Round v. Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC (Mich. App. 2022)
Posted: September 26, 2022 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Michigan, Ski Area | Tags: fatality, Michigan, Michigan Ski Area Safety Act, SASA, ski area, ski run, Snow Making, Snow Making Equipment Leave a commentRound v. Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC (Mich. App. 2022)
CHERYLE A. ROUND, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF CHARLES R. ROUND, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
v.
TRINIDAD RESORT & CLUB, LLC,Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.
No. 357849
Court of Appeals of Michigan
September 15, 2022
UNPUBLISHED
Antrim County Circuit Court LC No. 20-009218-NO
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Garrett and Yates, JJ.
Per Curiam
Defendant appeals by leave granted[1] an order denying its motion for summary disposition which asserted that it was entitled to immunity under Michigan’s Ski Area Safety Act (SASA), MCL 408.321 et seq., because plaintiff could not demonstrate noncompliance with a statutory duty; the snow-making equipment that plaintiff’s decedent collided with was not located on the ski run so a warning sign was not required. We agree and reverse.
On December 21, 2019, plaintiff’s decedent, Charles R. Round, died after allegedly sustaining fatal injuries when he collided with snow-making equipment at Schuss Mountain, a ski area owned and operated by defendant. At the time, Round was participating in an event called the Tannenbaum Blitzen parade whereby volunteer skiers ski down an unlit hill-known as Kingdom Come-at night while carrying lighted torches, eventually getting to the bottom of the hill to light the ski resort’s Christmas tree. Round was leading the parade of skiers-as he had for several years-when he suddenly veered to his left and skied beyond the edge of the ski run. A ski lift was located on the edge of the ski run and, underneath the ski lift, were four permanent snow-making machines installed at various points up the hill. At about the half-way point of the ski hill, Round crossed into this area, collided with a snow-making machine, and sustained severe injuries that proved fatal.
On June 24, 2020, Round’s wife, Cheryle A. Round, filed this negligence action, alleging that defendant failed to comply with duties imposed under the SASA, including by:
a. Failing to ensure that the snow-making equipment was properly marked or plainly visible to skiers;
b. Failing to properly light the ski area during the event;
c. Failing to mark the snow-making machine with a visible sign or other warning device to warn approaching skiers;
d. Failing to construct or maintain physical barriers to prevent skiers from colliding with the snow-making machine; and
e. Failing to install protective padding around the snow-making machine to prevent serious injuries from collisions.
In response to plaintiff’s complaint, defendant asserted affirmative defenses, including that it was immune and plaintiff’s claim was barred by the SASA. Defendant also filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract, indemnification, and other claims based on the release Round had signed.
On November 2, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (C)(10) as to defendant’s defense of immunity under the SASA. Plaintiff argued that her decedent collided with a snow-making machine that was neither properly marked nor plainly visible during the nighttime event; thus, the SASA did not presume-as set forth under MCL 408.342(2)-that her decedent assumed the risk of being injured in this situation. Defendant responded to plaintiff’s motion arguing, in relevant part, that plaintiff’s decedent assumed the risk of skiing in the event and signed a release to that effect. But, further, defendant owed no duty to mark or make plainly visible the snow-making machine at issue because it was 10 feet tall and was not located on the ski run.
On January 4, 2021, the trial court rendered its decision and order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition holding, in relevant part, that “the injury causing hazard (e.g. the snow-making equipment) was neither properly marked nor plainly visible, [and thus], the Decedent cannot be said to have assumed the inherent risk of the hazard and recovery is not precluded by SASA.”
Defendant filed its application for leave to appeal the trial court’s order which was denied “for failure to persuade the Court of the need for immediate appellate review.” See Round v Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 18, 2021 (Docket No. 356123).
On April 27, 2021, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10), arguing that defendant strictly complied with its duties mandated by the SASA. And contrary to plaintiff’s claims, defendant had no duty under the SASA to light, mark, or pad the snow-making machine at issue because it is undisputed that (1) the ski run was not open to the public when plaintiff’s decedent was fatally injured, (2) the snow-making machine extended more than six feet above the snow surface; it was ten feet above the snow surface, and (3) the snow-making machine was located off of the ski run; it was nine feet away from the groomed edge of the ski run known as Kingdom Come. Moreover, plaintiff’s decedent breached his duties under the SASA to “maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.” MCL 408.341(1). The video evidence showed that plaintiff’s decedent abruptly departed from the ski run without effort to correct his course before striking the snow-making machine. Defendant supported its motion with numerous exhibits, including deposition testimony transcripts, affidavits, an incident report, and photographs.
Plaintiff responded to defendant’s motion for summary disposition arguing, in relevant part, that the trial court already decided that plaintiff’s decedent did not assume the risk in this case, and thus, defendant was not entitled to immunity under the SASA. Further, plaintiff argued, (1) the ski run was open to the public when this incident occurred, (2) the snow-making machine was less than 6 feet above the snow surface when plaintiff’s expert, Stanley Gale, performed a site visit on March 6, 2021, and (3) the snow-making machine was located on the skiable portion of the trail, as Gale also determined, but, in any case, “it is the snow-making operations that must be located on the ski run-not the snow-making equipment itself.” Plaintiff supported her response with exhibits, including Gale’s investigative report.
Defendant replied to plaintiff’s response to its motion for summary disposition, arguing that (1) the ski run was not open to the public at the time of the accident, a fact supported by the deposition testimony of witnesses, the incident report, and even the deposition testimony of plaintiff’s purported expert, Stanley Gale; (2) the snow-making machine extended more than six feet above the snow surface at the time of the accident and Gale’s measurement using only his ski to gauge the distance more than one year after the accident was incompetent to refute defendant’s evidence; and (3) the snow-making machine was not located on the ski run, as even plaintiff’s decedent’s wife, son, and daughter admitted, and as testified to by other witnesses. Defendant supported its response with exhibits, including deposition testimony transcripts.
On June 1, 2021, the trial court heard oral argument on defendant’s motion and the parties argued consistently with their briefs. On June 27, 2021, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition, holding that (1) whether the ski run was open to the public at the time of the accident is irrelevant but, in any case, was a question of fact for the jury considering that not just employees participated in the event; (2) whether the height of the snow-making machine at issue was six feet above the snow surface was a question of fact for the jury because plaintiff’s expert found it to be less than six feet and the machine had been manipulated; and (3) whether the snow-making equipment was located on the ski run was a question of fact for the jury because plaintiff’s expert stated that it was on a skiable portion of the trail. The court did not address defendant’s claim that plaintiff’s decedent breached his duties under MCL 408.341(1) of the SASA to “maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.” Accordingly, the court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed that must be decided by a jury, and thus, defendant’s motion was denied.
On July 16, 2021, defendant filed its application for leave to appeal arguing that preemptory reversal was required but, at minimum, leave to appeal should be granted. The snow-making equipment at issue in this case was not located on a ski run, and thus, defendant owed no duty to mark the snow-making equipment and cannot be held liable for plaintiff decedent’s accident. This Court granted leave to appeal. Round v Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 1, 2021 (Docket No. 357849). On November 8, 2021, while this appeal was pending, plaintiff filed a motion to affirm which this Court denied. Round v Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 24, 2021 (Docket No. 357849).
On appeal, defendant argues that it was entitled to summary disposition because the snow-making equipment at issue was not located on a ski run; thus, defendant had no duty to place a warning sign on that equipment and defendant cannot be held liable for plaintiff’s decedent’s accident. We agree.
A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Hughes v Region VII Area Agency on Aging, 277 Mich.App. 268, 273; 744 N.W.2d 10 (2007). Defendant’s motion for summary disposition was brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (immunity), (C)(8) (failure to state a claim), and (C)(10) (no material factual issue), but was supported by numerous exhibits. Although the trial court did not indicate under which subrule it denied defendant’s motion, the court considered matters outside of the pleadings and so we review the motion as having been denied under MCR 2.116(C)(10). See id.; see also Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich. 429, 434; 526 N.W.2d 879 (1994).
Further, issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Anderson v Pine Knob Ski Resort, Inc, 469 Mich. 20, 23; 664 N.W.2d 756 (2003). Our purpose in reviewing questions of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Echelon Homes, LLC v Carter Lumber Co, 472 Mich. 192, 196; 694 N.W.2d 544 (2005). Our analysis begins by examining the plain language of the statute; if the language is unambiguous, no judicial construction is required or permitted and the statute must be enforced as written, giving its words their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. (citation omitted).
The SASA was enacted in 1962 “in an effort to provide some immunity for ski-area operators from personal-injury suits by injured skiers.” Anderson, 469 Mich. at 23. It delineates duties applicable to ski-area operators and to skiers. As to the duties imposed on skiers, and their acceptance of the associated risks of skiing, MCL 408.342 of the SASA provides, in part:
(2) Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare sports; rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment.
This provision has been referred to as an “assumption-of-risk provision,” and means that a skier has assumed the risk of being injured by these and similar dangers as inherent in the sport of skiing. Rusnak v Walker, 273 Mich.App. 299, 301, 304; 729 N.W.2d 542 (2007). Thus, when a skier’s injury arises from one of these dangers considered to be inherent in the sport of skiing, the ski-area operator is immune from liability unless the ski-area operator violated a specific duty imposed by the SASA that resulted in injury. Id. at 304-305, 313-314; see also Kent v Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc, 240 Mich.App. 731, 742-744; 613 N.W.2d 383 (2000).
