Illinois upholds release stopping a claim for injury from bouldering at defendant North Wall.
Posted: November 18, 2019 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Climbing Wall, Illinois, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: activities, Ankle, Bouldering, Bouldering Gym, Bouldering Line, Bouldering Wall, Climbers, Climbing, Climbing Wall Association, Customers, CWA, deposition, Employees, exculpatory, facilities, Falling, feet, floor, Gym, Harness, height, injuries, jumped, Manual, mat, North Wall, North Wall Incl, Open & Obvious, Open and Obvious, Open and Obvious Doctrine, parties, rock, rope, Summary judgment, trained, Trial court, video, waiver form, wanton conduct, willful, Willful and Wanton Leave a commentHowever, defendant climbing wall admitted it had not followed its own procedures or Climbing Wall Association manual with the plaintiff, law in Illinois saved defendant.
Cizek v. North Wall, Inc., 2018 IL App (2d) 170168-U *; 2018 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 320
State: Illinois, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
Plaintiff: Patricia Cizek
Defendant: North Wall, Inc., d/b/a North Wall Rock Climbing Gym
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence & Willful & Wanton Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Open & Obvious & Release
Holding: For the Defendant
Year: 2018
Summary
Plaintiff was boulder for the first time and not given the normal or required introduction at the bouldering gym. She fell off the wall and missed a crash pad breaking her ankle. Court held the release she signed stopped her lawsuit.
Facts
On February 14, 2013, she attended respondent’s gym with Kosinski, a coworker. She characterized Kosinski as a “good climber, experienced.” Kosinski told her climbing was one of his hobbies. She did not think climbing would involve any risk because “[k]ids were doing it.” Further, climbing occurred at a gym, which she viewed as a “safe zone.” Also, based on what she saw on television, she believed she would be using a harness. She and Kosinski did not consume any alcohol prior to arriving at North Wall, and she was not taking any medication at the time.
When they arrived, Kosinski paid the fee. Plaintiff signed and returned a waiver form. Kosinski had climbed at North Wall before. At the time, plaintiff did not know whether Kosinski was a member at North Wall, though she later learned that he had been at the time she was injured. Plaintiff acknowledged that she did, in fact, read and understand the waiver form. She did not look at the back of the form, but she recalled that she was given only one sheet of paper. She was provided with a pair of climbing shoes.
When she first arrived, she observed “children in harnesses with ropers.” There were two large green pads that covered most of the floor. Plaintiff did not recall seeing any bulletin boards or posters. She also did not recall seeing a black line running “continuously around the parameter [sic] of the climbing wall.” At the time of the deposition, she was aware that such a line existed. Beyond signing the waiver when she arrived, she had no further interaction with respondent’s staff. Plaintiff reviewed a number of pictures of the facility and testified that it had changed since her accident. She also identified a photograph taken in October 2013 that showed where she was injured.
She and Kosinski then proceeded to the climbing wall. She asked, “What about my harness?” Kosinski said that harnesses were “more trouble than they were worth.” Plaintiff stated that she “kind of was dumbfounded.” Plaintiff proceeded to climb without a harness. Kosinski went first. He told her to follow some yellow markers, as they were for beginners. While she watched Kosinski, she did not see a black, horizontal line on the wall. Prior to climbing, Kosinski placed a mat below the area in which he intended to climb. Plaintiff found climbing “very difficult,” explaining that “[y]ou use your core.” Plaintiff would “shimmy” down when she got “sore.” She added, “[i]ts tough work getting up there, so I need[ed] to get down.” She would jump down from two to three feet off the ground. Plaintiff made three or four climbs before she was injured.
Large green mats covered almost the entire floor of the gym. There were also smaller black mats that could be placed in different locations by climbers. Kosinski was not near plaintiff when she was injured. Before being injured, plaintiff had moved to a new climbing area. She placed a black mat where she planned on climbing. A green mat also abutted the wall in that area. The black mat was three to six inches away from the wall.
Plaintiff was injured during her third attempt at climbing that day, and she did not feel comfortable climbing. She explained that she was not wearing a harness, but was trying to do her best. There was a part of the floor that was not covered by a green mat in this area, which is where plaintiff landed when she was injured. Plaintiff stated she jumped off the wall and when she landed, her right foot was on a green mat, but her left foot landed on the uncovered floor. She felt pain in her left ankle and could not put weight on it. Kosinski and an employee came over to assist plaintiff. Kosinski got plaintiff some ibuprofen. Plaintiff felt “a little dizzy.” An employee called the paramedics. The paramedics stated that plaintiff’s ankle was broken. They assisted plaintiff to Kosinski’s car, and he drove her to St. Alexius hospital. At the hospital, they x-rayed plaintiff’s ankle and confirmed that it was broken. She was given some sort of narcotic pain killer, and her ankle was placed in a cast. Plaintiff was discharged and told to follow up with an orthopedic surgeon.
She followed up with Dr. Sean Odell. Odell performed a surgery six days after the accident. He installed eight pins and a plate. Plaintiff had broken both leg bones where they intersect at the ankle. She took Norco for months following the surgery. She engaged in physical therapy for years, including what she did at home. The hardware was removed in December 2013. Her ankle continues to be stiff, she has trouble with many activities, and she takes ibuprofen for pain several times per week.
The court also went through a litany of issues the defendant climbing gym did not do with the plaintiff.
Novice climbers were supposed to sign a waiver and view a video. Spencer trained Cipri [gym manager] to go over “any and all safety procedures” with new climbers.
There was no manual on “how to run North Wall,” but there was an “unofficial manual” kept on the front desk. This was comprised of a couple of binders that concerned how to teach climbing, use of the telephone, memberships, employee conduct, and various rules. He did not recall anything specific relating to dealing with novice climbers. There was a copy of the Climbing Wall Association manual in a file-cabinet drawer; however, he never used it for anything. Cipri did not recall Spencer [gym owner] instructing him to use this manual. Spencer did train employees on climbing, particularly new hires. Cipri described Spencer as an “absentee” manager.” He would come in early in the day, and Cipri typically would not see him.
Aside from ascertaining a customer’s age and climbing experience, they did nothing else to assess his or her proficiency. They would show new climbers a video and explain the rules of the gym to them. Cipri could not say whether a copy of a manual shown to him was the manual they were actually using when he worked for respondent. However, he stated various forms shown to him, including one concerning bouldering orientation, were not used when he was there. Spencer never told Cipri to get rid of any document; rather, he was adamant about keeping such material. Weekly inspections of the premises were conducted, but no records documenting them were maintained.
One document stated, “If the facility allows bouldering, the staff provides an orientation before novice climbers are allowed to boulder without assistance or direct supervision.” Cipri testified that this was not generated by respondent, but they followed it. Employees working the counter were trained to have new customers watch a video, instruct them on safety procedures, and assess their abilities. To the left of the front door, posters from the Climbing Wall Association were displayed. There was also one near the back door. Cipri did not remember what they were about beyond that they concerned “stable rules” of the Climbing Wall Association.
On redirect-examination, Cipri agreed that beyond verbal questioning, they did not test new customers. They did not “inspect or observe climbers while they were actually climbing to determine competency.” They did “orientate climbers” and show them the video. Further, new climbers read the waiver forms. Climbers were instructed on general and bouldering safety rules. Cipri was aware of an earlier incident where a young boy cut his head while climbing. Cipri stated that it was arguable that climbing with a rope was more dangerous than bouldering because a person could get tangled in the rope. Cipri did not give plaintiff an orientation, and he had no recollection of anyone giving her one.
Employees were instructed to follow the policies of the Climbing Wall Association. If an employee did not spend time with a new customer “explaining the policies and procedures of bouldering, that would be a violation of company policy.” This is true even if the new customer is accompanied by a more experienced climber.
Obviously, the defendant gym failed to follow its own rules or the rules and ideas of the CWA that the gym, in the court’s mind, had adopted.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The court first looked at the issue that falling was an open and obvious risk.
In Illinois, obvious dangers include fire, drowning in water, or falling from a height.”). Thus, for the purpose of resolving this appeal and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we will presume that plaintiff was aware that falling off the climbing wall presented certain obvious dangers.
The court moved on to review release law in Illinois. Illinois supports the use of releases, unless the contract is between parties with unequal bargaining power, violates public policy or there is a special relationship between the parties.
Absent fraud or willful and wanton negligence, exculpatory agreements of this sort are generally valid. An agreement may be also vitiated by unequal bargaining power, public policy considerations, or some special relationship between the parties; however, such issues are not present here. This court has previously explained that “[a]n exculpatory agreement constitutes an express assumption of risk insofar as the plaintiff has expressly consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him [or her].
When written the release must be expressed in clear, explicit an unequivocal language. The release must also be written in a way that both parties to the contract intended to apply to the conduct of the defendant which caused the harm to the plaintiff. However, the release must not be written precisely to cover the exact conduct or exact harm.
Thus, an exculpatory agreement will excuse a defendant from liability only where an “injury falls within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying the activity and, thus, reasonably contemplated by the plaintiff.” The foreseeability of the danger defines the scope of the release.
The court found the language “…arising out of or in any way related to [her] use of the climbing gym, whether that use is supervised or unsupervised, however, the injury or damage is caused.” w sufficient to the injury the plaintiff received based on the conduct (or lack of conduct in this case) of the defendant.
The court held “In sum, the release, here is clear, pertains to use of defendant’s climbing gym, and is broad enough to encompass falling or jumping from the climbing wall.”
The court then reviewed the willful and wanton claims of the plaintiff. The court described willful and wanton as “”Conduct is “willful and wanton” where it involves a deliberate intention to harm or a conscious disregard for the safety of others. It is an “aggravated form of negligence.”
The plaintiff argued that failing to follow the defendant bouldering gym’s own policies or evaluate her abilities was proof of willful and wanton conduct. She also pointed out the defendant failed to tell her not to climb above the bouldering line.
Quickly, the court determined the plaintiff had not pled or provided any facts to support her willful and wanton claims. Even if the defendant had followed its own policies, the plaintiff could not show that would have prevented her injuries. Falling at a height above the bouldering line is an open and obvious risk so failing to tell the plaintiff not to climb high is not relevant.
The risk of falling is open and obvious and none of the arguments made by the plaintiff as to the defendants actions overcame that doctrine.
So Now What?
It is great that Illinois supports the use of releases. Even in a case where the defendant failed to follow its own policies or the “manual” of the trade association it belonged to. Even better the court did not find the CWA manual or the defendant’s failure to follow its policies as an issue that could over come the release.
However, from the court’s writing, it is obvious, that the open and obvious doctrine was the most persuasive in supporting both the release and ignoring the defendant’s actions or lack of action.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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climbing, bouldering, gym, climbers, rope, mat, trained, exculpatory, employees, falling, rock, customers, willful, floor, trial court, facilities, harness, ankle, feet, summary judgment, waiver form, height, wanton conduct, jumped, manual, video, activities, deposition, injuries, parties
Cizek v. North Wall, Inc., 2018 IL App (2d) 170168-U *; 2018 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 320
Posted: November 15, 2019 Filed under: Climbing Wall, Illinois, Legal Case, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: activities, Ankle, Bouldering, Bouldering Gym, Climbers, Climbing, Climbing Gym, Climbing Wall, Climbing Wall Association, Customers, CWA, deposition, Employees, exculpatory, facilities, Falling, feet, floor, Gym, Harness, height, Illinois, injuries, jumped, Manual, mat, North Wall, North Wall Inc., parties, rock, rope, Summary judgment, trained, Trial court, video, waiver form, wanton conduct, willful Leave a commentCizek v. North Wall, Inc., 2018 IL App (2d) 170168-U *; 2018 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 320
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
March 2, 2018, Order Filed
No. 2-17-0168-U
Notice: THIS ORDER WAS FILED UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23 AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENT BY ANY PARTY EXCEPT IN THE LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOWED UNDER RULE 23(e)(1).
Prior History:
[**1] Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County. No. 15-LA-56. Honorable Thomas A. Meyer, Judge, Presiding.
Judges: PRESIDING JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Schostok and Spence concurred in the judgment.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Schostok and Spence concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
[*P1] Held: Plaintiff validly waived any cause of action stemming from defendant‘s alleged negligence and failed to identify facts from which willful and wanton conduct could be inferred; therefore, trial court‘s grant of summary judgment was proper.
[*P2]
I. INTRODUCTION
[*P3]
Plaintiff, Patricia Cizek, appeals an order of the circuit court of McHenry County granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, North Wall, Inc. (doing business as North Wall Rock Climbing Gym). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
[*P4]
II. BACKGROUND
[*P5]
Defendant operates an indoor rock climbing gym; plaintiff was a customer at the gym when she was injured. Plaintiff and a friend, Daniel Kosinski, attended the gym. Plaintiff had never been climbing before. At some point, after having been climbing for a while, plaintiff became tired and jumped down or fell from the climbing [**2]
wall. Plaintiff‘s right foot landed on a mat, but her left foot landed on the floor. Plaintiff‘s left ankle broke.
[*P6]
In her deposition (taken December 23, 2015), plaintiff testified as follows. She stated that she had been a member of a health club for 10 years, where she primarily swam and did yoga. Prior to February 14, 2013, plaintiff had no experience rock climbing or bouldering, though she had observed people rock climbing in the past. She agreed that she understood that rock climbing involved being at a height higher than the ground.
[*P7]
On February 14, 2013, she attended respondent‘s gym with Kosinski, a coworker. She characterized Kosinski as a “good climber, experienced.“ Kosinski told her climbing was one of his hobbies. She did not think climbing would involve any risk because “[k]ids were doing it.“ Further, climbing occurred at a gym, which she viewed as a “safe zone.“ Also, based on what she saw on television, she believed she would be using a harness. She and Kosinski did not consume any alcohol prior to arriving at North Wall, and she was not taking any medication at the time.
[*P8]
When they arrived, Kosinski paid the fee. Plaintiff signed and returned a waiver form. Kosinski [**3]
had climbed at North Wall before. At the time, plaintiff did not know whether Kosinski was a member at North Wall, though she later learned that he had been at the time she was injured. Plaintiff acknowledged that she did, in fact, read and understand the waiver form. She did not look at the back of the form, but she recalled that she was given only one sheet of paper. She was provided with a pair of climbing shoes.
[*P9]
When she first arrived, she observed “children in harnesses with ropers.“ There were two large green pads that covered most of the floor. Plaintiff did not recall seeing any bulletin boards or posters. She also did not recall seeing a black line running “continuously around the parameter [sic] of the climbing wall.“ At the time of the deposition, she was aware that such a line existed. Beyond signing the waiver when she arrived, she had no further interaction with respondent‘s staff. Plaintiff reviewed a number of pictures of the facility and testified that it had changed since her accident. She also identified a photograph taken in October 2013 that showed where she was injured.
[*P10]
She and Kosinski then proceeded to the climbing wall. She asked, “What about my harness?“ Kosinski [**4]
said that harnesses were “more trouble than they were worth.“ Plaintiff stated that she “kind of was dumbfounded.“ Plaintiff proceeded to climb without a harness. Kosinski went first. He told her to follow some yellow markers, as they were for beginners. While she watched Kosinski, she did not see a black, horizontal line on the wall. Prior to climbing, Kosinski placed a mat below the area in which he intended to climb. Plaintiff found climbing “very difficult,“ explaining that “[y]ou use your core.“ Plaintiff would “shimmy“ down when she got “sore.“ She added, “[i]ts tough work getting up there, so I need[ed] to get down.“ She would jump down from two to three feet off the ground. Plaintiff made three or four climbs before she was injured.
[*P11]
Large green mats covered almost the entire floor of the gym. There were also smaller black mats that could be placed in different locations by climbers. Kosinski was not near plaintiff when she was injured. Before being injured, plaintiff had moved to a new climbing area. She placed a black mat where she planned on climbing. A green mat also abutted the wall in that area. The black mat was three to six inches away from the wall.
[*P12]
Plaintiff was injured [**5]
during her third attempt at climbing that day, and she did not feel comfortable climbing. She explained that she was not wearing a harness, but was trying to do her best. There was a part of the floor that was not covered by a green mat in this area, which is where plaintiff landed when she was injured. Plaintiff stated she jumped off the wall and when she landed, her right foot was on a green mat, but her left foot landed on the uncovered floor. She felt pain in her left ankle and could not put weight on it. Kosinski and an employee came over to assist plaintiff. Kosinski got plaintiff some ibuprofen. Plaintiff felt “a little dizzy.“ An employee called the paramedics. The paramedics stated that plaintiff‘s ankle was broken. They assisted plaintiff to Kosinski‘s car, and he drove her to St. Alexius hospital. At the hospital, they x-rayed plaintiff‘s ankle and confirmed that it was broken. She was given some sort of narcotic pain killer, and her ankle was placed in a cast. Plaintiff was discharged and told to follow up with an orthopedic surgeon.
[*P13]
She followed up with Dr. Sean Odell. Odell performed a surgery six days after the accident. He installed eight pins and a plate. Plaintiff [**6]
had broken both leg bones where they intersect at the ankle. She took Norco for months following the surgery. She engaged in physical therapy for years, including what she did at home. The hardware was removed in December 2013. Her ankle continues to be stiff, she has trouble with many activities, and she takes ibuprofen for pain several times per week.
[*P14]
On cross-examination, plaintiff stated that she read the wavier form before she signed it (though, she added, she did not “study“ it). Other climbers were climbing without ropes, and the only people she saw using ropes were children. She was not offered a rope or harness. Plaintiff still takes prescription pain killers on occasion. However, she does not like to take it due to its side effects.
[*P15]
A discovery deposition of Daniel Kosinski was also conducted. He testified that he knew plaintiff from work. She was a travel agent that did “all the travel arrangements for [his] company.“ He and plaintiff were friends, though they do not associate outside of work.
[*P16]
Kosinski stated that rock climbing is one of his hobbies. He started climbing in 2008. He initially climbed at Bloomingdale Lifetime Fitness. They eventually offered him a job, and [**7]
he worked there for four or five years. His title was “[r]ock wall instructor.“ He described bouldering as climbing without a rope. He stated that it “is a little more intense.“ Generally, one climbs at lower levels, and there are mats, as opposed to ropes, for protection. He added that “[t]here‘s not really much instruction [to do] in terms of bouldering.“ He explained, “bouldering, there‘s just—okay, this is how high you can go and that‘s pretty much it.“ There was no bouldering line at Lifetime Fitness. However, they did have a rule that you should not climb above the height of your shoulders. A spotter is not typically required when bouldering.
[*P17]
He and plaintiff went to North Wall on February 14, 2013. He was a member and had been there “multiple times“ previously. When he first went to North Wall, he signed a waiver and viewed a video recording that concerned safety. Due to height considerations, Kosinski characterized North Wall as “pretty much a dedicated bouldering gym.“ North Wall offers top rope climbing, which Kosinski said was often used for children‘s parties.
[*P18]
Kosinski believed he was aware that plaintiff did not have any climbing experience prior to their trip to North [**8]
Wall. He could not recall whether there were any safety posters displayed. He and plaintiff had a conversation about the risks involved in rock climbing. He also explained to her what bouldering entailed and that a rope was not used. He noted that plaintiff was “shaky“ or “nervous“ on her first climb. Kosinski told plaintiff that if she was not comfortable, she should come down. He did not recall a bouldering line at North Wall and believed it was permissible to climb all the way to the top when bouldering. He did not recall whether plaintiff had been provided with climbing shoes. Plaintiff was in better than average physical condition.
[*P19]
When plaintiff was injured, she was climbing on a wall called Devil‘s Tower. It was toward the back, right of the facility. During the climb on which plaintiff was injured, Kosinski observed that plaintiff was “stuck“ at one point and could not figure out what to do next. He walked over to assist her. She was four or five feet off the ground. Plaintiff‘s left foot and hand came off the wall, and her body swung away from the wall (counterclockwise). She then fell and landed on the edge of a mat. Kosinski stated she landed “half on the mat“ and was rotating [**9]
when she landed. After plaintiff landed, Kosinski went over to check on her. Plaintiff said she believed she had broken her ankle. He did not know whether plaintiff had applied chalk to her hands before, nor did he recall what she was wearing. It did not appear that plaintiff had control of herself before she fell off the wall and injured herself. It also did not appear to him that plaintiff was attempting to get down from the wall or that she deliberately jumped.
[*P20]
Kosinski told an employee of respondent‘s to call the paramedics. Kosinski recalled an employee offering plaintiff ice. Plaintiff declined a ride to the hospital in an ambulance, and Kosinski drove her there instead.
[*P21]
Kosinski testified that he and plaintiff had never been romantically involved. He recalled that plaintiff used crutches following the injury and took some time off from work. According to Kosinski, she used crutches for “quite a while.“
[*P22]
On cross-examination, Kosinski explained that a spotter, unlike a belayer, only has limited control over a climber. A spotter “just direct[s] them to fall onto a mat and not hit their head.“ It would have been possible for plaintiff to use a rope while climbing (assuming one was [**10]
available). Kosinski stated that use of a rope might have prevented plaintiff‘s injury; however, it might also have caused another injury, such as plaintiff hitting her head on something. Kosinski agreed that he climbed twice a week or about 100 times per year. He did not recall an employee ever advising him about not climbing too high when bouldering. An automatic belayer might have lessened the force with which plaintiff landed and mitigated her injury. It was about 25 to 30 feet from the front desk to the place where plaintiff fell. The safety video new customers had to watch was about two minutes long. He did not observe plaintiff watching the video.
[*P23]
Prior to climbing, Kosinski told plaintiff that climbing was a dangerous sport and that they would be climbing without ropes. He did not recall any employee of respondent testing plaintiff with regard to her climbing abilities. After refreshing his recollection with various documents, Kosinski testified that they had been climbing for about half an hour when plaintiff was injured. He agreed that plaintiff was an inexperienced climber.
[*P24]
On redirect-examination, he confirmed that he was not present when plaintiff first checked in at North [**11]
Wall. He had no knowledge of what transpired between plaintiff and respondent‘s employees at that point.
[*P25]
Jason R. Cipri also testified via discovery deposition. He testified that he had been employed by respondent as a manager for two years, from 2012 to 2014. His immediate supervisor was Randy Spencer (respondent‘s owner). When he was hired in 2012, Cipri was trained on office procedures, logistics, how to deal with the cash register, where to put the mail, and the use of a computer system. He was also trained on dealing with customers. Cipri started climbing in 2000 and had worked for respondent for about a year around the time of plaintiff‘s injury.
[*P26]
Novice climbers were supposed to sign a waiver and view a video. Spencer trained Cipri to go over “any and all safety procedures“ with new climbers. Cipri was trained to “interact with the customers to decide and figure out their climbing ability.“ Three types of climbing occurred at North Wall: bouldering, top-rope climbing, and lead climbing (also known as sport climbing). Plaintiff was bouldering when she was injured. Bouldering does not involve the use of ropes. Cipri estimated about 90 percent (or at least the “vast majority“) of [**12]
the climbing at North Wall is bouldering. Cipri received very specific training regarding how to execute waiver forms. Customers were instructed to read the waiver form.
[*P27]
There was a “bouldering line“ on the climbing wall. People engaged in bouldering were not supposed to bring their feet above that line. The bouldering line is described in the waiver. However, Cipri explained, having a bouldering line is not common. He added, “We all kind of thought it was cute, but it didn‘t really serve a purpose.“
[*P28]
Cipri was working as a manager on the day plaintiff was injured. He recalled that an employee named Miranda, whom he called a “coach,“ came and told him that someone had been injured. He called the paramedics, as that was what plaintiff wanted. He brought plaintiff some ice. He described Kosinski (whom he initially called Eric) as a “pretty novice climber.“ Cipri did not know whether plaintiff was above the bouldering line when she fell. Plaintiff did not appear intoxicated or smell of alcohol. She did not appear to have any injuries besides the one to her ankle. Plaintiff would not have been allowed to use a rope because “you have to be certified and taken through a lesson to use the [**13]
ropes.“
[*P29]
To the left side of the customer-service counter, there were posters addressing “safety and such.“ Cipri filled out an accident report concerning plaintiff‘s injury. Cipri denied that he was terminated by respondent and that the owner ever accused him of using drugs on the job. There was no manual on “how to run North Wall,“ but there was an “unofficial manual“ kept on the front desk. This was comprised of a couple of binders that concerned how to teach climbing, use of the telephone, memberships, employee conduct, and various rules. He did not recall anything specific relating to dealing with novice climbers. There was a copy of the Climbing Wall Association manual in a file-cabinet drawer; however, he never used it for anything. Cipri did not recall Spencer instructing him to use this manual. Spencer did train employees on climbing, particularly new hires. Cipri described Spencer as an “absentee“ manager.“ He would come in early in the day, and Cipri typically would not see him.
[*P30]
Aside from ascertaining a customer‘s age and climbing experience, they did nothing else to assess his or her proficiency. They would show new climbers a video and explain the rules of the gym to them. [**14]
Cipri could not say whether a copy of a manual shown to him was the manual they were actually using when he worked for respondent. However, he stated various forms shown to him, including one concerning bouldering orientation, were not used when he was there. Spencer never told Cipri to get rid of any document; rather, he was adamant about keeping such material. Weekly inspections of the premises were conducted, but no records documenting them were maintained.
[*P31]
On cross-examination, Cipri stated that his sister had been hired to rewrite the operations manual. One document stated, “If the facility allows bouldering, the staff provides an orientation before novice climbers are allowed to boulder without assistance or direct supervision.“ Cipri testified that this was not generated by respondent, but they followed it. Employees working the counter were trained to have new customers watch a video, instruct them on safety procedures, and assess their abilities. To the left of the front door, posters from the Climbing Wall Association were displayed. There was also one near the back door. Cipri did not remember what they were about beyond that they concerned “stable rules“ of the Climbing [**15]
Wall Association.
[*P32]
Cipri did not witness plaintiff‘s accident, and he did not recall being present when she was checked in. He never had rejected a customer previously, but he had the authority to do so. He never encountered a situation where he felt it was necessary.
[*P33]
On redirect-examination, Cipri agreed that beyond verbal questioning, they did not test new customers. They did not “inspect or observe climbers while they were actually climbing to determine competency.“ They did “orientate climbers“ and show them the video. Further, new climbers read the waiver forms. Climbers were instructed on general and bouldering safety rules. Cipri was aware of an earlier incident where a young boy cut his head while climbing. Cipri stated that it was arguable that climbing with a rope was more dangerous than bouldering because a person could get tangled in the rope. Cipri did not give plaintiff an orientation, and he had no recollection of anyone giving her one.
[*P34]
Randall Spencer, respondent‘s owner, also testified via discovery deposition. Spencer testified that North Wall is “pretty much run by employees“ and he does not “have much of a role anymore.“ The business is run by a manager, Eric Paul. [**16]
Spencer did not have an independent recollection of plaintiff‘s accident. Cipri was the manager at the time. There was another manager as well named Chuck Kapayo, who Spencer described as co-managing with Cipri. Anything Spencer knew about plaintiff‘s accident he learned from Cipri or another employee named Terri Krallitsch. Usually, two people worked at any given time, although, sometimes, only one would be present.
[*P35]
Spencer identified the waiver form signed by plaintiff. However, he acknowledged that it was not the original. The purpose of the waiver was to inform a customer about the danger involved in rock climbing. Further, employees were “trained to talk about the rules and safety items when [customers] first come into the gym.“ In addition, there were posters, four of which were visible at the entrance. The posters were produced by the Climbing Wall Association as part of their Climb Smart Program. Spencer added that they say “[c]limbing is [d]angerous.“ One says “Bouldering is Dangerous Climb Smart.“ These were the only ways customers were informed of the dangers of rock climbing. Customers are not tested as to their climbing proficiency, and they are not trained unless they [**17]
sign up for a class. Customers were told not to climb above the bouldering line when bouldering.
[*P36]
Employees were instructed to follow the policies of the Climbing Wall Association. If an employee did not spend time with a new customer “explaining the policies and procedures of bouldering, that would be a violation of company policy.“ This is true even if the new customer is accompanied by a more experienced climber.
[*P37]
Spencer explained that bouldering is climbing without a rope. The bouldering line is a “little bit over three feet“ from the floor. Climbers were to keep their feet below the bouldering line. The accident report prepared by Cipri states plaintiff‘s feet were six feet off the floor when she fell. The only equipment provided by respondent to plaintiff was climbing shoes. Respondent could have provided a harness, and plaintiff could have been belayed. They did not provide chalk to plaintiff.
[*P38]
Spencer testified that the waiver form states that it “is not intended to provide a description of all risks and hazards.“ He explained that this means it is possible to get hurt in a manner not described in the waiver. There was no formal training program for employees. Managers trained [**18]
new employees, and managers themselves came to respondent already having climbing experience. In 2013, respondent had no auto-belay system in place. Spencer testified that he fired Cipri because of “suspected drug use.“
[*P39]
The released signed by plaintiff states, in pertinent part, as follows. Initially, it states that plaintiff is giving up any right of actions “arising out of use of the facilities of North Wall, Inc.“ Plaintiff then acknowledged that “the sport of rock climbing and the use of the facilities of North Wall, Inc., has inherent risks.“ It then states that plaintiff has “full knowledge of the nature and extent of all the risks associated with rock climbing and the use of the climbing gym, including but not limited to“ the following:
“1. All manner of injury resulting from falling off the climbing gym and hitting rock faces and/or projections, whether permanently or temporarily in place, or on the floor or loose. 2. Rope abrasions, entanglement and other injuries ***. 3. Injuries resulting from falling climbers or dropped items ***. 4. Cuts and abrasions resulting from skin contact with the climbing gym and/or the gym‘s devices and/or hardware. 5. Failure of ropes, slings, [**19]
harnesses, climbing hardware, anchor points, or any part of the climbing gym structure.“
Plaintiff then waived any cause of action “arising out of or in any way related to [her] use of the climbing gym whether that use is supervised or unsupervised, however the injury or damage is caused.“
[*P40]
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. It noted that case law indicates that a competent adult recognizes the danger of falling from a height. It next observed that the waiver plaintiff signed stated that she was releasing defendant from “all manner of injury resulting from falling off the climbing gym.“ The trial court then rejected plaintiff‘s argument that this language was too general to be enforced. It further found that plaintiff had set forth no facts from which willful and wanton conduct could be inferred. This appeal followed.
[*P41]
III. ANALYSIS
[*P42]
We are confronted with two main issues. First is the effect of the waiver form signed by plaintiff. Second, we must consider whether plaintiff‘s count alleging willful and wanton conduct survives regardless of the waiver (an exculpatory agreement exempting liability for willful and wanton conduct would violate public policy (Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Center, Inc., 178 Ill. App. 3d 597, 604, 533 N.E.2d 941, 127 Ill. Dec. 859 (1989))). [**20]
Plaintiff‘s brief also contains a section addressing proximate cause; however, as we conclude that the waiver bars plaintiff‘s cause of action, we need not address this argument.
