIVIL ACTION BROUGHT BY ANY PERSON FOR INJURIES OR RELATED DAMAGES THAT RESULT FROM AN ACT OR OMISSION TAKEN PURSUANT TO THIS ARTICLE:

(a) AN AUTHORIZED ENTITY THAT POSSESSES AND MAKES AVAILABLE EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS OR AN EPAS AND THE ENTITYS EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS;

(b)  AN AUTHORIZED ENTITY THAT DOES NOT POSSESS OR MAKE AVAILABLE EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS OR AN EPAS AND THE ENTITYS EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS;

(c) AN INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY THAT CONDUCTS AN ANAPHYLAXIS TRAINING PROGRAM;

(d)  AN INDIVIDUAL WHO PRESCRIBES OR DISPENSES AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR;

 

(e) AN INDIVIDUAL WHO ADMINISTERS OR PROVIDES AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR;

 

(f)  A MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL WHO CONSULTS THE USER OF AN EPAS AND MAKES THE EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS STORED IN THE EPAS AVAILABLE TO THE USER; OR

(g)  AN INDIVIDUAL WHO USES AN EPAS.

(2)  IMMUNITY UNDER SUBSECTION (1) OF THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO ACTS OR OMISSIONS THAT ARE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT OR WILLFUL AND WANTON.

(3)  THIS SECTION DOES NOT ELIMINATE, LIMIT, OR REDUCE ANY OTHER IMMUNITY OR DEFENSE THAT MAY BE AVAILABLE UNDER STATE LAW, INCLUDING THE PROTECTIONS SET FORTH IN SECTION 13-21-108, C.R.S. PROVIDING OR ADMINISTERING AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR BY AN ENTITY OR INDIVIDUAL IS DEEMED EMERGENCY CARE OR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 13-21-108, C.R.S.

(4)  AN AUTHORIZED ENTITY LOCATED IN THIS STATE THAT PROVIDES OR ADMINISTERS AN EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR OUTSIDE OF THIS STATE IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY RESULTING INJURIES OR RELATED DAMAGES IF THE AUTHORIZED ENTITY:

(a) WOULD NOT BE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES OR RELATED DAMAGES IF THE EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR HAD BEEN PROVIDED OR ADMINISTERED IN THIS STATE; OR

(b)  IS NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES OR RELATED DAMAGES UNDER THE LAW OF THE STATE WHERE THE AUTHORIZED ENTITY PROVIDED OR ADMINISTERED THE EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTOR.

 

25-47-108.  Health care professionals – hospitals – obligations under state and federal law. NOTHING IN THIS ARTICLE LIMITS THE OBLIGATIONS OF A HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL OR HOSPITAL UNDER STATE OR FEDERAL LAW IN PRESCRIBING, STORING, OR ADMINISTERING DRUGS OR DEVICES.

SECTION 2.  In Colorado Revised Statutes, 12-36-117, amend

(1.8) as follows:

 

12-36-117.  Unprofessional conduct. (1.8)  A licensee shall IS not be subject to disciplinary action by the board for issuing standing orders and protocols regarding the use of epinephrine auto-injectors in a public or nonpublic school in accordance with the requirements of section 22-1-119.5, C.R.S., or for the actions taken by a school nurse or by any designated school personnel who administer epinephrine auto-injectors in accordance with the requirements of section 22-1-119.5, C.R.S., OR FOR PRESCRIBING EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 47 OF TITLE 25, C.R.S.

 

SECTION 3.  In Colorado Revised Statutes, 12-38-125, add (1) (o) as follows:

12-38-125.  Exclusions. (1)  No provision of this article shall be construed to prohibit:

(o)  A PRESCRIPTION BY AN ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSE WITH PRESCRIPTIVE AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF EPINEPHRINE AUTOINJECTORS BY AN AUTHORIZED ENTITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 47 OF TITLE 25,

C.R.S.

SECTION 4.  In Colorado Revised Statutes, 12-42.5-102, amend

(42) (b) (XV) as follows:

12-42.5-102.  Definitions. As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires or the term is otherwise defined in another part of this article:

(42) (b)  “Wholesale distribution” does not include:

(XV)  The distribution, donation, or sale by a manufacturer or wholesaler of a stock supply of epinephrine auto-injectors to public schools or nonpublic schools for emergency use by designated school personnel in accordance with the requirements of section 22-1-119.5, C.R.S., OR TO OTHER ENTITIES FOR EMERGENCY USE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 47 OF TITLE 25, C.R.S.

SECTION 5. Appropriation. For the 2015-16 state fiscal year, $23,736 is appropriated to the department of public health and environment for use by the disease control and environmental epidemiology division.

This appropriation is from the general fund and is based on an assumption that the division will require an additional 0.4 FTE. To implement this act, the division may use this appropriation for costs to implement this act.

 

SECTION 6. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety.  

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Good Samaritan Laws by state

You need to understand whether or not you will be protected and what you can and cannot do to afford yourself of the protection.

The statutes that are quoted below are just part of the statute. Consequently you should find the entire law and find out how it affects you.

Yellow highlight is interesting language

Green highlights are very interesting language in the statute

Red Text is important language defining whether it is only medical care or medical and emergency/rescue care.

Pink highlight is where must the first aid training come from or the standard of first aid training that the Samaritan must use.

Red highlight is language that is restrictive or of major concern.

Turquoise highlighting is restrictive language.

Blue highlighting is language covering AED’s

Gray Highlighting is language covering epinephrine

Good Samaritan State Laws

State

Statute

Interesting Section

Alabama

§ 6-5-332. Good Samaritans.

(e) A person or entity, who in good faith and without compensation renders emergency care or treatment to a person suffering or appearing to suffer from cardiac arrest, which may include the use of an automated external defibrillator, shall be immune from civil liability for any personal injury as a result of care or treatment or as a result of any act or failure to act in providing or arranging further medical treatment where the person acts as an ordinary prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances, except damages that may result from the gross negligence of the person rendering emergency care. This immunity shall extend to the licensed physician or medical authority who is involved in automated external defibrillator site placement, the person who provides training in CPR and the use of the automated external defibrillator, and the person or entity responsible for the site where the automated external defibrillator is located. This subsection specifically excludes from the provision of immunity any designers, manufacturers, or sellers of automated external defibrillators for any claims that may be brought against such entities based upon current Alabama law.

 

Sec. 09.65.090.  Civil liability for emergency aid

(a) A person at a hospital or any other location who renders emergency care or emergency counseling to an injured, ill, or emotionally distraught person` who reasonably appears to the person rendering the aid to be in immediate need of emergency aid in order to avoid serious harm or death is not liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission in rendering emergency aid.

(b) A member of an organization that exists for the purpose of providing emergency services is not liable for civil damages for injury to a person that results from an act or omission in providing first aid, search, rescue, or other emergency services to the person, regardless of whether the member is under a preexisting duty to render assistance, if the member provided the service while acting as a volunteer member of the organization; in this subsection, “volunteer” means a person who is paid not more than $ 10 a day and a total of not more than $ 500 a year, not including ski lift tickets and reimbursement for expenses actually incurred, for providing emergency services.

(c) The immunity provided under (b) of this section does not apply to civil damages that result from providing or attempting to provide any of the following advanced life support techniques unless the person who provided them was authorized by law to provide them:

(1) manual electric cardiac defibrillation;

(2) administration of antiarrhythmic agents;

(3) intravenous therapy;

(4) intramuscular therapy; or

(5) use of endotracheal intubation devices.

(d) This section does not preclude liability for civil damages as a result of gross negligence or reckless or intentional misconduct.

Alaska

Sec. 09.65.090.  Civil liability for emergency aid

(a)           A person at a hospital or any other location who renders emergency care or emergency counseling to an injured, ill, or emotionally distraught person who reasonably appears to the person rendering the aid to be in immediate need of emergency aid in order to avoid serious harm or death is not liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission in rendering emergency aid.

(b) A member of an organization that exists for the purpose of providing emergency services is not liable for civil damages for injury to a person that results from an act or omission in providing first aid, search, rescue, or other emergency services to the person, regardless of whether the member is under a preexisting duty to render assistance, if the member provided the service while acting as a volunteer member of the organization; in this subsection, “volunteer” means a person who is paid not more than $ 10 a day and a total of not more than $ 500 a year, not including ski lift tickets and reimbursement for expenses actually incurred, for providing emergency services.

(c) The immunity provided under (b) of this section does not apply to civil damages that result from providing or attempting to provide any of the following advanced life support techniques unless the person who provided them was authorized by law to provide them:

(1) manual electric cardiac defibrillation;

(2) administration of antiarrhythmic agents;

(3) intravenous therapy;

(4) intramuscular therapy; or

(5) use of endotracheal intubation devices.

(d) This section does not preclude liability for civil damages as a result of gross negligence or reckless or intentional misconduct.

Arizona

§ 32-1471. Health care provider and any other person; emergency aid; nonliability

Any health care provider licensed or certified to practice as such in this state or elsewhere, or a licensed ambulance attendant, driver or pilot as defined in section 41-1831, or any other person who renders emergency care at a public gathering or at the scene of an emergency occurrence gratuitously and in good faith shall not be liable for any civil or other damages as the result of any act or omission by such person rendering the emergency care, or as the result of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured persons, unless such person, while rendering such emergency care, is guilty of gross negligence.

 

§ 32-1472. Limited liability for emergency health care at amateur athletic events

A health care provider licensed or certified pursuant to title 32 who agrees with any person or school to voluntarily attend an amateur athletic practice, contest or other event to be available to render emergency health care within the provider’s authorized scope of practice and without compensation to an athlete injured during such event is not liable for any civil or other damages as the result of any act or omission by the provider rendering the emergency care, or as the result of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured athlete, if the provider acts in good faith without gross negligence.

Arkansas

17-95-101. “Good Samaritan” law.

(a) Any health care professional under the laws of the State of Arkansas who in good faith lends emergency care or assistance without compensation at the place of an emergency or accident shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions performed in good faith so long as any act or omission resulting from the rendering of emergency assistance or services was not grossly negligent or willful misconduct.

(b) Any person who is not a health care professional who is present at an emergency or accident scene and who:

(1) Believes that the life, health, and safety of an injured person or a person who is under imminent threat of danger could be aided by reasonable and accessible emergency procedures under the circumstances existing at the scene thereof; and

(2) Proceeds to lend emergency assistance or service in a manner calculated in good faith to lessen or remove the immediate threat to the life, health, or safety of such a person, shall not be held liable in civil damages in any action in this state for any act or omission resulting from the rendering of emergency assistance or services unless the act or omission was not in good faith and was the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

(c) No health care professional who in good faith and without compensation renders voluntary emergency assistance to a participant in a school athletic event or contest at the site thereof or during transportation to a health care facility for an injury suffered in the course of the event or contest shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by that health care professional in rendering the emergency care. The immunity granted by this subsection shall not apply in the event of an act or omission constituting gross negligence.

(d) For the purposes of this section, “health care professional” means a licensed physician, chiropractic physician, dentist, optometric physician, podiatric physician, and any other licensed health care professional.

California

§ 1799.102. Emergency care at scene of emergency

(a) No person who in good faith, and not for compensation, renders emergency medical or nonmedical care at the scene of an emergency shall be liable for any civil damages resulting from any act or omission. The scene of an emergency shall not include emergency departments and other places where medical care is usually offered. This subdivision applies only to the medical, law enforcement, and emergency personnel specified in this chapter.

(b)

(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to encourage other individuals to volunteer, without compensation, to assist others in need during an emergency, while ensuring that those volunteers who provide care or assistance act responsibly.

(2) Except for those persons specified in subdivision (a), no person who in good faith, and not for compensation, renders emergency medical or nonmedical care or assistance at the scene of an emergency shall be liable for civil damages resulting from any act or omission other than an act or omission constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. The scene of an emergency shall not include emergency departments and other places where medical care is usually offered. This subdivision shall not be construed to alter existing protections from liability for licensed medical or other personnel specified in subdivision (a) or any other law.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to change any existing legal duties or obligations, nor does anything in this section in any way affect the provisions in Section 1714.5 of the Civil Code, as proposed to be amended by Senate Bill 39 of the 2009-10 Regular Session of the Legislature.

(d) The amendments to this section made by the act adding subdivisions (b) and (c) shall apply exclusively to any legal action filed on or after the effective date of that act.

 

§ 1799.108.  Emergency field care treatment by certificate holder

Any person who has a certificate issued pursuant to this division from a certifying agency to provide prehospital emergency field care treatment at the scene of an emergency, as defined in Section 1799.102, shall be liable for civil damages only for acts or omissions performed in a grossly negligent manner or acts or omissions not performed in good faith.

