Release used to defend third party participants in horseback case applying Missouri’s law, not the main party to the contract.
Posted: May 25, 2020 Filed under: Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, Illinois, Missouri, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: additionally, Animal, argues, Assumption of risk, Cause of action, Choice of Law, conflict of laws, contacts, defense motion, deposition, Equine, Equine Liabililty Act, Exculpatory clause, Friends, Gross negligence, Horse, horseback riding, Illinois, injuries, kicked, Missouri, Motion to Dismiss, Other Participant, parties, principles, RELEASEES, ride, Risks, signing, sponsors, Summary judgment, the Animal Control Act, Third Party Beneficiary, Trail, Trial court 1 CommentIllinois resident sues Illinois’s resident for getting kicked by a horse in a riding area in Missouri. Area’s release included coverage for participants and protected horse owner from suit.
State: Illinois, Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District Applying Missouri law
Plaintiff: Deanna L. Perkinson
Defendant: Sarah Courson
Plaintiff Claims: Violation of the Animal Control Act and Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Release (neither party brought up the Missouri Equine Liability Act)
Holding: For the Defendant
Year: 2018
Summary
The term “other participants,” was used in a release signed to access land to ride horses to defend the owner of a horse that kicked another horse owner. The term was sufficient to include the rider in the protection the release afforded. Neither party argued the Equine Liability Act of Missouri where the incident took place.
Facts
Plaintiff testified she engaged in horseback riding on and off since the age of five. She and her husband owned nine horses and were part of a group of friends that rode horses together. Plaintiff estimated that 20 to 25 people were in their group, including defendant. She further estimated that she and defendant went horseback riding together approximately five or six times a year. Within plaintiff’s group of horseback riding friends, there were people that plaintiff was closer to and whom she would talk with about going on horseback riding trips. Plaintiff testified she was not close friends with defendant. She denied that they spent time socially at one another’s homes or that they participated in any activities together other than horseback riding.
In August 2014, individuals from plaintiff’s horseback riding group went on a trip to Cross Country Trail Ride, LLC (Cross Country), in Eminence, Missouri. According to plaintiff, each year, Cross Country organized a trail ride event during Labor Day weekend. She had previously attended the event approximately six times. Plaintiff testified Cross Country provided its paying guests with a campsite, stalls for horses, entertainment, and food.
On August 28, 2014, plaintiff arrived at Cross Country with her husband, daughter, and stepdaughter. The family took four of their own horses and met up with other individuals from plaintiff’s group of friends. Plaintiff stated she had not known whether defendant would be on the trip but saw defendant at Cross Country on the evening of her arrival.
Plaintiff acknowledged signing certain documents upon her arrival at Cross Country on August 28, 2014. She identified her signature on forms that were submitted as exhibits during her deposition and recalled signing similar forms during her previous visits to Cross Country. Plaintiff acknowledged that part of the form she signed was titled “Release of Liability” and instructed her to read before signing; however, plaintiff testified she did not read the form because she had driven a long distance to get to Cross Country and believed it “was just to register.” Plaintiff admitted signing similar forms on behalf of her daughter and stepdaughter.
Plaintiff testified that prior to signing the Cross Country forms, she understood that there was a risk of injury when participating in horseback riding events, including falling off a horse or being kicked. Despite that risk of injury, she participated anyway. Further, plaintiff testified she would have proceeded with the trail ride at Cross Country if she had read the form she signed, which included a warning about the risk of injury when participating in horseback riding events and statements indicating she fully assumed the risks of participation. Plaintiff acknowledged that the form she signed used the phrase “other participants.” She agreed that defendant would have been “another participant” in the activities at Cross Country.
On August 29, 2014, plaintiff, her family, and members of her group intended to take a six-hour trail ride on one of the “identified trails” at Cross Country. Plaintiff was riding a horse named Chester, and defendant was riding a horse named Little Bit. Plaintiff did not recall ever previously being around Little Bit. Further, she acknowledged consuming beer during the trail ride. Plaintiff stated she also observed that defendant was consuming alcohol and believed defendant was intoxicated. During a break on the trail ride, defendant told plaintiff that Little Bit “had kicked [defendant’s] husband while her husband was in the pasture.” She did not remember defendant telling her when the kick occurred or that the horse was in heat at the time. Plaintiff stated she did not notice anything concerning about Little Bit’s behavior while horseback riding on the day of the incident.
At some point during the trail ride, plaintiff and defendant began riding next to one another and were talking. Plaintiff did not recall who approached whom or how long they rode next to each other. As they were riding together down a hill, defendant’s horse kicked out with both of its rear legs and struck plaintiff on her right shin. Plaintiff did not know what caused the horse to kick. Following the kick, plaintiff had to be helped off her horse, and an ambulance was called to the scene. Plaintiff stated she had a broken bone in her shin and, ultimately, underwent two surgeries.
Plaintiff testified that during the trail ride defendant should have put a red ribbon on her horse’s tail to warn others that her horse was known to kick. She asserted, however, that the presence of a red ribbon would not have altered her own behavior. Additionally, plaintiff stated she returned to Cross Country for horseback riding after the August 2014 incident with defendant’s horse. Although she did not plan on attending Cross Country’s Labor Day event in 2016, she did plan to go to another location in Missouri for a Labor Day trail ride.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
This is a complicated case because it was started in Illinois after the accident happened in Missouri. Consequently, the issues that support the outdoor recreation industry are woven around the other issues such as where the lawsuit should be and what law should be applied to the case.
The court was an Illinois court and the defendant, and the plaintiffs were Illinois’s residents. However, because the accident occurred in Missouri, the court applied Missouri’s law to the case.
The court first looked at Missouri’s law and the requirements to prove negligence.
To obtain relief in a negligence cause of action, “‘the plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant failed to perform that duty; and (3) the defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.'”
Then the assumption of the risk doctrine was reviewed as applied in Missouri.
Under the “assumption of the risk doctrine” a person who “voluntarily consents to accept the danger of a known and appreciated risk may not sue another for failing to protect him from it.”
A document showing the plaintiff assumed the risks or explicitly accepted the risks is called an express assumption of the risk document in Missouri (and most other states).
An express assumption of risk is the simplest application of the doctrine and “recognizes that, when a plaintiff makes an express statement that he is voluntarily accepting a specified risk, the plaintiff is barred from recovering damages for an injury resulting from that risk.” An express assumption of risk “most often involves a written waiver or release by the would-be plaintiff.” Further, “in an ‘express assumption of the risk’ case, the plaintiff’s consent relieves the defendant of any duty to protect the plaintiff from injury.”
The Missouri law concerning releases was analyzed.
Although exculpatory clauses in contracts releasing an individual from his or her own future negligence are disfavored, they are not prohibited as against public policy.” “[C]ontracts exonerating a party from acts of future negligence are to be ‘strictly construed against the party claiming the benefit of the contract, and clear and explicit language in the contract is required to absolve a person from such liability.'” Missouri law requires “clear, unambiguous, unmistakable, and conspicuous language in order to release a party from his or her own future negligence,” and “[g]eneral language will not suffice.” “‘The words “negligence” or “fault” or their equivalents must be used conspicuously so that a clear and unmistakable waiver and shifting of risk occurs. There must be no doubt that a reasonable person agreeing to an exculpatory clause actually understands what future claims he or she is waiving.’
In this case, the release was not signed because of a legal relationship between the parties, but was signed as part of accessing the land where the accident occurred. Meaning both parties signed the release to ride on the land. Consequently, the argument centered around whether that release was written to protect parties such as the defendant in this case. Whether the release signed by the plaintiff to ride on the land of the landowner provided protection to the owner of the horse that kicked her.
Additionally, [o]nly parties to a contract and any third-party beneficiaries of a contract have standing to enforce that contract.” To be deemed a third-party beneficiary, the terms of the contract must clearly express intent to benefit the third party or an identifiable class of which the third party is a member. When an express declaration of intent is lacking, a strong presumption exists “‘that the third party is not a beneficiary and that the parties contracted to benefit only themselves.'”
As in most other states, to understand a contract you must determine the effect intended by the parties to be given to the contract. Each clause should be read in the context of the entire contract, not as individual issues. The information within the “four corners” of the contract is the only information that can be reviewed by a court in determining the meaning of a contract, unless the contract is ambiguous, then outside information can be brought into to define the ambiguous section.
A contract is ambiguous when “duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the words used in the contract.”
The language of the release referred to “other participants.” The defendant argued that she was the intended beneficiary of this language. If the defendant was found to be the intended beneficiary, then the release would stop the claims of the plaintiff. The term other participants usually follows the name of the party wanting the release to be signed. In this case, the landowner would have their name as the party to be protected and the clause and other participants followed. Did the term have legal meaning and apply to the defendant or was the term just dicta, additional language in the agreement that had no meaning.
The plaintiff argued that she did not know what she was signing and therefore, could not have intended the release to benefit the defendant. The plaintiff also argued the phrase “other participants” was ambiguous.
However, the court disagreed and found it covered the defendant and was not a catch-all phrase. The court found the defendant was a participant within the meaning of the words and the language of the release.
The final failure of the plaintiff’s argument fell when the court brought up that in her own deposition, she characterized the defendant as another participant in the trail ride.
The next argument, is another argument that is surfacing in plaintiff’s arguments across the US. The plaintiff argued the release should not apply because it purports to relieve liability for more than simple negligence. Meaning the release was written to cover intentional torts, gross negligence and other activities of the public interest.
However, the court did not agree with that argument because the release did not refer to any additional legal theories other than negligence. The release only used the term negligence and did not sue any language that extended that term to a greater definition.
The court also quoted a Missouri Supreme Court decision that held that the plaintiff could not get a release thrown out by arguing it covered gross negligence. Missouri does not recognize gross negligence. Since it does not exist under Missouri’s law, it could not be used to void a release.
In DeCormier v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Group, Inc., the Missouri Supreme Court stated that it would “enforce exculpatory agreements to protect a party from liability for their own negligence” and a plaintiff could not “avoid this rule by alleging [a defendant was] grossly negligent because Missouri’s courts do not recognize degrees of negligence at common law.” Thus, it rejected the precise argument plaintiff has raised in this case both before the trial court and on appeal.
Nor does Missouri recognize a cause of action for recklessness.
The next argument was the release was not clear because it was mixed in with another form. The top part of the form was labeled a registration form, and the bottom part was a release.
The court recognized this but found the release part of the form was labeled Release of Liability – Read Before Signing and separated by a dotted line from the top of the form. The significant language in the release was also capitalized for emphasis.
The court held with the trial court and found the release signed by the parties to ride on the property protected the defendant in this case.
So Now What?
This is the first case I have found where a release was used to protect a third party from a lawsuit. I have long argued that this should be the case. Even though the release was signed for a land owner, any litigation is going to cost many parties money. The decision does not say, however, in cases like this many times, the landowner and other participants in the ride are deposed, and as such they lose work and possibly incur legal fees for the depositions.
Having the release be part of a registration form was an issue. Eliminate the argument by the plaintiff and make it a separate form. If you need more information than what is normally required on a release collect it a different way or at the end.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Pennsylvania No Duty Rule stops lawsuit by underage rider.
Posted: May 18, 2020 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Minors, Youth, Children, Pennsylvania | Tags: appreciated, assume a risk, Assumption of risk, assumption of the risk, comparative negligence, cross-motions, Dirt Bike, Doctrine of Assumption of the Risk, Duty of care, injuries, Jump, material fact, minors, negligence claim, No Duty, No Duty Rule, Off Road, operators, parental consent, parties, plaintiffs', rider's, riding, Risks, skiing, Summary judgment, track Leave a commentA minor with 12 years of riding and competing on dirt bikes could not sue the commercial operation after crashing on the course.
Hawkins v. Switchback MX, LLC, 339 F. Supp. 3d 543, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155249
State: Pennsylvania; United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
Plaintiff: Kameron Hawkins and Amber Lynn Durbin
Defendant: Switchback MX, LLC d/b/a Switchback Raceway
Plaintiff Claims: negligence and negligence per se
Defendant Defenses: Pennsylvania No Duty Rule (Assumption of the Risk)
Holding: For the Defendant
Year: 2019
Summary
The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act specifically identifies downhill skiing and off-road riding as exempt from the comparative negligence act. In both those sports, the participant assumes the risk of their injuries due from the inherent risks of the sports.
Facts
Hawkins [plaintiff] began riding a dirt bike at the age of five or six.. He learned the ins and outs of dirt bike [motorized] riding from his father, who raced dirt bikes and often brought Hawkins to spectate at off-road races Hawkins began participating in races himself at “a young age” and even secured sponsorships. He testified that he was aware of the dangers of riding dirt bikes from early on in his experience, that his father instructed him to avoid jumps that “you don’t think you can handle,” and that he wore protective gear to guard against the risk of injury. He acknowledges that dirt bike riding is “a dangerous sport,” that “you could get hurt” on a dirt bike, and that a fall could cause “injury . . . or even death.” Despite his protective measures, Hawkins has suffered injuries in the past riding a dirt bike. Hawkins had been to Switchback on three prior occasions: once as a spectator, once as pit crew member for his friend Jonathan Franjko, and once as a rider.
The events preceding Hawkins’ accident on January 9, 2016 are disputed by the parties and not fully explored in the Rule 56 record. According to Hawkins, he arrived at Switchback with several friends and met with Brader, who asked them whether they had been to Switchback before. Hawkins relayed that, after the group responded affirmatively, Brader told them to sign in, accepted their payment, and provided them with wristbands to attach to their helmets to indicate they had been authorized to ride. He denied ever being asked to present identification and did not recall being asked his age.
Switchback’s account diverges considerably. According to Brader, Hawkins entered the indoor facility on January 9, 2016 with Franjko, who had a Switchback membership card. Brader did not recognize Hawkins and thought he appeared to be under the age of 18. Brader reported that he told Hawkins he needed to “take home a waiver and fill it out” and that he had to “bring [the waiver] out next time and join us another day.” Brader does not recall Hawkins signing in on Switchback’s sign-in sheet for January 9, 2016, but testified that he told Hawkins he “could not ride” without waiver and consent forms on file. Brader also testified that he does not know how Hawkins ultimately came to access the track on January 9, 2016. It is undisputed that Durbin did not execute a parental consent form allowing Hawkins to participate in dirt bike riding at Switchback.
On January 9, 2016, Hawkins somehow gained access Switchback’s indoor dirt bike racing track. Hawkins “attempted a jump, without enough speed,” on one of the track’s “table top jumps,” which caused the frame of his dirt bike to hit the ground and “flip [the] bike and Hawkins over.” According to Brader, it was only after this wreck that he became aware that Hawkins had accessed the track. Brader testified that Hawkins “didn’t look right” and that he offered to call an ambulance. Franjko confirmed that Brader asked “a couple times” whether Hawkins wanted medical attention. Hawkins left Switchback’s facility with his friends without receiving medical attention. Hawkins was subsequently treated for injuries including a lacerated kidney and pancreas, trauma to his spleen, a broken hip, a concussion, and post-concussion syndrome. The accident occurred four months before Hawkins’ 18th birthday.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The court first reviewed the requirements to prove a negligence claim in Pennsylvania.
Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must prove the “four basic elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages. That is, plaintiffs must prove: (1) the existence of a legal duty requiring a certain standard of conduct; (2) breach of that duty by the defendant; (3) a causal connection between defendant’s breach and plaintiffs’ injury; and (4) actual loss or damages.
The court then reviewed the claims of the plaintiff as whether the defendant owed a duty to the minor plaintiff because the plaintiff assumed the risk of his injuries.
The defendant’s position was it had no duty to protect the plaintiff because of the inherent risk set out in the “no duty” rule in the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act.
The plaintiff’s response to that argument was the negligence of the defendant was in allowing the plaintiff to access the track.
The court looked at the conflicting arguments by next reviewing assumption of the risk as applied in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act eliminated the defense of assumption of the risk in all areas except two when it enacted the statute. The two exemptions were downhill skiing and off-road vehicle riding. Meaning in those two situations, the no-duty rule retained the defense of assumption of the risk. The defendant has no duty to protect the plaintiff from the inherent risks of the sport of downhill skiing or off-road riding.
The court then reviewed whether assumption of the risk applied to minors. That is “the court must ask what the “particular minor plaintiff knows, sees, hears, comprehends, and appreciates” with respect to the risk involved.”
Under Pennsylvania law, to prove assumption:
…the court must find that the plaintiff (1) “consciously appreciated the risk” attending the activity, (2) assumed the risk of injury by nonetheless engaging in the activity, and (3) sustained an injury that was “the same risk of injury that was appreciated and assumed.”
A factor in determining whether or not a minor assumed the risk is the minor’s age and experience. In this case that worked for the defendant because the minor was only four months from turning eighteen at the time of the accident and had been riding for twelve years.
The court then defined inherent risk as a risk “which “cannot be removed without altering the fundamental nature” of the activity.”
The court broke down the inherent risks of off-road riding as identified in the statute, to see if the plaintiff’s injury landing on a table-top jump was inherent to the sport.
Common sense dictates that the risk of a fall or collision that does not involve another rider or object is equally inherent in the activity. Indeed, Hawkins’ own experience bears this out—he testified that his accident on January 9, 2016, was not his first; that he knew from personal experience that attempting jumps carried a certain risk; and that he wore protective gear in an attempt to mitigate that risk. We find that the risk of suffering serious injury when attempting a dirt bike jump is one which “cannot be removed without altering the fundamental nature” of dirt bike riding and is thus inherent in the activity.
We further conclude that reasonable persons could not debate whether Hawkins appreciated and knowingly assumed that risk. Hawkins was nearly 18 years old at the time of the accident and had been riding dirt bikes for more than 12 years. He was a vastly experienced rider. He was well aware that dirt bike riding carried the risk of serious injury and even death. Indeed, Hawkins acknowledged that a dirt bike presents a certain danger “even when the bike’s on the ground.” Given this unequivocal record testimony, we have little difficulty finding that this particular rider—plaintiff Kameron Hawkins—knew, appreciated, and assumed the risks attending off-road dirt bike riding.
For these reasons, the court found the minor, because of his age and experience assumed the risk of his injuries, and the defendant was not liable for those injuries because of the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act.
So Now What?
Assumption of the risk in most states is the only defense you have to injuries a minor receives. Unless your state has a specific statute that identifies your activity as one with inherent risk a person assumes, you need to prove the minor in your case assumed those risks.
To do that you must maximize all the avenues to educate and document that education of a minor, in fact, all participants in your activity or business.
Post videos of your activity showing crashes, flips and falls on your website and social media. Point out possible risks on your site and social media. Then confirm in some way that the minor observed that information.
You can go so far as to ask the minor and/or the minor’s parents of their experience in the sport. Have they participated in the sport before, seen it on TV, participated for how many years, etc.
A release is your best defense to a lawsuit, but for minors, in those states where releases are not valid and or minors, assumption of the risk is your best and sometimes only defense.
For more information see:
States that allow a parent to sign away a minor’s right to sue
States that do not Support the Use of a Release
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
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Perkinson v. Courson, 2018 IL App (4th) 170364, 97 N.E.3d 574, 2018 Ill. App. LEXIS 120, 420 Ill. Dec. 692
Posted: May 14, 2020 Filed under: Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, Illinois, Missouri, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: additionally, Animal, argues, Assumption of risk, Cause of action, Choice of Law, conflict of laws, contacts, defense motion, deposition, Equine, Equine Liabililty Act, Exculpatory clause, Friends, Gross negligence, Horse, horseback riding, injuries, kicked, Motion to Dismiss, parties, principles, Release, RELEASEES, ride, Risks, signing, sponsors, Summary judgment, the Animal Control Act, Trail, Trial court, Waiver Leave a commentPerkinson v. Courson, 2018 IL App (4th) 170364, 97 N.E.3d 574, 2018 Ill. App. LEXIS 120, 420 Ill. Dec. 692
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District
March 12, 2018, Filed
DEANNA L. PERKINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SARAH COURSON, Defendant-Appellee.
Prior History: [***1] Appeal from Circuit Court of Jersey County. No. 15L31. Honorable Eric S. Pistorius, Judge Presiding.
Counsel: Timothy J. Chartrand, of Williamson, Webster, Falb & Glisson, of Alton, for appellant.
Amy L. Jackson and Samantha Dudzinski, of Rammelkamp Bradney, P.C., of Jacksonville, for appellee.
Judges: PRESIDING JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Steigmann and Turner concurred in the judgment and opinion.
[****698] [**580] PRESIDING JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Steigmann and Turner concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
[*P1] In August 2014, plaintiff, Deanna L. Perkinson, was kicked by a horse and injured. In December 2015, she filed a two-count complaint against the horse’s owner, defendant Sarah Courson, alleging a violation of the Illinois Animal Control Act (510 ILCS 5/1 to 35 (West 2014)) (count I) and negligence (count II). Although plaintiff and defendant are Illinois residents, the incident at issue occurred in Missouri and the trial court determined Missouri law controlled the conflict. Following that determination, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss count I of plaintiff’s complaint and her motion for summary judgment as to count II. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the court erred in (1) ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss count I of the complaint because the motion was brought pursuant to the [***2] wrong statutory section, (2) finding Missouri law applied to the parties’ controversy, and (3) finding defendant was entitled to summary judgment on count II of the complaint. We affirm.
[*P2] I. BACKGROUND
[*P3] In her December 2015 complaint, plaintiff alleged that both she and defendant were Illinois residents. On August 29, 2014, they were horseback riding alongside one another on a public trail when plaintiff was kicked by the horse defendant was riding, which defendant owned. Plaintiff maintained she sustained permanent and disfiguring injuries to her right leg as a result of being kicked. In connection with count I of her complaint, alleging a violation of the Animal Control Act, plaintiff also asserted that at the time and place of her injury, she did not provoke defendant’s horse, had been conducting herself peaceably, and was in a location where she had a legal right to be. Relative to count II, alleging negligence, plaintiff asserted defendant owed her a duty of care but breached that duty by (1) failing to warn plaintiff of the horse’s violent propensity to kick others, (2) failing to properly train the [**581] [****699] horse, (3) riding too close to plaintiff and plaintiff’s horse when knowing that [***3] her horse had a violent propensity to kick others, and (4) riding her horse contrary to industry and practice norms. Plaintiff further alleged that as a direct and proximate result of defendant’s negligence, she was kicked by defendant’s horse without provocation and injured.
[*P4] In January 2016, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. She first sought dismissal of count I pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014)). Specifically, defendant argued that the incident at issue occurred while the parties were on a horseback riding trip in Eminence, Missouri, and, as a result, Missouri law governed “the pending litigation.” She further maintained that because count I of plaintiff’s complaint was based entirely on Illinois statutory law, that count necessarily failed to state a claim upon which any relief could be granted and had to be dismissed. Defendant further sought dismissal of both count I and count II under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2014)). She argued plaintiff signed a “‘Release of Liability'” (Release) prior to horseback riding, which, under Missouri law, barred her claims.
[*P5] In February 2016, plaintiff responded to defendant’s motion, arguing Illinois [***4] law applied to both counts of her complaint. Further, she argued the Release referenced by defendant should be disregarded because defendant failed to attach a sworn or certified copy of the Release to her motion to dismiss. Plaintiff alternatively argued the Release was against Illinois public policy, vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and could not be relied upon by defendant who was “a non-party outside of the Release.”
[*P6] In March 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss. At the hearing, defendant withdrew the portion of her motion that sought dismissal pursuant to section 2-619 and proceeded only with the portion of her motion that sought dismissal of count I under section 2-615. Ultimately, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss count I, holding as follows:
“[I]n conflict of law cases the courts must determine which forum has the most significant contacts with the litigation. Further, there is a legal presumption that the law of the state where the injury occurred applies in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties unless Illinois has a more significant relation to the conflict. This court finds that *** plaintiff has failed to establish that Illinois has [***5] a more significant relationship to the conflict. As such, Count I, which is based on the [Illinois] Animal Control Act, is hereby dismissed.”
[*P7] In April 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s ruling as to count I of her complaint. She argued the court erred in its application of existing law as the case authority cited by both parties heavily favored application of Illinois law rather than Missouri law. Additionally, plaintiff maintained the court erred by placing the burden on her to establish that Illinois had a more significant relationship to the matter, rather than on defendant, the moving party.
[*P8] In June 2016, a hearing was conducted on plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. In its written order, the trial court stated it had considered both plaintiff’s motion and defendant’s response and “noted, for the first time,” that the question of which state’s law to apply involved factual determinations regarding the nature of the parties’ relationship, the planning of their trip to Missouri, and the training of defendant’s horse while in Illinois. The court [**582] [****700] pointed out that no affidavits or deposition testimony had been presented by the parties and elected to “keep plaintiff’s [***6] Motion to Reconsider under advisement until the[ ] facts or issues [could] be fleshed out during the discovery process.”
[*P9] In September 2016, plaintiff filed a supplemental brief to her motion to reconsider, and defendant filed a supplemental response. Plaintiff attached the depositions of both parties to her filing.
[*P10] During her deposition, plaintiff testified she resided in Dow, Illinois, both at the time of the incident at issue and at the time of her deposition. She had known defendant since 2003. They met through mutual friends and were brought together through the activity of horseback riding. Plaintiff and her husband had also purchased defendant’s house.
[*P11] Plaintiff testified she engaged in horseback riding on and off since the age of five. She and her husband owned nine horses and were part of a group of friends that rode horses together. Plaintiff estimated that 20 to 25 people were in their group, including defendant. She further estimated that she and defendant went horseback riding together approximately five or six times a year. Within plaintiff’s group of horseback riding friends, there were people that plaintiff was closer to and whom she would talk with about going on horseback [***7] riding trips. Plaintiff testified she was not close friends with defendant. She denied that they spent time socially at one another’s homes or that they participated in any activities together other than horseback riding.
[*P12] On examination by her own counsel, plaintiff testified that prior to August 2014, she considered defendant her friend. They had ridden horses together in Illinois and “hung out” at the home of a mutual friend. Also, they had each other’s telephone numbers and were Facebook friends.
[*P13] In August 2014, individuals from plaintiff’s horseback riding group went on a trip to Cross Country Trail Ride, LLC (Cross Country), in Eminence, Missouri. According to plaintiff, each year, Cross Country organized a trail ride event during Labor Day weekend. She had previously attended the event approximately six times. Plaintiff testified Cross Country provided its paying guests with a campsite, stalls for horses, entertainment, and food.
[*P14] On August 28, 2014, plaintiff arrived at Cross Country with her husband, daughter, and stepdaughter. The family took four of their own horses and met up with other individuals from plaintiff’s group of friends. Plaintiff stated she had not known whether [***8] defendant would be on the trip but saw defendant at Cross Country on the evening of her arrival.
[*P15] Plaintiff acknowledged signing certain documents upon her arrival at Cross Country on August 28, 2014. She identified her signature on forms that were submitted as exhibits during her deposition and recalled signing similar forms during her previous visits to Cross Country. Plaintiff acknowledged that part of the form she signed was titled “Release of Liability” and instructed her to read before signing; however, plaintiff testified she did not read the form because she had driven a long distance to get to Cross Country and believed it “was just to register.” Plaintiff admitted signing similar forms on behalf of her daughter and stepdaughter.
[*P16] Plaintiff testified that prior to signing the Cross Country forms, she understood that there was a risk of injury when participating in horseback riding events, including falling off a horse or being kicked. Despite that risk of injury, she participated anyway. Further, plaintiff testified she would have proceeded with the trail ride at Cross Country if she had read the form she signed, which included a [**583] [****701] warning about the risk of injury when participating [***9] in horseback riding events and statements indicating she fully assumed the risks of participation. Plaintiff acknowledged that the form she signed used the phrase “other participants.” She agreed that defendant would have been “another participant” in the activities at Cross Country.
[*P17] On August 29, 2014, plaintiff, her family, and members of her group intended to take a six-hour trail ride on one of the “identified trails” at Cross Country. Plaintiff was riding a horse named Chester, and defendant was riding a horse named Little Bit. Plaintiff did not recall ever previously being around Little Bit. Further, she acknowledged consuming beer during the trail ride. Plaintiff stated she also observed that defendant was consuming alcohol and believed defendant was intoxicated. During a break on the trail ride, defendant told plaintiff that Little Bit “had kicked [defendant’s] husband while her husband was in the pasture.” She did not remember defendant telling her when the kick occurred or that the horse was in heat at the time. Plaintiff stated she did not notice anything concerning about Little Bit’s behavior while horseback riding on the day of the incident.
[*P18] At some point during the trail [***10] ride, plaintiff and defendant began riding next to one another and were talking. Plaintiff did not recall who approached whom or how long they rode next to each other. As they were riding together down a hill, defendant’s horse kicked out with both of its rear legs and struck plaintiff on her right shin. Plaintiff did not know what caused the horse to kick. Following the kick, plaintiff had to be helped off her horse, and an ambulance was called to the scene. Plaintiff stated she had a broken bone in her shin and, ultimately, underwent two surgeries.
[*P19] Plaintiff testified that during the trail ride defendant should have put a red ribbon on her horse’s tail to warn others that her horse was known to kick. She asserted, however, that the presence of a red ribbon would not have altered her own behavior. Additionally, plaintiff stated she returned to Cross Country for horseback riding after the August 2014 incident with defendant’s horse. Although she did not plan on attending Cross Country’s Labor Day event in 2016, she did plan to go to another location in Missouri for a Labor Day trail ride.
[*P20] As stated, the record also contains defendant’s deposition. Defendant testified she resided in [***11] Farina, Illinois, with her husband. She met plaintiff in 2003 through her former sister-in-law who was friends with plaintiff. Also, in 2013, plaintiff purchased defendant’s house in Dow, Illinois. Defendant testified she advertised the sale of her house on Facebook and plaintiff “friended [her] on Facebook” and contacted her by telephone about the house. Defendant noted her phone number was in her advertisement. She was not aware of plaintiff having her phone number prior to the time she advertised the sale of her house. Defendant considered plaintiff to be an acquaintance rather than a friend, noting they only socialized through mutual friends and always went horseback riding in a group setting. She estimated that she went horseback riding with plaintiff twice a year since 2006 but did not recall whether all of those occasions were in Illinois.
[*P21] Defendant testified she grew up around horses and regularly went horseback riding. Since 2003, she owned 11 different horses. Defendant stated someone else would train her horses to ride and then she “worked the tweaks out.” Specifically, defendant stated she trained her horses, including Little Bit, to “neck rein,” [**584] [****702] not to ride too close to [***12] other horses, and in “ground manners.”
[*P22] In 2012, defendant purchased Little Bit from one of the members of her horseback riding group of friends. She kept Little Bit at her farm in Farina, Illinois. In 2013, Little Bit was trained for 30 days in Kampsville, Illinois, by an individual named Samuel Kaufman. Thereafter, defendant took over. Defendant testified her training with Little Bit included going on several trail rides with other horses. She estimated Little Bit went on six trail rides before the Cross Country trail ride in August 2014. Defendant stated that, prior to August 2014, Little Bit kicked at another horse in a pasture while she was in heat. During that incident, Little Bit made contact with defendant’s husband who “was in the way.” Defendant denied that any other kicking incidents occurred prior to August 2014.
[*P23] Defendant testified she had been to Cross Country eight times prior to August 2014. She always went to Cross Country with a group. Defendant recalled seeing plaintiff at Cross Country prior to 2014 but did not recall if they rode horses together. In August 2014, defendant was at Cross Country with her husband, mother, and father. During the August 29, 2014, trail [***13] ride, defendant rode Little Bit, who had not previously been on a trail ride at Cross Country.
[*P24] Defendant acknowledged drinking alcohol on the trail ride but stated she did not know if she was intoxicated. She estimated she had less than six beers, the amount she typically packed in her cooler. Defendant denied noticing anything peculiar about Little Bit during the trail ride. However, she asserted she told all of the other horseback riders that she would stay toward the back of the group because Little Bit was young, she did not know whether the horse would kick, and defendant did not totally trust the horse. Defendant testified she trusted Little Bit enough to ride her with other people but “didn’t trust that she maybe wouldn’t kick.”
[*P25] Defendant described the incident involving plaintiff, stating they were coming down a hill side by side when Little Bit “trotted up ahead.” She then heard plaintiff yell out and observed plaintiff reaching for her leg. Defendant estimated that she and plaintiff had been a little more than arm’s distance apart and were having a conversation before the incident. She stated she did not know why Little Bit kicked. In the fall of 2014, defendant sold Little [***14] Bit. She testified she was not comfortable with the horse, noting an occasion when Little Bit bucked her off after being “spooked” by cattle.
[*P26] In October 2016, the trial court entered a written order finding no reason to reconsider its previous ruling and denying plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. In so holding, the court noted it reviewed its prior decision and the parties’ additional arguments. It stated the additional facts presented to it only further supported its decision to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss.
[*P27] In February 2017, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to count II of plaintiff’s complaint, alleging negligence, as well as a memorandum of law in support of her motion. She alleged that based on the deposition testimony of plaintiff and defendant, no question of material fact existed and she was entitled to judgment in her favor as a matter of law. Defendant maintained plaintiff was unable to establish that defendant owed her a duty, arguing that plaintiff both implicitly and explicitly assumed the risks associated with horseback riding. Also, she argued that plaintiff’s “testimony undermine[d] any and all proffered allegations of breach of duty.”
[*P28] [**585] [****703] Defendant [***15] attached the parties’ depositions to her filing, as well as copies of the Cross Country documents plaintiff acknowledged signing. The documents included forms titled “RELEASE OF LIABILITY—READ BEFORE SIGINING [sic],” which provided as follows:
“In consideration of being allowed to participate in any way, including but not limited to trail riding, competing, officiating, working for, recreating in any fashion while visiting Cross Country Trail Ride, LLC, and its trail ride program, its related events and activities, I *** the undersigned, acknowledge, appreciate, and agree that;
1. The risk of injury from the activities involved in this program is significant, including the potential for permanent paralysis and death, and while particular skills, equipment, and personal discipline may reduce the risk, the risk of serious injury does exist; and,
2. I KNOWINGLY AND FREELY ASSUME ALL SUCH RISKS, both known and unknown, EVEN IF ARISING FROM NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES or others, and assume full responsibility for my participation; and,
3. I willingly agree to comply with the stated and customary terms of participation. If, however, I observe any unusual significant hazard during my presence [***16] or participation, I will remove myself from participation and bring such to the attention of the Company immediately; and,
4. I, for myself and on behalf of my heirs, assigns, personal representatives, and next of kin, HEREBY RELEASE, INDEMNIFY, AND HOLD HARMLESS CROSS COUNTRY TRAIL RIDE, LLC, officers, officials, agents and/or employees, other participants, sponsoring agencies, sponsors, advertisers, and, if applicable, owners and lessors of premises used for the activity (‘Releasees’), WITH RESPECT TO ANY AND ALL INJURY, DISABILITY, DEATH, or loss or damage to person or property associated with my presence or participation, WHETHER ARISING FROM THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE, to the fullest extent permitted by law.
5. Releasor expressly agrees that this release, waiver, and indemnity agreement is intended to be as broad and inclusive as permitted by the laws of the State of Missouri and that if any portion thereof is held invalid, it is agreed that the valid portion shall, not withstanding, continue in full legal force and effect.”
[*P29] In March 2017, plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s motion, and in April 2017 defendant filed a reply. Both parties relied on Missouri [***17] substantive law when addressing defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In April 2017, the trial court also conducted a hearing in the matter and entered a written order granting defendant’s motion. Although the court’s written order did not specify the basis for its ruling, the court’s oral comments at the hearing reflect that it relied upon the Release plaintiff signed at Cross Country. Specifically, it stated as follows:
“Based upon the Release and without going to what is otherwise, I think a factual question, I think the Release in and of itself is sufficient to provide a basis for [defendant’s] Motion for Summary Judgment. It identifies itself as a release. It specifically tells the person who’s signing it to sign it and [plaintiff] sign[ed] not only for herself, but for her underage children. It says ‘please read this before you sign it[.’] It specifically addresses other participants. That’s as strong of language as you can get. So based *** on that, and that alone, the [**586] [****704] court’s [going to] grant the Motion for Summary Judgment.”
[*P31] II. ANALYSIS
[*P32] A. Statutory Designation for Motion to Dismiss
[*P33] On appeal, plaintiff first argues the trial court erred in granting [***18] defendant’s motion to dismiss count I of her complaint, alleging a violation of the Animal Control Act, because it was brought under the wrong section of the Code. She notes defendant sought dismissal of count I pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014)) but argues that, because defendant’s motion “raised an affirmative, factual defense,” it should have been brought pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2014)).
[*P34]
“A section 2-615 motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects apparent on its face.” Bueker v. Madison County, 2016 IL 120024, ¶ 7, 410 Ill. Dec. 883, 72 N.E.3d 269. “The only matters to be considered in ruling on such a motion are the allegations of the pleadings themselves.” Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 485, 639 N.E.2d 1282, 1289, 203 Ill. Dec. 463 (1994). Conversely, “[a] motion to dismiss under section 2-619 [citation] admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim, but asserts certain defects or defenses outside the pleading that defeat the claim.” In re Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 20, 390 Ill. Dec. 123, 28 N.E.3d 776. Where grounds for dismissal do not appear on the face of the complaint, the section 2-619 motion must be supported by affidavit. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a) (West 2014).
[*P35] As noted, defendant sought dismissal of count I of plaintiff’s complaint, arguing Missouri law applied to the parties’ conflict and, as a result, plaintiff’s claim asserting liability based solely on an Illinois statute—the Animal Control Act—could [***19] not stand. Defendant brought her motion under section 2-615 of the Code, and as stated, plaintiff argues defendant should have designated section 2-619.
[*P36] Here, it appears defendant labeled her motion to dismiss count I with the wrong statutory section. Section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code provides for dismissal where “the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2014)). “[A]ffirmative matter” has been held to include “the basic issue as to which state’s law is to apply to the action.” Ingersoll v. Klein, 106 Ill. App. 2d 330, 336, 245 N.E.2d 288, 291 (1969), aff’d, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); see also Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d at 487 (citing Ingersoll, 46 Ill. 2d at 42, for the proposition that a choice-of-law defense had “been considered ‘affirmative matter’ so as to negate completely the asserted claim”).
[*P37] Additionally, our supreme court has acknowledged that the conflict-of-law methodology “may raise factual issues.” Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 227 Ill. 2d 147, 154, 879 N.E.2d 893, 898, 316 Ill. Dec. 505 (2007). Such factual issues are properly considered and addressed in the context of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, where a trial court may consider pleadings, depositions, and affidavits when making its ruling (Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill. 2d 181, 185, 650 N.E.2d 1000, 1002, 209 Ill. Dec. 27 (1995)), rather than in the context of section 2-615 motion, where only the pleadings may be considered (Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d at 485).
[*P38] Nevertheless, even if defendant improperly labeled her motion to dismiss count I, no reversible error [***20] occurred. We note plaintiff failed to object to the [**587] [****705] statutory designation in defendant’s motion to dismiss. Thus, she has forfeited her challenge to that designation on appeal. American National Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 192 Ill. 2d 274, 280, 735 N.E.2d 551, 554, 248 Ill. Dec. 900 (2000). Moreover, setting plaintiff’s forfeiture aside, we note that a defendant’s error in labeling a motion to dismiss is not fatal where the nonmoving party has suffered no prejudice. Wallace v. Smyth, 203 Ill. 2d 441, 447, 786 N.E.2d 980, 984, 272 Ill. Dec. 146 (2002). In this instance, plaintiff acknowledges that the trial court allowed the choice-of-law issue to be “fleshed out” through the discovery process. Further, the record shows the issue was given full and thorough consideration by the trial court. Thus, plaintiff had a sufficient opportunity to be heard, and we find no reversible error.
[*P39] B. Choice-of-Law Determination
[*P40] Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in finding Missouri law applied to the parties’ conflict. She contends that a choice-of-law analysis and the facts applicable to that analysis support the conclusion that Illinois has a more significant relationship to her cause of action.
[*P41] Initially, we note that a de novo standard of review applies to this issue. Such a standard is applicable on review of a dismissal under either section 2-615 or 2-619 of the Code. Patrick Eng’g, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31, 976 N.E.2d 318, 364 Ill. Dec. 40. Additionally, we apply a de [***21] novo standard when reviewing a trial court’s choice-of-law determination. Townsend, 227 Ill. 2d at 154.
[*P42]
“A choice-of-law determination is required only when a difference in law will make a difference in the outcome.” Id. at 155. Thus, “a choice-of-law analysis begins by isolating the issue and defining the conflict.” Id. Here, the parties agree that conflicts exist between Missouri and Illinois law. Notably, they identify Missouri’s lack of a statute that is equivalent to the Illinois Animal Control Act. If Illinois law applies, claimant can maintain the cause of action alleged in count I of her complaint, which is based on that Illinois statute; however, if Missouri law applies, count I of her complaint must be dismissed as it would state no cause of action upon which relief could be granted under Missouri law. Thus, we agree that a conflict exists that will result in a difference in outcome.
[*P43] Next, when making a choice-of-law determination, “the forum court applies the choice-of-law rules of its own state.” Id. Illinois has adopted the choice-of-law analysis contained in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) (Second Restatement).Townsend, 227 Ill. 2d . at 163-64. Under the Second Restatement, a presumption exists in favor of applying the [***22] law of the state where the injury occurred. Id. at 163. The presumption “may be overcome only by showing a more or greater significant relationship to another state.” (Emphases in original.) Id. Specifically, section 146 of the Restatement provides as follows:
“In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in [the Second Restatement] to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (1971).
[*P44]
Once a court chooses the presumptively applicable law, it “tests” its [**588] [****706] choice against various “principles” and “contacts” as set forth in sections 6 and 145 of the Second Restatement. Townsend, 227 Ill. 2d at 164. Section 6(2) sets forth the following relevant factors for consideration:
“(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field [***23] of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.”
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2) (1971).
[*P45] Additionally, section 145(2) sets forth the following “[c]ontacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of [section] 6“:
“(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2) (1971).
The contacts set forth in section 145(2) “are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.” Id.