[*P43]
A. THE WAIVER
[*P44]
The trial court granted summary judgment on all but the willful and wanton count of plaintiff‘s complaint based on plaintiff‘s execution of a waiver. As this case comes to us following a grant of summary judgment, our review is de novo. Bier v. Leanna Lakeside Property Ass‘n, 305 Ill. App. 3d 45, 50, 711 N.E.2d 773, 238 Ill. Dec. 386 (1999). Under the de novo standard of review, we owe no deference to the trial court‘s decision and may freely substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Miller v. Hecox, 2012 IL App (2d) 110546, ¶ 29, 969 N.E.2d 914, 360 Ill. Dec. 869. Summary judgment is a drastic method of resolving litigation, so it should be granted only if the movant‘s entitlement to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Bier, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 50. It is appropriate only where “the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.“
Id. Finally, it is axiomatic that we review the result to which the trial court arrived at, rather than its reasoning. In re Marriage of Ackerley, 333 Ill. App. 3d 382, 392, 775 N.E.2d 1045, 266 Ill. Dec. 973 (2002).
[*P45]
Though we are not bound by the trial court‘s reasoning, [**21]
we nevertheless find ourselves in agreement with it. Like the trial court, we find great significance in the proposition that the danger of falling from a height is “open and obvious“ to an adult. Ford ex rel. Ford v. Narin, 307 Ill. App. 3d 296, 302, 717 N.E.2d 525, 240 Ill. Dec. 432 (1999); see also Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 448, 665 N.E.2d 826, 216 Ill. Dec. 568 (1996); Mount Zion Bank & Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110, 118, 660 N.E.2d 863, 214 Ill. Dec. 156 (1995) (“In Illinois, obvious dangers include fire, drowning in water, or falling from a height.“). Thus, for the purpose of resolving this appeal and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we will presume that plaintiff was aware that falling off the climbing wall presented certain obvious dangers.
[*P46]
We also note that, in Illinois, parties may contract to limit the liability for negligence. Oelze v. Score Sports Venture, LLC, 401 Ill. App. 3d 110, 117, 927 N.E.2d 137, 339 Ill. Dec. 596 (2010). Absent fraud or willful and wanton negligence, exculpatory agreements of this sort are generally valid. Id. An agreement may be also vitiated by unequal bargaining power, public policy considerations, or some special relationship between the parties (Id.); however, such issues are not present here. This court has previously explained that “[a]n exculpatory agreement constitutes an express assumption of risk insofar as the plaintiff has expressly consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him [or her].“
Falkner, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 602.
[*P47]
Agreements of this nature “must be expressed in clear, explicit [**22]
and unequivocal language showing that such was the intent of the parties.“
Calarco v. YMCA of Greater Metropolitan Chicago, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1043, 501 N.E.2d 268, 103 Ill. Dec. 247 (1986). That is, it must “appear that its terms were intended by both parties to apply to the conduct of the defendant which caused the harm.“
Id., (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, Explanatory Notes ‘ 496B, comment d, at 567 (1965)). Nevertheless, “The precise occurrence which results in injury need not have been contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was entered into.“
Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill. App. 3d 581, 585, 559 N.E.2d 187, 147 Ill. Dec. 187 (1990). Thus, an exculpatory agreement will excuse a defendant from liability only where an “injury falls within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying the activity and, thus, reasonably contemplated by the plaintiff.“
Id. The foreseeability of the danger defines the scope of the release. Cox v. U.S. Fitness, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 122442, ¶ 14, 377 Ill. Dec. 930, 2 N.E.3d 1211.
[*P48]
Numerous cases illustrate the degree of specificity required in an exculpatory agreement necessary to limit a defendant‘s liability for negligence. In Garrison, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 583, the plaintiff was injured when a weighted bar rolled off a grooved rest on a bench press and landed on his neck. The plaintiff alleged that the bench press was improperly designed and that the defendant-gym was negligent in providing it when it was not safe for its intended use. Id. [**23]
The plaintiff had signed an exculpatory agreement, which stated, inter alia:
“It is further agreed that all exercises including the use of weights, number of repetitions, and use of any and all machinery, equipment, and apparatus designed for exercising shall be at the Member‘s sole risk. Notwithstanding any consultation on exercise programs which may be provided by Center employees it is hereby understood that the selection of exercise programs, methods and types of equipment shall be Member‘s entire responsibility, and COMBINED FITNESS CENTER [sic] shall not be liable to Member for any claims, demands, injuries, damages, or actions arising due to injury to Member‘s person or property arising out of or in connection with the use by Member of the services and facilities of the Center or the premises where the same is located and Member hereby holds the Center, its employees and agents, harmless from all claims which may be brought against them by Member or on Member‘s behalf for any such injuries or claims aforesaid.“
Id. at 584.
The plaintiff argued that the agreement did not contemplate a release of liability for the provision of defective equipment. The trial court granted the defendant‘s motion [**24]
for summary judgment based on the exculpatory agreement.
[*P49]
The reviewing court affirmed. Id. at 586. It explained as follows:
“Furthermore, the exculpatory clause could not have been more clear or explicit. It stated that each member bore the ‘sole risk‘; of injury that might result from the use of weights, equipment or other apparatus provided and that the selection of the type of equipment to be used would be the ‘entire responsibility‘ of the member.“
Id. at 585.
It further noted that the defendant “was aware of the attendant dangers in the activity and, despite the fact that plaintiff now alleges that the bench press he used was unreasonably unsafe because it lacked a certain safety feature, the injury he sustained clearly falls within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying the activity of weight-lifting.“
Id.
[*P50]
Similarly, in Falkner, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 603, the court found the following exculpatory clause exempted the defendant from liability following a parachute accident: “The Student exempts and releases the [defendant] *** from any and all liability claims *** whatsoever arising out of any damage, loss or injury to the Student or the Student‘s property while upon the premises or aircraft of the [defendant] or while [**25]
participating in any of the activities contemplated by this agreement.“ The plaintiff‘s decedent died during a parachute jump. The court placed some significance on the fact that the decedent had been a pilot in the Army Air Corp. Id.
[*P51]
Another case that provides us with some guidance is Oelze, 401 Ill. App. 3d 110, 927 N.E.2d 137, 339 Ill. Dec. 596. There, the plaintiff had signed an exculpatory agreement stating, “I hereby release SCORE Tennis & Fitness and its owners and employees from any and all liability for any damage or injury, which I may receive while utilizing the equipment and facilities and assume all risk for claims arising from the use of said equipment and facilities.“
Id. at 118. The plaintiff, who was playing tennis, was injured when she tripped on a piece of equipment that was stored behind a curtain near the tennis court she was using while she was trying to return a lob. Id. at 113. The plaintiff argued that this risk was “unrelated to the game of tennis“ and thus outside the scope of the release. Id. at 120. However, the court found that the broad language of the release encompassed the risk, relying on the plaintiff‘s agreement “to assume the risk for her use of the club‘s ‘equipment and facilities.‘”
Id.
[*P52]
Finally, we will examine Calarco, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 501 N.E.2d 268, 103 Ill. Dec. 247. In that case, the plaintiff [**26]
was injured when weights from a “Universal“ gym machine fell on her hand. Id. at 1038. The trial court granted summary judgment based on an exculpatory clause. Id. at 1038-39. The clause read:
“‘In consideration of my participation in the activities of the Young Men‘s Christian Association of Metropolitan Chicago, I do hereby agree to hold free from any and all liability the [defendant] and do hereby for myself, *** waive, release and forever discharge any and all rights and claims for damages which I may have or which may hereafter accrue to me arising out of or connected with my participation in any of the activities of the [defendant].
I hereby do declare myself to be physically sound, having medical approval to participate in the activities of the [defendant].‘”
Id. at 1039.
The reviewing court reversed, finding that the language of the release was not sufficiently explicit to relieve the defendant from liability. Id. at 1043. It explained, “The form does not contain a clear and adequate description of covered activities, such as ‘use of the said gymnasium or the facilities and equipment thereof,‘ to clearly indicate that injuries resulting from negligence in maintaining the facilities or equipment would be covered by the release [**27] .” (Emphasis added.) Id.
[*P53]
In the present case, plaintiff waived any cause of action “arising out of or in any way related to [her] use of the climbing gym whether that use is supervised or unsupervised, however the injury or damage is caused.“ (Emphasis added.) This is remarkably similar to the language, set forth above, that the Calarco court stated would have been sufficient to shield the defendant in that case. Id. Likewise, in Garrison, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 585, the language that was found sufficient to protect the defendant stated that each member bore the ‘sole risk; of injury that might result from the use of weights, equipment or other apparatus provided and that the selection of the type of equipment to be used would be the ‘entire responsibility‘ of the member.“ Again, identifying the activity involved along with an expressed intent to absolve the defendant from any liability prevailed. Here, the activity was clearly defined and plaintiff‘s intent to waive any cause related to that activity was clear. Furthermore, plaintiff‘s injury was of the sort that a participant in that activity could reasonably expect. As Oelze, 401 Ill. App. 3d at 120, indicates, language encompassing assumption of “the risk for her use of the club‘s ‘equipment and [**28]
facilities‘” is broad and sufficient to cover accidents of the sort that are related to the primary activity. See also Falkner, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 603. Here, falling or jumping off the climbing wall are things a climber can clearly expect to encounter.
[*P54]
Plaintiff cites Locke v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 669 (N.D. Ill. 2014), a case from the local federal district court. Such cases merely constitute persuasive authority (Morris v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2015 IL App (5th) 140622, ¶ 25, 396 Ill. Dec. 330, 39 N.E.3d 1156); nevertheless, we will comment on it briefly. In that case, the plaintiff suffered a heart attack and died during a basketball game at a gym operated by the defendant. Id. at 671. There was an automatic defibrillator on site, but no employee retrieved it or attempted to use it. Id. The plaintiff had signed a waiver, which included the risk of a heart attack. Id. at 672. However, the waiver did not mention the defendant‘s failure to train its employees in the use of the defibrillator. Id. The Locke court held that by advancing this claim as a failure to train by the defendant, the plaintiff could avoid the effect of the waiver. Id. at 674-75.
[*P55]
We find Locke unpersuasive. Following the reasoning of Locke, virtually any claim can be recast as a failure to train, supervise, or, in some circumstances, inspect. Allowing such a proposition to defeat an otherwise valid exculpatory agreement [**29]
would effectively write such agreements out of most contracts. See Putnam v. Village of Bensenville, 337 Ill. App. 3d 197, 209, 786 N.E.2d 203, 271 Ill. Dec. 945 (2003) (“Limiting the disclaimer in the manner suggested by the plaintiffs would effectively write it out of the contract. Virtually every error in construction by a subcontractor could be recast and advanced against [the defendant] as a failure to supervise or inspect the project.“). Here, plaintiff promised to release defendant from any liability resulting from her use of the climbing wall. Moreover, we fail to see how providing additional training to employees would have impacted on plaintiff‘s perception of an obvious risk. Allowing her to avoid this promise in this manner would be an elevation of form over substance.
[*P56]
At oral argument, plaintiff relied heavily on the allegation that the spot where she landed was uneven due to the placement of mats in the area. As noted, one of plaintiff‘s feet landed on a mat and the other landed directly on the floor. According to plaintiff, the risk of landing on an uneven surface was not within the scope of the waiver she executed. This argument is foreclosed by two cases which we cite above. First, in Oelze, 401 Ill. App. 3d at 113, the plaintiff was injured while, during a game of tennis, she tripped on a piece [**30]
of equipment stored behind a curtain near the tennis court. This arguably dangerous condition was found to be within the scope of her waiver. Id. at 121-22. Furthermore, in Garrison, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 584, the plaintiff argued that an alleged defect in gym equipment rendered ineffective an exculpatory agreement which stated that the plaintiff “bore the ‘sole risk‘ of injury that might result from the use of weights, equipment or other apparatus provided and that the selection of the type of equipment to be used would be the ‘entire responsibility‘ of the member.“
Id. at 585. In this case, assuming arguendo, there was some unevenness in the floor due to the placement of the floor mats, in keeping with Oelze and Garrison, such a defect would not vitiate plaintiff‘s waiver.
[*P57]
In sum, the release here is clear, pertains to use of defendant‘s climbing gym, and is broad enough to encompass falling or jumping from the climbing wall.
[*P58]
B. WILLFUL AND WANTON CONDUCT
[*P59]
In an attempt to avoid the effect of the exculpatory agreement, plaintiff also contends that defendant engaged in willful and wanton conduct. Conduct is “willful and wanton“ where it involves a deliberate intention to harm or a conscious disregard for the safety of others. In re Estate of Stewart, 2016 IL App (2d),151117 ¶ 72, 406 Ill. Dec. 345, 60 N.E.3d 896. It is an “aggravated [**31]
form of negligence.“
Id. Plaintiff contends that defendant should have followed its own policies and evaluated her abilities. However, plaintiff does not explain what such an evaluation would have shown or what sort of action it would have prompted one of defendant‘s employees to take that would have protected plaintiff from the injury she suffered. Plaintiff also points to defendant‘s failure to advise her not to climb above the bouldering line. As the trial court observed, the risk of falling from a height is “open and obvious“ to an adult. Ford ex rel. Ford, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 302. Plaintiff cites nothing to substantiate the proposition that failing to warn plaintiff of a risk of which she was presumptively already aware rises to the level of willful and wanton conduct. Indeed, how a defendant could consciously disregard the risk of not advising plaintiff of the dangers of heights when she was presumptively aware of this risk is unclear (plaintiff provides no facts from which an intent to harm could be inferred).
[*P60]
In short, the conduct identified by plaintiff simply does not show a willful and wanton disregard for her safety.
[*P61]
IV. CONCLUSION
[*P62]
In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County [**32]
is affirmed.
Kalter, et al., v. Grand Circle Travel, et al., 631 F.Supp.2d 1253 (C.D.Cal. 2009)
Posted: October 9, 2019 Filed under: Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, California | Tags: assumption of the risk, Climbing, Hiking, Machu Picchu, Open and Obvious, Peru, stone steps, tour operator, Walking Leave a commentKalter, et al., v. Grand Circle Travel, et al., 631 F.Supp.2d 1253 (C.D.Cal. 2009)
631 F.Supp.2d 1253 (C.D.Cal. 2009)
Jill Kalter, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Grand Circle Travel, et al., Defendants.
No. CV 08-02252 SJO (AGRx).
United States District Court, C.D. California.
June 24, 2009
David B. Leichenger, Jon Matthew Steiner, Levitt Leichenger and Aberle, Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiffs.
John S. Murray, Mary Agnes Watson, Walsworth Franklin Bevins & McCall LLP, Orange, CA, Robert Mueller, Rodney E. Gould, Rubin Hay and Gould PC, Framingham, MA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Docket No. 57]
S. JAMES OTERO, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Grand Circle, LLC (erroneously sued as Grand Circle Travel, Overseas Adventure Travel and Overseas Adventure Travel Partners, Inc.) and Grand Circle Corporation’s (collectively, ” Grand Circle” ) Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 13, 2009. Plaintiffs Jill and Scott Kalter (collectively, ” Plaintiffs” ) filed an Opposition, to which Grand Circle replied. The Court found this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and vacated the hearing set for June 1, 2009. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b). For the following reasons, Grand Circle’s Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Grand Circle is a tour operator that arranges vacation packages to destinations around the world. (Olson Decl., filed as Gould Decl. Ex D, ¶ ¶ 2, 8; Pls.’ Separate Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Material Fact (” Statement” ) ¶ 1.) Jill Kalter (” Kalter” ) purchased a Grand Circle ” Amazon River Cruise & Rain Forest” tour, along with an optional post-trip extension to visit the Inca ruins at Machu Picchu. (Olson Decl. ¶ 13; Pls.’ Statement ¶ 2.) Prior to departing on her trip, Kalter received from Grand Circle an itinerary of the Machu Picchu trip extension (the ” Itinerary” ), which stated that her group would visit Machu Picchu on two consecutive days, and that on the second day she would have the option of remaining with a guide or exploring the ruins on her own. (Kalter Dep., filed as Gould Decl. Ex. A, 35:5-35:7, 36:15-20; 44:19-45:22; Itinerary, filed as Leichenger Decl. ” Kalter Dep. Ex. 20″ ; Pls.’ Statement ¶ ¶ 3-4.) The Itinerary also stated: ” [t]hese Inca sites are not like ancient squares in Europe; they are spread out over steep hillsides with large stone steps and uneven surfaces…. In the ruins, there are no handrails some places where you might like one.” (Itinerary at 65.) Kalter received and read the itinerary prior to departing on her trip. (Kalter Dep. 36: 15-20.) In addition, the tour guide, Jesus Cardenas, distributed a map of Machu Picchu to the tour participants prior to entering the park.[1] (Cardenas Decl. ¶ 20; Kalter Dep. 59:18-20.) The map includes a section entitled ” Visit Regulations,” which states, among other things, ” Do not climb the walls,” and ” Follow only designated routes according to arrows.” (Map, filed as Cardenas Decl. Ex. C.)
It was raining on both days Kalter was at Machu Picchu. (Kalter Dep. 54:12-16, 71:8-11.) The first day, she remained with Cardenas and walked on the stone paths. Id. 52:22-25, 64:11-16. The second day, she opted to explore on her own, and ventured off the established paths. Id. 67:24-68:1, 126:4-6; Supplemental Cardenas Decl. ¶ 11-12. Cardenas states that he gave verbal warnings to the group to use caution due to wet and slippery conditions. (Cardenas Decl. ¶ 13.) Kalter states that she did not hear Cardenas give these warnings, but that she ” has no reason to doubt” that he did so. (Kalter Decl. ¶ 7; Kalter Dep. 54:24-55:2.) Kalter went to an area known as the ” terraces,” filled with vertical rock walls that contain small stone protrusions called ” floating steps.” (Kalter Dep. 8:5-14; Pls.’ Statement ¶ 10; see Supplemental Cardenas Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. C (photographs of only set of floating steps above the location where Kalter was found after the fall).[2]) Some of these terraces are along paths color-coded by length, and no paths at Machu Picchu require traversing floating steps. (Cardenas Decl. ¶ 5.) Approximately one hour after venturing out on her own, Kalter became lost and disoriented, and was concerned about connecting with her group so that she would not miss the train. (Kalter Decl. ¶ 10; Kalter Dep. 85:11-13, 101:20-21.) In an effort to get a better view of where she was, Kalter stepped up onto the bottom two floating steps of a vertical wall. (Kalter Decl. ¶ ¶ 10-11; Kalter Dep. 8:16-20; Supplemental Cardenas Decl. Ex. C.) Kalter did not think this was a dangerous act. (Kalter Decl. ¶ 11.) As a result, Kalter fell and suffered serious injuries, and is now a quadriplegic.[3] (Pl.’s Opp’n 3.)
Grand Circle now moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiffs’ claims are barred under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk; (2) Grand Circle had no duty to warn Kalter of the dangerous nature of the floating steps because it was open and obvious; and (3) Grand Circle is not liable for the actions of Cardenas because he is an independent contractor.
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper only if ” the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A ” material” fact is one that could affect the outcome of the case, and an issue of material fact is ” genuine” if ” the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
A. Primary Assumption of the Risk Bars Plaintiffs’ Claims.
” The question of the existence and scope of a defendant’s duty of care is a legal question which depends on the nature of the sport or activity in question and on the parties’ general relationship to the activity, and is an issue to be decided by the court, rather than the jury.” Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal.4th 296, 313, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696 (1992). The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk applies where ” the defendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the particular risk of harm that caused the injury.” Id. at 314-315, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696. To determine if primary assumption of the risk applies, courts look to the nature of the activity, and the parties’ relationship to that activity. Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc., 37 Cal.App.4th 184, 190, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 392 (1995). The question turns on whether the plaintiff’s injury is within the ” inherent” risk of the activity. Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 185 Cal.App.3d 176, 182, 229 Cal.Rptr. 612 (1986). A risk is inherent to an activity if its elimination would chill vigorous participation in the activity and thereby alter the fundamental nature of the activity. Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 318, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696. Accordingly, ” the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies where ‘ conditions or conduct that otherwise might be viewed as dangerous often are an integral part’ of the activity itself.” Andia v. Full Serv. Travel, No. 06-437, 2007 WL 4258634, at *4, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88247, at *13 (S.D.Cal. Nov. 29, 2007) (citing Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 315, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696). When primary assumption of the risk applies, a defendant is only liable for a plaintiff’s injuries ” if the defendant ‘ engages in conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport or activity’ or increases the inherent risk involved in the activity.” Id. (citing Saville v. Sierra College, 133 Cal.App.4th 857, 866, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 (Cal.Ct.App.2005)).
If, on the other hand, ” the defendant does owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff proceeds to encounter a known risk imposed by the defendant’s breach of duty,” the doctrine of secondary assumption of the risk applies, which is analyzed under comparative fault principles. Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 315, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696. In such a case, ” the trier of fact, in apportioning the loss resulting from the injury, may consider the relative responsibility of the parties.” Id.
Here, Kalter was engaged in the activity of hiking on uneven terrain amongst ancient ruins. Inherent in this activity is the risk that one will fall and become injured. ( SeeAndia, 2007 WL 4258634, at *5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88247, at *15) (holding that ” falling is always a risk when engaging in any kind of strenuous hike on steep and uneven terrain” ). The Itinerary Kalter received prior to the tour informed her that the Inca sites at Machu Picchu ” are spread out over steep hillsides with large stone steps and uneven surfaces.” (Itinerary 65.) Eliminating tour participants’ access to these large stone steps and uneven surfaces in an attempt to protect against the risk of falling would eliminate the ability to view the Inca sites, and thus ” alter the fundamental nature of the activity.” SeeKnight, 3 Cal.4th at 318, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696. In other words, ” hiking across uneven and challenging natural terrain is an inherent risk of hiking to [the ancient ruins at Machu Picchu], without which the general public would be substantially deprived of viewing the … phenomenon.” Seeid. Moreover, as discussed further below, Kalter did not fall while engaging in the activities condoned by Defendants-she chose to leave the established stone pathway, and further endangered herself by stepping onto the floating steps. Accordingly, the Court finds that primary assumption of the risk applies to Kalter’s injuries from falling while hiking at Machu Picchu. Therefore, Grand Circle is only liable for only liable for Kalter’s injuries ” if [it] engage[d] in conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in [hiking amongst ancient ruins on uneven terrain] or increase[d] the inherent risk involved in the activity.” SeeSaville, 133 Cal.App.4th at 866, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 515.
Plaintiffs argue that Grand Circle breached its duty to Kalter by ” encouraging and permitting her to roam the ruins of Machu Picchu on her own, then directing her to an area unknown, i.e. which was not explored with her Trip Leader the prior day, and given the conditions of that day, was dangerous and confusing.” (Pls.’ Opp’n 10.) Kalter was an experienced hiker, and prior to electing to explore the ruins on her own instead of remaining with Cardenas, she had read Grand Circle’s Itinerary informing her that she would encounter steep hillsides, large stone steps, and uneven surfaces. (Itinerary 65; Kalter Dep. 36: 15-20, 48:9-14.) She also received the map from Cardenas which stated ” Do not climb the walls” and ” Follow only designated routes according to arrows.” (Kalter Dep. 59:18-20; Cardenas Decl. Ex. C.) Moreover, Plaintiffs do not dispute that visitors to Machu Picchu often wander the ruins on their own, and that park regulations do not prohibit them from doing so. ( See Cardenas Decl. ¶ 15; Pls.’ Statement ¶ 26.) In addition, Plaintiffs provide no evidence that Cardenas or Grand Circle knew Kalter would attempt to climb the floating steps, and do not dispute Cardenas’ statement that Kalter ” never asked me if she could climb down from or up to any terraces. At no time did I tell Ms. Kalter that she should climb down or up the series of terraces, and at no time did I tell Ms. Kalter that it would be okay for her to climb up or down the stone terrace walls or on the ‘ floating steps.’ ” (Cardenas Decl. ¶ 16.)
Given these undisputed facts, Grand Circle’s act of allowing Kalter to explore on her own areas she had not been to with Cardenas was not ” so reckless as to be totally outside the range of ordinary activity” involved in the excursion, nor did it increase the inherent risk of falling and sustaining injury involved in hiking in this region. SeeSaville, 133 Cal.App.4th at 866, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 515. The Court also notes that other participants in the tour stated that Cardenas was ” outstanding and the accident was not at all [his] fault. And of course, [Kalter] fell on a day of totally independent activities.” ( See Dobbins Dep. 13-25; see also Garvey Dep. 121:21- 25.) Moreover, even if Grand Circle or Cardenas erred in estimating Kalter’s ability to hike on her own across the uneven terrain at Machu Picchu in rainy weather, ” an instructor’s assessment errors-either in making the necessarily subjective judgment of skill level or the equally subjective judgment about the difficulty of conditions-are in no way ‘ outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.’ ” Kane v. Nat’l Ski Patrol, 88 Cal.App.4th 204, 214, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 600 (Cal.Ct.App.2001); see alsoAndia, 2007 WL 4258634, at *5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88247, at *16 (holding that tour guide’s ” decision to allow Plaintiff to return to the Rangers station alone [during a guided hike to a lava flow] … at most constituted ‘ assessment errors,’ but these ‘ subjective judgments about the difficulty of the conditions were ‘ in no way so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved’ in the activity of lava hiking” ).
Plaintiffs have submitted a declaration by Alexander Anolik, a travel and tourism attorney, stating that Cardenas ” failed to insist, explain the need for or put together a ‘ buddy system’ whereby Ms. Kalter would not have to be in this strange and dangerous area by herself,” and contending that his conduct of allowing Kalter to explore on her own fell below the standard of care in the travel industry. (Anolik Decl. ¶ 4.) Anolik submits no case law or any other information to suggest that such conduct falls below a standard of care, or that any other tour companies or guides employ such practices. ( See Supplemental Cardenas Decl. ¶ 3, stating that he is unaware of any other tour guide at Machu Picchu that requires a buddy system.) Further, as explained above, allowing tour participants to hike on their own, even off trail on uneven terrain, is not so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in hiking. SeeAndia, 2007 WL 4258634, at *5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88247, at *16. As such, the Court finds Anolik’s bare assertions insufficient to create a triable issue of fact regarding whether Defendants’ conduct was so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity or otherwise increased the inherent risk involved in the activity of hiking amongst ancient ruins in an undeveloped area. Accordingly, Grand Circle is not liable for Kalter’s injuries under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk.
B. Grand Circle Had No Duty to Warn Kalter of the Open and Obvious Danger Posed by the Wet Floating Steps.
” It is established law, at least in the exercise of ordinary care, that one is under no duty to warn another of a danger equally obvious to both.” Andia, 2007 WL 4258634, at *6, 2007 U.S. Dist. 88247, at *18 (citing Marshall v. United Airlines, 35 Cal.App.3d 84, 90, 110 Cal.Rptr. 416 (1973)). Here, it was obvious to both Kalter and Cardenas that it was raining, and Kalter admitted at her deposition that she ” knew [the stones] were slippery and wet.” (Kalter Dep. 64:19-65:3, 71:14-15.) Moreover, the danger of slipping and falling from stepping on a small wet stone step protruding from a vertical wall is undoubtedly an obvious danger.
Plaintiffs conclusorily state that ” there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the conditions that caused Ms. Kalter’s injuries were open and obvious,” but offer no evidence to support this claim. (Pls.’ Opp’n 13.) Indeed, Kalter admits that it was ” raining on and off,” that she ” knew the rocks could be slippery” , and that before she started climbing she could see the third step was missing. (Kalter Dep. 71:8-15, 101:12-18.) Kalter offers no evidence to suggest that she believed climbing the floating steps was allowed or common, or that she saw anyone else climbing them. Further, it appears that the danger of climbing the steps was obvious to other members of Kalter’s tour; when asked whether he saw anyone climbing the steps, one member responded, ” Good Lord. Someone, probably the guide, said that the Indians might have used them.” (Dobbins Dep. 24:23-25.) In addition, the map Kalter received prior to entering the park instructed her not to climb the walls. (Cardenas Decl. Ex. C.) Kalter also testified at her deposition that she ” thought there would be some risk in climbing up the floating steps.” (Kalter Dep. 110:12-22.) Further, Plaintiffs offer no evidence that the risk of slipping on the wet floating steps was any less obvious to Kalter than to Cardenas, especially in light of the fact that Kalter had walked on stone with Cardenas the previous day and noted that the stone was ” slippery at times.” (Kalter Dep. 64:15-18.)
Plaintiffs also cite case law holding that ” although the obviousness of a danger may obviate the duty to warn of its existence, if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g. when necessity requires persons to encounter it), there may be a duty to remedy the danger, and the breach of that duty may in turn form the basis for liability.” (Pls.’ Opp’n 12), citing Martinez v. Chippewa Entrps., Inc., 121 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 152 (Cal.Ct.App.2004) (emphasis in original) (holding that trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on obvious danger where plaintiff slipped on water covering defendant landowner’s driveway.) While a landowner may be required to remedy a dangerous but obvious condition on his property, the situation differs with regards to a tour guide and tour company, where, as here, the dangerous condition is neither on the guide or company’s property nor within their control. Further, in Martinez, the plaintiff slipped on water in a defendant’s driveway that she had to cross to get by; in contrast, ” necessity” did not ” require [Kalter] to encounter” the floating steps. SeeMartinez, 121 Cal.App.4th at 1184, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 152.
Moreover, numerous courts have held that tour companies and guides have no duty to warn of obvious dangers their customers encounter on trips. See, e.g.,Tei Yan Sun v. Governmental Auths. of Taiwain, 2001 U.S. Dist. 1160, at *31-32 (finding no liability for failure to disclose dangers of ” severe undertow, high waives, and strong surf” at beach, and noting that travel agents have no duty to disclose obvious dangers to travelers) (citing McCollum v. Friendly Hills Travel Ctr., 172 Cal.App.3d 83, 95, 217 Cal.Rptr. 919 (Cal.Ct.App.1985)); Passero v. DHC Hotels & Resorts, 981 F.Supp. 742, 744 (D.Conn.1996)(” A tour operator may be obligated, under some circumstances, to warn a traveler of a dangerous condition unknown to the traveler but known to it…. This doctrine applies to situations where a tour operator is aware of a dangerous condition not readily discoverable by the plaintiff. It simply does not apply to an obvious dangerous condition equally observable by plaintiff.” ); Stafford v. Intrav, Inc., 841 F.Supp. 284, 287 (E.D.Mo.1993) (noting that travel agents owe no duty to disclose information that is obvious and apparent to the traveler). Plaintiffs cite no cases in which courts have found tour companies or guides liable for failing to warn of or remedy open and obvious dangers.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Grand Circle had no duty to warn Kalter that the floating steps might be slippery and dangerous in the rain, as this danger was readily observable.
C. Since Neither Grand Circle Nor Cardenas Are Liable for Kalter’s Injuries, the Court Need Not Reach the Issue of Whether Cardenas Is an Employee or Independent Contractor.
As explained above, neither Grand Circle nor Cardenas are liable for Kalter’s injuries because the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk applies, and because neither had a duty to warn her of the open and obvious danger of falling while climbing wet stone steps protruding from a vertical wall. Further, Plaintiffs do not argue that Cardenas’ actions after Kalter fell caused or contributed to her injury. As such, whether Cardenas is Grand Circle’s employee or an independent contractor does not affect Grand Circle’s liability, and the Court need not reach the issue.
III. RULING
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Grand Circle’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
———
Notes:
[1] The map is produced by the Peru National Institute of Culture, not Grand Circle.