 

§ 50086.  Voluntary emergency services; Immunity from liability

No person who is summoned by a county sheriff, city police department, fire department, park ranger, or other local agency to voluntarily assist in a search or rescue operation, who possesses first aid training equivalent to the Red Cross advanced first aid and emergency care training standards, and who in good faith renders emergency services to a victim prior to or during the evacuation or extrication of the victim, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in rendering such emergency services.

For the purposes of this section, “emergency services” includes, but is not limited to, first aid and medical services, rescue procedures, and transportation or other related activities necessary to insure the safety of the victim who is the object of the search or rescue operation.

Colorado

13-21-108. Persons rendering emergency assistance exempt from civil liability

(1) Any person licensed as a physician and surgeon under the laws of the state of Colorado, or any other person, who in good faith renders emergency care or emergency assistance to a person not presently his patient without compensation at the place of an emergency or accident, including a health care institution as defined in section 13-64-202 (3), shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions made in good faith as a result of the rendering of such emergency care or emergency assistance during the emergency, unless the acts or omissions were grossly negligent or willful and wanton. This section shall not apply to any person who renders such emergency care or emergency assistance to a patient he is otherwise obligated to cover.

(2) Any person while acting as a volunteer member of a rescue unit, as defined in section 25-3.5-103 (11), C.R.S., notwithstanding the fact that such organization may recover actual costs incurred in the rendering of emergency care or assistance to a person, who in good faithrenders emergency care or assistance without compensation at the place of an emergency or accident shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions in good faith.

(3) Any person, including a licensed physician, surgeon, or other medical personnel, while acting as a volunteer member of a ski patrol or ski area rescue unit, notwithstanding the fact that such person may receive free skiing privileges or other benefits as a result of his volunteer status, who in good faith renders emergency care or assistance without other compensation at the place of an emergency or accident shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions in good faith.

 (5) An employer shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions made by an employee while rendering emergency care or emergency assistance if the employee:

(a) Renders the emergency care or emergency assistance in the course of his or her employment for the employer; and

(b) Is personally exempt from liability for civil damages for the acts or omissions under subsection (1) of this section.

Connecticut

§ 52-557b. “Good Samaritan law”. Immunity from liability for emergency medical assistance, first aid or medication by injection. School personnel not required to administer or render.

(a) A person licensed to practice medicine and surgery under the provisions of chapter 370 or dentistry under the provisions of section 20-106 or members of the same professions licensed to practice in any other state of the United States, a person licensed as a registered nurse under section 20-93 or 20-94 or certified as a licensed practical nurse under section 20-96 or 20-97, a medical technician or any person operating a cardiopulmonary resuscitator or an automatic external defibrillator, or a person trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation or in the use of an automatic external defibrillator in accordance with the standards set forth by the American Red Cross or American Heart Association, who, voluntarily and gratuitously and other than in the ordinary course of such person’s employment or practice, renders emergency medical or professional assistance to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to exempt paid or volunteer firefighters, police officers or emergency medical services personnel from completing training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation or in the use of an automatic external defibrillator in accordance with the standard set forth by the American Red Cross or American Heart Association. For the purposes of this subsection, “automatic external defibrillator” means a device that: (1) Is used to administer an electric shock through the chest wall to the heart; (2) contains internal decision-making electronics, microcomputers or special software that allows it to interpret physiologic signals, make medical diagnosis and, if necessary, apply therapy; (3) guides the user through the process of using the device by audible or visual prompts; and (4) does not require the user to employ any discretion or judgment in its use.

(b) A paid or volunteer firefighter or police officer, a teacher or other school personnel on the school grounds or in the school building or at a school function, a member of a ski patrol, a lifeguard, a conservation officer, patrol officer or special police officer of the Department of Environmental Protection, or emergency medical service personnel, who has completed a course in first aid offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health or any director of health, as certified by the agency or director of health offering the course, and who renders emergency first aid to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency first aid, which may constitute ordinary negligence. No paid or volunteer firefighter, police officer or emergency medical service personnel who forcibly enters the residence of any person in order to render emergency first aid to a person whom such firefighter, police officer or emergency medical service personnel reasonably believes to be in need thereof shall be liable to such person for civil damages incurred as a result of such entry. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

(e) (1) For purposes of this subsection, “cartridge injector” means an automatic prefilled cartridge injector or similar automatic injectable equipment used to deliver epinephrine in a standard dose for emergency first aid response to allergic reactions.

(2) Any volunteer worker associated with, or any person employed to work for, a program offered to children sixteen years of age or younger by a corporation, other than a licensed health care provider, that is exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, who (A) has been trained in the use of a cartridge injector by a licensed physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse or registered nurse, (B) has obtained the consent of a parent or legal guardian to use a cartridge injector on his or her child, and (C) uses a cartridge injector on such child in apparent need thereof participating in such program, shall not be liable to such child assisted or to such child’s parent or guardian for civil damages for any personal injury or death which results from acts or omissions by such worker in using a cartridge injector which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

(h) Any person who has completed a course in first aid offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health or any director of health, as certified by the agency or director of health offering the course, or has been trained in the use of a cartridge injector by a licensed physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse or registered nurse, and who, voluntarily and gratuitously and other than in the ordinary course of such person’s employment or practice, renders emergency assistance by using a cartridge injector on another person in need thereof, or any person who is an identified staff member of a before or after school program, day camp or day care facility, as provided in section 19a-900, and who renders emergency assistance by using a cartridge injector on another person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in using a cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence. For the purposes of this subsection, “cartridge injector” has the same meaning as provided in subdivision (1) of subsection (e) of this section.

 

Delaware

§ 6801. Persons rendering emergency care exempt from liability; Advanced Life Support Standards Committee

(a) Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of any public or private and special law, any person who voluntarily, without the expectation of monetary or other compensation from the person aided or treated, renders first aid, emergency treatment or rescue assistance to a person who is unconscious, ill, injured or in need of rescue assistance, or any person in obvious physical distress or discomfort shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such person or for damages for the death of such person alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or omission in the rendering of such first aid, emergency treatment or rescue assistance, unless it is established that such injuries or such death were caused wilfully, wantonly or recklessly or by gross negligence on the part of such person. This section shall apply to members or employees of nonprofit volunteer or governmental ambulance, rescue or emergency units, whether or not a user or service fee may be charged by the nonprofit unit or the governmental entity and whether or not the members or employees receive salaries or other compensation from the nonprofit unit or the governmental entity. This section shall not be construed to require a person who is ill or injured to be administered first aid or emergency treatment if such person objects thereto on religious grounds. This section shall not apply if such first aid or emergency treatment or assistance is rendered on the premises of a hospital or clinic.

Florida

§ 768.13.  Good Samaritan Act; immunity from civil liability

(1) This act shall be known and cited as the “Good Samaritan Act.”

(2) (a) Any person, including those licensed to practice medicine, who gratuitously and in good faith renders emergency care or treatment either in direct response to emergency situations related to and arising out of a public health emergency declared pursuant to s. 381.00315, a state of emergency which has been declared pursuant to s. 252.36 or at the scene of an emergency outside of a hospital, doctor’s office, or other place having proper medical equipment, without objection of the injured victim or victims thereof, shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of such care or treatment or as a result of any act or failure to act in providing or arranging further medical treatment where the person acts as an ordinary reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.

(b) 1. Any health care provider, including a hospital licensed under chapter 395, providing emergency services pursuant to obligations imposed by 42 U.S.C. s. 1395dd,s. 395.1041, s. 395.401, or s. 401.45 shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of such medical care or treatment unless such damages result from providing, or failing to provide, medical care or treatment under circumstances demonstrating a reckless disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life or health of another.

2. The immunity provided by this paragraph applies to damages as a result of any act or omission of providing medical care or treatment, including diagnosis:

a. Which occurs prior to the time the patient is stabilized and is capable of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient, unless surgery is required as a result of the emergency within a reasonable time after the patient is stabilized, in which case the immunity provided by this paragraph applies to any act or omission of providing medical care or treatment which occurs prior to the stabilization of the patient following the surgery.

b. Which is related to the original medical emergency.

3. For purposes of this paragraph, “reckless disregard” as it applies to a given health care provider rendering emergency medical services shall be such conduct that a health care provider knew or should have known, at the time such services were rendered, created an unreasonable risk of injury so as to affect the life or health of another, and such risk was substantially greater than that which is necessary to make the conduct negligent.

4. Every emergency care facility granted immunity under this paragraph shall accept and treat all emergency care patients within the operational capacity of such facility without regard to ability to pay, including patients transferred from another emergency care facility or other health care provider pursuant to Pub. L. No. 99-272, s. 9121. The failure of an emergency care facility to comply with this subparagraph constitutes grounds for the department to initiate disciplinary action against the facility pursuant to chapter 395.

(c) 1. Any health care practitioner as defined in s. 456.001(4) who is in a hospital attending to a patient of his or her practice or for business or personal reasons unrelated to direct patient care, and who voluntarily responds to provide care or treatment to a patient with whom at that time the practitioner does not have a then-existing health care patient-practitioner relationship, and when such care or treatment is necessitated by a sudden or unexpected situation or by an occurrence that demands immediate medical attention, shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission relative to that care or treatment, unless that care or treatment is proven to amount to conduct that is willful and wanton and would likely result in injury so as to affect the life or health of another.

2. The immunity provided by this paragraph does not apply to damages as a result of any act or omission of providing medical care or treatment unrelated to the original situation that demanded immediate medical attention.

3. For purposes of this paragraph, the Legislature’s intent is to encourage health care practitioners to provide necessary emergency care to all persons without fear of litigation as described in this paragraph.

(d) Any person whose acts or omissions are not otherwise covered by this section and who participates in emergency response activities under the direction of or in connection with a community emergency response team, local emergency management agencies, the Division of Emergency Management of the Department of Community Affairs, or the Federal Emergency Management Agency is not liable for any civil damages as a result of care, treatment, or services provided gratuitously in such capacity and resulting from any act or failure to act in such capacity in providing or arranging further care, treatment, or services, if such person acts as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.

(3) Any person, including those licensed to practice veterinary medicine, who gratuitously and in good faith renders emergency care or treatment to an injured animal at the scene of an emergency on or adjacent to a roadway shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of such care or treatment or as a result of any act or failure to act in providing or arranging further medical treatment where the person acts as an ordinary reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.

Georgia

§ 51-1-29.  Liability of persons rendering emergency care

Any person, including any person licensed to practice medicine and surgery pursuant to Article 2 of Chapter 34 of Title 43 and including any person licensed to render services ancillary thereto, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victim or victims thereof without making any charge therefor shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering emergency care or as a result of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person.

Hawaii

§ 663-1.5.  Exception to liability.

(a) Any person who in good faith renders emergency care, without remuneration or expectation of remuneration, at the scene of an accident or emergency to a victim of the accident or emergency shall not be liable for any civil damages resulting from the person’s acts or omissions, except for such damages as may result from the person’s gross negligence or wanton acts or omissions.

(c) Any physician licensed to practice under the laws of this State or any other state who in good faith renders emergency medical care in a hospital to a person, who is in immediate danger of loss of life, without remuneration or expectation of remuneration, shall not be liable for any civil damages, if the physician exercises that standard of care expected of similar physicians under similar circumstances.

(d) Any person or other entity who as a public service publishes written general first aid information dealing with emergency first aid treatment, without remuneration or expectation of remuneration for providing this public service, shall not be liable for any civil damages resulting from the written publication of such first aid information except as may result from its gross negligence or wanton acts or omissions.

(e) Any person who in good faith, without remuneration or expectation of remuneration, attempts to resuscitate a person in immediate danger of loss of life when administering any automated external defibrillator, regardless of where the automated external defibrillator that is used is located, shall not be liable for any civil damages resulting from any act or omission except as may result from the person’s gross negligence or wanton acts or omissions.

Any person, including an employer, who provides for an automated external defibrillator shall not be vicariously liable for any civil damages resulting from any act or omission of the persons or employees who, in good faith and without remuneration or the expectation of remuneration, attempt to resuscitate a person in immediate danger of loss of life by administering an automated external defibrillator, except as may result from a person’s or employer’s gross negligence or wanton acts or omissions.

(f) Any physician who administers an automated external defibrillator program without remuneration or expectation of remuneration shall not be liable for any civil damages resulting from any act or omission involving the use of an automated external defibrillator, except as may result from the physician’s gross negligence or wanton acts or omissions.

(g) This section shall not relieve any person, physician, or employer of:

(1) Any other duty imposed by law regarding the designation and training of persons or employees;

(2) Any other duty imposed by provisions regarding the maintenance of equipment to be used for resuscitation; or

(3) Liability for any damages resulting from gross negligence, or wanton acts or omissions.