Relevant to this case is the immunity related to snow-making equipment. Under MCL 408.342(2), ski-area operators are immune from liability for collisions with snow-making equipment, if that equipment is “properly marked or plainly visible.” Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary disposition which addressed SASA’s immunity provision, MCL 408.342(2). Specifically, plaintiff argued that defendant was not entitled to immunity because plaintiff’s decedent did not assume the risk of skiing into the unmarked and not plainly visible snow-making equipment at issue in this case. The trial court agreed and granted plaintiff’s motion, holding that the snow-making equipment was neither properly marked nor plainly visible, and thus, plaintiff’s decedent cannot be charged with assuming this risk as inherent in the sport of skiing so liability was not precluded under the SASA.
Thereafter, defendant filed the motion for summary disposition at issue here, arguing that the snow-making equipment at issue in this case actually did not have to be “properly marked or plainly visible” because it was not on the ski run; rather, plaintiff’s decedent skied off of the ski run and into an area that was not meant for skiing where he collided with the snow-making equipment. In other words, defendant argued that it breached no duty imposed by the SASA with regard to the snow-making equipment, and thus, could not be held liable for plaintiff’s decedent’s accident.
The duty provision pertaining to snow-making equipment is codified in MCL 408.326a(b) and Mich. Admin Code, R 408.80(2). These provisions address the issue that was not decided by plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, i.e., whether defendant, as the ski-area operator, had a duty to mark the snow-making equipment in this case. If SASA did not require marking this equipment with a warning sign or other device, defendant did not breach any statutory duty to plaintiff and summary disposition in favor of defendant would be appropriate.
MCL 408.326a provides in relevant part:
Each ski area operator shall, with respect to operation of a ski area, do all of the following:
* * *
(b) Mark with a visible sign or other warning device the location of any hydrant or similar fixture or equipment used in snow-making operations located on a ski run, as prescribed by rules promulgated [by the Ski Area Safety Board].
The corresponding administrative rule, Mich. Admin Code, R 408.80, prescribes the conditions under which snow-making equipment must be marked, stating:
(1) When a ski run, slope, or trail is open to the public, the ski area operator shall mark snowmaking devices as stated in this rule.
(2) A ski area operator shall mark the location of any hydrant, snow gun, or similar fixture or equipment which is used in snowmaking operations located on a ski run and which extends less than 6 feet above the snow surface with a caution sign that has contrasting colors. An orange marking disc, with a minimum diameter of 8 inches, may be used as a caution sign. One sign is adequate for all devices within an area 3 feet on either side of the sign and 10 feet in the downhill direction of the ski run from the sign.
The dispositive issue here is whether the snow-making equipment at issue was “located on a ski run,” as set forth in MCL 408.326a(b) and R 408.80(2).[2] We conclude that it was not. Accordingly, defendant was not in violation of the SASA, and thus, could not be held liable for plaintiff’s decedent’s accident.
The SASA does not define the phrase “ski run.” When a statute does not define a term, it is construed in accordance with its ordinary and generally accepted meaning. Popma v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 446 Mich. 460, 470; 521 N.W.2d 831 (1994). At minimum, the plain meaning of the phrase “ski run” for purposes of the SASA must include a path or route expected to be used for skiing down a hill. Indeed, ski runs are named, designed, constructed, groomed, and designated as the route skiers are to use for skiing down a particular hill. As this Court similarly noted in Rhoda v O’Dovero, Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 24, 2016 (Docket No. 321363), unpub op at 8: “Although the SASA does not define the terms ‘run,’ ‘slope’ or ‘trail,’ the plain, ordinary and common meanings of these terms encompass the paths a skier or snowboarder takes to get down a hill, including those paths designed and constructed by the ski operator for precisely that purpose.”[3]
In this case, no genuine issue of material fact exists-the snow-making equipment at issue was not located on the path or route expected to be used for skiing down Kingdom Come. The evidence presented by defendant in support of its argument included deposition testimony from witnesses. Plaintiff admitted during her deposition that she saw a video taken the night of the accident and she saw that her decedent actually veered the wrong way before striking the equipment-that had been in the same place for years-which was located off of the ski trail. Rick Van Tongeren, the snow sports school manager at the Shanty Creek Resort, testified that he watched a video taken the night of the incident and plaintiff’s decedent was skiing out of control in the wrong direction, i.e., not on the expected path, and was skiing very fast before the accident.
Mike Moreen, the director of the ski patrol at the Shanty Creek Resort, testified that he was skiing in the parade and was at the back of the lineup when he received a radio call from Fred Hunt that ski patrol was needed “skier’s left off of ski run about halfway down the hill.” When Moreen arrived to help Round, he saw that Round was “in a difficult location down off of the skiing surface, underneath the snow gun, underneath the structure, the stanchion of the snow gun . . . .” Moreen noted that they were “in deep snow” and “were off of the skiing surface quite a ways, several feet.” Round was down an embankment; about 10 to 15 feet away. And after they got Round on the toboggan to remove him from the accident site, “it probably took four or five repetitions to get him from the snow gun up to the skiing surface.”
Mark Durance, a member of the ski patrol at the Shanty Creek Resort, testified that he was skiing in the parade and was the second person from the last in the lineup. When the radio call came in, Durance followed Moreen to the accident site. Round was located about “ten feet or so off the ski run so it’s not a run.” Durance could not really determine Round’s condition “because he was so far off the existing run” that he could barely make observations. Ted Ewald, a ski instructor at Shanty Creek Resort, testified that he was skiing in the parade about 10 people from the front and he saw that “somebody went into the woods . . . .” But he did not see precisely what happened, the actual event; “I saw something in the woods when I skied by there.”
The evidence presented by defendant in support of its motion for summary disposition also included an incident report. The incident report included witness statements. One witness, Michael Casey, who was the third person from the front skiing in the parade, reported that he saw that Round-who was the leader of the parade-at one point seemed to be a lot further away than he should have been, indicating increased speed. He then saw Round “go off the ski hill into the woods.”
The incident report included a drawing of the snow-making machine at issue and depicted measurements taken the day after the accident. The drawing shows that the snow-making machine was located nine feet from the groomed trail; the machine sat between the groomed trail and trees, i.e., a “woods,” that was located 22 feet from the groomed trail; and the machine stood ten feet tall above the snow surface. The drafter of the drawing, Tom Murton, averred in an affidavit that he drew the diagram after the accident and the precise measurements were accurate. Murton also testified in a deposition about his investigation of the accident-including the measurements taken-that occurred the day after the accident. He testified that the snow-making equipment at issue is not part of Kingdom Come’s groomed ski surface or the ski run itself and had been in the same location permanently since at least the mid-1990s when he began working there. Photographs were also submitted in support of defendant’s motion for summary disposition and they show the scene of the accident, including the snow-making machine at issue, and it is clear that the machine was very close to the wooded area and not on the ski run known as Kingdom Come.
In opposition to defendant’s claim that it had no duty to mark the snow-making equipment at issue in this case because it was “not located on a ski run,” plaintiff argued that the machine was located on a skiable portion of the trail. Plaintiff supported that argument with a report from her purported expert, Gale, which stated that the snow-making machine was located on the skiable portion of the trail. But it is unclear as to what Gale considered a “skiable portion of the trail.” At issue here was the path or route expected to be used for skiing down Kingdom Come. Any area where there is snow is likely to be considered by some people as “skiable,” or able to be skied on-even areas that are not expected to be skied on and areas not designed or designated for skiing. We cannot agree with the trial court that Gale’s statement, alone-and which is unsupported by precise measurements or other evidence-is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of disputed fact that warrants a trial. The party filing a motion for summary disposition has the initial burden of supporting its position with documentary evidence and the party opposing that motion must then establish by evidentiary materials that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich. 358, 362; 547 N.W.2d 314 (1996). Defendant provided a plethora of evidence establishing that plaintiff’s decedent did not encounter and collide with the snow-making equipment on the path or route expected to be used for skiing down Kingdom Come. Gale’s claim that the snow-making equipment was located on a “skiable portion of the trail” is not sufficient to establish that it was “located on a ski run,” which would give rise to a duty for defendant to mark that equipment with a caution sign or other warning device.
And most obviously in this case, if the snow-making machine at issue was, in fact, located on the path or route expected to be used for skiing down Kingdom Come-within the contemplation of R 408.80(2), other skiers in the Tannenbaum Blitzen parade would likely have collided with-or at least seen and avoided-that equipment. There is no such evidence. The SASA imposes certain and specific duties on ski-area operators, one of which is to mark the location of snow-making equipment “located on a ski run and which extends less than 6 feet above the snow surface . . . .” Mich. Admin Code, R 408.80(2); see also MCL 408.326a(b). Clearly, snow-making equipment that is located on a ski run and which extends more than 6 feet above the snow surface need not be marked. This balancing of responsibilities recognizes that skiers are charged with exercising care for their own safety by avoiding obvious hazards they might encounter skiing down a hill, and ski-area operators are charged with providing warnings when a hazard that a skier might encounter skiing down a hill is less likely to be obvious. A ski-area operator is not charged by law with the impossible task of making its ski runs or every allegedly “skiable” area at its facility “accident proof.” Ski-area operators are not absolute insurers of safety, particularly with regard to those skiers who intentionally or inadvertently ski off the path or route expected to be used for skiing down a particular hill. This conclusion is consistent with the SASA’s purpose of “promoting safety, reducing litigation and stabilizing the economic conditions in the ski resort industry,” Grieb v Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc, 155 Mich.App. 484, 487; 400 N.W.2d 653 (1986), while at the same time ensures that ski-area operators stay vigilant and responsible for providing reasonably safe skiing conditions in the areas their patrons are invited, and expected, to ski.