[2] Plaintiffs object to these photographs on the grounds that they ” lack proper foundation, are misleading in that the angles from which most are taken (particularly the closeups) and the two-dimensional nature of them cannot fairly (and accurately) depict how Ms. Kalter viewed the conditions at the time that she stepped on the two lowest steps.” (Pls.’ Objections to Evidence 2.) However, Cardenas states in his declaration that he took all of the photographs, and that they fairly and accurately reflect the conditions and terrain at Machu Picchu. (Supplemental Cardenas Decl. ¶ 8.) The Court finds these photographs to fairly and accurately represent the floating steps.
[3] It is unclear exactly how Kalter fell, as she does not remember and there were apparently no witnesses. (Kalter Dep. 12:22-13:5.)
New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students
Posted: August 1, 2019 Filed under: Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Camping, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, First Aid, Insurance, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Medical, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Sea Kayaking, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Swimming, Whitewater Rafting, Zip Line | Tags: Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Desk Reference, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, Good Samaritan Statutes, Hang gliding, Insurance, James H. Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Law, Legal Case, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, Outdoor Industry, Outdoor recreation, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Reference Book, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Reward, Risk, Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Textbook, Whitewater Rafting, zip line Leave a comment“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry
Denver based James H. Moss, JD, an attorney who specializes in the legal issues of outdoor recreation and adventure travel companies, guides, outfitters, and manufacturers, has written a comprehensive legal guidebook titled, “Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law”. Sagamore Publishing, a well-known Illinois-based educational publisher, distributes the book.
Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.
“There was nothing out there that looked at case law and applied it to legal problems in outdoor recreation,” Moss explained. “The goal of this book is to provide sound advice based on past law and experience.”
The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.
While written as a college-level textbook, the guide also serves as a legal primer for executives, managers, and business owners in the field of outdoor recreation. It discusses how to tackle, prevent, and overcome legal issues in all areas of the industry.
The book is organized into 14 chapters that are easily accessed as standalone topics, or read through comprehensively. Specific topics include rental programs, statues that affect outdoor recreation, skiing and ski areas, and defenses to claims. Mr. Moss also incorporated listings of legal definitions, cases, and statutes, making the book easy for laypeople to understand.
PURCHASE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Cases
Introduction
Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview
Risk
Risk
Perception versus Actual Risk
Risk v. Reward
Risk Evaluation
Risk Management Strategies
Humans & Risk
Risk = Accidents
Accidents may/may not lead to litigation
How Do You Deal with Risk?
How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?
Negative Feelings against the Business
Risk, Accidents & Litigation
No Real Acceptance of the Risk
No Money to Pay Injury Bills
No Health Insurance
Insurance Company Subrogation
Negative Feelings
Litigation
Dealing with Different People
Dealing with Victims
Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit
Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits
Emergency Medical Services
Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation
Employees
How Do You Handle A Victim?
Dealing with Different People
Dealing with Victims
Legal System in the United States
Courts
State Court System
Federal Court System
Other Court Systems
Laws
Statutes
Parties to a Lawsuit
Attorneys
Trials
Law
Torts
Negligence
Duty
Breach of the Duty
Injury
Proximate Causation
Damages
Determination of Duty Owed
Duty of an Outfitter
Duty of a Guide
Duty of Livery Owner
Duty of Rental Agent
Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader
In Loco Parentis
Intentional Torts
Gross Negligence
Willful & Wanton Negligence
Intentional Negligence
Negligence Per Se
Strict Liability
Attractive Nuisance
Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence
Product Liability
Contracts
Breach of Contract
Breach of Warranty
Express Warranty
Implied Warranty
Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
Warranty of Merchantability
Warranty of Statute
Detrimental Reliance
Unjust Enrichment
Liquor Liability
Food Service Liability
Damages
Compensatory Damages
Special Damages
Punitive Damages
Statutory Defenses
Skier Safety Acts
Whitewater Guides & Outfitters
Equine Liability Acts
Legal Defenses
Assumption of Risk
Express Assumption of Risk
Implied Assumption of Risk
Primary Assumption of Risk
Secondary Assumption of Risk
Contributory Negligence
Assumption of Risk & Minors
Inherent Dangers
Assumption of Risk Documents.
Assumption of Risk as a Defense.
Statutory Assumption of Risk
Express Assumption of Risk
Contributory Negligence
Joint and Several Liability
Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue
Why do you need them
Exculpatory Agreements
Waivers
Covenants Not to sue
Who should be covered
What should be included
Negligence Clause
Jurisdiction & Venue Clause
Assumption of Risk
Other Clauses
Indemnification
Hold Harmless Agreement
Liquidated Damages
Previous Experience
Misc
Photography release
Video Disclaimer
Drug and/or Alcohol clause
Medical Transportation & Release
HIPAA
Problem Areas
What the Courts do not want to see
Statute of Limitations
Minors
Adults
Defenses Myths
Agreements to Participate
Parental Consent Agreements
Informed Consent Agreements
Certification
Accreditation
Standards, Guidelines & Protocols
License
Specific Occupational Risks
Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators
College & University Issues
Animal Operations, Packers
Equine Activities
Canoe Livery Operations
Tube rentals
Downhill Skiing
Ski Rental Programs
Indoor Climbing Walls
Instructional Programs
Mountaineering
Retail Rental Programs
Rock Climbing
Tubing Hills
Whitewater Rafting
Risk Management Plan
Introduction for Risk Management Plans
What Is A Risk Management Plan?
What should be in a Risk Management Plan
Risk Management Plan Template
Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan
Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters
Building Fire & Evacuation
Dealing with an Emergency
Insurance
Theory of Insurance
Insurance Companies
Deductibles
Self-Insured Retention
Personal v. Commercial Policies
Types of Policies
Automobile
Comprehension
Collision
Bodily Injury
Property Damage
Uninsured Motorist
Personal Injury Protection
Non-Owned Automobile
Hired Car
Fire Policy
Coverage
Liability
Named Peril v. All Risk
Commercial Policies
Underwriting
Exclusions
Special Endorsements
Rescue Reimbursement
Policy Procedures
Coverage’s
Agents
Brokers
General Agents
Captive Agents
Types of Policies
Claims Made
Occurrence
Claims
Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements
Bibliography
Index
The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.
What is a Risk Management Plan and What do You Need in Yours?
Posted: July 25, 2019 Filed under: Activity / Sport / Recreation, Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Avalanche, Camping, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, First Aid, Health Club, Indoor Recreation Center, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Medical, Minors, Youth, Children, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Playground, Racing, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Scuba Diving, Sea Kayaking, Search and Rescue (SAR), Ski Area, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Snow Tubing, Sports, Summer Camp, Swimming, Triathlon, Whitewater Rafting, Youth Camps, Zip Line | Tags: #ORLawTextbook, #ORRiskManagment, #OutdoorRecreationRiskManagementInsurance&Law, #OutdoorRecreationTextbook, @SagamorePub, Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, General Liability Insurance, Good Samaritan Statutes, Guide, Hang gliding, http://www.rec-law.us/ORLawTextbook, Insurance, Insurance policy, James H. Moss, James H. Moss J.D., Jim Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Liability insurance, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, OR Textbook, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Law, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Outfitter, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, risk management plan, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Textbook, Understanding, Understanding Insurance, Understanding Risk Management, Whitewater Rafting, zip line Leave a commentEveryone has told you, you need a risk management plan. A plan to follow if you have 
a crisis. You‘ve seen several and they look burdensome and difficult to write. Need help writing a risk management plan? Need to know what should be in your risk management plan? Need Help?
This book can help you understand and write your plan. This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you plan is a workable plan, not one that will create liability for you.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview
Chapter 2 U.S. Legal System and Legal Research
Chapter 3 Risk 25
Chapter 4 Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue
Chapter 5 Law 57
Chapter 6 Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation
Chapter 7 PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases
Chapter 8 Defenses to Claims
Chapter 9 Minors
Chapter 10 Skiing and Ski Areas
Chapter 11 Other Commercial Recreational Activities
Chapter 12 Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities
Chapter 13 Rental Programs
Chapter 14 Insurance
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Need a Handy Reference Guide to Understand your Insurance Policy?
Posted: July 18, 2019 Filed under: Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Avalanche, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, Health Club, Indoor Recreation Center, Insurance, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Minors, Youth, Children, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Scuba Diving, Sea Kayaking, Ski Area, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Snow Tubing, Sports, Summer Camp, Swimming, Whitewater Rafting, Youth Camps, Zip Line | Tags: #ORLawTextbook, #ORRiskManagment, #OutdoorRecreationRiskManagementInsurance&Law, #OutdoorRecreationTextbook, @SagamorePub, Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, General Liability Insurance, Good Samaritan Statutes, Guide, Hang gliding, http://www.rec-law.us/ORLawTextbook, Insurance, Insurance policy, James H. Moss, James H. Moss J.D., Jim Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Liability insurance, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Law, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Outfitter, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Whitewater Rafting, zip line Leave a commentThis book should be on every outfitter and guide’s desk. It will answer your questions, help you sleep at night, help you answer your guests’ questions and allow you to run your business with less worry.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview
Chapter 2 U.S. Legal System and Legal Research
Chapter 3 Risk 25
Chapter 4 Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue
Chapter 5 Law 57
Chapter 6 Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation
Chapter 7 PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases
Chapter 8 Defenses to Claims
Chapter 9 Minors
Chapter 10 Skiing and Ski Areas
Chapter 11 Other Commercial Recreational Activities
Chapter 12 Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities
Chapter 13 Rental Programs
Chapter 14 Insurance
$99.00 plus shipping
New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students
Posted: July 11, 2019 Filed under: Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Camping, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, First Aid, Insurance, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Medical, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Sea Kayaking, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Swimming, Whitewater Rafting, Zip Line | Tags: Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Desk Reference, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, Good Samaritan Statutes, Hang gliding, Insurance, James H. Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Law, Legal Case, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, Outdoor Industry, Outdoor recreation, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Reference Book, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Reward, Risk, Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Textbook, Whitewater Rafting, zip line Leave a comment“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry
Denver based James H. Moss, JD, an attorney who specializes in the legal issues of outdoor recreation and adventure travel companies, guides, outfitters, and manufacturers, has written a comprehensive legal guidebook titled, “Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law”. Sagamore Publishing, a well-known Illinois-based educational publisher, distributes the book.
Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.
“There was nothing out there that looked at case law and applied it to legal problems in outdoor recreation,” Moss explained. “The goal of this book is to provide sound advice based on past law and experience.”
The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.
While written as a college-level textbook, the guide also serves as a legal primer for executives, managers, and business owners in the field of outdoor recreation. It discusses how to tackle, prevent, and overcome legal issues in all areas of the industry.
The book is organized into 14 chapters that are easily accessed as standalone topics, or read through comprehensively. Specific topics include rental programs, statues that affect outdoor recreation, skiing and ski areas, and defenses to claims. Mr. Moss also incorporated listings of legal definitions, cases, and statutes, making the book easy for laypeople to understand.
PURCHASE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Cases
Introduction
Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview
Risk
Risk
Perception versus Actual Risk
Risk v. Reward
Risk Evaluation
Risk Management Strategies
Humans & Risk
Risk = Accidents
Accidents may/may not lead to litigation
How Do You Deal with Risk?
How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?
Negative Feelings against the Business
Risk, Accidents & Litigation
No Real Acceptance of the Risk
No Money to Pay Injury Bills
No Health Insurance
Insurance Company Subrogation
Negative Feelings
Litigation
Dealing with Different People
Dealing with Victims
Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit
Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits
Emergency Medical Services
Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation
Employees
How Do You Handle A Victim?
Dealing with Different People
Dealing with Victims
Legal System in the United States
Courts
State Court System
Federal Court System
Other Court Systems
Laws
Statutes
Parties to a Lawsuit
Attorneys
Trials
Law
Torts
Negligence
Duty
Breach of the Duty
Injury
Proximate Causation
Damages
Determination of Duty Owed
Duty of an Outfitter
Duty of a Guide
Duty of Livery Owner
Duty of Rental Agent
Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader
In Loco Parentis
Intentional Torts
Gross Negligence
Willful & Wanton Negligence
Intentional Negligence
Negligence Per Se
Strict Liability
Attractive Nuisance
Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence
Product Liability
Contracts
Breach of Contract
Breach of Warranty
Express Warranty
Implied Warranty
Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
Warranty of Merchantability
Warranty of Statute
Detrimental Reliance
Unjust Enrichment
Liquor Liability
Food Service Liability
Damages
Compensatory Damages
Special Damages
Punitive Damages
Statutory Defenses
Skier Safety Acts
Whitewater Guides & Outfitters
Equine Liability Acts
Legal Defenses
Assumption of Risk
Express Assumption of Risk
Implied Assumption of Risk
Primary Assumption of Risk
Secondary Assumption of Risk
Contributory Negligence
Assumption of Risk & Minors
Inherent Dangers
Assumption of Risk Documents.
Assumption of Risk as a Defense.
Statutory Assumption of Risk
Express Assumption of Risk
Contributory Negligence
Joint and Several Liability
Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue
Why do you need them
Exculpatory Agreements
Releases
Waivers
Covenants Not to sue
Who should be covered
What should be included
Negligence Clause
Jurisdiction & Venue Clause
Assumption of Risk
Other Clauses
Indemnification
Hold Harmless Agreement
Liquidated Damages
Previous Experience
Misc
Photography release
Video Disclaimer
Drug and/or Alcohol clause
Medical Transportation & Release
HIPAA
Problem Areas
What the Courts do not want to see
Statute of Limitations
Minors
Adults
Defenses Myths
Agreements to Participate
Parental Consent Agreements
Informed Consent Agreements
Certification
Accreditation
Standards, Guidelines & Protocols
License
Specific Occupational Risks
Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators
College & University Issues
Animal Operations, Packers
Equine Activities
Canoe Livery Operations
Tube rentals
Downhill Skiing
Ski Rental Programs
Indoor Climbing Walls
Instructional Programs
Mountaineering
Retail Rental Programs
Rock Climbing
Tubing Hills
Whitewater Rafting
Risk Management Plan
Introduction for Risk Management Plans
What Is A Risk Management Plan?
What should be in a Risk Management Plan
Risk Management Plan Template
Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan
Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters
Building Fire & Evacuation
Dealing with an Emergency
Insurance
Theory of Insurance
Insurance Companies
Deductibles
Self-Insured Retention
Personal v. Commercial Policies
Types of Policies
Automobile
Comprehension
Collision
Bodily Injury
Property Damage
Uninsured Motorist
Personal Injury Protection
Non-Owned Automobile
Hired Car
Fire Policy
Coverage
Liability
Named Peril v. All Risk
Commercial Policies
Underwriting
Exclusions
Special Endorsements
Rescue Reimbursement
Policy Procedures
Coverage’s
Agents
Brokers
General Agents
Captive Agents
Types of Policies
Claims Made
Occurrence
Claims
Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements
Bibliography
Index
The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.
Appellate court slams climbing gym, all climbing gyms in New York with decision saying no climbing gym can use a release.
Posted: May 20, 2019 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Climbing Wall, New York, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: action to recover, appeals, appreciated, Climbing, consented, cross-appeal, cross-motion, engaging, gap, Inherent Risk, Inherent Risks, injured plaintiff, inter alia, leave to amend, Mats, personal injuries, personal injury damages, plaintiffs', Prima facie, Punitive damages, recover damages, recreational, Risks, rock, Rock climbing, Sport, Summary judgment 2 CommentsA climbing gym is a recreational facility. As such, under New York law, the court found all releases fail at climbing gyms. Short, simple and broad statement leaves little room to defend using a release in New York.
Citation: Lee, et al., v Brooklyn Boulders, LLC, 156 A.D.3d 689; 67 N.Y.S.3d 67; 2017 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8723; 2017 NY Slip Op 08660
State: New York; Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department
Plaintiff: Jennifer Lee, et al.
Defendant: Brooklyn Boulders, LLC
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Release and Assumption of the Risk
Holding: For the Plaintiff
Year: 2017
Summary
A climber fell between the mats at a climbing gym injuring her ankle. The release was thrown out because a climbing gym is a recreational facility and assumption of the risk did not prevail because the Velcro holding the mats together hid the risk.
Facts
The plaintiff Jennifer Lee (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) allegedly was injured at the defendant’s rock climbing facility when she dropped down from a climbing wall and her foot landed in a gap between two mats. According to the injured plaintiff, the gap was covered by a piece of Velcro.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The trial court dismissed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the defendant appealed. There were two issues the defendant argued on appeal: Release and Assumption of the Risk.
The court threw out the release in a way that makes using a release in New York at a climbing gym difficult if not impossible.
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the release of liability that the injured plaintiff signed is void under General Obligations Law § 5-326 because the defendant’s facility is recreational in nature. Therefore, the release does not bar the plaintiffs’ claims.
The court threw out the release with a very far-reaching statement. “the defendant’s facility is recreational in nature.” It is unknown if the defendant tried to argue educational issues such as in Lemoine v Cornell University, 2 A.D.3d 1017; 769 N.Y.S.2d 313; 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13209 (NY 2003)
The court then looked at the defense of assumption of the risk.
Relieving an owner or operator of a sporting venue from liability for inherent risks of engaging in a sport is justified when a consenting participant is aware of the risks; has an appreciation of the nature of the risks; and voluntarily assumes the risks. If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has performed its duty. Moreover, “by engaging in a sport or recreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation
This court would seem to agree with an assumption of the risk defense based on statements made in case law set out above.
However, the facts in this case do not lead to such a clear decision. Because the gap between the mats was covered by Velcro, the court thought the Velcro concealed the risk.
Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies. The defendant submitted the injured plaintiff’s deposition testimony, which reveals triable issues of fact as to whether the gap in the mats constituted a concealed risk and whether the injured plaintiff’s accident involved an inherent risk of rock climbing.
The Velcro, which was designed to keep the mats from separating, concealed the gap, which injured the plaintiff’s foot, when she landed between the mats. The defense of assumption of the risk was not clear enough for the court to decided the issue. Therefore assumption of the risk must be decided by a jury.
Since the defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, its motion was properly denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition papers
So Now What?
It is getting tough to defend against claims and injuries in New York, specifically in climbing gyms. For an almost identical case factually see: Employee of one New York climbing wall sues another NYC climbing wall for injuries when she fell and her foot went between the mats.
Obviously, the facts in the prior New York climbing gym case, where the plaintiff fell between the mats provided the “track” used by this plaintiff in this lawsuit.
If your climbing gym has mats held together with Velcro or some other material, paint the material yellow or orange and identify that risk in your release or assumption of the risk agreement.
Assumption of the risk may still be a valid defense see NY determines that falling off a wall is a risk that is inherent in the sport. Unless you are teaching a class or some other way to differentiate your gym or that activity from a recreational activity, you are going to have to beef up your assumption of the risk paperwork and information to stay out of court.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
Copyright 2019 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529
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Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Email: Jim@Rec-Law.US
By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
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New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students
Posted: April 25, 2019 Filed under: Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Camping, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, First Aid, Insurance, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Medical, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Sea Kayaking, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Swimming, Whitewater Rafting, Zip Line | Tags: Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Desk Reference, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, Good Samaritan Statutes, Hang gliding, Insurance, James H. Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Law, Legal Case, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, Outdoor Industry, Outdoor recreation, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Reference Book, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Reward, Risk, Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Textbook, Whitewater Rafting, zip line Leave a comment“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry
Denver based James H. Moss, JD, an attorney who specializes in the legal issues of outdoor recreation and adventure travel companies, guides, outfitters, and manufacturers, has written a comprehensive legal guidebook titled, “Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law”. Sagamore Publishing, a well-known Illinois-based educational publisher, distributes the book.
Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.
“There was nothing out there that looked at case law and applied it to legal problems in outdoor recreation,” Moss explained. “The goal of this book is to provide sound advice based on past law and experience.”
The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.
While written as a college-level textbook, the guide also serves as a legal primer for executives, managers, and business owners in the field of outdoor recreation. It discusses how to tackle, prevent, and overcome legal issues in all areas of the industry.
The book is organized into 14 chapters that are easily accessed as standalone topics, or read through comprehensively. Specific topics include rental programs, statues that affect outdoor recreation, skiing and ski areas, and defenses to claims. Mr. Moss also incorporated listings of legal definitions, cases, and statutes, making the book easy for laypeople to understand.
PURCHASE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Cases
Introduction
Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview
Risk
Risk
Perception versus Actual Risk
Risk v. Reward
Risk Evaluation
Risk Management Strategies
Humans & Risk
Risk = Accidents
Accidents may/may not lead to litigation
How Do You Deal with Risk?
How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?
Negative Feelings against the Business
Risk, Accidents & Litigation
No Real Acceptance of the Risk
No Money to Pay Injury Bills
No Health Insurance
Insurance Company Subrogation
Negative Feelings
Litigation
Dealing with Different People
Dealing with Victims
Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit
Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits
Emergency Medical Services
Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation
Employees
How Do You Handle A Victim?
Dealing with Different People
Dealing with Victims
Legal System in the United States
Courts
State Court System
Federal Court System
Other Court Systems
Laws
Statutes
Parties to a Lawsuit
Attorneys
Trials
Law
Torts
Negligence
Duty
Breach of the Duty
Injury
Proximate Causation
Damages
Determination of Duty Owed
Duty of an Outfitter
Duty of a Guide
Duty of Livery Owner
Duty of Rental Agent
Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader
In Loco Parentis
Intentional Torts
Gross Negligence
Willful & Wanton Negligence
Intentional Negligence
Negligence Per Se
Strict Liability
Attractive Nuisance
Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence
Product Liability
Contracts
Breach of Contract
Breach of Warranty
Express Warranty
Implied Warranty
Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
Warranty of Merchantability
Warranty of Statute
Detrimental Reliance
Unjust Enrichment
Liquor Liability
Food Service Liability
Damages
Compensatory Damages
Special Damages
Punitive Damages
Statutory Defenses
Skier Safety Acts
Whitewater Guides & Outfitters
Equine Liability Acts
Legal Defenses
Assumption of Risk
Express Assumption of Risk
Implied Assumption of Risk
Primary Assumption of Risk
Secondary Assumption of Risk
Contributory Negligence
Assumption of Risk & Minors
Inherent Dangers
Assumption of Risk Documents.
Assumption of Risk as a Defense.
Statutory Assumption of Risk
Express Assumption of Risk
Contributory Negligence
Joint and Several Liability
Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue
Why do you need them
Exculpatory Agreements
Releases
Waivers
Covenants Not to sue
Who should be covered
What should be included
Negligence Clause
Jurisdiction & Venue Clause
Assumption of Risk
Other Clauses
Indemnification
Hold Harmless Agreement
Liquidated Damages
Previous Experience
Misc
Photography release
Video Disclaimer
Drug and/or Alcohol clause
Medical Transportation & Release
HIPAA
Problem Areas
What the Courts do not want to see
Statute of Limitations
Minors
Adults
Defenses Myths
Agreements to Participate
Parental Consent Agreements
Informed Consent Agreements
Certification
Accreditation
Standards, Guidelines & Protocols
License
Specific Occupational Risks
Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators
College & University Issues
Animal Operations, Packers
Equine Activities
Canoe Livery Operations
Tube rentals
Downhill Skiing
Ski Rental Programs
Indoor Climbing Walls
Instructional Programs
Mountaineering
Retail Rental Programs
Rock Climbing
Tubing Hills
Whitewater Rafting
Risk Management Plan
Introduction for Risk Management Plans
What Is A Risk Management Plan?
What should be in a Risk Management Plan
Risk Management Plan Template
Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan
Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters
Building Fire & Evacuation
Dealing with an Emergency
Insurance
Theory of Insurance
Insurance Companies
Deductibles
Self-Insured Retention
Personal v. Commercial Policies
Types of Policies
Automobile
Comprehension
Collision
Bodily Injury
Property Damage
Uninsured Motorist
Personal Injury Protection
Non-Owned Automobile
Hired Car
Fire Policy
Coverage
Liability
Named Peril v. All Risk
Commercial Policies
Underwriting
Exclusions
Special Endorsements
Rescue Reimbursement
Policy Procedures
Coverage’s
Agents
Brokers
General Agents
Captive Agents
Types of Policies
Claims Made
Occurrence
Claims
Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements
Bibliography
Index
The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.
What is a Risk Management Plan and What do You Need in Yours?
Posted: April 11, 2019 Filed under: Activity / Sport / Recreation, Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Avalanche, Camping, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, First Aid, Health Club, Indoor Recreation Center, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Medical, Minors, Youth, Children, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Playground, Racing, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Scuba Diving, Sea Kayaking, Search and Rescue (SAR), Ski Area, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Snow Tubing, Sports, Summer Camp, Swimming, Triathlon, Whitewater Rafting, Youth Camps, Zip Line | Tags: #ORLawTextbook, #ORRiskManagment, #OutdoorRecreationRiskManagementInsurance&Law, #OutdoorRecreationTextbook, @SagamorePub, Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, General Liability Insurance, Good Samaritan Statutes, Guide, Hang gliding, http://www.rec-law.us/ORLawTextbook, Insurance, Insurance policy, James H. Moss, James H. Moss J.D., Jim Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Liability insurance, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, OR Textbook, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Law, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Outfitter, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, risk management plan, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Textbook, Understanding, Understanding Insurance, Understanding Risk Management, Whitewater Rafting, zip line Leave a commentEveryone has told you, you need a risk management plan. A plan to follow if you have a crisis. You‘ve seen several and they look burdensome and difficult to write. Need help writing a risk management plan? Need to know what should be in your risk management plan? Need Help?
This book can help you understand and write your plan. This book is designed to help you rest easy about what you need to do and how to do it. More importantly, this book will make sure you plan is a workable plan, not one that will create liability for you.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview
Chapter 2 U.S. Legal System and Legal Research
Chapter 3 Risk 25
Chapter 4 Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue
Chapter 5 Law 57
Chapter 6 Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation
Chapter 7 PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases
Chapter 8 Defenses to Claims
Chapter 9 Minors
Chapter 10 Skiing and Ski Areas
Chapter 11 Other Commercial Recreational Activities
Chapter 12 Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities
Chapter 13 Rental Programs
Chapter 14 Insurance
$99.00 plus shipping
Need a Handy Reference Guide to Understand your Insurance Policy?
Posted: April 2, 2019 Filed under: Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Avalanche, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, Health Club, Indoor Recreation Center, Insurance, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Minors, Youth, Children, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Scuba Diving, Sea Kayaking, Ski Area, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Snow Tubing, Sports, Summer Camp, Swimming, Whitewater Rafting, Youth Camps, Zip Line | Tags: #ORLawTextbook, #ORRiskManagment, #OutdoorRecreationRiskManagementInsurance&Law, #OutdoorRecreationTextbook, @SagamorePub, Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, General Liability Insurance, Good Samaritan Statutes, Guide, Hang gliding, http://www.rec-law.us/ORLawTextbook, Insurance, Insurance policy, James H. Moss, James H. Moss J.D., Jim Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Liability insurance, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Law, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Outfitter, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Whitewater Rafting, zip line Leave a commentThis book should be on every outfitter and guide’s desk. It will answer your questions, help you sleep at night, help you answer your guests’ questions and allow you to run your business with less worry.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Law, and Insurance: An Overview
Chapter 2 U.S. Legal System and Legal Research
Chapter 3 Risk 25
Chapter 4 Risk, Accidents, and Litigation: Why People Sue
Chapter 5 Law 57
Chapter 6 Statutes that Affect Outdoor Recreation
Chapter 7 PreInjury Contracts to Prevent Litigation: Releases
Chapter 8 Defenses to Claims
Chapter 9 Minors
Chapter 10 Skiing and Ski Areas
Chapter 11 Other Commercial Recreational Activities
Chapter 12 Water Sports, Paddlesports, and water-based activities
Chapter 13 Rental Programs
Chapter 14 Insurance
$99.00 plus shipping
New Book Aids Both CEOs and Students
Posted: March 28, 2019 Filed under: Adventure Travel, Assumption of the Risk, Camping, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, First Aid, Insurance, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Legal Case, Medical, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock Climbing, Sea Kayaking, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, Paragliding, Hang gliding, Swimming, Whitewater Rafting, Zip Line | Tags: Adventure travel, and Law, assumption of the risk, camping, Case Analysis, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Contract, Cycling, Desk Reference, Donkeys, Equine Activities (Horses, first aid, Good Samaritan Statutes, Hang gliding, Insurance, James H. Moss, Jurisdiction and Venue (Forum Selection), Law, Legal Case, Medical, Mountain biking, Mountaineering, Mules) & Animals, Negligence, Outdoor Industry, Outdoor recreation, Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Paddlesports, Paragliding, Recreational Use Statute, Reference Book, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Reward, Risk, Risk Management, Rivers and Waterways, Rock climbing, Sea Kayaking, ski area, Ski Area Statutes, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Skydiving, swimming, Textbook, Whitewater Rafting, zip line Leave a comment“Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law” is a definitive guide to preventing and overcoming legal issues in the outdoor recreation industry
Denver based James H. Moss, JD, an attorney who specializes in the legal issues of outdoor recreation and adventure travel companies, guides, outfitters, and manufacturers, has written a comprehensive legal guidebook titled, “Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law”. Sagamore Publishing, a well-known Illinois-based educational publisher, distributes the book.
Mr. Moss, who applied his 30 years of experience with the legal, insurance, and risk management issues of the outdoor industry, wrote the book in order to fill a void.
“There was nothing out there that looked at case law and applied it to legal problems in outdoor recreation,” Moss explained. “The goal of this book is to provide sound advice based on past law and experience.”
The Reference book is sold via the Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.
While written as a college-level textbook, the guide also serves as a legal primer for executives, managers, and business owners in the field of outdoor recreation. It discusses how to tackle, prevent, and overcome legal issues in all areas of the industry.
The book is organized into 14 chapters that are easily accessed as standalone topics, or read through comprehensively. Specific topics include rental programs, statues that affect outdoor recreation, skiing and ski areas, and defenses to claims. Mr. Moss also incorporated listings of legal definitions, cases, and statutes, making the book easy for laypeople to understand.
PURCHASE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Cases
Introduction
Outdoor Recreation Law and Insurance: Overview
Risk
Risk
Perception versus Actual Risk
Risk v. Reward
Risk Evaluation
Risk Management Strategies
Humans & Risk
Risk = Accidents
Accidents may/may not lead to litigation
How Do You Deal with Risk?
How Does Acceptance of Risk Convert to Litigation?
Negative Feelings against the Business
Risk, Accidents & Litigation
No Real Acceptance of the Risk
No Money to Pay Injury Bills
No Health Insurance
Insurance Company Subrogation
Negative Feelings
Litigation
Dealing with Different People
Dealing with Victims
Develop a Friend & Eliminate a Lawsuit
Don’t Compound Minor Problems into Major Lawsuits
Emergency Medical Services
Additional Causes of Lawsuits in Outdoor Recreation
Employees
How Do You Handle A Victim?