[*P46] Practically, it makes no difference whether a court first considers the section 145(2) contacts or the section 6(2) general principles. Townsend, 227 Ill. 2d at 168. “In either case[,] the Second Restatement’s goal is the same—to ensure that a court is not merely ‘counting contacts,’ and that each contact is meaningful in light of the policies sought to be vindicated by the conflicting laws.” Id.
[*P47] Here, plaintiff was kicked by defendant’s horse while on a trail ride in Missouri. Thus, Missouri is “the state where the injury occurred,” and a presumption exists in favor [***24] of applying Missouri law unless, as plaintiff argues, Illinois has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. In testing this presumption, we first consider relevant “contacts” as set forth in section 145(2) of the Restatement.
[*P48] 1. Section 145 Contacts
[*P49] The first contact for consideration is the place where the injury occurred. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2)(a) (1971). As discussed, plaintiff was kicked by defendant’s horse in Missouri, and thus, that is where her injury occurred. Plaintiff maintains this factor is of minimal importance because the location of her injury was merely fortuitous in that the incident could just as easily have occurred in Illinois. To support her argument, plaintiff cites cases with fact scenarios that involve interstate travelers and motor vehicle accidents, which courts have determined could just as easily have occurred in another state. Murphy v. Mancari’s Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 408 Ill. App. 3d 722, 727-28, 948 N.E.2d 233, 238, 350 Ill. Dec. 164 (2011); Miller v. Hayes, 233 Ill. App. 3d 847, 852, 600 N.E.2d 34, 38, 175 Ill. Dec. 411 (1992); Schulze v. Illinois Highway Transportation Co., 97 Ill. App. 3d 508, 510-11, 423 N.E.2d 278, 280, 53 Ill. Dec. 86 (1981).
[*P50] [****707] [**589] Specifically, in Murphy, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 723, the plaintiffs were Illinois residents who brought suit against an Illinois automobile dealer that sold them a vehicle after one of the plaintiffs was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Michigan. The trial court determined Michigan law applied to the liability and damages issues in the case, and the plaintiffs appealed. Id. at 724.
[*P51] On review, the First District [***25] noted that, in the context of a choice-of-law analysis, “situations may exist where the place of injury is merely fortuitous and, therefore, not an important contact.” Id. at 727. In the case before it, the court found that the injured plaintiff’s presence in Michigan was not fortuitous because “[h]e was purposefully and voluntarily in Michigan, driving to his weekend home with the intention of staying there for several days.” Id. at 727. However, it also determined that a purposeful presence in Michigan did not mean that the accident “could not have happened in Michigan fortuitously.” Id. It pointed out that the cause of the accident had not been determined and “[t]he same type of accident and the same type of injuries could have just as easily happened in Illinois.” Id. at 727-28. Thus, the court concluded the place of injury was not an important consideration in the context of the case before it. Id. at 728.
[*P52] Defendant argues Murphy is distinguishable from the present case, and we agree. Notably, this case does not involve a motor vehicle accident that happened by chance in one state versus another. Instead, plaintiff’s injury occurred at the planned destination of both parties. The specific location, Cross Country, focused [***26] on horseback riding activities in which both parties planned to engage. Additionally, both plaintiff and defendant had previously visited Cross Country on multiple occasions.
[*P53] We note comment e of section 145 provides as follows:
“In the case of personal injuries or of injuries to tangible things, the place where the injury occurred is a contact that, as to most issues, plays an important role in the selection of the state of the applicable law [citation]. *** This is so for the reason among others that persons who cause injury in a state should not ordinarily escape liabilities imposed by the local law of that state on account of the injury. ***
Situations do arise, however, where the place of injury will not play an important role in the selection of the state of the applicable law. This will be so, for example, when the place of injury can be said to be fortuitous or when for other reasons it bears little relation to the occurrence and the parties with respect to the particular issue ***.” (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. e (1971).
Under the facts of this case, we cannot say that the place of injury bears little relation to the occurrence or the parties. This is particularly true in light of the underlying issues presented [***27] in plaintiff’s complaint, which almost exclusively involve the parties’ behavior and conduct while horseback riding at Cross Country in Missouri. Therefore, we find this contact weighs in favor of applying Missouri law.
[*P54] The next contact for consideration is the place where the conduct causing the plaintiff’s injury occurred. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2)(b) (1971). An analysis of injury-causing conduct “includes all conduct from any source contributing to the injury,” including a defendant’s affirmative defenses [**590] [****708] or allegations of contributory negligence. Townsend, 227 Ill. 2d at 169.
[*P55] Here, plaintiff acknowledges that, relative to count I, this factor favors application of Missouri law because “the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred would be the place where the animal caused injury without provocation.” She asserts, however, that she alleged injury-causing conduct that occurred in both Illinois and Missouri in connection with count II and thus, this factor must be “deemed a wash.” We disagree.
[*P56] In count II, plaintiff asserted defendant was negligent for failing to warn plaintiff of the horse’s violent propensity to kick, failing to properly train her horse, riding the horse too close to plaintiff, and failing to adhere to industry [***28] and practice norms while riding her horse. All but one of these alleged actions or inactions by defendant occurred exclusively in Missouri. Additionally, defendant has argued that plaintiff expressly assumed the risks associated with horseback riding at Cross Country and points to the Release plaintiff signed in Missouri. Given that the vast majority of relevant conduct occurred in Missouri, we find this factor weighs in favor of applying Missouri law to the parties’ conflict.
[*P57] The third contact for consideration is “the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2)(c) (1971). Here, both parties are Illinois residents and neither disputes that this factor weighs in favor of applying Illinois law.
[*P58] The final contact for consideration is “the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2)(d) (1971). In this instance, the parties’ relationship primarily arose from having a group of mutual friends in Illinois and engaging in horseback riding activities within that group. Plaintiff and defendant were riding horses together in Missouri at the time of the incident at issue but had previously ridden horses together in Illinois. [***29] Ultimately, we find this contact favors applying Illinois law, as most of the parties’ interactions occurred within this state.
[*P59] Here, the section 145(2) contacts are evenly split, with two favoring application of Missouri law and two favoring Illinois law. However, as noted, the 145(2) contacts “are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2) (1971). In this case, the fact that the parties interacted with one another more frequently in Illinois has little to do with the issues presented by either count I or count II of plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, we find the fourth factor set forth in section 145(2) is only minimally important to the underlying proceedings. As a result, the section 145(2) contacts, when considered alone, support rather than rebut the presumption in favor of applying Missouri law. This does not end our analysis, however, and we must also consider the principles set forth in section 6 of the Second Restatement.
[*P60] 2. Section 6 Principles
[*P61] As noted, section 6(2) of the Second Restatement sets forth the following principles for consideration when conducting a choice-of-law analysis:
“(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant [***30] policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
[****709] [**591] (d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.”
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2) (1971).
In this case, a detailed analysis of all seven section 6 principles is unnecessary because the principles set forth in sections 6(2)(a), 6(2)(d), and 6(2)(f) are only minimally implicated in a personal injury action. Townsend, 227 Ill. 2d at 169-70 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. b, at 415-16 (1971)). Therefore, we confine our analysis to the remaining section 6 principles. Id. at 170.
[*P62] As stated, the parties agree that Illinois law conflicts with Missouri law based upon the existence of the Animal Control Act in Illinois and the lack of an equivalent Missouri statute. Initially, we consider this conflict in light of the relevant policies of Illinois (section 6(2)(b)), the relevant policies of Missouri and the relative interest of Missouri in the determination of the issue (section 6(2)(c)), and the basic policies underlying the particular field of law (section 6(2)(e)).
[*P63] Under the Animal Control Act, “[i]f a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks, attempts to attack, [***31] or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself or herself in any place where he or she may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in civil damages to such person for the full amount of the injury proximately caused thereby.” 510 ILCS 5/16 (West 2014). Our supreme court has described the history behind the Animal Control Act and interpreted its provisions as follows:
“The original version of this statute was passed in 1949 and applied only to dogs. [Citation.] The apparent purpose of the legislation was modest: to reduce the burden on dog-bite plaintiffs by eliminating the ‘one-bite rule’—the common law requirement that a plaintiff must plead and prove that a dog owner either knew or was negligent not to know that his dog had a propensity to injure people. [Citation.]
Enacting the Animal Control Act in 1973, the legislature amended this ‘dog-bite statute’ to cover ‘other animals.’ ***
*** [W]e believe that the legislature intended only to provide coverage under the statute for plaintiffs who, by virtue of their relationship to the owner of the dog or other animal or the lack of any such relationship, may not have any way of knowing or avoiding the risk that the animal [***32] poses to them. This interpretation is consistent with the emphasis the statute places on lack of provocation and plaintiff’s peaceable conduct in a place in which he is legally entitled to be.” Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 546-47, 519 N.E.2d 917, 918-19, 116 Ill. Dec. 702 (1988).
In Harris, the supreme court held the Animal Control Act was inapplicable to circumstances “where a person rents a horse and understands and expressly accepts the risks of using the horse.” Id. at 547-48; Johnson v. Johnson, 386 Ill. App. 3d 522, 535, 898 N.E.2d 145, 159, 325 Ill. Dec. 412 (2008) (“[T]he common law defense of assumption of the risk has been recognized as a valid affirmative defense to an action brought pursuant to the Animal Control Act.”).
[*P64] As indicated by the parties, Missouri does not have a comparable statute. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 273.036 (West [**592] [****710] 2014) (providing for strict liability in the event of dog bites but not applying to other animals). However, it has enacted the Equine Liability Act, for the purpose of codifying “the common law assumption of risk principle in the context of a specific recreational activity.” Frank v. Mathews, 136 S.W.3d 196, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). That Act limits liability for injuries resulting from the inherent risks associated with equine activities, providing as follows:
“[A]n equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, *** any employee thereof, or any other person or corporation shall not be liable for an injury to or [***33] the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine *** activities and, *** no participant or a participant’s representative shall make any claim against, maintain an action against, or recover from an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, *** any employee thereof, or any other person from injury, loss, damage or death of the participant resulting from any of the inherent risks of equine or livestock activities.” (Emphases added.) Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.325(2) (West 2014).
Under the Equine Liability Act, an “equine activity” includes “[r]ides *** sponsored by an equine activity sponsor.” Id. § 537.325(3)(e). Further, an “equine activity sponsor” includes a group or corporation that “sponsors, organizes[,] or provides the facilities for, an equine activity.” Id. § 537.325(4). The Equine Liability Act does not relieve covered individuals “from any duty that common law negligence principles impose upon them.” Frank, 136 S.W.3d at 203.
[*P65] Finally, we note that, although not significantly addressed by either party, Illinois has also adopted an Equine Activity Liability Act (Illinois Equine Act) (745 ILCS 47/1 et seq. (West 2014)). The legislature has set forth the purpose of the Illinois Equine Act as follows:
“The General Assembly recognizes that persons who participate [***34] in equine activities may incur injuries as a result of the risks involved in those activities. The General Assembly also finds that the State and its citizens derive numerous economic and personal benefits from equine activities. Therefore, it is the intent of the General Assembly to encourage equine activities by delineating the responsibilities of those involved in equine activities.” 745 ILCS 47/5 (West 2014).
The Fifth District of this court has noted that equine activity liability acts “have been enacted in more than 40 states since the mid-1980s” and are intended “to promote equine activities and the horse industry in general by limiting liability for some horse-related activities.” Smith v. Lane, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1126, 1128-29, 832 N.E.2d 947, 950, 295 Ill. Dec. 497 (2005).
[*P66] Here, plaintiff argues the policy behind the Animal Control Act “is more significant within the context of injuries by animals than the purpose of the Missouri Equine Liability Act.” We cannot agree. Clearly, Illinois has a policy, by way of the Animal Control Act, of protecting individuals who come into contact with an animal and are unable to appreciate or avoid the risks posed by the animal. However, both Missouri and Illinois have acknowledged that special circumstances exist with respect to horses and equine-related [***35] activities. Like Missouri law, Illinois law also contemplates that certain inherent risks are associated with equine activities like the sort of activity engaged in by the parties in this case. Both states have a policy of promoting equine activities and limiting liability associated with those activities. Both states also take into account assumption of risk principles with respect to horse-related injuries, even in the context of the Animal Control Act. Given these circumstances, we fail to see how [**593] [****711] Illinois policies are any “more significant” than those behind relevant Missouri law. Rather, both states appear to have similar policies and interests relative to injuries caused by horse-related activities.
[*P67] In addressing the relevant policies and interests of both Illinois and Missouri, plaintiff also argues that Illinois has a significant interest in providing tort remedies to its injured citizens. She cites Esser v. McIntyre, 169 Ill. 2d 292, 300, 661 N.E.2d 1138, 1142, 214 Ill. Dec. 693 (1996), wherein the supreme court held that “[h]aving provided a legal means for a plaintiff to recover for injuries caused by a defendant’s culpable conduct, Illinois has a strong interest in providing that remedy in disputes between Illinois residents.” In so holding, the court noted [***36] that under the law of the place of injury in that case—Mexico—Illinois’s interest would be circumvented because the plaintiff had no remedy against the defendant. Id. In fact, the parties had agreed that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendant under Mexican law. Id. at 297. The same cannot be said in this case, as plaintiff has a potential remedy under Missouri law in the form of a negligence cause of action. Further, we note that Missouri has a competing interest in having its laws apply to equine-related activities that occur within its borders.
[*P68] Ultimately, we disagree with plaintiff that the policies and interests relevant to this matter weigh in favor of applying Illinois law. Therefore, plaintiff does not overcome the presumption in favor of applying Missouri law.
[*P69] On review, plaintiff also addresses the principle relating to the “ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2)(g) (1971). She maintains that because Illinois law is more advantageous to her claim, this principle weighs in favor of applying Illinois law. However, we agree with defendant that the purpose of section 6(2)(g) is to consider whether the competing laws are “simple and easy to apply” rather [***37] than which law is most beneficial to plaintiff. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt. j (1971).
[*P70] Relative to this principle, we note that the Illinois Equine Act may be applied to preempt the Animal Control Act in certain situations. See Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill. App. 3d 453, 458-59, 714 N.E.2d 1, 5, 239 Ill. Dec. 443 (1999) (stating the Illinois Equine Act would bar actions in which the plaintiff was engaged in an “‘equine activity'” that would have previously been permitted under the Animal Control Act); Smith, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1134 (stating that “had the [Illinois] Equine Act applied to the facts of the case, preemption would have barred an action for the same alleged injuries under the Animal Control Act”). However, the Illinois Equine Act has also been found to be “unclear as to whether it was meant to limit the liability of persons other than equine activity sponsors and equine professionals,” i.e., persons like defendant in this case. Kush v. Wentworth, 339 Ill. App. 3d 157, 165, 790 N.E.2d 912, 918, 274 Ill. Dec. 139 (2003). In Kush, the Second District of this court criticized the Illinois Equine Act for containing inconsistencies and “obvious drafting error,” as well as provisions that could lead to absurd results. Id. at 162-63. Given the lack of clarity of this state’s equine activity liability act, we must find that consideration of whether the competing laws are “simple and easy to apply” also weighs in favor of applying [***38] Missouri law.
[*P71] As discussed, a presumption exists in this case in favor of applying the Missouri law to the parties’ conflict. We find [**594] [****712] nothing in either the parties’ arguments or our review of the Second Restatement’s relevant contacts and principles for consideration that overrides that presumption. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s finding that Missouri law applies to the underlying controversy.
[*P72] In so holding, we note that plaintiff suggests it is unclear from the underlying proceedings whether the trial court’s choice-of-law ruling was as to both counts of her complaint. We disagree. The court’s order referred generally to “the litigation” or “the conflict” when holding Missouri law was applicable, and nothing in its orders indicates that its ruling was limited to only count I. Further, as plaintiff acknowledges, both parties proceeded as if Missouri law applied to count II by citing substantive law from that state in connection with filings related to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, we find plaintiff’s assertion that the record is somehow unclear is without merit.
[*P73] C. Motion for Summary Judgment
[*P74] On appeal, plaintiff next argues the trial court erred [***39] in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to count II of her complaint. “Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Village of Bartonville v. Lopez, 2017 IL 120643, ¶ 34, 413 Ill. Dec. 34, 77 N.E.3d 639. “If the plaintiff fails to establish any element of the cause of action, summary judgment for the defendant is proper.” Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 417, 888 N.E.2d 1, 9, 320 Ill. Dec. 784 (2008). The trial court’s summary judgment ruling is subject to de novo review. Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 2016 IL 120041, ¶ 48, 412 Ill. Dec. 882, 77 N.E.3d 50.
[*P75]
To obtain relief in a negligence cause of action, “‘the plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant failed to perform that duty; and (3) the defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.'” Peters v. Wady Industries, Inc., 489 S.W.3d 784, 793 (Mo. 2016) (quoting Martin v. City of Washington, 848 S.W.2d 487, 493 (Mo. 1993)). In this case, both before the trial court and on appeal, defendant has argued that plaintiff cannot establish that defendant owed her a duty based on the Release plaintiff signed at Cross Country. The trial court’s oral ruling reflects that it agreed with this argument and granted summary judgment in defendant’s favor. For the reasons that follow, we [***40] also agree that plaintiff signed a valid and enforceable release of liability and expressly assumed the risks associated with the underlying horseback riding activities.
[*P76]
Under the “assumption of the risk doctrine” a person who “voluntarily consents to accept the danger of a known and appreciated risk[ ] *** may not sue another for failing to protect him from it.” Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 191 (Mo. 2014). An express assumption of risk is the simplest application of the doctrine and “recognizes that, when a plaintiff makes an express statement that he is voluntarily accepting a specified risk, the plaintiff is barred from recovering damages for an injury resulting from that risk.” Id. An express assumption of risk “most often involves a written waiver or release by the would-be plaintiff.” Id. Further, “in an ‘express assumption of the risk’ case, the plaintiff’s consent relieves the defendant of any duty to protect the plaintiff from injury.” Id. at 193.
[*P77]
“Although exculpatory clauses in contracts releasing an individual [**595] [****713] from his or her own future negligence are disfavored, they are not prohibited as against public policy.” Alack v. Vic Tanny International of Missouri, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. 1996). “[C]ontracts exonerating a party from acts of future negligence are to be ‘strictly construed against the party [***41] claiming the benefit of the contract, and clear and explicit language in the contract is required to absolve a person from such liability.'” Id. (quoting Hornbeck v. All American Indoor Sports, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)). Missouri law requires “clear, unambiguous, unmistakable, and conspicuous language in order to release a party from his or her own future negligence,” and “[g]eneral language will not suffice.” Id. at 337. “‘The words “negligence” or “fault” or their equivalents must be used conspicuously so that a clear and unmistakable waiver and shifting of risk occurs. There must be no doubt that a reasonable person agreeing to an exculpatory clause actually understands what future claims he or she is waiving.'” Holmes v. Multimedia KSDK, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 557, 560-61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337-38).
[*P78] Additionally, “[o]nly parties to a contract and any third-party beneficiaries of a contract have standing to enforce that contract.” Verni v. Cleveland Chiropractic College, 212 S.W.3d 150, 153 (Mo. 2007). To be deemed a third-party beneficiary, the terms of the contract must clearly express intent to benefit the third party or an identifiable class of which the third party is a member. Id. When an express declaration of intent is lacking, a strong presumption exists “‘that the third party is not a beneficiary and that the parties contracted to benefit only themselves.'” Id. (quoting Nitro Distributing, Inc. v. Dunn, 194 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Mo. 2006)).
[*P79]
In Missouri, the [***42] primary rule of contract interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the parties. State ex rel. Pinkerton v. Fahnestock, 531 S.W.3d 36, 44 (Mo. 2017). Intent is determined by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the contract language. Id. Each clause in a contract should be read in the context of the contract as a whole, and any interpretation that would render a provision meaningless should be avoided. Id. Additionally, the parties’ intentions should be “gleaned from the four corners of the contract” unless the contract is ambiguous, in which case a court may resort to considering extrinsic evidence. Kansas City N.O. Nelson Co. v. Mid-Western. Construction Co. of Missouri, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Mo. App. 1989).
[*P80] Additionally, whether a contract is ambiguous presents a question of law. Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 334. “‘An ambiguity arises when there is duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the words used in the contract.'” Id. at 337 (quoting Rodriguez v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America, 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. 1991)).
[*P81] Here, plaintiff acknowledged signing the Release at issue upon her arrival at Cross Country. In fact, she signed three such Releases—one for herself and one for each of the two minors who accompanied her. The operative language of the Release is as follows:
“4. I, for myself and on behalf of my heirs, assigns, personal representatives, and next of kin, HEREBY RELEASE, INDEMNIFY, AND HOLD HARMLESS CROSS COUNTRY [***43] TRAIL RIDE, LLC, officers, officials, agents and/or employees, other participants, sponsoring agencies, sponsors, advertisers, and, if applicable, owners and lessors of premises used for the activity (‘Releasees’), WITH RESPECT TO [**596] [****714] ANY AND ALL INJURY, DISABILITY, DEATH, or loss or damage to person or property associated with my presence or participation, WHETHER ARISING FROM THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE, to the fullest extent permitted by law.” (Emphasis added.)
Defendant maintains she was an intended third-party beneficiary of the Release in that she falls within the category of “other participants” and, as a result, plaintiff agreed to release her from liability for injuries plaintiff sustained while horseback riding at Cross Country, including those that occurred due to defendant’s negligence.
[*P82] Initially, plaintiff argues the Release fails to clearly express the intent to benefit defendant as a third party. To support this contention, she points to her own testimony that she “did not even know what she [was] signing” and the lack of testimony from anyone associated with Cross Country regarding their intent in entering the contract. Additionally, plaintiff maintains [***44] the phrase “other participants” is ambiguous and could be reasonably interpreted as a “catch-all term” that means “’employees, agents, servants, and/or independent contractors of [Cross Country] who perform services which further [its] business'” and not, as defendant suggests, other paying customers who are similarly situated to plaintiff and defendant. We disagree and find the Release is unambiguous and clearly expresses an intent to benefit an identifiable class, i.e., “other participants,” of which defendant is a member.
[*P83] Looking as we must at the four corners of the parties’ agreement, it is clear that “other participants” were included within the list of individuals or entities to whom the parties to the agreement intended the release of liability to apply. In other words, there was an express intent to benefit “other participants” in the Release. Additionally, when looking at the agreement as a whole, it is clear that the phrase “other participants” refers to those individuals at Cross Country who were similarly situated to plaintiff and defendant, i.e., paying customers or guests who were engaging in the activities provided or offered by Cross Country. Although the term “participants” [***45] is not defined in the Release, as defendant notes, the terms “participate,” “participation,” and “participants” are used throughout the document. Their use clearly reflects that these words were intended to refer to individuals visiting Cross Country for the purpose of engaging in its recreational activities, including horseback riding. The Release provides as follows:
“In consideration of being allowed to participate in any way, including but not limited to trail riding, competing, officiating, working for, recreating in any fashion while visiting Cross Country Trail Ride, LLC, and its trail ride program, its related events and activities, I *** the undersigned, acknowledge, appreciate, and agree that;
1. The risk of injury from the activities involved in this program is significant, including the potential for permanent paralysis and death, and while particular skills, equipment, and personal discipline may reduce the risk, the risk of serious injury does exist; and,
2. I KNOWINGLY AND FREELY ASSUME ALL SUCH RISKS, both known and unknown, EVEN IF ARISING FROM NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES or others, and assume full responsibility for my participation; and,
3. I willingly agree to comply [***46] with the stated and customary terms of participation. If, however, I observe any unusual significant hazard during my [**597] [****715] presence or participation, I will remove myself from participation and bring such to the attention of the Company immediately; and,
4. I, for myself and on behalf of my heirs, assigns, personal representatives, and next of kin, HEREBY RELEASE, INDEMNIFY, AND HOLD HARMLESS CROSS COUNTRY TRAIL RIDE, LLC, officers, officials, agents and/or employees, other participants, sponsoring agencies, sponsors, advertisers, and, if applicable, owners and lessors of premises used for the activity (‘Releasees’), WITH RESPECT TO ANY AND ALL INJURY, DISABILITY, DEATH, or loss or damage to person or property associated with my presence or participation, WHETHER ARISING FROM THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE, to the fullest extent permitted by law.” (Emphases added.)
Additionally, signature lines on the Release required the “PARTICIPANT[‘]S SIGNATURE” or the signature of a parent or guardian for “PARTICIPANTS OF MINORITY AGE.”
[*P84] During her own deposition, plaintiff acknowledged that the Release used the phrase “other participants” and that she would characterize defendant as “another [***47] participant” in the activities at Cross Country. We agree and find the language used in the Release is clear and that it unambiguously refers to an identifiable class of individuals that includes defendant.
[*P85] Plaintiff next argues the Release is deficient because it purported to relieve liability for nonreleasable claims, including “intentional torts, gross negligence, and/or activities involving the public interest.” She notes language in the Release stated it applied to “THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE.” Plaintiff maintains the word “otherwise” encompasses those nonreleasable claims and, thus, renders the Release duplicitous, indistinct, uncertain, and ambiguous.
[*P86] To support her argument, plaintiff relies on Lewis v. Snow Creek, Inc., 6 S.W.3d 388, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999), involving an exculpatory clause that purported “to shield [a party] from ‘any claim based on negligence and *** any claim based upon *** other legal theory.'” There, the reviewing court noted “‘there is no question that one may never exonerate oneself from future liability for intentional torts or for gross negligence, or for activities involving the public interest.'” Id. (quoting Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337). It found that the exculpatory clause before it used general language by referencing [***48] claims based on “‘any *** other legal theory,'” stating such language included “intentional torts, gross negligence or any other cause of action not expressly listed.” Id. Thus, because the contract at issue purported to relieve the respondent in the case of all liability but did not actually do so, it was duplicitous, indistinct, uncertain and, ultimately, ambiguous. Id.
[*P87] We find Lewis distinguishable from the present case. The language there was much broader than the language of the Release that plaintiff signed. Unlike in this case, the exculpatory clause in Lewis expressly referred to legal theories other than negligence. Additionally, we note other courts applying Missouri law have suggested that the same language that is at issue in this case was sufficiently clear and unambiguous. See Haines v. St. Charles Speedway, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 964, 969 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (finding a release was clear and unambiguous under Missouri law where it relieved liability for the “negligence of the Releasees or otherwise” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hornbeck v. All American Indoor Sports, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 717, 721 [****716] [**598] (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (stating language that released claims “‘whether caused by the negligence of the releasees or otherwise'” would “clearly and unambiguously encompass[ ] the negligence of the party seeking to enforce the release” (quoting [***49] Haines, 689 F. Supp. at 969)). In this instance, the Release plaintiff signed used the term “negligence” and did not expressly include references to any “other legal theory.” We find the Release was sufficient to notify plaintiff that she was releasing “other participants” in trail riding activities at Cross Country from claims arising from the “other participant’s” own negligence. See Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337 (“The exculpatory language must effectively notify a party that he or she is releasing the other party from claims arising from the other party’s own negligence.”).
[*P88] Finally, plaintiff also challenges the format of the Cross Country Release. Again, she relies on Lewis, wherein the court additionally found the exculpatory clause before it was not conspicuous and, thus, insufficient to provide notice of a release of liability for negligence claims. Lewis, 6 S.W.3d at 394-95. Specifically, the reviewing court noted the form at issue was titled as a “Rental Form” rather than a release, the form’s exculpatory clause was in approximately five-point font at the bottom of the form, and the plaintiffs “had to sign the Rental Form to receive ski equipment and had to do so while in a line.” Id.
[*P89] Again, the present case is distinguishable. Here, the Release documents [***50] submitted by the parties consisted of two pages. As argued by defendant, the first page was separated into two equal parts. The top portion was labeled “Registration Form” and included several blank spaces for basic guest information. The bottom portion of the form was labeled “RELEASE OF LIABILITY—READ BEFORE SIGINING [sic]” and was separated from the top portion of the form by a dotted line. The titles of both documents appear to be in the same font size with the title of the Release being entirely capitalized. The release information is not relegated to only the bottom portion of the form but, instead, consists of several paragraphs and occupies half of the first page. Significant language in the Release is also capitalized for emphasis. The second page of the Release documents was similarly divided into two equal parts. However, both parts of the second page pertained to Cross Country’s Release. Plaintiff signed the Cross Country Release three times, once for herself and once for each of the minors accompanying her. Further, we note that although plaintiff claims she did not read the release, she did acknowledge that she was required to sign similar documents during previous visits [***51] to Cross Country.
[*P90] Here, we find the Release at issue was unambiguous and conspicuous such that it sufficiently informed plaintiff that she was releasing other individuals participating in Cross Country’s trail riding activities—including defendant—from claims arising out of their own negligence. Plaintiff expressly assumed the risks associated with her horseback riding activities at Cross Country and, through the Cross Country Release she signed, relieved defendant of any duty to protect her from injury. Given the circumstances presented, the trial court committed no error in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
[*P91] We note plaintiff has additionally argued on appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in defendant’s favor under Missouri law because defendant’s conduct was grossly negligent. She points out that, under Missouri law, “one may never exonerate oneself from future liability for intentional [**599] [****717] torts or for gross negligence, or for activities involving the public interest.” Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337. Further, plaintiff notes that in response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, she made the following argument: “There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [***52] Defendant acted grossly negligent in participating in a group trail ride with a sizeable group, including children, on a horse she did not trust, that had kicked one person prior, while intoxicated and riding too closely to Plaintiff.”
[*P92] In DeCormier v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Group, Inc., 446 S.W.3d 668, 671 (Mo. 2014), the Missouri Supreme Court stated that it would “enforce exculpatory agreements to protect a party from liability for their own negligence” and a plaintiff could not “avoid this rule by alleging [a defendant was] grossly negligent because Missouri courts do not recognize degrees of negligence at common law.” Thus, it rejected the precise argument plaintiff has raised in this case both before the trial court and on appeal.
[*P93] As plaintiff notes, Missouri does recognize a separate cause of action for recklessness. Id. at 671-72.
“Conduct is in reckless disregard of another if the actor:
‘[A]ct[s] or fails to do an act which it is [the actor’s] duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that the actor’s conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of *** harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to [the other.]’ [Citations.]” Id. at 672.
“[R]ecklessness [***53] is a distinct cause of action from negligence.” Throneberry v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 526 S.W.3d 198, 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). “Recklessness looks to the tortfeasor’s state of mind” and “is an aggravated form of negligence which differs in quality, rather than in degree, from ordinary lack of care.” Hatch v. V.P. Fair Foundation, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 126, 139 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
[*P94] Under the circumstances presented here, plaintiff cannot rely on a claim of recklessness to avoid enforceability of the Release, as she did not raise the claim before the trial court. SI Securities v. Bank of Edwardsville, 362 Ill. App. 3d 925, 933, 841 N.E.2d 995, 1002, 299 Ill. Dec. 263 (2005) (“Issues not raised in a complaint and points not argued in the trial court are waived on appeal.”).
[*P95] Additionally, the record reflects defendant raised plaintiff’s signing of the release and its express assumption of risk argument as an affirmative defense. In Missouri, “[t]o avoid an affirmative defense alleged in an answer, a plaintiff must plead specifically matters of affirmative avoidance.” Angoff v. Mersman, 917 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); see also Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, Inc., 950 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Mo. 1997) (stating that “[r]elease is an affirmative defense that must be pled in an answer” and once done requires a plaintiff to file a reply if he or she intends to assert an affirmative avoidance). “The plaintiff’s reply should distinctly allege the grounds of avoidance,” and “[m]atters of avoidance are not available to a party who does not plead them specifically.” Angoff, 917 S.W.2d at 211. “An affirmative [***54] avoidance is waived if the party raising it has neglected to plead it.” Id.
[*P96] Here, plaintiff did not plead a cause of action based on “recklessness” either in her complaint or in responding to defendant’s answer and motion for summary judgment. As defendant points out, she also did not seek to amend her original pleading to include a claim of recklessness. Accordingly, we find plaintiff’s arguments [**600] [****718] are forfeited and do not preclude summary judgment in defendant’s favor.
[*P97] III. CONCLUSION
[*P98] For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
End of Document
Push a release too far, in a state that is not sure Releases should be valid, and you provide the court with the opportunity to void releases and indemnification in the state.
Posted: May 4, 2020 Filed under: Climbing Wall, Connecticut | Tags: alleges, argues, Climb, common law, contractual, cross claim, defendants', discovery, Indemnification, indemnify, Indemnity, injuries, marks, material fact, Minor, minor plaintiff, Motion for Summary Judgment, parties, patron's, pleadings, quotation, recreational activity, Release, riding, Risks, rock, signing, Snow Tubing, Summary judgment, summary judgment motion, Third Party, Third Party Signor, violate public policy, visitor, Waiver Leave a commentNon-mother brought a group of kids to climbing gym and signed release for the kids. One was hurt, and the climbing wall sued the non-mother for indemnification in the release for the damages of the injured child.
Cannon v. Rock Climb Fairfield, LLC, 2020 Conn. Super. LEXIS 261
State: Connecticut; Superior Court of Connecticut
Plaintiff: Cindy Cannon PPA Emma Cannon (minor)
Defendant: Rock Climb Fairfield, LLC, Carabiners Fairfield, LLC and Matthew Conroy
Defendant Third Party Plaintiffs: Kate Licata, Indemnifier
Plaintiff Claims: negligent in supervising the rock climbing activities
Defendant Defenses: release and indemnification
Holding: For the Defendant Third Party Plaintiff, Indemnifier
Year: 2020
Summary
When litigating a case, you don’t look to the future effects of what you are doing. You look at winning. That is the only thing, your client and the client’s insurance company want. That is the only thing as an attorney you are allowed to do. You must represent the client and win.
In this case, the defendant used every argument they could to try to win, and not only lost the case, but voided releases for recreation in the state an eliminated any value the indemnification clause might have had in a release.
Facts
The case arises from an incident where the minor plaintiff, Emma Cannon, fell from a climbing wall at the Rock Climb defendant’s indoor rock climbing facility located in Fairfield, Connecticut. The minor plaintiff claims she sustained personal injuries. On behalf of her minor child, Cindy Cannon instituted the present action alleging the facility, its agents and employees were negligent in supervising the rock climbing activities, thereby causing the minor plaintiff’s injuries. The defendants have filed an answer and eight special defenses to the amended complaint.
Thereafter, the Rock Climb defendants filed an apportionment complaint against the defendant Kate Licata, who brought the minor plaintiff, Emma Cannon, and several other girls to the facility for a group birthday party event. The apportionment complaint is dated February 6, 2019. The apportionment complaint alleges that Licata was negligent in numerous ways and seeks an apportionment of liability and damages as to Licata for the percentage of negligence attributable to her. The apportionment complaint is not the subject of the motion for summary judgment that is presently before the court. The Rock Climb defendants also filed a cross claim against Licata alleging contractual and common-law indemnity. The cross claim, which is the subject of Licata’s motion for summary judgment, is dated February 22, 2019.
The cross claim alleges that the Rock Climb defendants, who are the third-party plaintiffs, require all invitees to its facility to complete a “Release of Liability and Assumption of Risk” form before participating in rock climbing activities. If the participant is a minor, the form must be signed by the minor’s parent or court-appointed guardian, which Licata was not. The release form contains language to the effect that the parent or guardian of the minor has explained the inherent risks of the activity to the minor and the minor understands the said risks and that the minor, nonetheless, wishes to participate in the activities. The release form further provides that “the parent of the minor visitor . . . forever discharge, and agree to indemnify . . . Carabiners Fairfield, LLC, its agents, owners, officers, volunteers, employees, and all other persons or entities acting in any capacity on its behalf . . . from any and all claims, suits, demands, causes of action, which are in any way connected with my or the minor visitor’s visit to the RCF activity site . . . My agreement of indemnity is intended to include claims arising out of losses suffered by me (an adult climber or parent) or the child and losses caused by me or the child. The agreements of indemnity and release include claims of negligence . . . of a Released Party.” The Rock Climb defendants allege that Licata completed an online version of the Release form and electronically signed it on behalf of the minor plaintiff Emma Cannon on October 3, 2016. Thus, Licata is contractually obligated to defend and indemnify the Rock Climb defendants for the injuries and damages resulting from Emma Cannon’s fall at the Rock Climb defendants’ facility pursuant to General Statutes §52-102a.5
The Rock Climb defendants also allege Licata is liable for common-law indemnification, claiming that any injuries sustained by the minor plaintiff were proximately caused, in whole or part, by Licata’s negligence and carelessness in multiple ways. Among these allegations are failing to supervise and monitor the minor; failing to instruct the minor; and failing to warn the minor of the dangerous nature and risks of the activity. Lastly, the Rock Climb defendants argue that a substantial amount of discovery remains outstanding and various issues of fact are yet to be settled, and therefore, it argues that Licata’s summary judgment motion should be denied.
The defendant argued on appeal that:
Licata argues that she was not given any opportunity to negotiate the terms of the Release document, which was presented to her on a “take or leave it” basis.
It was the Rock Climb defendants who were responsible for training Licata and/or the minor plaintiff to ensure safe rock climbing, as Licata claims she did not possess the knowledge, experience or authority to ensure the rock climbing facility was in a safe condition.
Additionally, Licata argues she was not in control of the situation on the date in question, and the cross claim does not even allege she was in control of the situation. Therefore, any claim for common-law indemnification also fails as a matter of law.
These three arguments made by the defendant are critical in how the court viewed the situation and more importantly the realities of using this type of document in a recreation case.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The court first set out the requirements to win a motion for summary judgment. In doing so it defined the term “a material fact.” “A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case….”
“[a] genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact . . . and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence . . . Hence, the genuine issue aspect of summary judgment procedure requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred.
Summary judgment will not be granted if there is a material fact in question. So knowing the definition is important since most summary judgement claims revolve around whether there is a material fact that must be adjudicated.
The court then looked at the indemnification clause in the release; contractual indemnification. Under Connecticut law, indemnification is defined as:
Indemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one who is claimed to be primarily liable.” “A party may bring an indemnification claim based on the terms of an indemnity agreement . . . [A]llegations of contractual indemnification must be supported by the terms of the contract or the contract itself . . . Under Connecticut law, to state a contract-based indemnification claim, the claimant must allege either an express or implied contractual right to indemnification
Indemnification agreements are contracts and as such construed under the principles of contract law.
The essential elements for a cause of action based on breach of contract are (1) the formation of an agreement, (2) performance by one party, (3) breach of the agreement by the opposing party, and (4) damages . . . [and] causation
Additionally, for a contract to be valid, there must be mutual assent between the parties to create a contract and the parties to the contract must be reasonably clear.
The court then looked at the indemnification language in the release in this case.
Paragraph 3 is titled “Release and Indemnity. That paragraph notes that the signor of the agreement is an adult visitor or parent of a minor visitor and that the signor releases and discharges and agrees to indemnify the RCF defendants from all claims, suits, demands or causes of action, which are connected to the minor’s visit to and participation in, RCF activities. The agreement is intended to include claims arising out of losses suffered by the child and losses caused by the signor or the child. By signing the agreement, the signor agrees to indemnify and release claims of negligence of the RCF defendants.
Lastly, paragraph 5 of the Release notes that the signor acknowledges that if the minor visitor for whom the signor has signed their signature, is hurt and files a lawsuit, the signor will protect the released and indemnified RCF defendants from any claims of the minor visitor.
The court did point out, but did not act upon the issue that release was not signed by anyone at the gym.
The court then looked at release law in Connecticut. The Supreme Court of Connecticut set forth three requirements for a release in a recreational activity to be valid.
(1) the societal expectation that family oriented activities will be reasonably safe; (2) the illogic of relieving the party with greater expertise and information concerning the dangers associated with the activity from the burden of proper maintenance of the snowtubing run; and (3) the fact that the release at issue was a standardized adhesion contract, lacking equal bargaining power between the parties, and offered to the plaintiff on a “take it or leave it” basis.
The court then found that the release in this case violated public policy in Connecticut.
We conclude that, based on our decision in Hanks, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the recreational activity of horseback riding and instruction that was offered by the defendants demonstrates that the enforcement of an exculpatory agreement in their favor from liability for ordinary negligence violates public policy and is not in the public interest. First, similar to the situation at issue in Hanks, the defendants in the present case provided the facilities, the instructors, and the equipment for their patrons to engage in a popular recreational activity, and the recreational facilities were open to the general public regardless of an individual’s ability level. Indeed, the defendants acknowledged that, although the release required riders to indicate their experience level, it also anticipated a range in skills from between “[n]ever ridden” to “[e]xperienced [r]ider,” and that the facility routinely had patrons of varying ability levels. Accordingly, there is a reasonable societal expectation that a recreational activity that is under the control of the provider and is open to all individuals, regardless of experience or ability level, will be reasonably safe.
Meaning, a release cannot be used to protect the provider of a recreational activity that is open to the public and requires skill because there is a general expectation that those activities are safe. On top of that, the plaintiff lacked any knowledge, experience or skill to determine if the defendants’ facility were in good working order or safe.
To the contrary, it was the defendants, not the plaintiff or the other customers, who had the “expertise and opportunity to foresee and control hazards, and to guard against the negligence of their agents and employees. They alone [could] properly maintain and inspect their premises, and train their employees in risk management.” In particular, the defendants acknowledged that they were responsible for providing their patrons with safe horses, qualified instructors, as well as properly maintained working equipment and riding surfaces.
The court looked at the statements from the guest’s point of view and found it illogical that the guest could make those judgements.
As we concluded in Hanks, it is illogical to relieve the defendants, as the party with greater expertise and information concerning the dangers associated with engaging in horseback riding at their facility, from potential claims of negligence surrounding an alleged failure to administer properly the activity.
The defendant also argued the release was an adhesion contract.
Specifically, we have noted that the most salient feature of adhesion contracts is that they are not subject to the normal bargaining processes of ordinary contracts, and that they tend to involve a standard form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usually a consumer, who has little choice about the terms.
Because the plaintiff could not negotiate the release provisions, and her only option was not to participate, because of that, the court concluded the contract was an adhesion contract.