In this case, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition because defendant had no duty under the SASA to mark the location of the snow-making equipment that plaintiff’s decedent collided with, allegedly causing his fatal injuries. There is no genuine issue of fact that the snow-making equipment was not located on the ski run, i.e., the path or route expected to be used for skiing down Kingdom Come. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision. This matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition and dismissing this case.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
———
Notes:
[1]
Round v Trinidad Resort & Club, LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 1, 2021 (Docket No. 357849).
[2] To the extent plaintiff argues that it was the snow-making operations that must be on the ski run and not the snow-making equipment itself, we reject that argument as inconsistent with the plain language of MCL 408.326a(b) and R 408.80(2).
[3] Although not binding precedent, a court may consider unpublished opinions for their instructive or persuasive value. Cox v Hartman, 322 Mich.App. 292, 307; 911 N.W.2d 219 (2017).
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Estate of Taylor v. Outdoor Adventures of Davison, LLC (Mich. App. 2022)
Posted: January 31, 2022 Filed under: Michigan, Paddlesports, Uncategorized | Tags: Commercial Campground, drowning, Exclusive Remedy, Michigan, Paddleboard, Worker's Compensation Leave a commentEstate of Taylor v. Outdoor Adventures of Davison, LLC (Mich. App. 2022)
ESTATE OF ALLYN L. TAYLOR, by LOUIS B. TAYLOR, Personal Representative, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
OUTDOOR ADVENTURES OF DAVISON, LLC, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 355035, 355036
Court of Appeals of Michigan
January 13, 2022
UNPUBLISHED
Genesee Circuit Court LC No. 18-110936-NO.
Before: Mark T. Boonstra, P.J., and Mark J. Cavanagh and Michael J. Riordan, JJ.
Per Curiam.
In this negligence action arising from the drowning death of plaintiff’s decedent, Allyn Taylor, defendant Outdoor Adventures of Davison, LLC, appeals by leave granted the trial court’s orders denying its motions for summary disposition.[1] We hold that the trial court erred by ruling that the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., did not apply to bar plaintiff’s negligence claim. At the time of his drowning death, Taylor, an employee of defendant, was on defendant’s grounds performing a task for defendant within a reasonable time after his working hours. Thus, he is presumed to have been in the course of his employment and he was not engaged in an activity the major purpose of which was social or recreational. MCL 418.301(3). Therefore, under MCL 418.131(1), the WDCA provides plaintiffs exclusive remedy against defendant for Taylor’s drowning death. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from the tragic June 12, 2016 drowning death of plaintiff s decedent, 20-year-old Allyn Taylor, on Lake Linda in Davison, Michigan. Taylor was an employee of defendant, which owns a campground on Lake Linda. Defendant provided paddleboats to its customers for their use on Lake Linda. Taylor’s job responsibilities included checking out the boats and making sure all the boats were accounted for at the end of the day. When the boats were not in use, they were moored to a dock, but many of the ties were bad so boats would sometimes float away. One of Taylor’s job responsibilities was to retrieve any wayward paddleboats. Taylor would sometimes use another boat to pull a wayward boat back in, but if the wayward boat was not too far away from the dock, Taylor would sometimes swim out to it and pull it back in. Evidence was presented that the lake contained seaweed or lake weeds in the water near the dock, which could make swimming difficult.
On June 12, 2016, Taylor finished work at approximately 8:00 p.m. He thereafter spoke to his mother on the telephone and told her that he was going to go fishing while he waited for his parents to pick him up, and he also planned on bringing in a paddleboat that had drifted away from the dock. Taylor drowned that evening while swimming to reach a wayward paddleboat.
According to Deputy Jason Thomas of the Genesee County Dive Team, the water right near the dock was clear, but lake weeds were visible at the top of the water within 10 yards of the dock. Taylor’s body was recovered in 9 to 10 feet of water near the wall of lake weeds, approximately 90 feet from the dock. Autopsy photographs showed that Taylor had weeds wrapped around his left arm, in his mouth, and also in his nose. Plaintiffs expert in aquatic safety, Ralph L. Johnson, Ph.D, opined that Taylor experienced an “active drowning,” whereby he became entangled in the lake weeds, which caused him to panic below the water surface, struggle a great deal, and “suck[] water like crazy.” Although Taylor had also been diagnosed with syncope, a physical condition that causes fainting spells, neither Johnson nor the medical examiner, Dr. Patrick Cho, M.D., believed that this condition contributed to Taylor’s drowning.
Plaintiff filed this action against defendant for negligence. Plaintiff alleged that Taylor drowned as a result of becoming entangled in the lake weeds in Lake Linda, and that defendant was aware of the hazardous lake weeds and did nothing to alleviate the dangerous condition or to warn swimmers of the potential danger. As relevant to these appeals, defendant filed two motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (C)(10), respectively, asserting that plaintiffs action was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA, MCL 418.131(1), and that plaintiffs action was barred by the recreational land use act (RUA), MCL 324.73301(1), because Taylor was engaged in the recreational activity of swimming at the time of his drowning death. Defendant also argued that plaintiff could not establish a triable issue of fact regarding causation because plaintiffs theory that Taylor drowned after becoming entangled in the lake weeds was based solely on speculation, which is insufficient to establish a question of fact. The trial court disagreed with defendant on all of these issues, and thus denied defendant’s motions for summary disposition. As noted, this Court granted defendant’s two applications for leave to appeal and consolidated the cases.
II. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
We first consider defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by holding that the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA did not apply to bar plaintiff’s action. We agree that defendant was entitled to summary disposition on this ground.
“We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.” O’Leary v O’Leary, 321 Mich.App. 647, 651; 909 N.W.2d 518 (2017). Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(4) if the trial court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petersen Fin LLC v Kentwood, 326 Mich.App. 433, 441; 928 N.W.2d 245 (2018). If the facts are not in dispute, the issue of whether a plaintiff’s injury arose out of and in the course of employment under MCL 418.301(1) is a question of law reviewed de novo. See Smith v Chrysler Group, LLC, 331 Mich.App. 492, 496; 954 N.W.2d 214 (2020).
It is undisputed that, at the time of Taylor’s drowning, he was attempting to secure a wayward paddleboat for defendant, his employer. MCL 418.301 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) An employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is subject to this act at the time of the injury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act. . . .
* * *
(3) An employee going to or from his or her work, while on the premises where the employee’s work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and after his or her working hours, is presumed to be in the course of his or her employment. Notwithstanding this presumption, an injury incurred in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational is not covered under this act.
MCL 418.131(1) further provides that “[t]he right to the recovery of benefits as provided in [the WDCA] shall be the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational disease. The only exception to this exclusive remedy is an intentional tort.” Under MCL 418.131(3), however, an injury is not covered by the WDCA if it was incurred “in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational.”
In Eversman v Concrete Cutting & Breaking, 463 Mich. 86, 95; 614 N.W.2d 862 (2000), our Supreme Court explained that in applying “the social or recreational test” of MCL 418.301(3), a court “must consider the major purpose of the activity in which the plaintiff was engaged at the time of the injury.” See also Buitendorp v Swiss Valley, Inc, 485 Mich. 879; 772 N.W.2d 50 (2009) (holding that “the major purpose of the plaintiff’s activity at the time of injury determines whether the social or recreational bar [of MCL 418.301(3)] applies”). In considering this question, the court is required to examine “the totality of the circumstances.” Eversman, 463 Mich. at 96. In the present case, the evidence demonstrated that Taylor had finished his work and went fishing while waiting for his parents to pick him up from work, but then decided to swim out to a wayward paddleboat to return it to the dock, which was one of his employment responsibilities. Taylor’s time card reflected that he began work on June 12, 2016, at 12:58 p.m. and clocked out at 8:04 p.m. Two witnesses confirmed that Taylor was fishing with them off the dock, and they last saw Taylor at approximately 8:49 p.m., when they left the dock to go fish by a nearby bridge. The Richfield Township Police Department was dispatched to the scene at 9:45 p.m. Taylor spoke to his mother on the telephone and told her that he planned to retrieve a paddleboat that had floated away from the dock.
Because Taylor was on defendant’s grounds within a reasonable time after his working hours, he is presumed to have been in the course of his employment under MCL 418.301(3). Additionally, under “the social and recreational test” set forth in Eversman, at the time of his drowning, Taylor was attempting to bring into shore a paddleboat that had drifted away. Because the evidence is clear that the “major purpose” of this activity was to perform a task for his employer, it is not subject to the social or recreational bar of MCL 418.301(3). Eversman, 463 Mich. at 95. Therefore, under MCL 418.131(1), the WDCA provides plaintiffs exclusive remedy against defendant for Taylor’s drowning death. Accordingly, the trial court erred by holding that the exclusive remedy provision does not bar plaintiffs negligence claim against defendant.