(h) For the purposes of this section:

“Automated external defibrillator program” means an appropriate training course that includes cardiopulmonary resuscitation and proficiency in the use of an automated external defibrillator.

“Good faith” includes but is not limited to a reasonable opinion that the immediacy of the situation is such that the rendering of care should not be postponed.

“Rescue team” means a special group of physicians, basic life support personnel, advanced life support personnel, surgeons, nurses, volunteers, or employees of the owners or operators of the hospital or authorized emergency vehicle who have been trained in basic or advanced life support and have been designated by the owners or operators of the hospital or authorized emergency vehicle to attempt to provide such support and resuscitate persons who are in immediate danger of loss of life in cases of emergency.

Idaho

§ 5-330. Immunity of persons giving first aid from damage claim

That no action shall lie or be maintained for civil damages in any court of this state against any person or persons, or group of persons, who in good faith, being at, or stopping at the scene of an accident, offers and administers first aid or medical attention to any person or persons injured in such accident unless it can be shown that the person or persons offering or administering first aid, is guilty of gross negligence in the care or treatment of said injured person or persons or has treated them in a grossly negligent manner. The immunity described herein shall cease upon delivery of the injured person to either a generally recognized hospital for treatment of ill or injured persons, or upon assumption of treatment in the office or facility of any person undertaking to treat said injured person or persons, or upon delivery of said injured person or persons into custody of an ambulance attendant.

Illinois

§ 745 ILCS 49/67.  First aid providers; exemption for first aid

Sec. 67. First aid providers; exemption for first aid. Any person who is currently certified in first aid by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, or the National Safety Council and who in good faith provides first aid without fee to any person shall not, as a result of his or her acts or omissions, except willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the person in providing the aid, be liable to a person to whom such aid is provided for civil damages.

The provisions of this Section shall not apply to any health care facility as defined in Section 8-2001 of the Code of Civil Procedure [735 ILCS 5/8-2001] or to any practitioner as defined in Section 8-2003 of the Code of Civil Procedure [735 ILCS 5/8-2003] providing services in a hospital or health care facility.

 

§ 745 ILCS 49/75.  Employers and employees under the Health and Safety Act; exemption from civil liability for emergency care

Immunity for Employees and Employers for first aid at work

 

§ 745 ILCS 49/2.  Legislative purpose

Sec. 2. Legislative purpose. The General Assembly has established numerous protections for the generous and compassionate acts of its citizens who volunteer their time and talents to help others. These protections or good Samaritan provisions have been codified in many Acts of the Illinois Compiled Statutes. This Act recodifies existing good Samaritan provisions. Further, without limitation the provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed to encourage persons to volunteer their time and talents.

 

§ 745 ILCS 49/10.  Cardiopulmonary resuscitation; exemption from civil liability for emergency care

Sec. 10. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation; exemption from civil liability for emergency care. Any person currently certified in basic cardiopulmonary resuscitation who complies with generally recognized standards, and who in good faith, not for compensation, provides emergency cardiopulmonary resuscitation to a person who is an apparent victim of acute cardiopulmonary insufficiency shall not, as the result of his or her acts or omissions in providing resuscitation, be liable for civil damages, unless the acts or omissions constitute willful and wanton misconduct.

 

§ 745 ILCS 49/12.  Use of an automated external defibrillator; exemption from civil liability for emergency care

Sec. 12. Use of an automated external defibrillator; exemption from civil liability for emergency care. As provided in Section 30 of the Automated External Defibrillator Act, any automated external defibrillator user who in good faith and without fee or compensation renders emergency medical care involving the use of an automated external defibrillator in accordance with his or her training is not liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission, except for willful and wanton misconduct, by that person in rendering that care.

 

§ 745 ILCS 49/65.  Choking victim at food-service establishment; exemption from civil liability for emergency assistance

Sec. 65. Choking victim at food-service establishment; exemption from civil liability for emergency assistance. Except as provided by law, no person shall be obligated to remove, assist in removing, or attempt to remove, food from another person’s throat, nor shall any person who in good faith removes or attempts to remove food in an emergency occurring at a food-service establishment as defined in the Choke-Saving Methods Act [410 ILCS 10/1 et seq.] be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by that person in rendering emergency assistance.

 

§ 745 ILCS 49/67.  First aid providers; exemption for first aid

Sec. 67. First aid providers; exemption for first aid. Any person who is currently certified in first aid by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, or the National Safety Council and who in good faith provides first aid without fee to any person shall not, as a result of his or her acts or omissions, except willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the person in providing the aid, be liable to a person to whom such aid is provided for civil damages.

The provisions of this Section shall not apply to any health care facility as defined in Section 8-2001 of the Code of Civil Procedure [735 ILCS 5/8-2001] or to any practitioner as defined in Section 8-2003 of the Code of Civil Procedure [735 ILCS 5/8-2003] providing services in a hospital or health care facility.

 

Indiana

34-30-12-1. Immunity for providing emergency care.

(a) This section does not apply to services rendered by a health care provider (as defined in IC 34-18-2-14 or IC 27-12-2-14 before its repeal) to a patient in a health care facility (as defined in IC 27-8-10-1).

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), a person who comes upon the scene of an emergency or accident or is summoned to the scene of an emergency or accident and, in good faith, gratuitously renders emergency care at the scene of the emergency or accident is immune from civil liability for any personal injury that results from:

(1) any act or omission by the person in rendering the emergency care; or

(2) any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person; except for acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

(c) This subsection applies to a person to whom IC 16-31-6.5 applies. A person who gratuitously renders emergency care involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator is immune from liability for any act or omission not amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct if the person fulfills the requirements set forth in IC 16-31-6.5.

(d) This subsection applies to an individual, business, or organization to which IC 16-31-6.5 applies. An individual, business, or organization that allows a person who is an expected user to use an automatic external defibrillator of the individual, business, or organization to in good faith gratuitously render emergency care is immune from civil liability for any damages resulting from an act or omission not amounting to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct by the user or for acquiring or providing the automatic external defibrillator to the user for the purpose of rendering the emergency care if the individual, business, or organization and the user fulfill the requirements set forth in IC 16-31-6.5.

(e) A licensed physician who gives medical direction in the use of a defibrillator or a national or state approved defibrillator instructor of a person who gratuitously renders emergency care involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator is immune from civil liability for any act or omission of the licensed physician or instructor if the act or omission of the licensed physician or instructor:

(1) involves the training for or use of an automatic external defibrillator; and

(2) does not amount to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

Iowa

613.17 Emergency assistance in an accident.

A person, who in good faith renders emergency care or assistance without compensation, shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions occurring at the place of an emergency or accident or while the person is in transit to or from the emergency or accident or while the person is at or being moved to or from an emergency shelter unless such acts or omissions constitute recklessness. For purposes of this section, if a volunteer fire fighter, a volunteer operator or attendant of an ambulance or rescue squad service, a volunteer paramedic, a volunteer emergency medical technician, or a volunteer registered member of the national ski patrol system receives nominal compensation not based upon the value of the services performed, that person shall be considered to be receiving no compensation. The operation of a motor vehicle in compliance with section 321.231 by a volunteer fire fighter, volunteer operator, or attendant of an ambulance or rescue squad service, a volunteer paramedic, or volunteer emergency medical technician shall be considered rendering emergency care or assistance for purposes of this section. For purposes of this section, a person rendering emergency care or assistance includes a person involved in a workplace rescue arising out of an emergency or accident.

Kansas

65-2891.   Emergency care by health care providers; liability; standards of care applicable.

(a) Any health care provider who in good faith renders emergency care or assistance at the scene of an emergency or accident including treatment of a minor without first obtaining the consent of the parent or guardian of such minor shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions other than damages occasioned by gross negligence or by willful or wanton acts or omissions by such person in rendering such emergency care.

(b)  Any health care provider may render in good faith emergency care or assistance, without compensation, to any minor requiring such care or assistance as a result of having engaged in competitive sports, without first obtaining the consent of the parent or guardian of such minor. Such health care provider shall not be liable for any civil damages other than damages occasioned by gross negligence or by willful or wanton acts or omissions by such person in rendering such emergency care.

(c)  Any health care provider may in good faith render emergency care or assistance during an emergency which occurs within a hospital or elsewhere, with or without compensation, until such time as the physician employed by the patient or by the patient’s family or by guardian assumes responsibility for such patient’s professional care. The health care provider rendering such emergency care shall not be held liable for any civil damages other than damages occasioned by negligence.

(d)  Any provision herein contained notwithstanding, the ordinary standards of care and rules of negligence shall apply in those cases wherein emergency care and assistance is rendered in any physician’s or dentist’s office, clinic, emergency room or hospital with or without compensation.

(e)  As used in this section the term “health care provider” means any person licensed to practice any branch of the healing arts, licensed dentist, licensed optometrist, licensed professional nurse, licensed practical nurse, licensed podiatrist, licensed pharmacist, licensed physical therapist, and any physician assistant who has successfully completed an American medical association approved training program and has successfully completed the national board examination for physician assistants of the American board of medical examiners, any licensed athletic trainer, any licensed occupational therapist, any licensed respiratory therapist, any person who holds a valid attendant’s certificate under K.S.A. 65-6129, and amendments thereto, any person who holds a valid certificate for the successful completion of a course in first aid offered or approved by the American red cross, by the American heart association, by the mining enforcement and safety administration of the bureau of mines of the department of interior, by the national safety council or by any instructor-coordinator, as defined in K.S.A. 65-6112, and amendments thereto, and any person engaged in a postgraduate training program approved by the state board of healing arts.

Kentucky

KRS § 311.667  (2009)

311.667.  Requirements for person or entity acquiring an automated external defibrillator.

  In order to ensure public health and safety:

   (1) A person or entity who acquires an AED shall ensure that:

      (a) Expected AED users receive American Heart Association or American Red Cross training in CPR and AED use, or an equivalent nationally recognized course in CPR and AED use;

      (b) The AED is maintained and tested according to the manufacturer’s operational guidelines;

      (c) There is medical oversight of the AED program by a physician licensed in Kentucky to ensure compliance with requirements for training, maintenance, notification, and communication with the local emergency medical services system. The physician providing oversight shall also work with the AED site to establish protocols for AED deployment and conduct a review of each use of an AED; and

      (d) Any person who renders emergency care or treatment on a person in cardiac arrest by using an AED activates the local emergency medical services system as soon as possible and, if an entity with an AED program, reports any clinical use of the AED to the licensed physician.

   (2) Any person or entity who acquires an AED shall notify an agent of the local emergency medical services system and the local emergency communications or vehicle dispatch center of the existence, location, and type of AED acquired.

 

KRS § 311.668  (2009)

311.668.  Immunity from civil liability for user of automated external defibrillator — Exemption from KRS 311.667 for Good Samaritan.

  (1) Any person or entity who, in good faith and without compensation, renders emergency care or treatment by the use of an AED shall be immune from civil liability for any personal injury as a result of the care or treatment, or as a result of any act or failure to act in providing or arranging further medical treatment, where the person acts as an ordinary, reasonable prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.

(2) The immunity from civil liability for any personal injury under subsection (1) of this section includes the licensed physician who is involved with AED site placement, the person or entity who provides the CPR and AED site placement, the person or entity who provides the CPR and AED training, and the person or entity responsible for the site where the AED is located.

(3) The immunity from civil liability under subsection (1) of this section does not apply if the personal injury results from the gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the person rendering the emergency care.

(4) The requirements of KRS 311.667 shall not apply to any individual using an AED in an emergency setting if that individual is acting as a Good Samaritan under KRS 411.148 and KRS 313.257.

 

KRS § 313.257  (2009)

313.257. Nonliability of licensees for emergency care.

  No person licensed under this chapter, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of the emergency, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care.

 

KRS § 411.148  (2009)

411.148. Nonliability of licensees and certified technicians for emergency care.

  (1) No physician licensed under KRS Chapter 311, registered or practical nurse licensed under KRS Chapter 314, person certified as an emergency medical technician by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, person certified by the American Heart Association or the American Red Cross to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation, or employee of any board of education established pursuant to the provision of KRS 160.160, who has completed a course in first aid and who maintains current certification therein in accordance with the standards set forth by the American Red Cross shall be liable in civil damages for administering emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency outside of a hospital, doctor’s office, or other place having proper medical equipment excluding house calls, for acts performed at the scene of such emergency, unless such acts constitute willful or wanton misconduct.

(2) Nothing in this section applies to the administering of such care or treatment where the same is rendered for remuneration or with the expectation of remuneration.

(3) The administering of emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency by employees of a board of education shall not be considered to be rendered for remuneration or with the expectation of remuneration because such personnel perform such care as part of their regular professional or work responsibilities for which they receive their regular salaries from the school board which is their employer.