The court circled back to the knowledge and skill of the guest by looking at the facts, that the guests and injured child did not bring any equipment or provided any training, guidance and/or supervision to the children under the third party plaintiff’s care.
Neither the minor plaintiff or Licata provided any of the equipment to be used. Licata, herself, did not provide training, guidance or supervision to the minors, including the minor plaintiff. Licata possessed no special knowledge regarding rock climbing or bouldering activities including training and safety procedures other than an initial orientation by RCF employees. Maklad testified at her deposition that the orientation lasted only five to ten minutes. The RCF defendants/third-party plaintiffs admit that there was zero expectation that Licata would “train and guide climbers” or to inspect various facility equipment. RCF argues that they did expect that parents and guardians would supervise children.
Because the third party plaintiff had no knowledge or skill concerning climbing, she could not have been supervising the children while climbing, it does not matter whether or not she was “adequately supervising” the children because she could not. This created another whole in the indemnification argument and another issue that must be decided by the trial court.
This brought the court back to the indemnification issue.
To hold a third party liable to indemnify one tortfeasor for damages awarded against it to the plaintiff for negligently causing harm to the plaintiff, a defendant seeking indemnification must establish that: (1) the third party against whom indemnification is sought was negligent; (2) the third party’s active negligence, rather than the defendant’s own passive negligence, was the direct, immediate cause of the accident and the resulting harm; (3) the third party was in control of the situation to the exclusion of the defendant seeking reimbursement; and (4) the defendant did not know of the third party’s negligence, had no reason to anticipate it, and reasonably could rely on the third party not to be negligent.”
The definition in Connecticut basically ruled out the third party plaintiff as a possible indemnifier for the gym.
“Our Supreme Court has defined exclusive control of the situation, for the purpose of a common-law indemnification claim, as exclusive control over the dangerous condition that gives rise to the accident.”
Since the third party defendant did not have any control over the situation because she lacked the knowledge, experience and skill to climb or supervise anyone else climbing and because she, and the children went to the gym because of the gym’s knowledge, skill, ability to see risks and the gym had the needed equipment, there could not be indemnification.
On top of that, because the court found the climbing gym had done such a poor job of prosecuting it’s indemnification claim the court found the claim had been abandoned.
The third-party plaintiffs, the RCF defendants, have produced little to no credible evidence; nor have they alleged or argued that Licata was in control of the situation to the exclusion. “Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.”
That means the indemnification claim could not be brought back up at trial.
So Now What?
There is a dozen interesting statements found in this release that when brought to the light of reality will cause or should cause concern for the way some releases are written. Not legal as much as how the assumptions on how the law would work when applied to the facts which the court rejected.
- Having signor of the release accept the equipment and facility as is or to be in good shape, was determined to be a joke. The signor was coming to the facility for their expertise and had no expertise to make that determination on their own.
You don’t want to have your release thrown out because a clause in the release, no matter who it protects is false.
- Having the signor of the release agree that they are in control of the children they bring to the gym was found ridiculous for the same reasons.
-
The Indemnification clause was not written to follow Connecticut law and as such was found to be worthless.
- Worse when argued by the defendant gyms, it was found the language, and their arguments were so futile as to be abandoned.
- Worse when argued by the defendant gyms, it was found the language, and their arguments were so futile as to be abandoned.
- The release placed so many burdens, which the signor could not get around; the release was found to be void because it violated public policy.
I have yet to read a case where an indemnification clause has been upheld in a release, unless the circumstances were very odd and the parties knowledgeable about what they were agreeing too.
Are there situations where there is a need, and you can properly write an indemnification clause in a release. Yes. However, the injured part will be indemnifying you not for your losses, but for the losses you incur when their actions involve a third party.
An example might be you are billed for the cost of search and rescue under your permit or concession agreement to find the lost guest. A well-written indemnification clause can be used to recover for the costs of these expenses, because the defendant did not cause the loss and is not trying to recover for its losses, only the losses the guest has made the defendant liable for.
The three arguments made by the defendant set forth in the summary will soon be present in many third party defenses I predict. They are simple yet set forth the reality of the people signing the indemnification clauses. Uniformly, the courts have struck down indemnification clauses when used to recover money for a plaintiff’s claim.
For more articles on Indemnification Clauses see:
Indemnification agreements? What are you signing?
One case where an indemnification agreement was upheld:
A federal district court in Massachusetts upholds indemnification clause in a release.
This case will have far reaching effect in other states.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Collecting accident reports without doing something with the reports guarantees you will lose a lawsuit and in this case possibly for gross negligence.
Posted: May 4, 2020 Filed under: Climbing Wall, Utah | Tags: Accident Reports, Bouldering, Bouldering Wall, Climbers, Climbing Gym, Climbing Wall, concealed, damaged, district court, Failue to Act, floor, Gross negligence, Hazard, Incident Reports, indifference, injuries, material fact, Mats, Padding, patches, quotation, reliability, simplified, slight care, Steps, Summary judgment, tear, vinyl Leave a commentClimbing gym had a collection of accident reports that were based on the same set of facts. Failure to act on the reports and solve the problem was enough proof for the Utah appellate court to hold the actions of the defendant gym were possibly grossly negligent.
Howe v. Momentum LLC, 2020 UT App 5, 2020 Utah App. LEXIS 1, 2020 WL 34996
State: Utah; Court of Appeals of Utah
Plaintiff: Scott Howe
Defendant: Momentum LLC
Plaintiff Claims: Momentum was grossly negligent. He alleged that Momentum, “with a knowing and reckless indifference and disregard for the safety of [Howe] and other members of [Momentum], concealed, or caused to be concealed, the defects in their floor padding by placing mats over the defective area
Defendant Defenses: the actions of the defendant did not rise to the level of gross negligence.
Holding: For the Plaintiff
Year: 2020
Summary
Incident and Accident reports that have not been acted on and the issues that caused the accidents which had not been fixed, were proof that the defendant climbing gym possibly acted in a grossly negligent way.
Facts
Momentum is an indoor-climbing facility with a separate area for bouldering. The bouldering area’s concrete floor is covered by approximately twelve inches of foam padding overlain by thick vinyl, known as an “impact attenuation surface.” In the years after Momentum’s 2007 opening, some of the vinyl began to tear and separate. In late September 2011, Momentum had “[a]t least one” tear repaired with a welded vinyl patch.
But Momentum’s management team deemed these tear patches a hazard for tripping, so it placed modular one-inch-thick mats over certain areas of the bouldering area floor that were showing signs of wear or damage. The mats are not designed to be anchored to the underlying pad and they would sometimes move when people landed on them. Because the mats tended to move, Momentum staff “monitored the floor regularly to try to keep the [mats] in place.” In addition to this action, a Momentum employee altered the routes above those areas by reconfiguring and reducing the number of foot-and hand-holds to reduce customer use of the areas with worn and damaged padding.
Over the years—and prior to Howe’s injury—Momentum’s patrons had reported incidents, some of which involved injuries, which alerted Momentum to the fact that the padding in the bouldering area was worn and damaged in some places. Before Howe was injured, five incidents were reported before Momentum began using the mats and another eight were reported thereafter. Each of these injuries involved a climber dropping from the bouldering wall or “slab area” to the floor below and, upon landing, pushing a foot through the floor padding, making contact with the concrete floor below, either rolling or twisting an ankle in the process.
In March 2012, Howe was bouldering at Momentum. After finishing his bouldering route, Howe dropped off the wall to the floor below. As he made contact with the floor, his “left foot impacted the mat on top of the padded floor, causing the mat to move. As the mat moved, it exposed the padded floor beneath. Concealed under the mat, the cover of the pad was split in a straight line, exposing the abutting edges of pads below.” When Howe’s “right foot impacted the top of the two abutting pads, [his] foot passed between the two abutting pads to the floor beneath.” As a result of the contact with the concrete, Howe broke his right ankle.
Howe sued, asserting—among other things—that Momentum was grossly negligent. He alleged that Momentum, “with a knowing and reckless indifference and disregard for the safety of [Howe] and other members of [Momentum], concealed, or caused to be concealed, the defects in their floor padding by placing mats over the defective area.”
The defendant Momentum filed a motion for summary judgement to dismiss the gross negligence claims of the plaintiff. The trial court judge ruled the plaintiff had shown enough action and inaction on the part of the gym that the plaintiff could proceed to trial on a claim of gross negligence. The defendant appealed this ruling.
The decision also looks at the qualifications of the plaintiff’s expert witness. However, there is nothing in the decision that warrants review here.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The court’s analysis of the law was quite good and balanced. It’s application of the law to the facts was clear cut. The court defined gross negligence under Utah’s law as “…the failure to observe even slight care….”
A broader definition was defined as:
“…the essential evidence needed to survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a gross negligence claim” is “evidence that the defendant’s conduct dramatically magnified the risk of harm to the plaintiff….
The court concluded its review of gross negligence with this statement about the actions of the defendant. “…Momentum’s failure to take further action in the face of eight additional incidents creates questions of fact about whether it was grossly negligent….”
The court then followed with this statement.
It is beyond question that a plaintiff who can demonstrate that a defendant has taken no action in response to injury incidents will have likely made out at least a prima facie case of gross negligence,….
At this point, in the opinion it is clear the court looked at Momentum’s failure to act after collecting more than 13 incident reports as gross negligence.
It is also clear that the court believes that failure to act on the defendant’s own incident reports is a major failure of the defendant. Why have accident and incident reports if you do nothing about them.
These acts arguably show that Momentum exercised slight care in the beginning and was therefore not completely indifferent to the consequences of allowing climbers to use the bouldering area given the condition of the padding.
The court gave the climbing gym some benefit because after the first five accidents, they placed additional padding over the torn spots. However, having eight additional incidents, with the torn padding was more than the court would allow.
The court then summed up the accident reports that the defendant compiled.
…onto the floor below, the mat moved, their feet were caught in the crack in the foam padding, and their ankles were injured. Under these circumstances, the question of whether Momentum’s continued use of the mats constituted gross negligence presents a disputed issue of material fact.
The court found that collecting injury reports, which almost identical fact situations and not doing anything about it were proof of gross negligence. The appellate court held the trial court was correct in denying the defendant climbing gym’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss the gross negligence claims.
So Now What?
Incident reports are legal explosives just waiting to go off when a plaintiff’s attorney gets them. If you collect them, then you MUST do something with them.
Each report MUST be analyzed. It must be compared with all other reports to see trends or to determine what the cause or problem is. Then something must be done to correct the problem.
If you decided the report is a rate instance or something outside of your ability to control it, then you must indicate that in your notes or on your response to the report. If a second accident occurs with the same fact situation, then it is not longer a rare case, it is something you must act on.
If not, like in this case, the reports prove foreseeability and in this case, prove that failing to act when the defendant knew a problem existed, was enough to support a claim of gross negligence.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Cannon v. Rock Climb Fairfield, LLC, 2020 Conn. Super. LEXIS 261
Posted: April 29, 2020 Filed under: Climbing Wall, Connecticut, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: alleges, argues, Climb, Climbing Wall, Climbing Wall Release, common law, contractual, cross claim, defendants', discovery, Indemnification, Indemnification Agreement, indemnify, Indemnity, injuries, marks, material fact, minor plaintiff, parties, patron's, pleadings, quotation, recreational activity, Release, riding, Risks, rock, signing, Snow Tubing, Summary judgment, summary judgment motion, Third Party, violate public policy, visitor, Waiver Leave a commentCannon v. Rock Climb Fairfield, LLC, 2020 Conn. Super. LEXIS 261
No Shepard’s Signal™
As of: April 9, 2020 8:28 PM Z
Cannon v. Rock Climb Fairfield, LLC
Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield At Bridgeport
February 13, 2020, Decided; February 13, 2020, Filed
FBTCV186079642S
2020 Conn. Super. LEXIS 261 *
Cindy Cannon PPA Emma Cannon v. Rock Climb Fairfield, LLC et al.
Notice: THIS DECISION IS UNREPORTED AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW. COUNSEL IS CAUTIONED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION OF THE STATUS OF THIS CASE.
Judges: [*1] Richard E. Arnold, Judge Trial Referee.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #142
The third-party defendant Kate Licata has moved for summary judgment on Counts One and Two of the Cross Complaint filed by the defendants third-party plaintiffs, Rock Climb Fairfield, LLC, Carabiners Fairfield, LLC and Matthew Conroy.1 Count One of the cross complaint alleges contractual indemnification and Count Two alleges common-law indemnification. The cross complaint is dated February 22, 2019. The third-party defendant Licata’s motion for summary judgment is dated September 9, 2019. The defendant third-party plaintiff’s objection is dated October 14, 2019.2 Licata’s reply to the objection is dated October 17, 2019. The court heard oral argument on October 21, 2019.
The case arises from an incident where the minor plaintiff, Emma Cannon, fell from a climbing wall at the Rock Climb defendant’s indoor rock climbing facility located in Fairfield, Connecticut. The minor plaintiff claims she sustained personal injuries. On behalf of her minor child, Cindy Cannon instituted the present action alleging the facility, its agents and employees were negligent in supervising the rock [*2] climbing activities, thereby causing the minor plaintiff’s injuries.3 The defendants have filed an answer and eight special defenses to the amended complaint.
Thereafter, the Rock Climb defendants filed an apportionment complaint against the defendant Kate Licata, who brought the minor plaintiff, Emma Cannon, and several other girls to the facility for a group birthday party event. The apportionment complaint is dated February 6, 2019.4 The apportionment complaint alleges that Licata was negligent in numerous ways and seeks an apportionment of liability and damages as to Licata for the percentage of negligence attributable to her. The apportionment complaint is not the subject of the motion for summary judgment that is presently before the court. The Rock Climb defendants also filed a cross claim against Licata alleging contractual and common-law indemnity. The cross claim, which is the subject of Licata’s motion for summary judgment, is dated February 22, 2019.
The cross claim alleges that the Rock Climb defendants, who are the third-party plaintiffs, require all invitees to its facility to complete a “Release of Liability and Assumption of Risk” form before participating in rock climbing [*3] activities. If the participant is a minor, the form must be signed by the minor’s parent or court-appointed guardian, which Licata was not. The release form contains language to the effect that the parent or guardian of the minor has explained the inherent risks of the activity to the minor and the minor understands the said risks and that the minor, nonetheless, wishes to participate in the activities. The release form further provides that “the parent of the minor visitor . . . forever discharge, and agree to indemnify . . . Carabiners Fairfield, LLC, its agents, owners, officers, volunteers, employees, and all other persons or entities acting in any capacity on its behalf . . . from any and all claims, suits, demands, causes of action, which are in any way connected with my or the minor visitor’s visit to the RCF activity site . . . My agreement of indemnity is intended to include claims arising out of losses suffered by me (an adult climber or parent) or the child and losses caused by me or the child. The agreements of indemnity and release include claims of negligence . . . of a Released Party.” The Rock Climb defendants allege that Licata completed an online version of the Release [*4] form and electronically signed it on behalf of the minor plaintiff Emma Cannon on October 3, 2016. Thus, Licata is contractually obligated to defend and indemnify the Rock Climb defendants for the injuries and damages resulting from Emma Cannon’s fall at the Rock Climb defendants’ facility pursuant to General Statutes §52-102a.5
The Rock Climb defendants also allege Licata is liable for common-law indemnification, claiming that any injuries sustained by the minor plaintiff were proximately caused, in whole or part, by Licata’s negligence and carelessness in multiple ways. Among these allegations are failing to supervise and monitor the minor; failing to instruct the minor; and failing to warn the minor of the dangerous nature and risks of the activity. Lastly, the Rock Climb defendants argue that a substantial amount of discovery remains outstanding and various issues of fact are yet to be settled, and therefore, it argues that Licata’s summary judgment motion should be denied.
The plaintiff cross claim defendant, Licata, argues that the defendants cross claim plaintiffs’ claims are void as against public policy as a result of the decision in Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 885 A.2d 734 (2005), [*7] regarding any waiver signed by Licata, and any waiver signed by Licata was a contract of adhesion. Licata argues that she was not given any opportunity to negotiate the terms of the Release document, which was presented to her on a “take or leave it” basis. It was the Rock Climb defendants who were responsible for training Licata and/or the minor plaintiff to ensure safe rock climbing, as Licata claims she did not possess the knowledge, experience or authority to ensure the rock climbing facility was in a safe condition. Additionally, Licata argues she was not in control of the situation on the date in question, and the cross claim does not even allege she was in control of the situation. Therefore, any claim for common-law indemnification also fails as a matter of law.
I
Summary Judgment
The legal standard governing summary judgment motions is well settled. Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Practice Book §17-49. “A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts [*8] at issue are those alleged in the pleadings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morrissey-Manter v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center, 166 Conn.App. 510, 517, 142 A.3d 363, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 924, 149 A.3d 982 (2016). Moreover, “[a] genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact . . . and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence . . . Hence, the genuine issue aspect of summary judgment procedure requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rickel v. Komaromi, 144 Conn.App. 775, 790-91, 73 A.3d 851 (2013).
“The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Pierre v. Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420, 426, 165 A.3d 148 (2017). “Because litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by the finder of fact, the party moving for summary judgment is held to a strict standard. [H]e must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) [*9] Barasso v. Rear Still Hill Road, LLC, 81 Conn.App. 798, 802-03, 842 A.2d 1134 (2004). Consequently, on a motion by defendant for summary judgment the burden is on the defendant to negate each claim as framed by the complaint. Squeo v. Norwalk Hospital Ass’n, 316 Conn. 558, 594, 113 A.3d 932 (2015). “It necessarily follows that it is only [o]nce [the] defendant’s burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rockwell v. Quintner, 96 Conn.App. 221, 229, 899 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 917, 908 A.2d 538 (2006).
“A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morrissey-Manter v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center, 166 Conn.App. 510, 517, 142 A.3d 363, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 924, 149 A.3d 982 (2016). Moreover, “[a] genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact . . . and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence . . . Hence, the genuine issue aspect of summary judgment procedure requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rickel v. Komaromi, 144 Conn.App. 775, 790-91, 73 A.3d 851 (2013). “Because litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues [*10] of fact decided by the finder of fact, the party moving for summary judgment is held to a strict standard. [H]e must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barasso v. Rear Still Hill Road, LLC, 81 Conn.App. 798, 802-03, 842 A.2d 1134 (2004).
II
Additional Discovery Argument
In their objection to summary judgment, the RCF defendants argue several times that summary judgment would be inappropriate because discovery is not complete. The court has before it the scheduling orders submitted by the parties, as signed by legal counsel for the RCF parties and the plaintiff. These scheduling orders filed on February 22, 2019,were approved by the court (Kamp, J.) on March 7, 2019.6 The approved scheduling order listed September 30, 2019, as the date by which all discovery was to be completed. There have been no requests to modify the scheduling order or to extend the dates for the completion of discovery.7 The court has before it the “Rock Climb Fairfield Release of Liability and Assumption of Risk” document and further additional information submitted by the parties to allow the court to move forward, including the transcript of the deposition [*11] testimony of Nora Maklad and employee of RCF. There is no indication that the defendants have sought more information through the discovery process or that Licata has objected to, obstructed or delayed the discovery process. The court has a one hundred and twenty-day time limitation to issue its decision and the court will do so within that time limit with the information that is available, as a trial date assignment is pending.
III
Contractual Indemnification
Count One of the Rock Climb defendants’ third-party complaint against Licata alleges contractual indemnification. “Indemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one who is claimed to be primarily liable.” Atkinson v. Berloni, 23 Conn.App. 325, 326, 580 A.2d 84 (1990). “A party may bring an indemnification claim based on the terms of an indemnity agreement . . . [A]llegations of contractual indemnification must be supported by the terms of the contract or the contract itself . . . Under Connecticut law, to state a contract-based indemnification claim, the claimant must allege either an express or implied contractual right to indemnification . . . There is no requirement that a party seeking indemnification must assert allegations of exclusive control (or any of the other elements [*12] of a claim for indemnification based on active-passive negligence) in order to state a legally sufficient claim for contractual indemnification.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinney v. Gilbane Building Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 01 0276049 (September 21, 2004, Wiese, J.).
“As a general rule, contractual indemnification claims that are based on written agreements are construed in accordance with the principles of contract law.”
Lawrence v. Sodexho, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06 5001264 (January 25, 2007, Owens, J.T.R.); 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 843, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 245; see also PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 290, 838 A.2d 135 (2004). “The essential elements for a cause of action based on breach of contract are (1) the formation of an agreement, (2) performance by one party, (3) breach of the agreement by the opposing party, and (4) damages . . . [and] causation.” Greco Properties, LLC v. Popp, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CVH 7628, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 414 (February 15, 2008, Bentivegna, J.), citing McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 93 Conn.App. 486, 503-04, 890 A.2d 140, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928, 895 A.2d 798 (2006).
“[I]n order to form a contract, generally there must be a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange between two or more parties . . . and the identities of [*13] the contracting parties must be reasonably certain.” (Citations omitted.) Ubysz v. DiPietro, 185 Conn. 47, 51, 440 A.2d 830 (1981); BRJM, LLC v. Output Systems, Inc., 100 Conn.App. 143, 152, 917 A.2d 605, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 917, 925 A.2d 1099 (2007). “[A] party is entitled to indemnification, in the absence of a contract to indemnify, only upon proving that the party against whom indemnification is sought either dishonored a contractual provision or engaged in some tortious conduct.” Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, Inc., 216 Conn. 65, 74, 579 A.2d 26 (1990). “[Allegations of contractual indemnification must be supported by the terms of the contract or the contract itself . . . Under Connecticut law, to state a contract-based indemnification claim, the claimant must allege either an express or implied contractual right to indemnification . . .”(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fisher v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-09-4008690-S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 32 (January 7, 2011, Roche, J.).
As noted, herein, the contract relied upon by the Rock Climb defendants is the “Rock Climb Fairfield Release of Liability and Assumption of Risk” document that has been submitted for the court’s review. It was admittedly signed by Kate Licata on October 3, 2016, the date of the alleged incident, wherein the minor child was injured. The document bears the name of the minor child [*14] and her date of birth. It lists the e-mail address of Licata and Licata’s electronic signature.
Paragraph 1 of the document titled “activities and risks” lists indoor wall climbing and bouldering as activities. Risks include, among other things: falling from climbing surfaces; persons climbing out of control or beyond personal limits; over-exertion; inadequate physical conditioning; and the negligence of other persons, including other visitors. The document states that the risks described in the document “are inherent in RCF activities . . . and cannot be eliminated without jeopardizing the essential qualities of the activity.”
Paragraph 2, titled “Assumption of Risks” states:
I accept and assume all the risks of a visit to RCF activity sites, inherent or not and whether or not described above, If the visitor is a minor of whom I am parent or legal guardian, I have explained the risks to the minor visitor, who understands them and wishes to visit and participate in RCF activities in spite of the risks.
Paragraph 3 is titled “Release and Indemnity. That paragraph notes that the signor of the agreement is an adult visitor or parent of a minor visitor and that the signor releases and discharges [*15] and agrees to indemnify the RCF defendants from all claims, suits, demands or causes of action, which are connected to the minor’s visit to and participation in, RCF activities. The agreement is intended to include claims arising out of losses suffered by the child and losses caused by the signor or the child. By signing the agreement, the signor agrees to indemnify and release claims of negligence of the RCF defendants.
Lastly, paragraph 5 of the Release notes that the signor acknowledges that if the minor visitor for whom the signor has signed their signature, is hurt and files a lawsuit, the signor will protect the released and indemnified RCF defendants from any claims of the minor visitor.
The Release bears a signature line and date line for the “parent or legal court appointed guardian. As stated, it is signed by Kate Licata and dated October 3, 2016. The document is not signed by the RCF defendants or any agent, servant or employee of the RCF defendants.
Licata, in moving for summary judgment, argues the “Release of Liability and Assumption of Risk” document is void as against public policy and unenforceable against her. Her argument relies upon the decisions in Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corporation, 276 Conn. 314, 885 A.2d 734 (2005) and Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, 280 Conn. 153, 905 A.2d 1156 (2006).
In Hanks [*16] , the plaintiff, a patron, brought his three children and another child to Powder Ridge to snow-tube. Neither the plaintiff or the children had ever snow-tubed at Powder Ridge, but the snow-tubing run was open to the public generally, regardless of prior snow-tubing experience, with the restriction that only persons at least six years old or forty-four inches tall were eligible to participate. In order to snow-tube at Powder Ridge, patrons were required to sign a “Waiver, Defense, Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreement, and Release of Liability.” The plaintiff read and signed the agreement on behalf of himself and the four children. While snow-tubing, the plaintiff’s right foot became caught between his snow-tube and the man-made bank of the snow-tubing run, resulting in serious injuries that required multiple surgeries to repair. Id., 316-17. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants negligently caused his injuries in several ways. Id. The defendants denied the plaintiff’s allegations of negligence and asserted two special defenses. “Specifically, the defendants alleged that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by his own negligence and that the agreement relieved the defendants of liability, “even if the accident was due to the negligence of the defendants.” Id., 318-19.
In Hanks, our Supreme Court determined that even though the exculpatory agreement purporting to release the defendants from prospective liability for personal injuries sustained as a result of the operator’s negligent conduct was well drafted, it nonetheless violated public policy. In finding the agreement violated public policy, the Supreme Court reversed [*17] the trial court’s granting of summary judgment for the defendants. Id., 321-26.
In Hanks, snowtubing was the recreational activity at issue. Our Supreme Court placed particular emphasis on: (1) the societal expectation that family oriented activities will be reasonably safe; (2) the illogic of relieving the party with greater expertise and information concerning the dangers associated with the activity from the burden of proper maintenance of the snowtubing run; and (3) the fact that the release at issue was a standardized adhesion contract, lacking equal bargaining power between the parties, and offered to the plaintiff on a “take it or leave it” basis. Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. at 331-34. The court recognized the clear public policy in favor of participation in athletics and recreational activities. Id., at 335.
In Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, supra, 280 Conn. 153, the plaintiff was an experienced horseback rider, who was injured while riding one of the defendant’s horses. The plaintiff subsequently challenged the validity of a release document similar to the one in Hanks, and in this case, wherein the defendant sought to insulate itself from liability. Reardon found that the decision in Hanks was controlling in determining the validity of the release and indemnity agreement.
We conclude [*18] that, based on our decision in Hanks, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the recreational activity of horseback riding and instruction that was offered by the defendants demonstrates that the enforcement of an exculpatory agreement in their favor from liability for ordinary negligence violates public policy and is not in the public interest. First, similar to the situation at issue in Hanks, the defendants in the present case provided the facilities, the instructors, and the equipment for their patrons to engage in a popular recreational activity, and the recreational facilities were open to the general public regardless of an individual’s ability level. Indeed, the defendants acknowledged that, although the release required riders to indicate their experience level, it also anticipated a range in skills from between “[n]ever ridden” to “[e]xperienced [r]ider,” and that the facility routinely had patrons of varying ability levels. Accordingly, there is a reasonable societal expectation that a recreational activity that is under the control of the provider and is open to all individuals, regardless of experience or ability level, will be reasonably safe.
Additionally, in [*19] the present case, as in Hanks, the plaintiff “lacked the knowledge, experience and authority to discern whether, much less ensure that, the defendants’ [facilities or equipment] were maintained in a reasonably safe condition. Specifically, although the plaintiff characterized herself as an experienced rider, she was in no greater position then the average rider to assess all the safety issues connected with the defendants’ enterprise. To the contrary, it was the defendants, not the plaintiff or the other customers, who had the “expertise and opportunity to foresee and control hazards, and to guard against the negligence of their agents and employees. They alone [could] properly maintain and inspect their premises, and train their employees in risk management.” In particular, the defendants acknowledged that they were responsible for providing their patrons with safe horses, qualified instructors, as well as properly maintained working equipment and riding surfaces. In the context of carrying out these duties, the defendants were aware, and were in a position continually to gather more information, regarding any hidden dangers associated with the recreational activity including the [*20] temperaments of the individual horses, the strengths of the various riding instructors, and the condition of the facility’s equipment and grounds. As we concluded in Hanks, it is illogical to relieve the defendants, as the party with greater expertise and information concerning the dangers associated with engaging in horseback riding at their facility, from potential claims of negligence surrounding an alleged failure to administer properly the activity.
(Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Id., 161-62.
Lastly, the Reardon court noted that the release that the plaintiff signed broadly indemnifying the defendants from liability for damages resulting from the defendants’ own negligence was a classic contract of adhesion of the type that this court found to be in violation of public policy in Hanks.
Specifically, we have noted that the most salient feature of adhesion contracts is that they are not subject to the normal bargaining processes of ordinary contracts, and that they tend to involve a standard form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usually a consumer, who has little choice about the terms. In the present case, signing the release [*21] provided by the defendants was required as a condition of the plaintiff’s participation in the horseback riding lesson, there was no opportunity for negotiation by the plaintiff, and if she was unsatisfied with the terms of the release, her only option was to not participate in the activity. As in Hanks, therefore, the plaintiff had nearly zero bargaining power with respect to the negotiation of the release and in order to participate in the activity, she was required to assume the risk of the defendants’ negligence. This condition of participation violates the stated public policy of our tort system because the plaintiff was required to bear an additional risk despite her status as a patron who was not in a position to foresee or control the alleged negligent conduct that she was confronted with, or manage and spread the risk more effectively then the defendants.
(Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Id., 162-63.
It is also noted that the court in Reardon did not limit its decision to the sport of horseback riding or the activity of snowtubing which was the activity in Hanks. “The list of recreational activities that we identified in Hanks was meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. [*22] Indeed, it would be impossible for us to identify all of the recreational activities controlled by the Hanks decision.” Id., 165-66. The court finds that the factors considered in Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corporation, supra, 276 Conn. 314 and Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, supra, 280 Conn. 153 apply to the activities of bouldering and rock climbing which are present in the case before this court.8
In the present case, the defendant’s facility was open to the general public regardless of a patron’s experience level. The minor plaintiff was a ten-year-old female. The defendants have admitted that they provided instruction to the group of minors attending the birthday celebration at the defendants’ facility. Neither the minor plaintiff or Licata provided any of the equipment to be used. Licata, herself, did not provide training, guidance or supervision to the minors, including the minor plaintiff. Licata possessed no special knowledge regarding rock climbing or bouldering activities including training and safety procedures other than an initial orientation by RCF employees.9 Maklad testified at her deposition that the orientation lasted only five to ten minutes. The RCF defendants/third-party plaintiffs admit that there was zero expectation that Licata would “train and guide climbers” [*23] or to inspect various facility equipment. RCF argues that they did expect that parents and guardians would supervise children. Thus, there is a question of fact as to whether or not Licata was adequately supervising the minor plaintiff Cannon when she fell. The court disagrees.
In this case, signing the release provided by RCF was required as a condition of the plaintiff’s participation in the bouldering and rock climbing activities at the RCF facility. There was no opportunity for negotiation by the plaintiff, and if she was unsatisfied with the terms of the release, her only option was to not to allow the minor guests who accompanied her to the birthday party to participate. Licata had no bargaining power with respect to the negotiation of the release and in order to participate in the activity, she was required to assume the risk of the defendants’ negligence. “This condition of participation violates the stated public policy of our tort system because the plaintiff was required to bear an additional risk despite her status as a patron who was not in a position to foresee or control the alleged negligent conduct that she was confronted with, or manage and spread the [*24] risk more effectively then the defendants.” Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, supra, 280 Conn. 162-63. The RCF release at issue was a standardized adhesion contract, lacking equal bargaining power between the parties, and offered to the plaintiff on a “take it or leave it” basis. Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. at 331-34.10
The RCF parties additionally argue that it is improper to allow Licata to avail herself of arguments based on public policy when she in turn violated public policy by signing the Release and Indemnification Agreement when she was not the parent or legal guardian of the minor plaintiff, Cannon. They argue Licata violated societal expectations and norms in signing the document and now disclaiming responsibility. They declare that Licata is the wrongdoer and should not be allowed to walk away from this issue.
Licata in her reply to the RCF objection to summary judgment argues that the RCF defendants have cited no authority for their position that Licata’s signing of the release document on behalf of the minor, Emma Cannon constituted a violation of public policy; nor have they explained why such a violation would restrict Licata from challenging the validity of the waiver. Licata also questions why the RCF defendants would make this argument, given that the sole basis [*25] for the contractual indemnification claim against Licata is her signing of the release document is which they now assert violated public policy. The court agrees. If the signing of the release was invalid, then it would stand to reason that the release itself is invalid. The RCF defendants, by their own reasoning would be attempting to enforce an agreement, which they themselves claim is invalid.
For the reasons set forth herein, the court grants Licata’s motion for summary judgment on Count One of the Rock Climb defendants’ third-party complaint against Licata alleging contractual indemnification.
IV Common-Law Indemnification
In Count Two of the cross claim, the RCF defendants allege common-law indemnification. Therefore, the court reviews our law concerning common-law indemnification, as set forth in Valente v. Securitas Sec. Services, USA, Inc., 152 Conn.App. 196, 203-04, 96 A.3d 1275 (2014). Citing, Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Corp., 152 Conn. 405, 412, 207 A.2d 732 (1965), the Appellate Court in Valente, supra, noted that “[g]enerally, there is no right to indemnification between joint tortfeasors.” Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Corp., supra, recognized an exception to this general rule. “Kaplan teaches that indemnification is available from a third party on whom a primary exposure of liability is claimed to rest. To hold a third party liable to indemnify one tortfeasor for damages awarded against [*26] it to the plaintiff for negligently causing harm to the plaintiff, a defendant seeking indemnification must establish that: (1) the third party against whom indemnification is sought was negligent; (2) the third party’s active negligence, rather than the defendant’s own passive negligence, was the direct, immediate cause of the accident and the resulting harm; (3) the third party was in control of the situation to the exclusion of the defendant seeking reimbursement; and (4) the defendant did not know of the third party’s negligence, had no reason to anticipate it, and reasonably could rely on the third party not to be negligent.” (Citation omitted.) Valente v. Securitas Sec. Services, USA, Inc., supra, 152 Conn.App. 203-04. “Our Supreme Court has defined exclusive control of the situation, for the purpose of a common-law indemnification claim, as exclusive control over the dangerous condition that gives rise to the accident.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., citing, Pellecchia v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 139 Conn.App. 767, 775, 57 A.3d 803 (2012) (dangerous condition held to be electric power line which electrocuted plaintiff), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 911, 61 A.3d 532 (2013).
The court has reviewed the objection to the motion for summary judgment filed by the RCF defendants and notes, as pointed out by Licata in her reply brief, that the RCF defendants have [*27] not addressed Licata’s claim in her motion for summary judgment that she did not control the situation that prevailed at the RCF’s facility on the date of the minor’s injury; nor is it alleged in the cross claim that Licata controlled the situation. An essential element of common-law indemnification is that the third party, Licata, was in control of the situation to the exclusion of the third-party plaintiffs. Valente v. Securitas Sec. Services, USA, Inc., supra, 152 Conn.App. 203-04; Pellecchia v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., supra, 139 Conn.App. 775. The third-party plaintiffs, the RCF defendants, have produced little to no credible evidence; nor have they alleged or argued that Licata was in control of the situation to the exclusion. “Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Merchant v. State Ethics Commission, 53 Conn.App. 808, 818, 733 A.2d 287 (1999). These same principles apply to claims raised in the trial court. Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Department of Public Utility Control, 266 Conn. 108, 120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003).
For the foregoing reasons discussed, herein, Licata’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to Count Two alleging common-law indemnification.
ORDERS
Licata’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Count One, which alleges contractual indemnification and Count [*28] Two, which alleges common-law indemnification.
End of Document
PA Supreme Court determines colleges owe a duty to provide medical care to student-athletes and releases are valid for stopping claims by student athletes.
Posted: April 27, 2020 Filed under: Pennsylvania, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Sports | Tags: Appellants', Athletic, benefits, Certification, Coach, contact sport, courts, Duty of care, factors, Football, foreseeable, Gross negligence, impose a duty, injuries, intercollegiate, licensed, medical personnel, NCAA, Ordinary Negligence, participating, parties, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Pre-Injury Contract, Pre-injury Release, Public Policy, recklessness, Release, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), social utility, Sports, student athlete, student-athletes, Summary judgment, team, trainers, Waiver, weighs Leave a commentCourt also sets forth requirements for a release to be valid under Pennsylvania law.
Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 215 A.3d 3, 2019 Pa. LEXIS 4615
State: Pennsylvania, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Plaintiffs: , Augustus Feleccia and Justin T. Resch
Defendant: Lackawanna College a/k/a Lackawanna Junior College, AD Mecca, Coach Duda, Coach Reiss, Coach Lamagna and Coyne and Bonisese
Plaintiff Claims: negligence, including negligence per se. The complaint also sought punitive damages, alleging appellants acted “willfully, wantonly and/or recklessly
Defendant Defenses: Release
Holding: For the Plaintiff’s
Year: 2017
Summary
In this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviews requirements for how a release must be written in Pennsylvania law to be valid. Pennsylvania has no definition of gross negligence, but a release is still not valid to stop a gross negligence claim.
Finally, if you create a duty or make a promise that people rely on to their detriment or injury you are liable. Here a college is liable to its student-athletes who were injured during practice for not having certified athlete trainers on the field.
Facts
Lackawanna had customarily employed two athletic trainers to support the football program.1 However, both athletic trainers resigned in the summer of 2009 and AD Mecca advertised two job openings for the position of athletic trainer. AD Mecca received applications from Coyne and Bonisese, recent graduates of Marywood University who had obtained Bachelor of Science degrees in Athletic Training. AD Mecca conducted telephone interviews with Coyne and Bonisese for the open athletic trainer positions at Lackawanna.
At the time she applied and interviewed for the Lackawanna position, Coyne had not yet passed the athletic trainer certification exam, which she took for the first time on July 25, 2009, and was therefore not licensed by the Board. Bonisese was also not licensed, having failed the exam on her first attempt, and still awaiting the results of her second attempt when she applied and interviewed for the Lackawanna position. Nevertheless, Lackawanna hired both Coyne and Bonisese in August 2009 with the expectation they would serve as athletic trainers, pending receipt of their exam results, and both women signed “athletic trainer” job descriptions. Id. After starting their employment at Lackawanna, Coyne and Bonisese both learned they did not pass the athletic trainer certification exam. Coyne informed AD Mecca of her test results, and AD Mecca also learned Bonisese had failed her second attempt at certification.
AD Mecca retitled the positions held by Coyne and Bonisese from “athletic trainers” to “first responders.” Id. at 1204. AD Mecca notified Coyne and Bonisese via email and written correspondence that due to their failure to pass the certification exam, they would function as “first responders” instead of “athletic trainers.” However, neither Coyne nor Bonisese executed [*7] new job descriptions, despite never achieving the credentials included in the athletic trainer job descriptions they did sign. Appellants were also aware the qualifications of their new hires was called into question by their college professors and clinic supervisors. See Id. More specifically, Shelby Yeager, a professor for Coyne and Bonisese during their undergraduate studies, communicated to AD Mecca her opinion that Coyne and Bonisese were impermissibly providing athletic training services in September 2009. Professor Yeager was aware Lackawanna did not have any full-time athletic trainers on staff2 and noted Coyne and Bonisese, as recent graduates, were inexperienced and did not have the required Board license. Professor Yeager stated that Coyne in particular was “ill-equipped to handle the rigors of a contact sport (like football) as an athletic trainer on her own regardless of whether she managed to pass [the certification] exam and obtain her state license.” Id., quoting Affidavit of Shelby Yeager. With regard to Bonisese, Bryan Laurie, who supervised her as a student, rated her performance as “below average/poor” and provided his assessment that she was not qualified to act as an athletic trainer in March of 2010. Id., citing Affidavit of Bryan Laurie.
Appellee Resch started playing football at the age of six, and continued playing through high school. Id. at 1204-05. Upon graduating from high school in 2008, Resch was accepted at Lackawanna and, hoping to continue playing football, met with Coach Duda prior to arriving for classes. Resch tried out for the Lackawanna football team in the fall of 2008. Resch not only failed to make the roster, but was also placed on academic probation, so he was ineligible to play football in the spring of 2009.
Appellee Feleccia also began playing football as a child at the age of ten, and played through high school. Feleccia was recruited by Coach Duda to play football at Lackawanna. See id. Feleccia did not make the team in the fall of 2008, but practiced with them during that time. During a scrimmage in the fall of 2008, Feleccia tore the labrum in his left shoulder, which was surgically repaired. Feleccia was also placed on academic probation after the fall 2008 semester and temporarily withdrew from Lackawanna. See id.
In mid-January 2010, Resch and Feleccia returned to Lackawanna for the spring semester with the aspiration to make the football team. Id. Lackawanna required appellees to fill out and sign various documents in a “participation packet” before playing with the team, including a “Waiver of Liability and Hold Harmless Agreement” (the Waiver) and a form including an “Information/Emergency Release Consent” (the Consent).
On March 29, 2010, appellees participated in the first day of spring contact football practice. The team engaged in a variation of the tackling drill known as the “Oklahoma Drill.” Appellees had previously participated in the Oklahoma Drill, or a variation of it, either in high school or at Lackawanna football practices, and were aware the drill would take place during practices. While participating in the drill, both Resch and Feleccia suffered injuries. Resch attempted to make a tackle and suffered a T-7 vertebral fracture. Resch was unable to get up off the ground and Coyne attended to him before he was transported to the hospital in an ambulance. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1207. Notwithstanding Resch’s injury, the Lackawanna football team continued practicing and running the Oklahoma Drill. Later that same day, Feleccia was injured while attempting to make his first tackle, experiencing a “stinger” in his right shoulder, i.e., experiencing numbness, tingling and a loss of mobility in his right shoulder. Id. Bonisese attended Feleccia and cleared him to continue practice “if he was feeling better.” Id. Feleccia returned to practice and then suffered a traumatic brachial plexus avulsion while making a tackle with his right shoulder. Id.
The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed based by the trial court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants. The Plaintiff’s then appealed that dismissal of their complaint to the Pennsylvania Superior Court (intermediate appellate court). The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court on several issues. The defendants then filed this appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was based on two issues.
a. Is a Pennsylvania college required to have qualified medical personnel present at intercollegiate athletic events to satisfy a duty of care to the college’s student-athletes?
b. Is an exculpatory clause releasing “any and all liability” signed in connection with participation in intercollegiate football enforceable as to negligence?