The present case is distinguishable from Nock v M & G Convoy, Inc (On Remand), 204 Mich.App. 116; 514 N.W.2d 200 (1994), which is cited in Eversman. In Nock, the plaintiff truck driver, after making deliveries for his employer to several cities in Ohio, arrived in Detroit and, while at a Detroit bar, was attacked by another patron with a pool cue and lost an eye. Id. at 118. This Court agreed that under the version of MCL 418.301(3) in effect at that time, “the major purpose” of the plaintiffs patronage at the bar was both social and recreational, and therefore, his injuries were not compensable under the WDCA. Id. at 121. In contrast, Taylor was on defendant’s grounds a short time after his work hours with defendant had ended and, although he was engaged in the social activity of fishing in Lake Linda while waiting for his parents to pick him up, he stopped that activity and was engaged in an effort to secure a wayward paddleboat for defendant at the time he drowned. Under these circumstances, the major purpose of Taylor’s activity at the time of drowning was not social or recreational, and his injuries are presumed to have arisen out of and during the course of his employment. Therefore, the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA is applicable.[2]
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA is not applicable. At the time of his drowning death, Taylor was on defendant’s grounds performing a task for defendant, his employer, within a reasonable time after his working hours. Thus, he is presumed to have been in the course of his employment and he was not engaged in an activity the major purpose of which was social or recreational. MCL 418.301(1), (3). Therefore, under MCL 418.131(1), the WDCA provides plaintiffs exclusive remedy against defendant for Taylor’s drowning death, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this case. We accordingly remand to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction
———
Notes:
[1] In Docket No. 355035, defendant appeals by leave granted the trial court’s September 16, 2020 order denying its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4). Estate of Allyn Taylor v Outdoor Adventures of Davison LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 17, 2020 (Docket No. 355035). In Docket No. 355036, defendant appeals by leave granted the trial court’s June 29, 2020 order denying its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Estate of Allyn Taylor v Outdoor Adventures of Davison LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 17, 2020 (Docket No. 355036). We consolidated the cases “to advance the efficient administration of the appellate process.” Estate of Allyn Taylor v Outdoor Adventures of Davison LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 20, 2021 (Docket Nos. 355035 & 335036).
[2] Having so concluded, we need not reach defendant’s alternate arguments for reversal.
NASTAR release was held by the Michigan Appellate court to be written narrowly and only protect the ski area when the guest was racing or training.
Posted: April 2, 2018 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Michigan, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Inherent Risk, Michigan, Michigan Ski Safety Act, NASTAR, Release, SASA, Ski Area Safety Act 1 CommentMichigan Ski Safety Act did not apply because it was too early in the proceedings to determine if a rope hanging below the chairlift was an inherent risk of skiing under the act.
Ritari, JR v Peter E. O’dovero, Inc., 2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 1711
State: Michigan, Court of Appeals of Michigan
Plaintiff: Ronald Ritari, JR. and Tama Ritari
Defendant: Peter E. O’dovero, Inc., doing business as Marquette Mountain
Plaintiff Claims: was negligent by having ropes in the area of the chair lift, failing to post warnings of the danger, failing to take measures to prevent plaintiff from catching his skis on the rope, failing to employ the emergency stop when plaintiff yelled for help, and failing to adequately supervise and control the chair lift
Defendant Defenses: Release and Michigan Ski Area Safety Act (SASA)
Holding: For the Plaintiff
Year: 2017
Summary
Your release must be written to cover the risks and activities you need to cover. If your release fails, as in this case, then you are faced with proving the activity that injured your guest was an inherent risk of skiing.
A rope hanging below a lift, low enough a ski could be caught in the lift is going to be an interesting argument at trial to prove it is an inherent risk of skiing.
Facts
The plaintiff was a season pass holder at the ski area and enjoyed racing NASTAR. One evening while riding the chair lift his skis were caught on a nylon rope hanging below the lift when a gust of wind pulled the chair down. The plaintiff was pulled out of the chair by the rope where he fell 12′ to the ground sustaining a fractured pelvis and fracture ribs.
The plaintiff filed suit. The Defendant ski area filed a motion for summary judgment based on the NASTAR release and the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act. The plaintiff seems to have signed two releases, one when he purchased a season pass, however, only the NASTAR release was argued at trial.
The trial court dismissed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment finding the release was ambiguous, and the rope hanging below the chairlift was not an inherent risk of skiing. The defendant appealed the trial court’s decision.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The court first looked at the release. The trial court had found the release was ambiguous. “A contract is ambiguous only if its language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.”
The scope of a release is governed by the intent of the parties as it is expressed in the release. If the text in the release is unambiguous, the parties’ intentions must be ascertained from the plain, ordinary meaning of the language of the release. A contract is ambiguous only if its language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. The fact that the parties dispute the meaning of a release does not, in itself, establish an ambiguity.
To determine if a contract is valid the contract “…must be read as a whole, construed so as to give effect to every word or phrase as far as practicable…” An ambiguous contract is also referred to as a contract “…reasonable susceptible to more than one interpretation.”
The appellate court found the release was not ambiguous.
We conclude that, when read as a whole and interpreted in conjunction with the NASTAR registration form on its reverse side, the language of the Participant release is unambiguous and in-tended to relieve defendant of “all liability” for injuries suffered during training for or participating in a racing competition.
The plaintiff also argued that the release only applied when the plaintiff was racing or training for NASTAR. Here the court found for the plaintiff. On this issue, the appellate court agreed with the trial court and held that the release could be interpreted to only be for racing or training for NASTAR events.
A rope hanging below the chairlift was not a listed risk in the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act. Therefore, the court needed to determine if the ski area safety act applied to this risk.
There is no dispute that the nylon rope that entangled plaintiff is a hazard not listed in MCL 408.342(2). Thus, the question is whether the placement of a nylon rope under a chair lift is inherent to skiing and, if so, whether placement of the rope in this case was obvious and necessary. For defendant to be entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), these material facts must be undisputed and defendant must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The court held the jury had to determine if the risk was obvious and necessary and inherent to skiing.
The appellate court sent the case back to the trial court for additional discovery by the parties and trial.
So Now What?
Any time you have an incident on the lift outside of the loading and unloading area it is going to create a problem for the courts and a question of fact. In several states, like Colorado, the operator of a lift owes the highest degree of care to the lift riders. In Colorado, this case would be based on how much the check would be, not if there was going to be a check.
Furthermore, a rope hanging below a lift that a skier could catch a ski or board with is also suspect. Whether the riders were bouncing on the lift or a gust of wind did force the chair down, that is a risk that needed to be looked at from all angles. Skiers running into people and legs extending from the chair and people on the chair catching their fee in it is a risk of roping off an area under a lift.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Ritari, JR v Peter E. O’dovero, Inc., 2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 1711
Posted: April 1, 2018 Filed under: Legal Case, Michigan, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Chair Lift, Inherent Risk, Michigan, skiing Leave a commentRitari, JR v Peter E. O’dovero, Inc., 2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 1711
Ronald Ritari, JR. and Tama Ritari, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v Peter E. O’dovero, Inc., doing business as Marquette Mountain, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 335870
COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN
2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 1711
October 24, 2017, Decided
NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS RULES, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE NOT PRECEDENTIALLY BINDING UNDER THE RULES OF STARE DECISIS.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Motion granted by Ritari v. Peter E. O’Dovero, 2018 Mich. LEXIS 90 (Mich., Jan. 12, 2018)
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] Marquette Circuit Court. LC No. 16-054384-NO.
CORE TERMS: skiing, nastar, rope, training, ski, chair lift, racing, placement, sport, registration form, hazard, recreational, ski area, participating, skier, lift, competitive, competitor, hazardous, alpine, matter of law, clearance, snowboarding, season, risks associated, reverse side, unambiguous, susceptible, entangled, ambiguous
JUDGES: Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and BECKERING and RIORDAN, JJ.
OPINION
Per Curiam.
In this interlocutory appeal,1 defendant, Peter E. O’Dovero, Inc, d/b/a Marquette Mountain, challenges the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (release, immunity granted by law) and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact, movant entitled to judgment as a matter of law). The case arises out of an incident at Marquette Mountain ski resort that occurred when plaintiff, Ronald Ritari, Jr., was riding up the ski hill on a chair lift and became entangled in a rope that had been installed underneath the lift, which pulled him off the lift and caused him to sustain serious injuries in the ensuing fall.2 Because material questions of fact remain, we agree with the trial court that summary disposition is inappropriate at this time.
1 Ronald Ritari Jr v Peter E O’Dovero, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 20, 2017 (Docket No. 335870).
2 Plaintiff Tama Ritari’s claim is derivative of her husband’s; therefore, “plaintiff” refers to Ronald Ritari, Jr.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of January 29, 2015, plaintiff went to Marquette Mountain to ski. He was a season pass holder there and enjoyed NASTAR3 racing. According to plaintiff’s complaint and affidavit, at around 6:45 p.m. he and his son boarded [*2] a chair lift to reach the top of the hill for their first run of the evening. They planned to take a couple of pleasure runs down the hill before their Thursday night ski league began. When his chair was approximately 20 yards from the loading zone, a gust of wind pulled the chair down and the tips of plaintiff’s skis became entangled in a nylon rope attached to the ground by two poles directly below the chair lift. Plaintiff was able to free the tip of his left ski from the rope, but he was unable to free the tip of his right ski, and he felt his leg being pulled backward as his chair continued to move up the hill. Plaintiff grabbed the middle pole of the chair to keep from falling and screamed as loudly as he could for the chair lift operator to stop the lift. But the chair lift did not stop, and plaintiff was pulled out of his chair by the rope. He fell approximately 12 feet to the ground and sustained a fractured pelvis and fractured ribs.
3 According to its website, NASTAR is the “largest public grassroots ski racing program in the world” and “gives recreational racers an opportunity to compete and compare their scores to friends and family regardless of when and where they race using the NASTAR handicap system.” NASTAR competitions typically occur on grand slalom and slalom courses laid out by the host ski resorts in accordance with NASTAR’s instructions. http://www.nastar.com (accessed 9/15/17).