Louisiana

§ 9:2793. Gratuitous service at scene of emergency; limitation on liability

A. No person who in good faith gratuitously renders emergency care, first aid or rescue at the scene of an emergency, or moves a person receiving such care, first aid or rescue to a hospital or other place of medical care shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission in rendering the care or services or as a result of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the person involved in the said emergency; provided, however, such care or services or transportation shall not be considered gratuitous, and this Section shall not apply when rendered incidental to a business relationship, including but not limited to that of employer-employee, existing between the person rendering such care or service or transportation and the person receiving the same, or when incidental to a business relationship existing between the employer or principal of the person rendering such care, service or transportation and the employer or principal of the person receiving such care, service or transportation. This Section shall not exempt from liability those individuals who intentionally or by grossly negligent acts or omissions cause damages to another individual.

B. The immunity herein granted shall be personal to the individual rendering such care or service or furnishing such transportation and shall not inure to the benefit of any employer or other person legally responsible for the acts or omissions of such individual, nor shall it inure to the benefit of any insurer.

 

§ 9:2793.2. Gratuitous emergency services rendered by American Red Cross volunteers; limitation of liability

A. No person who in good faith gratuitously renders any emergency service as a volunteer on behalf of the American Red Cross shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission in rendering such care or services or as a result of any act or failure to act or failure to provide or arrange for further services.

B. The limitation of liability provided in Subsection A shall not apply if any of the following exists:

(1) The emergency service provided was inconsistent with or a breach of policies or procedures taught in the current and most advanced national American Red Cross First Aid Training Course or American Red Cross Disaster Nursing Course, or both.

(2) The emergency service provided was not supervised by a duly qualified employee or agent of the American Red Cross, as required by the policy and procedures of the American Red Cross.

(3) The damages were caused by the intentional act or omission or gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the volunteer.

C. As used in this Section:

(1) “Emergency service” means the immediate and temporary care rendered to a victim of injury or sudden illness consistent with the policies and procedures taught in the current and most advanced American Red Cross First Aid Training Course or the American Red Cross Disaster Nursing Course, or both.

(2) “Volunteer” means a person who has successfully completed first aid training by the American Red Cross or other recognized emergency medical training program and whose certification is current.

Maine

§ 164.  Immunity from civil liability

Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of any public or private and special law, any person who voluntarily, without the expectation of monetary or other compensation from the person aided or treated, renders first aid, emergency treatment or rescue assistance to a person who is unconscious, ill, injured or in need of rescue assistance, shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such person nor for damages for the death of such person alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or omission in the rendering of such first aid, emergency treatment or rescue assistance, unless it is established that such injuries or such death were caused willfully, wantonly or recklessly or by gross negligence on the part of such person. This section shall apply to members or employees of nonprofit volunteer or governmental ambulance, rescue or emergency units, whether or not a user or service fee may be charged by the nonprofit unit or the governmental entity and whether or not the members or employees receive salaries or other compensation from the nonprofit unit or the governmental entity. This section shall not be construed to require a person who is ill or injured to be administered first aid or emergency treatment if such person objects thereto on religious grounds. This section shall not apply if such first aid or emergency treatment or assistance is rendered on the premises of a hospital or clinic.

Maryland

§ 5-603. Emergency medical care

(a) In general. — A person described in subsection (b) of this section is not civilly liable for any act or omission in giving any assistance or medical care, if:

(1) The act or omission is not one of gross negligence;

(2) The assistance or medical care is provided without fee or other compensation; and

(3) The assistance or medical care is provided:

(i) At the scene of an emergency;

(ii) In transit to a medical facility; or

(iii) Through communications with personnel providing emergency assistance.

(b) Applicability. — Subsection (a) of this section applies to the following:

(1) An individual who is licensed by this State to provide medical care;

(2) A member of any State, county, municipal, or volunteer fire department, ambulance and rescue squad or law enforcement agency or of the National Ski Patrol System, or a corporate fire department responding to a call outside of its corporate premises, if the member:

(i) Has completed an American Red Cross course in advanced first aid and has a current card showing that status;

(ii) Has completed an equivalent of an American Red Cross course in advanced first aid, as determined by the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene; or

(iii) Is certified or licensed by this State as an emergency medical services provider;

(3) A volunteer fire department, ambulance and rescue squad whose members have immunity; and

(4) A corporation when its fire department personnel are immune under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(c) Immunity for individual not covered by this section. — An individual who is not covered otherwise by this section is not civilly liable for any act or omission in providing assistance or medical aid to a victim at the scene of an emergency, if:

(1) The assistance or aid is provided in a reasonably prudent manner;

(2) The assistance or aid is provided without fee or other compensation; and

(3) The individual relinquishes care of the victim when someone who is licensed or certified by this State to provide medical care or services becomes available to take responsibility.

Massachusetts

§ 12V.  Exemption From Civil Liability for Rendering Emergency Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation.

Any person, whose usual and regular duties do not include the provision of emergency medical care, and who, in good faith, attempts to render emergency care including, but not limited to, cardiopulmonary resuscitation or defibrillation, and does so without compensation, shall not be liable for acts or omissions, other than gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct, resulting from the attempt to render such emergency care.

Michigan

§ 41.711a.    Rendition of emergency care; civil liability.

§ 41.711a.    Rendition of emergency care; civil liability.

   Sec. 1 a. Any municipal or private ambulance driver or attendant or policeman or fireman engaged in emergency first aid service, who, in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency, shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of acts or omissions in rendering the emergency care, except acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.

 

§ 691.1501.    Physicians, physician’s assistant, or nurses rendering emergency care or determining fitness to engage in competitive sports; liability for acts or omissions; definitions.

   Sec. 1. (1) A physician, physician’s assistant, registered professional nurse, or licensed practical nurse who in good faith renders emergency care without compensation at the scene of an emergency, if a physician-patient relationship, physician’s assistant-patient relationship, registered professional nurse-patient relationship, or licensed practical nurse-patient relationship did not exist before the emergency, is not liable for civil damages as a result of acts or omissions by the physician, physician’s assistant, registered professional nurse, or licensed practical nurse in rendering the emergency care, except acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.
   (2) A physician or physician’s assistant who in good faith performs a physical examination without compensation upon an individual to determine the individual’s fitness to engage in competitive sports and who has obtained a form described in this subsection signed by the individual or, if the individual is a minor, by the parent or guardian of the minor, is not liable for civil damages as a result of acts or omissions by the physician or physician’s assistant in performing the physical examination, except acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct or which are outside the scope of the license held by the physician or physician’s assistant. The form required by this subsection shall contain a statement indicating that the person signing the form knows that the physician or physician’s assistant is not necessarily performing a complete physical examination and is not liable under this section for civil damages as a result of acts or omissions by the physician or physician’s assistant in performing the physical examination, except acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct or which are outside the scope of the license held by the physician or physician’s assistant.
   (3) A physician, physician’s assistant, registered professional nurse, or licensed practical nurse who in good faith renders emergency care without compensation to an individual requiring emergency care as a result of having engaged in competitive sports is not liable for civil damages as a result of acts or omissions by the physician, physician’s assistant, registered professional nurse, or licensed practical nurse in rendering the emergency care, except acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct and except acts or omissions that are outside the scope of the license held by the physician, physician’s assistant, registered professional nurse, or licensed practical nurse. This subsection applies to the rendering of emergency care to a minor even if the physician, physician’s assistant, registered professional nurse, or licensed practical nurse does not obtain the consent of the parent or guardian of the minor before the emergency care is rendered.
   (4) As used in this act:
   (a) “Competitive sports” means sports conducted as part of a program sponsored by a public or private school that provides instruction in grades kindergarten through 12 or a charitable or volunteer organization. Competitive sports do not include sports conducted as part of a program sponsored by a public or private college or university.
   (b) “Licensed practical nurse” means an individual licensed to engage in the practice of nursing as a licensed practical nurse under article 15 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368,
MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838.
   (c) “Physician” means an individual licensed to engage in the practice of medicine or the practice of osteopathic medicine and surgery under article 15 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838.
   (d) “Physician’s assistant” means an individual licensed to engage in the practice of medicine or the practice of osteopathic medicine and surgery performed under the supervision of a physician as provided in article 15 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838.
   (e) “Registered professional nurse” means an individual licensed to engage in the practice of nursing under article 15 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838
.

 

§ 691.1502.    Emergency care; exemption of certain persons from civil liability; exception; staffing hospital emergency facilities

   Sec. 2. (1) If an individual’s actual hospital duty does not require a response to the emergency situation, a physician, physician’s assistant, dentist, podiatrist, intern, resident, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, registered physical therapist, clinical laboratory technologist, inhalation therapist, certified registered nurse anesthetist, x-ray technician, or paramedic, who in good faith responds to a life threatening emergency or responds to a request for emergency assistance in a life threatening emergency within a hospital or other licensed medical care facility, is not liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission in the rendering of emergency care, except an act or omission amounting to gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.
   (2) The exemption from liability under subsection (1) does not apply to a physician if a physician-patient relationship, to a physician’s assistant if a physician’s assistant-patient relationship, or to a licensed nurse if a nurse-patient relationship existed before the emergency.
   (3) The exemption from liability under subsection (1) does not apply to a physician’s assistant unless the response by the physician’s assistant is within the scope of the license held by the physician’s assistant or within the expertise or training of the physician’s assistant.
   (4) This act does not diminish a hospital’s responsibility to reasonably and adequately staff hospital emergency facilities if the hospital maintains or holds out to the general public that it maintains emergency room facilities.

 

§ 691.1504.    Rendering of cardiopulmonary resuscitation; applicability of subsection (1) to civil actions; use of automated external defibrillator; applicability of subsections (3) and (4).

   Sec. 4. (1) Subject to subsection (2), an individual who having no duty to do so in good faith voluntarily renders cardiopulmonary resuscitation to another individual is not liable in a civil action for damages resulting from an act or omission in rendering the cardiopulmonary resuscitation, except an act or omission that constitutes gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.
   (2) Subsection (1) applies only to a civil action that is filed or pending on or after May 1, 1986.
   (3) Subject to subsection (5), an individual who having no duty to do so in good faith voluntarily renders emergency services to another individual using an automated external defibrillator is not liable in a civil action for damages resulting from an act or omission in rendering the emergency services using the automated external defibrillator, except an act or omission that constitutes gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.
   (4) Subject to subsection (5), the following persons are not liable in a civil action for damages resulting from an act or omission of an individual rendering emergency services using an automated external defibrillator as described in subsection (3), except if the person’s actions constitute gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct:
   (a) A physician who provides medical authorization for use of an automated external defibrillator.
   (b) An individual who instructs others in the use of an automated external defibrillator.
   (c) An individual or entity that owns, occupies, or manages the premises where an automated external defibrillator is located or used.
   (5) Subsections (3) and (4) apply only to a civil action that is filed or pending on or after the effective date of the amendatory act that added this subsection.

 

§ 691.1505.    Liability of block parent volunteer; definitions.

   Sec. 5. (1) A block parent volunteer who in good faith and while acting as a block parent volunteer renders assistance to a minor during an emergency shall not be liable for civil damages resulting from an act or omission in the rendering of that assistance, except an act or omission amounting to gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct.
   (2) As used in this section:
   (a) “Block parent volunteer” means a person who is a member of a nonprofit volunteer organization which has as its primary function assisting minors in getting safely to and from school.
   (b) “Minor” means a person who is less than 18 years of age.

 

§ 691.1507.    Member of national ski patrol system rendering emergency care; liability for acts or omissions.

   Sec. 7. A person who is a registered member of the national ski patrol system and who, in good faith and while on patrol as a member of the national ski patrol system, renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency shall not be liable for civil damages as a result of acts or omissions by the person in rendering the emergency care, except acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.

Minnesota

604A.01 Good Samaritan Law

Subdivision 1. Duty to assist.

A person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do so without danger or peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel. A person who violates this subdivision is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.

Subd. 2. General immunity from liability.

(a) A person who, without compensation or the expectation of compensation, renders emergency care, advice, or assistance at the scene of an emergency or during transit to a location where professional medical care can be rendered, is not liable for any civil damages as a result of acts or omissions by that person in rendering the emergency care, advice, or assistance, unless the person acts in a willful and wanton or reckless manner in providing the care, advice, or assistance. This subdivision does not apply to a person rendering emergency care, advice, or assistance during the course of regular employment, and receiving compensation or expecting to receive compensation for rendering the care, advice, or assistance.

(b) For the purposes of this section, the scene of an emergency is an area outside the confines of a hospital or other institution that has hospital facilities, or an office of a person licensed to practice one or more of the healing arts under chapter 147, 147A, 148, 150A, or 153. The scene of an emergency includes areas threatened by or exposed to spillage, seepage, fire, explosion, or other release of hazardous materials, and includes ski areas and trails.