That means the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will only look at the two issues it has decided that need to be reviewed by the Supreme Court and nothing else.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
What is interesting are two things.
First, the court allowed a release to be used by a college to prevent lawsuits when a student is injured during practice for an NCAA sport. The analysis did not center around the relationship between the student athlete and the university; it centered around the fact the University had told student athletes they would have trainers and did not.
Sort of a detrimental reliance claim: I relied upon your statements that then injured me. Or as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §323
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.
The court found the College had created an expectation, relied upon by the students, that there would be athletic trainers available on the field during practice. Because the two trainers on the field were not certified, and possibly, to some extent, the actions of the school in changing the requirements or the people on the field to help the athletes from trainers to medical responders, the court found a legal theory where the college could be liable.
The second issue is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of Pennsylvania release law. Under Pennsylvania law “Accordingly, exculpatory contracts are valid and enforceable only when “certain criteria are met.” To meet that criteria the court restated four requirements under Pennsylvania law for a release to be valid.
(1) the contract language must be construed strictly, since exculpatory language is not favored by the law; 2) the contract must state the intention of the parties with the greatest particularity, beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no inference from words of general import can establish the intent of the parties; 3) the language of the contract must be construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking immunity from liability; and 4) the burden of establishing the immunity is upon the party invoking protection under the clause).
The first issue the court reviewed in determining if the release was valid was the lack of the word negligence in the release. If the release failed to specifically state the release stopped claims for the defendants negligence was it enforceable. The court said the release was valid even if it did not include the word negligence in its wording. To be valid the release must spell “…out the intention of the parties with particularity” and show “the intent to release [appellants] from liability by express stipulation.”
That means the court must review the party’s intentions in creating the agreement between them. Furthermore, the injuries suffered by the plaintiff must be encompassed within the terms of the release. That does not mean a specific list of injuries, just a general idea that the injury suffered was within the contemplation of the release.
The court then looked at ordinary negligence and gross negligence under Pennsylvania law. The court first stated there is a difference between ordinary, gross and reckless conduct or negligence.
However, the court avoided the issue of defining gross negligence or the issue of whether gross negligence was valid in this claim. The court stated, “([A]s gross negligence is not implicated in the instant matter, we leave for another day the question of whether a release for gross negligence can withstand a public policy challenge.”
The court then looked at how both parties in their briefs defined the actions of the defendant college. The court then reviewed public policy requirements to void a release under Pennsylvania law.
A determination that a contract is unenforceable because it contravenes public policy “requires a showing of overriding public policy from legal precedents, governmental practice, or obvious ethical or moral standards. “It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring. . . .”
However, the court then stated that pre-injury contracts, releases, are unenforceable when the liability of the defendant arises from recklessness. So the court refused to define gross negligence and used an old definition of recklessness. The Court then held that recklessness, not necessarily defined in a definition of negligence, could void a release.
Again, the Court repeated that Pennsylvania had not defined gross negligence in a civil liability setting.
Thus, although we have not previously settled on a definitive meaning of the term “gross negligence” as compared to “ordinary negligence” in the civil context, we have recognized there is a difference between the two concepts, and they are distinguished by the degree of deviation from the standard of care.
The court did then define gross negligence but did so in a way that did not set the definition in stone under Pennsylvania law. It just pulled definitions of gross negligence from lower courts and did not adopt any of them as the definition.
…in essence, gross negligence is merely negligence with a vituperative epithet. It constitutes conduct more egregious than ordinary negligence but does not rise to the level of intentional indifference to the consequences of one’s acts. It may also be deemed to be a lack of slight diligence or care comprising a conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty and the consequences to another party. The term has also been found to mean a form of negligence where the facts support substantially more than ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference. The behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard of care.
Gross negligence has thus been consistently recognized as involving something more than ordinary negligence, and is generally described as “want of even scant care” and an “extreme departure” from ordinary care.
As we have seen, gross negligence does not rise to the level of the intentional indifference or “conscious disregard” of risks that defines recklessness, but it is defined as an “extreme departure” from the standard of care, beyond that required to establish ordinary negligence, and is the failure to exercise even “scant care.
The court then repeated that the release would not stop a claim for gross negligence.
Moreover, although the Waiver bars’ recovery for appellees’ damages arising from ordinary negligence, we hold the Waiver does not bar recovery for damages arising from gross negligence or recklessness, and there remain factual questions regarding whether appellants’ conduct constituted gross negligence or recklessness.
Pennsylvania joins the list of states that a release will not stop a claim for gross negligence. A gross negligence claim must be decided by the trier of fact, the jury, in these cases.
So Now What?
First, we have definitive guidelines from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on how the court wants a release to be written. Second, we know that Pennsylvania joins the majority of states where a release cannot stop a claim for gross negligence.
We also know that recklessness is enough to void a release as well as gross negligence. However, terms we will result in battles by both sides to use the definitions they want applied to the facts of each particular case.
Finally, as in most states, if you make a promise to someone, and they rely on that promise to their detriment, you are going to write a check!
It is an interesting opinion purely from the allowance of the student-athletes to sue their college. However, the reasoning behind how a release must be written in Pennsylvania has great value.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Howe v. Momentum LLC, 2020 UT App 5, 2020 Utah App. LEXIS 1, 2020 WL 34996
Posted: April 23, 2020 Filed under: Climbing Wall, Utah | Tags: Accident Reports, Bouldering, Bouldering Wall, Climbers, Climbing Gym, Climbing Wall, concealed, damaged, district court, Failue to Act, floor, Gross negligence, Hazard, Incident Reports, indifference, injuries, landing, material fact, Mats, Padding, patches, quotation, reliability, simplified, slight care, Steps, Summary judgment, tear, vinyl Leave a commentHowe v. Momentum LLC, 2020 UT App 5, 2020 Utah App. LEXIS 1, 2020 WL 34996
Court of Appeals of Utah
January 3, 2020, Filed
No. 20190187-CA
[*P1] Scott Howe sued Momentum LLC under a theory of gross negligence1 for injuries he sustained while “bouldering.”2 Momentum moved for summary judgment, which the district court denied because the disputed facts were sufficient to raise a jury question. The district court also ruled that Howe’s expert (Expert) was qualified to testify on the industry standard of care. The matter is before this court on an interlocutory appeal challenging the court’s denial of the summary judgment motion and its decision to permit Expert to testify. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND3
[*P2] Momentum is an indoor-climbing facility with a separate area for bouldering. The bouldering area’s concrete floor is covered by approximately twelve inches of foam padding overlain by thick vinyl, known as an “impact attenuation surface.” In the years after Momentum’s 2007 opening, some of the vinyl [**2] began to tear and separate. In late September 2011, Momentum had “[a]t least one” tear repaired with a welded vinyl patch.
[*P3] But Momentum’s management team deemed these tear patches a hazard for tripping,4 so it placed modular one-inch-thick mats over certain areas of the bouldering area floor that were showing signs of wear or damage. The mats are not designed to be anchored to the underlying pad and they would sometimes move when people landed on them. Because the mats tended to move, Momentum staff “monitored the floor regularly to try to keep the [mats] in place.” In addition to this action, a Momentum employee altered the routes above those areas by reconfiguring and reducing the number of foot-and hand-holds to reduce customer use of the areas with worn and damaged padding.
[*P4] Over the years—and prior to Howe’s injury—Momentum’s patrons had reported incidents, some of which involved injuries, which alerted Momentum to the fact that the padding in the bouldering area was worn and damaged in some places. Before Howe was injured, five incidents were reported before Momentum began using the mats and another eight were reported thereafter. Each of these injuries involved a climber dropping [**3] from the bouldering wall or “slab area” to the floor below and, upon landing, pushing a foot through the floor padding, making contact with the concrete floor below, either rolling or twisting an ankle in the process.
[*P5] In March 2012, Howe was bouldering at Momentum. After finishing his bouldering route, Howe dropped off the wall to the floor below. As he made contact with the floor, his “left foot impacted the mat on top of the padded floor, causing the mat to move. As the mat moved, it exposed the padded floor beneath. Concealed under the mat, the cover of the pad was split in a straight line, exposing the abutting edges of pads below.” When Howe’s “right foot impacted the top of the two abutting pads, [his] foot passed between the two abutting pads to the floor beneath.” As a result of the contact with the concrete, Howe broke his right ankle.
[*P6] Howe sued, asserting—among other things—that Momentum was grossly negligent. He alleged that Momentum, “with a knowing and reckless indifference and disregard for the safety of [Howe] and other members of [Momentum], concealed, or caused to be concealed, the defects in their floor padding by placing mats over the defective area.”
[*P7] Howe designated [**4] a liability Expert. Expert has a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering and petroleum refining, as well as a master’s degree in metallurgical and materials engineering. His professional experience includes research and development engineering as well as forensic engineering. Expert owns a forensic engineering company that specializes in “metallurgical, materials, and mechanical failure analysis”; “materials evaluation and testing”; “product liability and analysis”; “fire and explosion cause and origin”; “industrial, recreational, and construction accident analysis”; and “chemical and mechanical systems failure analysis.” Expert has been an expert witness in numerous cases, one of which involved a mechanical failure that caused an indoor climbing accident. He has also had professional experience with evaluating impact attenuation surfaces in the ski industry.
[*P8] Expert opined that Momentum did not take appropriate steps to protect climbers in the bouldering area. Indeed, Expert concluded that
Momentum significantly elevated the risk of injury to climbers in the bouldering area by (1) failing to repair, restrict access, clearly mark, cordon off, close walls, or close areas around and [**5] near the areas where the vinyl padding cover was damaged, and by (2) placing the [mats] over the damaged areas of the padding cover, thus concealing the hazard created by the damage.
In Expert’s opinion, appropriate steps to remedy the problem could have included using “warning signs, closing the sections of the floor or wall near damaged areas,” removing the hand-and foot-holds above the damaged padding, making inaccessible the damaged padding areas, or repairing the damaged padding. During deposition testimony, Expert explained that “those are ways to prevent the public from interacting with the obvious hazard created by the opening in the pads.” This approach was based on his “engineering background and experience in dealing with hazards.” In short, his opinion is that “gluing and adhering . . . a large patch of vinyl over the tear” would have been safer than using the mats.
[*P9] Momentum moved for summary judgment, arguing the undisputed facts established that it exercised at least slight care to protect climbers using its facility, which meant Howe could not demonstrate gross negligence. Momentum also moved to exclude Expert, claiming he was unqualified to opine upon the standard of [**6] care in the indoor-climbing industry. The district court denied these motions, and Momentum successfully petitioned this court for an interlocutory appeal.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P10] Momentum raises two issues on appeal. First, it claims the district court erred when it denied Momentum’s motion for summary judgment. HN1[
] Denials of summary judgment are questions of law reviewed for correctness. Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, ¶ 6, 225 P.3d 185.
[*P11] Second, Momentum claims the district court erred when it denied Momentum’s motion to exclude Expert. HN2[
] A district court’s determination regarding the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, ¶ 16, 269 P.3d 980.
ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment
[*P12] HN3[
] Summary judgment shall be granted “if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). In this case, the district court denied Momentum’s motion for summary judgment on Howe’s claim for gross negligence, based on its finding that there were “numerous genuine issues of disputed material fact.”
[*P13]
HN4[
] In reviewing a district court’s summary judgment decision, appellate courts “must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence [**7] in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment to determine whether there is a material issue of fact to be tried.” Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982). “Gross negligence is the failure to observe even slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that may result. Summary judgment is proper where reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion based on the applicable material facts.” Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2017 UT 54, ¶ 35, 423 P.3d 1150 (quotation simplified).
[*P14] Citing Penunuri and Blaisdell v. Dentrix Dental Systems, Inc., 2012 UT 37, 284 P.3d 616, Momentum argues that “the undisputed material facts of this case show that [it] exercised care, far more than even slight care, and was not careless or reckless, let alone to a degree that shows utter indifference,” and that therefore “the district court erred in denying Momentum’s motion for summary judgment.” (Quotation simplified.) Momentum points out that it “[u]ndisputedly . . . took steps to protect climbers from being injured by the wear and tear damage that had developed in its primary padding,” including using welded patches, “thinn[ing] out” the climbing routes, and, “[a]fter determining that the . . . patches created tripping hazards,” using the mats and monitoring their positioning. In Momentum’s view, these steps [**8] demonstrate that it took at least slight care and was not utterly indifferent to the consequences that could result from a failure to take care.
[*P15] Howe acknowledges that Momentum took these steps, but argues they were inadequate. He further asserts that Momentum’s use of the pads to cover the defective flooring concealed the risk and rendered the climbers “defenseless against the dangerous conditions known to Momentum,” and claims that his “inability to see the dangerous flooring over which he was climbing contributed to his injuries.” At oral argument before this court, Howe argued this concealment “dramatically magnified” the risk of harm.
[*P16] We note the tension between our supreme court’s recent articulation of the elements of gross negligence as “the failure to observe even slight care,” Penunuri, 2017 UT 54, ¶ 35, 423 P.3d 1150 (quotation simplified), and the language of a subsequent paragraph suggesting that “the essential evidence needed to survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a gross negligence claim” is “evidence that the defendant’s conduct dramatically magnified the risk of harm to the plaintiff,” id. ¶ 37. We can envision situations in which the straightforward application of the elements identified [**9] in paragraph 35 might dictate a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant while the application of the elements identified in paragraph 37 might dictate the denial of summary judgment. But we need not explore this tension further here because Momentum’s failure to take further action in the face of eight additional incidents creates questions of fact about whether it was grossly negligent, even assuming that paragraph 35 sets forth the correct formulation of the elements of gross negligence.
[*P17] Although Momentum took certain steps to remedy the problem created by the deterioration of the foam padding, injury incidents continued to occur even after implementation of Momentum’s injury-avoidance strategy. HN5[
] It is beyond question that a plaintiff who can demonstrate that a defendant has taken no action in response to injury incidents will have likely made out at least a prima facie case of gross negligence, one sufficient to withstand summary judgment. See id. ¶ 16 (“Summary judgment dismissing a gross negligence claim is appropriate where reasonable minds could only conclude that the defendant was not grossly negligent under the circumstances . . . .”). We cannot see much of a distinction [**10] between that situation and the case Howe brings here: a defendant takes some action in response to injury incidents, and therefore arguably demonstrates slight care in the beginning, but takes no additional action after injury incidents continue to occur following implementation of its original strategy. Stated another way, we are not persuaded that a defendant who simply relies on a repeatedly-failed strategy to avert injury from a known risk is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the “slight care” question.
[*P18] In this case, five incidents, some of which involved injuries, motivated Momentum to take steps to address the problem and ultimately to place mats over the cracked foam padding. These acts arguably show that Momentum exercised slight care in the beginning and was therefore not completely indifferent to the consequences of allowing climbers to use the bouldering area given the condition of the padding. But by the time Howe was injured, eight more injuries had been reported to Momentum, even after it had thinned the routes and put down the extra pads. These eight additional climbers were injured in roughly the same manner as Howe: when they dropped from the bouldering wall [**11] onto the floor below, the mat moved, their feet were caught in the crack in the foam padding, and their ankles were injured. Under these circumstances, the question of whether Momentum’s continued use of the mats constituted gross negligence presents a disputed issue of material fact.
[*P19] Because a reasonable finder of fact could determine, on this record, that Momentum was grossly negligent, the district court’s denial of summary judgment was appropriate.
II. Expert Testimony
[*P20] HN6[
] The Utah Rules of Evidence allow “a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to “testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Utah R. Evid. 702(a). Furthermore, “[s]cientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony (1) are reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts.” Id. R. 702(b).
[*P21] Momentum argues the district court [**12] abused its discretion in denying its motion to exclude Expert. First, it contends Expert’s experience as an engineer did not qualify him to testify as to the applicable standard of care in the indoor-climbing industry. Second, Momentum contends that, because Expert did not evaluate or test vinyl floor padding or the mats used to cover the damaged areas, Expert’s opinions did not meet the reliability standard imposed by rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
[*P22] But as Howe points out, Expert’s training as a professional engineer with experience in “forensic engineering and accident analysis in recreational settings,” “slip and fall accident analysis,” and “warnings, design, and standard of care issues” qualifies him to assist the finder of fact in making a determination of the standard of care in the indoor-climbing industry.
[*P23] Expert’s proposed testimony is that Momentum acted with indifference toward the safety of its members when it placed mats over the damaged padding; Expert opines that Momentum could have and should have taken alternative steps to mitigate the effects of the worn padding. As Howe points out, and the district court agreed, this testimony “will be helpful to the jury to understand the options Momentum had [**13] in addressing the damaged vinyl” and to avoid speculation regarding its options.
[*P24]
HN7[
] Further, as to reliability, Expert’s opinion is based “upon [his] engineering education, experience, and training” and “knowledge . . . gained from being a forensic engineer . . . and studying padding and other types of accidents.” In determining whether to allow an expert to offer an opinion, the district court’s role is that of a “gatekeeper,” meant “to screen out unreliable expert testimony.” Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, ¶ 28, 269 P.3d 980 (quotation simplified). The court is afforded “broad discretion” when making this determination, and we “will reverse its decision only when it exceeds the bounds of reasonability.” Id. ¶ 31 (quotation simplified). Here, the court’s determination that Expert’s opinion was sufficiently reliable does not “exceed[] the bounds of reasonability,” and we decline to reverse it. See id. (quotation simplified). Expert’s opinion meets the threshold showing of reliability and “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Utah R. Evid. 702(a). Therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Momentum’s motion to exclude his testimony.
CONCLUSION
[*P25] Because there are material facts in [**14] dispute, the district court properly denied Momentum’s summary judgment motion. Furthermore, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Momentum’s motion to exclude Expert. We affirm the district court’s rulings on these points and remand for further proceedings.
Feleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 215 A.3d 3, 2019 Pa. LEXIS 4615
Posted: April 13, 2020 Filed under: Pennsylvania, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Sports | Tags: Appellants', Athletic, benefits, Certification, Coach, contact sport, courts, Duty of care, exculpatory, Exculpatory Agreement, factors, Football, foreseeable, Gross negligence, impose a duty, injuries, intercollegiate, licensed, medical personnel, Ordinary Negligence, participating, parties, Public Policy, recklessness, Release, social utility, Sports, student athlete, student-athletes, Summary judgment, Supreme Court, team, trainers, Waiver, weighs Leave a commentFeleccia v. Lackawanna Coll., 215 A.3d 3, 2019 Pa. LEXIS 4615
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
December 5, 2018, Argued; August 20, 2019, Decided
No. 75 MAP 2017
215 A.3d 3 *; 2019 Pa. LEXIS 4615 **
AUGUSTUS FELECCIA AND JUSTIN T. RESCH, Appellees v. LACKAWANNA COLLEGE A/K/A LACKAWANNA JUNIOR COLLEGE, KIM A. MECCA, MARK D. DUDA, WILLIAM E. REISS, DANIEL A. LAMAGNA, KAITLIN M. COYNE AND ALEXIS D. BONISESE, Appellants
Subsequent History: As corrected August 26, 2019.
Prior History: [**1] Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 385 MDA 2016 dated February 24, 2017, reconsideration denied April 26, 2017, Reversing the Judgment of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, at No. 12-CV-1960 entered February 2, 2016 and Remanding for trial.
Counsel: For Pennsylvania Association for Justice, Amicus Curiae: Barbara Axelrod, Esq., Beasley Firm, L.L.C. (The).
For Association of Independent Colleges and Universities of Pennsylvania, Amicus Curiae: Christopher D. Carusone, Esq., Cohen Seglias Pallas Greenhall & Furman PC.
For National Athletic Trainers’ Association & PA Athletic Trainers’ Society, Inc., Amicus Curiae: Mitchell Y. Mirviss, Esq.
For Lackawanna College a/k/a Lackawanna Junior College, Kim A. Mecca, Mark D. Duda, William E.Reiss, Daniel A.Lamagna, Kaitlin M.Coyne & Alexis D.Bonisese, Appellants: Steven Jay Engelmyer, Esq., Kleinbard LLC.
For Lackawanna College a/k/a Lackawanna Junior College, Kim A. Mecca, Mark D. Duda, William E.Reiss, Daniel A.Lamagna, Kaitlin M.Coyne & Alexis D.Bonisese, Appellants: Eric Joseph Schreiner, Esq., Kleinbard LLC.
For Lackawanna College a/k/a Lackawanna Junior College, Kim A. Mecca, Mark D. Duda, William E.Reiss, Daniel [**2] A.Lamagna, Kaitlin M.Coyne & Alexis D.Bonisese, Appellants: Joshua John Voss, Esq., Kleinbard LLC.
For Augustus Feleccia and Justin T. Resch, Appellee: Andrew P. Motel, Esq., Law Offices of Andrew P. Motel, L.L.C. (The).
For Augustus Feleccia and Justin T. Resch, Appellee: Robert A. Saraceni Jr., Esq.
For Augustus Feleccia and Justin T. Resch, Appellee: Daniel Joel Siegel, Esq., Law Offices of Daniel J. Siegel, L.L.C.
Judges: SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ. Justices Baer, Todd, Donohue and Mundy join the opinion. Chief Justice Saylor and Justice Wecht file concurring and dissenting opinions.
In this discretionary appeal arising from the dismissal of personal injury claims on summary judgment, we consider whether the Superior Court erred in 1) finding a duty of care and 2) holding a pre-injury waiver signed by student athletes injured while playing football was not enforceable against claims of negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness. After careful review, we affirm the Superior Court’s order only to the extent it reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment on the [*6] claims of gross negligence and recklessness, and we remand [**3] to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Appellees, Augustus Feleccia and Justin T. Resch, (collectively, appellees) were student athletes who played football at Lackawanna Junior College (Lackawanna), a non-profit junior college. See Complaint at ¶¶ 29, 30. At all times relevant to this matter, the following individuals were employed by Lackawanna and involved in its football program: (1) Kim A. Mecca, the Athletic Director for Lackawanna College who oversaw all of Lackawanna’s athletic programs, including the football program (AD Mecca); (2) Mark D. Duda, the head coach (Coach Duda); (3) William E. Reiss, an assistant and linebacker coach (Coach Reiss); (4) Daniel A. Lamagna, an assistant and quarterback coach (Coach Lamagna); (5) Kaitlin M. Coyne, hired to be an athletic trainer (Coyne); and (6) Alexis D. Bonisese, hired to be an athletic trainer (Bonisese) (collectively with Lackawanna referred to as appellants). Id. at ¶¶31-34, 40, 41, 43, 44.
Lackawanna had customarily employed two athletic trainers to support the football program.1 However, both athletic trainers resigned in the summer of 2009 and AD Mecca advertised two job openings for the position [**4] of athletic trainer. AD Mecca received applications from Coyne and Bonisese, recent graduates of Marywood University who had obtained Bachelor of Science degrees in Athletic Training. AD Mecca conducted telephone interviews with Coyne and Bonisese for the open athletic trainer positions at Lackawanna. See Feleccia v. Lackawanna College, 2017 PA Super 44, 156 A.3d 1200, 1203 (Pa. Super. 2017).
At the time she applied and interviewed for the Lackawanna position, Coyne had not yet passed the athletic trainer certification exam, which she took for the first time on July 25, 2009, and was therefore not licensed by the Board. Bonisese was also not licensed, having failed the exam on her first attempt, and still awaiting the results of her second attempt when she applied and interviewed for the Lackawanna position. Nevertheless, Lackawanna hired both Coyne and Bonisese in August 2009 with the expectation they would serve as athletic trainers, pending receipt of their exam results, and both women signed “athletic trainer” job descriptions. Id. After starting their employment at Lackawanna, Coyne and Bonisese both learned they did not pass the athletic trainer certification exam. Coyne informed AD Mecca of her test results, and AD Mecca also learned Bonisese had failed her second [**5] attempt at certification. Id. at 1203-04.
AD Mecca retitled the positions held by Coyne and Bonisese from “athletic trainers” to “first responders.” Id. at 1204. AD Mecca notified Coyne and Bonisese via email and written correspondence that due to their failure to pass the certification exam, they would function as “first responders” instead of “athletic trainers.” However, neither Coyne nor Bonisese executed [*7] new job descriptions, despite never achieving the credentials included in the athletic trainer job descriptions they did sign. Appellants were also aware the qualifications of their new hires was called into question by their college professors and clinic supervisors. See Id. More specifically, Shelby Yeager, a professor for Coyne and Bonisese during their undergraduate studies, communicated to AD Mecca her opinion that Coyne and Bonisese were impermissibly providing athletic training services in September 2009. Professor Yeager was aware Lackawanna did not have any full-time athletic trainers on staff2 and noted Coyne and Bonisese, as recent graduates, were inexperienced and did not have the required Board license. Professor Yeager stated that Coyne in particular was “ill-equipped to handle the rigors [**6] of a contact sport (like football) as an athletic trainer on her own regardless of whether she managed to pass [the certification] exam and obtain her state license.” Id., quoting Affidavit of Shelby Yeager. With regard to Bonisese, Bryan Laurie, who supervised her as a student, rated her performance as “below average/poor” and provided his assessment that she was not qualified to act as an athletic trainer in March of 2010. Id., citing Affidavit of Bryan Laurie.
Appellee Resch started playing football at the age of six, and continued playing through high school. Id. at 1204-05. Upon graduating from high school in 2008, Resch was accepted at Lackawanna and, hoping to continue playing football, met with Coach Duda prior to arriving for classes. Resch tried out for the Lackawanna football team in the fall of 2008. Resch not only failed to make the roster, but was also placed on academic probation, so he was ineligible to play football in the spring of 2009.
Appellee Feleccia also began playing football as a child at the age of ten, and played through high school. Feleccia was recruited by Coach Duda to play football at Lackawanna. See id. Feleccia did not make the team in the fall of 2008, but practiced [**7] with them during that time. During a scrimmage in the fall of 2008, Feleccia tore the labrum in his left shoulder, which was surgically repaired. Feleccia was also placed on academic probation after the fall 2008 semester and temporarily withdrew from Lackawanna. See id.
In mid-January 2010, Resch and Feleccia returned to Lackawanna for the spring semester with the aspiration to make the football team. Id. Lackawanna required appellees to fill out and sign various documents in a “participation packet” before playing with the team, including a “Waiver of Liability and Hold Harmless Agreement” (the Waiver) and a form including an “Information/Emergency Release Consent” (the Consent). See Appellees’ Brief in Opposition to MSJ at Exhibit 18(b). Appellee Resch “skimmed” and signed the Waiver on March 22, 2010. Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1205. Feleccia also executed the Waiver on March 22, 2010. The Waiver provided as follows:
1. In consideration for my participation in [Football] (sport), I hereby release, waive, discharge and covenant not to sue Lackawanna College, its trustees, officers, agents, and employees from any and all liability, claims, demands, actions, and causes of action whatsoever arising out of or related [**8] to any loss, damage, or injury, including death, that may be sustained by me, or to any property belonging to me, [*8] while participating in such athletic activity.
2. To the best of my knowledge, I am not aware of any physical disability or health-related reasons or problems which would preclude or restrict my participation in this activity. I am fully aware of the risks and hazards connected with [Football] (sport), and I hereby elect to voluntarily participate in said activity, knowing that the activity may be hazardous to me and my property. I voluntarily assume full responsibility for any risks of loss, property damage, or personal injury, including death, that may be sustained by me, or any loss or damage to property owned by me, as a result of being engaged in such activity.
3. I have adequate health insurance necessary to provide for and pay any medical costs that may directly or indirectly result from my participation in this activity. I agree to indemnify and hold harmless Lackawanna College, its trustees, officers, agents, and employees, from any loss, liability, damage or costs, including court costs and attorneys’ fees that may be incurred, due to my participation in said activity. [**9]
4. It is my express intent that this Release and Hold Harmless Agreement shall bind my family, if I am alive, and my heirs, assigns and personal representative, if I am deceased, and shall be deemed as a release, waiver, discharge and covenant not to sue Lackawanna College, its trustees, officers, agents and employees. I hereby further agree that this Waiver of Liability and Hold Harmless Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
In signing this release, I acknowledge and represent that I have read the foregoing Waiver of Liability and Hold Harmless Agreement, understand it and sign it voluntarily; no oral representations, statements, or inducements, apart from the foregoing written agreement, have been made; I am at least eighteen (18) years of age and fully competent; and I execute this Release for full, adequate and complete consideration fully intending to be bound by the same. Parent/Guardians’ signature required for individuals under eighteen (18) years of age.
Waiver attached as Exhibit A to Appellants’ Answer with New Matter.
Appellees also signed the Consent that provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) I do hereby off[er] [**10] my voluntary consent to receive emergency medical services in the event of an injury during an athletic event provided by the athletic trainer, team physician or hospital staff.
Consent attached as part of Exhibit 18(b) to Appellees’ Brief in Opposition to MSJ.
On March 29, 2010, appellees participated in the first day of spring contact football practice. The team engaged in a variation of the tackling drill known as the “Oklahoma Drill.” Appellees had previously participated in the Oklahoma Drill, or a variation of it, either in high school or at Lackawanna football practices, and were aware the drill would take place during practices. While participating in the drill, both Resch and Feleccia suffered injuries. Resch attempted to make a tackle and suffered a T-7 vertebral fracture. Resch was unable to get up off the ground and Coyne attended to him before he was transported to the hospital in an ambulance. See Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1207. Notwithstanding Resch’s injury, the Lackawanna football team continued practicing and running the Oklahoma Drill. Later that same day, Feleccia was injured while attempting to make his first tackle, experiencing a “stinger” in his right shoulder, [*9] i.e., experiencing numbness, [**11] tingling and a loss of mobility in his right shoulder. Id. Bonisese attended Feleccia and cleared him to continue practice “if he was feeling better.” Id. Feleccia returned to practice and then suffered a traumatic brachial plexus avulsion while making a tackle with his right shoulder. Id.
Appellees filed suit against appellants, Lackawanna, AD Mecca, Coach Duda, Coach Reiss, Coach Lamagna and Coyne and Bonisese, asserting claims for damages caused by negligence, including negligence per se. The complaint also sought punitive damages, alleging appellants acted “willfully, wantonly and/or recklessly.” Complaint at ¶¶82, 97, 98, 102 & 103. Appellants filed preliminary objections which were overruled, and filed an answer with new matter raising defenses, including that the Waiver precluded liability on all of appellees’ claims.
At the close of discovery, appellants filed a motion for summary judgment, relying primarily on the Waiver; appellants argued they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to appellees’ voluntary release of appellants from any and all liability for damages resulting from participation in the Lackawanna football program. See Appellants’ Brief in Support of [**12] MSJ at 13. In response, appellees argued Lackawanna “ran its Athletic Training Department in a manner demonstrating a total disregard for the safety of its student-athletes or the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” Appellees’ Brief in Opposition to MSJ at 1. Appellees argued appellants had required appellees to sign the Consent for treatment by an “athletic trainer,” thus taking on a duty to provide an athletic trainer, but then failed to provide an athletic trainer for its football team. See id. at 18-20.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellants. The court ruled the Waiver: (1) did not violate public policy; (2) was a contract between Lackawanna and college students relating to their own private affairs, and (3) was not a contract of adhesion. See Feleccia v. Lackawanna College, 2016 WL 409711, at *5-*10 (Pa..Com.Pl. Civil Div. Feb. 2, 2016), citing Chepkevich. v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 607 Pa. 1, 2 A.3d 1174 (Pa. 2010) (setting forth elements of valid exculpatory agreements).
The court then considered whether the Waiver was enforceable, i.e., whether it “spells out the intention of the parties with particularity and shows the intent to release [Lackawanna] from liability by express stipulation.” Id. at *10, quoting Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1191 (additional citations omitted). The court noted the Waiver did not specifically use the word “negligence” or mention the [**13] Oklahoma Drill, but it was executed freely by appellees, and stated they were fully aware of the risks and hazards in the activity and “voluntarily assume[d] full responsibility for any . . . personal injury” resulting from it. Id. at *11, quoting the Waiver. The court found the Waiver immunized appellants from liability because it addressed the “risks and hazards” ordinarily inherent in the sport of football. Id. at *12.3 Finding the negligence claims barred, the court ruled the claim for punitive damages also failed, and discussion of the Waiver’s applicability to those allegations was unnecessary. Id. at *14 n.13. [*10] The court concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact and appellants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the Waiver.
Appellees filed an appeal and the Superior Court reversed.4 Although the panel agreed with the trial court’s holding the Waiver was valid under Chepkevich, the panel disagreed that the Waiver barred all of appellees’ claims as a matter of law. The panel first observed the Waiver was “not sufficiently particular and without ambiguity” to relieve appellants of liability for their own acts of negligence. Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1212-13, quoting Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1189 (exculpatory [**14] clause is unenforceable “unless the language of the parties is clear that a person is being relieved of liability for his own acts of negligence.”).
The panel also held the trial court erred in failing to address appellees’ allegations underlying their claim for punitive damages, and whether the Waiver applied to preclude liability based on those allegations. Id. at 1213. The panel recognized this Court’s jurisprudence holding exculpatory clauses are not enforceable to preclude liability for reckless conduct. Id. at 1214, citing Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 47 A.3d 1190, 616 Pa. 385 (Pa. 2012).
Finally, the panel’s “most important” reason for reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was that, after reviewing the record in the light most favorable to appellees as the non-moving parties, there were genuine issues of material fact as to “whether the College’s failure to have qualified medical personnel at the March 29, 2010 practice constitute[d] gross negligence or recklessness,” and whether that failure caused appellees’ injuries or increased their risk of harm. Id. at 1214, 1219. The panel’s determination in this regard was based on its view that Lackawanna had a “duty of care to its intercollegiate student athletes . . . to have qualified medical personnel available at the [**15] football tryout on March 29, 2010, and to provide adequate treatment in the event that an intercollegiate student athlete suffered a medical emergency.” Id. at 1215. The panel relied in part on Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Circ. 1993), where the Third Circuit predicted this Court “would hold that a special relationship existed between the [c]ollege and [student-athlete] that was sufficient to impose a duty of reasonable care on the [c]ollege.” Id. at 1367. The panel further held it was for a jury to decide whether appellees signed the Waiver “unaware that [Lackawanna’s] athletic department did not include qualified athletic trainers.” Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1219. Accordingly, the panel remanded the matter for trial.
Upon petition by appellants we granted allowance of appeal to address following issues:
a. Is a Pennsylvania college required to have qualified medical personnel present at intercollegiate athletic events to satisfy a duty of care to the college’s student-athletes?
b. Is an exculpatory clause releasing “any and all liability” signed in connection with participation in intercollegiate football enforceable as to negligence?
Feleccia v. Lackawanna College, 644 Pa. 186, 175 A.3d 221 (Pa. 2017) (per curiam).
HN1[
] This matter presents pure questions of law, over which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See [**16] In re Vencil, 638 Pa. 1, 11-12, 152 A.3d 235 (Pa. 2017). “[A]n appellate court may reverse the entry of summary judgment only where it finds that the trial [*11] court erred in concluding that the matter presented no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is clear that the moving party was entitled to [a] judgment as a matter of law.” Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 576 Pa. 644, 841 A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa. 2003), citing Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa. 407, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001). We consider the parties’ arguments with these standards in mind.
II.
A. Is a Pennsylvania college required to have qualified medical personnel present at intercollegiate athletic events to satisfy a duty of care to the college’s student-athletes?
Appellants argue the Superior Court created a brand new common law duty of care requiring colleges to have qualified medical personnel available to render treatment at every practice and every game. Appellants aver the Superior Court did so without attempting to analyze the factors set forth in Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen, 562 Pa. 547, 756 A.2d 1166, 1169 (Pa. 2000) (before recognizing new duty of care courts must analyze the relationship between the parties; the social utility of the actor’s conduct; the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; and the overall public interest in the proposed solution). Appellants’ Brief at 18-20, citing Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1215. Appellants [**17] assert that, in creating this new duty of care, the Superior Court relied only on a decades-old, non-binding federal decision. Id., citing Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1371. Appellants argue that, had the Superior Court applied the Althaus factors instead, it would not have created such a duty. Appellants’ Brief at 20-22. Appellants argue a proper analysis of these factors either weighs against the creation of a new duty or is neutral. Accordingly, appellants request we reverse the Superior Court’s decision to the extent it created a new duty.5
Appellees respond that the panel did not create a new, onerous duty, and that appellants actually failed to comply with existing common law and statutory duties to have qualified medical personnel available at intercollegiate athletic events. Appellees refer to MPA provisions that set forth the qualifications for an “athletic trainer” and the manner in which they must perform their duties. Specifically, appellees note the regulations implementing the MPA establish restrictions and protocols for licensed athletic trainers, and they also prohibit the use of the title “athletic trainer” by any person without a Board-issued license. [**18] See Appellees’ Brief at 29-30, quoting 63 P.S. §422.51a (“An athletic trainer who meets the requirements of this section shall be licensed, may use the title ‘athletic trainer’ . . . and may perform athletic training services. A person who is not licensed under this section may not use the designation of licensed athletic trainer, athletic trainer or any of the listed abbreviations for that title, including ‘L.A.T.’ or ‘A.T.L.,’ or any similar designation.”). Appellees thus argue the Superior Court’s holding recognizes appellants have a duty to provide athletic trainers at practices, [*12] who, by statute, should be qualified medical personnel. Appellees’ Brief at 31.
Appellees also submit appellants’ claim the Superior Court ignored the Althaus factors is disingenuous. Appellees note the panel explicitly relied on Kleinknecht and, although the federal decision predated Althaus, the Third Circuit considered the same factors ultimately set forth in Althaus. Appellees’ Brief at 39-40, citing Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1215 (Kleinknecht court recognized: special relationship between college and student-athlete requiring college to act with reasonable care towards athletes; risk of severe injuries during athletic activities was foreseeable; [**19] and college acted unreasonably in failing to protect against risk). In any event, appellees reiterate, the Superior Court did not create a new common law duty, but rather recognized the “duty of care is necessarily rooted in often amorphous public policy considerations[.]” Appellees’ Brief at 38, quoting Althaus, 756 A.2d at 1169.
Finally, appellees observe appellants themselves undertook the duty to protect their student-athletes by customarily hiring licensed athletic trainers prior to 2009, and holding out Coyne and Bonisese as “athletic trainers” in the documentation regarding their employment, including executed job descriptions, where Coyne and Bonisese acknowledged they were required to have passed the national certification exam, which is a pre-requisite to use of the title “athletic trainer.” See Appellees’ Brief at 41-43, quoting Rstmt (2d) of Torts, §323 (“One who undertakes . . . to render services to another . . . is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking[.]”). Appellees argue the evidence presented was sufficient to raise factual jury questions regarding whether appellants breached this duty and whether [**20] that breach led to appellees’ injuries.6
Having considered the parties’ arguments and the opinion below, we acknowledge the Superior Court articulated a duty not previously recognized by Pennsylvania Courts: a college has a “duty of care to its intercollegiate student athletes requir[ing] it to have qualified medical personnel available at [athletic events, including] the football tryout, . . . and to provide adequate treatment in the event that an intercollegiate student athlete suffer[s] a medical emergency.” Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1215, citing Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1369-70. We further recognize the Superior Court did not analyze the Althaus factors, as [*13] required when imposing a previously unarticulated common law duty. Althaus, 756 A.2d at 1169. Instead, the panel relied on non-binding federal case law to impose what it viewed as a new common law duty. In this specific regard, the panel erred.
HN2[
] Courts should not enter into the creation of new common law duties lightly because “the adjudicatory process does not translate readily into the field of broad-scale policymaking.” Lance v. Wyeth, 624 Pa. 231, 85 A.3d 434, 454 (Pa. 2014), citing Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1245; see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 605 Pa. 269, 989 A.2d 313, 333 (Pa. 2010) (“Unlike the legislative process, the adjudicatory process is structured to cast a narrow focus on matters framed by litigants before the Court in [**21] a highly directed fashion”). We also acknowledge it “is the Legislature’s chief function to set public policy and the courts’ role to enforce that policy, subject to constitutional limitations.” Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1245 & n.19 (additional citations omitted). “[T]he Court has previously adopted the default position that, unless the justifications for and consequences of judicial policymaking are reasonably clear with the balance of factors favorably predominating, we will not impose new affirmative duties.” Id. at 1245 (citations omitted).
Applying the Althaus factors is not a mere formality, but is necessary when courts announce a new common law duty. Althaus requires consideration of the justifications for and the relevant consequences and policy concerns of the new duty of care. See Althaus, 756 A.2d at 1169 (setting forth factors for determination of new common law duty). Further, “determining whether to impose a duty often requires us to weigh ‘amorphous public policy considerations, which may include our perception of history, morals, justice and society.'” Walters v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 187 A.3d 214, 223 (Pa. 2018), quoting Althaus, 756 A.2d at 1169 (additional citations omitted). The Superior Court did not engage these factors, nor did the summary judgment record include relevant data regarding, for example, injury rates [**22] at practices, the consequences of having (or not having) available qualified medical professionals, the budgetary or other collegiate resource impact, or the relative public policy concerns involved.7
Importantly, however, an Althaus analysis was not necessary here because our review reveals the present circumstances involve application of existing statutory [*14] and common law duties of care. See, e.g., Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1038 (Pa. 2018) (analysis of Althaus factors not required where case is one involving “application of an existing duty to a novel factual scenario”). In Dittman, for example, we recognized the legal duty of an employer (UPMC) “to exercise reasonable care to safeguard its employees’ sensitive personal information stored by the employer on an internet-accessible computer system.” Id. at 1038. We did so because UPMC had required its employees to provide sensitive personal information, and then collected and stored that information on its computer system without implementing adequate security measures, such as encryption, firewalls, or authentication protocols. Id. at 1047. We reasoned that this “affirmative conduct” by UPMC created the risk of a data breach, which in [**23] fact occurred. Id. We further determined that, in collecting and storing its employees’ data on its computers, UPMC owed those employees a duty to “exercise reasonable care to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm arising out of that act.” Id. Dittman may have been our first opportunity to recognize this duty in the context of computer systems security, but there is longstanding jurisprudence holding that “[i]n scenarios involving an actor’s affirmative conduct, he is generally ‘under a duty to others to exercise the care of a reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm to them arising out of the act.'” Id. at 1046, quoting Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1246. This existing duty “appropriately undergirds the vast expanse of tort claims in which a defendant’s affirmative, risk-causing conduct is in issue.” Id. at 1047, quoting Seebold, 57 A.3d at 1246, see also Dittman, 796 A.3d at 1056-57 (Saylor, CJ, concurring and dissenting) (requirement to provide confidential information as condition of employment created “special relationship” between employer and employees giving rise to duty of reasonable care to protect information against foreseeable harm).