Dealing with Different People
Dealing with Victims
Legal System in the United States
Courts
State Court System
Federal Court System
Other Court Systems
Laws
Statutes
Parties to a Lawsuit
Attorneys
Trials
Law
Torts
Negligence
Duty
Breach of the Duty
Injury
Proximate Causation
Damages
Determination of Duty Owed
Duty of an Outfitter
Duty of a Guide
Duty of Livery Owner
Duty of Rental Agent
Duty of Volunteer Youth Leader
In Loco Parentis
Intentional Torts
Gross Negligence
Willful & Wanton Negligence
Intentional Negligence
Negligence Per Se
Strict Liability
Attractive Nuisance
Results of Acts That Are More than Ordinary Negligence
Product Liability
Contracts
Breach of Contract
Breach of Warranty
Express Warranty
Implied Warranty
Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
Warranty of Merchantability
Warranty of Statute
Detrimental Reliance
Unjust Enrichment
Liquor Liability
Food Service Liability
Damages
Compensatory Damages
Special Damages
Punitive Damages
Statutory Defenses
Skier Safety Acts
Whitewater Guides & Outfitters
Equine Liability Acts
Legal Defenses
Assumption of Risk
Express Assumption of Risk
Implied Assumption of Risk
Primary Assumption of Risk
Secondary Assumption of Risk
Contributory Negligence
Assumption of Risk & Minors
Inherent Dangers
Assumption of Risk Documents.
Assumption of Risk as a Defense.
Statutory Assumption of Risk
Express Assumption of Risk
Contributory Negligence
Joint and Several Liability
Release, Waivers & Contracts Not to Sue
Why do you need them
Exculpatory Agreements
Releases
Waivers
Covenants Not to sue
Who should be covered
What should be included
Negligence Clause
Jurisdiction & Venue Clause
Assumption of Risk
Other Clauses
Indemnification
Hold Harmless Agreement
Liquidated Damages
Previous Experience
Misc
Photography release
Video Disclaimer
Drug and/or Alcohol clause
Medical Transportation & Release
HIPAA
Problem Areas
What the Courts do not want to see
Statute of Limitations
Minors
Adults
Defenses Myths
Agreements to Participate
Parental Consent Agreements
Informed Consent Agreements
Certification
Accreditation
Standards, Guidelines & Protocols
License
Specific Occupational Risks
Personal Liability of Instructors, Teachers & Educators
College & University Issues
Animal Operations, Packers
Equine Activities
Canoe Livery Operations
Tube rentals
Downhill Skiing
Ski Rental Programs
Indoor Climbing Walls
Instructional Programs
Mountaineering
Retail Rental Programs
Rock Climbing
Tubing Hills
Whitewater Rafting
Risk Management Plan
Introduction for Risk Management Plans
What Is A Risk Management Plan?
What should be in a Risk Management Plan
Risk Management Plan Template
Ideas on Developing a Risk Management Plan
Preparing your Business for Unknown Disasters
Building Fire & Evacuation
Dealing with an Emergency
Insurance
Theory of Insurance
Insurance Companies
Deductibles
Self-Insured Retention
Personal v. Commercial Policies
Types of Policies
Automobile
Comprehension
Collision
Bodily Injury
Property Damage
Uninsured Motorist
Personal Injury Protection
Non-Owned Automobile
Hired Car
Fire Policy
Coverage
Liability
Named Peril v. All Risk
Commercial Policies
Underwriting
Exclusions
Special Endorsements
Rescue Reimbursement
Policy Procedures
Coverage’s
Agents
Brokers
General Agents
Captive Agents
Types of Policies
Claims Made
Occurrence
Claims
Federal and State Government Insurance Requirements
Bibliography
Index
The 427-page volume is sold via Summit Magic Publishing, LLC.
Employee of one New York climbing wall sues another NYC climbing wall for injuries when she fell and her foot went between the mats.
Posted: August 13, 2018 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Climbing Wall, New York, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Advice, Affirmative Defense, amend, amusement, appreciated, Bouldering, Climb, Climbing, concealed, Dangerous Condition, Gym, instructional, leave to amend, mat, matting, Public Policy, reciprocal agreement, recreational, risk doctrine, rock, Rock climbing, Sport, Teaching, team, training, unaware, unreasonably, Void, wasn't, watching Leave a commentRelease thrown out because of New York’s anti-release statute and condition causing plaintiff’s injury was the risk was “un-assumed, concealed or unreasonably increased” eliminating assumption of the risk claim.
McDonald v. Brooklyn Boulders, LLC., 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5211; 2016 NY Slip Op 32822(U)
State: New York, Supreme Court of New York, Kings County
Plaintiff: Meghan McDonald
Defendant: Brooklyn Boulders, LLC
Plaintiff Claims: negligence,
Defendant Defenses: Release and Assumption of the Risk
Holding: for the Plaintiff
Year: 2016
Summary
Another case where it appears, the court was more on the plaintiff’s side then neutral. However, you must play with the cards you are dealt. Here a person injured at a climbing gym survived a motion for summary judgment because the release violated New York’s release law, and she could not assume the risk of the mats separating because it was not obvious or known to her.
Facts
The plaintiff was an employee of another climbing wall business. She was the coach of the climbing team there. She was at the defendant’s climbing wall business either to coach her team or to climb personally, which were in dispute. While climbing on an overhang she fell and her foot went between the mats causing her injury.
The plaintiff did not pay to climb because the clubs had reciprocal agreements allowing employees to climb at other gyms for free. The mats were Velcroed together. The plaintiff sued. The defendant club filed a motion for summary judgment, and this is the court’s response to that motion.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The defendant argued the release should stop the plaintiff’s lawsuit, and she assumed the risk of her injury.
The plaintiff argued New York General Obligations Law (GOL) §5-326 made the release unenforceable.
The legislative intent of the statute is to prevent amusement parks and recreational facilities from enforcing exculpatory clauses printed on admission tickets or membership applications because the public is either unaware of them or not cognizant of their effect
New York General Obligations Law (GOL) §5-326 has been held to not apply to teaching, Lemoine v Cornell University, 2 A.D.3d 1017; 769 N.Y.S.2d 313; 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13209 (NY 2003). Because the plaintiff was there with students, the defendant argued the statute did not apply.
However, the plaintiff argued she was not teaching, just climbing with friends who were former students.
In support of her position that she was not at Brooklyn Boulders for instructional purposes, but, rather was there for a fun day of climbing, plaintiff points to her testimony that she brought some of the older members of her team to Brooklyn Boulders to climb. She testified that they all worked at The Rock Club so this was an end of summer treat for them to go and climb somewhere else and not have to work.
The other defense to New York General Obligations Law (GOL) §5-326 is there was no fee paid by the plaintiff to climb at the defendant gym. She was there because of the reciprocal program in place with her employer.
The court agreed she was not teaching and found she had paid a fee to climb at the defendant’s gym. Because the program was part of her employment compensation, she had paid a fee by taking advantage of the opportunity as an employee.
In addition, the court finds defendants’s argument that the fact that plaintiff did not pay a fee that day renders GOL §5-326 not applicable is equally unavailing. The reciprocal agreement that was in place between Brooklyn Boulders and The Rock Club, where plaintiff was employed, which allowed such employees to use other bouldering facilities without being charged a fee was a benefit of their employment and thus could be considered compensation.
The final defense was assumption of the risk. The plaintiff said she had never been to that area of the gym before, however, she did scan the area before climbing.
Under NY law, the assumption of risk defense is defined as:
The assumption of the risk defense is based on the proposition that “by engaging in a sport or recreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation”
By engaging in the activity or sport the plaintiff gives consent to the risks and limits the duty owed by the defendant. However, the risks of the activity, according to this court must be “fully comprehended or perfectly obvious.” The court then determined “Stated otherwise, the duty of the defendant is to protect the plaintiff from injuries arising out of unassumed, concealed, or unreasonably increased risks.”
Furthermore, “in assessing whether a defendant has violated a duty of care within the genre of tort-sports activities and their inherent risks, the applicable standard should include whether the conditions caused by the defendants’ negligence are unique and created a dangerous condition over and above the usual dangers that are inherent in the sport’
The Velcro connection holding the mats together was an injury for the jury to determine because the court found the condition was a concealed risk.
So Now What?
It is pretty skanky (legal word) for an employee of one gym, climbing for free, to sue another gym. I suspect the lawsuit was probably a subrogation claim where her health insurance was attempting to recover for her medical bills. However, that is just speculation.
New York General Obligations Law (GOL) §5-326 is read differently by ever judge that reviews it. Some simply say it does not apply and allows the release to prevail. Any court that seems to do an analysis of the law seems to rule on the side of the plaintiff lately. The late is left over from the days when consumers did not know what a release was and were caught off guard when they risked their neck in gyms.
However, the chances of it being repealed are slim, too many plaintiffs use the law so having a recreation business in New York requires more work on the part of the recreation provider to prove assumption of the risk.
Video’s, lengthy assumption of the risk agreements outlining the known and unknown risks and more in-depth classes for beginners and new people at the gym will be required in this jurisdiction.
Can you see this climbing coach being told she must take a one-hour class on climbing because she has never been to the gym before?
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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McDonald v. Brooklyn Boulders, LLC., 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5211; 2016 NY Slip Op 32822(U)
Posted: July 31, 2018 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Climbing Wall, Legal Case, New York, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Advice, Affirmative Defense, amend, amusement, appreciated, assumption of the risk, Bouldering, Brooklyn Boulders, Climb, Climbing, Climbing Wall, concealed, Dangerous Condition, Gym, Indoor Climbing Wall, instructional, leave to amend, mat, Mats, matting, Public Policy, reciprocal agreement, recreational, Release, risk doctrine, rock, Rock climbing, Sport, Teaching, team, The Rock Club, training, unaware, unreasonably, Velcro, Void, wasn't, watching Leave a commentMcDonald v. Brooklyn Boulders, LLC., 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5211; 2016 NY Slip Op 32822(U)
[**1] Meghan Mcdonald, Plaintiff, – against – Brooklyn Boulders, LLC., Defendant. Index No. 503314/12
503314/12
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, KINGS COUNTY
2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5211; 2016 NY Slip Op 32822(U)
April 12, 2016, Decided
NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE PRINTED OFFICIAL REPORTS.
CORE TERMS: climbing, mat, climb, team, rock climbing, recreational, leave to amend, affirmative defense, risk doctrine, instructional, bouldering, void, appreciated, concealed, teaching, training, wasn’t, amend, sport’, Rock, gym, matting, reciprocal agreement, public policy, dangerous condition, unreasonably, amusement, watching, unaware, advice
JUDGES: [*1] PRESENT: HON. MARK I. PARTNOW, J.S.C.
OPINION BY: MARK I. PARTNOW
OPINION
Upon the foregoing papers, defendant Brooklyn Boulders, LLC (defendant or Brooklyn Boulders) moves for an order: 1) pursuant to CPLR §3212 granting summary judgment and the dismissal of plaintiff Meghan McDonald’s complaint against defendant; and 2) pursuant to CPLR §3025 (b) granting defendant leave to amend its answer to the complaint to include an additional affirmative defense.
[**2] Background
Plaintiff is employed as a program director and head coach of a youth rock climbing team at The Rock Club, an indoor rock climbing gym in New Rochelle, New York and has been so employed since 2006. On September 1, 2011, plaintiff went to Brooklyn Boulders with some of the members of her youth climbing team and other adults. Brooklyn Boulders is an indoor rock climbing and bouldering facility located in Brooklyn, New York. Plaintiff testified that this trip was a treat for her team and that she would be climbing that day too. It is undisputed that plaintiff signed a waiver before she began climbing and that she did not pay an entry fee pursuant to a reciprocal agreement in place between The Rock Club and Brooklyn Boulders as well as other rock climbing facilities. After [*2] approximately one and a half hours of bouldering with her team, plaintiff went to an area of the bouldering wall known as The Beast, which is very challenging in that it becomes nearly horizontal for some distance. It was her first time on the Beast, although she had been to Brooklyn Boulders on prior occasions. Plaintiff testified that she visually inspected the area below the Beast before she began her climb. Lance Pinn, the Chief Marketing Officer, President and founder of Brooklyn Boulders testified that there was foam matting system in place, with matting wall to wall in the area of the Beast. The largest pieces available were 9 feet by 7 feet so the area where the foam pieces met when placed on the ground was covered with Velcro to keep the foam matting pieces flush together.
[**3] Plaintiff finished her upward climb and then climbed down as far as she could and then looked down below to make sure there were no shoes in her way and that her spotter was out of the way. She stated that she knew that there were mats underneath so she jumped down a distance of approximately five feet. Her right foot landed on the mat but her left foot landed on the Velcro strip where two floor mats met. [*3] She testified that her left foot went through the Velcro into a space between the two mats. Plaintiff sustained an ankle fracture as a result and required surgeries and physical therapy.
Brooklyn Boulders’ Motion
Brooklyn Boulders moves for an order: 1) pursuant to CPLR §3212 granting summary judgment and the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint against defendant; and 2) pursuant to CPLR §3025 (b) granting defendant leave to amend its answer to the complaint to include an additional affirmative defense.
Defendant argues that the liability waiver that plaintiff signed when she entered the facility releases it from liability. Defendant maintains that plaintiff was an expert climber and coach and understood the meaning of the waiver and appreciated the assumption of risk involved in the activity that she was engaged. Defendant also points out that she did not pay a fee to climb that day based upon the reciprocal program in place with other climbing facilities. Defendant claims that plaintiff was instructing her students that day as they observed her climbing and point to her testimony as follows:
[**4] Q: And were you teaching them, you know, what to do and what not to do?
A: I wasn’t teaching them, but if they had a question [*4] they would ask me hey, should I do this or do this or what do you think of this move I always give advice. (Page 30, lines 12-17).
Q. Did you ever teach any or give any instruction there?
A. Just of terms of like in my kids I probably give instruction everywhere I go. There are so many people that climb at Brooklyn Boulders that are total beginners. I’m often spotting brand new people and telling them how to spot one another. (Page 45, lines 5-12).
Defendant notes that although General Obligations Law (GOL) §5-326 renders contract clauses which release certain entities from liability void as against public policy, activities which are “instructional” as opposed to recreational are found to be outside the scope of GOL §5-326. Defendant maintains that here, plaintiff was at Brooklyn Boulders to instruct her team members and thus GOL §5-326 is not applicable. Moreover, defendant argues that the waiver at issue was explicit, comprehensive and expressly provided that Brooklyn Boulders was released from liability for personal injuries arising out of or connected with plaintiff’s participation in rock climbing.
In support of its motion, defendant submits the signed waiver which states, in pertinent part:
I acknowledge [*5] that climbing on an artificial climbing wall entails known and unanticipated risks which could result in physical or emotional injury, paralysis, death, or damage to myself, to property, or third parties. I understand that such risks simply cannot be eliminated without jeopardizing the essential [**5] qualities of the activity. I have examined the Climbing Wall and have full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risks associated with rock climbing and the use of the Climbing Wall, including but not limited to:
a:. All manner of injury resulting from my falling off or from the Climbing Wall and hitting the floor, wall faces, people or rope projections, whether permanently or temporarily in place, loose and/or damaged artificial holds, musculoskeletal injuries and/or overtraining; head injuries; or my own negligence . . . I further acknowledge that the above list is not inclusive of all possible risks associated with the Climbing Wall and related training facilities and I agree that such list in no way limits the extent or reach of this Assumption of Risk, Release and Indemnification . . .
Defendant also argues that since plaintiff did not pay a fee to climb that day that her activity was [*6] outside the scope of GOL §5-326.
Next defendant argues that the assumption of risk doctrine bars plaintiff’s claims because, as a general rule, a plaintiff who voluntarily participates in a sporting or recreational event is held to have consented to those commonly appreciated risks that are inherent in, and arise out of, the nature of the sport generally and flow from participation in such event.
Finally, defendant argues that it should be allowed to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of release. Defendant contends that it was unaware of the existence of the release and waiver when it served its answer. Moreover, defendant contends that plaintiff will not be prejudiced because she was, in fact, questioned about the release that she signed during her deposition.
[**6] Plaintiff opposes defendant’s motion arguing that General Obligations Law §5-326 renders the waiver and release that she signed void. She points out that defendant is attempting to circumvent this law by asserting that the activity in which plaintiff was involved was instructional as opposed to recreational and misstates her testimony in an attempt to mislead the court. Plaintiff contends that such behavior should be sanctioned. In support of her position [*7] that she was not at Brooklyn Boulders for instructional purposes, but, rather was there for a fun day of climbing, plaintiff points to her testimony that she brought some of the older members of her team to Brooklyn Boulders to climb. She testified that they all worked at The Rock Club so this was an end of summer treat for them to go and climb somewhere else and not have to work. (Page 62, lines 5-13). She further points to the following testimony:
Q: In September of 2011 when you went there on the date in question what was your purpose of being there?
A: I went there with a handful of kids who are on my climbing team, but it wasn’t a specific training day. Usually when we go it would be for training but this was just like a fun day. I was going to climb with them.
Q: And were they climbing around you.
A: Yeah, they were.(page 29, lines 14-25).
Q: And were you supervising them?
A: I wasn’t their active supervisor. I’m a coach though so I’m always watching what they do. But this was one of the few times that I was actually going to be climbing so it was kind of a treat for them I guess to be able to climb with me.
[**7] Q: Were they watching you?
A: A few of them were watching me yeah.
Q: And were [*8] you teaching them, you know, what to do and what not to do?
A: I wasn’t teaching them, but if they had a question they would ask me hey, should I do this or do this or what do you think of this move I always give advice (page 30, lines 2-17).
Plaintiff also contends that defendant incorrectly argues that GOL §5-326 does not apply because she cannot be classified a user since she did not pay to climb that day. In this regard, plaintiff contends that she is indeed a user and the law is applicable because there was a reciprocal agreement between the gym at which she was employed and Brooklyn Boulders pursuant to which employees were not required to pay a fee to use either gym. Thus, she contends the value of the reciprocity agreement is the compensation.
Next, plaintiff argues that the assumption of risk doctrine is not applicable where the risk was un-assumed, concealed or unreasonably increased. Plaintiff argues that the question of whether the gap in the mats at Brooklyn Boulders is a commonly appreciated risk inherent in the nature of rock climbing necessitates denial of the summary judgment motion. She claims that she did not assume the risk that there would be a gap in the matting that was in [*9] place as protection from a fall. Moreover, plaintiff maintains that defendant fails to proffer any evidence demonstrating when the mats were last inspected prior to plaintiff’s accident.
Plaintiff argues that issues as to whether dangerous or defective conditions exist on property and whether the condition is foreseeable can only be answered by a jury. Thus, she [**8] contends that whether the condition of the mats was dangerous and/or defective is an issue of fact and that defendant has failed to proffer any evidence that the mats were in a reasonably safe condition.
Finally, plaintiff opposes defendant’s request to amend its answer to add the affirmative defense of waiver. Plaintiff argues that the existence of the waiver was known and that it is disingenuous at best to assert otherwise. Plaintiff contends that this request, post note of issue, is highly prejudicial to plaintiff.
In reply, defendant argues that plaintiff’s demand for sanctions lacks merit and that plaintiff’s testimony establishes that she was in fact, instructing her students when her accident occurred. Defendant contends that the waiver applies. Next defendant claims that as far as inspection of its equipment it had a [*10] route setting department that checked its walls and mats and that bouldering climbers were responsible for enuring their own safety when climbing. Finally, defendant argues that the assumption of risk doctrine applies and that plaintiff visually inspected the area before the accident and that the Velcro covers were visible and moreover, she had the option to use additional mats underneath her while climbing. Defendant further contends that the mats did not constitute a dangerous condition. Finally, Brooklyn Boulders reiterates its request for leave to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense.
[**9] Discussion
Leave to Amend
Generally, in the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, leave to amend pleadings should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (Yong Soon Oh v Hua Jin, 124 AD3d 639, 640, 1 N.Y.S.3d 307 [2015]; see Jones v LeFrance Leasing Ltd. Partnership, 127 AD3d 819, 821, 7 N.Y.S.3d 352 [2015]; Rodgers v New York City Tr. Auth., 109 AD3d 535, 537, 970 N.Y.S.2d 572 [2013]; Schwartz v Sayah, 83 AD3d 926, 926, 920 N.Y.S.2d 714 [2011]). A motion for leave to amend is committed to the broad discretion of the court (see Ravnikar v Skyline Credit-Ride, Inc., 79 AD3d 1118, 1119, 913 N.Y.S.2d 339 [2010]). However, where amendment is sought after the pleader has filed a note of issue, “a trial court’s discretion to grant a motion to amend should be exercised with caution” (Harris v Jim’s Proclean Serv., Inc., 34 AD3d 1009,1010, 825 N.Y.S.2d 291 [3d Dept 2006]).
Here, while the court is not satisfied with counsel’s explanation that he was unaware of the [*11] existence of the release and waiver signed by plaintiff at the time that the original answer was served, the court notes that plaintiff was questioned about the release and waiver during her May 6, 2014 deposition so the court finds that there is no surprise of prejudice in allowing defendant leave to serve its amended answer and assert the affirmative defense of release and waiver. Accordingly, that branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to amend its answer to the complaint to include this affirmative defense is granted.
[**10] General Obligations Law §5-326
GOL §5-326 states that:
Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with, or collateral to, any contract, membership application, ticket of admission or similar writing, entered into between the owner or operator of any pool, gymnasium, place of amusement or recreation, or similar establishment and the user of such facilities, pursuant to which such owner or operator receives a fee or other compensation for the use of such facilities, which exempts the said owner or operator from liability for damages caused by or resulting from the negligence of the owner, operator or person in charge of such establishment, or their agents, servants or employees, shall [*12] be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.
Such contracts or agreements are void as against public policy unless the entity can show that its facility is used for instructional purposes as opposed to recreational purposes. “The legislative intent of the statute is to prevent amusement parks and recreational facilities from enforcing exculpatory clauses printed on admission tickets or membership applications because the public is either unaware of them or not cognizant of their effect (see Lux v Cox, 32 F.Supp.2d 92, 99 [1998]; McDuffie v Watkins Glen Int’l, 833 F. Supp. 197, 202 [1993] ). Facilities that are places of instruction and training (see e.g. Millan v Brown, 295 AD2d 409, 411, 743 N.Y.S.2d 539 [2002]; Chieco v Paramarketing, Inc., 228 AD2d 462, 463, 643 N.Y.S.2d 668 [1996]; Baschuk v Diver’s Way Scuba, 209 AD2d 369, 370, 618 N.Y.S.2d 428 [1994] ), rather than “amusement or recreation” (see e.g. Meier v Ma-Do Bars, 106 AD2d 143, 145, 484 N.Y.S.2d 719 [1985] ), have been found to be outside the scope of the statute. “In assessing whether a facility is instructional or recreational, courts have [**11] examined, inter alia, the organization’s name, its certificate of incorporation, its statement of purpose and whether the money it charges is tuition or a fee for use of the facility” (Lemoine v Cornell Univ., 2 AD3d 1017, 1019, 769 N.Y.S.2d 313 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701, 810 N.E.2d 912, 778 N.Y.S.2d 459 [2004]). In cases involving a mixed use facility, courts have focused less on a facility’s ostensible purpose and more on whether the person was at the facility for the purpose of receiving instruction (Id. At 1019; see Scrivener v Sky’s the Limit, 68 F Supp 2d 277, 281 [1999]; Lux v Cox, 32 F Supp 2d at 99). Where [*13] a facility “promotes . . . a recreational pursuit, to which instruction is provided as an ancillary service,” General Obligations Law § 5-326 applies even if the injury occurs while receiving instruction (Debell v Wellbridge Club Mgt., Inc., 40 AD3d 248, 249, 835 N.Y.S.2d 170 [2007]; Bacchiocchi v Ranch Parachute Club, 273 AD2d 173, 175, 710 N.Y.S.2d 54 [2000]).
Here, defendant asserts that GOL §5-326 is not applicable because plaintiff was at Brooklyn Boulders to instruct her team members. The court disagrees. Plaintiff’s testimony establishes that she was at Brooklyn Boulders with her team for a day of fun and not to teach them how to climb. Her testimony that she would give advice to the students if they asked does not rise to the level of providing rock climbing instruction on that day. Moreover, the court notes that the cases invloving the exemption for instrctional activities generally involve the person being instructed sustaining an injury and not the person who was providing the instruction. In addition, the court finds defendants’s argument that the fact that plaintiff did not pay a fee that day renders GOL §5-326 not applicable is equally unavailing. The reciprocal agreement that was in place between Brooklyn Boulders and The Rock Club, [**12] where plaintiff was employed, which allowed such employees to use other bouldering facilities without being charged a fee was a benefit of [*14] their employment and thus could be considered compensation. Accordingly, the court finds that the release and waiver signed by plaintiff is void pursuant to GOL §5-326.
Assumption of Risk
The assumption of the risk defense is based on the proposition that “by engaging in a sport or recreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation” (Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d 471, 484, 685 N.E.2d 202, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421 [1997]; Paone v County of Suffolk, 251 AD2d 563, 674 N.Y.S.2d 761 [2d Dept 1998]), including the injury-causing events which are the known, apparent, or reasonably foreseeable risks of the participation (see Rosenbaum v Bayis Ne’Emon Inc., 32 AD3d 534, 820 N.Y.S.2d 326 [2d Dept 2006]; Colucci v Nansen Park, Inc., 226 AD2d 336, 640 N.Y.S.2d 578 [2d Dept 1996]). A plaintiff is deemed to have given consent limiting the duty of the defendant who is the proprietor of the sporting facility “to exercise care to make the conditions as safe as they appear to be. If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has performed its duty” (Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 502 N.E.2d 964, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 [1986]). Stated otherwise, the duty of the defendant is to protect the plaintiff from injuries arising out of unassumed, concealed, or unreasonably increased risks (see Manoly v City of New York, 29 AD3d 649, 816 N.Y.S.2d 499 [2d Dept 2006]; Pascucci v Town of Oyster Bay, 186 AD2d 725, 588 N.Y.S.2d 663 [2d Dept 1992]). It is well settled that “awareness of [**13] risk is not to be determined in a vacuum. It is, rather, to [*15] be assessed against the background of the skill and experience of the particular plaintiff” (Maddox v City of New York, 66 NY2d 270, 278, 487 N.E.2d 553, 496 N.Y.S.2d 726 [1985]; see also Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650, 657-658, 541 N.E.2d 29, 543 N.Y.S.2d 29 [1989]; Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 440, 502 N.E.2d 964, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 [1986]; Latimer v City of New York, 118 AD3d 420, 421, 987 N.Y.S.2d 58 [2014]). When applicable, the assumption of risk doctrine “is not an absolute defense but a measure of the defendant’s duty of care” (Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d at 439). Thus, “a gym or athletic facility cannot evade responsibility for negligent behavior ‘by invoking a generalized assumption of risk doctrine as though it was some sort of amulet that confers automatic immunity’ (Jafri v Equinox Holdings, Inc., 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5330, 4-5 [Sup. Ct, New York County quoting Mellon v Crunch & At Crunch Acquisition, LLC, 32 Misc 3d 1214[A], 934 N.Y.S.2d 35, 2011 NY Slip Op 51289[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2011]; Livshitz v United States Tennis Assn. Natl. Tennis Ctr., 196 Misc 2d 460, 466, 761 N.Y.S.2d 825 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2003]).
Furthermore, “in assessing whether a defendant has violated a duty of care within the genre of tort-sports activities and their inherent risks, the applicable standard should include whether the conditions caused by the defendants’ negligence are unique and created a dangerous condition over and above the usual dangers that are inherent in the sport’ (Morgan, 90 NY2d at 485. quoting Owen v R.J.S. Safety Equip., 79 NY2d 967, 970, 591 N.E.2d 1184, 582 N.Y.S.2d 998 [1992]; Georgiades v Nassau Equestrian Ctr. at Old Mill, Inc., 134 AD3d 887, 889, 22 N.Y.S.3d 467 [2d Dept 2015]; Weinberger v Solomon Schechter Sch. of Westchester, 102 AD3d 675, 678, 961 N.Y.S.2d 178 [2d Dept 2013]). Participants, however, do not assume risks which have been unreasonably increased or [**14] concealed over and above the usual dangers inherent in the activity (see Morgan, 90 NY2d at 485; Benitez, 73 NY2d at 657-658; Muniz v Warwick School Dist., 293 AD2d 724, 743 N.Y.S.2d 113 [2002]).
In this regard, the court finds that plaintiff has raised a question of fact regarding whether the condition of the mats, with the Velcro connection, increased the risk in the danger [*16] of the activity and caused a concealed dangerous condition. Thus it cannot be said that plaintiff assumed the particular risk that was present and caused her injuries.
Based upon the foregoing, that branch of Brooklyn Boulders motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is denied.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court.
ENTER,
/s/ Mark I Partnow
J. S. C.
HON. MARK I PARTNOW
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
Release for a health club which had a foam pit included language specific to the injury the plaintiff suffered, which the court used to deny the plaintiff’s claim.
Posted: July 30, 2018 Filed under: Health Club, Illinois, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Ambiguity, Ambiguous, assumption of the risk, bones, Climbing, de novo, deposition, discovery, encompassed, exculpatory, Exculpatory clause, foam, Gym, Gymnastics, Health club, inherent, Inherent Risk, injury resulting, jumping, landing, Notice, physical condition, pit, Public Policy, Release, release agreement, releasing, Risk, risk of injury, Sport, springboard, Summary judgment, Supervision, surface, undersigned Leave a commentArgument made that the word inherent limited the risks the release covered and as such did not cover the injury the plaintiff received.
Macias, v. Naperville Gymnastics Club, 2015 IL App (2d) 140402-U; 2015 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 448
State: Illinois, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
Plaintiff: Kamil Macias
Defendant: Naperville Gymnastics Club
Plaintiff Claims: negligent in its failure to properly supervise the open gym, train participants, and warn participants of hazards and dangers accompanied with activities and use of equipment in the open gym
Defendant Defenses: Release
Holding: For the Defendant
Year: 2015
Summary
Plaintiff was injured jumping headfirst into a foam pit at the defendant’s gym. The plaintiff had signed a release relieving the defendant of liability, which was upheld by the trial court and the appellate court.
For the first time, the plaintiff argued the release was limited by the language in the release because it used the term inherent in describing the risks. Inherent limits the risks, to those that are part and parcel of the activity and the injury that befell the plaintiff was a freak accident.
Facts
The plaintiff went to the defendant club during open hours when the public could attend with a friend. He paid an admission fee and signed a release. The club had a foam pit. The plaintiff watched other people jump into the pit then tried it himself. He jumped off the springboard and instead of landing feet first he landed head first in the pit.
The plaintiff broke his neck requiring extensive surgery and rehabilitation.
The defendant club filed a motion to dismiss based upon the release signed by the plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss because the release was ambiguous.
During discovery, the plaintiff admitted he did not see the rules of the gym but did understand the risks of landing in the pit head first.
Walk around all pits and trampolines,” and he stated that he understood what this meant. The rules also stated: “Do not play on any equipment without proper supervision,” and “Do not do any gymnastics without proper supervision,” and plaintiff stated that he understood what these meant. Plaintiff also stated that he did not see a sign painted on the wall in the gym titled, “Loose foam pit rules.” That sign stated: “Look before you leap,” “No diving or belly flops,” and “Land on feet, bottom or back only.” Plaintiff acknowledged that he understood what these meant
After discovery, the defendant club filed a motion for summary judgment based on the additional information collected during discovery. The trial court granted that motion, and this appeal was dismissed.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The appellate court looked at contract law in Illinois.
The primary objective in construing a contract is to give effect to the parties’ intent, and to discover this intent the various contract provisions must be viewed as a whole. Words derive meaning from their context, and contracts must be viewed as a whole by examining each part in light of the other parts. Id. Contract language must not be rejected as meaningless or surplusage; it is presumed that the terms and provisions of a contract are purposely inserted and that the language was not employed idly.