(c) For the purposes of this section, “person” includes a public or private nonprofit volunteer firefighter, volunteer police officer, volunteer ambulance attendant, volunteer first provider of emergency medical services, volunteer ski patroller, and any partnership, corporation, association, or other entity.

(d) For the purposes of this section, “compensation” does not include payments, reimbursement for expenses, or pension benefits paid to members of volunteer organizations.

(e) For purposes of this section, “emergency care” includes providing emergency medical care by using or providing an automatic external defibrillator, unless the person on whom the device is to be used objects; or unless the person is rendering this care during the course of regular employment, the person is receiving or expects to receive compensation for rendering this care, and the usual and regular duties of the person include the provision of emergency medical care. “Automatic external defibrillator” means a medical device heart monitor and defibrillator that:

(1) has received approval of its premarket notification, filed pursuant to United States Code, title 21, section 360(k), from the United States Food and Drug Administration;

(2) is capable of recognizing the presence or absence of ventricular fibrillation or rapid ventricular tachycardia, and is capable of determining, without intervention by an operator, whether defibrillation should be performed; and

(3) upon determining that defibrillation should be performed, automatically charges and requests delivery of an electrical impulse to an individual’s heart.

 

Mississippi

§ 41-60-33. Requirements and training for use of automated external defibrillator

   Any person may use an automated external defibrillator for the purpose of saving the life of another person in sudden cardiac death, subject to the following requirements:

   (a) A Mississippi licensed physician must exercise medical control authority over the person using the AED to ensure compliance with requirements for training, emergency medical services (EMS) notification and maintenance;

   (b) The person using the AED must have received appropriate training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and in the use of an AED by the

 American Heart Association, American Red Cross, National Safety Council or other nationally recognized course in CPR and AED use;

   (c) The AED must not operate in a manual mode except when access control devices are in place or when appropriately licensed individuals such as registered nurses, physicians or emergency medical technician-paramedics utilize the AED; and

   (d) Any person who renders emergency care or treatment on a person in sudden cardiac death by using an AED must activate the EMS system as soon as possible, and report any clinical use of the AED to the licensed physician.

 

 

§ 73-25-37. Liability of physician, dentist, nurse, emergency medical technician, etc., for rendering emergency care; immunity from civil liability for good faith use of automated external defibrillator by person untrained in its use

(1) No duly licensed, practicing physician, physician assistant, dentist, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, certified registered emergency medical technician, or any other person who, in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care, renders emergency care to any injured person at the scene of an emergency, or in transporting the injured person to a point where medical assistance can be reasonably expected, shall be liable for any civil damages to the injured person as a result of any acts committed in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care or omissions in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care by such persons in rendering the emergency care to the injured person.

(2) (a) Any person who in good faith, with or without compensation, renders emergency care or treatment by the use of an automated external defibrillator (AED) in accordance with the provisions of Sections 41-60-31 through 41-60-35, as well as the person responsible for the site where the AED is located if the person has provided for compliance with the provisions of Sections 41-60-31 through 41-60-35, shall be immune from civil liability for any personal injury as a result of that care or treatment, or as a result of any act, or failure to act, in providing or arranging further medical treatment, where the person acts as an ordinary, reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances and the person’s actions or failure to act does not amount to willful or wanton misconduct or gross negligence.

   (b) A person who has not complied with the provisions of Sections 41-60-31 through 41-60-35, but who has access to an AED and uses it in good faith in an emergency as an ordinary prudent person would have done in the same or similar circumstances, shall be immune from civil liability for any personal injury as a result of an act or omission related to the operation of or failure to operate an AED if the person’s actions or failure to act do not amount to willful or wanton misconduct or gross negligence.

(3) The immunity from civil liability for any personal injury under subsection (2) of this section includes the licensed physician who authorizes, directs or supervises the installation or provision of AED equipment in or on any premises or conveyance other than a medical facility, the owner of the premises where an AED is used, the purchaser of the AED, a person who uses an AED during an emergency for the purpose of attempting to save the life of another person who is or who appears to be in cardiac arrest, and the person who provides the CPR and AED training.

(4) The immunity from civil liability under subsection (2) of this section does not apply if the personal injury results from the gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the person rendering the emergency care.

Missouri

§ 537.037. Emergency care, no civil liability, exceptions (Good Samaritan law)

2. Any other person who has been trained to provide first aid in a standard recognized training program may, without compensation, render emergency care or assistance to the level for which he or she has been trained, at the scene of an emergency or accident, and shall not be liable for civil damages for acts or omissions other than damages occasioned by gross negligence or by willful or wanton acts or omissions by such person in rendering such emergency care.

Montana

27-1-714 Limits on liability for emergency care rendered at scene of accident or emergency.

(1)  Any person licensed as a physician and surgeon under the laws of the state of Montana, any volunteer firefighter or officer of any nonprofit volunteer fire company, or any other person who in good faith renders emergency care or assistance without compensation except as provided in subsection (2) at the scene of an emergency or accident is not liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions other than damages occasioned by gross negligence or by willful or wanton acts or omissions by such person in rendering such emergency care or assistance.

(2)  Subsection (1) includes a person properly trained under the laws of this state who operates an ambulance to and from the scene of an emergency or renders emergency medical treatment on a volunteer basis so long as the total reimbursement received for such volunteer services does not exceed 25% of his gross annual income or $ 3,000 a calendar year, whichever is greater.

(3)  If a nonprofit subscription fire company refuses to fight a fire on nonsubscriber property, such refusal does not constitute gross negligence or a willful or wanton act or omission.

Nebraska

25-21,186. Emergency care at scene of emergency; persons relieved of civil liability, when

No person who renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or other emergency gratuitously, shall be held liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering the emergency care or as a result of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for medical treatment or care for the injured person.

Nevada

41.500.  General rule; volunteers; members of search and rescue organization; persons rendering cardiopulmonary resuscitation or using defibrillator; presumptions relating to emergency care rendered on public school grounds or in connection with public school activities; business or organization that has defibrillator for use on premises.

1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 41.505, any person in this state who renders emergency care or assistance in an emergency, gratuitously and in good faith, is not liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission, not amounting to gross negligence, by him in rendering the emergency care or assistance or as a result of any act or failure to act, not amounting to gross negligence, to provide or arrange for further medical treatment for the injured person.

4. Any person who is a member of a search and rescue organization in this state under the direct supervision of any county sheriff who in good faith renders care or assistance in an emergency to any injured or ill person, whether at the scene of an emergency or while transporting an injured or ill person to or from any clinic, doctor’s office or other medical facility, is not liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission, not amounting to gross negligence, by him in rendering the emergency care or assistance, or as a result of any act or failure to act, not amounting to gross negligence, to provide or arrange for further medical treatment for the injured or ill person.

6. Any person who:

(a) Has successfully completed a course in cardiopulmonary resuscitation according to the guidelines of the American National Red Cross or American Heart Association;

(b) Has successfully completed the training requirements of a course in basic emergency care of a person in cardiac arrest conducted in accordance with the standards of the American Heart Association; or

(c) Is directed by the instructions of a dispatcher for an ambulance, air ambulance or other agency that provides emergency medical services before its arrival at the scene of the emergency,

and who in good faith renders cardiopulmonary resuscitation in accordance with his training or the direction, other than in the course of his regular employment or profession, is not liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission, not amounting to gross negligence, by that person in rendering that care.

7. For the purposes of subsection 6, a person who:

(a) Is required to be certified in the administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation pursuant to NRS 391.092; and

(b) In good faith renders cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the property of a public school or in connection with a transportation of pupils to or from a public school or while on activities that are part of the program of a public school,

shall be presumed to have acted other than in the course of his regular employment or profession.

8. Any person who gratuitously and in good faith renders emergency medical care involving the use of an automated external defibrillator is not liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission, not amounting to gross negligence, by that person in rendering that care.

9. A business or organization that has placed an automated external defibrillator for use on its premises is not liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission, not amounting to gross negligence, by the person rendering such care or for providing the automated external defibrillator to the person for the purpose of rendering such care if the business or organization:

(a) Complies with all current federal and state regulations governing the use and placement of an automated external defibrillator;

(b) Ensures that the automated external defibrillator is maintained and tested according to the operational guidelines established by the manufacturer; and

(c) Establishes requirements for the notification of emergency medical assistance and guidelines for the maintenance of the equipment.

10. As used in this section, “gratuitously” means that the person receiving care or assistance is not required or expected to pay any compensation or other remuneration for receiving the care or assistance.

New Hampshire

508:12 Aid at Scene of Emergency or to Victim of Crime.

I. If any person in good faith renders emergency care at the place of the happening of an emergency or to a victim of a crime or delinquent act or while in transit in an ambulance or rescue vehicle, to a person who is in urgent need of care as a result of the emergency or crime or a delinquent act, and if the acts of care are made in good faith and without willful or wanton negligence, the person who renders the care is not liable in civil damages for his acts or omissions in rendering the care, as long as he receives no direct compensation for the care from or on behalf of the person cared for. Any person rendering emergency care shall have the duty to place the injured person under the care of a physician, nurse, or other person qualified to care for such person as soon as possible and to obey the instructions of such qualified person.

II. Nothing in this section shall be used to construe that the perpetrator of a crime or a delinquent act or his accomplice shall be rendered innocent of liability.

III. A law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty who in good faith and without negligence renders emergency care or transport pursuant to paragraph I is exempt from civil liability under the provisions of paragraph I.

New Jersey

§ 2A:62A-1. Civil immunity for emergency care

Any individual, including a person licensed to practice any method of treatment of human ailments, disease, pain, injury, deformity, mental or physical condition, or licensed to render services ancillary thereto, or any person who is a volunteer member of a duly incorporated first aid and emergency or volunteer ambulance or rescue squad association, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victim or victims thereof, or while transporting the victim or victims thereof to a hospital or other facility where treatment or care is to be rendered, shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care.

New Mexico

§ 24-10-3.  Persons coming to aid or rescue of another rendering emergency care; release from liability

No person who comes to the aid or rescue of another person by providing care or assistance in good faith at or near the scene of an emergency, as defined in Section 24-10-4 NMSA 1978, shall be held liable for any civil damages as a result of any action or omission by that person in providing that care or assistance, except when liable for an act of gross negligence; but nothing in this section applies to the provision of emergency care or assistance when it is rendered for remuneration or with the expectation of remuneration or is rendered by a person or agent of a principal who was at the scene of the accident or emergency because he or his principal was soliciting business or performing or seeking to perform some services for remuneration.

New York

§ 6547.  Emergency services rendered by physician assistant

   Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of any general, special or local law, any physician assistant properly registered in this state who voluntarily and without the expectation of monetary compensation renders first aid or emergency treatment at the scene of an accident or other emergency, outside a hospital, doctor’s office or any other place having proper and necessary medical equipment, to a person who is unconscious, ill or injured, shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such person or for damages for the death of such person alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or omission in the rendering of such first aid or emergency treatment unless it is established that such injuries were or such death was caused by gross negligence on the part of such physician assistant. Nothing in this section shall be deemed or construed to relieve a licensed physician assistant from liability for damages for injuries or death caused by an act or omission on the part of a physician assistant while rendering professional services in the normal and ordinary course of his practice.

 

NY CLS Educ § 6909  (2009)

§ 6909.  Special provision

   1. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of any general, special, or local law, any licensed registered professional nurse or licensed practical nurse who voluntarily and without the expectation of monetary compensation renders first aid or emergency treatment at the scene of an accident or other emergency, outside a hospital, doctor’s office or any other place having proper and necessary medical equipment, to a person who is unconscious, ill or injured shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such person or for damages for the death of such person alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or omission in the rendering of such first aid or emergency treatment unless it is established that such injuries were or such death was caused by gross negligence on the part of such registered professional nurse or licensed practical nurse. Nothing in this subdivision shall be deemed or construed to relieve a licensed registered professional nurse or licensed practical nurse from liability for damages for injuries or death caused by an act or omission on the part of such nurse while rendering professional services in the normal and ordinary course of her practice.

2. Nothing in this article shall be construed to confer the authority to practice medicine or dentistry.

3. An applicant for a license as a registered professional nurse or licensed practical nurse by endorsement of a license of another state, province or country whose application was filed with the department under the laws in effect prior to August thirty-first, nineteen hundred seventy-one shall be licensed only upon successful completion of the appropriate licensing examination unless satisfactory evidence of the completion of all educational requirements is submitted to the department prior to September one, nineteen hundred seventy-seven.

4. A certified nurse practitioner may prescribe and order a non-patient specific regimen to a registered professional nurse, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the commissioner, consistent with subdivision three of section six thousand nine hundred two of this article, and consistent with the public health law, for:

(a) administering immunizations.