Additionally, HN3[
] we have adopted as an accurate statement of Pennsylvania law the Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 (1965). Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 421 A.2d 674, 677-78 (Pa. 1980) (“Section 323(a) of the Restatement of Torts has been part [**24] of the law of Pennsylvania for many years.”). Section 323 provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.
Restatement. (Second) of Torts, §323 (1965). See also Feld v Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742, 746 (Pa. 1984) (landlord that undertook duty to provide secured parking for tenants may be liable for damages arising from failure to exercise reasonable care in doing so).
In Feld, the plaintiffs were injured during a carjacking that began inside the garage of their apartment building. They filed a negligence lawsuit against their landlord, who had charged tenants additional rental fees to provide a gate and security guard for its parking garages. In discussing the viability of the plaintiffs’ negligence action, the Feld Court first noted landlords do not generally owe a duty as insurer to protect the safety of their tenants. However, the Court noted such a duty might [**25] arise if the landlord undertook [*15] to provide secured parking and failed to exercise reasonable care in doing so, and the tenants, who had relied on those services, were injured as a result. Id. at 746, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, §323 (1965) (identifying discrete duty where a “landlord [who] by agreement or voluntarily offers a program to protect the premises, . . . must perform the task in a reasonable manner and where a harm follows a reasonable expectation of that harm, he is liable.”).
Application of these legal principles to the present factual scenario supports a determination that “affirmative conduct” by appellants created a “special relationship” with and increased risk of harm to its student athletes such that appellants had a duty to “exercise reasonable care to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm arising” from that affirmative conduct. Dittman, supra. In addition, the record supports a finding appellants undertook a duty to provide duly licensed athletic trainers for the purpose of rendering treatment to its student athletes participating in athletic events, including the football practice on March 29, 2010,8 although it remains to be determined whether the steps actually taken by appellants satisfied that duty. [**26] See Wilson v. PECO Energy Co., 2012 PA Super 279, 61 A.3d 229, 233 (Pa. Super. 2012) (sufficient facts alleged to overcome summary judgment and reach jury on question of scope of duty undertaken and its breach).
Specifically, when we consider the record in the light most favorable to appellees as the non-moving parties, we observe the following: before hiring Coyne and Bonisese, Lackawanna customarily employed athletic trainers, who were licensed as required by applicable statutes and regulations; Lackawanna required its student athletes including appellees to execute the Consent to treatment by “athletic trainer, team physician or hospital staff” in the event of an emergency during participation in the football program; Lackawanna held out Coyne and Bonisese as athletic trainers to appellees and their teammates, despite its knowledge they lacked the statutorily required licenses; Lackawanna demonstrated its awareness that Coyne and Bonisese did not have the qualifications of athletic trainers by renaming them “first responders,” but did not alter their job descriptions, which encompassed the duties of “athletic trainers”; Coyne and Bonisese were the only individuals present at the March 29, 2010 football tryout to provide treatment [**27] to injured student athletes; the coaching staff propagated the misrepresentation of Coyne and Bonisese as athletic trainers; and Coyne and Bonisese [*16] performed the role of athletic trainers by attending appellees when they were injured, and directing appellee Feleccia to return to practice when he was “feeling better.”
Under these circumstances, appellants clearly created an expectation on which the student athletes might reasonably rely — i.e. in the case of injury during an athletic event, they receive treatment from a certified athletic trainer, as clearly outlined in the Consent they were required to sign. We thus easily conclude appellants undertook a duty to provide treatment by a certified athletic trainer at the March 29, 2010 practice. We further conclude the record, taken in the light most favorable to appellees, demonstrates the existence of a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to overcome summary judgment regarding whether appellants breached this duty and caused appellees’ injuries. Thus, we hold the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of appellants.
B. Is the Waiver enforceable as to the negligence claims?
Notwithstanding the existence of a duty [**28] on the part of appellants, and factual allegations of a breach of that duty which would support a negligence claim, we must now consider whether the Waiver completely precludes any liability on such a claim, or on appellees’ additional claims of gross negligence and recklessness. Appellants observe that by signing the Waiver appellees released “any and all liability, claims, demands, actions and causes of action whatsoever arising out of or related to any loss, damage, or injury, including death, that may be sustained” while playing football at Lackawanna. Appellants’ Brief at 38. Appellants submit Topp Copy Prods. v. Singletary, 626 A.2d 98, 100, 533 Pa. 468 (Pa. 1993) held a Waiver of “any and all” liability was sufficiently clear to bar claims of all negligence, and the Superior Court erred in holding the Waiver is unenforceable because “it does not indicate that Lackawanna was being relieved of liability for its own acts of negligence.” Appellants’ Brief at 39, quoting Topp Copy, 626 A.2d at 100 (“[T]he word ‘all’ needs no definition; it includes everything and excludes nothing. There is no more comprehensive word in the language, and as used here it is obviously broad enough to cover liability for negligence.”) (additional citations omitted). Appellants emphasize “Pennsylvania [**29] courts have consistently held that exculpatory clauses may bar suits based on negligence even where the language of the clause does not specifically mention negligence at all.” Appellants’ Brief at 43, quoting Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1193 (emphasis added).
Appellees submit the only issue preserved by appellants with respect to the validity of the Waiver is whether it is enforceable as to negligence, and that in this regard, the Superior Court correctly determined the Waiver is not sufficiently explicit regarding appellants’ own negligence to be enforceable. Appellees further assert the law is clear the Waiver is not enforceable to protect appellants from liability arising from gross negligence or recklessness, and the Superior Court properly remanded for further proceedings to determine whether appellants’ conduct constituted gross negligence or recklessness. Appellees’ Brief at 45-46, citing Tayar, supra, and Chepkevich, supra.
At the outset, we note appellants concede, as they must, that appellees’ claims of liability arising from recklessness are not precluded by the Waiver. See, e.g. Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1203 (finding public policy prohibits pre-injury waivers from releasing reckless behavior). The issue before us is thus narrowed to whether the Waiver, which purports [**30] to release “any [*17] and all liability,” precludes liability on appellees’ claims of negligence and, relatedly, gross negligence.9 We bear in mind that exculpatory contracts are generally disfavored, and subject to close scrutiny. See Employers Liability Assur. Corp. v. Greenville Bus. Men’s Ass’n, 423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa. 1966) (“contracts providing for immunity from liability for negligence must be construed strictly since they are not favorites of the law”); see also Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1199. Accordingly, exculpatory contracts are valid and enforceable only when “certain criteria are met.” Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1200 & n.8, citing Chepkevich and Topp Copy. Our case law provides “guiding standards” for assessing the enforceability of exculpatory contracts. See, e.g., Topp Copy, 626 A.2d at 99 (1) the contract language must be construed strictly, since exculpatory language is not favored by the law; 2) the contract must state the intention of the parties with the greatest particularity, beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no inference from words of general import can establish the intent of the parties; 3) the language of the contract must be construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking immunity from liability; and 4) the burden of establishing the immunity is upon the party invoking protection under the clause).
i. Ordinary Negligence
The Superior Court considered the Waiver to be unenforceable as to appellees’ claims of negligence because its “language does not indicate that Lackawanna was being relieved of liability for its own acts of negligence.” Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1213. The court further found fault with the Waiver because it did not specifically include the word “negligence.” Id. at 1212-13. Although our cases have directed that exculpatory clauses must clearly provide “a person is being relieved of liability for his own acts of negligence[,]” we have not prescribed specific language. Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1189, quoting Topp Copy, 626 A.2d at 99. In this case, the Waiver purported to protect appellants from “any and all liability” arising out of “any injury” sustained by student athletes while playing football at Lackawanna. We have determined such language is sufficient to express the parties’ intention to bar ordinary negligence claims. See Topp Copy, 626 A.2d at 99, 101 (lease agreement releasing lessor from ‘”any and all liability” clearly and unambiguously covered negligence claims’); see also Cannon v. Bresch, 307 Pa. 31, 160 A. 595, 596 (Pa. 1932) (lease releasing landlord from “all liability” was sufficient to cover liability for negligence).
[*18] The Superior Court, in reaching the opposite result, failed to acknowledge the trial court did not find [**32] the mere existence of the Waiver automatically extinguished all potential claims of liability. Rather, the trial court applied the Topp Copy guiding standards to determine “whether the [exculpatory] clause ‘spells out the intention of the parties with particularity and shows the intent to release [appellants] from liability by express stipulation.'” Trial Court op. at 19, quoting McDonald v. Whitewater Challengers, Inc., 2015 PA Super 104, 116 A.3d 99, 121 (Pa. Super. 2015), quoting Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1191. The trial court examined the facts of record, including the parties’ intentions related to the execution of the Waiver as well as whether the risks undertaken by appellees and injuries suffered were encompassed within its terms. Trial Court op. at 18-22. The trial court determined it could not “say that the risks associated with Lackawanna’s Oklahoma Drill are so far beyond those risks ordinarily inherent to the sport of football and addressed in the Waiver as ‘risks and hazards’ typical of the sport that we must, as a matter of law, invalidate the Waiver.” Id. at 21-22. The trial court thus found the Waiver was enforceable and entered summary judgment in favor of appellants. We conclude that the Superior Court’s reversal of this holding with respect to appellees’ claims of ordinary negligence was error.10 [**33] See, e.g., Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1194-95 (release enforceable to preclude liability for general claims of negligence); see also, Topp Copy, 626 A.2d at 101 (release of “any and all” liability sufficient to preclude liability resulting from landlord’s negligence); see also Cannon, 160 A. at 597 (“The covenant in this lease against liability for acts of negligence does not contravene any policy of the law.”).
ii. Gross Negligence
As we have seen, appellees’ claims of ordinary negligence are barred by the Waiver, their claims of recklessness are not, and the allegations of recklessness will be tested at trial on remand. We have yet to rule on whether appellees may also proceed to trial on their allegations of gross negligence, or whether such claims are precluded by the Waiver. See Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1199 n.7 (“[A]s gross negligence is not implicated in the instant matter, we leave for another day the question of whether a release for gross negligence can withstand a public policy challenge.”).
Appellants consider gross negligence to be more closely aligned with negligence than recklessness, describing it as a form of negligence where there is a more significant departure from the standard of care, but without the “conscious action or inaction” that characterizes recklessness. [**34] See Appellants’ Brief at 52. Appellants view gross negligence as a type of negligence that is covered by the Waiver and precludes appellees’ action for damages. Id. at 53-54.
Appellees respond that gross negligence is “more egregiously deviant conduct than ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference. . . . The behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard of care.” [*19] Appellees’ Brief at 50, quoting Bloom v. Dubois Reg’l Med. Ctr., 597 A.2d 671, 679, 409 Pa. Super. 83 (Pa. Super. 1991); accord Albright v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 548 Pa. 268, 696 A.2d 1159, 1164 (Pa. 1997) (“We believe that this definition is a clear, reasonable, and workable definition of gross negligence[.]”). Here, appellees assert, there were sufficient facts presented for the jury to conclude appellants’ conduct was grossly negligent, and public policy compels the conclusion such conduct should not be immunized by the Waiver. Appellees’ Brief at 52-53.
HN4[
] A determination that a contract is unenforceable because it contravenes public policy “requires a showing of overriding public policy from legal precedents, governmental practice, or obvious ethical or moral standards.” See Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1199, citing Williams v. GEICO Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 613 Pa. 113, 32 A.3d 1195, 1200 (Pa. 2011). “It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion [**35] in regard to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring. . . .” Id., quoting Williams, 32 A.3d at 1200. Our law is clear that pre-injury exculpatory contracts purporting to protect a party from liability arising from recklessness are unenforceable on this public policy basis.
Although we have equated “gross negligence” with “recklessness” in the criminal law context, we have not expressly applied that equation in the civil context. See Com. v. Huggins, 575 Pa. 395, 836 A.2d 862, 867 (Pa. 2003) (gross negligence equates with recklessness for purpose of establishing mens rea for manslaughter). In the civil context, there is some difficulty in ascertaining the term’s precise meaning. See In re Scheidmantel, 2005 PA Super 6, 868 A.2d 464, 484-85 (Pa. Super. 2005) (recognizing “gross negligence” is frequently invoked but is not well defined in the civil context and “Pennsylvania Courts have struggled to provide a workable definition for ‘gross negligence’ when faced with the need to apply the concept.”). In Albright, 696 A.2d at 1164, we defined gross negligence in the context of the Mental Health Procedures Act11 as a “form of negligence where the facts support substantially more than ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference. The behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard [**36] of care.” Id. at 1164, quoting Bloom, 597 A.2d at 679.
HN5[
] Thus, although we have not previously settled on a definitive meaning of the term “gross negligence” as compared to “ordinary negligence” in the civil context, we have recognized there is a difference between the two concepts, and they are distinguished by the degree of deviation from the standard of care. See, e.g., Albright, supra; Ratti v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 2000 PA Super 239, 758 A.2d 695, 703 (Pa. Super. 2000), appeal denied, 567 Pa. 715, 785 A.2d 90 (Pa. 2001). See also Pa. Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions 13.50 (“Gross negligence is significantly worse than ordinary negligence” requiring proof actor “significantly departed from how a reasonably careful person would act under the circumstances”). To the extent our courts have used the term, the “general consensus finds gross negligence constitutes conduct more egregious than ordinary negligence but does not rise to the level of intentional indifference to the consequences of one’s acts.” Id. Other Pennsylvania sources have observed:
[*20] In essence, gross negligence is merely negligence with a vituperative epithet. It constitutes conduct more egregious than ordinary negligence but does not rise to the level of intentional indifference to the consequences of one’s acts. It may also be deemed to be a lack of slight diligence or care [**37] comprising a conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty and the consequences to another party. The term has also been found to mean a form of negligence where the facts support substantially more than ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference. The behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard of care.
2 Summ. Pa. Jur. 2d Torts §20:5 (internal citations omitted).
HN6[
] Gross negligence has thus been consistently recognized as involving something more than ordinary negligence, and is generally described as “want of even scant care” and an “extreme departure” from ordinary care. Royal Indem. Co. v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 255 F.Supp.2d 497, 505 (E.D. Pa. 2003), quoting Williams v. State Civil Serv. Comm’n, 9 Pa. Commw. 437, 306 A.2d 419, 422 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973), aff’d 457 Pa. 470, 327 A.2d 70 (Pa. 1974); see also Scheidmantel, 868 A.2d at 485 (gross negligence is “a lack of slight diligence or care comprising a conscious, voluntary act or omission in ‘reckless disregard’ of a legal duty and the consequences to another party”). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 1057 (7th ed. 1999) (gross negligence is a “lack of slight diligence or care” and a “conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty and the consequences to another party”). With these principles in mind, we now proceed to consider whether a pre-injury exculpatory [**38] waiver is valid to preclude claims of gross negligence.12
In Tayar, we held an exculpatory clause was not valid to preclude liability arising from reckless conduct because allowing such waivers would permit parties to “escape liability for consciously disregarding substantial risks of harm to others[.]” Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1203. We recognized such pre-injury releases are unenforceable in circumstances where they “would jeopardize the health, safety, and welfare of the people by removing any incentive for parties to adhere to minimal standards of safe conduct.” Id.
As we have seen, HN7[
] gross negligence does not rise to the level of the intentional indifference or “conscious disregard” of risks that defines recklessness, but it is defined as an “extreme departure” from the standard of care, beyond that required to establish ordinary negligence, and is the failure to exercise even “scant care.” Royal Indem. Co., 255 F.Supp.2d at 505. See also 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of [*21] Torts § 140 (gross negligence is “a high, though unspecified degree of negligence, or as courts sometimes say, the failure to use even slight care.”) Thus, gross negligence involves more than a simple breach of the standard of care (which would establish ordinary negligence), and instead [**39] describes a “flagrant” or “gross deviation” from that standard. Bloom, 597 A.2d at 679 (gross negligence involves behavior that is “flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard of care”). As such, the same policy concerns that prohibit the application of a waiver in cases of recklessness — i.e., allowing it would incentivize conduct that jeopardizes the signer’s health, safety and welfare to an unacceptable degree requires a similar holding with regard to gross negligence.13 Accordingly, we hold the Waiver is not enforceable to preclude liability arising from appellees’ claims of gross negligence, and the allegations supporting such claims should be tested at trial on remand.
III. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, we hold appellants had a duty to provide duly licensed athletic trainers for the purpose of rendering treatment to its student athletes participating in athletic events, including the football practice of March 29, 2010, and there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether appellants breached this duty. Moreover, although the Waiver bars recovery for appellees’ damages arising from ordinary negligence, we hold the Waiver does not bar recovery for damages arising [**40] from gross negligence or recklessness, and there remain factual questions regarding whether appellants’ conduct constituted gross negligence or recklessness. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s order only to the extent it vacated the trial court’s entry of summary judgment on these claims specifically, and we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justices Baer, Todd, Donohue and Mundy join the opinion.
Chief Justice Saylor and Justice Wecht file concurring and dissenting opinions.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
I join the majority opinion to the extent it reverses the Superior Court’s creation of a generalized duty of care owed by Pennsylvania colleges to student athletes to have medical personnel available at all football practices. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 14. I respectfully differ, however, with the majority’s follow-on holding that, under an assumption-of-duty theory as reflected in Section 323 of the Second Restatement of Torts, Lackawanna College definitively owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs on the date in question.
As a general matter, whether a defendant owed a duty of care to another person at [**41] the relevant time is a legal issue to be decided on the underlying facts. See, e.g., Dittman v. UPMC, Pa. , , 196 A.3d 1036, 1046 (2018); accord Kukis v. [*22] Newman, 123 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (“The existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide based on the specific facts of the case.”). Because the complaint was dismissed on a defense motion for summary judgment, the majority appropriately “consider[s] the record in the light most favorable to [Plaintiffs] as the non-moving parties[.]” Majority Opinion, slip op. at 19. In doing so the majority recites certain facts which remain in dispute. This alone is not problematic given that, again, the record is being viewed favorably to Plaintiffs. The difficulty arises when the majority holds, in definitive terms, that a duty existed in light of such circumstances.
For example, the majority states, “Lackawanna held out Coyne and Bonisese as athletic trainers to [Plaintiffs] and their teammates,” and that these same two individuals “performed the role of athletic trainers by attending [Plaintiffs] when they were injured[.]” Id. Notably, Appellees expressly denied that Coyne and Bonisese held themselves out as athletic trainers or Lackawanna College held them out as such. See Defendants’ Answer and New Matter at ¶¶40, 42, 43, 44 (averring [**42] that, at all relevant times, Coyne and Bonisese were held out by themselves and the college as first responders). Thus, I would frame the holding in more abstract terms and allow the common pleas court to determine, after resolution of any necessary factual disputes, whether Appellees’ affirmative conduct created a duty under the circumstances — and if so, the scope that duty.1
In terms of the second question accepted for review — whether the exculpatory clause is valid as to negligence — I also respectfully differ with the majority’s conclusion that the clause is unenforceable as contrary to public policy relative to a claim based on gross negligence.2
It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in [*23] regard to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring. There must be a positive, well-defined, universal public sentiment, deeply integrated in the customs and beliefs of the people and in their conviction of what is just and right and in the interests of the public weal.
Shick v. Shirey, 552 Pa. 590, 600, 716 A.2d 1231, 1235-36 (1998) (quoting Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 325, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (1941)); see also Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 616 Pa. 385, 399, 47 A.3d 1190, 1199 (2012) (recognizing that “avoidance of contract [**43] terms on public policy grounds requires a showing of overriding public policy from legal precedents, governmental practice, or obvious ethical or moral standards”). Tayar cited Williams v. GEICO Government Employees Insurance Co., 613 Pa. 113, 32 A.3d 1195 (2011), for this position, and continued as follows:
Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interest. As the term “public policy” is vague, there must be found definite indications in the law of the sovereignty to justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to that policy[.] . . . Only dominant public policy would justify such action. In the absence of a plain indication of that policy through long governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious ethical or moral standards, the Court should not assume to declare contracts . . . contrary to public policy. The courts must be content to await legislative action.
Tayar, 616 Pa. at 399-400, 47 A.3d at 1199 (quoting Williams, 613 Pa. at 120-21, 32 A.3d at 1200) (alterations made by Tayar).
In this vein, it seems to me that, to invalidate the waiver relative to gross negligence claims as contrary to public policy, the concept of gross negligence would, at a minimum, have to be well understood and defined. [**44] Apart from a clear notion of what constitutes gross negligence as distinguished from ordinary negligence, it seems difficult to contend that laws, legal precedents, long governmental practice, or other recognized indicators of longstanding, dominant public policy are so firmly entrenched in this Commonwealth against such waivers as to permit this Court to declare, as the majority presently does, that they are judicially prohibited.
Yet, as the majority explains, it is difficult even to ascertain the precise meaning of gross negligence, as that term represents an “amorphous concept,” that is, at its essence, “merely negligence with a vituperative epithet.” The majority proceeds to describe gross negligence as “appear[ing] to lie somewhere between” negligence and recklessness. Majority Opinion, slip op. at 21 n.9, 27.
This type of uncertainty in discerning just what gross negligence consists of, in my view (and for reasons more fully explained below) undermines the concept that liability waivers should be deemed unenforceable as against claims of gross negligence although they can be valid and enforceable in relation to claims of ordinary negligence.
In terms of the competing interests involved, it should go [**45] without saying that athletic and other recreational pursuits by Pennsylvania residents are in the public interest and should be encouraged. See, e.g., Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 607 Pa. 1, 30, 2 A.3d 1174, 1191 (2010) (reviewing cases). On the other hand, it is plainly contrary to public policy to enforce releases which would allow individuals intentionally to harm others with impunity. Accord Tayar, 616 Pa. at 401, 47 A.3d at 1200. In Tayar, this Court extended that understanding to harm stemming [*24] from recklessness, that is, conduct in which the actor knowingly disregards an unreasonable risk of harm. Tayar reasoned that the conscious act of ignoring such a risk “aligns . . . closely with intentional conduct.” Id. at 403, 47 A.3d at 1201. Still, this Court should not overlook the competing policy grounds underlying the enforceability of liability waivers relative to inherently risky athletic activities.
Generally speaking, an exculpatory clause is a renunciation of a right and, as such, it constitutes a means of allocating risk as between contracting parties. See generally Anita Cava & Don Wiesner, Rationalizing a Decade of Judicial Responses to Exculpatory Clauses, 28 Santa Clara L. Rev. 611, 648 (1988). Because incurring risks is costly, shifting risks from the organizer of the athletic endeavor (the “supplier”) to the participant (the “consumer”) allows the supplier to lower the price of the activity, [**46] particularly where there is market competition and/or where, as here, the provider is a non-profit organization. Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1527, 113 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1991) (applying similar reasoning to a contractual forum-selection clause). See generally Brief for Amicus Ass’n of Indep. Colls. & Univs. of Pa. at 12-14 (detailing that complying with the generalized duty imposed by the Superior Court would be likely to impose significant costs on the Association’s member institutions). A lower price, in turn, serves the public interest because, on the margin at least, recreational opportunities become available to lower-income residents who would otherwise be excluded from such events.
It may be assumed that another factor favoring enforcement is the recognition that, subject to limiting principles, parties are generally at liberty to enter into contracts of their choosing. See Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist. v. American Cas. Co., 493 Pa. 254, 258, 426 A.2d 94, 96 (1981). This is reflected in the test for enforceability, one element of which asks whether each party is a “free bargaining agent.” Tayar, 616 Pa. at 399, 47 A.3d at 1199 (citing Emp’rs Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Greenville Business Men’s Ass’n, 423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966)).
Conversely, enforcing waivers of liability based on any kind of fault — including ordinary negligence — diminishes incentives for the supplier to manage risks which it is in a better position than the consumer to control.
None of the above is to suggest that negligent or grossly negligent [**47] conduct is in any sense socially beneficial. Rather, it is offered solely for the purpose of illustrating that multiple competing interests are at stake when a litigant requests that we judicially invalidate an otherwise binding contractual provision on public policy grounds. Presumably, this Court’s line of decisions enforcing waivers as to ordinary negligence reflects a balancing of these considerations.
Certainly, and as noted, a weighing of such policies favors unenforceability where intentional or reckless conduct is concerned. In such instances, not only are there obvious reasons based on enduring societal mores which support such a result, but — and perhaps less obvious — any competing interest in cost reduction is not unduly compromised. This is because, absent some proof of intentional conduct or conscious disregard, the common pleas court can, in a given case, be expected to act as a gatekeeper so that the supplier need not incur the cost of litigating the case to the conclusion of a jury trial and, perhaps, post-trial motions.
The same cannot be said for gross negligence precisely because of its “amorphous” nature. After today it will be difficult for common pleas courts to [**48] decide — when the [*25] defendant is in possession of a validly-executed waiver covering the activity in question — whether the complaint should be dismissed on the grounds that it only alleges ordinary negligence and not gross negligence. As a consequence, litigants can be expected to argue, with regard to any supportable allegation of negligence, that they are entitled to have a jury decide whether the defendant’s negligence was, in fact, “gross.” Absent thorough and detailed appellate guidance as to the types of facts that must be pled to allege gross negligence, such an argument is likely to prevail in many if not most cases.
In all events, the type of policy making this Court presently undertakes is best suited to the General Assembly. We have observed on multiple occasions that the legislative branch is the appropriate forum for the balancing of social policy considerations and interests and the making of social policy judgments, and that it has the tools to perform these tasks — tools which the courts lack. See, e.g., Seebold v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 618 Pa. 632, 653, 57 A.3d 1232, 1245 & n.19 (2012).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the holding reached in Part II(b) of the majority opinion. I note, however, that I do not foreclose reconsidering my [**49] position if, in the future, the concept of gross negligence in Pennsylvania is made subject to a more precise definition which allows for some measure of consistency and predictability in litigation.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
I. Introduction
Like the Majority, I believe that Lackawanna College had a duty to ensure that certified athletic trainers were available to treat student-athletes injured during the March 29, 2010 football tryouts. Considering the record in the light most favorable to Feleccia and Resch, as we must, it is clear that Lackawanna College assumed this duty through its own actions and representations.1 As a general matter, I agree as well with the Majority’s analysis regarding the enforceability of the liability waiver that Feleccia and Resch signed. Specifically, I join in the conclusion that the waiver was enforceable as to ordinary negligence, and not enforceable as to gross negligence.2
[*26] I write separately because, while the Majority limits Lackawanna College’s duty to the obligation it undertook through its own actions and representations, see Maj. Op. at 18-19, principles of Pennsylvania tort law require us to go further. Based upon [**50] the factors that this Court articulated in Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen, 562 Pa. 547, 756 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 2000), as well as the persuasive opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993), colleges owe a duty to their student-athletes to ensure that qualified medical personnel3 are available to render needed assistance during school-sponsored and supervised intercollegiate contact sport activities.
II. Legal Backdrop
A. Kleinknecht
While this Court previously has rejected the doctrine of in loco parentis as a basis for finding that colleges owe a duty of care to their students,4 we have not addressed whether colleges owe any duty to their student-athletes. In a case with similar facts, the Third Circuit predicted that this Court would indeed conclude that a college’s relationship with its student-athletes created a duty of care to these athletes during their participation in intercollegiate contact sports. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1367-69. In Kleinknecht, a college lacrosse player suffered cardiac arrest during practice and ultimately died. No medical personnel were present at the practice, and the coaches lacked any immediate means to contact emergency services.
Distinguishing prior cases in which courts held that colleges owed no duty to their students, [**51] the Kleinknecht court explained that, unlike in those cases, the lacrosse player was not acting as a private student engaged in his own affairs when he collapsed.5 Instead, the student was [*27] participating in a scheduled practice for an intercollegiate, school-sponsored team under the supervision of coaches employed by the college. The court also found the college’s recruitment of the lacrosse player significant, noting that it could not “help but think that the College recruited [the athlete] for its own benefit, probably thinking that his [athletic skill] would bring favorable attention and so aid the College in attracting other students.” Id. at 1368.
Additionally observing that the imposition of a duty is justified when the foreseeable risk of harm is unreasonable, the Kleinknecht court considered the foreseeability and magnitude of the risk at the lacrosse practice. The court found that it is “clearly foreseeable that a person participating [in an intercollegiate contact sport] will sustain serious injury requiring immediate medical attention.” Id. at 1371. The court also opined that the “magnitude of foreseeable harm—irreparable injury or death to [a student-athlete] as a result of inadequate [**52] preventative emergency measures—is indisputable.” Id. at 1370. Accordingly, in light of the relationship between a college and its student-athletes and the foreseeability of grave injury during athletes’ participation in contact sports, the court opined that the college owed a duty “to provide prompt and adequate emergency medical services” to its intercollegiate athletes when they are “engaged in a school-sponsored athletic activity for which [they] ha[ve] been recruited.” Id. at 1371.
B. Althaus
Seven years after the Third Circuit decided Kleinknecht, this Court compiled earlier approaches to the duty inquiry and distilled them into a five-factor framework.6 Observing that the concept of duty is “necessarily rooted in often amorphous public policy considerations,” Althaus, 756 A.2d at 1169, we acknowledged that discerning a “previously unrecognized duty” is an inherently difficult task. See Walters v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 187 A.3d 214, 222 (Pa. 2018). To assist in this undertaking, we identified the following five factors for courts to consider: “(1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the actor’s conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; and (5) the overall public [**53] interest in the proposed solution.” Althaus, 756 A.2d at 1169. We also have noted that “[n]o one of these five factors is dispositive. Rather, a duty will be found to exist where the balance of these factors weighs in favor of placing such a burden on a defendant.” Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 576 Pa. 644, 841 A.2d 1000, 1008-09 (Pa. 2003).
III. Analysis
Although some twenty-six years have passed since the Third Circuit’s prediction in Kleinknecht, this Court has yet to resolve whether colleges owe any duty to their student-athletes. Allowing for argument’s [*28] sake that this is a new duty, a principled weighing of the Althaus factors leads to the conclusion that colleges owe a duty to ensure that qualified medical personnel are available to student-athletes participating in school-sponsored and supervised intercollegiate contact sports.7
A. Althaus (1): The relationship between the parties8
A party’s duty of care to another can arise from the parties’ relationship. See Morena v. S. Hills Health Sys., 501 Pa. 634, 462 A.2d 680, 684 (Pa. 1983). In light of the increased autonomy afforded to college students in modern times, courts have rejected the notion that colleges act in loco parentis or as [**54] “insurer[s] of the safety of [their] students.” See Sullivan, 572 A.2d at 1213 (quoting Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138). However, despite widespread agreement among courts on this general principle, courts differ as to whether colleges owe any duty to their student-athletes.9 In recent [*29] decades, scholars have opined that the unique relationship between colleges and their student-athletes justifies the imposition of a duty upon the college when the athletes participate in intercollegiate contact sports. These commentators observe that, unlike the relationship between a college and its average student, the relationship between colleges and their student-athletes is characterized by mutual benefits and by the college’s assertion and exercise of significant control over the athletes’ lives, thereby justifying the recognition of a duty of care.10
In the case before us today, the relationship between [**55] Lackawanna College and its intercollegiate football players weighs in favor of recognizing a duty similar to the one that the Third Circuit articulated in Kleinknecht. Like the student-athlete in Kleinknecht, at the time of their injuries, Feleccia and Resch both were engaged in something other than their own private affairs. Rather, Feleccia and Resch were participating in tryouts for the intercollegiate, school-sponsored football team under the supervision of coaches employed by the college. Like the Third Circuit in Kleinknecht, I would find that the college expected its relationship with the student-athletes to benefit the college. Before Feleccia and Resch enrolled at Lackawanna College, its head football coach contacted both of them about playing football for the school’s intercollegiate team, presumably because the college expected to gain favorable attention or other benefits from their participation in the program. Moreover, as the Majority aptly observes, Feleccia’s and Resch’s relationship with Lackawanna College rested in part upon their reasonable expectation, based upon the college’s actions and representations, that a certified athletic trainer would treat them if they [**56] were injured during athletic activities. See Maj. Op. at 19.
Accordingly, like the school-athlete relationship at issue in Kleinknecht, the relationship between Lackawanna College and its intercollegiate football players weighs in favor of recognizing a duty.
B. Althaus (2): The social utility of the actor’s conduct
The conduct at issue in any negligence case is the “act or omission upon which liability is asserted.” Walters, 187 A.3d at [*30] 234. In cases in which an actor’s omission is at issue, courts must consider not only the social utility of the actor’s conduct, but also the utility of the individual’s failure to act. For example, in Walters, this Court weighed the social utility of UPMC providing health care services to the community against the utility of UPMC’s failure to report a former employee’s theft of fentanyl to the appropriate authorities. Although we concluded that UPMC’s provision of health care was beneficial to society, we found that its failure to take “steps to enhance public safety” by ensuring that its former employee did not “repeat his dangerous and criminal conduct” lacked any social utility. Id. at 235.
Similarly, in Phillips, 576 Pa. 644, 841 A.2d 1000, this Court weighed the social utility of a company manufacturing butane lighters [**57] against the utility of the company’s failure to manufacture these lighters with child safety features. After opining that the lighters had obvious social utility, we observed:
[T]he evidence does not show that the utility of the lighter is increased when a child safety device is lacking. Conversely, it is readily apparent that a device which would prevent small children, who lack the discretion and caution of the average adult, from creating a flame would have great utility in our society.
Id. at 659-60. Therefore, we concluded that this factor weighed in favor of imposing a duty.11
Here, we must weigh the social utility of Lackawanna College maintaining an intercollegiate athletic program against the utility of the college’s failure to ensure that qualified medical personnel were available to its student-athletes during football tryouts. Unquestionably, intercollegiate athletics furnish many benefits. As the Supreme Court of California observed in Avila, “[i]ntercollegiate competition allows a school to, on the smallest scale, offer its students the benefits of athletic participation and, on the largest scale, reap the economic and marketing benefits that derive from maintenance of [**58] a major sports program.” Avila, 131 P.3d at 392. Intercollegiate athletic programs provide numerous revenue sources for colleges. In addition to the money colleges earn from ticket sales at intercollegiate athletic events, successful athletic programs serve as magnets for corporate sponsorships and substantial donations from alumni and fans.12 These programs also exponentially increase the sales of merchandise bearing the school’s name, mascot, and logo, generating significant profits for schools.13
Intercollegiate athletic programs also may increase the school’s marketability and enrollment.14 These programs inevitably [*31] facilitate the recruitment of other athletes, who desire to play for a reputable team. Intercollegiate athletics attract media attention, expanding the school’s visibility to prospective students. Further, the culture surrounding intercollegiate athletic programs improves the quality of students’ college experience by fostering and enhancing school spirit, and by offering students the opportunity to participate in a variety of social activities that attend these sports. Thus, by improving the quality of campus life, such programs enhance the school’s appeal to athletes and non-athletes [**59] alike. Additionally, cheering for or participating in intercollegiate sports often creates a lasting connection between students and their universities, increasing the likelihood that they will donate to the school as alumni, recommend the school to potential students, or otherwise volunteer their services in order to help the school succeed.
In contrast, Lackawanna’s failure to ensure that certified athletic trainers were available during football tryouts lacks any social utility. Undoubtedly, the availability of qualified medical personnel such as certified athletic trainers increases the social utility of intercollegiate programs by providing athletes with proper medical care, and by preventing injuries like Feleccia’s and Resch’s. Moreover, as discussed more fully infra, the college’s failure to ensure that qualified medical personnel were available severely undermined the benefits that intercollegiate athletics generate.
Thus, because the social utility of maintaining intercollegiate athletic programs is great, and because the failure to ensure that qualified medical personnel are available to student-athletes during intercollegiate contact sports lacks any social utility, [**60] this factor weighs in favor of imposing a duty.
C. Althaus (3): The nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred
In addition to identifying the nature of a college’s relationship with its student-athletes as a basis for imposing a duty of care upon the college, the Kleinknecht court also found that the college owed its athletes a duty of care based upon the foreseeability of severe injury at a practice for a contact sport. Here, the risk of injury exceeded the risk at issue in Kleinknecht. As observed by amicus curiae, the National Athletic Trainers’ Association (“NATA”), collegiate football has one of the highest injury rates of all collegiate sports, and the preseason practice injury rate is over twice the rate during in-season practices. See Amicus Brief for NATA at 8. Moreover, college football players routinely suffer severe injuries. The drill that led to Feleccia’s and Resch’s injuries was a variation of the once-prevalent Oklahoma Drill, a tackling drill that has been the subject of extensive criticism during recent concussion litigation.15 Two experts, including the former head football coach at Texas A&M University and a certified athletic trainer at Stevenson [**61] University, also opined that Lackawanna College ran a particularly dangerous variant of the drill.16
[*32] The foreseeability of the risk of the exacerbation of practice injuries was only enhanced when Lackawanna College employed Alexis Bonisese and Kaitlin Coyne to fulfill the roles of athletic trainers, despite the school’s awareness that these two individuals possessed neither the athletic training certifications nor the skills necessary to perform the duties of athletic trainers. See Maj. Op. at 3-4, 19. By employing Bonisese and Coyne, Lackawanna College not only failed to ensure that qualified medical personnel were available to care for injured football players, but also created an additional risk for the College’s athletes by allowing them to receive care and advice from unqualified individuals whom the athletes believed to be certified trainers. The athletes thus were unable to make an informed decision as to whether to consult or follow the recommendations of (uncertified) staff, exposing those athletes to the hidden risk of greater injury arising from bad advice.17
Given the magnitude and frequency with which players [**62] sustain serious injury in contact sports, and football in particular, and given the likelihood that uncertified individuals undertaking the responsibilities of athletic trainers will render bad advice that further endangers athletes, the harm that Feleccia and Resch suffered was entirely foreseeable. In light of these considerations, Lackawanna College’s failure to protect against these risks was unreasonable, and this factor weighs in favor of imposing a duty on colleges in favor of student-athletes.
D. Althaus (4): The consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor
Requiring colleges to ensure that qualified medical personnel are available to student-athletes participating in intercollegiate contact sports undoubtedly imposes a financial burden upon colleges and universities, particularly small colleges lacking the resources of larger institutions. Some schools may be hard-pressed to find the money to fulfill this obligation, and could face a difficult decision between cutting spending in other areas of their budgets and reducing the number of intercollegiate sports that they offer. Additionally, it may be difficult for some colleges to find qualified medical personnel who are willing [**63] to work for their schools, depending upon the individual’s salary requirements and the location of the college. However, for several mitigating reasons, these burdens weigh only modestly, if at all, against imposing a duty upon colleges.
First, this duty is limited. Like Lackawanna College, the college in Kleinknecht contended that imposing a duty of care would create a slippery slope, requiring colleges to provide medical personnel for all sports, irrespective of whether the sport posed a substantial risk of injury or whether the college sponsored or supervised the athletic event. The Third Circuit rejected this argument as an “unwarranted extension” of its holding, explaining that the duty it imposed was limited to the particular facts of the case in which an athlete suffered a medical emergency [*33] while participating in an intercollegiate contact sport for which the college had recruited him. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1370-71. I agree generally with the Kleinknecht court’s suggested limitation,18 such that the duty in question should extend only to intercollegiate contact sports. At least for present purposes, other athletic activities, such as intramurals, necessarily fall outside the scope of this duty.19
Second, Lackawanna College and colleges like it are tuition-dependent for the bulk of their revenue. See Deposition of Suellen Musewicz, 11/11/14, at 15. For all the reasons discussed above, maintaining an intercollegiate athletic program attracts more students, increasing tuition revenue. Indeed, Feleccia and Resch both averred that they attended Lackawanna College because they wanted to participate in its football program.20 Furthermore, although hiring qualified medical personnel such as certified athletic trainers increases the cost of colleges’ athletic programs, it also can increase the appeal of these programs to prospective student-athletes, in additional service of the above-stated benefits. By contrast, developing a reputation for employing unqualified individuals to treat injured players has the potential to decrease the number of students willing to participate on a college’s sports teams. Failing to ensure that injured athletes have access to proper medical care during athletic events increases injury rates, decreasing the college’s ability to capitalize on the benefits that successful programs generate. Additionally, such failures can result in litigation [**65] (as evidenced by the present case), which presents its own financial and reputational challenges for colleges.
Third, hiring qualified medical personnel is hardly cost-prohibitive. This is particularly true because the number of medical personnel a college must employ to cover its intercollegiate contact sports is dependent upon a variety of factors unique to each college. As one example, NATA has promulgated worksheets to assist colleges in calculating an appropriate amount of medical coverage for their athletic programs. These worksheets incorporate many factors, including the intercollegiate sports that the college offers, the injury rates of those sports, the length of each sport’s season, and the number of participating athletes.
Using Lackawanna College as an example, to be staffed adequately in-season for all sports during the 2009-10 academic year according to NATA’s recommendations, one expert opined that the college needed to hire approximately 2.27 full-time athletic trainers. See Expert Report of M. [*34] Scott Zema, 9/28/15, at 4 (unnumbered). This number is roughly consistent with the two full-time certified athletic trainers that Lackawanna College had on staff prior to employing [**66] Bonisese and Coyne, an expense that evidently was deemed cost-effective at the time. Thus, requiring Lackawanna College to meet NATA’s suggestion would require it to do little more than restore the staffing it had prior to creating the dubious “first responder” positions for the uncertified Bonisese and Coyne.
In short, the consequences of recognizing this duty are not de minimis, but this impact is offset by the aforementioned considerations, particularly when considering the facts of this case. Thus, in my view, the fourth Althaus factor weighs only slightly, if at all, against imposing a duty.