A release is a contract. For the release to be valid and enforceable, it should:
…contain clear, explicit, and unequivocal language referencing the types of activities, circumstances, or situations that it encompasses and for which the plaintiff agrees to relieve the defendant from a duty of care. In this way, the plaintiff will be put on notice of the range of dangers for which he assumes the risk of injury, enabling him to minimize the risks by exercising a greater degree of caution.
The court found the injury suffered by the plaintiff fell within the scope of the possible injuries of the release and contemplated by the plaintiff upon signing the release.
Two clauses in the release stated the plaintiff was in good physical health and had proper physical condition to participate. The plaintiff argued these clauses made the release ambiguous; however, the appellate court did not find that to be true.
Here is the interesting argument in the case.
I have repeatedly stated that releases that limit releases to the inherent risk are limited in their scope. The plaintiff made that argument here.
Plaintiff argues that the use of “inherent risk” language throughout the release creates an ambiguity as to whether the language covers only dangers inherent in gymnastics and not freak accidents. We also reject this argument. As previously stated, the release specifically lists landing on landing surfaces as an inherent risk. Thus, there is no ambiguity as to whether plaintiff’s injury was covered by the release.
The plaintiff also argued his injury was not foreseeable because:
… (1) he lacked specialized knowledge of gymnastics and, in particular, foam pits, to appreciate the danger and foresee the possibility of injury, and (2) his injury was not the type that would ordinarily accompany jumping into a foam pit.
The argument on whether the injury was foreseeable is not whether the plaintiff knew of the risk but:
The relevant inquiry is not whether [the] plaintiff foresaw [the] defendants’ exact act of negligence,” but “whether [the] plaintiff knew or should have known” the accident “was a risk encompassed by his [or her] release.
The court found the injury the plaintiff received was on that was contemplated by the release.
Thus, the issue here is whether plaintiff knew or should have known that the accident was a risk encompassed by the release which he signed. As previously determined, the language of the release in this case was specific enough to put plaintiff on notice. In discussing inherent risks in the sport of gymnastics and use of the accompanying equipment, the release lists injuries resulting from landing on the landing surfaces, which includes injuries to bones, joints, tendons, or death.
The plaintiff also argued the release violated public policy because the release was presented to “opened its gym to the unskilled and inexperienced public” when it opened its gym to the public.
The court struck down this argument because the freedom to contract was greater than the limitation on damages issues.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s granting of the summary judgment for the defendant based on the release.
So Now What?
The inherent risk argument here was made but either not effectively argued by the plaintiff or ignored by the court. However, for the first time, the argument that the word inherent is a limiting word, not a word that expands the release was made in an argument.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Macias, v. Naperville Gymnastics Club, 2015 IL App (2d) 140402-U; 2015 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 448
Posted: July 29, 2018 Filed under: Health Club, Illinois, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Ambiguity, Ambiguous, bones, Climbing, de novo, deposition, discovery, encompassed, exculpatory, Exculpatory clause, foam, Gym, Gymnastics, Inherent Risk, injury resulting, jumping, landing, Notice, physical condition, pit, Public Policy, release agreement, releasing, risk of injury, Sport, springboard, Summary judgment, Supervision, surface, undersigned Leave a commentMacias, v. Naperville Gymnastics Club, 2015 IL App (2d) 140402-U; 2015 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 448
Kamil Macias, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Naperville Gymnastics Club, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 2-14-0402
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, SECOND DISTRICT
2015 IL App (2d) 140402-U; 2015 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 448
March 10, 2015, Order Filed
NOTICE: THIS ORDER WAS FILED UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23 AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENT BY ANY PARTY EXCEPT IN THE LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOWED UNDER RULE 23(e)(1).
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County. No. 11-L-1418. Honorable Judges Hollis L. Webster and John T. Elsner, Judges, Presiding.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
CORE TERMS: gym, pit, landing, summary judgment, foam, exculpatory clause, gymnastics, release agreement, surface, inherent risk, jumping, discovery, ambiguity, exculpatory, deposition, injury resulting, public policy, risk of injury, physical condition, releasing, ambiguous, sport, bones, supervision, de novo, springboard, encompassed, notice, undersigned, climbing
JUDGES: JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Schostok and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
OPINION BY: BURKE
OPINION
ORDER
Held: Release agreement for the gym was sufficiently clear, explicit, and unequivocal to show intent to protect facility from liability arising from use of its “foam pit”; it was proper for the gym to raise the issue it had raised in the section 2-619 motion in a summary judgment motion as it alleged new facts which were developed during discovery that affected the validity of the release; affirmed.
[*P2] Plaintiff, Kamil Macias, filed a complaint against defendant, Naperville Gymnastics Club (the Club), for injuries he received after jumping off a springboard and landing head first into a “foam pit.” The trial court denied the Club’s motion to dismiss, pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010)), but it later granted the Club’s motion for summary judgment based on a liability release agreement signed by plaintiff. Plaintiff raises several issues on appeal concerning the release and the effect of the earlier [**2] section 2-619 motion to dismiss. We affirm.
[*P3] I. BACKGROUND
[*P4] On January 15, 2011, plaintiff came to the Club with his friend. The Club offers “open gym” hours where members of the Club and the general public can attend. Plaintiff, who was not a member of the Club, paid a $10 admission fee and he signed a liability release agreement.
[*P5] A foam pit was located in the gym. After seeing participants jumping into the pit, plaintiff jogged up to a springboard in front of the pit, jumped onto the board and into the pit. While attempting to jump feet first, plaintiff’s body moved in the air, causing him to land head first, striking the bottom of the pit. Plaintiff immediately lost all feeling in his body below the neck. He remained in the pit covered by pieces of foam until he was extracted by the Naperville Fire Department. At the time, plaintiff was 20 years old, about 6 feet tall, and weighed 310 pounds. As a result of the accident, plaintiff suffered a broken neck, requiring extensive surgery and rehabilitation. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging the Club was negligent in its failure to properly supervise the open gym, train participants, and warn participants of hazards and dangers accompanied with activities [**3] and use of equipment in the open gym.
[*P6] The Club filed a section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2010)), alleging that plaintiff signed a two-page liability release agreement that contained an exculpatory clause releasing the Club from liability for any acts of negligence.
[*P7] The trial court found the release ambiguous and denied the section 2-619(a)(9) motion without prejudice. In denying the motion, the judge stated that she felt it was inappropriate to dismiss the suit at that point, that there was case law on both sides of “these exculpatory clauses,” and the judge agreed that it was something that could be developed through discovery. She further stated, “But I think it’s something that is better suited for a summary judgment motion if the facts do bear that out from the defense’s perspective.”
[*P8] During discovery, plaintiff was questioned by defense counsel and testified to the following:
“Q. Okay. That first part of the form it says, ‘To gain admission to the activity areas of [the Club], all parts of this form must be read, understood, and signed.’ Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you understand what that means?
A. Yes.
* * *
Q. Did you understand this to be an agreement on January 15th, 2011[,] between you and [the [**4] Club]?
A. Had I read this agreement I would have understood.
* * *
Q. And you understand that [the release] means that when you sign it that you’re agreeing to not bring any lawsuit against [the Club]?
A. Correct.
Q. And if you had read it on January 15th of 2011, that’s what you would have understood it to mean?
A. Correct.
* * *
Q. And you agree that the sport of gymnastics is a risky sport?
A. Correct.
Q: And you would have felt the same on January 15th, 2011[,] before your accident?
A. Yes.”
[*P9] At the entrance to the gym was a closed door with a window pane in it. Plaintiff did not recall seeing a sign on the door entitled, “Rules of the Gym.” Plaintiff reviewed the rules at his deposition and admitted that it said to “Walk around all pits and trampolines,” and he stated that he understood what this meant. The rules also stated: “Do not play on any equipment without proper supervision,” and “Do not do any gymnastics without proper supervision,” and plaintiff stated that he understood what these meant. Plaintiff also stated that he did not see a sign painted on the wall in the gym titled, “Loose foam pit rules.” That sign stated: “Look before you leap,” “No diving or belly flops,” and “Land on [**5] feet, bottom or back only.” Plaintiff acknowledged that he understood what these meant.
[*P10] After discovery, the Club filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the exculpatory clause of the release signed by plaintiff. The motion included the deposition testimony and that (1) plaintiff denied being given any verbal instructions and denied seeing the warning signs or rules posted in the gym before he was injured, and (2) plaintiff admitted that he would have understood the terms of the liability release, had he read it. Following argument, the trial court granted the Club’s motion for summary judgment. This timely appeal follows.
[*P11] II. ANALYSIS
[*P12] A. Standard of Review
[*P13] Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010). The motion should be denied if there are disputed facts, but also if reasonable people could draw different inferences from the undisputed facts. Wood v. National Liability & Fire Insurance Co., 324 Ill. App. 3d 583, 585, 755 N.E.2d 1044, 258 Ill. Dec. 225 (2001). We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 30, 978 N.E.2d 1000, 365 Ill. Dec. 497.
[*P14] We review the parties’ [**6] liability release agreement in accordance with well-established contract principles. Joyce v. Mastri, 371 Ill. App. 3d 64, 74, 861 N.E.2d 1102, 308 Ill. Dec. 537 (2007). The primary objective in construing a contract is to give effect to the parties’ intent, and to discover this intent the various contract provisions must be viewed as a whole. Kerton v. Lutheran Church Extension Fund, 262 Ill. App. 3d 74, 77, 634 N.E.2d 16, 199 Ill. Dec. 416 (1994). Words derive meaning from their context, and contracts must be viewed as a whole by examining each part in light of the other parts. Id. Contract language must not be rejected as meaningless or surplusage; it is presumed that the terms and provisions of a contract are purposely inserted and that the language was not employed idly. Id.
[*P15] In order for an exculpatory clause to be valid and enforceable, it should contain clear, explicit, and unequivocal language referencing the types of activities, circumstances, or situations that it encompasses and for which the plaintiff agrees to relieve the defendant from a duty of care. Calarco v. YMCA, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1040, 501 N.E.2d 268, 103 Ill. Dec. 247 (1986). In this way, the plaintiff will be put on notice of the range of dangers for which he assumes the risk of injury, enabling him to minimize the risks by exercising a greater degree of caution. Neumann v. Gloria Marshall Figure Salon, 149 Ill. App. 3d 824, 827, 500 N.E.2d 1011, 102 Ill. Dec. 910 (1986). The precise occurrence which results in injury need not have been contemplated by the parties at the time the contract [**7] was entered into. Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill. 2d 82, 86, 413 N.E.2d 1252, 46 Ill. Dec. 139 (1980). It should only appear that the injury falls within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying the activity and, thus, reasonably contemplated by the plaintiff. Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill. App. 3d 581, 585, 559 N.E.2d 187, 147 Ill. Dec. 187 (1990). Further, when interpreting a contract containing an exculpatory clause, the court must interpret the scope of the exculpatory provision in the “context of the entire agreement.” Shorr Paper Products, Inc. v. Aurora Elevator, Inc., 198 Ill. App. 3d 9, 13, 555 N.E.2d 735, 144 Ill. Dec. 376 (1990). We review the interpretation of an exculpatory agreement or release of liability authorization de novo. Stratman v. Brent, 291 Ill. App. 3d 123, 137, 683 N.E.2d 951, 225 Ill. Dec. 448 (1997).
[*P16] In Garrison, a member of a health club who was injured when lifting weights on a bench press brought suit against the club and the manufacturer of the press. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the club, and the plaintiff appealed. The First District Appellate Court held that the exculpatory clause could not have been more clear or explicit, as it stated that each member bore the “sole risk” of injury that might result from the use of weights, equipment, or other apparatus provided and that the selection of the type of equipment to be used would be the “entire responsibility” of the member. The court found that the injury the plaintiff sustained clearly fell within the scope of possible dangers [**8] ordinarily accompanying the activity of weightlifting. Id. at 585. The court observed that the injury was of a type that would normally be contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was made and, therefore, the court held that it clearly fell within the parameters of the exculpatory clause. Id. See also Hussein v. L.A. Fitness International, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 121426, 987 N.E.2d 460, 369 Ill. Dec. 833; Neumann v. Gloria Marshall Figure Salon, 149 Ill. App. 3d 824, 500 N.E.2d 1011, 102 Ill. Dec. 910 (1986).
[*P17] Similar to Garrison and the cases cited above, the release agreement in the present case is clear and specific regarding the risks it covers and the release of the Club’s negligence. It specifically references the inherent risk of injury resulting from landing on landing surfaces, and plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition that this phrase includes the foam pit in which he was injured. The agreement also releases the Club from any and all claims, including those caused by its negligence. Furthermore, plaintiff’s signature certified that he recognized the dangers inherent with climbing and jumping activities and that he voluntarily assumed the risks.
[*P18] Nevertheless, plaintiff raises several arguments regarding the validity of the release and the effect of the earlier section 2-619 motion.
[*P19] B. Ambiguity of the Release
[*P20] 1. First Clause
[*P21] The first clause of the release, which is typed in capital letters, states: [**9]
“BY SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT UNSUPERVISED USE OF ANY AREA OF FACILITY IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED AND COMPLETELY AT THE RISK OF THE PARTICIPANT AND THAT THE RULES [OF] EACH AREA BEING UTILIZED ARE UNDERSTOOD PRIOR TO PARTICIPATION!”
Plaintiff asserts that this clause is ambiguous as to whether supervision and a full understanding of the rules of the Club is a condition precedent to releasing defendant from liability. We agree that the first clause, standing alone, might be construed as stating that supervision and a full understanding of the rules of the Club is a condition preceding releasing the Club from liability. However, case law teaches that we must review the language of the release in its entirety in order to interpret the parties’ intent.
[*P22] The release contains a “Covenant Not to Sue for Injury or Damages,” which provides, in relevant part:
“Notice: This is a legally binding agreement. By signing this agreement, you waive your right to bring a court action to recover compensation or to obtain any other remedy for any injury to yourself *** however caused arising out of use of the facilities of [the Club].
I hereby acknowledge and agree that the sport of gymnastics [**10] and the use of the accompanying equipment has INHERENT RISKS. I have full knowledge of the nature and extent of all of the risks inherent in gymnastics and the use of the facilities of the gym, including but not limited to:
***
5. Injuries resulting from landing on the landing surfaces; and
6. Injuries to bones, joints, tendons, or death.
[*P23] The section of the release agreement entitled “Release Indemnification Liquidation Damages and Agreement to Arbitrate” states, in relevant part:
“In consideration of my use of the GYM, I the undersigned user, agree to release on behalf of myself *** [the Club] *** including but not limited to a claim of NEGLIGENCE.”
[*P24] The clause of the release immediately preceding plaintiff’s signature provides that “the undersigned recognize[s] the dangers inherent with climbing and jumping activities,” and the undersigned is “assuming the hazard of this risk upon myself because I wish to participate. I realize that I am subject to injury from this activity and that no form of pre-planning can remove all of the danger to which I am exposing myself.”
[*P25] In reading the release in its entirety, it is clear that the first clause of the release cannot be construed as plaintiff argues. The [**11] release contains no such limitations as it covers a number of activities, including “[i]njuries resulting from landing on the landing surfaces” (i.e. the “foam pit”), releasing the Club from negligence, and “the dangers inherent with climbing and jumping activities.”
[*P26] 2. Physical Condition Clause
[*P27] Two clauses of the release request the participant to agree that he or she is in good physical health and proper physical condition to participate. Plaintiff cites Calarco v. YMCA of Greater Metropolitan Chicago, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 501 N.E.2d 268, 103 Ill. Dec. 247 (1986), and Macek v. Schooner’s Inc., 224 Ill. App. 3d 103, 586 N.E.2d 442, 166 Ill. Dec. 484 (1991), for the proposition that these types of clauses render the release ambiguous, as it is unclear whether the release only applies to injuries resulting from a participant’s physical ailments. In other words, the release does not apply to participants without physical ailments.
[*P28] We fail to follow the logic of plaintiff’s argument. However, the cases relied on by plaintiff are readily distinguishable. In Calarco, the plaintiff had been injured when metal weights from an exercise machine fell on her hand, breaking her bones. The plaintiff had agreed “to hold free from any and all liability the [defendant] *** for damages which [the plaintiff] may have or which may hereafter accrue to [the plaintiff] arising out of or connected with [the plaintiff’s] participation [**12] in any of the activities of the [defendant].” We held that the exculpatory clause in the membership application for the defendant’s facility was insufficient to protect the defendant from liability as a matter of law because the clause did not adequately describe the covered activities to clearly indicate that defendant’s negligence would be covered by the release. Calarco, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 1043-44. We further noted that the statement immediately following the alleged exculpatory language contained a declaration of physical health by the signer, and that the combination of the two provisions further complicated the interpretation of the release. Id.
[*P29] In Macek, the plaintiff participated in an arm wrestling contest with a machine that broke his arm. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because the release did not specify the covered activities but rather merely indicated that damages for “all injuries suffered” are waived. The court found further that the line immediately following the exculpatory language regarding the signer’s physical condition provided additional ambiguity. Id. at 106.
[*P30] In both Calarco and Marek, the releases did not specify the covered activities and did not specifically cover the defendants’ [**13] negligence. Both courts held that the physical condition clause simply added to the ambiguity of the release. However, contrary to Calarco and Marek, the release in this case clearly covers the activities in question and specifically releases defendant from liability for its negligence.
[*P31] 3. Inherent Risk Language
[*P32] Plaintiff argues that the use of “inherent risk” language throughout the release creates an ambiguity as to whether the language covers only dangers inherent in gymnastics and not freak accidents. We also reject this argument. As previously stated, the release specifically lists landing on landing surfaces as an inherent risk. Thus, there is no ambiguity as to whether plaintiff’s injury was covered by the release.
[*P33] C. Forseeability
[*P34] Plaintiff argues that his injury was not foreseeable because (1) he lacked specialized knowledge of gymnastics and, in particular, foam pits, to appreciate the danger and foresee the possibility of injury, and (2) his injury was not the type that would ordinarily accompany jumping into a foam pit.
[*P35] A plaintiff who expressly consents to relieve a defendant of an obligation of conduct toward the plaintiff assumes the risk of injury as a result of the [**14] defendant’s failure to adhere to the obligation. Larsen v. Vic Tanny International, 130 Ill. App. 3d 574, 576, 474 N.E.2d 729, 85 Ill. Dec. 769 (1984). The doctrine of assumption of risk presupposes, however, that the danger which causes the injury is such that it ordinarily accompanies the activities of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff knows or should know both the danger and the possibility of injury prior to its occurrence. Id. at 576. The standard is a subjective one geared to a particular plaintiff, and the determination ordinarily will be made by a jury. Id. at 576-77.
[*P36] “The foreseeability of a specific danger defines the scope.” Cox v. U.S. Fitness, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 122442, ¶ 14, 377 Ill. Dec. 930, 2 N.E.3d 1211. “The relevant inquiry *** is not whether [the] plaintiff foresaw [the] defendants’ exact act of negligence,” but “whether [the] plaintiff knew or should have known” the accident “was a risk encompassed by his [or her] release.” Hellweg v. Special Events Management, 2011 IL App (1st) 103604, ¶ 7, 956 N.E.2d 954, 353 Ill. Dec. 826.
[*P37] Thus, the issue here is whether plaintiff knew or should have known that the accident was a risk encompassed by the release which he signed. As previously determined, the language of the release in this case was specific enough to put plaintiff on notice. In discussing inherent risks in the sport of gymnastics and use of the accompanying equipment, the release lists injuries resulting from landing on the landing surfaces, which includes [**15] injuries to bones, joints, tendons, or death. Plaintiff agreed that the foam pit was a landing surface and that some of the possible injuries that he could sustain at the gym from gymnastics activities included injuries to his bones, and he admitted at deposition that he had not read the release and that, had he read the release, he would have understood it to mean that he could not sue the gym for any injuries he sustained. Based on these facts, plaintiff should have known the risks of injury associated with the activity of jumping into the foam pit. Plaintiff participated in open gym, which reasonably contemplates participating in the use of the accompanying equipment. Plaintiff could have reasonably presumed that, should he jump from a springboard into the foam pit, he might land on his head. It is entirely foreseeable that, if plaintiff accidently fell on his head, he would be hurt by “landing on the landing surfaces,” a risk encompassed by the release agreement. See Oelze v. Score Sports Venture, 401 Ill. App. 3d 110, 121, 927 N.E.2d 137, 339 Ill. Dec. 596 (2010). Although plaintiff suffered a serious injury, we are bound by the release agreement. Accordingly, we find the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the basis that the release barred plaintiff’s negligence [**16] claim.
[*P38] D. Public Policy
[*P39] Plaintiff next argues that it would be against public policy to enforce the release in this case because the Club opened its gym to the unskilled and inexperienced public. Plaintiff does not cite any cases in support of this argument. In fact, the only case he cites, Hamer v. City Segway Tours of Chicago, LLC, 402 Ill. App. 3d 42, 930 N.E.2d 578, 341 Ill. Dec. 368 (2010), is inapposite to his position.
[*P40] Several cases have rejected plaintiff’s argument in the fitness club setting. See, e.g., Kubisen v. Chicago Health Clubs, 69 Ill. App. 3d 463, 388 N.E.2d 44, 26 Ill. Dec. 420 (1979); Owen v. Vic Tanny’s Enterprises, 48 Ill. App. 2d 344, 199 N.E.2d 280 (1964). Had plaintiff, an adult, read the release and disagreed with it, he could have simply refused to participate in open gym. “While exculpatory or limitation of damages clauses are not favored and must be strictly construed against a benefitting party [citation] the basis for their enforcement is the strong public policy favoring freedom of contract.” Rayner Covering Systems, Inc. v. Danvers Farmers Elevator Co., 226 Ill. App. 3d 507, 512, 589 N.E.2d 1034, 168 Ill. Dec. 634 (1992). There does not seem to be any reason in this case to depart from the strong public policy of allowing parties to freely enter into contracts.
[*P41] E. Section 2-619 Motion to Dismiss
[*P42] The Club filed a section 2-619 motion, alleging that plaintiff signed a two-page liability release that contained an exculpatory clause, which released the Club from liability for any acts of negligence. The trial court found the release was ambiguous and denied the motion. However, [**17] the court recognized that disputed facts might affect the validity of the release and indicated that the Club was free to raise the issue again in a summary judgment motion after facts surrounding the execution of the release were developed in discovery.
[*P43] Citing Makowski v. City of Naperville, 249 Ill. App. 3d 110, 117-18, 617 N.E.2d 1251, 187 Ill. Dec. 530 (1993), plaintiff acknowledges that a trial court may allow a party to reassert a defense after previously ruling on the merits only when new evidence is presented. Plaintiff claims that the summary judgment motion did not allege new facts but simply relied on the language of the release as it did in the Club’s section 2-619 motion. We disagree.
[*P44] The Club did allege additional facts in its summary judgment motion that were developed during discovery that affected the validity of the release. Those facts included plaintiff’s acknowledgment that he understood the meaning of the terms of the release, that he understood the inherent risks, and that he understood that the risk of “landing on landing surfaces” would include the foam pit where he was injured. He also testified that had he read the release he would have understood its language to mean that he could not sue the gym for any injuries he sustained. Since we review a summary judgment motion [**18] de novo (Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 30), this evidence tends to defeat plaintiff’s ambiguity arguments.
[*P45] III. CONCLUSION
[*P46] For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Du Page County granting the Club’s motion for summary judgment.
[*P47] Affirmed.
Plaintiff cannot assume a risk which is not inherent in the activity or which he does not know.
Posted: July 16, 2018 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Climbing Wall, New York | Tags: amusement, Assumption of risk, assumption of the risk, attraction, Carabiner, Climbing, Climbing Wall, constructive notice, dan-gerous condition, defective condition, failed to meet, festival, Harness, Mobile Climbing Wall, Premises Liability, Summary judgment, worn Leave a commentThe decision lacks any real information on how a carabiner detached from a harness on a mobile climbing wall. However, the decision makes the correct determination on whether the plaintiff assumed the risk under New York law.
Stillman v Mobile Mountain, Inc., 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4124; 2018 NY Slip Op 04149
State: New York, Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Plaintiff: Jacob Stillman
Defendant: Mobile Mountain, Inc.
Plaintiff Claims: negligence
Defendant Defenses: Assumption of the Risk and lack of constructive notice of an alleged defect
Holding: for the Plaintiff
Year: 2018
Summary
This case looks at assumption of risk as a defense, when the risk assumed is not “visible” or known to the injured plaintiff. The plaintiff fell from a mobile climbing wall when the carabiner used in the belay detached. The defense of assumption of risk failed because the risk was concealed or unreasonably enhanced according to the court.
Facts
The defendant set up its mobile climbing wall at the Eden Corn Festival. While climbing the carabiner detached from the harness and the plaintiff fell 18′ to the ground.
The climbing wall amusement attraction included a safety harness worn by the patron and a belay cable system that attached to the harness by use of a carabiner. There is no dispute that the carabiner detached from the safety harness worn by plaintiff, and that plaintiff fell approximately 18 feet to the ground below.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on assumption of the risk and the defendant did not have any notice that the “defective” part of the wall was defective. What part of the wall that was defined as defective was never identified. The trial court denied the defendants motion and the defendant appealed.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
Assumption of the risk in New York is a defense in athletic or recreational activities. If you engage in the activity, you assume the risks that are inherent in the activity.
The doctrine of assumption of the risk operates “as a defense to tort recovery in cases involving certain types of athletic or recreational activities” A person who engages in such an activity “consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation”
However, a plaintiff cannot assume risks that the plaintiff does not know about, that are concealed, or are created due to the reckless or intentional conduct of the defendant.
However, “participants are not deemed to have assumed risks resulting from the reckless or intentional conduct of others, or risks that are concealed or unreasonably enhanced”
However, the analysis the court used to deny the plaintiff’s motion was the defendant failed to prove that falling from a climbing wall was an inherent risk of climbing.
Here, we conclude that the court properly denied that part of defendant’s motion based on assumption of the risk inasmuch as it failed to meet its initial burden of establishing that the risk of falling from the climbing wall is a risk inherent in the use and enjoyment thereof
It seems to be confusing to say the risk of falling off a wall, suspended in the air is not obvious. However, this is a New York decision, which are always brief. Therefore, the statement of the court encompasses the real risk, that the carabiner or part of the system would fail allowing the plaintiff to fall.
More importantly, the plaintiff could not assume the risk of the carabiner failing because it is not an inherent risk of the sport and because there is no way the plaintiff could have known, seen, or discovered the risk.
So Now What?
The decision lacks more information than it provides. How did the carabiner become detached? Carabiners do not fail and there is nothing indicating the carabiner did fail. Consequently, either the carabiner was never attached properly or the plaintiff opened the carabiner.
The decision does follow other decisions like this in all other states. How it is explained is just a little confusing.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Stillman v Mobile Mountain, Inc., 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4124; 2018 NY Slip Op 04149
Posted: July 6, 2018 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Climbing Wall, Legal Case, New York | Tags: amusement, assumption of the risk, attraction, Carabiner, Climbing, Climbing Wall, constructive notice, Dangerous Condition, defective condition, failed to meet, festival, Harness, Mobile Climbing Wall, Premises Liability, Summary judgment, worn Leave a commentStillman v Mobile Mountain, Inc., 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4124; 2018 NY Slip Op 04149
[**1] Jacob Stillman, Plaintiff-Respondent, v Mobile Mountain, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, et al., Defendants.
543 CA 17-01915
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT
2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4124; 2018 NY Slip Op 04149
June 8, 2018, Decided
June 8, 2018, Entered
CORE TERMS: climbing, defective condition, carabiner, festival, harness, constructive notice, failed to meet, dangerous condition, premises liability, summary judgment, attraction, amusement, worn
COUNSEL: [*1] OSBORN, REED & BURKE, LLP, ROCHESTER (JEFFREY P. DIPALMA OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CONNORS LLP, BUFFALO (LAWLOR F. QUINLAN, III, OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
JUDGES: PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, DEJOSEPH, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
OPINION
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Mark J. Grisanti, A.J.), entered March 28, 2017. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that part of the motion of defendant Mobile Mountain, Inc., seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he sustained when he fell from an artificial rock climbing wall amusement attraction owned and operated by Mobile Mountain, Inc. (defendant) at the Eden Corn Festival. Insofar as relevant to this appeal, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it on the grounds that the action is barred by the doctrine of assumption of the risk and, in the alternative, that it lacked constructive notice of any alleged defective condition causing the accident and injuries. Supreme Court denied that part of the motion, [*2] and we affirm.
The climbing wall amusement attraction included a safety harness worn by the patron and a belay cable system that attached to the harness by use of a carabiner. There is no dispute that the carabiner detached from the safety harness worn by plaintiff, and that plaintiff fell approximately 18 feet to the ground below.
The doctrine of assumption of the risk operates “as a defense to tort recovery in cases involving certain types of athletic or recreational activities” (Custodi v Town of Amherst, 20 NY3d 83, 87, 980 N.E.2d 933, 957 N.Y.S.2d 268 [2012]). A person who engages in such an activity “consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation” (Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d 471, 484, 685 N.E.2d 202, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421 [1997]). However, “participants are not deemed to have assumed risks resulting from the reckless or intentional conduct of others, or risks that are concealed or unreasonably enhanced” (Custodi, 20 NY3d at 88). Here, we conclude that the court properly denied that part of defendant’s motion based on assumption of the risk inasmuch as it failed to meet its initial burden of establishing that the risk of falling from the climbing wall is a risk inherent in the use and enjoyment thereof (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324, 501 N.E.2d 572, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923 [1986]).
Defendant further contends that the court [*3] erred in denying that part of its motion based on lack of constructive notice of any alleged defective condition in the carabiner or the climbing wall. We reject that contention. Defendant casts the alleged defective condition as a dangerous condition on the property giving rise to premises liability (see generally Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837-838, 492 N.E.2d 774, 501 N.Y.S.2d 646 [1986]), and it thereafter attempts to establish its lack of liability based upon its lack of constructive notice of that condition (see generally Depczynski v Mermigas, 149 AD3d 1511, 1511-1512, 52 N.Y.S.3d 776 [4th Dept 2017]). Even [**2] assuming, arguendo, that the alleged defective condition constitutes a “dangerous condition on property” (Clifford v Woodlawn Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 31 AD3d 1102, 1103, 818 N.Y.S.2d 715 [4th Dept 2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]), we conclude that defendant failed to establish either its own level of legal interest in the premises or its rights and obligations associated therewith. Indeed, the record is devoid of evidence regarding who owned the real property where the festival was held. Further, although defendant’s president testified at his deposition that defendant had a “contract” to operate the climbing wall at the festival, defendant failed to submit a copy of that contract or to otherwise establish the terms of or the identity of any other party to the alleged contract. We therefore conclude that defendant [*4] failed to meet its burden on that part of its motion based on premises liability (see generally Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 324).
Entered: June 8, 2018
Whitewater rafting release upheld by the Alaska Supreme Court.