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging that the ski area was negligent by having ropes in the area of the chair lift, failing to post warnings of the danger, failing to take measures to prevent plaintiff from catching his skis on the [*3] rope, failing to employ the emergency stop when plaintiff yelled for help, and failing to adequately supervise and control the chair lift. Before any discovery began by way of interrogatories, depositions, or otherwise, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), contending that plaintiff had signed releases broad enough to bar any claim for injuries arising out of the incident. Defendant relied on three forms signed by plaintiff.
Specifically, On December 13, 2014, in conjunction with purchasing an annual ski pass at Marquette Mountain for the 2014-2015 season, plaintiff signed a release wherein he agreed to assume “the risk of any injury to person or property resulting from any of the inherent dangers and risks of skiing/snowboarding . . . .” On December 16, 2014, he filled out a document in order to participate in NASTAR races. The document, a single sheet of paper, contains two forms, one on the front and one on the back. Hand-printed vertically in capital letters along the right side of both forms are the instructions, “FILL OUT BOTH SIDES.”
On the front side of the NASTAR document is a registration form. The form has headings entitled “Registration Form,” “Racer Information,” [*4] “Team Information,” and “Waiver and Release of Liability.” According to the release language on this form, plaintiff, “in exchange for being permitted to participate in NASTAR events (the “Event”),” assumes all risks associated with his involvement in the event and the “risk of injury caused by the condition of any property, facilities, or equipment used during the Event, whether foreseeable or unforeseeable.”
On the reverse side of the NASTAR document is a release entitled “Marquette Mountain Ski Area, and Competition Participant” (henceforth, the “Participant release”). According to the relevant terms of this release, “Participant, the undersigned, being at least 18 years old . . . agrees and understands that alpine skiing and snowboarding in its various forms (hereinafter the “Activity”) is HAZARDOUS4 and may involve the risk of physical injury or death.” The Participant also agrees that “training or racing competitively is more HAZARDOUS than recreational skiing,” that he or she is “a competitor at all times, whether practicing for competition or in competition.” According to the release, the Participant assumes all risks associated with the Activity, including but not limited to [*5] the risk of all course conditions, course construction or layout and obstacles, risks associated with riding the lifts, and risks associated with ski lift operations and acts or omissions of employees. The Participant agrees to release defendant from “all liabilities” arising from engagement in “the Activity,” including any injuries caused by the actual negligence of defendant’s employees. In its motion for summary disposition, defendant contended that, by signing this release, plaintiff assumed “all” risks, argued that “all” left no room for exceptions, and stressed that the terms of this release barred plaintiff’s claim for negligence as a matter of law.
4 A fold or wrinkle in the copy of the release that is in the record obscures this word. However, defendant quotes the relevant section of the release in its motion for summary disposition as “I further agree and understand that training or racing competitively is more HAZARDOUS than recreational skiing.”
In support of its motion, defendant also argued that MCL 408.342(2), the assumption of risk provision in the Ski Area Safety Act of 1962 (SASA), MCL 408.321 et seq., operated to bar plaintiff’s claim because risks associated with fencing and falling from a chair lift inhere in the sport of skiing.
Plaintiff countered that neither the season-pass release nor the assumption of risk provision in SASA barred his claim because the inappropriate placement of a rope directly under the chair lift was not an inherent risk of skiing. Additionally, plaintiff argued that the [*6] rope was not necessary because its placement violated the standards governing minimum clearance between a chair lift and an obstacle below, and it was not obvious because he neither saw it nor expected it to be placed where it was. He further argued that neither side of the executed NASTAR document barred his claim because he was not engaged in a NASTAR event, nor was he training for such an event when he was injured. Finally, plaintiff contended that there remained genuine issues of material fact regarding whether defendant’s chair lift personnel were inattentive and failed to timely shut off the chair lift when the rope entangled him, and that this was not a risk assumed pursuant to the assumption of risk provision of SASA.
At the motion hearing, defendant argued that the Participant release on the back side of the NASTAR document applied not just to competitions and training for competitions, but to “skiing in all its forms.” Accordingly, the Participant release controlled resolution of the matter and insulated defendant from any alleged negligent placement of the nylon rope. At the same time, defendant insisted that it had not been negligent in placement of the rope at issue because [*7] the rope’s location complied with required clearance standards and was necessary to the safety of skiers.5 Plaintiff reiterated his argument that the forms on both sides of the NASTAR document pertained to participation in competition-related skiing, and that the rope at issue was neither necessary nor obvious with respect to any assumption of the risk plaintiff assumed when signing up for his season pass or through SASA.
5 Defendant acknowledged plaintiff’s argum
Accreditation is marketing. In fact, it may be why you are being sued.
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Accreditation is marketing. In fact, it may be why you are being sued.
Marketing is not a way to manage risks or stop lawsuits. Marketing Makes Promises that Risk Management Must Pay For.ent about the front side of the NASTAR document focusing on event racing and the fact that the release language there and in the season pass document coincides with the language of SASA, which is commonly referred to as the assumption of the risk clause. As such, while arguing that the rope at issue was a necessary and obvious danger, defendant focused on the back side of the NASTAR document and its “sweeping” release of defendant’s own negligence for the purpose of his motion for summary disposition at such an early stage in the litigation.
Ruling from the bench, the trial court noted that construing the viability of plaintiff’s claim under SASA turned on necessary factual findings yet to be made, rendering summary disposition inappropriate at that point in the proceedings. With regard to the releases, the trial court observed that the parties’ arguments were geared toward the form on the reverse side of the NASTAR document. The trial court easily dispensed with the front page as being race-related. As for the back side, the Participant release, the trial court concluded that there were questions about the extent to which the release might apply to relieve defendant of liability outside the context of racing or training.
In addition to its location on the back of the NASTAR form, the trial court pointed [*8] to three phrases in the Participant release that seem to limit the scope of that release to training for or participating in a competition. The first is the phrase in which the participant agrees with the premise “that Participant is a competitor at all times, whether practicing for competition or in competition.” The second is the provision, “Participant is always provided an opportunity to and will conduct a reasonable visual inspection of the training or racecourse.” The third phrase is, “I further agree and understand that training or racing competitively is more [hazardous] . . . than recreational skiing.” The trial court described the language of the release as “a little ambiguous” and concluded that in light of the questions about the extent to which the release might apply to relieve defendant of all liability at any time, even when the person who signed it is simply recreationally skiing, summary disposition was premature.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary disposition because the unambiguous language of the December 16, 2014 Participant release releases it from all liability regardless of whether plaintiff was injured [*9] while practicing for a competition, in competition, or simply skiing recreationally. It also claims that it is entitled to summary disposition under the assumption of the risk statute in SASA, MCL 408.343(2). We conclude that defendant is racing too quickly to the finish line in this case, to which it may or may not be entitled a victory.
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition, Casey v Auto Owners Ins Co, 273 Mich App 388, 393; 729 NW2d 277 (2006), as well as issues involving contractual and statutory interpretation, Rodgers v JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, 315 Mich App 301, 307; 890 NW2d 381 (2016).
A. RELEASE
Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate where the terms of a release bar a claim. As this Court has explained,
The scope of a release is governed by the intent of the parties as it is expressed in the release. If the text in the release is unambiguous, the parties’ intentions must be ascertained from the plain, ordinary meaning of the language of the release. A contract is ambiguous only if its language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. The fact that the parties dispute the meaning of a release does not, in itself, establish an ambiguity. [Cole v Ladbroke Racing Michigan, Inc, 241 Mich App 1, 13-14; 614 NW2d 169 (2000).]
In addition, a contract must be read as a whole, Dobbelaere v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 275 Mich App 527, 529; 740 NW2d 503 (2007), and “construed so as to give effect to every word or phrase as far as practicable,” Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 467; 663 NW2d 447 (2003). See [*10] also Restatement Contracts, 2d, § 202, p 86 (“a writing is interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the same transaction are interpreted together.”).6 The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law. Mich Nat’l Bank, 228 Mich App 710, 714; 580 NW2d 8 (1998).
6 See also Restatement Contracts, 1st, § 235 (“A writing is interpreted as a whole and all writings forming part of the same transaction are interpreted together.”).
After our review of the language of the Participant release, we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the language of the release is ambiguous, or in other words, “reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.” Xu v Gay, 257 Mich App 263, 272 668 NW2d 166 (2003) (“A contract is ambiguous only if its language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.”). However, we agree with plaintiff, not defendant, as to its meaning and scope. Several factors indicate that the NASTAR registration and Participant release were part of the same transaction–which is in fact undisputed–and therefore, should be read and interpreted together: the “Participant” release is on the reverse side of the NASTAR registration form, both forms bear the handwritten instruction to “fill out both sides,” and plaintiff executed both releases on the same date specifically in order to participate in NASTAR races. We conclude that, when read as a whole and interpreted in conjunction with the NASTAR registration form on its reverse side, [*11] the language of the Participant release is unambiguous and intended to relieve defendant of “all liability” for injuries suffered during training for or participating in a racing competition.
As noted above, the trial court identified three examples where the language of the release focuses specifically on competitive skiing. After identifying the “Activity” in which the Participant is participating as “alpine skiing and snowboarding in its various forms” and noting that it may involve physical injury or death, the release requires the participant to “agree and understand that training and racing competitively is more [hazardous] than recreational skiing” (emphasis added). In addition, the release requires the participant to “agree with the Premise that Participant is a competitor at all times, whether practicing for competition or in competition” (emphasis added). Note that it does not also say when simply pleasure skiing or taking the children out for lessons on the bunny hill. Further, the Participant is required to “agree that Participant is always provided an opportunity to and will conduct a reasonable visual inspection of the training or racecourse” (emphasis added). This focuses [*12] on race-related activities. Even without consideration of the NASTAR release, the fact that the Participant release requires the participant to agree expressly to statements emphasizing the dangers of training for and participating in competitive racing specifically renders the release susceptible to the interpretation that its focus is on insulating defendant from liability for injuries sustained by participants when training for or competing in races.