E. Althaus (5): The overall public interest in the proposed solution
In cases in which we have considered whether one party owed a duty to another, this Court time and again has observed that the concept of duty amounts to “the sum total of those considerations of policy which led the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.” See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672, 681 (Pa. 1979) (quoting Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758, 764 (Haw. 1974)). Accordingly, like Dean Prosser, we have recognized:
These are shifting sands, and no fit foundation . . . . The word serves a useful purpose in directing attention to the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, rather than the [**67] causal sequence of events; beyond that it serves none. In the decision whether or not there is a duty, many factors interplay: The hand of history, our ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall. In the end the court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the mores of the community, “always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind.”
Gardner ex rel. Gardner v. CONRAIL, 573 A.2d 1016, 1020, 524 Pa. 445 (Pa. 1990) (quoting William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1953)). Thus, a duty arises, in part, from society’s interest in protecting the plaintiff from a certain harm.
In Kleinknecht and in the present case, the public has a substantial interest in protecting the health and well-being of intercollegiate athletes. As the Superior Court observed, “[c]olleges are expected to put a priority on the health and safety of their students, especially student[-]athletes engaged in dangerous sports.” Feleccia, 156 A.3d at 1219. As discussed supra, student-athletes participating in intercollegiate contact sports face a significant and foreseeable risk of acute injury, and colleges benefit considerably [**68] from students’ participation in their athletic programs. The receipt of such benefits at the expense of these athletes’ health and well-being is, as one scholar opined, “grossly unfair.”21
Colleges are best positioned to ensure that their athletes receive timely, competent medical attention when they participate in contact sports. In theory, one might suggest that student-athletes could [*35] seek out their own treatment when they are injured and decide for themselves when they feel well enough to return to play. The wisdom of imposing such a responsibility on student-athletes is questionable, at best. Scholars have observed that, when allowed to make their own decisions regarding injuries and returning to play, collegiate athletes often are willing to sacrifice their bodies in pursuit of their athletic goals, and to take great risks because they believe themselves to be impervious to injury.22 Further, in addition to the pressure that they place upon themselves, student-athletes also experience pressure from coaches, teammates, parents, sponsors, and the media to perform despite their injuries.23 This pressure can cause athletes to return to play before recovering fully from an illness [**69] or injury or to play through pain rather than receiving necessary medical attention.24 These considerations are only amplified in the context of a competitive tryout, when an athlete may fear losing the chance to play entirely. Moreover, the extensive training and certification required of an athletic trainer demonstrates just how unqualified student-athletes are to make their own decisions regarding whether they need medical attention and when they can return to play.25
Our Commonwealth’s imposition of rigorous requirements on those wishing to claim the title “athletic trainer” also demonstrates the interest of our citizens, expressed through their General Assembly, in ensuring that athletes who seek athletic training services receive a certain standard of care. The Medical Practice Act of 1985 and its implementing regulations prohibit unlicensed individuals from using the title “athletic trainer” or providing athletic training services, and allow the imposition of injunctions and penalties on those who [**70] violate the Act.26 As these laws indicate, [*36] the interest of Pennsylvania and its citizens in the health and safety of student-athletes is particularly great when a college affirmatively purports to provide its athletes with care from certified athletic trainers while in fact allowing uncertified individuals to masquerade in performing athletic training duties. In such circumstances, an athlete’s decision-making ability regarding his medical care and return to play not only is compromised by the aforementioned pressures, but also is impaired by his ignorance of the caregiver’s lack of qualification to deliver advice.
Lackawanna College’s conduct makes clear that the public’s interest in protecting the health and safety of intercollegiate athletes cannot be entrusted categorically to colleges based upon the assumption that they will in all instances ensure that their athletic departments are staffed adequately to provide treatment to injured student-athletes. Judicial recognition of this duty is necessary to ensure that colleges take the necessary precautions to protect their athletes from injury by holding them accountable for failing to fulfill this obligation.
Because the public [**71] has a strong interest in protecting collegiate athletes from injury, and from receiving athletic training services from uncertified individuals, this factor also weighs in favor of imposing a duty.
IV. Conclusion
Based upon this analysis of the Althaus factors, the better view of Pennsylvania law is that colleges and universities bear a duty to ensure that qualified medical personnel are available to student-athletes when the athletes participate in intercollegiate contact sports. Whether Lackawanna College breached this duty, and whether this breach caused Feleccia’s and Resch’s injuries, remain questions for the jury.27 Thus, while I agree with the Majority to the extent that it concludes that Lackawanna College owed a duty to Feleccia and Resch in this case, I disagree with the Majority’s choice to limit its holding to this case-specific evaluation of this school’s particular representations and these parties’ course of conduct. Unintentionally, but in practical effect, such limitation may create a perverse incentive for institutions like Lackawanna College to do less rather than more to protect their athletes by encouraging the institutions to make no representations at all.
End of Document
Backing of a lift ticket peeled off by Plaintiff to attach lift ticket to his jacket held by Federal District court to be a release and prevents plaintiffs’ claims for skiing into hidden snow making equipment.
Posted: November 25, 2019 Filed under: New Hampshire, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: allegations, argues, backing, court finds, enforceable, grooming, gun, Inherent Risk, injuries, Lift Ticket, Mount, Mount Sunapee Resort, New Hampshire, operators, parties, passenger, peel-off, Public Policy, Reasonable person, recklessness, releases, ski area, Ski Resort, skier's, skiing, Snow, Snow Making, Snow Making Equipment, snowmaking, Summary judgment, Sunapee Difference, Sunapee Difference LLC, ticket, Trail, Tramway, visible, warn Leave a commentFive Federal District Courts have ruled that the information on the back of a lift ticket is a release. No state Courts have ruled this way.
Miller v. Sunapee Difference, LLC, 308 F. Supp. 3d 581; 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55536; 2018 DNH 072
State: New Hampshire, United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
Plaintiff: Thomas Jackson Miller
Defendant: The Sunapee Difference, LLC d/b/a Mount Sunapee Resort
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Release
Holding: For the Defendant
Year: 2018
Summary
The plaintiff in this case, a skier at New Hampshire’s Mount Sunapee resort, was injured when he struck a support post for snow making equipment. At issue in this case is whether a release attached to his lift ticket excuses the ski area for liability in connection with its alleged negligence in failing to mark the post, warn skiers about it, or otherwise make it visible.
Facts
Following a large 2015 snowfall, Miller visited Mount Sunapee with his brother and father for a day of skiing. Miller was skiing ahead of his companions through fresh powder on the left side of the Beck Brook trail4 when he struck an unmarked “snow gun holder” that was concealed by snow. The “holder” — essentially a steel pipe protruding from the ground — is a mounting post for snow-making guns. The post remains embedded in the ground after the guns are removed. There was no snow-making gun in the holder at the time of this accident. Miller suffered serious leg injuries in the collision.
The major difference in this case was the lift ticket identified itself as a release. The back of the lift ticket, on the part that peeled away to reveal the sticky section where the lift ticket attached to itself to create a two-sided lift ticket stated:
In order to ski at Mount Sunapee, Miller first purchased a lift ticket. The ticket has a self-adhesive backing, which the skier affixes to his zipper tab or similar visible location. In order to attach it, the skier must first remove it from a peel-off backing. Printed on the back of the peel-off backing of the Mount Sunapee lift ticket was the following:
STOP
YOU ARE RELEASING THIS SKI AREA FROM LIABILITY
By removing this peel-off backing and using this ticket, you agree to be legally bound by the LIABILITY RELEASE printed on the other side of this ticket. If you are not willing to be bound by this LIABILITY RELEASE, please return this ticket with the peel-off backing intact to the ticket counter for a full refund.
The Lift Ticket itself stated:
LIABILITY RELEASE
Skiing, snowboarding, and other winter sports are inherently dangerous and risky with many hazards that can cause injury or death. As purchaser or user of this ticket, I agree, as a condition of being allowed to use the facilities of the Mount Sunapee resort, to freely accept and voluntarily assume all risks of property damage, personal injury, or death resulting from their inherent or any other risks or dangers. I RELEASE MOUNT SUNAPEE RESORT, its parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees and agents FROM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY OF ANY KIND INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE which may result from conditions on or about the premises, operation of the ski area or its afacilities [sic] or from my participation in skiing or other winter sports, accepting for myself the full and absolute responsibility for all damages or injury of any kind which may result from any cause. Further I agree that any claim which I bring against Mount Sunapee Resort, its officers, directors, employees or agents shall be brought only in Federal or State courts in the State of New Hampshire. I agree my likeness may be used for promotional purposes.
MOUNT SUNAPEE CARES, SKI RESPONSIBLY AND ALWAYS IN CONTROL.
RECKLESS SKIING WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF TICKET
NON-TRANSFERABLE: Use by a non-purchaser constitutes theft of services.
NON-REFUNDABLE. LOST TICKETS WILL NOT BE REPLACED Mount Sunapee Resort, P.O. Box 2021, Newbury, NH 03255
The language on this lift ticket specifically stated that it was a release, not just a lift ticket and not just a warning.
Analysis: making sense of the law based upon these facts.
The court first looked at New Hampshire law on releases.
Such an exculpatory contract is enforceable if: 1) it does not violate public policy; 2) the plaintiff understood the import of the agreement or a reasonable person in [plaintiff’s] position would have understood the import of the agreement; and 3) the plaintiff’s claims fall within the contemplation of the parties when they executed the contract.
The plaintiff argued that the release was void because it violated public policy, and a reasonable person would only understand that the release applied to the inherent risks of skiing.
New Hampshire public policy requires a showing that no special relationship exists between the parties to the agreement and there is no disparity in the bargaining power between the parties. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that an agreement would violate public policy if “it is injurious to the interests of the public, violates some public statute, or tends to interfere with the public welfare or safety.”
The plaintiff admitted that there was no special relationship between the parties nor was there a disparity of bargaining power. He centered his public policy argument on the theory that the release violated New Hampshire statutory law and that the release was injurious so the public interest. The statutory law argument was based on the New Hampshire Ski Area Act. The Act requires ski area operators to mark visible man-made objects. This object was not visible so therefor the plaintiff argued it should be marked and therefore, was negligence not to pad or mark it. However, the court would not buy into adding language to the statute where none existed. On top of that another section of the statute specially stated a ski assumes the risks of hitting snow making equipment.
The next argument advanced to argue the release violated public policy was based on several prior court decisions that held there was a duty on the state to do things. However, here again, the court found the was no duty in the New Hampshire Ski Area Act other than found in the plain language of the act. The duty the plaintiff was attempting to create was based on tying different sections of the act together that were not related.
The final public policy argument was because the ski area, Mount Sunapee was located on state-owned land and developed with federal funding, that created a greater duty to the public. However, the plaintiff could not provide any support for this theory, other than arguing sections of the lease between the ski area, and the state required it. The court found there was no language in the lease that created supported a public policy argument.
In most states, to create a contract, there are several requirements. One of those is there must be a meeting of the minds. A meeting of the minds requires the parties to know they are entering into a contract and the general terms of the agreement. This was clearly not the case in this situation (and in most lift ticket cases); however, New Hampshire does not require a meeting of the minds to enforce a contract.
The plaintiff then argued that without a signature, there could be a release. However, New Hampshire had a lot of case law where unsigned contracts were enforced.
The plaintiff argued he did not have an opportunity to read the release. However, that does not matter in New Hampshire and in most states when you sign it. However, here there was no signature.
A plaintiff’s failure to read a release “does not preclude enforcement of the release.” As long as the plaintiff had an opportunity to read the release, even if he chooses not to take it, a release can be enforced.
Here the court sort of worked its way around that issue because it found the plaintiff was a personal injury attorney. The plaintiff had submitted affidavits on the issue, which the court found lacking in the information needed to support the plaintiff’s arguments. The court did hammer plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument until plaintiff’s counsel admitted he had the opportunity to read it if he wanted.
Another issue is what the parties were contemplating when they made the agreement. A requirement for a contract under New Hampshire law. The court found the language of the release, which it had earlier found valid, contained the necessary information to define what the intention of the release was.
If “the release clearly and specifically indicates the intent to release the defendant from liability for personal injury caused by the defendant’s negligence, the agreement will be upheld.” Id. The court gives the language of the release “its common meaning and give[s] the contract itself the meaning that would be attached to it by a reasonable person.” Id. “All that is required” is for the language to “clearly and specifically indicate[] the intent to release the defendants from liability for personal injury caused by the defendants’ negligence . . . .”
The court then went into the Reckless, Wanton or positive misconduct claims of the plaintiff. New Hampshire has adopted the Restatement of Torts definition of Reckless.
Under the Restatement [(Second) of Torts], § 500, at 587 (1965), conduct is “reckless” if it “would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such a risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.” Id. The conduct “must involve an easily perceptible danger of death or substantial physical harm, and the probability that it will so result must be substantially greater than is required for ordinary negligence.”
The court further defined reckless under New Hampshire law as:
…at a minimum, is conduct “where the known danger ceases to be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable person would avoid, and becomes in the mind of the actor a substantial certainty.
However, the court found that the pleadings of the plaintiff pled no more than simple negligence. Meaning the facts argued by the plaintiff did not rise to the level needed to create a recklessness claim.
The court summed up its analogy as:
The undisputed factual record shows that plaintiff purchased and affixed to his clothing a lift ticket at Mount Sunapee that unambiguously released the ski area from liability from its own negligence, that such a release does not violate public policy, and that plaintiff’s signature was not required to effectuate its terms. Furthermore, there is no material factual dispute that plaintiff had the opportunity to read both the cautionary language on the ticket’s peel-off backing and the release language itself, that he would have understood that language to constitute a release and that a reasonable person in his position would have understood that the release exculpated Mount Sunapee from its own negligence.
So Now What?
It seemed obvious that this court was going to hold for the ski area. The decision explored all the arguments and possible arguments the plaintiff’s made and then ruled for the defendants.
The back of the pass had more than normal warning language as required by most statutes. This peel away release stated it was a release. There is also an issue that the purchaser of the lift ticket had already paid for the ticket before they found out there was a release giving rise to misrepresentation and fraud claim may be.
What is interesting is the change in the past five year, only in Federal District Courts holding that a lift ticket is a valid release at least mentioning the lift ticket as more than a receipt or a pass to access the lifts.
For more articles about Lift Tickets being used to stop lawsuits at ski areas see:
Lift tickets are not contracts and rarely work as a release in most states http://rec-law.us/1bO85eU
Colorado Federal District Court judge references a ski area lift ticket in support of decision granting the ski area’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the lawsuit. http://rec-law.us/2vHUXf1
#BoycottNH New Hampshire charges for Search & Rescue. Do not recreate in New Hampshire
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Miller v. Sunapee Difference, LLC, 308 F. Supp. 3d 581; 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55536; 2018 DNH 072
Posted: November 19, 2019 Filed under: New Hampshire, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: allegations, argues, backing, court finds, enforceable, grooming, gun, Inherent Risk, injuries, Lift Ticket, Mount, Mount Sunapee Resort, New Hampshire, operators, parties, passenger, peel-off, Public Policy, Reasonable person, recklessness, Release, releases, ski area, skier's, skiing, Snow, Snow Making, Snow Making Equipment, snowmaking, Summary judgment, Sunapee Difference, Sunapee Difference LLC, ticket, Trail, Tramway, visible, Waiver, warn Leave a commentMiller v. Sunapee Difference, LLC, 308 F. Supp. 3d 581; 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55536; 2018 DNH 072
United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
March 31, 2018, Decided; March 31, 2018, Filed
Civil No. 16-cv-143-JL
Counsel: [**1] For Thomas Jackson Miller, Plaintiff: Arend R. Tensen, Cullenberg & Tensen, Lebanon, NH.
For The Sunapee Difference, LLC, doing business as Mount Sunapee Resort, other Mount Sunapee Resort, Defendant: Thomas B.S. Quarles, Jr., LEAD ATTORNEY, Brendan P Mitchell, Devine Millimet & Branch PA, Manchester, NH.
Judges: Joseph N. Laplante, United States District Judge.
Opinion by: Joseph N. Laplante
[*584] MEMORANDUM ORDER
The plaintiff in this case, a skier at New Hampshire’s Mount Sunapee resort, was injured when he struck a support post for snow making equipment. At issue in this case is whether a release attached to his lift ticket excuses the ski area for liability in connection with its alleged negligence in failing to mark the post, warn skiers about it, or otherwise make it visible.
Invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), plaintiff Thomas Jackson Miller, a New York resident, sued The Sunapee Difference, LLC, operator of the Mount Sunapee Resort (“Mount Sunapee”), a New Hampshire ski area, for injuries he sustained when he struck the unmarked and unpadded post that was concealed by fresh snow. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), Mount Sunapee moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the liability release printed on Miller’s [**2] lift ticket bars his claim. Miller argues that the release is unenforceable under New Hampshire law and inapplicable on its face. As both sides submitted [*585] documents outside the pleadings in litigating this motion, the court has, with the parties’ consent,1 converted the motion into one for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).2 Having considered the parties’ filings and hearing oral argument, the court finds that the release is both applicable and enforceable, and therefore grants summary judgment in favor of Mount Sunapee.3
I. Applicable legal standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court “constru[es] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolv[es] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Pierce v. Cotuit Fire Dist., 741 F.3d 295, 301 (1st Cir. 2014). In the summary judgment analysis, “a fact is ‘material’ if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation.” Maymi v. P.R. Ports. Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008). A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.” Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir.1996) (citation and [**3] internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, if the nonmoving party’s “evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,” no genuine dispute as to a material fact has been proved, and “summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted).
II. Background
Following a large 2015 snowfall, Miller visited Mount Sunapee with his brother and father for a day of skiing. Miller was skiing ahead of his companions through fresh powder on the left side of the Beck Brook trail4 when he struck an unmarked “snow gun holder” that was concealed by snow. The “holder” — essentially a steel pipe protruding from the ground — is a mounting post for snow-making guns. The post remains embedded in the ground after the guns are removed. There was no snow-making gun in the holder at the time of this accident. Miller suffered serious leg injuries in the collision.
In order to ski at Mount Sunapee, Miller first purchased a lift ticket. The ticket has a self-adhesive backing, which the skier affixes to his zipper tab or similar visible location. In order to attach it, the skier must first remove it from a peel-off backing. Printed on the back of the peel-off backing of the Mount Sunapee lift ticket [**4] was the following:
[*586] STOP
[a red octagon image similar to a traffic-control “stop sign”]
YOU ARE RELEASING THIS SKI AREA FROM LIABILITY
By removing this peel-off backing and using this ticket, you agree to be legally bound by the LIABILITY RELEASE printed on the other side of this ticket. If you are not willing to be bound by this LIABILITY RELEASE, please return this ticket with the peel-off backing intact to the ticket counter for a full refund.
The lift ticket itself displayed the following language:
LIABILITY RELEASE
Skiing, snowboarding, and other winter sports are inherently dangerous and risky with many hazards that can cause injury or death. As purchaser or user of this ticket, I agree, as a condition of being allowed to use the facilities of the Mount Sunapee resort, to freely accept and voluntarily assume all risks of property damage, personal injury, or death resulting from their inherent or any other risks or dangers. I RELEASE MOUNT SUNAPEE RESORT, its parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees and agents FROM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY OF ANY KIND INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE which may result from conditions on or about the premises, operation of the ski area [**5] or its afacilities [sic] or from my participation in skiing or other winter sports, accepting for myself the full and absolute responsibility for all damages or injury of any kind which may result from any cause. Further I agree that any claim which I bring against Mount Sunapee Resort, its officers, directors, employees or agents shall be brought only in Federal or State courts in the State of New Hampshire. I agree my likeness may be used for promotional purposes.
MOUNT SUNAPEE CARES, SKI RESPONSIBLY AND ALWAYS IN CONTROL.
RECKLESS SKIING WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF TICKET
NON-TRANSFERABLE: Use by a non-purchaser constitutes theft of services.
NON-REFUNDABLE. LOST TICKETS WILL NOT BE REPLACED Mount Sunapee Resort, P.O. Box 2021, Newbury, NH 03255
(Emphasis in original).
After timely filing this lawsuit,5 Miller filed an Amended Complaint6 asserting a single count of negligence. He alleges that Mount Sunapee failed to mark or warn skiers of the pipe, or otherwise mitigate its danger to skiers, by, for example, padding it or making it visible to skiers. In addition, Miller alleges that Mount Sunapee breached its duties to create a safe environment for guests, and to perform in-season trail maintenance [**6] work. Finally, Miller claims that Mount Sunapee is liable because it failed to comply with N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A:23 (II)(b), which provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he ski area operator shall warn skiers and passengers by use of the trail board, if applicable, that snow grooming or snow making operations are routinely in progress on the slopes and trails serviced by each tramway.”7
[*587] III. Analysis
As noted at the outset, Sunapee argues that the release printed on Miller’s lift ticket — in combination with the acceptance of its terms on the backing sheet — bars his claim. “Although New Hampshire law generally prohibits a plaintiff from releasing a defendant from liability for negligent conduct, in limited circumstances a plaintiff can expressly consent by contract to assume the risk of injury caused by a defendant’s negligence.” Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 413, 807 A.2d 1274 (2002). Such an exculpatory contract is enforceable if: 1) it does not violate public policy; 2) the plaintiff understood the import of the agreement or a reasonable person in [plaintiff’s] position would have understood the import of the agreement; and 3) the plaintiff’s claims fall within the contemplation of the parties when they executed the contract. McGrath v. SNH Dev., Inc., 158 N.H. 540, 542, 969 A.2d 392 (2009) (citing Dean v. MacDonald, 147 N.H. 263, 266-67, 786 A.2d 834 (2008)); Lizzol v. Brothers Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 2016 DNH 199, *7.
Plaintiff argues that the [**7] release satisfies none of these criteria, because: 1) it violates public policy; 2) a reasonable person would have understood the release to exclude only “inherent risks of skiing,” as enumerated in New Hampshire’s “ski statute,” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A:24; 3) the release does not encompass reckless, wanton, or willful conduct; and 4) the release is unsigned.
A. Public policy
“A defendant seeking to avoid liability must show that an exculpatory agreement does not contravene public policy; i.e., that no special relationship existed between the parties and that there was no other disparity in bargaining power.” McGrath, 158 N.H. at 543 (quoting Barnes v. N.H. Karting Assoc., 128 N.H. 102, 106, 509 A.2d 151 (1986)). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has also found an agreement to be against public policy “if, among other things, it is injurious to the interests of the public, violates some public statute, or tends to interfere with the public welfare or safety.” Id. (citing Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, 140 N.H. 770, 775, 674 A.2d 962 (1996)). Miller does not argue that he had a special relationship with Mount Sunapee or that there was a disparity in bargaining power between the two.8 Instead, he confines his public policy argument to two points: 1) that the release violates New Hampshire statutory law; and 2) that it is injurious to the interest of the public. Neither argument [**8] withstands scrutiny.
1. New Hampshire statutory law
Miller argues that the combination of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 225-A:23, II, and 225-A:24 requires ski area operators to plainly mark or make visible snow-making equipment. Therefore, he concludes, applying the release to the allegedly hidden snow gun holder would allow Mount Sunapee to impermissibly evade this statutory responsibility. As a general proposition, Miller is correct that a release can not excuse a ski area‘s statutory violation. Harper, 140 N.H. at 775; cf. Nutbrown v. Mount Cranmore, 140 N.H. 675, 683, 671 A.2d 548 (1996) (noting, in ski accident case, that ski areas’ immunity does not apply to claim based on statutory violation). However, Miller’s argument here is built on a faulty premise — that [*588] § 225-A:24, denoted “Responsibilities of Skiers and Passengers” — imposes an affirmative duty on ski areas to mark or make visible snow-making equipment. The court rejects this argument for several reasons.
First, Miller attempts, without legal support, to create an affirmative duty out of the text of § 225-A:24 where none exists. Section 225-A:24 “is an immunity provision for ski area operators.” Cecere v. Loon Mountain Recreation Corp., 155 N.H. 289, 291, 923 A.2d 198 (2007). It has been “interpreted to mean that ski area operators owe no duty to skiers to protect them from the inherent risks of skiing.” Rayeski v. Gunstock Area/Gunstock Area Comm’n, 146 N.H. 495, 497, 776 A.2d 1265 (2001). One of the inherent “risks, hazards, or dangers which [**9] the skier . . . assumes as a matter of law” is “plainly marked or visible snow making equipment.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A:24, I. Miller argues that because unmarked or not visible snow-making equipment is not “an inherent risk” enumerated by the statute, ski areas therefore have a statutory duty to mark them or make them visible.
This argument is both contrary to the language of the statute and unsupported by any legal authority. While the language of the statutory immunity provision — enumerating a “Skier’s Responsibilities” — arguably does not bar Miller’s claim9 that he struck an unmarked and not visible piece of equipment, it likewise creates no affirmative duties for ski areas. Stated differently, while New Hampshire law may allow
ski area liability for injuries resulting from collisions with unmarked equipment, it does not logically follow that New Hampshire law requires the marking of such equipment. The statute sets forth no such obligation or legal duty.
To avoid the plain language of §225-A:24, Miller argues that Rayeski, supra, imposes an affirmative duty on Mount Sunapee when read in conjunction with § 225-A:23. In that case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, invoking §225-A:24, upheld the dismissal of a skier’s claim for injuries sustained [**10] in a collision with an unmarked light pole. 146 N.H. at 500. The plaintiff in Rayeski argued that the light pole collision was similar to a collision with unmarked snow-making equipment, which the statute “implies . . . is not an inherent risk of skiing” by not barring such a claim. Id. at 498. In the course of finding that the pole collision was an inherent risk of skiing (despite not being specifically enumerated as such in the statute), the Court distinguished between poles and snow making equipment:
We conclude that the legislature’s explicit reference to “plainly marked or visible snow making equipment” was intended to balance the immunity granted to ski area operators under RSA 225-A:24 with their duty under RSA 225-A:23, II(b) (2000) to warn skiers of snow making or grooming activities by denying immunity to ski area operators who breach a statutorily imposed safety responsibility.
Id. (emphasis added).
Based on the emphasized language, Miller argues that § 225-A:23 required Mount Sunapee to mark or make visible the snow gun holder he struck. This argument ignores the plain language both of Rayeski and the statute. The Rayeski
opinion referred only to “snow making or grooming activities,” and made no reference to marking equipment. And [**11] the statute, captioned “Base Area; Information to Skiers and [*589] Passengers,” requires that a ski area operator “warn skiers and passengers by use of the trail board, if applicable, that snow grooming or snow making operations are routinely in progress on the slopes and trails serviced by each tramway.” (Emphasis added). Thus, contrary to Miller’s argument, this section imposes no requirement to “mark or make visible” the snow gun holder at issue in this case. Instead, the statute requires the ski area to post “at the base area” a warning concerning grooming and snowmaking operations, if applicable.10See Nardone v. Mt. Cranmore, Civ. No. 91-114-SD, slip op. at 6-7 (holding that § 225-A:23, II(b)‘s warning requirement does not apply where snowmaking was not in progress and where plaintiff collided with fixed, unmarked piece of snowmaking equipment) (emphasis added).11 Miller does not dispute Mount Sunapee’s contention that there was no grooming or snow making “in progress” at the time of or in the vicinity of Miller’s accident.12 An inoperative snow gun holder is neither an “activity” nor an “operation.”
Further undermining Miller’s argument that § 225-A:24 creates obligations for ski area
operators is the fact that [**12] its five sub-sections are explicitly and unambiguously addressed to skiers and passengers (as opposed to ski area
operators), as follows: I) “Each person who participates in the sport of skiing . . . accepts . . . the dangers inherent in the sport . . . .”; II) “Each skier and passenger shall have the sole responsibility . . . “; III) “Each skier or passenger shall conduct himself or herself . . .”; IV) “Each passenger shall be the sole judge of his ability . . .”; V) “No skier or passenger or other person shall . . .” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A:24, I-V (emphasis added).
In addition, under New Hampshire statutory construction law, “[t]he title of a statute is ‘significant when considered in connection with . . . ambiguities inherent in its language.'” Appeal of Weaver, 150 N.H. 254, 256, 837 A.2d 294 (2003) (quoting State v. Rosario, 148 N.H. 488, 491, 809 A.2d 1283 (2002); see also, Berniger v. Meadow Green-Wildcat Corp., 945 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1991) (interpreting N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A:24 and observing that “[i]t is well established that a statute’s title may aid in construing any ambiguities in a statute.”). As noted, the title of § 225-A:24 is explicitly directed at “skiers and passengers,” not ski area operators. While this court discerns no such ambiguity that would justify a foray into ascertaining “legislative intent,” our Court of Appeals has stated that “the title indicates the legislative intent to limit the application [**13] of [§ 225-A:24] to skiers and passengers and similar classes of individuals, which does not include a ski operator or its employees.” Berniger, 945 F.2d at 9 (1st Cir. 1991). This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the preceding provision, § 225-A:23, is captioned “Responsibilities of Ski Area Operators,” further [*590] suggesting § 225-A:24‘s inapplicability here. This statutory structure — clearly distinguishing ski area operator responsibilities from visitor responsibilities — is especially important in light of the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s requirement that statutes be construed “as a whole.” Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721, 82 A.3d 917 (2013); see also, Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2529, 186 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2013) (“Just as Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so too are its structural choices.”); DeVere v. Attorney General, 146 N.H. 762, 766, 781 A.2d 24 (2001) (noting that structure of a statute can be an interpretive tool). Accordingly, the court finds that the Mount Sunapee release does not impermissibly seek to avoid statutory liability.13
In addition to his misplaced reliance on Rayeski, Miller also argues that the McGrath Court’s allowance of liability releases is “limited to situations where the public statute at issue contains a statutorily imposed enforcement mechanism,” which allows state officials to protect the public interest by imposing [**14] penalties on violators.14
The holding in McGrath, which involved a snowmobiling accident, is not as broad as plaintiff posits. It is true that the Court in McGrath, in rejecting a claim that a liability waiver violated public policy because it allowed defendants to avoid certain snowmobile safety statutes, noted that the waiver did not affect the State’s ability to enforce snowmobiling rules and penalize infractions, and thus did not entirely relieve the defendant property owners of any statutory responsibility. 158 N.H. at 543 (citing N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 215-C:32 and 34). But several factors undercut Miller’s reliance on McGrath. First, plaintiff’s argument is premised on his assertion that Mount Sunapee is trying to avoid liability for a statutory violation. The court has already rejected plaintiff’s premise as an untenable reading of §§ 225-A:23 and 24. Next, the State enforcement criterion was not dispositive in McGrath, as the Court found that the liability waiver did not contravene public policy because, “[i]rrespective of the statute, the plaintiff has voluntarily agreed not to hold the ski area, or its employees, liable for injuries resulting from negligence so that she may obtain a season ski pass.” Id. at 543 (emphasis added). In addition, even [**15] if the court read McGrath to require a state law enforcement vehicle to protect the public interest, the New Hampshire ski statutes do in fact provide one. Under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A:26, “any person . . . violating this chapter . . . shall be guilty of a violation if a natural person, or guilty of a misdemeanor if any other person.”
Plaintiff argues that this statutory enforcement provision is limited to tramway operations, and thus does not satisfy McGrath. He supports this argument with a letter from a supervisor at the New Hampshire Division of Fire Safety,15 which [*591] correctly observes, pursuant to N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A:3-a, that the authority of the Passenger Tramway Safety Board is limited to ski lift operations and “shall not extend to any other matters relative to the operation of a ski area.”16 The letter also states that the penalty provision of § 225-A:26 “specifically relates to operating a tramway without it first being registered.”17 The letter also specifically mentions §§ 225-A:23 and 24, as being outside the tramway board’s authority.18
There are several reasons why the letter does not advance plaintiff’s statutory argument. First, the letter is not properly part of the summary judgment record. According to its terms, it was sent in response [**16] to plaintiff’s counsel’s request for documents concerning the enforcement of § 225-A:26. However, “[i]n opposing a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must proffer admissible evidence that could be accepted by a rational trier of fact as sufficient to establish the necessary proposition.” Gomez-Gonzalez v. Rural Opportunities, Inc., 626 F.3d 654, 662 n.3 (1st Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). The letter itself is inadmissible hearsay, as it is being offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted with respect to enforcement of § 225-A:23 and 24. See
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2); see also Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (“It is black-letter law that hearsay evidence cannot be considered on summary judgment for the truth of the matter asserted.”). Moreover, although apparently issued by a government office (the plaintiff made no effort to lay such a foundation), the letter is not admissible under the Public Records hearsay exception. See
Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (requiring, for admissibility, the evidence in question to, inter alia, set out the public office’s activities and involve a matter observed while under a legal duty to report). It is true that some forms of evidence, such as affidavits and declarations, may be considered on summary judgment, even if they would not be admissible at trial, so long as they “set out facts that would be admissible in evidence” [**17] if the affiant or declarant testified to them at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). The letter in question, however, is neither an affidavit nor a declaration. In addition to being an unsworn letter, it fails to show how the letter writer is expressing “personal knowledge,” and fails to show that she is “competent to testify on the matters stated,” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); see also
Fed. R. Evid. 602 (personal knowledge requirement).
Next, even if the letter was properly before the court, it lacks any legal force, either as a pronouncement of New Hampshire law, or an interpretation thereof. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A:8 empowers the Tramway Safety Board to make rules regarding tramways. “Rules and Regulations promulgated by administrative agencies, pursuant to a valid delegation of authority, have the full force and effect of laws.” State v. Elementis Chem., 152 N.H. 794, 803, 887 A.2d 1133 (2005). Under New Hampshire administrative law, however, as set forth under its Administrative Procedure Act, the letter in question is not a rule, and thus lacks such force. It is simply a letter answering a question posed by the plaintiff’s lawyer. See
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:1, XV (explicitly excluding, under definition of “Rule,” “informational pamphlets, letters or other explanatory materials which refer to a statute or rule without affecting its substance or [**18] interpretation”). Notably, the plaintiff cites no provision of New Hampshire’s administrative [*592] law involving the Passenger Tramway Safety Board or Rules which support his theory. See N.H. Code. Admin. R. Ann. (PAS 301.01 et. seq. (2016)).
Finally, even if the letter was a properly admissible part of the summary judgment record in support of the proposition that the enforcement of § 225-A:26 is limited to tramway operations, and even if it were a duly-promulgated article of New Hampshire administrative law, it still fails to advance the plaintiff’s argument (to the extent it even addresses the issue before the court), because it incorrectly contradicts the governing statute, § 225-A:26.
As noted, the letter states that the authority of the Tramway Safety Board is limited to ski lift operations and “shall not extend to any other matters relative to the operation of a ski area.”19 This is undoubtedly true as far as it goes, as it tracks the language of § 225-A:3-a. That observation misses the point, however, as § 225-A:26 does not limit enforcement of § 225-A to the Tramway Board. To the contrary, the statute holds “any person” “guilty” of a violation or misdemeanor for violations of “this chapter,” i.e., the entirety of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A, a chapter which [**19] addresses a wider variety of ski-related activities than ski lifts and tramways. Thus, the letter contradicts the plain language of the statute by inaccurately portraying the applicability of § 225-A:26 as limited to “operating a tramway without it first being registered.”20 Under New Hampshire law, “[r]ules adopted by administrative agencies may not add to, detract from, or in any way modify statutory law,” Elementis Chem., 152 N.H. at 803, and the letter’s pronouncement, even it were a duly adopted Rule, would be invalid. See Appeal of Gallant, 125 N.H. 832, 834, 485 A.2d 1034 (1984) (noting that agency regulations that contradict the terms of a governing statute exceed the agency’s authority and are void). The statute penalizes not only failing to register, but also “violating this chapter or rules of the [Tramway Safety] board.” (emphasis added). In effect, the plaintiff is asking the court to ignore the plain language of the statute in favor of a letter which is neither properly before the court nor is a valid administrative rule and which fails to address the issue before the court — the scope of § 225-A:26. The court is not free to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, New Hampshire’s Administrative Procedure Act,21 or the plain language of New Hampshire’s ski-related statutes.
Accordingly, the court finds that New Hampshire statutory law provides no support to plaintiff’s public policy argument.
2. Injurious to the public interest
Plaintiff next argues that the Mount Sunapee release violates public policy as injurious to the public interest because Mount Sunapee is located on state-owned land that was, at least in part, developed with federal funding. Plaintiff cites no authority for this argument, but instead relies on various provisions in the lease between Mount Sunapee and the State of New Hampshire. None of these provisions establish or support the proposition that public policy prohibits the enforcement of the release.
For example, the lease requires the property to be used for “public outdoor recreational uses,” “for the mutual benefit of the public and the Operator,” and “as a public ski area . . . for the general public.”22 In addition, the ski area operator is [*593] required to “allow public access,” “maintain the Leased Premises in first class condition,” and “undertake trail maintenance.”23 Even assuming, arguendo, that the lease theoretically establishes public policy, the plaintiff makes no coherent argument how the release in question runs afoul of any [**21] of its provisions. Instead, plaintiff argues, strenuously but without authority, that condoning Mount Sunapee’s requirement that a skier agree to the release as a condition of skiing there “effectively sanctions the conversion of public land by Mount Sunapee.”24 He also argues, again without authority, that:
“[p]rivate operators of public lands, to which the public must be allowed access, cannot be allowed to limit access to such lands to those individuals who are willing to forego their statutory rights by exculpating the private operators from the consequences of their own negligence. To hold otherwise, would mark the first step toward eliminating public access to public lands at the expense of the general public.”
(Emphasis added). Initially, the court reiterates its finding, supra, Part III.A.1, that the language at issue in this case does not implicate plaintiff’s statutory rights. Moreover, whatever persuasive force his policy-based arguments hold, plaintiff cites no authority — in the form of cases, statutes or regulations — upon which the court can rely to accept them.25
As a final public-interest related matter, the parties dispute the import of liability releases used at Cannon [**22] Mountain, a state-owned and operated ski area. In its motion, Mount Sunapee cited those releases to demonstrate that New Hampshire’s public policy does not generally disfavor liability releases.26 Plaintiff, however, points out that because the Cannon release does not use the word “negligence,” it may, in fact, not release Cannon from its own negligence. See Barnes, 128 N.H. at 107 (noting that “the [exculpatory] contract must clearly state that the defendant is not responsible for the consequences of his negligence.”). Therefore, plaintiff suggests, Sunapee’s release may have exceeded what public policy (as articulated in the Cannon release) permits. Regardless of the Cannon release’s enforceability — a matter on which the court offers no opinion — the court finds that Mount Sunapee has the better of this argument. New Hampshire’s public policy is likely best expressed by its legislative enactments, particularly N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A:24, I, under which “ski area operators owe no duty to protect patrons from the inherent risks of skiing and thus are immunized from liability for any negligence related to these risks.” Cecere v. Loon Mountain Recreation Corp., 155 N.H. 289, 295, 923 A.2d 198 (2007). Such legislatively-enacted immunity from negligence undercuts Miller’s argument that the Cannon release demarcates [**23] the outer boundary of New Hampshire public policy. Ultimately, the court is skeptical that, as both parties implicitly argue, the state’s risk management decisions and devices, as embodied in certain ski area releases, constitute articulations of public policy.
Having failed to demonstrate any statutory transgressions or injury to the public interest, plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Mount Sunapee release violates public policy.
[*594] B. Import of the agreement
The next factor the court must consider in assessing the enforceability of the Mount Sunapee release is whether the plaintiff or a reasonable person in his position would have understood its import. Dean, 147 N.H. at 266-67. Miller argues that a factual dispute exists as to this criterion because there was no “meeting of the minds” sufficient to form an enforceable binding agreement.27 He bases this proposition, in turn, on two assertions: 1) that the release is unsigned; and 2) that he did not read it. The court finds that New Hampshire law does not require a signature to effectuate the terms of a release and that the plaintiff had — but chose not to take advantage of — an opportunity to read the release.
1. Signature
As an initial matter, the court notes that a “meeting of the minds” is not an explicit requirement of enforceability under New Hampshire law. The Court in Dean required only that “the plaintiff understood the import of the agreement or a reasonable person in his position would have understood the import of the agreement.” 147 N.H. at 266-67. While a signature might be evidence of such understanding, it has never been held to be a prerequisite. Indeed, in Gannett v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 131 N.H. 266, 552 A.2d 99 (1988), the Court enforced an unsigned and unread release of an insurance claim.
Plaintiff asserts that the New Hampshire Supreme Court has never explicitly upheld the enforcement of an unsigned liability release. See, e.g., McGrath, 158 N.H. at 545 (“[t]he ski pass application signed by the plaintiff”); Dean, 147 N.H. at 266 (“Mr. Dean signed the Release before entering the infield pit area”); Audley, 138 N.H. at 417 (“two releases signed by the plaintiff”); Barnes, 128 N.H. at 106 (“release and waiver of liability and indemnity agreement he signed”). Even if one were to accept this proposition despite the holding in Gannett, which is arguably distinguishable from the line of New Hampshire cases just cited, it is not dispositive, because the Court has also never explicitly required a signature on a liability release as a condition [**25] of enforceability.
In a diversity case such as this one, if the state’s highest court has not spoken directly on the question at issue, this court must try to predict “how that court likely would decide the issue,” looking to the relevant statutory language, analogous state Supreme Court and lower state court decisions, and other reliable sources of authority. Gonzalez Figueroa v. J.C. Penney P.R., Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 318-19 (1st Cir. 2009). A review of an analogous decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court and several New Hampshire trial court decisions reviewing ski area liability releases leads the court to conclude that Miller’s unsigned release is enforceable.
The court finds some guidance in Gannett, supra, where the Court enforced a release of an insurance claim even though the releasing party neither read nor signed the release, but returned it before cashing the insurer’s check. 131 N.H. at 270. Especially salient here, the Court found it “irrelevant whether [plaintiff] actually read the release, when the release clearly and unambiguously stated the condition, and when she had the opportunity to read it.” Id. at 269-270 (emphasis added). The Gannett Court cited the passage in Barnes, 128 N.H. at 108, enforcing an un-read liability [*595] release where the defendant felt rushed through the admittance line. The Barnes court enforced [**26] the release where “[t]here was no evidence . . . that [the plaintiff] was denied the opportunity to read the body of the release.” Id.