(b) the emergency treatment of anaphylaxis.

(c) administering purified protein derivative (PPD) tests.

(d) administering tests to determine the presence of the human immunodeficiency virus.

5. A registered professional nurse may execute a non-patient specific regimen prescribed or ordered by a licensed physician or certified nurse practitioner, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the commissioner.

6. A registered professional nurse defined under subdivision one of section sixty-nine hundred two of this article may use accepted classifications of signs, symptoms, dysfunctions and disorders, including, but not limited to, classifications used in the practice setting for the purpose of providing mental health services.

7. [Expires and repealed March 31, 2012] A certified nurse practitioner may prescribe and order a non-patient specific regimen to a licensed pharmacist, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the commissioner, and consistent with the public health law, for administering immunizations. Nothing in this subdivision shall authorize unlicensed persons to administer immunizations, vaccines or other drugs.

 

 

NY CLS Gen Bus § 627-a (2009)

§ 627-a.  Automated external defibrillator requirements

   1. Every health club as defined under paragraph b of subdivision one of section three thousand-d of the public health law whose membership is five hundred persons or more shall have on the premises at least one automated external defibrillator and shall have in attendance, at all times during business hours, at least one individual performing employment or individual acting as an authorized volunteer who holds a valid certification of completion of a course in the study of the operation of AEDs and a valid certification of the completion of a course in the training of cardiopulmonary resuscitation provided by a nationally recognized organization or association.
 
2. Health clubs and staff pursuant to subdivision one of this section shall be deemed a “public access defibrillation provider” as defined in paragraph (c) of subdivision one of section three thousand-b of the public health law and shall be subject to the requirements and limitation of such section.
 
3. Pursuant to sections three thousand-a and three thousand-b of the public health law, any public access defibrillation provider, or any employee or other agent of the provider who, in accordance with the provisions of this section, voluntarily and without expectation of monetary compensation
renders emergency medical or first aid treatment using an AED which has been made available pursuant to this section, to a person who is unconscious, ill or injured, shall be liable only pursuant to section three thousand-a of the public health law.

 

NY CLS Pub Health § 3000-a (2009)

§ 3000-a.  Emergency medical treatment

   1. Except as provided in subdivision six of section six thousand six hundred eleven, subdivision two of section six thousand five hundred twenty-seven, subdivision one of section six thousand nine hundred nine and sections six thousand five hundred forty-seven and six thousand seven hundred thirty-seven of the education law, any person who voluntarily and without expectation of monetary compensation renders first aid or emergency treatment at the scene of an accident or other emergency outside a hospital, doctor’s office or any other place having proper and necessary medical equipment, to a person who is unconscious, ill, or injured, shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such person or for damages for the death of such person alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or omission in the rendering of such emergency treatment unless it is established that such injuries were or such death was caused by gross negligence on the part of such person. Nothing in this section shall be deemed or construed to relieve a licensed physician, dentist, nurse, physical therapist or registered physician’s assistant from liability for damages for injuries or death caused by an act or omission on the part of such person while rendering professional services in the normal and ordinary course of his or her practice.
 
2. (i) A person who, or entity, partnership, corporation, firm or society that, purchases or makes available resuscitation equipment that facilitates
first aid, [fig 1] an automated external defibrillator or an epinephrine auto-injector device [fig 2] as required by or pursuant to law or local law, or (ii) [fig 3] an emergency health care provider [fig 4] under a collaborative agreement [fig 5] pursuant to section three thousand-b of this article with respect to an automated external defibrillator, [fig 6] or (iii) the emergency health care provider with a collaborative agreement under section three thousand-c of this article with respect to use of an epinephrine auto-injector device, [fig 7] shall not be liable for damages arising either from the use of that equipment by a person who voluntarily and without expectation of monetary compensation renders first aid or emergency treatment at the scene of an accident or medical emergency, or from the use of defectively manufactured equipment; provided that this subdivision shall not limit the person’s or entity’s, partnership’s, corporation’s, firm’s society’s or the emergency health care provider’s liability for his, her or its own negligence, gross negligence or intentional misconduct.

 

NY CLS Unconsol Ch 211-A, § 1 (2009)

§ 1.  [Immunity from liability]

   Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of any general, special or local law, any person who is registered as a member of the ski patrol with the National Ski Patrol System and who voluntarily and without the expectation of monetary compensation renders first aid, initial emergency medical aid procedures, or emergency treatment at a ski area to a person who is unconscious, ill or injured shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such person or for damages for the death of such person alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or omission in the rendering of such first aid, initial emergency medical aid procedures or emergency treatment, unless it is established that such injuries were or such death was caused by gross negligence on the part of such person.

North Carolina

§ 20-166. Duty to stop in event of accident or collision; furnishing information or assistance to injured person, etc.; persons assisting exempt from civil liability

(d) Any person who renders first aid or emergency assistance at the scene of a motor vehicle accident on any street or highway to any person injured as a result of the accident, shall not be liable in civil damages for any acts or omissions relating to the services rendered, unless the acts or omissions amount to wanton conduct or intentional wrongdoing.

 

§ 90-21.14. First aid or emergency treatment; liability limitation

(a) Any person, including a volunteer medical or health care provider at a facility of a local health department as defined in G.S. 130A-2 or at a nonprofit community health center or a volunteer member of a rescue squad, who receives no compensation for his services as an emergency medical care provider, who renders first aid or emergency health care treatment to a person who is unconscious, ill or injured,

(1) When the reasonably apparent circumstances require prompt decisions and actions in medical or other health care, and

(2) When the necessity of immediate health care treatment is so reasonably apparent that any delay in the rendering of the treatment would seriously worsen the physical condition or endanger the life of the person, shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by the person or for damages for the death of the person alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or omission in the rendering of the treatment unless it is established that the injuries were or the death was caused by gross negligence, wanton conduct or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the person rendering the treatment.

(b) Nothing in this section shall be deemed or construed to relieve any person from liability for damages for injury or death caused by an act or omission on the part of such person while rendering health care services in the normal and ordinary course of his business or profession. Services provided by a volunteer health care provider who receives no compensation for his services and who renders first aid or emergency treatment to members of athletic teams are deemed not to be in the normal and ordinary course of the volunteer health care provider’s business or profession.

North Dakota

32-03.1-02. Actions barred.

No person, or the person’s employer, subject to the exceptions in sections 32-03.1-03, 32-03.1-04, and 32-03.1-08, who renders aid or assistance necessary or helpful in the circumstances to other persons who have been injured or are ill as the result of an accident or illness, or any mechanical, external or organic trauma, may be named as a defendant or held liable in any personal injury civil action by any party in this state for acts or omissions arising out of a situation in which emergency aid or assistance is rendered, unless it is plainly alleged in the complaint and later proven that such person’s acts or omissions constituted intentional misconduct or gross negligence.

 

32-03.1-07. Costs and fees.

Notwithstanding any other provision in the laws of this state, or any court rules, if a party names a defendant in a suit alleging intentional misconduct or gross negligence, as described in section 32-03.1-01, and the trial judge dismisses the complaint or grants a defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, or directs a verdict for a defendant, or grants a defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or at any point in the proceedings grants a plaintiff’s motion to discontinue the action against the defendant, the defendant shall be entitled to full costs and reasonable attorneys fees expended in connection with the defendant’s defense of the action. If good reason is shown, the trial judge may suspend the operation of this section.

Ohio

§ 2305.23. Liability for emergency care

No person shall be liable in civil damages for administering emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency outside of a hospital, doctor’s office, or other place having proper medical equipment, for acts performed at the scene of such emergency, unless such acts constitute willful or wanton misconduct.
 
   Nothing in this section applies to the administering of such care or treatment where the same is rendered for remuneration, or with the expectation of remuneration, from the recipient of such care or treatment or someone on his behalf. The administering of such care or treatment by one as a part of his duties as a paid member of any organization of law enforcement officers or fire fighters does not cause such to be a rendering for remuneration or expectation of remuneration.

Oklahoma

§ 5.  Responsibility for negligence–“Good Samaritan Act”

(a) Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself, and except as hereinafter provided.
(1) Where no prior contractual relationship exists, any person licensed to practice any method of treatment of human ailments, disease, pain, injury, deformity, mental or physical condition, or licensed to render services ancillary thereto, including licensed registered and practical nurses, who, under emergency circumstances that suggest the giving of aid is the only alternative to probable death or serious bodily injury, in good faith, voluntarily and without compensation, renders or attempts to render emergency care to an injured person or any person who is in need of immediate medical aid, wherever required, shall not be liable for damages as a result of any acts or omissions except for committing gross negligence or willful or wanton wrongs in rendering the emergency care.
(2) Where no prior contractual relationship exists, any person who in good faith renders or attempts to render emergency care consisting of artificial respiration, restoration of breathing, or preventing or retarding the loss of blood, or aiding or restoring heart action or circulation of blood to the victim or victims of an accident or emergency, wherever required, shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care.
(3) Where no prior contractual relationship exists, any person licensed to perform surgery or dentistry in this state who in good faith renders emergency care requiring the performance of an operation or other form of surgery upon any individual who was the victim of an accidental act shall not be liable for any civil damages or subject to criminal prosecution as the result of nonconsent whereby such person renders or attempts to render the emergency surgery or operation voluntarily and without compensation, wherever required, except for gross negligence or willful or wanton wrongs committed in rendering the care; provided, however, that the exemption granted by this subsection shall not attach if the victim is an adult who is conscious and capable of giving or refusing his consent; or if the victim’s spouse, or parent, or guardian in the case of a minor or incompetent person, can be reached in a reasonable time considering the condition of the victim and consistent with good medical practice, and unless concurrence is obtained for such emergency surgery or operation from one other person licensed to perform surgery in this state.
(4) Where no contractual relationship exists, any person, or any member of his immediate family or household, who has been approved by the local P.T.A. or other local sponsoring agency or organization, who has registered with the local municipal police chief or the county sheriff, and who has been granted appropriate authorization by either the police chief or the county sheriff to indicate by sign in the window of his home or in any other tangible or identifiable manner that he will extend aid and refuge to persons on the streets in apparent danger, or in need of aid, by inviting those persons into the person’s home, or onto premises thereof, and in good faith provides such refuge or aid without objection of the endangered or needy person, whether child or adult, neither the person extending the aid and refuge nor the homeowner or head of household shall be liable for civil damages as a result of actions or omissions in rendering emergency physical care to the body of the aided person; nor shall they be liable for civil damages for any other injury in the home, or on premises thereof, to the person aided, nor for any failure to provide or arrange for his police protection or other protection or medical treatment, when the actions or omissions were those of an ordinarily reasonably prudent person under the circumstances without want of ordinary care or skill.
(b) This act shall be known and may be cited as the “Good Samaritan Act.”

Oregon

30.800. Liability for emergency medical assistance.

(1) As used in this section, “emergency medical assistance” means:

(a) Medical or dental care not provided in a place where emergency medical or dental care is regularly available, including but not limited to a hospital, industrial first-aid station or a physician’s or dentist’s office, given voluntarily and without the expectation of compensation to an injured person who is in need of immediate medical or dental care and under emergency circumstances that suggest that the giving of assistance is the only alternative to death or serious physical after effects; or

(b) Medical care provided voluntarily in good faith and without expectation of compensation by a physician licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners for the State of Oregon in the physician’s professional capacity as a team physician at a public or private school or college athletic event or as a volunteer physician at other athletic events.

(2) No person may maintain an action for damages for injury, death or loss that results from acts or omissions of a person while rendering emergency medical assistance unless it is alleged and proved by the complaining party that the person was grossly negligent in rendering the emergency medical assistance.

(3) The giving of emergency medical assistance by a person does not, of itself, establish the relationship of physician and patient, dentist and patient or nurse and patient between the person giving the assistance and the person receiving the assistance insofar as the relationship carries with it any duty to provide or arrange for further medical care for the injured person after the giving of emergency medical assistance.

 

Pennsylvania

§ 8331.  Medical good Samaritan civil immunity

(a) GENERAL RULE.– Any physician or any other practitioner of the healing arts or any registered nurse, licensed by any state, who happens by chance upon the scene of an emergency or who arrives on the scene of an emergency by reason of serving on an emergency call panel or similar committee of a county medical society or who is called to the scene of an emergency by the police or other duly constituted officers of a government unit or who is present when an emergency occurs and who, in good faith, renders emergency care at the scene of the emergency, shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such physician or practitioner or registered nurse in rendering the emergency care, except any acts or omissions intentionally designed to harm or any grossly negligent acts or omissions which result in harm to the person receiving emergency care.
 
   (b) DEFINITION.– As used in this section “good faith” shall include, but is not limited to, a reasonable opinion that the immediacy of the situation is such that the rendering of care should not be postponed until the patient is hospitalized.