Defendant contends that the Participant release’s acknowledgement that competitive racing is more hazardous than recreational skiing does not restrict the release’s scope to competitive skiing. However, the release does more than merely acknowledge the dangers of competitive skiing; it requires the Participant to expressly agree that competitive skiing is more hazardous than recreational skiing. Moreover, under the defendant’s alleged interpretation, the Participant’s acknowledgement that he or she is a competitor at all times renders it impossible for the person who signs the release as a “Participant” to ever ski recreationally. According to the logic of defendant’s argument, once a person fills out the NASTAR registration form and [*13] accompanying Participant release, he or she is a “competitor” indefinitely, regardless of whether he or she is actually competing or training for a competition.7
7 Under defendant’s proposed at-all-times interpretation, there is no time frame for how long someone is considered to be a Participant if that word is not tied to actual racing or training. Are they deemed to be a Participant for the rest of the season? Indefinitely? What if they only participated in one race? In doing so, have they given up all rights they might otherwise have had as a recreational skier? And where does it say that in the release? Defendant’s proposed interpretation creates an ambiguity that it cannot resolve within the confines of the agreement.
Other portions of the Participant release also support the conclusion that the unambiguous language limits its scope to liability for injuries suffered during or while training for a ski or snowboard competition. The heading contains what one might reasonably construe as an identification of the parties to the release, “Marquette Mountain Ski Area, and Competition Participant.” The comma inserted between “Marquette Mountain Ski Area” and “Competition Participant” suggests that the release involves Marquette Mountain Ski Area on one side, and a “competition participant” on the other. Defendant urges this Court to ignore the “competition participant” designation, arguing that it is not part of the four corners of the agreement and is neither used nor defined in the release. However, interpreting the NASTAR release and the Participant release together makes clear that “competition participant” refers to the person participating in the NASTAR competition that defendant is hosting.8 Further, if “competition” refers only to the NASTAR [*14] event, but “participant” can have more than one referent,9 it seems reasonable that the release would focus on defining “participant” to ensure inclusion of all the word’s possible meanings. Additionally, that the participant is “a competitor at all times” harkens back to “competition participant” in the heading, again allowing one to reasonably interpret the release to pertain only to the release of liability arising from injuries associated with training for or racing in a competition.
8 The mere fact that the release uses the word “Participant” conjures up images of participation in something; it would not lead the reader to conclude that one is a Participant whenever they are on the slopes, even when they are not actually participating in anything or training for anything.
9 E.g., “participant” includes a person at least 18-years old, a participating minor, and the parents or legal guardian of as well as his or her parent or legal guardian.
Moreover, the Participant warrants in the Participant release that he or she is in good health and has left no special instructions “that have not been listed on the registration form.” Although the Participant release makes no further mention of a registration form, the NASTAR document on the reverse side is both a registration form and a release, and it contains a ‘Physically Challenged” heading where competitors may identify their physical or intellectual challenges.
Finally, defendant asserts that “alpine skiing and snowboarding” is not limited to competitive racing. This is true; “alpine skiing” may refer to downhill skiing for sport or recreation. However, interpreting the Participant release with [*15] the NASTAR release renders the phrase “alpine skiing and snowboarding in its various forms” susceptible to the interpretation that it refers specifically to the three downhill disciplines from which participants may choose to compete at a NASTAR event: alpine skiing, snowboarding, and telemarker (which combines elements of Alpine and Nordic skiing).
Given the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition associated with the Participant release, but it erred to the extent it deemed the release language ambiguous. Assuming factual development establishes that plaintiff was not engaged in training for or competing in racing activities at the time of his injury, as plaintiff contends it will, the Participant release does not apply. Moreover, for the reasons set forth below, determination of whether the release language in plaintiff’s season pass bars his claim–which entails an assumption of the risks inherent in skiing analysis–will depend on further factual development gleaned from discovery, which has not yet begun.
B. MCL 408.342(2)
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). Summary disposition [*16] under (C)(10) is proper if the documentary evidence filed by the parties and viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion fails to show a genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
The Legislature enacted SASA in 1962, and amended it in 1981. Kent v Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc, 240 Mich App 731, 737; 613 NW2d 383 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). One of the purposes of the Legislature’s amendment was “to make the skier, rather than the ski area operator, bear the burden of damages from injuries.” Id. Thus, among the provisions in the 1981 amendment was one for the acceptance of risk by skiers, MCL 408.342(2), which provides as follows:
(2) Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snowmaking or snow-grooming equipment.
Where, as here, an injury results [*17] from a hazard not listed in the statute, Michigan’s Supreme Court has established a test to determine whether a defendant ski resort is nevertheless immune on grounds that the hazard is of the same type as those listed in the statute. Anderson v Pine Knob Ski Resort, 469 Mich 20, 24-25; 664 NW2d 756 (2003).
At issue in Anderson was whether the assumption of risk provision barred the plaintiff’s suit for injuries suffered when he collided with a timing shack during a skiing race. The Supreme Court determined that the different types of hazards listed in MCL 408.342(2) had in common “that they all inhere in the sport of skiing and, as long as they are obvious and necessary to the sport, there is immunity from suit.” Id. at 25. Thus, once a hazard is determined to be inherent to the sport of skiing, “only if [it is] unnecessary or not obvious is the ski operator liable.” Id. at 26. Applying the facts of Anderson to its legal conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned:
There is no disputed issue of fact in this matter that in ski racing, timing, as it determines who is the winner, is necessary. Moreover, there is no dispute that for the timing equipment to function, it is necessary that it be protected from the elements. This protection was afforded by the shack that all also agree was obvious [*18] in its placement at the end of the run. We have then a hazard of the same sort as the ski towers and snow-making and grooming machines to which the statute refers us. As with the towers and equipment, this hazard inheres in the sport of skiing. The placement of the timing shack is thus a danger that skiers such as Anderson are held to have accepted as a matter of law. [Id. at 25-26.]
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the ski operator was immune from suit because the timing shack was a hazard inherent to skiing, and it was necessary and obvious.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that, at this early stage of the proceedings, the record facts are simply insufficient to determine whether SASA applies to bar plaintiff’s claim. There is no dispute that the nylon rope that entangled plaintiff is a hazard not listed in MCL 408.342(2). Thus, the question is whether the placement of a nylon rope under a chair lift is inherent to skiing and, if so, whether placement of the rope in this case was obvious and necessary. For defendant to be entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), these material facts must be undisputed and defendant must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Quinto, 451 Mich at 362.
However, [*19] the parties dispute the material facts. And the record evidence–given that discovery has not yet begun–is not sufficient to resolve their disputes. For example, although both parties agree that the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard B77.1-2006 governs the construction, installation, and operation of a ski lift, they dispute whether defendant’s positioning of the rope violated the clearance requirements set forth in ANSI, and whether such violation renders defendant liable for injuries attributable to the violation. In fact, there is no record evidence as to what the rope was even for, making impossible at this point a determination of whether it was a necessary part of skiing. Plaintiff asserts that defendant’s placement of the rope “in an area directly below the chair lift” violated the ANSI standards, and that the rope was neither obvious nor necessary. Defendant contends that plaintiff’s allegation that his fall to the ground was approximately 12 feet demonstrates that defendant complied with the requirement to have a clearance of at least 8 feet between the lowest point of the carrier and the terrain. In addition, defendant characterizes the rope as a “fence,” [*20] and asserts, “fencing and its risks are intrinsic in the sport of skiing,” and further asserts that the rope/fence was absolutely needed to prevent skiers from traveling under the chair lift and being injured.” However, because there is nothing in the record evidence indicating the rope’s purpose or its location relative to the chair lift and the terrain, it is impossible to determine where the rope was placed and whether it was necessary. Defendant contends that plaintiff’s description of his fall in his affidavit demonstrates that there was at least an 8-foot clearance between the carrier, but defendant has not eliminated the possibility that the rope was too close to the carrier when it caught plaintiff’s skis, and it begs the question of why there was a rope if the minimum clearance did not require one. In short, defendant has not met its burden to submit affirmative evidence indicating that it was entitled to summary disposition on grounds that the dangers posed by the nylon rope at issue were inherent to skiing, and that they were necessary and obvious.10
Quinto, 451 Mich at 362.
10 Because we conclude that defendant’s motion for summary disposition was properly denied at this stage of the case, we need not address plaintiff’s additional argument that SASA does not bar his claim arising from the chair lift operator’s alleged failure to stop the chair lift after plaintiff became entangled in the rope.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
Michigan Equine helped the plaintiff more than the stable and helped prove there may be gross negligence on the part of the defendant
Posted: January 11, 2016 Filed under: Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, Michigan, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: Equine, Equine Liability Act, Horse, Michigan, Michigan Equine Liability Act, Saddle, stable, Trail Ride Leave a commentPlaintiff argues gross negligence claim which appellate court agreed raise enough triable issues of fact to send the case back to the trial court.
Hawkins, v Ranch Rudolph, Inc., 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 2366
State: Michigan, COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN
Plaintiff: Bret D. Hawkins and Erin Hawkins
Defendant: v Ranch Rudolph, Inc. and Circle H Stables, Inc.