Two New Hampshire Superior Court cases involving ski lift ticket releases also inform this analysis. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465, 87 S. Ct. 1776, 18 L. Ed. 2d 886 (1967) (noting that decrees of lower state courts should be “attributed some weight”, but are not controlling, where the highest State court has not spoken on an issue). In Camire v. Gunstock Area Comm’n, No. 11-C-337, 2013 N.H. Super. LEXIS 30 (N.H. Super. Ct., Mar. 22, 2013) (O’Neil, J.), the court granted the defendant ski area summary judgment based on an unsigned release. 2013 N.H. Super. LEXIS 30 at *8. (“[T]he fact that Ms. Camire did not sign the agreement does not render it unenforceable, as a participant’s signature is not required under the factors set forth in [Dean]“), aff’d on other grounds, 166 N.H. 374, 97 A.3d 250 (2014). While the trial judge also noted that the ski area had a large sign near the ticket kiosk calling attention to the existence of the lift ticket release, and that plaintiff testified in her deposition that she would have understood the ticket’s release language had she read it, 2013 N.H. Super. LEXIS 30 at *5, the trial court’s observation that the lack of a signature was not dispositive is entitled, as the United States Supreme Court has [**27] noted, to “some weight.” Bosch’s Estate, 387 U.S. at 465.
The court also draws some guidance from a New Hampshire trial court that denied a ski area operator’s motion for summary judgment in another case involving a lift ticket release. In Reynolds v. Cranmore Mountain Resort, No. 00-C-0035, (N.H. Super. Ct., March 20, 2001) (O’Neil, J.), the plaintiff’s lift ticket contained a peel off backing similar to the one at issue here, including the red “STOP” sign symbol. Id. at 2. The plaintiff claimed that she did not sign the release and that the release language was not conspicuous enough to give notice to a reasonable person. Id. at 5. While the court did not rule on the signature issue, it ruled that a jury issue remained as to whether the “STOP” sign on the ticket was sufficiently conspicuous, because the peel-off backing contained an advertisement for a free workout, also written in red, in a larger font than much of the warning on the backing. Id. at 1-2, 7. In so ruling, the court relied on Passero v. Killington, Ltd., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14049, 1993 WL 406726 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 1993), a Pennsylvania case in which the lift ticket at issue contained an advertisement in a larger typeface than the release language. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14049, [WL] at * 7 (“[Plaintiff] argues that the exculpatory clause’s minuscule size, its setting against a dark background, and the existence [**28] of a much larger advertisement for a 15% discount on a “COMPLETE OVERNIGHT SKI TUNE-UP” on the lift ticket’s adhesive backing, all serve to distract the skier’s attention away from the substantive rights he or she is supposedly relinquishing by purchasing the lift ticket.”). The Superior Court found that it was “best left to the trier of fact to determine whether the language of the lift ticket reasonably communicated the existence of a contractual agreement to the purchaser . . . .” Id. Here, the Mount Sunapee lift ticket contains no such distracting advertisement or font sizes greater than that of the release language on the ticket. As the distracting features were the basis for the New Hampshire Superior Court’s denial of summary judgment in Reynolds, the lack of any such features here is significant. Accordingly, the court finds that the lack of a signature on the lift ticket release is not, under the circumstances of this case, a barrier to its enforceability where the plaintiff had an opportunity to read it and the terms were unambiguous and not contrary to public policy.
[*596] 2. Opportunity to read the release
A plaintiff’s failure to read a release “does not preclude enforcement of [**29] the release.” Barnes, 128 N.H. at 108. As long as the plaintiff had an opportunity to read the release, even if he chooses not to take it, a release can be enforced. Dean, 147 N.H. at 270; cf. Jenks v. N.H. Motor Speedway, Inc., 2010 DNH 38 (material factual dispute existed as to whether plaintiff had opportunity to read release where plaintiff put his name on a sign-up sheet and release may have been obscured).
Plaintiff, a personal injury attorney, originally submitted two sparse affidavits in opposition to Mount Sunapee’s dispositive motion.28 The affidavits’ only reference to the release is that he did not read the language on the lift ticket or the peel off backing, nor was he instructed to. He did not claim that he lacked the time or opportunity to read it, or was discouraged from doing so. Nor do the affidavits state that he did not peel off the lift ticket from the backing paper.
To be sure, the plaintiff carries no burden of proof at summary judgment, but the sparse and somewhat cryptic nature of the plaintiff’s affidavits — one of which conspicuously tracked the facts emphasized in the Reynolds Superior Court decision, supra, but added nothing more — led this court to ask several pointed questions at oral argument. When pressed by the court regarding the omitted, but [**30] critical, subject matter, plaintiff’s counsel conceded that Miller purchased the ticket, affixed it to his own jacket, had the opportunity to read the backing and the release, and would have recognized it as a release (although not as interpreted by Mount Sunapee).29
In an abundance of caution, and reluctant to grant summary judgment terminating plaintiff’s claims without a more fully developed record, the court sua sponte ordered supplemental discovery concerning, inter alia, the issue of plaintiff’s purchase and use of the lift ticket on the day of his injury.30 Although the plaintiff resisted defense counsel’s attempts to elicit direct answers to straightforward questions about his handling and viewing of the lift ticket, plaintiff’s deposition confirmed certain relevant facts that his counsel conceded at oral argument. First, plaintiff testified that he was handed the lift ticket with the release language facing up, and did not see the language on the peel-off backing.31 Nevertheless, plaintiff confirmed that he had the opportunity to read the release language on the lift ticket and the peel off backing before he removed the ticket from the backing and affixed it to his clothing.32 Even [**31] though plaintiff testified [*597] that he attached the ticket to his pants immediately after receiving it, and thus did not read it, he agreed that he was not pressured to do so,33 and had the opportunity to read it if he so chose.34
Based on the summary judgment record, the plaintiff’s concessions at oral argument and his supplemental deposition testimony sua sponte ordered by the court in an abundance of caution, the court finds that the undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiff purchased the lift ticket, peeled it from its backing before attaching it to his clothing, had the opportunity to read both sides of it,35 and that “a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position” would have “known of the exculpatory provision.” Barnes, 128 N.H. at 107. The court therefore finds that plaintiff’s decision to not [*598] read the lift ticket release language does not render it unenforceable.36
C. Contemplation [**34] of the parties
The final factor the court considers is whether the plaintiff’s claims “were within the contemplation of the parties.” Barnes, 128 N.H. at 107. This factor concerns whether plaintiff’s claims were within the scope of the release. Dean, 147 N.H. at 267. To determine the scope and application of a liability release agreement, the court must examine its language. Dean, 147 N.H. at 267. If “the release clearly and specifically indicates the intent to release the defendant from liability for personal injury caused by the defendant’s negligence, the agreement will be upheld.” Id. The court gives the language of the release “its common meaning and give[s] the contract itself the meaning that would be attached to it by a reasonable person.” Id. “All that is required” is for the language to “clearly and specifically indicate[] the intent to release the defendants from liability for personal injury caused by the defendants’ negligence . . . .” McGrath, 158 N.H. at 545.
While plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument that a reasonable person would have recognized the lift ticket language as a release, he argues that it would only be understood as applying to “the inherent risks of skiing,” as enumerated in § 225-A:24,37 and not to the circumstances of plaintiff’s accident.38 As [**35] explained below, this argument is based on an incomplete reading of the release and a flawed reading of persuasive New Hampshire Supreme Court precedent. It is therefore rejected.
Plaintiff argues that the first words of the release — “Skiing, snowboarding, and other winter sports are inherently dangerous”39 — limit the scope [**36] of the release to [*599] the inherent risks of skiing as set forth in N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A:24, which, he posits, do not include collisions with unmarked or not visible snow-making equipment. The remainder of the release, however, is far broader, explicitly encompassing “all risks . . . of personal injury . . . resulting from . . . inherent or any other risks or dangers.” (Emphasis added). Additional language in the release is similarly broad:
I RELEASE MOUNT SUNAPEE RESORT, its parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees and agents FROM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY OF ANY KIND INCLUDING NEGLIGENCEwhich may result from conditions on or about the premises, operation of the ski area or its afacilities [sic] or from my participation in skiing or other winter sports, accepting for myself the full and absolute responsibility for all damages or injury of any kind which may result from any cause.40
(Bold emphasis in original; underlining added). While plaintiff acknowledges that his “participation in skiing” might trigger the release, he argues that the expansive “any and all” language is qualified by the first sentence’s reference to skiing as “inherently dangerous,” which, he asserts, warrants limiting [**37] the release to the risks itemized in § 225-A:24.
In support of his “inherent risks” argument, plaintiff relies on Wright v. Loon Mountain Recreation Corp., 140 N.H. 166, 663 A.2d 1340 (1995), a case in which a horseback rider was kicked by her guide’s horse, allegedly due to the guide’s negligence. Id. at 168. The Court in Wright held that a release which first noted the “inherent hazards” of horseback riding “obscured” the later following exculpatory clause, part of which resembled the one employed here by Mount Sunapee. Id. at 170. But there is a significant textual difference between the release in
Wright and the one at issue here, and that difference was the lynchpin of the Wright Court’s analysis: the operative language of the Wright release affirmatively referred back to the “inherent hazards” language. In Wright, the exculpatory clause purporting to release the defendant from “any and all” liability began with the phrase “I therefore release . . .” Id. (emphasis added). The Court found the word “therefore” not only significant but dispositive, noting that it means, inter alia, “for that reason” and thus “cannot be understood without reading the antecedent [inherent hazards] language.” Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded, “[b]ecause the exculpatory [**38] clause is prefaced by the term ‘therefore,’ a reasonable person might understand its language to relate to the inherent dangers of horseback riding and liability for injuries that occur “for that reason.”41Id. The Court ultimately held that the negligence of a guide is not such an “inherent risk.” Id.
Unlike the release in Wright, however, the Mount Sunapee release contains no such “therefore” or other referential language which might call into question the breadth of the language that follows. As such, the court finds that the release [*600] “clearly state[s] that the defendant is not responsible for the consequences of his negligence,” Barnes, 128 N.H. at 107, and explicitly called particular attention “to the notion of releasing the defendant for liability for its own negligence.” Cf. Audley v. Melton, 138 N.H. 416, 419, 640 A.2d 777 (1994) (rejecting exculpatory clause because it failed to call particular attention to releasing defendant from liability). The court therefore finds that the Mount Sunapee release is not limited to the “inherent risks” of skiing enumerated in N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 225-A:24, I. Accordingly, even assuming that Miller’s accident did not result from an “inherent risk” of skiing, his claim is nevertheless encompassed by the terms of the release and within the contemplation [**39] of the parties.
D. Reckless, wanton or positive misconduct
After Mount Sunapee’s initial motion for judgment on the pleadings raised the lift ticket release as a defense, Plaintiff added four paragraphs to his suit in an Amended Complaint, all in support of his one negligence count. The new additions quote from a handwritten note on a “grooming report” prepared by Mount Sunapee Mountain Operations Manager Alan Ritchie two weeks prior to plaintiff’s accident. Ritchie’s note states the following: “keep the skier’s left guardrail 3′ from the tower guns at BTM (Hidden Hydrants below the snow[)]. Remove 2′ of snow from just above the Blue Shield around the Teckno fan gun.”42 Based solely upon this entry, Miller asserts that Mount Sunapee knew of buried snowmaking equipment and that failing to mark it or otherwise make it visible both violated its statutory duty and constituted “reckless, wanton, and positive acts of misconduct” from which it can not legally be released.43
In response, Mount Sunapee argues: 1) that the allegations do not support a claim for a statutory violation; 2) that New Hampshire law does not recognize extra-culpable, non-releasable categories of negligence; and 3) that [**40] the Amended Complaint and attached documents fail, in any event, to set forth facts amounting to anything other than ordinary negligence. The court has already found no statutory violation44 and further finds that the complaint, even as amended, alleges nothing more than ordinary negligence.
1. Recklessness
Plaintiff argues that the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint state a claim for reckless behavior, which, he argues, is not within the purview of the release. The court finds that the new amendments do not allege conduct that is more culpable than negligence, which is subject to the terms of the Mount Sunapee release.45
The New Hampshire Supreme Court generally refers favorably to the Restatement of Torts and has done so with respect to its description of “reckless” conduct:
[*601] Under the Restatement [(Second) of Torts], § 500, at 587 (1965), conduct is “reckless” if it “would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such a risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.” Id. The conduct “must involve an easily perceptible danger of death or substantial [**41] physical harm, and the probability that it will so result must be substantially greater than is required for ordinary negligence.” Id.
comment a at 588.
Boulter v. Eli & Bessie Cohen Found., 166 N.H. 414, 421, 97 A.3d 1127 (2014).
As the Court noted in Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 220, 614 A.2d 1064 (1992), a litigant’s characterization of conduct as evincing a particular culpable mental state is not particularly useful. “Recklessness,” at a minimum, is conduct “where the known danger ceases to be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable person would avoid, and becomes in the mind of the actor a substantial certainty.” Id. (quoting WP Keaton, et al., Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts § 8 (5th ed. 1984)). Here, notwithstanding the descriptive adjectives employed by the plaintiff, the facts and allegations pled do not suggest that, to anyone affiliated with Mount Sunapee, there was “a substantial certainty” that serious foreseeable harm would occur based on its alleged conduct or that Mount Sunapee’s conduct involved an unreasonable risk of physical harm “substantially greater than is required for ordinary negligence or that the risk was one involving an easily perceptible danger of death or substantial physical harm.” Boulter, 166 N.H. at 422.
Plaintiff relies on a recent New Hampshire Superior Court case involving an injured ski lift [**42] passenger in which the trial judge held that the plaintiff’s allegations of recklessness were sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.46 In Perry v. SNH Dev., No. 2015-CV-00678, 2017 N.H. Super. LEXIS 32 (N.H. Super. Ct., Sept. 13, 2017) (Temple, J.), the child plaintiff was injured after first dangling from, and then falling from, a chair lift into which she was improperly loaded. 2017 N.H. Super. LEXIS 32 at *33. There, the plaintiff successfully pled facts that alleged recklessness and avoided the ski area‘s enforceable negligence release. 2017 N.H. Super. LEXIS 32 at *23. Specifically, the plaintiffs in Perry alleged that the ski area‘s:
employee(s)[‘] total and complete failure to monitor the safe and proper loading of the Rocket chair lift in any fashion, coupled with the undisputed failure (actions or inactions) to stop the chair lift once a life threatening emergency was clearly in progress and ongoing for a considerable period of time, were failures to do acts which the employees had a duty to perform for [plaintiffs] and constitute a reckless disregard of safety.
2017 N.H. Super. LEXIS 32 at *27. The court denied the ski area‘s motion for summary judgment on the recklessness issue, first noting the allegation that there “were multiple employees of Crotched Mountain in or around [**43] the area observing that Sarah was not able to properly and/or safely board the Rocket chair lift; but rather [was] dangling from the chair lift.” 2017 N.H. Super. LEXIS 32 at *33. The court found this allegation sufficient to support an inference that the ski area‘s employees [*602] “knew that [the child plaintiff] was not properly loaded on the chair lift, but chose not to act.” Id. The court additionally cited the allegations that the ski area‘s employees knew that their failure to “stop the chair lift once a life threatening emergency was clearly in progress” would create an “unreasonable risk of physical harm or death.” Id. These facts, the Superior Court concluded, were sufficient to establish a claim of reckless conduct. Id.
In reaching its decision, the Perry court assumed that recklessness involved a defendant’s “conscious choice.” 2017 N.H. Super. LEXIS 32 at *32 (citing State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 713, 827 A.2d 1001 (2003)). Here, plaintiff argues that a reasonable inference can be made that Mount Sunapee knowingly disregarded the risk of harm posed by hidden snowmaking equipment, and that they “knew that ‘hidden’ hydrants posed a danger, but chose not to act.47
The court finds no such inference. As noted, the amended allegations do not pertain to a time or place related to Miller’s accident. [**44] There is nothing in the Ritchie affidavit that supports an allegation that Mount Sunapee made a “conscious choice” to create a “risk that was substantially greater than is required for ordinary negligence or that . . . [involved] an easily perceptible danger of death or substantial physical harm.” Boulter, 166 N.H. at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted). Significantly, the allegations in this case stand in stark contrast to those in Perry, where ski area employees allegedly ignored a nearby lift passenger already in obvious danger, a child literally dangling from the moving chair lift. Under plaintiff’s theory, any collision with buried snowmaking equipment would constitute a claim for recklessness.
One of the cases cited in Perry supports the court’s conclusion. In Migdal v. Stamp, 132 N.H. 171, 564 A.2d 826 (1989), the plaintiff, a police officer, was shot by a 15-year old who had been involuntarily hospitalized due to mental health issues. Id. at 173. The day after his release into his parents’ custody, the teen took several guns and hundreds of rounds of ammunition from an unsecured gun cabinet in their home, fired them throughout the house, and then shot and injured the plaintiff, who responded to the scene. Id. The injured officer sued the shooter’s parents, [**45] who sought dismissal based on the “fireman’s rule.”48 After first noting that the rule bars claims of negligent, but not reckless, conduct, id. at 176, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had adequately pled recklessness by alleging that the parents “failed to seek recommended medical treatment” for their son and allowed him access to “an array of firearms and ammunition,” despite their knowledge that their son “was suffering from mental and emotional instabilities,” had “exhibited dangerous propensities,” and had ransacked and vandalized the house the day before. Id. Mount Sunapee’s conduct — failure to mark or make visible the snow gun holder — is neither of the same type nor degree as the defendants’ conduct in Migdal.
A ski case from the District of Massachusetts is also instructive. In Brush v. Jiminy Peak Mountain, 626 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. Mass. 2009), a ski racer was injured when she lost control and collided with a ski tower support located off the trail. Id.
[*603] at 143. In suing, inter alia, the ski area, the plaintiff alleged that netting and other safety devices should have been placed around the support, as required by certain ski racing standards and as had been done by the defendant in the past. Id. at 145. In order to avoid application of a release, the plaintiff asserted [**46] a claim for gross negligence, which, under Massachusetts law, is a less culpable standard than recklessness. Id. at 151 (citing Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505, 506 (Mass. 1919)). The Court concluded that plaintiff had alleged only simple negligence. Id. The Court first observed that “[t]here is no evidence in the record, and indeed no allegation, that any of the Defendants, or anyone at the competition, became aware that there was an area of the trail without netting where netting was normally placed and declined to remedy the situation.” Id. Ultimately, the Court held, “[a]t most there was a collective failure to take a step that might have lessened the injuries suffered by Plaintiff. No reasonable jury could find that this simple inadvertence, no matter how tragic its consequences, constituted gross negligence.” Id.
The court views the conduct alleged here as much more akin to that alleged in Brush — which alleged conduct that was less culpable than recklessness — than that in Perry
or Migdal. The factual allegations in this case fall far short of recklessness. First, as previously noted, the grooming report on which plaintiff relies is remote both in time and location. Next, the conduct alleged here is significantly less egregious than the [**47] allegations in Perry, where ski area employees allegedly ignored a nearby passenger already in danger of falling from a lift chair, or the conduct in Migdal, where the defendant parents, one day after their son had exhibited mental instability, ransacked the family home, and exhibited dangerous tendencies, failed to seek treatment for him and to secure multiple firearms and ammunition. As in Brush, the most that can be said here is that Mount Sunapee failed to take a step that — while not legally required, see supra, § III.A.1 — might have prevented plaintiff’s accident. These allegations do not support a claim that their acts or omissions in not clearing snow away from a snow gun holder in an ungroomed area “were substantially more serious” than ordinary negligence. Boulter, 166 N.H. at 422.49
2. Wanton and positive misconduct
In an attempt to characterize his claims in such a way to avoid the language of the release, plaintiff’s Amended Complaint describes them as “wanton and positive acts of misconduct,” that is, more culpable than negligence, but not intentional.50 The court, however, has already determined that the Complaint alleges no more than ordinary negligence, so this argument fails.
3. Potential [**48] certification
If the court had found that the facts alleged by the plaintiff could constitute conduct more culpable than negligence, it would have considered certifying an unresolved question to the New Hampshire [*604] Supreme Court: whether conduct more culpable than negligence, but less than intentional could be the subject of a release like the one at issue here. See
N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 34. In the absence of such allegations, certification is unnecessary.
IV. Conclusion
The undisputed factual record shows that plaintiff purchased and affixed to his clothing a lift ticket at Mount Sunapee that unambiguously released the ski area from liability from its own negligence, that such a release does not violate public policy, and that plaintiff’s signature was not required to effectuate its terms. Furthermore, there is no material factual dispute that plaintiff had the opportunity to read both the cautionary language on the ticket’s peel-off backing and the release language itself, that he would have understood that language to constitute a release and that a reasonable person in his position would have understood that the release exculpated Mount Sunapee from its own negligence.
As plaintiff has alleged only that Mount [**49] Sunapee’s negligence caused his injuries, and that the facts he alleges do not constitute conduct more culpable than negligence, the court finds that plaintiff’s claims fall within the ambit of the Mount Sunapee release and that the release is enforceable against the plaintiff. Therefore, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, having been converted to a motion for summary judgment51 is GRANTED.52
Illinois upholds release stopping a claim for injury from bouldering at defendant North Wall.
Posted: November 18, 2019 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Climbing Wall, Illinois, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: activities, Ankle, Bouldering, Bouldering Gym, Bouldering Line, Bouldering Wall, Climbers, Climbing, Climbing Wall Association, Customers, CWA, deposition, Employees, exculpatory, facilities, Falling, feet, floor, Gym, Harness, height, injuries, jumped, Manual, mat, North Wall, North Wall Incl, Open & Obvious, Open and Obvious, Open and Obvious Doctrine, parties, rock, rope, Summary judgment, trained, Trial court, video, waiver form, wanton conduct, willful, Willful and Wanton Leave a commentHowever, defendant climbing wall admitted it had not followed its own procedures or Climbing Wall Association manual with the plaintiff, law in Illinois saved defendant.
Cizek v. North Wall, Inc., 2018 IL App (2d) 170168-U *; 2018 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 320
State: Illinois, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
Plaintiff: Patricia Cizek
Defendant: North Wall, Inc., d/b/a North Wall Rock Climbing Gym
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence & Willful & Wanton Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Open & Obvious & Release
Holding: For the Defendant
Year: 2018
Summary
Plaintiff was boulder for the first time and not given the normal or required introduction at the bouldering gym. She fell off the wall and missed a crash pad breaking her ankle. Court held the release she signed stopped her lawsuit.
Facts
On February 14, 2013, she attended respondent’s gym with Kosinski, a coworker. She characterized Kosinski as a “good climber, experienced.” Kosinski told her climbing was one of his hobbies. She did not think climbing would involve any risk because “[k]ids were doing it.” Further, climbing occurred at a gym, which she viewed as a “safe zone.” Also, based on what she saw on television, she believed she would be using a harness. She and Kosinski did not consume any alcohol prior to arriving at North Wall, and she was not taking any medication at the time.
When they arrived, Kosinski paid the fee. Plaintiff signed and returned a waiver form. Kosinski had climbed at North Wall before. At the time, plaintiff did not know whether Kosinski was a member at North Wall, though she later learned that he had been at the time she was injured. Plaintiff acknowledged that she did, in fact, read and understand the waiver form. She did not look at the back of the form, but she recalled that she was given only one sheet of paper. She was provided with a pair of climbing shoes.
When she first arrived, she observed “children in harnesses with ropers.” There were two large green pads that covered most of the floor. Plaintiff did not recall seeing any bulletin boards or posters. She also did not recall seeing a black line running “continuously around the parameter [sic] of the climbing wall.” At the time of the deposition, she was aware that such a line existed. Beyond signing the waiver when she arrived, she had no further interaction with respondent’s staff. Plaintiff reviewed a number of pictures of the facility and testified that it had changed since her accident. She also identified a photograph taken in October 2013 that showed where she was injured.
She and Kosinski then proceeded to the climbing wall. She asked, “What about my harness?” Kosinski said that harnesses were “more trouble than they were worth.” Plaintiff stated that she “kind of was dumbfounded.” Plaintiff proceeded to climb without a harness. Kosinski went first. He told her to follow some yellow markers, as they were for beginners. While she watched Kosinski, she did not see a black, horizontal line on the wall. Prior to climbing, Kosinski placed a mat below the area in which he intended to climb. Plaintiff found climbing “very difficult,” explaining that “[y]ou use your core.” Plaintiff would “shimmy” down when she got “sore.” She added, “[i]ts tough work getting up there, so I need[ed] to get down.” She would jump down from two to three feet off the ground. Plaintiff made three or four climbs before she was injured.
Large green mats covered almost the entire floor of the gym. There were also smaller black mats that could be placed in different locations by climbers. Kosinski was not near plaintiff when she was injured. Before being injured, plaintiff had moved to a new climbing area. She placed a black mat where she planned on climbing. A green mat also abutted the wall in that area. The black mat was three to six inches away from the wall.
Plaintiff was injured during her third attempt at climbing that day, and she did not feel comfortable climbing. She explained that she was not wearing a harness, but was trying to do her best. There was a part of the floor that was not covered by a green mat in this area, which is where plaintiff landed when she was injured. Plaintiff stated she jumped off the wall and when she landed, her right foot was on a green mat, but her left foot landed on the uncovered floor. She felt pain in her left ankle and could not put weight on it. Kosinski and an employee came over to assist plaintiff. Kosinski got plaintiff some ibuprofen. Plaintiff felt “a little dizzy.” An employee called the paramedics. The paramedics stated that plaintiff’s ankle was broken. They assisted plaintiff to Kosinski’s car, and he drove her to St. Alexius hospital. At the hospital, they x-rayed plaintiff’s ankle and confirmed that it was broken. She was given some sort of narcotic pain killer, and her ankle was placed in a cast. Plaintiff was discharged and told to follow up with an orthopedic surgeon.
She followed up with Dr. Sean Odell. Odell performed a surgery six days after the accident. He installed eight pins and a plate. Plaintiff had broken both leg bones where they intersect at the ankle. She took Norco for months following the surgery. She engaged in physical therapy for years, including what she did at home. The hardware was removed in December 2013. Her ankle continues to be stiff, she has trouble with many activities, and she takes ibuprofen for pain several times per week.
The court also went through a litany of issues the defendant climbing gym did not do with the plaintiff.
Novice climbers were supposed to sign a waiver and view a video. Spencer trained Cipri [gym manager] to go over “any and all safety procedures” with new climbers.
There was no manual on “how to run North Wall,” but there was an “unofficial manual” kept on the front desk. This was comprised of a couple of binders that concerned how to teach climbing, use of the telephone, memberships, employee conduct, and various rules. He did not recall anything specific relating to dealing with novice climbers. There was a copy of the Climbing Wall Association manual in a file-cabinet drawer; however, he never used it for anything. Cipri did not recall Spencer [gym owner] instructing him to use this manual. Spencer did train employees on climbing, particularly new hires. Cipri described Spencer as an “absentee” manager.” He would come in early in the day, and Cipri typically would not see him.
Aside from ascertaining a customer’s age and climbing experience, they did nothing else to assess his or her proficiency. They would show new climbers a video and explain the rules of the gym to them. Cipri could not say whether a copy of a manual shown to him was the manual they were actually using when he worked for respondent. However, he stated various forms shown to him, including one concerning bouldering orientation, were not used when he was there. Spencer never told Cipri to get rid of any document; rather, he was adamant about keeping such material. Weekly inspections of the premises were conducted, but no records documenting them were maintained.
One document stated, “If the facility allows bouldering, the staff provides an orientation before novice climbers are allowed to boulder without assistance or direct supervision.” Cipri testified that this was not generated by respondent, but they followed it. Employees working the counter were trained to have new customers watch a video, instruct them on safety procedures, and assess their abilities. To the left of the front door, posters from the Climbing Wall Association were displayed. There was also one near the back door. Cipri did not remember what they were about beyond that they concerned “stable rules” of the Climbing Wall Association.
On redirect-examination, Cipri agreed that beyond verbal questioning, they did not test new customers. They did not “inspect or observe climbers while they were actually climbing to determine competency.” They did “orientate climbers” and show them the video. Further, new climbers read the waiver forms. Climbers were instructed on general and bouldering safety rules. Cipri was aware of an earlier incident where a young boy cut his head while climbing. Cipri stated that it was arguable that climbing with a rope was more dangerous than bouldering because a person could get tangled in the rope. Cipri did not give plaintiff an orientation, and he had no recollection of anyone giving her one.
Employees were instructed to follow the policies of the Climbing Wall Association. If an employee did not spend time with a new customer “explaining the policies and procedures of bouldering, that would be a violation of company policy.” This is true even if the new customer is accompanied by a more experienced climber.
Obviously, the defendant gym failed to follow its own rules or the rules and ideas of the CWA that the gym, in the court’s mind, had adopted.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The court first looked at the issue that falling was an open and obvious risk.
In Illinois, obvious dangers include fire, drowning in water, or falling from a height.”). Thus, for the purpose of resolving this appeal and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we will presume that plaintiff was aware that falling off the climbing wall presented certain obvious dangers.
The court moved on to review release law in Illinois. Illinois supports the use of releases, unless the contract is between parties with unequal bargaining power, violates public policy or there is a special relationship between the parties.
Absent fraud or willful and wanton negligence, exculpatory agreements of this sort are generally valid. An agreement may be also vitiated by unequal bargaining power, public policy considerations, or some special relationship between the parties; however, such issues are not present here. This court has previously explained that “[a]n exculpatory agreement constitutes an express assumption of risk insofar as the plaintiff has expressly consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him [or her].
When written the release must be expressed in clear, explicit an unequivocal language. The release must also be written in a way that both parties to the contract intended to apply to the conduct of the defendant which caused the harm to the plaintiff. However, the release must not be written precisely to cover the exact conduct or exact harm.
Thus, an exculpatory agreement will excuse a defendant from liability only where an “injury falls within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying the activity and, thus, reasonably contemplated by the plaintiff.” The foreseeability of the danger defines the scope of the release.
The court found the language “…arising out of or in any way related to [her] use of the climbing gym, whether that use is supervised or unsupervised, however, the injury or damage is caused.” w sufficient to the injury the plaintiff received based on the conduct (or lack of conduct in this case) of the defendant.
The court held “In sum, the release, here is clear, pertains to use of defendant’s climbing gym, and is broad enough to encompass falling or jumping from the climbing wall.”
The court then reviewed the willful and wanton claims of the plaintiff. The court described willful and wanton as “”Conduct is “willful and wanton” where it involves a deliberate intention to harm or a conscious disregard for the safety of others. It is an “aggravated form of negligence.”
The plaintiff argued that failing to follow the defendant bouldering gym’s own policies or evaluate her abilities was proof of willful and wanton conduct. She also pointed out the defendant failed to tell her not to climb above the bouldering line.
Quickly, the court determined the plaintiff had not pled or provided any facts to support her willful and wanton claims. Even if the defendant had followed its own policies, the plaintiff could not show that would have prevented her injuries. Falling at a height above the bouldering line is an open and obvious risk so failing to tell the plaintiff not to climb high is not relevant.
The risk of falling is open and obvious and none of the arguments made by the plaintiff as to the defendants actions overcame that doctrine.
So Now What?
It is great that Illinois supports the use of releases. Even in a case where the defendant failed to follow its own policies or the “manual” of the trade association it belonged to. Even better the court did not find the CWA manual or the defendant’s failure to follow its policies as an issue that could over come the release.
However, from the court’s writing, it is obvious, that the open and obvious doctrine was the most persuasive in supporting both the release and ignoring the defendant’s actions or lack of action.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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climbing, bouldering, gym, climbers, rope, mat, trained, exculpatory, employees, falling, rock, customers, willful, floor, trial court, facilities, harness, ankle, feet, summary judgment, waiver form, height, wanton conduct, jumped, manual, video, activities, deposition, injuries, parties
Cizek v. North Wall, Inc., 2018 IL App (2d) 170168-U *; 2018 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 320
Posted: November 15, 2019 Filed under: Climbing Wall, Illinois, Legal Case, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: activities, Ankle, Bouldering, Bouldering Gym, Climbers, Climbing, Climbing Gym, Climbing Wall, Climbing Wall Association, Customers, CWA, deposition, Employees, exculpatory, facilities, Falling, feet, floor, Gym, Harness, height, Illinois, injuries, jumped, Manual, mat, North Wall, North Wall Inc., parties, rock, rope, Summary judgment, trained, Trial court, video, waiver form, wanton conduct, willful Leave a commentCizek v. North Wall, Inc., 2018 IL App (2d) 170168-U *; 2018 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 320
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
March 2, 2018, Order Filed
No. 2-17-0168-U
Notice: THIS ORDER WAS FILED UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23 AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENT BY ANY PARTY EXCEPT IN THE LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOWED UNDER RULE 23(e)(1).
Prior History:
[**1] Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County. No. 15-LA-56. Honorable Thomas A. Meyer, Judge, Presiding.
Judges: PRESIDING JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Schostok and Spence concurred in the judgment.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Schostok and Spence concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
[*P1] Held: Plaintiff validly waived any cause of action stemming from defendant‘s alleged negligence and failed to identify facts from which willful and wanton conduct could be inferred; therefore, trial court‘s grant of summary judgment was proper.
[*P2]
I. INTRODUCTION
[*P3]
Plaintiff, Patricia Cizek, appeals an order of the circuit court of McHenry County granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, North Wall, Inc. (doing business as North Wall Rock Climbing Gym). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
[*P4]
II. BACKGROUND
[*P5]
Defendant operates an indoor rock climbing gym; plaintiff was a customer at the gym when she was injured. Plaintiff and a friend, Daniel Kosinski, attended the gym. Plaintiff had never been climbing before. At some point, after having been climbing for a while, plaintiff became tired and jumped down or fell from the climbing [**2]
wall. Plaintiff‘s right foot landed on a mat, but her left foot landed on the floor. Plaintiff‘s left ankle broke.
[*P6]
In her deposition (taken December 23, 2015), plaintiff testified as follows. She stated that she had been a member of a health club for 10 years, where she primarily swam and did yoga. Prior to February 14, 2013, plaintiff had no experience rock climbing or bouldering, though she had observed people rock climbing in the past. She agreed that she understood that rock climbing involved being at a height higher than the ground.
[*P7]
On February 14, 2013, she attended respondent‘s gym with Kosinski, a coworker. She characterized Kosinski as a “good climber, experienced.“ Kosinski told her climbing was one of his hobbies. She did not think climbing would involve any risk because “[k]ids were doing it.“ Further, climbing occurred at a gym, which she viewed as a “safe zone.“ Also, based on what she saw on television, she believed she would be using a harness. She and Kosinski did not consume any alcohol prior to arriving at North Wall, and she was not taking any medication at the time.
[*P8]
When they arrived, Kosinski paid the fee. Plaintiff signed and returned a waiver form. Kosinski [**3]
had climbed at North Wall before. At the time, plaintiff did not know whether Kosinski was a member at North Wall, though she later learned that he had been at the time she was injured. Plaintiff acknowledged that she did, in fact, read and understand the waiver form. She did not look at the back of the form, but she recalled that she was given only one sheet of paper. She was provided with a pair of climbing shoes.
[*P9]
When she first arrived, she observed “children in harnesses with ropers.“ There were two large green pads that covered most of the floor. Plaintiff did not recall seeing any bulletin boards or posters. She also did not recall seeing a black line running “continuously around the parameter [sic] of the climbing wall.“ At the time of the deposition, she was aware that such a line existed. Beyond signing the waiver when she arrived, she had no further interaction with respondent‘s staff. Plaintiff reviewed a number of pictures of the facility and testified that it had changed since her accident. She also identified a photograph taken in October 2013 that showed where she was injured.
[*P10]
She and Kosinski then proceeded to the climbing wall. She asked, “What about my harness?“ Kosinski [**4]
said that harnesses were “more trouble than they were worth.“ Plaintiff stated that she “kind of was dumbfounded.“ Plaintiff proceeded to climb without a harness. Kosinski went first. He told her to follow some yellow markers, as they were for beginners. While she watched Kosinski, she did not see a black, horizontal line on the wall. Prior to climbing, Kosinski placed a mat below the area in which he intended to climb. Plaintiff found climbing “very difficult,“ explaining that “[y]ou use your core.“ Plaintiff would “shimmy“ down when she got “sore.“ She added, “[i]ts tough work getting up there, so I need[ed] to get down.“ She would jump down from two to three feet off the ground. Plaintiff made three or four climbs before she was injured.
[*P11]
Large green mats covered almost the entire floor of the gym. There were also smaller black mats that could be placed in different locations by climbers. Kosinski was not near plaintiff when she was injured. Before being injured, plaintiff had moved to a new climbing area. She placed a black mat where she planned on climbing. A green mat also abutted the wall in that area. The black mat was three to six inches away from the wall.
[*P12]
Plaintiff was injured [**5]
during her third attempt at climbing that day, and she did not feel comfortable climbing. She explained that she was not wearing a harness, but was trying to do her best. There was a part of the floor that was not covered by a green mat in this area, which is where plaintiff landed when she was injured. Plaintiff stated she jumped off the wall and when she landed, her right foot was on a green mat, but her left foot landed on the uncovered floor. She felt pain in her left ankle and could not put weight on it. Kosinski and an employee came over to assist plaintiff. Kosinski got plaintiff some ibuprofen. Plaintiff felt “a little dizzy.“ An employee called the paramedics. The paramedics stated that plaintiff‘s ankle was broken. They assisted plaintiff to Kosinski‘s car, and he drove her to St. Alexius hospital. At the hospital, they x-rayed plaintiff‘s ankle and confirmed that it was broken. She was given some sort of narcotic pain killer, and her ankle was placed in a cast. Plaintiff was discharged and told to follow up with an orthopedic surgeon.
[*P13]
She followed up with Dr. Sean Odell. Odell performed a surgery six days after the accident. He installed eight pins and a plate. Plaintiff [**6]
had broken both leg bones where they intersect at the ankle. She took Norco for months following the surgery. She engaged in physical therapy for years, including what she did at home. The hardware was removed in December 2013. Her ankle continues to be stiff, she has trouble with many activities, and she takes ibuprofen for pain several times per week.
[*P14]
On cross-examination, plaintiff stated that she read the wavier form before she signed it (though, she added, she did not “study“ it). Other climbers were climbing without ropes, and the only people she saw using ropes were children. She was not offered a rope or harness. Plaintiff still takes prescription pain killers on occasion. However, she does not like to take it due to its side effects.
[*P15]
A discovery deposition of Daniel Kosinski was also conducted. He testified that he knew plaintiff from work. She was a travel agent that did “all the travel arrangements for [his] company.“ He and plaintiff were friends, though they do not associate outside of work.
[*P16]
Kosinski stated that rock climbing is one of his hobbies. He started climbing in 2008. He initially climbed at Bloomingdale Lifetime Fitness. They eventually offered him a job, and [**7]
he worked there for four or five years. His title was “[r]ock wall instructor.“ He described bouldering as climbing without a rope. He stated that it “is a little more intense.“ Generally, one climbs at lower levels, and there are mats, as opposed to ropes, for protection. He added that “[t]here‘s not really much instruction [to do] in terms of bouldering.“ He explained, “bouldering, there‘s just—okay, this is how high you can go and that‘s pretty much it.“ There was no bouldering line at Lifetime Fitness. However, they did have a rule that you should not climb above the height of your shoulders. A spotter is not typically required when bouldering.
[*P17]
He and plaintiff went to North Wall on February 14, 2013. He was a member and had been there “multiple times“ previously. When he first went to North Wall, he signed a waiver and viewed a video recording that concerned safety. Due to height considerations, Kosinski characterized North Wall as “pretty much a dedicated bouldering gym.“ North Wall offers top rope climbing, which Kosinski said was often used for children‘s parties.
[*P18]
Kosinski believed he was aware that plaintiff did not have any climbing experience prior to their trip to North [**8]
Wall. He could not recall whether there were any safety posters displayed. He and plaintiff had a conversation about the risks involved in rock climbing. He also explained to her what bouldering entailed and that a rope was not used. He noted that plaintiff was “shaky“ or “nervous“ on her first climb. Kosinski told plaintiff that if she was not comfortable, she should come down. He did not recall a bouldering line at North Wall and believed it was permissible to climb all the way to the top when bouldering. He did not recall whether plaintiff had been provided with climbing shoes. Plaintiff was in better than average physical condition.
[*P19]
When plaintiff was injured, she was climbing on a wall called Devil‘s Tower. It was toward the back, right of the facility. During the climb on which plaintiff was injured, Kosinski observed that plaintiff was “stuck“ at one point and could not figure out what to do next. He walked over to assist her. She was four or five feet off the ground. Plaintiff‘s left foot and hand came off the wall, and her body swung away from the wall (counterclockwise). She then fell and landed on the edge of a mat. Kosinski stated she landed “half on the mat“ and was rotating [**9]
when she landed. After plaintiff landed, Kosinski went over to check on her. Plaintiff said she believed she had broken her ankle. He did not know whether plaintiff had applied chalk to her hands before, nor did he recall what she was wearing. It did not appear that plaintiff had control of herself before she fell off the wall and injured herself. It also did not appear to him that plaintiff was attempting to get down from the wall or that she deliberately jumped.
[*P20]
Kosinski told an employee of respondent‘s to call the paramedics. Kosinski recalled an employee offering plaintiff ice. Plaintiff declined a ride to the hospital in an ambulance, and Kosinski drove her there instead.