 

§ 8332.  Nonmedical good Samaritan civil immunity

(a)           GENERAL RULE.– Any person who renders emergency care, first aid or rescue at the scene of an emergency, or moves the person receiving such care, first aid and rescue to a hospital or other place of medical care, shall not be liable to such person for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions in rendering the emergency care, first aid or rescue, or moving the person receiving the same to a hospital or other place of medical care, except any acts or omissions intentionally designed to harm or any grossly negligent acts or omissions which result in harm to the person receiving the emergency care, first aid or rescue or being moved to a hospital or other place of medical care.

(b)           (b) EXCEPTIONS.—

(c)           (1) This section shall not relieve a driver of an ambulance or other emergency or rescue vehicle from liability arising from operation or use of such vehicle.
(2) In order for any person to receive the benefit of the exemption from civil liability provided for in subsection (a), he shall be, at the time of rendering the emergency care, first aid or rescue or moving the person receiving emergency care, first aid or rescue to a hospital or other place of medical care, the holder of a current certificate evidencing the successful completion of a course in first aid, advanced life saving or basic life support sponsored by the American National Red Cross or the American Heart Association or an equivalent course of instruction approved by the Department of Health in consultation with a technical committee of the Pennsylvania Emergency Health Services Council and must be performing techniques and employing procedures consistent with the nature and level of the training for which the certificate has been issued.

Rhode Island

§ 9-1-27.1. Good Samaritan — Immunity from liability

No person who voluntarily and gratuitously renders emergency assistance to a person in need thereof including the administration of life saving treatment to those persons suffering from anaphylactic shock shall be liable for civil damages which result from acts or omissions by such persons rendering the emergency care, which may constitute ordinary negligence. This immunity does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton conduct.

South Carolina

§ 15-1-310. Liability for emergency care rendered at scene of accident.

Any person, who in good faith gratuitously renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victim thereof, shall not be liable for any civil damages for any personal injury as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering the emergency care or as a result of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person, except acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or wilful or wanton misconduct.

South Dakota

S.D. Codified Laws § 20-9-3  (2009)

§ 20-9-3. 

No physician, surgeon, osteopath, physician assistant, registered nurse or licensed practical nurse, licensed under the provisions of chapters 36-4, 36-4A and 36-9, who in good faith renders, in this state, emergency care at the scene of the emergency, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person rendering the emergency care.

 

S.D. Codified Laws § 20-9-4  (2009)

§ 20-9-4. 

   No physician, surgeon, osteopath, registered nurse or licensed practical nurse duly licensed to practice his profession in another state of the United States, who renders in this state emergency care at the scene of the emergency, shall be liable as specified in § 20-9-3, nor shall he be deemed to be practicing medicine or nursing within this state as contemplated by chapters 36-2, 36-4 and 36-9.

 

S.D. Codified Laws § 20-9-4.3  (2009)

§ 20-9-4.3.  “AED” and “person” defined

   Terms used in §§ 20-9-4.3 to 20-9-4.8, inclusive, mean:

   (1) “AED,” an automated external defibrillator;

   (2) “Person,” a natural person, organization, corporation, partnership, limited partnership, joint venture, association, government entity, or any other legal or commercial entity.

 

 

S.D. Codified Laws § 20-9-4.4  (2009)

§ 20-9-4.4.  Liability of person using or not using AED

   Any person, who in good faith obtains, uses, attempts to use, or chooses not to use an AED in providing emergency care or treatment, is immune from civil liability for any injury as a result of such emergency care or treatment or as a result of an act or failure to act in providing or arranging such medical treatment

 

S.D. Codified Laws § 20-9-4.6  (2009)

§ 20-9-4.6. 

Any person who provides AED training is immune from civil liability for any personal injury that occurs as a result of emergency care or treatment rendered using the AED or as a result of an act or failure to act in providing or arranging such medical treatment.

 

S.D. Codified Laws § 20-9-4.8  (2009)

§ 20-9-4.8. 

The immunity from civil liability under §§ 20-9-4.3 to 20-9-4.8, inclusive, does not apply if the personal injury results from the gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the person rendering such emergency care

 

§ 20-9-4.9.  Applicability of AED provisions — Immunity from liability for use of over-the-counter AED in providing emergency care

   The provisions of this chapter do not apply to an over-the-counter AED purchased without a written prescription. However, any person, who in good faith obtains an over-the-counter AED for use in providing emergency care or treatment or utilizes an over-the-counter AED, is immune from civil liability for any injury as a result of such emergency care or treatment or as a result of an act or failure to act in providing or arranging such emergency care or treatment. The immunity from civil liability pursuant to this section does not apply if the personal injury results from the gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the person rendering such emergency care.

 

S.D. Codified Laws § 36-4A-26.3  (2009)

§ 36-4A-26.3.  Liability and immunity

   No physician assistant licensed in this state or licensed or authorized to practice in other states of the United States who voluntarily and gratuitously, and other than in the ordinary course of employment or practice, renders emergency medical assistance is liable for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by those persons in rendering emergency care which constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity granted by this section does not apply to acts or omissions constituting willful, or wanton negligence or if the medical assistance is rendered at any hospital, physician’s office, or other health care delivery entity where those services are normally rendered. No physician who supervises a physician assistant voluntarily and gratuitously providing emergency care as described in this section is liable for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by the physician assistant rendering emergency care.

Tennessee

63-6-218.”Good Samaritan Law.”

(a) This section shall be known and cited as the “Good Samaritan Law.”

(b) Any person, including those licensed to practice medicine and surgery and including any person licensed or certified to render service ancillary thereto, or any member of a volunteer first aid, rescue or emergency squad that provides emergency public first aid and rescue services, who in good faith:

(1) Renders emergency care at the scene of an accident, medical emergency and/or disaster, while en route from such scene to a medical facility and while assisting medical personnel at the receiving medical facility, including use of an automated external defibrillator, to the victim or victims thereof without making any direct charge for the emergency care; or

(2) Participates or assists in rendering emergency care, including use of an automated external defibrillator, to persons attending or participating in performances, exhibitions, banquets, sporting events, religious or other gatherings open to the general public, with or without an admission charge, whether or not such emergency care is made available as a service, planned in advance by the promoter of the event and/or any other person or association, shall not be liable to such victims or persons receiving emergency care for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering the emergency care, or as a result of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person, except such damages as may result from the gross negligence of the person rendering such emergency care.

(c) A receiving medical facility shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission on the part of any member of a volunteer first aid, rescue or emergency squad that provides emergency public first aid and rescue services while such person is assisting medical personnel at the receiving medical facility.

(d) If:

 (1) A volunteer fire squad is organized by a private company for the protection of the plant and grounds of such company;

(2) Such squad is willing to respond and does respond to calls to provide fire protection for residents living within a six (6) mile radius of the county surrounding such plant; and

(3) The plant is located in a county that does not otherwise provide fire protection to such residents;

then the members of such volunteer fire squad, while providing fire protection within such area outside the plant, shall be liable to suit under the provisions of the Governmental Tort Liability Act, compiled in title 29, chapter 20, part 2.

Texas

§ 74.152.  Unlicensed Medical Personnel

Persons not licensed or certified in the healing arts who in good faith administer emergency care as emergency medical service personnel are not liable in civil damages for an act performed in administering the care unless the act is wilfully or wantonly negligent. This section applies without regard to whether the care is provided for or in expectation of remuneration.

Utah

§ 26-8a-601.  Persons and activities exempt from civil liability

(1) A licensed physician, physician’s assistant, or licensed registered nurse who, gratuitously and in good faith, gives oral or written instructions to an individual certified under Section 26-8a-302 or a person permitted to use a fully automated external defibrillator because of Section 26-8a-308 is not liable for any civil damages as a result of issuing the instructions, unless the instructions given were the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

(2) An individual certified under Section 26-8a-302, during either training or after certification, a licensed physician, physician’s assistant, or a registered nurse who, gratuitously and in good faith, provides emergency medical instructions or renders emergency medical care authorized by this chapter is not liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission in providing the emergency medical instructions or medical care, unless the act or omission is the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

(3) An individual certified under Section 26-8a-302 is not subject to civil liability for failure to obtain consent in rendering emergency medical services authorized by this chapter to any individual who is unable to give his consent, regardless of the individual’s age, where there is no other person present legally authorized to consent to emergency medical care, provided that the certified individual acted in good faith.

(4) A principal, agent, contractor, employee, or representative of an agency, organization, institution, corporation, or entity of state or local government that sponsors, authorizes, supports, finances, or supervises any functions of an individual certified under Section 26-8a-302 is not liable for any civil damages for any act or omission in connection with such sponsorship, authorization, support, finance, or supervision of the certified individual where the act or omission occurs in connection with the certified individual’s training or occurs outside a hospital where the life of a patient is in immediate danger, unless the act or omission is inconsistent with the training of the certified individual, and unless the act or omission is the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

(5) A physician who gratuitously and in good faith arranges for, requests, recommends, or initiates the transfer of a patient from a hospital to a critical care unit in another hospital is not liable for any civil damages as a result of such transfer where:

   (a) sound medical judgment indicates that the patient’s medical condition is beyond the care capability of the transferring hospital or the medical community in which that hospital is located; and

   (b) the physician has secured an agreement from the receiving facility to accept and render necessary treatment to the patient.

(6) A person who is a registered member of the National Ski Patrol System (NSPS) or a member of a ski patrol who has completed a course in winter emergency care offered by the NSPS combined with CPR for medical technicians offered by the American Red Cross or American Heart Association, or an equivalent course of instruction, and who in good faith renders emergency care in the course of ski patrol duties is not liable for civil damages as a result of any act or omission in rendering the emergency care, unless the act or omission is the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

(7) An emergency medical service provider who, in good faith, transports an individual against his will but at the direction of a law enforcement officer pursuant to Section 62A-15-629 is not liable for civil damages for transporting the individual.

(8) A person who is permitted to use a fully automated external defibrillator because of Section 26-8a-308 is not liable for civil damages as a result of any act or omission related to the use of the defibrillator in providing emergency medical care gratuitously and in good faith to a person who reasonably appears to be in cardiac arrest, unless the act or omission is the result of gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

 

§ 78-11-22.  Good Samaritan Act

(1) A person who renders emergency care at or near the scene of, or during an emergency, gratuitously and in good faith, is not liable for any civil damages or penalties as a result of any act or omission by the person rendering the emergency care, unless the person is grossly negligent or caused the emergency. As used in this section, “emergency” means an unexpected occurrence involving injury, threat of injury, or illness to a person or the public, including motor vehicle accidents, disasters, actual or threatened discharges, removal, or disposal of hazardous materials, and other accidents or events of a similar nature. “Emergency care” includes actual assistance or advice offered to avoid, mitigate, or attempt to mitigate the effects of an emergency.

(2) A person who gratuitously, and in good faith, assists governmental agencies or political subdivisions in the activities described in Subsections (2)(a) through (c) is not liable for any civil damages or penalties as a result of any act or omission unless the person rendering assistance is grossly negligent in:

   (a) implementing measures to control the causes of epidemic and communicable diseases and other conditions significantly affecting the public health, or necessary to protect the public health as set out in Title 26A, Chapter 1, Local Health Departments;

   (b) investigating and controlling suspected bioterrorism and disease as set out in Title 26, Chapter 23b, Detection of Public Health Emergencies Act; and

   (c) responding to a national, state, or local emergency, a public health emergency as defined in Section 26-23b-102, or a declaration by the President of the United States or other federal official requesting public health-related activities.

(3) The immunity in Subsection (2) is in addition to any immunity or protection in state or federal law that may apply.

Vermont

 

 

Virginia

§ 8.01-225.  Persons rendering emergency care, obstetrical services exempt from liability

A. Any person who:

1. In good faith, renders emergency care or assistance, without compensation, to any ill or injured person at the scene of an accident, fire, or any life-threatening emergency, or en route therefrom to any hospital, medical clinic or doctor’s office, shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions resulting from the rendering of such care or assistance.

2. In the absence of gross negligence, renders emergency obstetrical care or assistance to a female in active labor who has not previously been cared for in connection with the pregnancy by such person or by another professionally associated with such person and whose medical records are not reasonably available to such person shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions resulting from the rendering of such emergency care or assistance. The immunity herein granted shall apply only to the emergency medical care provided.

3. In good faith and without compensation, including any emergency medical services technician certified by the Board of Health, administers epinephrine in an emergency to an individual shall not be liable for any civil damages for ordinary negligence in acts or omissions resulting from the rendering of such treatment if such person has reason to believe that the individual receiving the injection is suffering or is about to suffer a life-threatening anaphylactic reaction.