Plaintiff Claims: Gross Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Actions not negligent
Holding: For Plaintiff
Year: 2005
The plaintiffs were on their honeymoon and signed up for a trail ride. They chose the “Wrangler Ride” offered by the defendant because the groom had never been on a horse before. The Bride had only been on a horse once when she was eleven. The Wrangler Ride was a four mile single file ride on trails through the woods.
The trail guide or wrangler chose a horse for the groom that was very gentle, normally used for kids. The wrangler gave everyone basic instructions how to stay on the horse and use the reins. The wrangler saddled the horses and double checked the saddles before and after the guests mounted their horses.
The groom claimed after mounting the horse he complained that his saddle was not securely fastened. The wrangler did not recall the groom making this request. She also did not notice the saddle was loose while the groom was mounting the horse.
During the ride the wrangler asked if they wanted to trot their horses and asked if anyone was opposed to the idea. She also said if they were having trouble to yell.
At this point the plaintiff’s version of the facts are so fare outside of the scope of a normal operation or how horses would respond it is clear the facts were altered or made up to support their claims.
According to plaintiffs, Ridge and her horse then “bolted” into a fast, or full-out run, and the other horses followed her lead. Both plaintiffs stated that when their horses began running they were too surprised or shocked to yell and were just trying to hang on. According to Bret, his saddle slid to the right and he grabbed the saddlehorn and the back of the saddle as instructed but was still falling off his horse. He stated that his arm hit a tree so hard that he suffered a humeral fracture. He then fell from the horse.
However the wrangler and other people on the ride described the events quite differently.
According to Ridge, a trot is a fast walk, “slower than a canter, and much slower than a run or gallop.” Other experienced riders in the group characterized a trot in similar language.
One of the other participants attested that he checked the saddle after the fall and it was not loose.
On top of that the facts are just too absurd to be believable. No trail ride, no matter how good the riders are going to take off on a gallop. It is dangerous for riders of all abilities and horses. Second, normally, the first thing someone in trouble or seeing a risk does is scream. Thirdly, if you are holding on to the saddlehorn with one hand and the back of the saddle with the other, how does your arm fly out and strike a tree?
The trial court could not find facts in the plaintiff’s version of the facts that would rise to the level required to prove negligence under Michigan law. The release voided all ordinary negligence claims so only the gross negligence claim was viable.
The case was dismissed and the plaintiff’s appealed.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The basic claim of the plaintiff is there were issues of fact in dispute giving rise to enough for a jury to decide.
The first issue the court addressed was the witness statements, but not directly. Rather the court looked at what a witness may say. Basically it is about anything as long as it is relevant to the case. Lay witnesses, witnesses that are not qualified as an expert witness, can provide opinions.
As an initial matter, plaintiffs’ testimony was admissible because it was based on their personal observations and perceptions. MRE 602. To the extent that plaintiffs’ testimony merely amounted to opinion, such testimony would nevertheless be admissible evidence. MRE 701. “MRE 701 allows opinion testimony by a lay witness as long as the opinion is rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or a fact in issue.” “Once a witness’s opportunity to observe is demonstrated, the opinion is admissible in the discretion of the trial court, and the weight to be accorded the testimony is for the jury to decide.” Moreover, laypersons are permitted to testify regarding speed. Therefore, that plaintiffs lacked experience with horses merely goes to the weight of their testimony not to its admissibility.
So no matter how farfetched or contrived the statements of a witness, if they cannot be proved as false, they are admitted into court.
The court then looked at gross negligence in Michigan. “…gross negligence should be defined as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.”
Since under Michigan and most other (if not all) state laws a release does not void a claim for gross negligence, the only claims left of the plaintiff were the gross negligence claims.
The Michigan Equine Liability act allows the use of a release by horse owners.
§ 691.1666. Notice; posting and maintenance of signs; contract; contents of notice.
(2) A written contract entered into by an equine professional for providing professional services, instruction, or rental of equipment, tack, or an equine to a participant, whether or not the contract involves an equine activity on or off the location or site of the equine professional’s business, shall contain in clearly readable print the warning notice set forth in subsection (3).
The court pointed out that the act did not provide protection for the “equine professional.” As such, the only claims available to the plaintiff were the claims for gross negligence.
The court then found that the plaintiff’s claims if viewed in a light most favorable to them could be found to be valid to prove a claim of gross negligence.
We conclude that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, reasonable minds could differ regarding whether her conduct of taking a totally inexperienced rider on a fast ride was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury resulted.
There is a dissenting opinion that found the trial court was correct in its analysis of the facts. However the majority opinion found that the issue at trial in this case was the decision to speed up the ride.
However, in our collective opinion, our point of departure from our esteemed colleague’s dissenting opinion is the trail guide’s decision to speed up the pace when plaintiff had never ridden a horse before. For a first time rider, yelling “Whoa Nellie” or in this instance, “Whoa Tye” hoping to slow the horse down or to obtain the trail guide’s attention for help could be difficult.
The court went on to explain its reasoning.
Ridge was in control of the horses’ speed, as the guide riding the lead horse. And Bret’s horse “bolted” not because it was scared, which would clearly be an inherent risk of an equine activity, but because it was following Ridge’s lead. It cannot be disputed that she made the conscious decision to “speed things up a little bit,” knowing that Bret lacked the requisite experience to control the animal on which he rode. It would seem that it was indisputably an important part of Ridge’s job to look after the safety of those placed in her care.
The court sent the case back to trial.
A reasonable person could conclude that Ridge’s conduct of taking plaintiffs on a fast ride given their known lack of experience unreasonably added to the risks of the already dangerous activity and was thus so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury resulted.
So Now What? (Motivational get them to do something post)
First the Michigan Equine Liability Statute only protects a horse owner from the actions of the horse. There was no protection for the actions of the wrangler or the stable. No matter how written all equine liability acts have been written in a similar way leaving wide open any lawsuit claiming the injury the plaintiff received was do the owner’s negligence.
As I have said in the past, Equine Liability Acts are 100% effective, since their enactment no horses have been sued. However the acts were so glaring deficient they have seemingly increased the number of lawsuits against horse owners.
This defendant wisely followed the requirements of the act and had guests sign a release.
The second issue is wild statements of the injured guests. Actually there are very little ways to counteract these statements except for one. If you can record either in writing, in the minds of witnesses or by a tape the statements of the possible plaintiffs. Keeping good notes on what they said might allow you to at least partially discredit later allegations, but only at trial.
Another real issue that came to light in this case is the other riders who were involved with their actions and opinions. One rider checked the saddle to see if it was tight and others opined they never went faster than a trot. Keeping the other witnesses and participants to an activity engaged and happy can be of infinite value to you later. Remember a Victim is not only the person who was hurt but anyone who saw the victim or was on the trip. These people may need care, maybe not first aid, but at least someone to help them deal with the issues they may be having.
Although those statements would have little value in pre-trial motions, their testimony at trial is the most valuable statements made on the stand. Jurors know that the other guests had a better view, a better understanding of what happened and no axe to grind or wallet to defend.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Michigan Equine Activity Liability Act
Posted: January 9, 2016 Filed under: Equine Activities (Horses, Donkeys, Mules) & Animals, Michigan | Tags: Equine, Equine Activities, Equine Liability Act, Equine Liability Statute, Horse, Horses, Michigan, stable Leave a commentMICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS SERVICE
Copyright © 2015 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
This document is current through 2015 Public Act 202 with the exception of Public Acts 160, 167, 170, 173-176, 178-179, 181, 182, 191, and 198.
Chapter 691 Judiciary
Act 351 of 1994 Equine Activity Liability Act
Go to the Michigan Code Archive Directory
MCLS § 691.1662 (2015)
§ 691.1663. Injury, death, or property damage; liability.
§ 691.1664. Liability; exception; waiver.
§ 691.1665. Liability not prevented or limited; conditions.
§ 691.1666. Notice; posting and maintenance of signs; contract; contents of notice.
§ 691.1667. Applicability of act.
§ 691.1661. Short title.
Sec. 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the “equine activity liability act”.
HISTORY: Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 1, eff March 30, 1995.
NOTES:
Prior codification:
MSA § 12.418(1)
Editor’s notes:
Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 7, eff March 30, 1995, provides:
“Sec. 7. This act applies only to a cause of action filed on or after the effective date of this act.”.
LexisNexis(R) Michigan analytical references:
Michigan Law and Practice, Animals §§ 61, 71
Michigan Law and Practice, Torts § 74
ALR notes:
Liability of owner or bailor of horse for injury by horse to hirer or bailee thereof, 6 ALR4th 358
Validity, construction, and effect of agreement exempting operator of amusement facility from liability for personal injury or death of patron, 54 ALR5th 513
Liability of owner of horse to person injured or killed when kicked, bitten, knocked down, and the like, 85 ALR2d 1161
Liability of youth camp, its agents or employees, or of scouting leader or organization, for injury to child participant in program, 88 ALR3d 1236
Research references:
4 Am Jur 2d, Animals §§ 96-100, 105, 106, 113-115, 122, 134, 136-141
1C Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms, Rev, Animals, §§ 3, 132-140
13 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 473, Knowledge of Animal’s Vicious Propensities
25 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 461, Failure to Use Due Care in Providing Horses for Hire
§ 691.1662. Definitions.