Posted: June 25, 2018 Filed under: Alaska, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Whitewater Rafting | Tags: acknowledgment, alert, appendix, Canyon, Climbing, drowning, exculpate, Gym, Inherent Risk, Inherent Risks, insinuate, instructors, Notice, Public Policy, purported, Rafting, reasonable steps, recreational, recreational activity, Release, rock, signature, signing, skilled, Summary judgment, training, trip, unrelated, waive, waived, Warning, Whitewater Leave a commentLanguage in the release stated the defendant would and had done their best to keep people adequate… that language almost voided the release. Don’t put in a release information that can be used against you!
Langlois v. Nova River Runners, Inc., 2018 Alas. LEXIS 31
State: Alaska, Supreme Court of Alaska
Plaintiff: Vanessa L. Langlois, Personal Representative of the Estate of Stephen J. Morton
Defendant: Nova River Runners, Inc.
Plaintiff Claims: Wrongful Death and multiple theories of Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Release
Holding: For the Defendant
Year: 2018
Summary
The deceased died whitewater rafting. Alaska has a six-prong test to determine if a release is valid. Here, the plaintiff argued the release in question failed on every point.
The Alaskan Supreme Court disagreed; however, on a few of the issues, the court struggled to have this release meet the requirements needed.
Facts
The defendant operated whitewater raft trips on Six Mile Creek near Hope, Alaska. The deceased signed a release prior to going rafting. No one could remember if the deceased read both sides of the release, however, ample time was given so the release could have been read.
The release is a 2-sided document. One side is labeled Participants Acknowledgment of Risk. The other side is where the participants acknowledge they have read the release.
The raft trip consists of three canyons. After the first two canyons, the participants are given an opportunity to get off the trip because the third canyon is the hardest. The deceased did not leave the trip. Sometime in the canyon is raft capsized, and the decedent died.
The spouse of the deceased brought his lawsuit on her behalf and as the executor (personal representative) of the estate. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims after the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the release signed by the deceased. The plaintiff appealed.
The decision was heard by the Alaska Supreme Court. Alaska does not have an intermediate appellate court so appeals from the trial court go to the Supreme Court.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
Alaska has a statute, Alaska Statute 09.65.290, that protects recreational defendants from liability from the inherent risks of the activity. The court recognized the statute is weak and stated that business in Alaska must supplement their protection by using a release.
The Alaska Supreme Court decided one prior decision concerning releases Donahue v. Ledgends, Inc., 2014 Alas. LEXIS 153, See Alaskan Supreme Court upholds releases for climbing gym and sets forth requirements on how releases will be upheld in AK. The court relied on its prior decision in Donahue to support its decision here.
In Donahue, the court created a six-part test to test the validity of a release.
…(1) the risk being waived must be specifically and clearly set forth (e.g. death, bodily injury, and property damage); (2) a waiver of negligence must be specifically set forth using the word “negligence”; (3) these factors must be brought home to the releasor in clear, emphasized language . . . ; (4) the release must not violate public policy; (5) if a release seeks to exculpate a defendant from liability for acts of negligence unrelated to inherent risks, the release must suggest an intent to do so; and (6) the release agreement must not represent or insinuate standards of safety or maintenance.
The plaintiff argued the release in this case did not satisfy the requirements set forth in Donahue.
The first argument was the release was not conspicuous and unequivocal because the release was two sided, and the sides did not appear to incorporate or be connected to each other.
The court did not agree with the argument because whether or not it was two different documents and whether or not the deceased read both sides was irrelevant because he signed the document. “We note that Participants in a recreational activity need not read a release for it to be binding if the language of the release is available to them.”
The next argument was different.
The Estate also argues that NOVA’s Release “does not specifically and clearly set forth the risk that the NOVA instructors may have been negligently trained or supervised, or that they may give inadequate warning or instructions.”
The court found that the language in the release was broad enough to cover this claim.
However, the Release covers this risk as well; it indemnifies the “Releasees” in capital letters from liability for injury or death, “whether arising from negligence of the Releasees or otherwise,” and specifically defines “Releasees” to include “employees.”
The court also found that in Donahue,
…we also observed that “[i]t would not be reasonable to conclude that [the defendant] sought a release only of those claims against it that did not involve the acts or omissions of any of its employees.”
The plaintiffs then argued that a release must use the word negligence in it. This is a requirement of many states. Here, however, the argument failed because the release did use the term negligence, several times. The plaintiff’s argued that each time the word negligence was used, it was used in a way that was different from the prior ways so the release was not clear and explicit.
Next the plaintiff’s argued the language was not clear and did not adequately define the activity. The court found this release used capital letters to highlight the clauses waiving negligence, and the negligence clause was not concealed from view.
The clause contained some legalese; however, releases should be read “as a whole” to determine whether or not the language in the release “clearly notify the prospective releasor of the effect of signing the agreement.”
The release was a general release in that it also included release language for glacier hiking and ice climbing. However, the inherent risks outlined in the release were the risks of whitewater rafting. With that risk language, the court found the reader would know they were signing a release.
Based on that language it is obvious the release would fail for ice climbing and glacier hiking?
The plaintiff’s argued the release violated public policy. However, the court outlined Alaska’s definition of public policy in relation to recreation activities.
In evaluating public policy arguments in the context of liability waivers, we have previously considered “[o]f particular relevance . . . the type of service performed and whether the party seeking exculpation has a decisive advantage in bargaining strength because of the essential nature of the service.”25 The type of service likely to inspire additional scrutiny on public policy grounds is “a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public.
A release for recreational activities does not violate public policy in Alaska.
The plaintiffs also argued the “release suggests an intent to exculpate nova from liability for employee negligence.”
The court said, yes it does and that is OK. However, the court also specifically identified weaknesses in the release in this area. However, the weaknesses were not enough to void the release.
Ideally NOVA’s Release would include a more detailed description of the types of negligence it covers, such as “employee negligence” and “negligent training.” But doing so is not a requirement under Donahue. We therefore conclude that the Release suggests an intent to exculpate NOVA from liability for acts of employee negligence.
The plaintiffs also argued the defendants violated their own requirements set forth in the release. The release stated:
“…the concessionaire has taken reasonable steps to provide you with appropriate equipment and/or skilled guides so you can enjoy an activity for which you may not be skilled.”
The court worked around this stating the language before and after this [stupid] section defined the risks of the activity, which should have shown the deceased that no matter what steps taken, there were still risks. The court stated, read as a whole, the release outlined numerous risks of whitewater rafting.
The plaintiff argued a case out of Florida, which also had numerous safety standards the defendant promised to meet and had not, should be controlling here. The court had been struggling through four paragraphs eventually concluded.
NOVA’s Release contains only a single half-sentence, to that effect, adequately disclaimed: “Although the concessionaire has taken reasonable steps to provide you with appropriate equipment and/or skilled guides so you can enjoy an activity for which you may not be skilled, this activity is not without risk. Certain risks cannot be eliminated without destroying the unique character of the activity.” And the release in Kerr was much broader — promising to “try to make the [premises] safe” — than NOVA’s Release, which promises merely that the company takes “reasonable steps to provide . . . appropriate equipment and/or skilled guides” while acknowledging in context that these precautions could not mitigate all the risks posed by a whitewater rafting trip. The Estate’s reliance on Kerr is thus misplaced, and we conclude that the Release does not represent or insinuate standards of safety or maintenance.
The court found the release met all the six requirements needed in Alaska to be a release and upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims.
So Now What?
If your release, and I hope, it does, covers more than one page, make sure the pages connect or relate to each other. First, if on just one piece of paper, at the bottom of each page put in the footer, “Please Read Other Side.” If the release is more than two pages, besides the admonition to read the other side include page numbers on the document.
Write the document so it flows. You don’t have to have a heading at the top of each page. The two different headings in this case raised the argument it was two separate and unrelated documents. If the document were two different documents, then the first page should have had a signature line also, which is what the plaintiff argued. With no signature line, the first page of the document was a separate document and could not be held against the deceased.
If the writing flows, the paragraph or idea continues on the next page, then this would have been a non-issue.
Next you have to write your release to cover not only could happen but will happen, and it is all tied back to your employees. Always protect your employees and write the release broadly so it covers all the possible actions or acts an employee could take that may lead to a claim.
Never create in your release in a way for the plaintiff to sue you. Never make promises, never say you operate at a level, never say you use the best or even adequate anything. That language in this release almost was enough to defeat the release, and it was obvious the court struggled to find a very weak argument to beat this part of the plaintiff’s claims.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
Copyright 2018 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529
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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
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NY determines that falling off a wall is a risk that is inherent in the sport. Plaintiff argued it wasn’t???
Posted: February 12, 2018 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Climbing Wall, New York | Tags: Affirmation, assump-tion of risk, assumption of the risk, Bouldering, Bouldering Wall, CGA, Climb, climbed, climber, Climbing, Climbing Gym, Climbing Gym Association, Falling, false sense of security, feet, gym's, Harness, height, Indoor, Inherent Risk, instructor, mat, opined, Orientation, Padding, quotation, reply, rock, roommate, rope, skill, Sport, Spotter, spotting, Standards, Summary judgment, top, Trade association Leave a commentPlaintiff also argued the standards of the trade association created a legal liability on the part of the defendant. Trade association standards come back to haunt the business the standards were created to protect.
Ho v Steep Rock Bouldering, LLC, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 32; 2018 NY Slip Op 30006(U)
State: New York: Supreme Court of New York, New York County
Plaintiff: Min-Sun Ho
Defendant: Steep Rock Bouldering, LLC
Plaintiff Claims: negligence
Defendant Defenses: Assumption of the Risk (although a release was signed it was not raised as a defense)
Holding: For the Defendant
Year: 2018
Summary
This case borders on the absurd because of the plaintiff’s claims and the statements of the plaintiff’s expert.
At the same time, this case borders on the scary because the standards of the trade association were used effectively to put a big dent in the defendant’s defenses.
It came down to simple logic. If you are ten to twelve feet off the ground is there an inherent risk that you could fall? Because it was to the court, the Plaintiff assumed the risk of her injuries, and her case was dismissed.
Facts
The plaintiff took a climbing class as a student in high school. Over a decade later, she signed up online to go bouldering at the defendant’s bouldering facility. She also checked out the defendant’s Facebook page.
She and her roommate went to the gym. At the gym, she realized that this was different from the climbing she had done in high school. She signed an electronic release, which she did not read. She also was questioned by an employee of the gym about her previous climbing experience. When talking with the employee she did not ask any questions.
She started bouldering and understood the grade system of what she was climbing. She had climbed once or twice to the top of the route she chose and down climbed or jumped after coming half-way down.
On her third or fourth climb, she was a few feet from the top of the wall when she fell. She landed on her right arm, tearing ligaments and breaking a bone which required surgery.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The decision first goes through the deposition testimony of the manager or the bouldering gym. The testimony was fairly straight forward, even talking about rules the gym had were not covered.
The next discussion was over the plaintiff’s expert witness. I’m just going to quote the decision.
After his review, Dr. Nussbaum opined that Plaintiff should have been provided with the following: a harness, a rope, or some similar safety device; a spotter; an orientation; and an introductory lesson. Dr. Nussbaum opined further that the only time a harness or similar device is not required is “when the wall is low, less than 8 feet[,] and where it is angled so that a [climber] cannot fall directly down[,] but simply slides down the angled wall. Here, the wall was high and not angled, and therefore the safety devices including the harness and rope are required.”
The plaintiff probably would not have fallen off a V1 on a slanted wall, if you can call a slanted wall a V1 or V2. More importantly with holds on the wall you would have not slid off, you have bounced off the holds as you slid down.
Dr. Nussbaum opined further that the reading Steep Rock Bouldering waiver form, which Plaintiff did not, would not mean that the reader understands or assumes the risk. Dr. Nussbaum opined further that the padding “likely” gave Plaintiff a “false sense of security” and “no appreciation of the risk here.”
Judges are responsible of interpreting the law in litigation. An opinion by an expert on a contract would not be allowed into evidence. More importantly, nothing in the background of the expert indicates any training or experience in what someone like the plaintiff would understand in reading a contract.
However, then it circled back around to industry practices. The plaintiff’s expert:
…cited to the Climbing Wall Association’s (“CWA”) Industry Practices § 4.06 and opined further that Defendant’s gym should have provided “a thorough orientation to bouldering and how to mitigate the risk of predictable falls” per the CWA guidelines.
Citing to CWA’s Industry Practices § 4.01, Dr. Nussbaum opined further:
“[Plaintiff’s] ‘level of qualification or access to the climbing should [have been] checked upon entering and prior to climbing in the facility.’ In the absence of demonstrated proficiency in climbing, [Plaintiff] should have been ‘supervised by staff or a qualified climbing partner, or her access to the facility must [have] be[en] limited accordingly.’ In the case at hand, there was a cursory transition from the street into the gym and the commencement of climbing. [Plaintiff] was simply asked if she had previous climbing-experience and essentially told ‘here’s the wall, have at it.'”
Citing to CWA’s Industry Practices § 4.02, Dr. Nussbaum opined further:
“[T]he climbing gym staff should [have] utilize[d] a screening process before allowing potential clients to access the climbing wall/facility. The purpose of the screening is to determine the ‘new client’s ability to climb in the facility’ and ‘to assess the client’s prior climbing experience, knowledge and skills (if any).’ [Plaintiff] was not asked about how long she had been climbing, whether or not she had experience at a climbing gym or facility, how often or how recently she had climbed, and/or the type of climbing she had done. She was not asked if she had knowledge of or experience bouldering. Again, she was simply asked if she had prior climbing experience, reflecting a wholly inadequate screening process.”
The Defendant’s expert did a great job of countering the claims made by the plaintiff’s expert. However, it is difficult to argue the language of a trade association is meant to mean something else when quoted by the plaintiff’s expert.
The court looked at the issue focusing on one main point. Did the plaintiff know and appreciate the risks of falling? This seems absurd to me. One of the basic fears that I think everyone has is a fear of falling. How it manifests itself may be different in different people, but everyone is afraid of falling.
The plaintiff in her testimony and the testimony of the expert witness made this the central point of the litigation and one the court had a difficult time reaching a conclusion on.
The court first looked at the assumption of risk doctrine in New York.
“Under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, a person who voluntarily participates in a sporting activity generally consents, by his or her participation, to those injury-causing events, conditions, and risks which are inherent in the activity.”
I cannot believe that when you are ten feet from the ground, there is not some form of awareness of the risk of falling.
The court then looked at the necessary elements of risk to determine what was inherent in a sport and what that means to the plaintiff and defendant.
“Risks inherent in a sporting activity are those which are known, apparent, natural, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the participation.” However, “[s]ome of the restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete onto the playing field. Thus, the rule is qualified to the extent that participants do not consent to acts which are reckless or intentional.” “[I]n assessing whether a defendant has violated a duty of care within the genre of tort-sports activities and their inherent risks, the applicable standard should include whether the conditions caused by the defendants’ negligence are unique and created a dangerous condition over and above the usual dangers that are inherent in the sport.” In assessing whether a plaintiff had the appropriate awareness to assume the subject risk, such “awareness of risk is not to be determined in a vacuum. It is, rather, to be assessed against the background of the skill and experience of the particular plaintiff.”
Boiled down, when you assume the risks of a sport or recreational activity:
In assuming a risk, Plaintiff has “given his consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone.”
The court was then able to find that the plaintiff had assumed the risk.
The Court finds that injury from falling is a commonly appreciable risk of climbing–with or without harnesses, ropes, or other safety gear–and that Plaintiff assumed this risk when she knowingly and voluntarily climbed Defendant’s gym’s climbing wall for the third or fourth time when she fell. To hold that Defendant could be liable for Plaintiff’s injuries because it allowed her to climb its wall without a rope and harness would effectively make the sport of bouldering illegal in this state.
However, what an agonizing intense effort for the courts to come to what seems to be a fairly simple conclusion. When you are standing 10′ in the air, do you feel apprehension about falling off. If you do and you stay there you assume the risk of falling I think.
So Now What?
I’ve written before about how easy it is to write about New York decisions. They are short and quick. One or two pages. This decision is fifteen pages long, an unbelievable long decision in New York. An unbelievable long decision for what I believe to be an extremely simple and basic concept. Did the plaintiff understand she could get hurt if she fell from the wall?
Yet the plaintiff made the court work hard to decide she assumed the risk. The plaintiff made an argument that the court found compelling enough to take 15 pages to determine if are 10′ in the air are you apprehensive.
There are several take a ways from this decision.
The decision indicates the plaintiff signed a release electronically. However, it was never raised as a defense. Probably because of New York General Obligations Law § 5-326. This law states releases are not valid at places of amusement. There has been one decision in New York were a release for a climbing wall injury was upheld; however, the court specifically distinguished that issues saying the climbing wall was for educational purposes since it was at a university and not a recreational situation. Read Lemoine v Cornell University, 2 A.D.3d 1017; 769 N.Y.S.2d 313; 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13209 (NY 2003).
The industry standards came back to play a role in the decision. There are dozens of arguments in favor of an industry creating standards. There is one argument on why they should not be made. Plaintiff’s use them to attack the people the standards were meant to protect.
No matter how many reasons why it might be a good thing; it fails in all of those reasons when it is used in court to beat a defendant over the head and prove they were wrong. A piece of paper, written by members of the industry, with the industry logo and name on it is proof to any juror that this is the way it must be done. If not, why would the piece of paper be written? Why would the industry and everyone else take the time and energy to create the rule, print it and hand out if that was the way it was supposed to be done.
So, then it is left up to the defense expert to find a way to prove that the piece of paper is wrong. That is impossible in 99% of the cases. As a member of the association, as a person who helped make the piece of paper, you are now saying what you did was wrong? It is not going to fly.
Here the defendant’s expert could not. So, he did not, his opinion walked all around the issue but did not bring up the standards that the plaintiff through at the court. Granted, the plaintiff had taken the standards and twisted them and their meaning in an attempt to apply them to this case, in a way that they were not meant to be. However, it is difficult to say to a judge or juror the plaintiff’s expert twisted the standards, and they don’t mean that. Of course, that is what the judge and jury would expert.
Thankfully, the defendant’s expert was great and just refused to take on the plaintiff’s expert and the far-out statements he made.
Here the plaintiff used the industry standards in an attempt to prove the defendant had breached its duty of care to the plaintiff. Here the name had been changed by the association over the years to lessen their impact and damage in a courtroom from standards to practices. However, they were still used to bludgeon the defendant who had probably paid to help create them.
Standards do not create value in a courtroom for defendants. You cannot say we did everything right, see read this and throw the standards at the judge and jury. However, we all need to learn from our mistakes, and we need ideas on how to get better. Besides there is always more than one way to do everything.
Create ideas, best practices, anything that allows different ways of doing things so the plaintiff cannot nail you down to one thing you did wrong. The simple example is there is no one way to belay. Yet standards for various industries have superficially set forth various ways over the years you “must” belay. Body belays went out decades ago with the introduction of belay devices. Yet when your lead is on a precarious move, and the piece below him might not be able to take the full weight of a fall, a body belay works because it helps absorb the energy and spread the belay over time putting less pressure on the pro.
There is no magic solution to everything and spending hours and dollars trying to tell the world, there is, will only come back to haunt you.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
Copyright 2017 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law
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Ho v Steep Rock Bouldering, LLC, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 32; 2018 NY Slip Op 30006(U)
Posted: February 10, 2018 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Climbing Wall, Legal Case, New York | Tags: Affirmation, Assumption of risk, assumption of the risk, Bouldering, Bouldering Wall, Climb, climbed, climber, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Falling, false sense of security, feet, gym's, Harness, height, Indoor, Inherent Risk, instructor, mat, opined, Orientation, Padding, quotation, reply, rock, roommate, rope, skill, Sport, Spotter, spotting, Summary judgment, top Leave a commentHo v Steep Rock Bouldering, LLC, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 32; 2018 NY Slip Op 30006(U)
[**1] Min-Sun Ho, Plaintiff, – v – Steep Rock Bouldering, LLC, Defendant. INDEX NO. 150074/2016
150074/2016
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY
2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 32; 2018 NY Slip Op 30006(U)
January 2, 2018, Decided
NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE PRINTED OFFICIAL REPORTS.
CORE TERMS: climbing, bouldering, rock, gym’s, rope, harness, spotter, opined, climb, climber, falling, affirmation, feet, mat, climbed, sport, orientation, roommate, height, summary judgment, top, spotting, assumption of risk, instructor, padding, false sense of security, indoor, reply, quotation, skill
JUDGES: [*1] PRESENT: Hon. Robert D. KALISH, Justice.
OPINION BY: Robert D. KALISH
OPINION
Motion by Defendant Steep Rock Bouldering, LLC pursuant to CPLR 3212 for an order granting summary judgment against Plaintiff Min-Sun Ho is granted.
BACKGROUND
I. Overview
Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for injuries she sustained on October 12, 2015, while at Defendant’s bouldering gym, Steep Rock Bouldering. Plaintiff alleges, in sum and substance, that, due to the negligence of Defendant, she fell from Defendant’s gym’s indoor climbing wall and landed on her right arm, tearing ligaments and breaking a bone in the arm and elbow area, which required surgery. Defendant argues, in sum and substance, that Plaintiff assumed the risk of injury from a fall at its gym and that its gym provided an appropriate level of safety and protection for boulderers through warnings, notices, an orientation, equipment, and the nature of the climbing wall itself. As such, Defendant argues it had no further duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues, in sum and substance, that she did not assume the risk of an injury from falling off of the climbing wall.
[**2] II. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced the instant action against Defendant on January 5, 2016, [*2] by e-filing a summons and a complaint alleging a negligence cause of action. (Goldstein affirmation, exhibit A.) Defendant answered on March 28, 2016, denying all the allegations in the complaint and asserting 21 affirmative defenses, including Plaintiff’s assumption of the risk. (Goldstein affirmation, exhibit B.)
The examination before trial (“EBT”) of Plaintiff was held on February 14, 2017. (Goldstein affirmation, exhibit E [Ho EBT].) The EBT of Defendant, taken of witness Vivian Kalea (“Kalea”), was held on February 23, 2017. (Goldstein affirmation, exhibit F [Kalea EBT].) Plaintiff provided Defendant with her liability expert’s disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) on or about March 27, 2017. (Goldstein affirmation, exhibit G.) Plaintiff filed the note of issue in this action on May 4, 2017. (Goldstein affirmation, exhibit J.)
On or about May 25, 2017, Defendant moved to strike Plaintiff’s note of issue. On or about May 30, 2017, Plaintiff cross-moved to preclude certain expert and medical testimony from Defendant at trial due to Defendant’s alleged failure to provide timely disclosures. Defendant provided Plaintiff with its liability expert’s disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) on or about June 16, 2017. [*3] (Goldstein affirmation, exhibit H.) On June 29, 2017, Defendant noticed the instant motion On July 14, 2017, this Court ordered Defendant’s motion to strike and Plaintiff’s cross motion to preclude withdrawn per the parties’ stipulation, dated July 6, 2017.
Defendant now moves for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting it summary judgment and dismissing this action with prejudice.
III. Plaintiff’s EBT
Plaintiff Min-Sun Ho stated that she and her roommate intended to climb the indoor wall at Steep Rock Bouldering on October 12, 2015. (Ho EBT at 12, lines 17-23.) Plaintiff further stated that her roommate had joined Defendant’s gym several weeks prior to October 12, 2015. (Id. at 13, lines 12-13; at 14, lines 2-3, 13-25.) Plaintiff further stated that, prior to October 12, 2015, in high school, she took a rock climbing class once a week for a semester. (Id. at 15, lines 16-25.) Now in her thirties, Plaintiff stated that she was able to recall the class, the basic commands for climbing, and the techniques for climbing. (Id. at 20, lines 5-2.1; at 22, lines 17-21.)
[**3] Plaintiff stated that, on October 12, 2015, she looked up Defendant’s gym’s Facebook page and observed people climbing at Steep Rock Bouldering without ropes or harnesses. [*4] (Id. at 27, lines 7-11; at 29, lines 15-20.) Plaintiff further stated that she then signed up online for a one-month membership at Steep Rock Bouldering. (Id. at 28, lines 15-20.) Plaintiff further stated that she had also heard from her roommate, before October 12, 2015, that there were no harnesses or ropes at Steep Rock Bouldering. (Id. at 30, lines 6-13.) Plaintiff further stated that, on October 12, 2015, Plaintiff’s roommate again explained that Defendant’s gym does not have harnesses or ropes. (Id. at 29, line 25; at 30, lines 2-5.) Plaintiff stated she was not aware, prior to October 12, 2015, that the term “bouldering” refers to a form of rock climbing without harnesses or ropes. (Id. at 85, lines 2-7.)
Plaintiff stated that, upon arriving at Steep Rock Bouldering on October 12, 2015, she observed a reception desk and a climbing wall to her left where she saw more than three people climbing. (Id. at 31, lines 17-23; at 32, line 25; at 33, lines 2-3.) Plaintiff further stated that she believed the climbing wall was about 15 feet tall. (Id. at 32, lines 4-20.) Plaintiff further stated that the receptionist asked if Plaintiff had rock climbed before and that she answered that she had, a long time ago. (Id. at 47, lines 2-8.) Plaintiff stated she signed [*5] an electronic waiver form at the reception desk. Plaintiff, at the time of the EBT, stated she did not recall having read any of the waiver except for the signature line. (Id. at 43, lines 11-19.)
Plaintiff stated that, after signing the waiver, she waited while the receptionist called a man over to Plaintiff and her roommate. Plaintiff stated she herself believed the man who came over was another Steep Rock Bouldering employee. (Id. at 45, lines 10-25; at 46, lines 2-4.) Plaintiff stated’ that the man told Plaintiff “something along the lines of that’s the wall as you can see, it’s self-explanatory.'” (Id. at 46, lines 11-12.) Plaintiff further stated that the man also told her “[t]hose are the bathrooms.” (Id. at 49, lines 2-3.) Plaintiff further stated that the man asked her if she had rock climbed before and that she answered “yeah, a while ago.” (Id. at 49, lines 7-10.) Plaintiff stated that the man did not say he was an instructor or take Plaintiff anywhere and that neither the man nor the receptionist said anything about an instructor. Plaintiff further stated that she did not have an orientation or an instructor at Defendant’s gym. (Id. at 47, lines 15-23; at 48, lines 21-25.) Plaintiff further stated she that did not see any instructional [*6] videos. (Id. at 80, lines 19-22.) Plaintiff further stated that she had felt comfortable not having an instructor and climbing the walls without any harnesses or ropes. (Id. at 81, lines 17-22.)
[**4] Plaintiff stated that, after speaking with the man, she changed into climbing shoes which she stated she recalled borrowing from Steep Rock Bouldering. (Id. at 48, lines 5-20.) Plaintiff further stated that she then put her and her roommate’s belongings away in a cubby and started getting ready to climb. (Id. at 49, lines 13-18.) Plaintiff stated that she had observed mats in front of the climbing wall on the floor. (Id. at 49, lines 19-24.) Plaintiff stated that she had further observed “quite a few” people who she thought were other climbers and their friends climbing the wall or watching and giving tips on holds. (Id. at 50, lines 5-21; at 55, lines 6-10.)
Plaintiff stated she was told before she started climbing that the holds on the climbing wall are tagged according to their difficulty and that the levels of difficulty marked “V0 or V1” are the “easiest.” (Id. at 54, lines 2-20.) Plaintiff further stated that, after waiting a few minutes, she herself climbed to the top of the climbing wall on level V1 on her first attempt. (Id. at 55, lines 16-19, 24-25; at [*7] 56, lines 2-9.) Plaintiff further stated that she did not think it took very long to make the climb. (Id. at 56, lines 10-11.) Plaintiff stated she and her roommate took turns climbing the wall. (Id. at 63, lines 12-16.) Plaintiff further stated that, while she herself was climbing, her roommate was on the mat watching her climb. (Id. at 63, lines 17- 22.) Plaintiff stated that she herself climbed again once or twice without incident. (Id. at 56, lines 16-19; at 57, lines 18-21.) Plaintiff stated that, on her third or fourth climb, she herself had made it about a couple of feet from the top of the wall before she fell. (Id. at 57, lines 3-10, 15-25; at 58, lines 2-9.) Plaintiff stated that her roommate was watching her when she fell. (Id. at 63, line 22.)
Plaintiff stated that she had not fallen from a climbing wall prior to October 12, 2015. (Id. at 59, lines 2-7.) Plaintiff further stated she did not think she could fall, nor did she think about falling, when she bought her membership, when she first saw the wall when she entered the building, or when she first started climbing. (Id. at 59, lines 13-25; at 60, lines 2-8, 17-19.) Plaintiff further stated that did not see anyone else fall at Steep Rock Bouldering prior to her own fall, but did see people [*8] jumping down from “[s]omewhere above the middle” and “closer to the top” of the climbing wall instead of climbing down. (Id. at 60, lines 9-16.)
Plaintiff stated she herself climbed down the wall after her first climb, but then became more “confident” and climbed down halfway and then jumped in subsequent successful climbs. (Id. at 60, lines 22-25; at 61, lines 2-6.) Plaintiff further stated that, immediately before she fell, she was climbing up the wall and reaching to the side. (Id. at 61, lines 7-13.) Plaintiff further stated that she then grabbed onto a knob, looked down, and saw a man looking up at her. (Id. at 62, [**5] lines 2-7.) Plaintiff was asked at the EBT “[w]hen you looked down, did you think about falling or if you could fall?” In reply, Plaintiff stated “I was a little scared. When I looked down, I was a lot higher than I thought I was.” (Id. at 62, lines 12-15.) Plaintiff stated that she had wanted to come back down at this time. (Id. at 62, lines 24-25; at 63, lines 2-4.) Plaintiff further stated that she fell after she saw the man looking up at her. (Id. at 62, line 8.) Plaintiff was asked at the EBT “[d]o you know why you fell?” and answered, “I don’t know exactly.” (Id. at 62, lines 5-6.)
IV. Defendant’s EBT
Vivian Kalea stated that, at the [*9] time of her EBT, she was the general manager of Steep Rock Bouldering. (Kalea EBT at 6, lines 4-7.) Kalea further stated that, on October 12, 2015, she was a closing manager and youth team coach at Steep Rock Bouldering. (Id. at 6, lines 8-12.)
Kalea stated that she was at Steep Rock Bouldering when Plaintiff was injured and filled out the related injury report form. (Id. at 13, lines 19-21.) Kalea stated that the injury report indicated that Plaintiff was a member of Steep Rock Bouldering and had paid a fee to use the gym prior to her injury. (Id. at 16, lines 12-13.) Kalea stated that the injury report further indicated that Plaintiff fell from a yellow V1 level of difficulty, about three moves from the top, and landed on her right side. (Id. at 19, lines 6-9; at 31, lines 15-21; at 34, line 25.)
Kalea stated that V1 is a beginner’s level of difficulty. (Id. at 34, lines 13-15.) Kalea further stated that, the higher the number is after the “V,” the greater the level of difficulty. Kalea stated that the “V” designation is not a description of a specific height or location. (Id. at 33, lines 9-14.) Kalea further stated that V2 is also a beginner’s level. (Id. at 33, lines 23-25, at 34, lines 2-4.) Kalea further stated that the wall Plaintiff was on had a “slight incline” but was “mostly [*10] vertical” and “[c]lose to 90 degrees. (Id. at 41, lines 11-25; at 42, lines 2-4.)