6. In good faith and without compensation, renders or administers emergency cardiopulmonary resuscitation, cardiac defibrillation, including, but not limited to, the use of an automated external defibrillator, or other emergency life-sustaining or resuscitative treatments or procedures which have been approved by the State Board of Health to any sick or injured person, whether at the scene of a fire, an accident or any other place, or while transporting such person to or from any hospital, clinic, doctor’s office or other medical facility, shall be deemed qualified to administer such emergency treatments and procedures and shall not be liable for acts or omissions resulting from the rendering of such emergency resuscitative treatments or procedures.

7. Operates an automated external defibrillator at the scene of an emergency, trains individuals to be operators of automated external defibrillators, or orders automated external defibrillators, shall be immune from civil liability for any personal injury that results from any act or omission in the use of an automated external defibrillator in an emergency where the person performing the defibrillation acts as an ordinary, reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances, unless such personal injury results from gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the person rendering such emergency care.

8. Is a volunteer in good standing and certified to render emergency care by the National Ski Patrol System, Inc., who, in good faith and without compensation, renders emergency care or assistance to any injured or ill person, whether at the scene of a ski resort rescue, outdoor emergency rescue or any other place or while transporting such injured or ill person to a place accessible for transfer to any available emergency medical system unit, or any resort owner voluntarily providing a ski patroller employed by him to engage in rescue or recovery work at a resort not owned or operated by him, shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions resulting from the rendering of such emergency care, treatment or assistance, including but not limited to acts or omissions which involve violations of any state regulation or any standard of the National Ski Patrol System, Inc., in the rendering of such emergency care or assistance, unless such act or omission was the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

9. Is an employee of a school board, authorized by a prescriber and trained in the administration of insulin and glucagon, who, upon the written request of the parents as defined in § 22.1-1, assists with the administration of insulin or administers glucagon to a student diagnosed as having diabetes who requires insulin injections during the school day or for whom glucagon has been prescribed for the emergency treatment of hypoglycemia shall not be liable for any civil damages for ordinary negligence in acts or omissions resulting from the rendering of such treatment if the insulin is administered according to the child’s medication schedule or such employee has reason to believe that the individual receiving the glucagon is suffering or is about to suffer life-threatening hypoglycemia. Whenever any employee of a school board is covered by the immunity granted herein, the school board employing him shall not be liable for any civil damages for ordinary negligence in acts or omissions resulting from the rendering of such insulin or glucagon treatment.

B. Any licensed physician serving without compensation as the operational medical director for a licensed emergency medical services agency in this Commonwealth shall not be liable for any civil damages for any act or omission resulting from the rendering of emergency medical services in good faith by the personnel of such licensed agency unless such act or omission was the result of such physician’s gross negligence or willful misconduct.

Washington

§ 4.24.300. Immunity from liability for certain types of medical care

(1) Any person, including but not limited to a volunteer provider of emergency or medical services, who without compensation or the expectation of compensation renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency or who participates in transporting, not for compensation, therefrom an injured person or persons for emergency medical treatment shall not be liable for civil damages resulting from any act or omission in the rendering of such emergency care or in transporting such persons, other than acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. Any person rendering emergency care during the course of regular employment and receiving compensation or expecting to receive compensation for rendering such care is excluded from the protection of this subsection.

(2) Any licensed health care provider regulated by a disciplining authority under RCW 18.130.040 in the state of Washington who, without compensation or the expectation of compensation, provides health care services at a community health care setting is not liable for civil damages resulting from any act or omission in the rendering of such care, other than acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

 

§ 4.24.310. Persons rendering emergency care or transportation — Definitions

For the purposes of RCW 4.24.300 the following words and phrases shall have the following meanings unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

(1) “Compensation” has its ordinary meaning but does not include: Nominal payments, reimbursement for expenses, or pension benefits; payments made to volunteer part-time and volunteer on-call personnel of fire departments, fire districts, ambulance districts, police departments, or any emergency response organizations; or any payment to a person employed as a transit operator who is paid for his or her regular work, which work does not routinely include providing emergency care or emergency transportation.

(2) “Emergency care” means care, first aid, treatment, or assistance rendered to the injured person in need of immediate medical attention and includes providing or arranging for further medical treatment or care for the injured person. Except with respect to the injured person or persons being transported for further medical treatment or care, the immunity granted by RCW 4.24.300 does not apply to the negligent operation of any motor vehicle.

(3) “Scene of an emergency” means the scene of an accident or other sudden or unexpected event or combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action.

West Virginia

§ 55-7-15.  Aid to victim of accident and victim of crime; immunity from civil liability.

No person, including a person licensed to practice medicine or dentistry, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or to a victim at the scene of a crime, without remuneration, shall be liable for any civil damages as the result of any act or omission in rendering such emergency care.

Wisconsin

448.03. License or certificate required to practice; use of titles; civil immunity; practice of Christian Science.

(1) LICENSE REQUIRED TO PRACTICE.

(a) No person may practice medicine and surgery, or attempt to do so or make a representation as authorized to do so, without a license to practice medicine and surgery granted by the board.

(2) EXCEPTIONS.

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed either to prohibit, or to require, a license or certificate under this subchapter for any of the following:

(i) Any person furnishing medical assistance or first aid at the scene of an emergency.

 

895.48. Civil liability exemption; emergency medical care.

(1) Any person who renders emergency care at the scene of any emergency or accident in good faith shall be immune from civil liability for his or her acts or omissions in rendering such emergency care. This immunity does not extend when employees trained in health care or health care professionals render emergency care for compensation and within the scope of their usual and customary employment or practice at a hospital or other institution equipped with hospital facilities, at the scene of any emergency or accident, enroute to a hospital or other institution equipped with hospital facilities or at a physicians office.

(1m)

(a) Except as provided in par. (b), any physician or athletic trainer licensed under ch. 448, chiropractor licensed under ch. 446, dentist licensed under ch. 447, emergency medical technician licensed under s. 146.50, first responder certified under s. 146.50 (8), physician assistant licensed under ch. 448, registered nurse licensed under ch. 441, or a massage therapist or bodyworker issued a certificate under ch. 460 who renders voluntary health care to a participant in an athletic event or contest sponsored by a nonprofit corporation, as defined in s. 66.0129 (6) (b), a private school, as defined in s. 115.001 (3r), a public agency, as defined in s. 46.856 (1) (b), or a school, as defined in s. 609.655 (1) (c), is immune from civil liability for his or her acts or omissions in rendering that care if all of the following conditions exist:

1. The health care is rendered at the site of the event or contest, during transportation to a health care facility from the event or contest, or in a locker room or similar facility immediately before, during or immediately after the event or contest.

2. The physician, athletic trainer, chiropractor, dentist, emergency medical technician, first responder, physician assistant, registered nurse, massage therapist or bodyworker does not receive compensation for the health care, other than reimbursement for expenses.

(b) Paragraph (a) does not apply to health care services provided by a volunteer health care provider under s. 146.89

(4)

(ag) In this subsection:

1. “Cardiac arrest” means the sudden cessation of cardiac function and the disappearance of arterial blood pressure that connote ventricular fibrillation or pulseless ventricular tachycardia.

2. “Pulseless ventricular tachycardia” means a disturbance in the normal rhythm of the heart that is characterized by rapid electrical activity of the heart with no cardiac output.

(am) Any of the following, other than an emergency medical technician or a first responder — defibrillation, is immune from civil liability for the acts or omissions of a person in rendering in good faith emergency care by use of an automated external defibrillator to an individual who appears to be in cardiac arrest:

1. The person who renders the care.

2. The owner of the automated external defibrillator.

3. The person who provides the automated external defibrillator for use, if the person ensures that the automated external defibrillator is maintained and tested in accordance with any operational guidelines of the manufacturer.

4. Any person who provides training in the use of an automated external defibrillator to the person who renders care.

(b) The immunity specified in par. (am) does not extend to any of the following:

1. A person whose act or omission resulting from the use or the provision for use of the automated external defibrillator constitutes gross negligence.

2. A health care professional who renders emergency care for compensation and within the scope of his or her usual and customary employment or practice at a hospital or other institution equipped with hospital facilities, at the scene of an emergency or accident, enroute to a hospital or other institution equipped with hospital facilities or at a physicians office.

Wyoming

§ 1-1-120.  Persons rendering emergency assistance exempt from civil liability.

(a) Any person licensed as a physician and surgeon under the laws of the state of Wyoming, or any other person, who in good faith renders emergency care or assistance without compensation at the place of an emergency or accident, is not liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions in good faith.

(b) Persons or organizations operating volunteer ambulances or rescue vehicles supported by public or private funds, staffed by unpaid volunteers, and which make no charge, or charge an incidental service or user fee, for services rendered during medical emergencies, and the unpaid volunteers who staff ambulances and rescue vehicles are not liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions in good faith in furnishing emergency medical services. This immunity does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. For purposes of this section, “unpaid volunteers” means persons who either receive incidental remuneration on a per call basis or receive no more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) annually for volunteer ambulance and rescue activities. The immunity provided by this subsection shall extend to a physician while serving in his capacity as medical director of any ambulance service, to hospitals and hospital employees for activities directly related to providing clinical training as part of an emergency medical service class approved by the department of health, and to students while participating in emergency medical services training approved by the department of health. If an unpaid volunteer’s, medical director’s, hospital’s or trainee’s acts or omissions are subject to the provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, immunity under this section is waived to the extent of the maximum liability provided under W.S. 1-39-118.

(c) Any person who provides assistance or advice without compensation other than reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses in mitigating or attempting to mitigate the effects of an actual or threatened discharge of hazardous materials, or in preventing, cleaning up or disposing of or in attempting to prevent, clean up or dispose of any discharge of hazardous materials, is not liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions in good faith in providing the assistance or advice. This immunity does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. As used in this subsection:

   (i) “Discharge” includes leakage, seepage or other release;

   (ii) “Hazardous materials” includes all materials and substances which are now or hereafter designated or defined as hazardous by any state or federal law or by the regulations of any state or federal government agency.

Washington, D.C.

§ 7-401. Limitation on liability for medical care or assistance in emergency situations [Formerly § 2-1344]

(a) Any person who in good faith renders emergency medical care or assistance to an injured person at the scene of an accident or other emergency in the District of Columbia outside of a hospital, without the expectation of receiving or intending to seek compensation from such injured person for such service, shall not be liable in civil damages for any act or omission, not constituting gross negligence, in the course of rendering such care or assistance.

(b) In the case of a person who renders emergency medical care or assistance in circumstances described in subsection (a) of this section and who is not licensed or certified by the District of Columbia or by any state to provide medical care or assistance, the limited immunity provided in subsection (a) of this section shall apply to such persons; provided, that the person shall relinquish the direction of the care of the injured person when an appropriate person licensed or certified by the District of Columbia or by any state to provide medical care or assistance assumes responsibility for the care of the injured person.

(c) A certified emergency medical technician/paramedic or emergency medical technician/intermediate paramedic who, in good faith and pursuant to instructions either directly or via telecommunication from a licensed physician, renders advanced emergency medical care or assistance to an injured person at the scene of an accident or other emergency or in transit from the scene of an accident or emergency to a hospital shall not be liable in civil damages for any act or omission not constituting gross negligence in the course of rendering such advanced emergency medical care or assistance.

(d) A licensed physician who in good faith gives emergency medical instructions either directly or via telecommunication to a certified emergency medical technician/paramedic or emergency medical technician/intermediate paramedic for the purpose of providing advanced emergency medical care to an injured person at the scene of an accident or other emergency or in transit from the scene of an accident or emergency to a hospital shall not be liable in civil damages for any act or omission not constituting gross negligence in the course of giving such emergency medical instructions.

(d-1) If the Mayor of the District of Columbia declares a state of emergency pursuant to § 7-2304, any act or omission of an emergency medical technician/paramedic (“Paramedic”), an emergency medical technician/intermediate paramedic (“EMT/I”), or an emergency medical technician (“EMT”), performed while providing advanced or basic life support to a patient or trauma victim shall not impose liability upon the Paramedic, EMT/I, or EMT, or any employer of the Paramedic, EMT/I, or EMT; provided, that the care is provided in good faith and does not constitute gross negligence.

(e) For the purposes of this section, the terms “emergency medical technician/paramedic,” “emergency medical technician/intermediate paramedic,” and “emergency medical technician” mean a person who has been trained in advanced emergency medical care, employed in that capacity, and certified by the appropriate governmental certifying authority in the District of Columbia or in any state to:

   (1) Carry out all phases of basic life support;

   (2) Administer drugs under the written or oral authorization, including via telecommunication, of a licensed physician;

   (3) Administer intravenous solutions under the written or oral authorization, including via telecommunication, of a licensed physician; and

   (4) Carry out, either directly or via telecommunication instructions from a licensed physician, certain other phases of advanced life support as authorized by the appropriate governmental certifying authority.

 

 

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