[*P21]
Kosinski testified that he and plaintiff had never been romantically involved. He recalled that plaintiff used crutches following the injury and took some time off from work. According to Kosinski, she used crutches for “quite a while.“
[*P22]
On cross-examination, Kosinski explained that a spotter, unlike a belayer, only has limited control over a climber. A spotter “just direct[s] them to fall onto a mat and not hit their head.“ It would have been possible for plaintiff to use a rope while climbing (assuming one was [**10]
available). Kosinski stated that use of a rope might have prevented plaintiff‘s injury; however, it might also have caused another injury, such as plaintiff hitting her head on something. Kosinski agreed that he climbed twice a week or about 100 times per year. He did not recall an employee ever advising him about not climbing too high when bouldering. An automatic belayer might have lessened the force with which plaintiff landed and mitigated her injury. It was about 25 to 30 feet from the front desk to the place where plaintiff fell. The safety video new customers had to watch was about two minutes long. He did not observe plaintiff watching the video.
[*P23]
Prior to climbing, Kosinski told plaintiff that climbing was a dangerous sport and that they would be climbing without ropes. He did not recall any employee of respondent testing plaintiff with regard to her climbing abilities. After refreshing his recollection with various documents, Kosinski testified that they had been climbing for about half an hour when plaintiff was injured. He agreed that plaintiff was an inexperienced climber.
[*P24]
On redirect-examination, he confirmed that he was not present when plaintiff first checked in at North [**11]
Wall. He had no knowledge of what transpired between plaintiff and respondent‘s employees at that point.
[*P25]
Jason R. Cipri also testified via discovery deposition. He testified that he had been employed by respondent as a manager for two years, from 2012 to 2014. His immediate supervisor was Randy Spencer (respondent‘s owner). When he was hired in 2012, Cipri was trained on office procedures, logistics, how to deal with the cash register, where to put the mail, and the use of a computer system. He was also trained on dealing with customers. Cipri started climbing in 2000 and had worked for respondent for about a year around the time of plaintiff‘s injury.
[*P26]
Novice climbers were supposed to sign a waiver and view a video. Spencer trained Cipri to go over “any and all safety procedures“ with new climbers. Cipri was trained to “interact with the customers to decide and figure out their climbing ability.“ Three types of climbing occurred at North Wall: bouldering, top-rope climbing, and lead climbing (also known as sport climbing). Plaintiff was bouldering when she was injured. Bouldering does not involve the use of ropes. Cipri estimated about 90 percent (or at least the “vast majority“) of [**12]
the climbing at North Wall is bouldering. Cipri received very specific training regarding how to execute waiver forms. Customers were instructed to read the waiver form.
[*P27]
There was a “bouldering line“ on the climbing wall. People engaged in bouldering were not supposed to bring their feet above that line. The bouldering line is described in the waiver. However, Cipri explained, having a bouldering line is not common. He added, “We all kind of thought it was cute, but it didn‘t really serve a purpose.“
[*P28]
Cipri was working as a manager on the day plaintiff was injured. He recalled that an employee named Miranda, whom he called a “coach,“ came and told him that someone had been injured. He called the paramedics, as that was what plaintiff wanted. He brought plaintiff some ice. He described Kosinski (whom he initially called Eric) as a “pretty novice climber.“ Cipri did not know whether plaintiff was above the bouldering line when she fell. Plaintiff did not appear intoxicated or smell of alcohol. She did not appear to have any injuries besides the one to her ankle. Plaintiff would not have been allowed to use a rope because “you have to be certified and taken through a lesson to use the [**13]
ropes.“
[*P29]
To the left side of the customer-service counter, there were posters addressing “safety and such.“ Cipri filled out an accident report concerning plaintiff‘s injury. Cipri denied that he was terminated by respondent and that the owner ever accused him of using drugs on the job. There was no manual on “how to run North Wall,“ but there was an “unofficial manual“ kept on the front desk. This was comprised of a couple of binders that concerned how to teach climbing, use of the telephone, memberships, employee conduct, and various rules. He did not recall anything specific relating to dealing with novice climbers. There was a copy of the Climbing Wall Association manual in a file-cabinet drawer; however, he never used it for anything. Cipri did not recall Spencer instructing him to use this manual. Spencer did train employees on climbing, particularly new hires. Cipri described Spencer as an “absentee“ manager.“ He would come in early in the day, and Cipri typically would not see him.
[*P30]
Aside from ascertaining a customer‘s age and climbing experience, they did nothing else to assess his or her proficiency. They would show new climbers a video and explain the rules of the gym to them. [**14]
Cipri could not say whether a copy of a manual shown to him was the manual they were actually using when he worked for respondent. However, he stated various forms shown to him, including one concerning bouldering orientation, were not used when he was there. Spencer never told Cipri to get rid of any document; rather, he was adamant about keeping such material. Weekly inspections of the premises were conducted, but no records documenting them were maintained.
[*P31]
On cross-examination, Cipri stated that his sister had been hired to rewrite the operations manual. One document stated, “If the facility allows bouldering, the staff provides an orientation before novice climbers are allowed to boulder without assistance or direct supervision.“ Cipri testified that this was not generated by respondent, but they followed it. Employees working the counter were trained to have new customers watch a video, instruct them on safety procedures, and assess their abilities. To the left of the front door, posters from the Climbing Wall Association were displayed. There was also one near the back door. Cipri did not remember what they were about beyond that they concerned “stable rules“ of the Climbing [**15]
Wall Association.
[*P32]
Cipri did not witness plaintiff‘s accident, and he did not recall being present when she was checked in. He never had rejected a customer previously, but he had the authority to do so. He never encountered a situation where he felt it was necessary.
[*P33]
On redirect-examination, Cipri agreed that beyond verbal questioning, they did not test new customers. They did not “inspect or observe climbers while they were actually climbing to determine competency.“ They did “orientate climbers“ and show them the video. Further, new climbers read the waiver forms. Climbers were instructed on general and bouldering safety rules. Cipri was aware of an earlier incident where a young boy cut his head while climbing. Cipri stated that it was arguable that climbing with a rope was more dangerous than bouldering because a person could get tangled in the rope. Cipri did not give plaintiff an orientation, and he had no recollection of anyone giving her one.
[*P34]
Randall Spencer, respondent‘s owner, also testified via discovery deposition. Spencer testified that North Wall is “pretty much run by employees“ and he does not “have much of a role anymore.“ The business is run by a manager, Eric Paul. [**16]
Spencer did not have an independent recollection of plaintiff‘s accident. Cipri was the manager at the time. There was another manager as well named Chuck Kapayo, who Spencer described as co-managing with Cipri. Anything Spencer knew about plaintiff‘s accident he learned from Cipri or another employee named Terri Krallitsch. Usually, two people worked at any given time, although, sometimes, only one would be present.
[*P35]
Spencer identified the waiver form signed by plaintiff. However, he acknowledged that it was not the original. The purpose of the waiver was to inform a customer about the danger involved in rock climbing. Further, employees were “trained to talk about the rules and safety items when [customers] first come into the gym.“ In addition, there were posters, four of which were visible at the entrance. The posters were produced by the Climbing Wall Association as part of their Climb Smart Program. Spencer added that they say “[c]limbing is [d]angerous.“ One says “Bouldering is Dangerous Climb Smart.“ These were the only ways customers were informed of the dangers of rock climbing. Customers are not tested as to their climbing proficiency, and they are not trained unless they [**17]
sign up for a class. Customers were told not to climb above the bouldering line when bouldering.
[*P36]
Employees were instructed to follow the policies of the Climbing Wall Association. If an employee did not spend time with a new customer “explaining the policies and procedures of bouldering, that would be a violation of company policy.“ This is true even if the new customer is accompanied by a more experienced climber.
[*P37]
Spencer explained that bouldering is climbing without a rope. The bouldering line is a “little bit over three feet“ from the floor. Climbers were to keep their feet below the bouldering line. The accident report prepared by Cipri states plaintiff‘s feet were six feet off the floor when she fell. The only equipment provided by respondent to plaintiff was climbing shoes. Respondent could have provided a harness, and plaintiff could have been belayed. They did not provide chalk to plaintiff.
[*P38]
Spencer testified that the waiver form states that it “is not intended to provide a description of all risks and hazards.“ He explained that this means it is possible to get hurt in a manner not described in the waiver. There was no formal training program for employees. Managers trained [**18]
new employees, and managers themselves came to respondent already having climbing experience. In 2013, respondent had no auto-belay system in place. Spencer testified that he fired Cipri because of “suspected drug use.“
[*P39]
The released signed by plaintiff states, in pertinent part, as follows. Initially, it states that plaintiff is giving up any right of actions “arising out of use of the facilities of North Wall, Inc.“ Plaintiff then acknowledged that “the sport of rock climbing and the use of the facilities of North Wall, Inc., has inherent risks.“ It then states that plaintiff has “full knowledge of the nature and extent of all the risks associated with rock climbing and the use of the climbing gym, including but not limited to“ the following:
“1. All manner of injury resulting from falling off the climbing gym and hitting rock faces and/or projections, whether permanently or temporarily in place, or on the floor or loose. 2. Rope abrasions, entanglement and other injuries ***. 3. Injuries resulting from falling climbers or dropped items ***. 4. Cuts and abrasions resulting from skin contact with the climbing gym and/or the gym‘s devices and/or hardware. 5. Failure of ropes, slings, [**19]
harnesses, climbing hardware, anchor points, or any part of the climbing gym structure.“
Plaintiff then waived any cause of action “arising out of or in any way related to [her] use of the climbing gym whether that use is supervised or unsupervised, however the injury or damage is caused.“
[*P40]
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. It noted that case law indicates that a competent adult recognizes the danger of falling from a height. It next observed that the waiver plaintiff signed stated that she was releasing defendant from “all manner of injury resulting from falling off the climbing gym.“ The trial court then rejected plaintiff‘s argument that this language was too general to be enforced. It further found that plaintiff had set forth no facts from which willful and wanton conduct could be inferred. This appeal followed.
[*P41]
III. ANALYSIS
[*P42]
We are confronted with two main issues. First is the effect of the waiver form signed by plaintiff. Second, we must consider whether plaintiff‘s count alleging willful and wanton conduct survives regardless of the waiver (an exculpatory agreement exempting liability for willful and wanton conduct would violate public policy (Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Center, Inc., 178 Ill. App. 3d 597, 604, 533 N.E.2d 941, 127 Ill. Dec. 859 (1989))). [**20]
Plaintiff‘s brief also contains a section addressing proximate cause; however, as we conclude that the waiver bars plaintiff‘s cause of action, we need not address this argument.
[*P43]
A. THE WAIVER
[*P44]
The trial court granted summary judgment on all but the willful and wanton count of plaintiff‘s complaint based on plaintiff‘s execution of a waiver. As this case comes to us following a grant of summary judgment, our review is de novo. Bier v. Leanna Lakeside Property Ass‘n, 305 Ill. App. 3d 45, 50, 711 N.E.2d 773, 238 Ill. Dec. 386 (1999). Under the de novo standard of review, we owe no deference to the trial court‘s decision and may freely substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Miller v. Hecox, 2012 IL App (2d) 110546, ¶ 29, 969 N.E.2d 914, 360 Ill. Dec. 869. Summary judgment is a drastic method of resolving litigation, so it should be granted only if the movant‘s entitlement to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Bier, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 50. It is appropriate only where “the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.“
Id. Finally, it is axiomatic that we review the result to which the trial court arrived at, rather than its reasoning. In re Marriage of Ackerley, 333 Ill. App. 3d 382, 392, 775 N.E.2d 1045, 266 Ill. Dec. 973 (2002).
[*P45]
Though we are not bound by the trial court‘s reasoning, [**21]
we nevertheless find ourselves in agreement with it. Like the trial court, we find great significance in the proposition that the danger of falling from a height is “open and obvious“ to an adult. Ford ex rel. Ford v. Narin, 307 Ill. App. 3d 296, 302, 717 N.E.2d 525, 240 Ill. Dec. 432 (1999); see also Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 448, 665 N.E.2d 826, 216 Ill. Dec. 568 (1996); Mount Zion Bank & Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110, 118, 660 N.E.2d 863, 214 Ill. Dec. 156 (1995) (“In Illinois, obvious dangers include fire, drowning in water, or falling from a height.“). Thus, for the purpose of resolving this appeal and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we will presume that plaintiff was aware that falling off the climbing wall presented certain obvious dangers.
[*P46]
We also note that, in Illinois, parties may contract to limit the liability for negligence. Oelze v. Score Sports Venture, LLC, 401 Ill. App. 3d 110, 117, 927 N.E.2d 137, 339 Ill. Dec. 596 (2010). Absent fraud or willful and wanton negligence, exculpatory agreements of this sort are generally valid. Id. An agreement may be also vitiated by unequal bargaining power, public policy considerations, or some special relationship between the parties (Id.); however, such issues are not present here. This court has previously explained that “[a]n exculpatory agreement constitutes an express assumption of risk insofar as the plaintiff has expressly consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him [or her].“
Falkner, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 602.
[*P47]
Agreements of this nature “must be expressed in clear, explicit [**22]
and unequivocal language showing that such was the intent of the parties.“
Calarco v. YMCA of Greater Metropolitan Chicago, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1043, 501 N.E.2d 268, 103 Ill. Dec. 247 (1986). That is, it must “appear that its terms were intended by both parties to apply to the conduct of the defendant which caused the harm.“
Id., (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, Explanatory Notes ‘ 496B, comment d, at 567 (1965)). Nevertheless, “The precise occurrence which results in injury need not have been contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was entered into.“
Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill. App. 3d 581, 585, 559 N.E.2d 187, 147 Ill. Dec. 187 (1990). Thus, an exculpatory agreement will excuse a defendant from liability only where an “injury falls within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying the activity and, thus, reasonably contemplated by the plaintiff.“
Id. The foreseeability of the danger defines the scope of the release. Cox v. U.S. Fitness, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 122442, ¶ 14, 377 Ill. Dec. 930, 2 N.E.3d 1211.
[*P48]
Numerous cases illustrate the degree of specificity required in an exculpatory agreement necessary to limit a defendant‘s liability for negligence. In Garrison, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 583, the plaintiff was injured when a weighted bar rolled off a grooved rest on a bench press and landed on his neck. The plaintiff alleged that the bench press was improperly designed and that the defendant-gym was negligent in providing it when it was not safe for its intended use. Id. [**23]
The plaintiff had signed an exculpatory agreement, which stated, inter alia:
“It is further agreed that all exercises including the use of weights, number of repetitions, and use of any and all machinery, equipment, and apparatus designed for exercising shall be at the Member‘s sole risk. Notwithstanding any consultation on exercise programs which may be provided by Center employees it is hereby understood that the selection of exercise programs, methods and types of equipment shall be Member‘s entire responsibility, and COMBINED FITNESS CENTER [sic] shall not be liable to Member for any claims, demands, injuries, damages, or actions arising due to injury to Member‘s person or property arising out of or in connection with the use by Member of the services and facilities of the Center or the premises where the same is located and Member hereby holds the Center, its employees and agents, harmless from all claims which may be brought against them by Member or on Member‘s behalf for any such injuries or claims aforesaid.“
Id. at 584.
The plaintiff argued that the agreement did not contemplate a release of liability for the provision of defective equipment. The trial court granted the defendant‘s motion [**24]
for summary judgment based on the exculpatory agreement.
[*P49]
The reviewing court affirmed. Id. at 586. It explained as follows:
“Furthermore, the exculpatory clause could not have been more clear or explicit. It stated that each member bore the ‘sole risk‘; of injury that might result from the use of weights, equipment or other apparatus provided and that the selection of the type of equipment to be used would be the ‘entire responsibility‘ of the member.“
Id. at 585.
It further noted that the defendant “was aware of the attendant dangers in the activity and, despite the fact that plaintiff now alleges that the bench press he used was unreasonably unsafe because it lacked a certain safety feature, the injury he sustained clearly falls within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying the activity of weight-lifting.“
Id.
[*P50]
Similarly, in Falkner, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 603, the court found the following exculpatory clause exempted the defendant from liability following a parachute accident: “The Student exempts and releases the [defendant] *** from any and all liability claims *** whatsoever arising out of any damage, loss or injury to the Student or the Student‘s property while upon the premises or aircraft of the [defendant] or while [**25]
participating in any of the activities contemplated by this agreement.“ The plaintiff‘s decedent died during a parachute jump. The court placed some significance on the fact that the decedent had been a pilot in the Army Air Corp. Id.
[*P51]
Another case that provides us with some guidance is Oelze, 401 Ill. App. 3d 110, 927 N.E.2d 137, 339 Ill. Dec. 596. There, the plaintiff had signed an exculpatory agreement stating, “I hereby release SCORE Tennis & Fitness and its owners and employees from any and all liability for any damage or injury, which I may receive while utilizing the equipment and facilities and assume all risk for claims arising from the use of said equipment and facilities.“
Id. at 118. The plaintiff, who was playing tennis, was injured when she tripped on a piece of equipment that was stored behind a curtain near the tennis court she was using while she was trying to return a lob. Id. at 113. The plaintiff argued that this risk was “unrelated to the game of tennis“ and thus outside the scope of the release. Id. at 120. However, the court found that the broad language of the release encompassed the risk, relying on the plaintiff‘s agreement “to assume the risk for her use of the club‘s ‘equipment and facilities.‘”
Id.
[*P52]
Finally, we will examine Calarco, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 501 N.E.2d 268, 103 Ill. Dec. 247. In that case, the plaintiff [**26]
was injured when weights from a “Universal“ gym machine fell on her hand. Id. at 1038. The trial court granted summary judgment based on an exculpatory clause. Id. at 1038-39. The clause read:
“‘In consideration of my participation in the activities of the Young Men‘s Christian Association of Metropolitan Chicago, I do hereby agree to hold free from any and all liability the [defendant] and do hereby for myself, *** waive, release and forever discharge any and all rights and claims for damages which I may have or which may hereafter accrue to me arising out of or connected with my participation in any of the activities of the [defendant].
I hereby do declare myself to be physically sound, having medical approval to participate in the activities of the [defendant].‘”
Id. at 1039.
The reviewing court reversed, finding that the language of the release was not sufficiently explicit to relieve the defendant from liability. Id. at 1043. It explained, “The form does not contain a clear and adequate description of covered activities, such as ‘use of the said gymnasium or the facilities and equipment thereof,‘ to clearly indicate that injuries resulting from negligence in maintaining the facilities or equipment would be covered by the release [**27] .” (Emphasis added.) Id.
[*P53]
In the present case, plaintiff waived any cause of action “arising out of or in any way related to [her] use of the climbing gym whether that use is supervised or unsupervised, however the injury or damage is caused.“ (Emphasis added.) This is remarkably similar to the language, set forth above, that the Calarco court stated would have been sufficient to shield the defendant in that case. Id. Likewise, in Garrison, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 585, the language that was found sufficient to protect the defendant stated that each member bore the ‘sole risk; of injury that might result from the use of weights, equipment or other apparatus provided and that the selection of the type of equipment to be used would be the ‘entire responsibility‘ of the member.“ Again, identifying the activity involved along with an expressed intent to absolve the defendant from any liability prevailed. Here, the activity was clearly defined and plaintiff‘s intent to waive any cause related to that activity was clear. Furthermore, plaintiff‘s injury was of the sort that a participant in that activity could reasonably expect. As Oelze, 401 Ill. App. 3d at 120, indicates, language encompassing assumption of “the risk for her use of the club‘s ‘equipment and [**28]
facilities‘” is broad and sufficient to cover accidents of the sort that are related to the primary activity. See also Falkner, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 603. Here, falling or jumping off the climbing wall are things a climber can clearly expect to encounter.
[*P54]
Plaintiff cites Locke v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 669 (N.D. Ill. 2014), a case from the local federal district court. Such cases merely constitute persuasive authority (Morris v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2015 IL App (5th) 140622, ¶ 25, 396 Ill. Dec. 330, 39 N.E.3d 1156); nevertheless, we will comment on it briefly. In that case, the plaintiff suffered a heart attack and died during a basketball game at a gym operated by the defendant. Id. at 671. There was an automatic defibrillator on site, but no employee retrieved it or attempted to use it. Id. The plaintiff had signed a waiver, which included the risk of a heart attack. Id. at 672. However, the waiver did not mention the defendant‘s failure to train its employees in the use of the defibrillator. Id. The Locke court held that by advancing this claim as a failure to train by the defendant, the plaintiff could avoid the effect of the waiver. Id. at 674-75.
[*P55]
We find Locke unpersuasive. Following the reasoning of Locke, virtually any claim can be recast as a failure to train, supervise, or, in some circumstances, inspect. Allowing such a proposition to defeat an otherwise valid exculpatory agreement [**29]
would effectively write such agreements out of most contracts. See Putnam v. Village of Bensenville, 337 Ill. App. 3d 197, 209, 786 N.E.2d 203, 271 Ill. Dec. 945 (2003) (“Limiting the disclaimer in the manner suggested by the plaintiffs would effectively write it out of the contract. Virtually every error in construction by a subcontractor could be recast and advanced against [the defendant] as a failure to supervise or inspect the project.“). Here, plaintiff promised to release defendant from any liability resulting from her use of the climbing wall. Moreover, we fail to see how providing additional training to employees would have impacted on plaintiff‘s perception of an obvious risk. Allowing her to avoid this promise in this manner would be an elevation of form over substance.
[*P56]
At oral argument, plaintiff relied heavily on the allegation that the spot where she landed was uneven due to the placement of mats in the area. As noted, one of plaintiff‘s feet landed on a mat and the other landed directly on the floor. According to plaintiff, the risk of landing on an uneven surface was not within the scope of the waiver she executed. This argument is foreclosed by two cases which we cite above. First, in Oelze, 401 Ill. App. 3d at 113, the plaintiff was injured while, during a game of tennis, she tripped on a piece [**30]
of equipment stored behind a curtain near the tennis court. This arguably dangerous condition was found to be within the scope of her waiver. Id. at 121-22. Furthermore, in Garrison, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 584, the plaintiff argued that an alleged defect in gym equipment rendered ineffective an exculpatory agreement which stated that the plaintiff “bore the ‘sole risk‘ of injury that might result from the use of weights, equipment or other apparatus provided and that the selection of the type of equipment to be used would be the ‘entire responsibility‘ of the member.“
Id. at 585. In this case, assuming arguendo, there was some unevenness in the floor due to the placement of the floor mats, in keeping with Oelze and Garrison, such a defect would not vitiate plaintiff‘s waiver.
[*P57]
In sum, the release here is clear, pertains to use of defendant‘s climbing gym, and is broad enough to encompass falling or jumping from the climbing wall.
[*P58]
B. WILLFUL AND WANTON CONDUCT
[*P59]
In an attempt to avoid the effect of the exculpatory agreement, plaintiff also contends that defendant engaged in willful and wanton conduct. Conduct is “willful and wanton“ where it involves a deliberate intention to harm or a conscious disregard for the safety of others. In re Estate of Stewart, 2016 IL App (2d),151117 ¶ 72, 406 Ill. Dec. 345, 60 N.E.3d 896. It is an “aggravated [**31]
form of negligence.“
Id. Plaintiff contends that defendant should have followed its own policies and evaluated her abilities. However, plaintiff does not explain what such an evaluation would have shown or what sort of action it would have prompted one of defendant‘s employees to take that would have protected plaintiff from the injury she suffered. Plaintiff also points to defendant‘s failure to advise her not to climb above the bouldering line. As the trial court observed, the risk of falling from a height is “open and obvious“ to an adult. Ford ex rel. Ford, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 302. Plaintiff cites nothing to substantiate the proposition that failing to warn plaintiff of a risk of which she was presumptively already aware rises to the level of willful and wanton conduct. Indeed, how a defendant could consciously disregard the risk of not advising plaintiff of the dangers of heights when she was presumptively aware of this risk is unclear (plaintiff provides no facts from which an intent to harm could be inferred).
[*P60]
In short, the conduct identified by plaintiff simply does not show a willful and wanton disregard for her safety.
[*P61]
IV. CONCLUSION
[*P62]
In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County [**32]
is affirmed.
Cyclists injured on a bike path after running into a downed tree, could not recover because the association that assisted in taking care of the bike path owed no duty to the cyclists.
Posted: June 17, 2019 Filed under: Cycling, Mountain Biking, Texas, Uncategorized | Tags: balancing, bicycle, Bike Path, cases, Cause of action, City Park, contemporaneous, Dangerous Condition, Downed Tree, factors, Falling, Foreseeability, general negligence, grant summary judgment, Gross negligence, hearsay, injuries, Legal Duty, Mountain bike, negligence claim, no evidence, nonmovant, pet, Premises, Premises Liability, premises liability theory, scintilla, Summary judgment, summary judgment motion, Trail, Tree, Trial court, Yacht Club Leave a commentIf there is no duty, there is no liability. Always check to make sure there really is a duty owed to someone before you start to claim or defend negligence actions.
Citation: DeLamar v. Fort Worth Mt. Biker’s Ass’n, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 466, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 466, 2019 WL 311517
State: Texas; Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth
Plaintiff: Norman Delamar
Defendant: Fort Worth Mountain Biker’s Association
Plaintiff Claims: general negligence and gross negligence
Defendant Defenses: No Duty
Holding: For the Defendants
Year: 2019
Summary
City parks had an agreement with the local cycling group to assist in keeping the bike pats in good shape. The ultimate responsibility for the bike paths was still held by the city. An injured cyclist who ran into a downed tree could not sue the cycling group because they owed no duty to the cyclists because the association did not have the authority from the city and did not accept a duty with the agreement with the city.
Facts
On July 12, 2014, Norman was riding his mountain bike on a trail in Gateway, a park owned by the City, when he came upon a downed tree resting across the trail at head level. Although known to be a “really good rider,” Norman asserts that because he did not have time to stop or avoid the tree, the tree “clotheslined” his head and neck and knocked him off of his bicycle, causing him injuries.
Norman sued the City, asserting claims of general negligence and gross negligence. In a single pleading, the City filed an answer and identified the Association as a responsible third party because of an “Adopt-A-Park Agreement” (Contract) that made the Association “responsible for constructing and maintaining the bike trail in question.” Norman then amended his petition and added the Association as a defendant in the suit.
The city’s contract with the association outlined things the association was to do to assist the city in keeping the trail available and generally covered trail maintenance. The city did not give up its right to control and manage the park where the trails were located.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, and this appeal ensued.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The first issue the court reviewed was this, a negligence claim or a premises liability claim.
Although premises liability is a form of negligence, “[n]egligence and premises liability claims . . . are separate and distinct theories of recovery, requiring plaintiffs to prove different, albeit similar, elements to secure judgment in their favor.”
The differences are subtle, but:
To prevail on a premises-liability claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the premises by the owner; (2) that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) that the owner did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) that the owner’s failure to use such care proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries, whereas under the common law doctrine of negligence, a plaintiff must prove (1) a legal duty owed by one person to another; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately resulting from the breach.
The difference is, one is based on the actions of the defendant, and the other is based on a condition of the land.
While, theoretically, a litigant may maintain causes of action for both general negligence and premises liability, to be viable, the general negligence theory of recovery must be based not upon an injury resulting from the condition of the property, but upon the defendant’s contemporaneous activity. (analyzing claimant’s negligence and premises liability claims together). If the injury is one caused by a premises defect, rather than a defendant’s contemporaneous activity, a plaintiff cannot circumvent the true nature of the premises defect claim by pleading it as one for general negligence.
As similar as they may appear to be, you cannot recover on the same set of facts for both a negligence action and a premise’s liability action. Even the court stated understanding the differences could be “tricky.”
The trial court and appellate court found the plaintiff’s claims sounded in premise’s liability.
However, the court went on to discuss the plaintiff’s allegations that his claim was a negligence claim. The issue was whether the association had a legal duty to the plaintiff.
The question of legal duty is a “multifaceted issue” requiring courts to balance a number of factors such as the risk and foreseeability of injury, the social utility of the actor’s conduct, the consequences of imposing the burden on the actor, and any other relevant competing individual and social interests implicated by the facts of the case. “Although the formulation and emphasis varies with the facts of each case, three categories of factors have emerged: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured; and (3) public policy considerations.”
Of the three, foreseeability as the dominant consideration, but not the sole consideration the court must review. Foreseeability alone is not sufficient to create a duty. “Foreseeability means that a person who possesses ordinary intelligence should have anticipated the danger that his negligent act would create for others.”
Although the association had some contractual responsibility for the trails, there was nothing the association could do about the trees. Only the city had the use of the chainsaws, and only the city could determine if a tree could be removed and then remove it.
And although it was foreseeable, a tree could fall on the trail; the issue required more analysis than that. The bike path was surrounded by thousands of trees. The plaintiff had ridden that path just two days earlier and admitted that the tree could have fallen two hours before he hit it. Although a tree falling was foreseeable, it was outside of the scope of something that you can do anything about, and on top of that the association had no authority to do anything about trees.
Finally, the agreement between the city and the association said nothing about the association agreeing to assume a legal duty to maintain the safety of the trails.
Based on our de novo review of the record, we hold that Norman failed to establish that the Association owed him a legal duty to protect him from the downed tree across the trail that the Association did not cause to fall, that may have fallen only hours-but no later than a day or two-before Norman struck it, and that the Association was not even authorized to unilaterally remove.
Because there could be no gross negligence if there was no general negligence, the plaintiffs gross and ordinary negligence claims were dismissed.
So Now What?
Foreseeability is a good thing for non-lawyers running a business or program to understand. Are your actions or inactions going to create a danger to someone.
The case does not state whether the city had any liability to the plaintiff, only the issues discussed in this decision were between the plaintiff and the defendant association.
More importantly, the court looked at trees falling as something that no one could really control. It was not liked anyone, the association or the city could come close to identifying trees that may fall in parks.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
Copyright 2019 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529
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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
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trail, summary judgment, general negligence, premises liability, premises, trial court, legal duty, no evidence, summary judgment motion, pet, hearsay, grant summary judgment, premises liability theory, mountain bike, balancing, nonmovant, falling, dangerous condition, gross negligence, negligence claim, downed tree, contemporaneous, foreseeability, factors, cause of action, yacht club, scintilla, injuries, bicycle, cases
Minnesota Supreme Court allows skier v. skier lawsuits in MN. Colliding with a tree is an inherent risk but colliding with a person is not?
Posted: March 25, 2019 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Minnesota, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: appreciated, assume a risk, ball, Baseball, Collisions, Court of Appeals, district court, doctrine, Downhill, flying, Hazard, Hockey, injuries, instructor, Law, participants, patron's, Primary Assumption of Risk, recreational, rider's, secondary assumption, Skating, skier collision, skier v. skier, skier's, skiing, Snowboarder v. Skier, snowboarding, Snowmobiling, Spectator, Sport, Summary judgment, trick Leave a commentNSSA website that describes skiing as safe if done under control contributes to the reasoning that skiers should be able to sue other skiers in a sport.
Soderberg, v. Anderson, 906 N.W.2d 889, 2018 Minn. App. LEXIS 47 (Minn. Ct. App., Jan. 16, 2018)
State: Minnesota; Supreme Court of Minnesota
Plaintiff: Julie A. Soderberg
Defendant: Lucas Anderson
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Primary Assumption of the Risk
Holding: For the Plaintiff
Year: 2019
Summary
Primary Assumption of the Risk does not apply to collisions between skiers on the slopes in Minnesota. Any collision between two people using a ski area will now result in lawsuits.
The Minnesota Supreme Court believed that skiing, and snowboarding were not inherently dangerous because they could be done with common sense and awareness to reduce the risk, as quoted from the NSAA website.
Facts
On the morning of January 3, 2016, appellant Lucas Anderson, age 35, went snowboarding at Spirit Mountain near Duluth. Spirit Mountain welcomes both skiers and snowboarders to enjoy runs marked “easiest,” “more difficult,” and “difficult.” Anderson considered himself to be an expert snowboarder. He began skiing in elementary school and took up snowboarding when he was 15.
When Anderson snowboarded at Spirit Mountain, he typically warmed up by going down less challenging runs. That morning, Anderson went down part of a “more difficult” run called Scissor Bill, which merges with an “easiest” run called Four Pipe. As he left Scissor Bill and entered Four Pipe, Anderson slowed down, looked up for other skiers and snowboarders coming down the hill, and proceeded downhill.
Anderson then increased his speed, used a hillock as a jump, and performed an aerial trick called a backside 180. To perform the trick, Anderson-riding his snowboard “regular”-went airborne, turned 180 degrees clockwise, and prepared to land “goofy.” Halfway through the trick, Anderson’s back was fully facing downhill. He could not see what was below him.
Respondent Julie Soderberg was below him. A ski instructor employed by Spirit Mountain, she was giving a lesson to a six-year-old child in an area of Four Pipe marked “slow skiing area.” At the moment when Anderson launched his aerial trick, Soderberg’s student was in the center of the run. Soderberg was approximately 10 to 15 feet downhill from, and to the left of, her student. She was looking over her right shoulder at her student.
As Anderson came down from his aerial maneuver, he landed on Soderberg, hitting her behind her left shoulder. Soderberg lost consciousness upon impact. She sustained serious injuries.
Soderberg sued Anderson for negligence. Anderson moved for summary judgment, arguing that, based on undisputed facts and the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk, he owed Soderberg no duty of care and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The court first looked at Assumption of the risk and the differences between Primary Assumption of the Risk and Secondary Assumption of the Risk.
Secondary assumption of risk is an affirmative defense that may be invoked when the plaintiff has unreasonably and voluntarily chosen to encounter a known and appreciated danger created by the defendant’s negligence. Secondary assumption of risk is “an aspect of contributory negligence,” and is part of the calculation of comparative fault. Id.
By contrast, primary assumption of risk is not a defense and applies only in limited circumstances. Unlike secondary assumption, primary assumption of risk “completely bars a plaintiff’s claim because it negates the defendant’s duty of care to the plaintiff.” Therefore, primary assumption of risk precludes liability for negligence, and is not part of the calculation of comparative fault. Primary assumption of risk “arises ‘only where parties have voluntarily entered a relationship in which plaintiff assumes well-known, incidental risks.'”
The court found the ski instructor did not assume the risk of being hit. “Here, the parties agree that Soderberg did not expressly assume the risk of being hit by Anderson. So, the issue is whether she assumed the risk by implication.”
This first step in the analysis, that the ski instructor did not assume the risk of being hit, which the defense agreed to, sealed the fate of the decision. I think now days; most people consider the risk of a collision to be possible on the slopes.
So, the court then went through the history of primary assumption of the risk in Minnesota and how it was applied in baseball, skating and other sports. It then related why it has not applied primary assumption of the risk to snowmobiling.
Recreational snowmobiling, though, is a different matter. We have consistently declined to apply the doctrine to bar claims arising out of collisions between snowmobilers. In Olson v. Hansen, 216 N.W.2d 124 we observed that, although snowmobiles can tip or roll, such a hazard “is one that can be successfully avoided. A snowmobile, carefully operated, is no more hazardous than an automobile, train, or taxi.” Id. at 128. Similarly, we “refused to relieve [a] defendant of the duty to operate his snowmobile reasonably and analyzed the defendant’s conduct under the doctrine of secondary assumption of risk.” In 2012, we reaffirmed that snowmobiling is not an inherently dangerous sporting activity.
The court found that although skiers do collide with each other, it is not so frequent that it is considered an inherent risk of the sport.
First, although there is no question that skiers can and do collide with one another, the record does not substantiate that injurious collisions between skiers are so frequent and damaging that they must be considered inherent in the sport. As the National Ski Areas Association has recognized through its seven-point Responsibility Code (adopted by Spirit Mountain), skiing and snowboarding contain “elements of risk,” but “common sense and personal awareness can help reduce” them. This recognition counsels against a flat no-duty rule that would benefit those who ski negligently. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, “If skiers act in accordance with the rules and general practices of the sport, at reasonable speeds, and with a proper lookout for others on the slopes, the vast majority of contact between participants will be eliminated. The same may not be said of soccer, football, basketball and hockey . . . .”
The National Ski Area Association, (NSAA) has this statement on their website:
Common Sense, it’s one of the most important things to keep in mind and practice when on the slopes. The National Ski Areas Association (NSAA) believes education, helmet use, respect and common sense are very important when cruising down the mountain. NSAA developed Your Responsibility Code to help skiers and boarders be aware that there are elements of risk in snowsports that common sense and personal awareness can help reduce.
The National Ski Patrol, which probably has a better understanding of the risks of skiing does not have that statement on its website. The good news is both the NSAA, and the NSP now at least have the same code on their websites. That was not true in the past.
The court then stated it just did not want to extend primary assumption of the risk to another activity.
Second, even though today we do not overrule our precedent regarding flying sports objects and slippery rinks, we are loathe to extend the doctrine of implied primary assumption to yet another activity. “The doctrine of assumption of risk is not favored, and should be limited rather than extended.”
Finally, the court stated that it did not believe this decision would lead to fewer Minnesotans skiing. It will, but not by much. However, what it will do will be to increase litigation amount skiers and boarders. And if you are looking at going to a state to ski, knowing you can be sued if you hit someone else on the slopes might have you ski in another state.
Minnesota now joins Colorado in having billboards you can see leaving the ski areas asking if you have been hurt while skiing.
So Now What?
The court used an interesting analysis coupled with language from the NSAA website to determine that skiing was like snowmobiling and totally controllable, therefore, it was not a sport where you assume the risk of your injuries.
This is a minority opinion. Something this court did not even consider in its opinion. Most states you assume the risk of a collision. This decision was clearly written to increase the litigation in the state.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
Copyright 2019 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529
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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #SkiLaw,
doctrine, primary assumption of risk, skiing, snowboarding, sport, skiers, court of appeals, recreational, snowmobiling, ball, collisions, downhill, summary judgment, patrons, rider’s, skating, secondary assumption, district court, assume a risk, law, participants, instructor, spectator, flying, hazard, hockey, trick, appreciated, Baseball, injuries
The one group of people who never sign a release and to whom you have no defenses are spectators. Here a spectator was injured during a bicycle race.
Posted: February 25, 2019 Filed under: Cycling, New York, Racing | Tags: Bicycle Race, Cycling, deposition, duty to plaintiff, injuries, Insurance, organizer, participants, Recreation, sanctioned, Signs, Spectator, Spectators, sponsor, Summary judgment, supervise, USA Cycling, USA Cycling Inc. Leave a commentIn this case, the plaintiff attempted to bring in USA Cycling, Inc. Spectators are always at risk, and defendants have little they can do to keep from getting sued except fencing in most cases.
Levine v USA Cycling, Inc., 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6063; 2018 NY Slip Op 33177(U)
State: New York: Supreme Court of New York, Kings County
Plaintiff: Steven Levine
Defendant: USA Cycling, Inc. & Kissena Cycling Club
Plaintiff Claims:
Defendant Defenses: Sponsor, now in control of event
Holding: For the defendants
Year: 2018
Summary
Plaintiff Cyclists riding inside the race course was injured when a racer struck him. The plaintiff sued the club that put on the event and USA Cycling, Inc. that sanctioned the event. USA Cycling moved for summary judgment arguing it owed no duty to the plaintiff because it had no control over and did not do anything other than sanction the race.
Facts
In the underlying matter, the plaintiff seeks to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained while cycling in Prospect Park, Brooklyn, New York on June 14, 2014. At the same time the plaintiff was cycling as a recreational activity, a cycling event was taking place in the same area of Prospect Park. The plaintiff was cycling the same route as those participating in the event when he collided with another cyclist who was a participant in the bike race.
As a result of injuries sustained by the plaintiff, which included a fractured and displaced clavicle that required surgical intervention….
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The defendant USA Cycling was brought into the case to possibly add money to the pot that might be available to the defendant. USA Cycling argued that because they did not own, control or have anything to do with the race other than to sponsor the race for a fee, they could not be held liable for anything that happened.
The court distilled the plaintiff’s claims and the defendant’s defenses into a single argument:
At issue in this matter, is whether defendant USA Cycling owed a duty to the plaintiff and by virtue thereof is liable to the plaintiff for the injuries sustained during the bike tour.
USA Cycling argued the following:
… USA Cycling did not coordinate the Prospect Park event; did not control or employ any of the people organizing or managing or working the race; did not select the location of the race nor supervise the race. They did not have any employees or representatives at the race. In addition, they are not the parent company of Kissena Cycling Club nor is Kissena Cycling Club a subsidiary of USA Cycling.
Mr. Sowl testified at his deposition that while USA Cycling sanctions events in the United States they do not run cycling events. Mr. Sowl stated that while there are benefits to a third party such as Kissena Cycling Club for having an event sanctioned by USA Cycling which includes that a cyclist participating in the event can use the results for upgrading their national results and rankings and the third-party event organizers can independently obtain liability insurance for their event through USA Cycling, he nevertheless maintained that they have no involvement in the operation of the race or the design of the course.
It USA Cycling did not owe the defendant a duty, then there was no negligence. The court defined negligence under New York law as:
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate (a) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach thereof, and (3) injury proximately resulting therefrom. In the absence of a duty, there is no breach and without a breach there is no liability
So, the issue is, did USA Cycling’s involvement in the race rise to the level that it owed a duty to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff argued the involvement was much more than just providing insurance for the race.
They [USA Cycling] collect some fees to compensate for sanctioning the event and provide insurance for the event.
The plaintiff maintains that the defendant did more than just sanction the race as they issued safety guidelines, rule books, post event forms, permits, an event checklist and insurance information to the Kissena Cycling Club, and even received a copy of the incident report.
The court found the actions of USA Cycling did not rise to the level to create a duty to the plaintiff.
USA Cycling is the national governing body for cycling in the United States. They oversee the discipline of road, mountain bike, Cyc-cross, BMS and track cycling. Mr. Sowl testified that except for a few national championships, they do not actually run events. While they sanction events, the events are generally owned and operated by a third party (such as the Kissena Cycling Club). In sanctioning the race at Prospect Park, USA Cycling recognized the event as an official event and the results when considering national rankings. However, while they sanction events they do not sponsor them. The chief referee at the event is an independent contractor who works for the event organizer and not USA Cycling. Mr. Sowl further testified that USA Cycling does not share in any portion of the fees that are generated by the local events.
The court found USA Cycling had no control over the race. This lack of control could not create a duty to the plaintiff.
This Court finds that the plaintiff has not established a prima facie case that the defendant USA Cycling had a duty to the plaintiff, and not having a duty was not negligent, and thus, not liable to the plaintiff. This Court finds that US