Kalea stated that Steep Rock Bouldering offered climbing shoe rentals and chalk for climbers on October 12, 2015. (Id. at 9, lines 20-21; at 10, line 14.) Kalea further stated that the climbing shoes provide support for climbing activities by improving friction and power to the big toe and that the chalk gives the climbers a better grip on whatever it is they are holding onto. (Id. at 21, lines 18-25; at 22, lines 2-25; at 23, lines 2-A.) Kalea further stated that the padded area in front of the climbing wall was over a foot thick on October 12, 2015, and was there to help absorb the shock from a fall. (Id. at 23, lines 5-18.) Kalea further stated that a [**6] spotter, “somebody who guides a climber to fall down,” was not required at Steep Rock Bouldering on October 12, 2015. (Id. at 49, lines 19-25.)
Kalea stated that the climbing walls at Steep Rock Bouldering are 14 feet high and that the holds do not all go to the top. (Id. at 24, lines 17-19.) Kalea further stated that the holds are of different textures, sizes, and appearances and that their locations can be changed to create varying paths up the wall and establish the difficulty of a given level. (Id. at 24, lines [*11] 16-25; at 25, lines 2-17; at 29, lines 2-5.) Kalea further stated that climbers at Steep Rock Bouldering do not climb with ropes or harnesses. (Id. at 40, line 25; at 41, line 2.)
Kalea stated that Steep Rock Bouldering employees ask whether it is a new member’s first time bouldering “to clarify that they understand the risk of bouldering.” (Id. at 21, lines 13-17.) Kalea further stated that every climber is supposed to receive an oral safety orientation from Steep Rock Bouldering staff prior to climbing that consists of the following:
“It consists of understanding the person’s climbing experience, their experience bouldering. That they understand that bouldering is a dangerous sport. How every fall in a bouldering environment is a ground fall. It goes over how the climbs are kind of situated, so everything is by color and numbers. It goes over that we do encourage down climbing in the facility. So that means when you reach the top of the problem, which is not necessarily the top of the wall, but the finishing hold, you climb down about halfway before you jump, if you do want to jump. It goes over how to best fall.”
(Id. at 46, lines 2-24; at 47, lines 3-16.) Kalea stated that the giving such an orientation is [*12] standard in the climbing industry and was required at Steep Rock Bouldering on October 12, 2015. (Id. at 48, lines 3-10.) Kalea further stated that “[i]t is made clear to everyone who walks in the door that they are going to receive a safety orientation” and that staffs failure to do so would be breaking Steep Rock Bouldering’s rules. (Id. at 48, lines 17-21.) Kalea was asked at the EBT to assume that Plaintiff was told “essentially . . . there is the wall, it’s self explanatory [sic] and that’s all the person did” and was then asked “[i]f that is all that was said, is that a proper safety instruction orientation?” (Id. at 49, lines 3-17.) Kalea replied, “[i]t is not.”
[**7] V. Plaintiff’s Liability Expert
Plaintiff retained Dr. Gary G. Nussbaum as its liability expert. Dr. Nussbaum has a Masters of Education and an Education Doctorate in Recreation and Leisure Studies from Temple University. Dr. Nussbaum has 45 years of experience in the adventure education, recreation, and climbing field with a variety of teaching credentials related specifically to climbing. In forming his opinion, Dr. Nussbaum reviewed photographs of the climbing wall used by Plaintiff on the date of her injury, the injury report, the waiver form, [*13] and the EBT transcripts.
After his review, Dr. Nussbaum opined that Plaintiff should have been provided with the following: a harness, a rope, or some similar safety device; a spotter; an orientation; and an introductory lesson. Dr. Nussbaum opined further that the only time a harness or similar device is not required is “when the wall is low, less than 8 feet[,] and where it is angled so that a [climber] cannot fall directly down[,] but simply slides down the angled wall. Here, the wall was high and not angled, and therefore the safety devices including the harness and rope are required.” (Broome affirmation, exhibit 1 [aff of Nussbaum], at 3.)
Dr. Nussbaum opined that a person of Plaintiff’s skill level was a novice and needed to be taught “how to climb, how to come down, and even how to fall safely. None of this was done or provided.” (Id. at 4.) Dr. Nussbaum opined further that “[a]s a new climber, [Plaintiff] did not appreciate the risk” involved with bouldering. (Id.) Dr. Nussbaum opined further that the reading Steep Rock Bouldering waiver form, which Plaintiff did not, would not mean that the reader understands or assumes the risk. (Id.) Dr. Nussbaum opined further that the padding “likely” [*14] gave Plaintiff a “false sense of security” and “no appreciation of the risk here.” (Id.)
Dr. Nussbaum opined that, because Steep Rock Bouldering does not offer rope climbing, its climbing wall requires that the climber “climb down, climb partway down and jump the remainder, fall down in a controlled manner, or simply fall down if he or she loses control.” (Id. at 5.) Dr. Nussbaum cited to the Climbing Wall Association’s (“CWA”) Industry Practices § 4.06 and opined further that Defendant’s gym should have provided “a thorough orientation to bouldering and how to mitigate the risk of predictable falls” per the CWA guidelines. (Id.)
[**8] Citing to CWA’s Industry Practices § 4.01, Dr. Nussbaum opined further:
“[Plaintiff’s] ‘level of qualification or access to the climbing should [have been] checked upon entering and prior to climbing in the facility.’ In the absence of demonstrated proficiency in climbing, [Plaintiff] should have been ‘supervised by staff or a qualified climbing partner, or her access to the facility must [have] be[en] limited accordingly.’ In the case at hand, there was a cursory transition from the street into the gym and the commencement of climbing. [Plaintiff] was simply asked if she had previous [*15] climbing-experience and essentially told ‘here’s the wall, have at it.'”
(Id. at 6.)
Citing to CWA’s Industry Practices § 4.02, Dr. Nussbaum opined further:
“[T]he climbing gym staff should [have] utilize[d] a screening process before allowing potential clients to access the climbing wall/facility. The purpose of the screening is to determine the ‘new client’s ability to climb in the facility’ and ‘to assess the client’s prior climbing experience, knowledge and skills (if any).’ [Plaintiff] was not asked about how long she had been climbing, whether or not she had experience at a climbing gym or facility, how often or how recently she had climbed, and/or the type of climbing she had done. She was not asked if she had knowledge of or experience bouldering. Again, she was simply asked if she had prior climbing experience, reflecting a wholly inadequate screening process.”
(Id.)
Dr. Nussbaum opined that spotting is an advanced skill requiring training for the spotter to spot effectively and safely. As such, Dr. Nussbaum stated, Plaintiff’s roommate “was not a spotter and had no skill and no training to be one.” (Id. at 3.) Dr. Nussbaum opined further that Steep Rock Bouldering was required to enforce its spotter [*16] requirement by providing an adequately skilled spotter or ensuring that an intended spotter has the requisite skill set. (Id. at 5.) Dr. Nussbaum opined further that, if Steep Rock Bouldering chooses not to require spotting, it is then required to “emphasize, encourage and instruct in the safest ways to descend, including falling [**9] techniques. . . . [It] did not enforce its spotting requirement nor [sic] provide proper instruction in falling techniques.” (Id. at 7.)
VI. Defendant’s Liability Expert
Defendant retained Dr. Robert W. Richards as its liability expert. Dr. Richards is a founding member of the CWA and is currently affiliated with CWA as an expert in risk management. Dr. Richards has been involved in the climbing wall industry since 1992. Dr. Richards stated that, as there are no set regulations for climbing facilities, the CWA intends to assist the industry in defining, understanding, and implementing a set of responsible management, operational, training, and climbing practices. (Goldstein affirmation, exhibit I [aff of Richards], ¶ 2.) Dr. Richards further stated that the CWA’s Industry Practices is a sourcebook for the operation of manufactured climbing walls. (Id. ¶ 3.)
In forming his opinion, [*17] Dr. Richards performed a site inspection of Steep Rock Bouldering’s climbing wall on June 22, 2017. (Id. ¶ 20.) Dr. Richards observed at the site inspection that Defendant’s gym had “Climb Smart” posters, indicating the risks of bouldering, displayed in multiple locations. Dr. Richards stated that these signs were also present on October 12, 2015. (Id.) Dr. Richards observed further that the climbing wall is approximately thirteen feet, six inches tall when measured from the top of the padded area around the wall. (Id. ¶ 30:) Dr. Richards stated that this was also the height of the wall on October 12, 2015. (Id.)
Dr. Richards describes the sport of bouldering as follows:
“Bouldering is the form of climbing that is performed without the use of safety ropes and typically on a climbing surface that is low enough in height that a fall from the wall will not be fatal. Bouldering walls in climbing gyms may range from ten to twenty feet in height. The [CWA] states that average bouldering wall heights in the climbing wall industry are between twelve and fifteen feet. Climbers who boulder are referred to as boulderers . . . .”
(Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Dr. Richards stated “[a] specific climb is referred [*18] to as a . . . ‘problem’ and is usually marked with colored tape or colored holds which are attached to the artificial climbing wall.” (Id. ¶ 7 [punctuation omitted].)
[**10] Dr. Richards opined that bouldering entails an inherent risk of injury from falls. (Id. ¶ 4.) Dr. Richards opined further that it is not possible to eliminate this risk “without altering the very essence of the sport.” (Id.) Dr. Richards opined further that the most common injuries in climbing gyms are to the extremities which can result from falls of any height. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Dr. Richards opined further that the risk inherent to bouldering was communicated to Plaintiff by means of a written liability release and an orientation. (Id. ¶ 17.) Dr. Richards stated that Plaintiff signed a liability release form and completed an orientation. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 31.) Dr. Richards stated further that the liability release form included the following language: “I have examined the climbing wall and have full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risks associated with rock climbing and the use of the climbing wall, including but not limited to: [injuries] resulting from falling off or coming down from the climbing wall . . . .” (Id. ¶ [*19] 17.)
Dr. Richards opined further that, having visited approximately “200 gyms” since 1992, he has never been to a gym that requires climbers to have spotters and strictly enforces that requirement. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 22-23.) Dr. Richards stated that spotting was developed for outdoor bouldering to guide the fall of boulderers in an environment where there are typically little or no padded surfaces to protect the head. (Id. ¶ 24.) Dr. Richards stated that the CWA does not require spotters when bouldering on artificial climbing walls and that it is not a common practice in the industry to require such spotters. (Id. ¶ 25.) Dr. Richards further stated that the padded landing surfaces in gyms reduce many of those dangers that a spotter would help to mitigate outdoors. (Id.) Dr. Richards opined that, as such, use of a spotter in an indoor climbing gym is of “limited benefit” and “may cause injury to the boulderer and spotter if the climber were to fall directly on the spotter.” (Id.)
Dr. Richards opined further that the purpose of Defendant gym’s padded landing surface around its climbing wall is “to mitigate potential injuries to the head and neck.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Dr. Richards opined further that, [*20] while the padding may “provide some cushioning for falls,” per Annex E to the CWA’s Industry Practices, “[p]ads are not designed to mitigate or limit extremity injuries, although they may do so.” (Id.) Dr. Richards stated that, while there was no industry standard regarding the type, amount, or use of such padding in October 2015, a typical surface in October 2015 would have “consisted of four to six inches of foam padding or other impact attenuation [**11] material with a top layer of gymnastic carpet or vinyl that covers the underlying padding.” (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Dr. Richards further stated that Defendant’s gym used foam pads of a twelve-inch depth that ran continuously along the climbing wall and extended twelve feet out from the wall on October 12, 2015. (Id. ¶ 29.)
ARGUMENT
I. Defendant’s Affirmation in Support
Defendant alleges in its papers that it has a place of business that includes a bouldering climbing gym in New York City on Lexington Avenue. (Affirmation of Goldstein ¶ 14.) Defendant further alleges that its gym has a continuous climbing wall that is approximately 30 to 40 feet wide and 14 feet tall and has climbing holds which are textured objects bolted into the wall which climbers [*21] can grab onto with their hands and stand upon with their feet. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 16.)
Defendant argues, in the main, that Plaintiff assumed the inherent risk associated with climbing an indoor wall and with bouldering when she chose to climb Defendant’s gym’s bouldering wall. (Memorandum of law of Goldstein, at 1.) Defendant argues Plaintiff was able to make an informed estimate of the risks involved in bouldering and that she willingly undertook them. (Id. at 3-4.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff was aware of the potential for injury from a fall because she is an intelligent adult familiar with the laws of gravity and had prior wall climbing experience in an indoor setting (albeit with ropes). (Id. at 4.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff was aware of the risks associated with climbing because, before she was injured, Plaintiff watched other climbers ascend and descend its climbing wall and climbed up and down the wall herself without incident several times, even feeling comfortable enough to jump from halfway down the wall as opposed to climbing all the way down. (Id. at 8-9.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly engaged in the bouldering activity and that her fall was a common, albeit [*22] unfortunate, occurrence. (Id. at 10.)
Defendant argues that falling is inherent to the sport of climbing, that falling cannot be eliminated without destroying the sport, and that injuries resulting from falling from a climbing wall are foreseeable consequences inherent to bouldering. (Id.) Defendant further argues that the risk of falling from Defendant’s gym’s climbing wall was open and obvious to Plaintiff. (Id. at 5.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff did not request further instruction beyond what Steep Rock [**12] Bouldering provided on October 12, 2015, and that Plaintiff was comfortable climbing without ropes or a harness. (Id. at 5-6.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegation that she did not receive proper instruction is pure conjecture and will only invite the jury to speculate about what further instruction Plaintiff would have received had she sought it out. (Id. at 6.)
Defendant argues that there was no unique risk or dangerous condition in Defendant’s gym on October 12, 2015, over and above the usual dangers inherent to bouldering. Defendant further argues that Defendant has the right to own and operate a gym that offers bouldering, only, and not rope climbing. (Id. at 7.) Defendant further argues that the height [*23] of its gym’s climbing wall and the depth of its surrounding padding were well within what was typical of other climbing facilities in October 2015. (Id.) Defendant further argues that it had no duty to provide a spotter or supervise Plaintiff’s climbing. (Id. at 7-8.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s expert has not cited to any standards or rules that would have required that Defendant provide Plaintiff with a spotter or supervise Plaintiff’s climbing or that would justify an opinion that negligence on the part of Defendant proximately caused Plaintiff’s accident. (Id. at 8, 10.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s expert fails to acknowledge that Plaintiff engaged in a rope climbing class every week for a semester. (Id. at 10.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s expert has never visited Steep Rock Bouldering and that therefore any assertions that Plaintiff’s expert will make are conclusory and insufficient to demonstrate Defendant’s negligence.
II. Plaintiff’s Affirmation in Opposition
Plaintiff argues in her papers that the affidavit of her liability expert, Dr. Gary G. Nussbaum, establishes Defendant’s negligence and Plaintiff’s lack of appreciation and understanding of the risk. (Affirmation of Broome, at 1.) Plaintiff further [*24] argues that she had a false sense of security because of the thick mats around the climbing wall and that she therefore did not appreciate the risk. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff further argues that her climbing experience at Steep Rock Bouldering was very different from her prior experience with climbing, which was limited to one semester of indoor climbing class 12-13 years prior to the incident, in high school, involving a rope, harness, spotter, and instructor. (Id. at 2; aff of Ho, at 2.) At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was age 30 and had never done any rock climbing again after the high school class. (Aff of Ho, at 2.)
[**13] Plaintiff argues that she believed the padding beneath the climbing wall would prevent “any injury whatsoever.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff further argues that this was her belief even though she signed a release of liability because she did not read it. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further argues that she was given no orientation or instructor on October 12, 2015, but was only told where the wall was and that it was “self-explanatory.” (Id.) Plaintiff further argues that the release she signed is void and unenforceable because she paid a fee to use Defendant’s gym. (Affirmation of Broome, at 2.)
Plaintiff argues that Defendant was negligent in failing to [*25] provide Plaintiff with a rope, a harness, instruction, an orientation, and a spotter. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further argues that the assertions of Defendant’s liability expert, Dr. Robert W. Richards, regarding posters on the wall at Steep Rock Bouldering are irrelevant and erroneous because he visited the facility 1.75 years after Plaintiff’s accident and claims the posters were in place on the date of the accident. (Id.)
III. Defendant’s Reply Affirmation in Support
Defendant argues in its reply papers that Plaintiff did not have a false sense of security because Plaintiff: (1) was aware that Defendant’s gym only supplied climbing shoes and climbing chalk; (2) observed that none of the other climbers were asking for a rope or a harness; (3) testified that she felt comfortable climbing without harness, a rope, or an instructor; (4) knew prior to her injury that the climbing paths have different difficulty levels and that she was at a beginner level; and (5) had already, prior to her injury, climbed the wall two to three times without incident, reached the top of the wall, and jumped from the wall to the floor from halfway up the wall. (Reply affirmation of Goldstein, at 1-2; reply memorandum of law of Goldstein [*26] ¶ 3.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s claim of having a false sense of security is disingenuous because she plainly observed the conditions of the climbing wall and the padded mats, was able to approximate the height of the wall, and, at age 30, was fully aware of, paid to engage in, and voluntarily undertook a form of climbing that involves neither ropes nor harnesses. (Reply memorandum of law of Goldstein ¶ 4.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has overlooked Dr. Richards’ explanation that a spotter has limited benefit and may cause injury to the climber and spotter if the climber were to fall directly onto the spotter. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant further argues that climbers utilizing a rope and harness may also sustain injury from falls when climbing. (Id. ¶ 6.)
[**14] Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant proximately caused Plaintiff’s injury because Plaintiff herself testified that she does not know why she fell, and mere speculation regarding causation is inadequate to sustain a cause of action. (Id. ¶ 5.)
Defendant further argues that Plaintiff was aware of and assumed the risk that, in climbing a wall without ropes and harnesses–or [*27] a spotter–she could sustain an immediate physical injury from a fall. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 9.)
IV. Oral Argument
On November 13, 2017, counsel for the parties in the instant action appeared before this Court for oral argument on Defendant’s instant motion for summary judgment. Stephanie L. Goldstein, Esq. argued on behalf of Defendant and Alvin H. Broome, Esq. argued on behalf of Plaintiff.
Defendant argued that this is an assumption of the risk case in which Plaintiff fell during participation in a sport–bouldering–which, by definition, is rock climbing without ropes or harnesses. (Tr at 2, lines 23-25; at 3, lines 8-18.) Defendant further argued that Plaintiff had no reasonable expectation there would be ropes or harnesses at Steep Rock bouldering. Plaintiff stated that her roommate told her that climbing at Steep Rock Bouldering would involve no ropes or harnesses. (Id. at 4, lines 5-13.) Plaintiff further stated that she observed photographs of people using the gym on Facebook at parties–prior to going to Defendant’s gym–without ropes or harnesses. (Id. at 4, lines 15-19.) Plaintiff further stated that she saw people climbing at the gym in person before she climbed and that none of them were using ropes [*28] or harnesses. (Id. at 4, lines 20-24.)
Defendant argued that Plaintiff was additionally noticed as to the dangers inherent to bouldering by the electronic waiver, which she signed. (Id. at 5, lines 3-18.) Defendant clarified that it is not moving to dismiss the instant action on waiver grounds and acknowledged that Plaintiff’s signing the waiver did not absolve Defendant of liability. (Id. at 5, lines 13-14.) Defendant argued that Plaintiff was further noticed by an individual, an employee of Defendant, who explained to Plaintiff prior to her climbing about the wall and the climbing paths. (Id. at 5, lines 19-23.) Defendant argued that Plaintiff was further noticed by her own experience of climbing up and down the wall two to three times without any [**15] incident and with jumping off of the wall prior to her fall. (Id. at 5, line 26; at 6, line 2; at 7, lines 11-16.) Defendant was comfortable climbing without equipment or an instructor. (Id. at 7, lines 6-10.)
Defendant argued that it cannot enforce a statement on its waiver that a climber is not to climb without a spotter. Defendant argued that this is for four reasons: because spotting does not prevent injury, because spotting was developed when bouldering was outside, because spotting [*29] can only act to attempt to protect the head and neck outdoors–and indoors the padding provides this function–and because spotting may endanger the spotter. Defendant stated that spotting is not enforced at its gym. Defendant further stated that its liability expert has not seen this requirement enforced at any of the 200 gyms he has traveled to which do have this requirement on paper. (Id. at 6, lines 7-26; at 7, lines 2-5.)
Defendant argued that falling when climbing a wall is a common, foreseeable occurrence at a climbing facility. (Id. at 8, lines 3-5.) Defendant further argued that Plaintiff is an intelligent woman, 30 years old at the time of her injury, with a degree in biology. As such, Defendant argued that Plaintiff knew the laws of gravity: what goes up, must come down. (Id. at 8, lines 6-9.) Defendant further argued that a person is said to have assumed the risk if he or she participates in an activity such as climbing where falling is an anticipated and known possibility. (Id. at 9, lines 9-13.) Defendant further argued that Plaintiff testified that she does not know what caused her to fall. (Id. at 7, lines 21-23.)
Plaintiff argued in opposition that Defendant’s own rules required a spotter for climbers and that [*30] Defendant broke its rule and therefore proximately caused Plaintiff’s injury. (Id. at 9, lines 24-26; at 10, lines 2-6; at 11, lines 11-16, 24-25; at 12, lines 15-21.) Plaintiff further argued that “in every kind of climbing you are required to have a rope, a harness, something to prevent an injury and a fall.” (Id. at 12, lines 11-13.) Plaintiff further argued that a spotter “will say lift your arms, turn to the side” as a person begins to fall. (Id. at 11, lines 24-25.)
Plaintiff further argued that proximate cause has been established and the real question for the Court is whether Plaintiff assumed the risk. (Id. at 12, lines 22-25.) Plaintiff argued that “unusually thick” mats around the climbing wall gave Plaintiff a false sense of security. (Id. at 13, line 8.) Plaintiff further argued that Plaintiff saw people fall onto the soft matted floor without getting hurt, and therefore assumes this is a safe sport, but it is not. Plaintiff argued that assumption of risk is a subjective standard and that Plaintiff was a novice who had only [**16] climbed with ropes and harnesses prior to the day of her injury and thus did not assume the risk of “falling on a soft mat and breaking an elbow.” (Id. at 10, lines 7-10; at 14, lines 13-16.)
Plaintiff [*31] argued that there is a distinction between assuming the risk that one could fall from a climbing wall and assuming the risk that one could be injured from the fall. Plaintiff further argued that Plaintiff assumed the former, not the latter, in part because of a false sense of security due to the mats and not having a spotter. (Id. at 14, lines 23-26; at 15, lines 2-23; at 16, lines 2-9.) Plaintiff further argued that the mats that are placed by the climbing wall are “extremely substantial,” “for the sole purpose of preventing injury,” and “designed supposedly to prevent injury from a fall, and . . . didn’t.” (Id. at 16, lines 16-20.)
Plaintiff argued that, as a matter of law, because the mats were there, Plaintiff cannot be held to the belief that she was going to get hurt when she went up the climbing wall. (Id. at 16, lines 22-24.) Plaintiff clarified that she is not claiming the mat was inadequate. (Id. at 16, line 21.) Plaintiff argued that there was no assumption of injury from climbing or falling normally from the Defendant’s gym’s climbing wall. (Id. at 17, lines 13-14.) Plaintiff argued further that Plaintiff “did not assume the risk of being injured by a fall, period.” (Id. at 18, line 20.)
Defendant argued in reply that Plaintiff [*32] was bouldering, which by definition involves no ropes or harnesses, and did so voluntarily. (Id. at 23, lines 11-12.) Defendant further argued that Plaintiff’s liability expert cites to no regulations, standards, or rules that would quantify his reasoning why there should have been ropes, harnesses, or a spotter, or why the mat gave Plaintiff a false sense of security. (Id. at 23, lines 17-22.) Defendant further argued that the law says that when someone assumes the risk, they are assuming the risk inherent to the activity, and that assumption of injury specifically is not required. (Id. at 23, line 26; at 24, lines 2-5.) Defendant further argued that, in the instant case, the risk inherent to bouldering is falling, and that falling from a height may result in injury. As such, Defendant argued, Plaintiff assumed the risk. (Id. at 24, lines 4-18.)
Defendant further argued that there was no negligent hidden condition and nothing wrong with the wall or the mats. (Id. at 24, lines 20-21, 24-25.) Defendant argued that a climbing wall of 13 to 14 feet and mats of 12-inch thickness, as here, are typical. (Id. at 24, lines 25-26; at 25, lines 2-3.) Defendant further argued that stating that Plaintiff fell because she did not have a rope or harness [*33] is speculation insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 25, lines 4-6.)
[**17] DISCUSSION
I. The Summary Judgment Standard
“To obtain summary judgment it is necessary that the movant establish his cause of action or defense sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in his favor, and he must do so by tender of evidentiary proof in admissible form.” (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 404 N.E.2d 718, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595 [1980] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].) “Once this showing has been made, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact that require a trial for resolution.” (Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 72, 81, 790 N.E.2d 772, 760 N.Y.S.2d 397 [2003].) “On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” (Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 499, 503, 965 N.E.2d 240, 942 N.Y.S.2d 13 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].) In the presence of a genuine issue of material fact, a motion for summary judgment must be denied. (See Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 231, 385 N.E.2d 1068, 413 N.Y.S.2d 141 [1978]; Grossman v Amalgamated Hous. Corp., 298 A.D.2d 224, 226, 750 N.Y.S.2d 1 [1st Dept 2002].)
II. The Assumption of Risk Doctrine
“Under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, a person who voluntarily participates in a sporting activity generally consents, by his or her participation, to those injury-causing events, conditions, and risks which are inherent [*34] in the activity.” (Cruz v Longwood Cent. School Dist., 110 AD3d 757, 758, 973 N.Y.S.2d 260 [2d Dept 2013].) “Risks inherent in a sporting activity are those which are known, apparent, natural, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the participation.” (Id.) However, “[s]ome of the restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete onto the playing field. Thus, the rule is qualified to the extent that participants do not consent to acts which are reckless or intentional.” (Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 439, 502 N.E.2d 964, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 [1986].) “[I]n assessing whether a defendant has violated a duty of care within the genre of tort-sports activities and their inherent risks, the applicable standard should include whether the conditions caused by the defendants’ negligence are unique and created a dangerous condition over and above the usual dangers that are inherent in the sport.” (Morgan v State, 90 NY2d 471, 485, 685 N.E.2d 202, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421 [1997] [internal quotation marks omitted].) In assessing whether a plaintiff had the appropriate awareness to assume the subject risk, such “awareness of risk is not to be determined in a vacuum. It is, rather, to be assessed against the background of the skill and experience of the particular plaintiff.” (Id. at 485-486.)
[**18] In 1975, the state legislature codified New York’s comparative fault law when it passed what is now CPLR 1411, “Damages recoverable when contributory negligence [*35] or assumption of risk is established.” CPLR 1411 provides:
“In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to the decedent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused the damages.”
Notwithstanding the text of CPLR 1411, the Court of Appeals has held that, in certain circumstances, a plaintiff’s assumption of a known risk can operate as a complete bar to recovery. The Court of Appeals refers to this affirmative defense as “primary assumption of risk” and states that “[u]nder this theory, a plaintiff who freely accepts a known risk commensurately negates any duty on the part of the defendant to safeguard him or her from the risk.” (Custodi v Town of Amherst, 20 NY3d 83, 87, 980 N.E.2d 933, 957 N.Y.S.2d 268 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted].) In assuming a risk, Plaintiff has “given his consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do [*36] or leave undone.” (Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 438, 502 N.E.2d 964, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 [1986], quoting Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 68, at 480-481 [5th ed].)
Nonetheless, the doctrine of primary assumption of risk has often been at odds with this state’s legislative adoption of comparative fault, and as such has largely been limited in application to “cases involving certain types of athletic or recreational activities.” (Custodi, 20 NY3d at 87.) In Trupia ex rel. Trupia v Lake George Cent. School Dist., Chief Judge Lippman discussed the uneasy coexistence of the two doctrines:
“The doctrine of assumption of risk does not, and cannot, sit comfortably with comparative causation. In the end, its retention is most persuasively justified not on the ground of doctrinal or practical compatibility, but simply for its utility in facilitating free and vigorous participation in athletic activities. We have recognized that athletic and recreative activities possess enormous social value, even while they involve significantly heightened risks, and have employed the notion that these risks may be voluntarily assumed to preserve these [**19] beneficial pursuits as against the prohibitive liability to which they would otherwise give rise. We have not applied the doctrine outside of this limited context [*37] and it is clear that its application must be closely circumscribed if it is not seriously to undermine and displace the principles of comparative causation that the Legislature has deemed applicable to any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death.”
(14 NY3d 392, 395-96, 927 N.E.2d 547, 901 N.Y.S.2d 127 [2010] [internal quotation marks and emendation omitted].) Writing two years later, Chief Judge Lippman further explained the scope of primary assumption of risk in Bukowski v Clarkson University:
“The assumption of risk doctrine applies where a consenting participant in sporting and amusement activities s aware of the risks; has an appreciation of the nature of the risks; and voluntarily assumes the risks. An educational institution organizing a team sporting activity must exercise ordinary reasonable care to protect student athletes voluntarily participating in organized athletics from unassumed, concealed, or enhanced risks. If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has performed its duty. Relatedly, risks which are commonly encountered or ‘inherent’ in a sport, such as being struck by a ball or bat in baseball, are risks [*38] for which various participants are legally deemed to have accepted personal responsibility. The primary assumption of risk doctrine also encompasses risks involving less than optimal conditions.”
(19 NY3d 353, 356, 971 N.E.2d 849, 948 N.Y.S.2d 568 [2012] [internal quotation marks and emendation omitted].)
III. Defendant Has Shown Prima Facie that Plaintiff Assumed the Risk of Injury from Falling from Defendant’s Gym’s Climbing Wall, and Plaintiff Has Failed to Raise a Genuine Issue of Material Fact in Response
Based upon the Court’s reading of the submitted papers and the parties’ oral argument before it, the Court finds that Defendant has shown prima facie that Plaintiff assumed the risks associated with falling from Defendant’s gym’s climbing wall, including injury. Defendant has shown prima facie that Plaintiff voluntarily participated in the sporting activity of bouldering at Steep Rock Bouldering and assumed the risks inherent therein. Specifically, Defendant has [**20] referred to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, which was sufficient to establish that Plaintiff: (1) had experience with rock climbing; (2) was aware of the conditions of the climbing wall from observations both at a distance–from looking online at Facebook and watching others–and [*39] up close on her two or three successful climbs prior to her injury; and (3) was aware that a person could drop down from the wall, as Plaintiff had herself already jumped down from the wall of her own accord.
In response, Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Steep Rock Bouldering’s climbing wall is of an average height for bouldering walls according to Dr. Richards. Dr. Nussbaum’s assertion that climbing on any wall of a height of eight feet or more requires a harness or similar device is conclusory, unsupported by citation, and, ultimately, unavailing.
To require harnesses and ropes at Steep Rock Bouldering would fundamentally change the nature of the sport. Bouldering is a type of climbing that does not require ropes or harnesses. The Court finds that injury from falling is a commonly appreciable risk of climbing–with or without harnesses, ropes, or other safety gear–and that Plaintiff assumed this risk when she knowingly and voluntarily climbed Defendant’s gym’s climbing wall for the third or fourth time when she fell. To hold that Defendant could be liable for Plaintiff’s injuries because it allowed her to climb its wall without a rope and harness would effectively [*40] make the sport of bouldering illegal in this state. To do so would fly in the face of the reasoning in Trupia that such “athletic and recreative activities possess enormous social value, even while they involve significantly heightened risks, and . . . that these risks may be voluntarily assumed to preserve these beneficial pursuits as against the prohibitive liability to which they would otherwise give rise.” (14 NY3d at 395-96.)
In dismissing the instant case, the Court notes that the facts here are distinguishable from those in Lee v Brooklyn Boulders, LLC ( NYS3d , 2017 NY Slip Op 08660, 2017 WL 6347269, *1 [2d Dept, Dec. 13, 2017, index No. 503080/2013]) and McDonald v. Brooklyn Boulders, LLC (2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5211, 2016 WL 1597764, at *6 [Sup Ct, Kings County Apr. 12, 2016]). Both cases involved plaintiffs who were injured when they jumped down from the climbing wall–at the same defendant’s bouldering facility–and each plaintiff’s foot landed in a gap between the matting. In both cases, summary judgment was denied because there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the gap in the matting presented a concealed risk. Here, Plaintiff does not contend that she was injured by such a concealed risk, but essentially argues she should not have been allowed to [**21] voluntarily engage in the sport of bouldering. For the reasons previously stated, this Court finds such an argument to be [*41] unavailing.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Defendant Steep Rock Bouldering, LLC’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 for an order granting Defendant summary judgment against Plaintiff Min-Sun Ho is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that the action is dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant; and it is further
ORDERED that counsel for movant shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon Plaintiff and upon the County Clerk (Room 141B) and the Clerk of the Trial Support Office (Room 158M), who are directed to mark the court’s records to reflect the dismissal of this action.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Dated: January 2, 2018
New York, New York
/s/ Robert D. Kalish, J.S.C.
HON. ROBERT D. KALISH
Plaintiff argues that release was limited to the risks that were inherent in climbing walls. Inherent is a limiting term and does not expand the scope of the risks a release is written to include.
Posted: January 22, 2018 Filed under: Climbing Wall, Indiana, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Belay device, belayer, business name, causes of action, climber, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Equine, exculpatory clauses, Falling, genuine issue, Horse, Indoor, Indoor Climbing, Inherent Risk, Inherent Risks, material facts, matter of law, Orientation, own negligence, personal injuries, property damage, Release, Releases / Waivers, risk associated, risks inherent, Rock climbing, rope, signing, Summary judgment, top, Top Rope, training, unambiguous, undersigned, waived, Waiver Leave a commentIn addition, incorrect name on the release gave plaintiff an additional argument. The LLC registered by the Indiana Secretary of State was named differently than the named party to be protected by the release.
Luck saved the defendant in this case.
Wiemer v. Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing Facility LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149663
State: Indiana: United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division
Plaintiff: Alexis Wiemer
Defendant: Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing Facility LLC,
Plaintiff Claims: Negligent Hiring and Instruction
Defendant Defenses: Release
Holding: For the Defendant
Year: 2017
Summary
Release was written broadly enough it covered negligence claims outside the normal injuries or claims from using a climbing wall. On top of that the mistakes in the release were covered by the letterhead.
Injury occurred because belayer did not know how to use the braking device.
A lot of things could have gone wrong because the climbing wall was not paying attention, but got lucky.
Facts
The plaintiff was a beginner in climbing and using climbing walls. Before climbing he signed a release and attended a facility orientation which covered training “on how to boulder, belay, and top rope climb.” The training received by the plaintiff was taught by an employee with little experience and mostly went over the defendant’s instructional books on rock climbing.
On the day of the accident, the plaintiff went to climb with a co-worker. While climbing the co-worker failed to use the belay device properly.
Incident reports indicate that Wiemer fell approximately thirty-five feet to the ground in a sitting position due to Magnus releasing a gate lever while he was belaying for Wiemer, which caused Wiemer to accelerate to the floor very quickly. As a result of the fall, he sustained severe and permanent injuries to his back, as well as impaired bladder and bowel control. Wiemer filed this action alleging Hoosier Heights was negligent in its operations. [emphasize added]
The plaintiff sued for his injuries.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The plaintiff’s first argument was the name of the parties to be released was not the legal name of the facility where the accident occurred. The facility was owned by a Limited Liability Company (LLC) registered with the state of Indiana as “Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing Facility.” On the release, the name of the party to be protected was “Hoosier Heights Indoor Rock Climbing Facility.” The release name had an extra word, “rock.”
The waiver signed by Wiemer incorrectly lists the business name as ‘Hoosier Heights Indoor Rock Climbing Facility L.L.C. Hoosier Heights acknowledges that its official name is Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing Facility LLC and that the word “Rock” does not appear in its corporate filings with the Indiana Secretary of State, although it appears on the Waiver at issue. Wiemer contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the validity of the Waiver, because the Waiver that he signed failed to name the correct entity and this inaccuracy created ambiguity as to who Wiemer contracted with.
However, the name and logo on the top of the release identified the company correctly, Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing Facility.
Since the release was a contract, the court was required to determine if the name issue made the contract ambiguous. Ambiguous means the language of the contract could be interpreted in more than one way. The name issue was not enough to find the contract was unambiguous so that the release was not void. The name issue was minor, and the correct name was at the top of the contract.
Under these circumstances, the misidentification of Hoosier Heights does not operate to void the Waiver. Because the Waiver is unambiguous, the Court need not examine extrinsic evidence to determine the proper parties to the Waiver. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied on this basis.
The second argument the plaintiff made was the release did not cover the claimed negligence of the defendant for negligent instruction, and negligent training. Those claims are generally not defined as an inherent risk of indoor rock climbing.
The negligent training and negligent instruction claims were not based at the defendant or the belayer. Those claims were based on the employee who instructed the belayer.
Inherent is a restrictive word. See 2015 SLRA – Inherent Risk: Should the Phrase be in your Release? and Here is another reason to write releases carefully. Release used the term inherent to describe the risks which the court concluded made the risk inherently dangerous and voids the release, and is interpreted differently by various courts. Consequently, the use of the word inherent can be dangerous in that it limits the breadth of the release.
Under Indiana’s law a release must be “specific and explicitly refer to the waiving [of] that the party’s negligence.” However, that explicit reference is not necessary for a claim that is inherent in the activity.
Nevertheless, “an exculpatory clause’s lack of a specific reference to the negligence of a defendant will not always preclude the defendant from being released from liability–such as when a plaintiff has incurred damages that are inherent in the nature of the activity.”
The plaintiff’s argument was:
Wiemer contends that his fall was due to Mellencamp’s improper training and instruction and this was not a risk that he agreed to assume. Further, he argues that improper training and instruction are not risks that are inherent in the nature of rock climbing.
The court could work around this explicit necessity because it found within the release language that covered the negligent training and instruction.
…team building, fitness training regimens and equipment purchased or rented at Hoosier Heights[,]…injuries resulting from falls, equipment failures, entanglements, falling or dropped items, or the negligence of other climbers, participants, belayers, spotters, employees, or other users of the facility…
It is the intention of the undersigned individually to exempt and relieve Hoosier Heights and its employees, … from liability for any personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death caused by negligence.
By reviewing the exact language of the release, the court was able to find language that warned of the specific issues the plaintiff claimed.
Similar to the result in Anderson, by signing the Waiver, Wiemer released Hoosier Heights from any liability resulting from its own negligence, including improper training and instruction. Further, Wiemer’s injury from falling was a risk that was inherent in the activity of rock climbing and explicitly noted in the Waiver.
The negligent training and negligent instruction claims were not based at the defendant or the belayer. Those claims were based on the employee who instructed the belayer.
As such the court found that both claims were prevented by the release the plaintiff had signed and dismissed the case.
So Now What?
This case was won by the defendant not because of proper legal planning but by luck.
If they had not used the correct letterhead for the release, the release might have been void because it named the wrong party to be protected by the release. When writing a release, you need to include the legal name of the party to be protected as well as any marketing or doing business as names.
Indiana’s requirement that the language of the release cover the exact injury the plaintiff is claiming is not new in most states. It is also a requirement that seems to be growing by the courts to favor a contract that covers the complaint.
In the past, judges would specifically point out when a claimed injury was covered in the release. Not so much as a legal requirement but to point out to the plaintiff the release covered their complaint. That prior identification seems to be growing among the states to a requirement.
In this case the release was written broadly so that the restrictions the term inherent placed in the release were covered. But for that broad language, the climbing gym might now have survived the claim.
More important writing the release wrong protecting the wrong party would have been fatal in most states.
Finally, this is another example of a belay system that is perfect, and the user failed. There are belay systems out there that don’t require user involvement, they work as long as they are corrected properly. This accident could have been avoided if the belay system worked.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Wiemer v. Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing Facility LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149663
Posted: September 30, 2017 Filed under: Climbing Wall, Indiana, Legal Case | Tags: belayer, business name, causes of action, climber, Climbing, Equine, exculpatory clauses, Falling, genuine issue, Horse, IN, Indoor, Inherent Risks, material facts, matter of law, Negligence, Orientation, own negli-gence, personal injuries, property damage, Release, risk associated, risks inherent, Rock climbing, rope, signing, Summary judgment, top, training, unambiguous, undersigned, waived, Wrongful Death 3 CommentsWiemer v. Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing Facility LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149663
Alexis Wiemer, Plaintiff, v. Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing Facility LLC, Defendant.
Case No. 1:16-cv-01383-TWP-MJD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA, INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149663
September 15, 2017, Decided
September 15, 2017, Filed
COUNSEL: [*1] For ALEXIS WIEMER, Plaintiff: Mary Beth Ramey, Richard D. Hailey, RAMEY – HAILEY, Indianapolis, IN.
For HOOSIER HEIGHTS INDOOR CLIMBING FACILITY LLC, Defendant: Jessica Whelan, Phil L. Isenbarger, BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL LLP, Indianapolis, IN.
JUDGES: TANYA WALTON PRATT, United States District Judge.
OPINION BY: TANYA WALTON PRATT
OPINION
ENTRY ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing Facility LLC’s (“Hoosier Heights”) Motion for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Filing No. 29). Plaintiff Alexis Wiemer (“Wiemer”) brought this action against Hoosier Heights for personal injuries sustained when he fell during a rock climbing activity. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Hoosier Heights’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
The material facts are not in dispute and are viewed in a light most favorable to Wiemer as the non-moving party. See Luster v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 652 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2011).
Hoosier Heights, located in Carmel, Indiana, is a limited liability company which owns and operates an indoor rock climbing facility. The facility is open to the public and is available for individuals of all skill levels in recreational climbing. In order to use the facilities, Hoosier Heights requires all patrons [*2] to sign and acknowledge having read and understood a “Waiver & Release of Liability” form (“Waiver”). (Filing No. 30-1.) The Waiver contains: general gym rules, exculpatory clauses relieving Hoosier Heights of liability, a medical authorization clause, an acknowledgement that the participant understands there are inherent risks to rock climbing with some risks listed, authorization to allow the Hoosier Heights’ staff to use any photographs taken during the patron’s visit for promotional materials, and a signature line for the participant. (Filing No. 30-1 at 1.) At the top of the Waiver is Hoosier Heights’ logo, address, and the name Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing.
The Waiver states, in relevant part:
RELEASE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK: In consideration of being permitted to use the facilities of Hoosier Heights Indoor Rock Climbing Facility L.L.C., and mindful of the significant risks involved with the activities incidental thereto, I, for myself, my heirs, my estate and personal representative, do hereby release and discharge Hoosier Heights Indoor Rock Climbing Facility L.L.C. (hereinafter referred to as “Hoosier Heights”) from any and all liability for injury that may result from my [*3] use of the facilities of Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing, and I do hereby waive and relinquish any and all actions or causes of action for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death occurring to myself arising as a result of the use of the facilities of Hoosier Heights or any activities incidental thereto, wherever or however such personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death may occur, whether foreseen or unforeseen, and for whatever period said activities may continue. I agree that under no circumstances will I, my heirs, my estate or my personal representative present any claim for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death against Hoosier Heights or its employees, members, directors, officers, agents and assigns for any of said causes of actions, whether said causes of action shall arise by the negligence of any said person or otherwise.
It is the intention of the undersigned individual to exempt and relieve Hoosier Heights and its employees, members, directors, officers, agents and assigns from liability for any personal injury, property damage or wrongful death caused by negligence.
(Filing No. 30-1.) The Waiver also contained a provision enumerating the risks [*4] inherent in the sport of rock climbing:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT: I, the undersigned, acknowledge that I understand that there are significant elements of risk associated with the sport of rock climbing, including those activities that take place indoors. In addition, I realize those risks also pertain to related activities such as bouldering, incidental weight training, team building, fitness training regimens and equipment purchased or rented at Hoosier Heights. I realize that those risks may include, but are not limited to, injuries resulting from falls, equipment failures, entanglements, falling or dropped items, or the negligence of other climbers, participants, belayers, spotters, employees, or other users of the facilities. I acknowledge and understand that the above list is not inclusive of all possible risks associated with rock climbing or the use of the Hoosier Heights facilities and that other unknown and unanticipated risks may result in injury, illness, paralysis, or death.
Id. In addition to executing the Waiver, Hoosier Heights requires that all patrons attend and acknowledge undergoing orientation and training.
Wiemer visited Hoosier Heights in October 2014. On that date, he attended [*5] a facility orientation, which is an employee-guided training on how to boulder, belay, and top rope climb.1 (Filing No. 30-7.) If a customer intends to use the “top rope” climbing area of the facility, they must first complete the “top rope” orientation and initial and sign the facility orientation form in the appropriate locations. Following his orientation and training, Wiemer signed a Waiver form.
1 Top rope climbing is a style of climbing in which a rope runs from a belayer at the foot of the climbing wall which is connected to an anchor system at the top of the wall and back down to the climber. Both climber and the belayer are attached to the rope through a harness and carabiner. The belayer is responsible for pulling the slack in the rope, which results in the climber moving up the wall. The belayer must keep the rope tight so that, in the event the climber releases from the wall, the climber remains suspended in the air and does not fall.
Kayli Mellencamp (“Mellencamp”), a part-time Hoosier Heights employee with very little rock climbing experience, provided Wiemer’s orientation and training. (Filing No. 30-6.) Mellencamp’s employee training consisted solely of reviewing company provided instructional books on rock climbing and witnessing other employee orientations. (Filing No. 67-2 at 10-11 and 13-14.) Mellencamp had no other professional rock climbing experience.
On January 14, 2015, Wiemer, along with several co-workers, including Robert Magnus (“Magnus”), traveled to Hoosier Heights for recreational rock climbing. Magnus had also previously visited Hoosier Heights, and Wiemer’s and Magnus’ Waivers were already on file and under the terms of their agreements remained in effect (Filing No. 30-6; Filing No. 30-7). Wiemer [*6] was top rope climbing while Magnus belayed below (Filing No. 30-4). Unfortunately, Wiemer fell while he was climbing. Incident reports indicate that Wiemer fell approximately thirty-five feet to the ground in a sitting position due to Magnus releasing a gate lever while he was belaying for Wiemer, which caused Wiemer to accelerate to the floor very quickly. (Filing No. 30-4 at 1-4.) As a result of the fall, he sustained severe and permanent injuries to his back, as well as impaired bladder and bowel control. Wiemer filed this action alleging Hoosier Heights was negligent in its operations.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 489-90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews “the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[s] all reasonable [*7] inferences in that party’s favor.” Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). However, “[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial.” Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted). “In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat the motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits of a claim.” Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). “[N]either the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties . . . nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “It is equally well settled, however, that where no factual disputes are present or where the undisputed facts demonstrate that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment in favor of that party is entirely appropriate. Collins v. American Optometric Ass’n, 693 F.2d 636, 639 (7th Cir. 1982).
III. DISCUSSION
Hoosier Heights contends that Wiemer’s signing of the Waiver, which contained an explicit reference waiving liability [*8] for Hoosier Heights’ own negligence, absolves it of any liability and Wiemer expressly acknowledged that falling was a risk inherent in indoor rock climbing. Wiemer responds with two arguments in the alternative. First, he argues that the Waiver misidentifies the released party as “Hoosier Heights Indoor Rock Climbing Facility” because the Defendant’s name, as alleged in the Complaint and as evidenced by the Indiana Secretary of State Certificate of Assumed Business Name, is “Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing Facility.” (Filing No. 67-4.) Second, Wiemer argues that Hoosier Heights negligence in the hiring and training of Mellencamp, was not an included “inherent risk” and this significantly contributed to his fall and injury.
A. Hoosier Heights’ Business Name
The waiver signed by Wiemer incorrectly lists the business name as ‘Hoosier Heights Indoor Rock Climbing Facility L.L.C.’ (Filing No. 30-1 at 1). Hoosier Heights acknowledges that its official name is Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing Facility LLC and that the word “Rock” does not appear in its corporate filings with the Indiana Secretary of State although it appears on the Waiver at issue. Wiemer contends that a genuine issue of material [*9] fact exists regarding the validity of the Waiver, because the Waiver that he signed failed to name the correct entity and this inaccuracy creates ambiguity as to who Wiemer contracted with.
The Court is not persuaded by Wiemer’s argument. “Release documents shall be interpreted in the same manner as any other contract document, with the intention of the parties regarding the purpose of the document governing.” Huffman v. Monroe County Community School Corp., 588 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Ind. 1992). “The meaning of a contract is to be determined from an examination of all of its provisions, not from a consideration of individual words, phrases, or even paragraphs read alone.” Huffman, 588 N.E.2d at 1267. In addition, when a contract is unambiguous, Indiana courts look to the four corners of the document to determine the intentions of the parties. Evan v. Poe & Associates, Inc., 873 N.E.2d 92, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). This analysis of contract interpretation is a question of law. Evans v. Med. & Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc., 741 N.E.2d 795, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
In Evans, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a contract was unambiguous that misidentified a business name in the agreement but included the relevant address as that of the business. Evans, 741 N.E.2d at 798. The Evans court found that the plaintiff could not recover payment from the owner, “Evans Ford,” in his personal capacity, even though that was the name indicated in the contract and the actual business [*10] was organized as a corporation under the name of “Evans Lincoln Mercury Ford, Inc.” Id. at 796-98. The court did not resort to extrinsic evidence because the contract unambiguously identified the parties despite the misidentification. See id. at 798.
In this case, the Waiver is unambiguous as to identifying the parties to the agreement. Although the language of the Release and Assumption of Risk paragraph identifies “Hoosier Heights Indoor Rock Climbing Facility,” the document’s letterhead at the top displays “Hoosier Heights Indoor Climbing,” and includes the relevant business address of Hoosier Heights where Wiemer visited. Under these circumstances, the misidentification of Hoosier Heights does not operate to void the Waiver. Because the Waiver is unambiguous, the Court need not examine extrinsic evidence to determine the proper parties to the Waiver. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied on this basis.
B. Negligent Training
Hoosier Heights contends that summary judgment is appropriate because the Waiver’s explicit references to the “inherent risks” of rock climbing creates a binding exculpatory clause which releases Hoosier Heights from liability. Wiemer argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists [*11] regarding whether improper instruction and inadequate training, is an “inherent risk” of indoor rock climbing.
Under Indiana law, waivers containing exculpatory clauses absolving parties of liability for their own negligence must be specific and explicitly refer to waiving that party’s negligence. Anderson v. Four Seasons Equestrian Center, 852 N.E.2d 576, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Nevertheless, “an exculpatory clause’s lack of a specific reference to the negligence of a defendant will not always preclude the defendant from being released from liability–such as when a plaintiff has incurred damages that are inherent in the nature of the activity.” Id. (citing Marsh v. Dixon, 707 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).
Wiemer contends that his fall was due to Mellencamp’s improper training and instruction and this was not a risk that he agreed to assume (Filing No. 67 at 10). Further, he argues that improper training and instruction are not risks that are inherent in the nature of rock climbing. Id. Hoosier Heights responds that falls, as indicated by the Waiver, are a specific risk inherent in the nature of rock climbing and that Wiemer specifically waived any claims to injuries from falls by signing the Waiver (Filing No. 68 at 14). Hoosier Heights also contends that Wiemer waived any claims for improper training and instruction [*12] by its’ employees as the Waiver contains an explicit release of Hoosier Heights’ employees for any negligence. Id. at 12.
Hoosier Heights acknowledges that negligence is generally a fact-intensive question; however, it responds that it is entitled to summary judgment because Wiemer waived any claims for liability on the basis of negligence. Id. at 11. Hoosier Heights points the Court to Anderson v. Four Seasons Equestrian Center. In Anderson, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the defendant, an equine center, was entitled to summary judgment even though the waiver at issue did not contain a specific and explicit release of the equine center due to its own negligence because the plaintiff’s injury of falling while mounting her horse was a risk inherent in the nature of the activity of horse riding. Anderson, 852 N.E.2d at 581. The plaintiff argued that her injury was due to the equine center’s negligence in caring for, conditioning, and training her horse. The court found that the plaintiff’s injury and resulting damages, including her characterization of the cause of those damages (i.e. conditioning and training of her horse), were risks that were inherent in the nature of horse riding and were exactly those for [*13] which she granted the equine center a release of liability by signing the waiver. Id. at 585.
In the present case, Wiemer signed a specific and explicit Waiver, which released Hoosier Heights from liability due to its own negligence. The Waiver explained that “rock climbing activity” at Hoosier Heights included, among other things,
…team building, fitness training regimens and equipment purchased or rented at Hoosier Heights[,]…injuries resulting from falls, equipment failures, entanglements, falling or dropped items, or the negligence of other climbers, participants, belayers, spotters, employees, or other users of the facility…. I understand that the above list is not inclusive of all possible risks associated with rock climbing.
(Filing No. 30-6 at 1). In addition, a very similarly worded reference to liability from their own negligence is contained in the second paragraph of the ‘Release and Assumption of Risk’ section which states, “It is the intention of the undersigned individually to exempt and relieve Hoosier Heights and its employees, … from liability for any personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death caused by negligence.” (Filing No. 30-1 at 1.) The direct mentions [*14] of Hoosier Heights’ own negligence adheres to the holding set in Powell that an exculpatory clause needs to be specific and explicit in referencing an absolving party’s liability from negligence.
Similar to the result in Anderson, by signing the Waiver, Wiemer released Hoosier Heights from any liability resulting from its own negligence, including improper training and instruction. Further, Wiemer’s injury from falling was a risk that was inherent in the activity of rock climbing and explicitly noted in the Waiver. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court determines that, based on the undisputed material facts, Hoosier Heights is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Hoosier Heights’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 29) is GRANTED, and Wiemer’s Complaint is DISMISSED. Final Judgment will issue under a separate order.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 9/15/2017
/s/ Tanya Walton Pratt
TANYA WALTON PRATT, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
What happens if you fail to follow the requirements of your insurance policy and do not get a release signed? In New Hampshire, you have no coverage.
Posted: July 17, 2017 Filed under: Climbing Wall, Insurance, New Hampshire, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: absurd, Ambiguity, Ambiguous, burden of proving, clear meaning, Climbing, Climbing Gym, construe, contracting parties, contractually, coverage, endorsement, Gym, Gymnastics, insurance coverage, Insurance policy, insured, insurer, linguistic, matter of law, objectively, ordinary meaning, policy language, policyholder, purported, question of law, reasonable expectations of coverage, Reasonable person, Release, Summary judgment, unambiguous, words used 1 CommentYou either have to create an absolutely fool proof system or take your release
online. If they don’t sign they don’t climb!
State: New Hampshire, Supreme Court of New Hampshire
Plaintiff: Colony Insurance Company
Defendant: Dover Indoor Climbing Gym& a.
Plaintiff Claims: There was no insurance coverage because the insured did not get a release signed by the injured claimant
Defendant Defenses: The insurance policy endorsement requiring a release to be signed was ambiguous
Holding: For the Plaintiff Insurance Company
Year: 2009
This is a scary case, yet the outcome is correct. The plaintiff insurance company issued a policy to the defendant climbing gym. An endorsement (an added amendment to the contract) to the policy said there would only be coverage if the gym all customers sign a release.
An endorsement to the policy stated: “All ‘participants’ shall be required to sign a waiver or release of liability in
your favor prior to engaging in any ‘climbing activity.’ “It further stated: “Failure to conform to this warranty will render this policy null and void as [sic] those claims brought against you.”
A climber came to the gym with a group of friends. The gym asked everyone if they had a release on file, and no one said no. (Yes really stupid procedures!) Bigelow was part of the group and did not have a release on file and had not signed a release. While climbing Bigelow fell and was injured.
Bigelow accompanied friends to the climbing gym, but did not sign a waiver. He testified that he was never asked to sign a waiver; the gym owner’s affidavit stated that the owner asked the group of climbers if they had waivers on file and received no negative answers. It is undisputed; however, that Bigelow did not sign a waiver or release. While climbing, Bigelow fell and sustained serious injuries.
The defendant climbing gym put the plaintiff insurance company on notice of the claim. When the insurance company found out no release was signed, the insurance company filed a declaratory judgment motion. A declaratory judgment is a way to go into a court and say there is no coverage under this policy because there was no release. It is an attempt to be a quick interpretation of the contract so the bigger issue can be resolved quickly.
The gym then put Colony on notice to defend and pay any verdict obtained by Bigelow. In response, Colony filed a petition for declaratory judgment, arguing that the gym’s failure to obtain a release from Bigelow absolved Colony of any duty to defend or indemnify the gym.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the climbing gym’s motion for summary judgment saying the endorsement requiring the signed release was ambiguous. The ambiguity was created because the insurance company had not provided the gym with a sample waiver to use.
The trial court found that Colony’s failure to provide the gym with a sample waiver rendered the endorsement provision ambiguous. The trial court therefore denied Colony’s motion for summary judgment, and granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.
This analysis by the court was absurd. Releases need to be written for the gym, for the gym’s clients and for the state law of the state where it is to be used. A “sample” release is a guaranteed loser in most cases. However, I suspect the court was looking for anyway it could find to provide coverage for the gym.
The trial court’s ruling meant the plaintiff insurance company had to provide coverage to the defendant for any claims made by the injured climber Bigelow.
The insurance company appealed the decision. New Hampshire does not have an intermediary appellate court system so the appeal went to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
Insurance policies are contracts and are interpreted as such. However, because have been written in a specific way and are always offered on a take it or leave it basis, as well as the fact the insurance company has all the cards (money) insurance policies have additional legal interpretations in addition to contract law.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court started its analysis by looking at how insurance policies are interpreted. That means the policy is read as a whole objectively. Terms are given their natural meaning, meaning there is no special interpretation of any term, and if the policy is clear and unambiguous is it enforced. No special reading of the policy is allowed based on any party to the policy’s expectations.
We construe the language of an insurance policy as would a reasonable person in the position of the insured based upon a more than casual reading of the policy as a whole. Policy terms are construed objectively, and where the terms of a policy are clear and unambiguous, we accord the language its natural and ordinary meaning. We need not examine the parties’ reasonable expectations of coverage when a policy is clear and unambiguous; absent ambiguity, our search for the parties’ intent is limited to the words of the policy.
The burden of proving that no insurance coverage exists as defined by the policy rests on the insurance company. That means coverage exists under the policy unless the insurance company can prove no coverage was written.
If an insurance company wants to limit its coverage, it is allowed to do so. However, that limitation must be clear and unambiguous. An ambiguity exists if a reasonable disagreement exists between the insurance company and the policyholder and that disagreement could lead to two or more, interpretations.
Although an insurer has a right to contractually limit the extent of its liability, it must do so “through clear and unambiguous policy language. Ambiguity exists if “reasonable disagreement between contracting parties” leads to at least two interpretations of the language.
Ambiguities will be examined in the appropriate context and the words construed in their plain, ordinary and popular meaning. If the interpretation of the ambiguity favors the policyholder, then the coverage will favor the insured.
In determining whether an ambiguity exists, we will look to the claimed ambiguity, consider it in its appropriate context, and construe the words used according to their plain, ordinary, and popular definitions. If one of the reasonable meanings of the language favors the policyholder, the ambiguity will be construed against the insurer.
If, however, the language in the policy is clear, the court will not bend over backward or as written in this case “perform amazing feats of linguistic gymnastics” to find an ambiguity and create coverage.
Where, however, the policy language is clear, this court “will not perform amazing feats of linguistic gymnastics to find a purported ambiguity” simply to construe the policy against the insurer and create coverage where it is clear that none was intended.
The court then looked at the determination of the trial court which found an ambiguity because the insurance company did not provide a sample insurance policy. The Supreme Court found that was an incorrect interpretation of the policy. Even the defendant climbing gym agreed with the court on this
issue.
Even the gym, however, contends that the trial court “reached the correct result for the wrong reasons.” Thus, the gym does not argue that the endorsement creates an ambiguity by its failure to provide the insured with a sample waiver form, but, rather, that the exclusionary language is ambiguous because it states that participants shall “be required” to sign waivers as opposed to mandating that the gym obtain signed waivers.
The court then applied to the law of New Hampshire in interpreting insurance policies to the facts of this case. The court found the language requiring a release was clear and that a reasonable person could only read it.
The clear meaning of the policy language is that the gym is required to actually obtain waivers from climbing participants. The gym’s interpretation would lead to the absurd result of requiring coverage even if the gym never actually enforced its waiver policy. A reasonable person reading the policy would not understand that coverage existed in such circumstances. The gym’s interpretation is unreasonably narrow, and is therefore not the type of alternative interpretation that renders policy language ambiguous.
Simply put the policy requires the defendant climbing gym to have everyone sign a release. If no release is signed, there was no coverage for the gym. The trial court was overturned, and the climbing gym faced the claims of the injured climber without insurance coverage.
So Now What?
One of the first cases I was involved with was very similar. A Montana stable was insured by an insurance company with an endorsement just as this one; all riders were required to sign a release. In Montana all guides, including horseback guides had to be licensed by the state. A state employee was checking out the
stable and found the releases. In Montana, you cannot use a release. (See States that do not Support the Use of a Release andMontana Statute Prohibits Use of a Release)
The state employee had the stable quit using the release, or they would lose their license to operate in Montana. A rider was injured and sued the stable, and the insurance company denied coverage. I was contacted by the law firm representing the insurance company and was floored by the facts and how the insurance company could deny coverage when it violated state regulations.
However, in that situation as well as this one, there is not much you can do to get around the situation if the policy clearly states you must have a release signed. In the Montana case, the stable owner should have immediately contacted his insurance company when he was told he could not use a release and pay to have the endorsement removed or found another insurance company to write him a policy.
In this case, a proper procedure should have been put in place to confirm signed releases rather than relying on the honesty of someone walking through the doors to the gym.
When you purchase insurance make sure you and your insurance agent are speaking clearly to each other, and you both understand what you are looking for. When the policy arrives, read the policy or pay a professional to read the policy for you looking for the coverage’s you need as well as looking for problems with the coverage.
If you ask the agent or broker to clarify the coverage you are wanting, to make sure you get that clarification in writing (or an email), so you can take that to court if necessary.
Most importantly create a system to make sure that everyone who comes to your facility, activity or business when you use a release, signs a release.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law
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