Sec. 2. As used in this act:
(a) “Engage in an equine activity” means riding, training, driving, breeding, being a passenger upon, or providing or assisting in veterinary treatment of an equine, whether mounted or unmounted. Engage in an equine activity includes visiting, touring, or utilizing an equine facility as part of an organized event or activity including the breeding of equines, or assisting a participant or show management. Engage in equine activity does not include spectating at an equine activity, unless the spectator places himself or herself in an unauthorized area and in immediate proximity to the equine activity.
(b) “Equine” means horse, pony, mule, donkey, or hinny.
(c) “Equine activity” means any of the following:
(i) An equine show, fair, competition, performance, or parade including, but not limited to, dressage, a hunter and jumper horse show, grand prix jumping, a 3-day event, combined training, a rodeo, riding, driving, pulling, cutting, polo, steeplechasing, English and western performance riding, endurance trail riding, gymkhana games, and hunting.
(ii) Equine training or teaching activities.
(iii) Boarding equines, including their normal daily care.
(iv) Breeding equines, including the normal daily care and activities associated with breeding equines.
(v) Riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine belonging to another, whether or not the owner receives monetary consideration or another thing of value for the use of the equine or is permitting a prospective purchaser of the equine or an agent to ride, inspect, or evaluate the equine.
(vi) A ride, trip, hunt, or other activity, however informal or impromptu, that is sponsored by an equine activity sponsor.
(vii) Placing or replacing a horseshoe on or hoof trimming of an equine.
(d) “Equine activity sponsor” means an individual, group, club, partnership, or corporation, whether or not operating for profit, that sponsors, organizes, or provides the facilities for an equine activity, including, but not limited to, a pony club; 4-H club; hunt club; riding club; school- or college-sponsored class, program, or activity; therapeutic riding program; stable or farm owner; and operator, instructor, or promoter of an equine facility including, but not limited to, a stable, clubhouse, ponyride string, fair, or arena at which the equine activity is held.
(e) “Equine professional” means a person engaged in any of the following for compensation:
(i) Instructing a participant in an equine activity.
(ii) Renting an equine, equipment, or tack to a participant.
(iii) Providing daily care of horses boarded at an equine facility.
(iv) Training an equine.
(v) Breeding of equines for resale or stock replenishment.
(f) “Inherent risk of an equine activity” means a danger or condition that is an integral part of an equine activity, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
(i) An equine’s propensity to behave in ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to a person on or around it.
(ii) The unpredictability of an equine’s reaction to things such as sounds, sudden movement, and people, other animals, or unfamiliar objects.
(iii) A hazard such as a surface or subsurface condition.
(iv) Colliding with another equine or object.
(g) “Participant” means an individual, whether amateur or professional, engaged in an equine activity, whether or not a fee is paid to participate.
HISTORY: Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 2, eff March 30, 1995.
NOTES:
Prior codification:
MSA § 12.418(2)
Editor’s notes:
Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 7, eff March 30, 1995, provides:
“Sec. 7. This act applies only to a cause of action filed on or after the effective date of this act.”.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Plaintiff, a visitor to a stable, was a “participant” under the Equine Activity Liability Act when she briefly assisted in the care of a horse owned by a friend. Therefore her claim for damages arising from being bitten by a horse was properly dismissed on summary. Amburgey v. Sauder, 238 Mich. App. 228, 605 N.W.2d 84, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 282 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
Horse owner could invoke MCL § 691.1663 of the Michigan Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA), MCL §§ 691.1661 et seq., although she was not an equine professional or an equine activity sponsor because she fit within the definition of “another person” under § 691.1663 of the EALA. Also, she properly was characterized as an equine participant as that term was defined in MCL § 691.1662. Gardner v. Simon, 445 F. Supp. 2d 786, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57228 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
Rider’s injuries while riding a horse resulted from “an inherent risk of an equine activity” as that phrase was defined under MCL § 691.1662(f) of the Michigan Equine Activity Liability Act, MCL §§ 691.1661 et seq., based on the rider’s testimony that, upon being mounted, the horse got a little antsy and started to raise up on the front end a little bit at which time the rider, who was experienced, began turning the horse in tight circles to settle him down. After turning two circles, the horse bumped his head on a tree; reared up and caught one of his front hoofs in a tree; went over backwards and fell on the rider, injuring the rider. Gardner v. Simon, 445 F. Supp. 2d 786, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57228 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
LexisNexis(R) Michigan analytical references:
Michigan Law and Practice, Animals § 73
ALR notes:
Liability of owner or bailor of horse for injury by horse to hirer or bailee thereof, 6 ALR4th 358
Validity, construction, and effect of agreement exempting operator of amusement facility from liability for personal injury or death of patron, 54 ALR5th 513
Liability of owner of horse to person injured or killed when kicked, bitten, knocked down, and the like, 85 ALR2d 1161
Liability of youth camp, its agents or employees, or of scouting leader or organization, for injury to child participant in program, 88 ALR3d 1236
Michigan Digest references:
Animals § 15
Research references:
1C Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms, Rev, Animals, § 1
25 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 461, Failure to Use Due Care in Providing Horses for Hire
§ 691.1663. Injury, death, or property damage; liability.
Sec. 3. Except as otherwise provided in section 5, an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or another person is not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant or property damage resulting from an inherent risk of an equine activity. Except as otherwise provided in section 5, a participant or participant’s representative shall not make a claim for, or recover, civil damages from an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or another person for injury to or the death of the participant or property damage resulting from an inherent risk of an equine activity.
HISTORY: Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 3, eff March 30, 1995.
NOTES:
Prior codification:
MSA § 12.418(3)
Editor’s notes:
Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 7, eff March 30, 1995, provides:
“Sec. 7. This act applies only to a cause of action filed on or after the effective date of this act.”.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Judgment granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of a horse owner in a neighbor’s personal injury action was affirmed because the neighbor failed to produce evidence in support of her claims under MCL 691.1665(b) and (d) as her injury resulted from an inherent risk of an equine activity and she did not prove otherwise. The claim was barred under MCL 691.1663. Beattie v. Mickalich, 284 Mich. App. 564, 773 N.W.2d 748, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 1445 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 486 Mich. 1060, 784 N.W.2d 38, 2010 Mich. LEXIS 1452 (Mich. 2010).
Horse owner could invoke MCL § 691.1663 of the Michigan Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA), MCL §§ 691.1661 et seq., although she was not an equine professional or an equine activity sponsor because she fit within the definition of “another person” under § 3 of the EALA. Also, she properly was characterized as an equine participant as that term was defined in MCL § 691.1662. Gardner v. Simon, 445 F. Supp. 2d 786, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57228 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
Bar to liability set forth in MCL § 691.1663 of the Michigan Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA), MCL §§ 691.1661 et seq., was subject to MCL § 691.1665, which provided that § 691.1663 of the EALA did not prevent liability for a negligent act or omission that proximately caused an injury. Accordingly, the EALA did not prevent liability on a rider’s claim that a horse owner was negligent in failing to warn the rider about the horse’s dangerous and viscous propensities; and whether the owner acted reasonably by suggesting to the rider that he ride the horse and not warning the rider that the horse was in need of further training, in light of the rider’s extensive experience with horses, was clearly a question of fact for a jury. Gardner v. Simon, 445 F. Supp. 2d 786, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57228 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
Statutory references:
Section 5, above referred to, is § 691.1665.
LexisNexis(R) Michigan analytical references:
Michigan Law and Practice, Animals §§ 71, 73
Michigan Law and Practice, Torts § 74
ALR notes:
Liability of owner or bailor of horse for injury by horse to hirer or bailee thereof, 6 ALR4th 358
Validity, construction, and effect of agreement exempting operator of amusement facility from liability for personal injury or death of patron, 54 ALR5th 513
Liability of owner of horse to person injured or killed when kicked, bitten, knocked down, and the like, 85 ALR2d 1161
Liability of youth camp, its agents or employees, or of scouting leader or organization, for injury to child participant in program, 88 ALR3d 1236
Michigan Digest references:
Animals § 15
Research references:
4 Am Jur 2d, Animals §§ 96-100, 105, 106, 113-115, 122, 134, 136-141
1C Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms, Rev, Animals, §§ 3, 132-140
13 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 473, Knowledge of Animal’s Vicious Propensities
25 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 461, Failure to Use Due Care in Providing Horses for Hire
§ 691.1664. Liability; exception; waiver.
Sec. 4. (1) This act does not apply to a horse race meeting that is regulated by the racing law of 1980, Act No. 327 of the Public Acts of 1980, being sections 431.61 to 431.88 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
(2) Two persons may agree in writing to a waiver of liability beyond the provisions of this act and such waiver shall be valid and binding by its terms.
HISTORY: Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 4, eff March 30, 1995.
NOTES:
Prior codification:
MSA § 12.418(4)
Editor’s notes:
Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 7, eff March 30, 1995, provides:
“Sec. 7. This act applies only to a cause of action filed on or after the effective date of this act.”.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
The Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA) provides immunity to commercial riding stables from claims for damages resulting from the inherent risks of horseback riding and being around horses, but the immunity provision does not apply to horse race meetings; a horse race meeting within the meaning of the EALA includes the activity of exercising a race horse at a track in preparation for a race; while the EALA did not confer immunity on a race track in a suit brought by a exercise rider who was injured when he was thrown from a horse, the release signed by the plaintiff was broad enough to protect the defendant from liability. Cole v. Ladbroke Racing Mich., Inc., 241 Mich. App. 1, 614 N.W.2d 169, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 110 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), app. denied, 463 Mich. 972, 623 N.W.2d 595, 2001 Mich. LEXIS 223 (Mich. 2001).
LexisNexis(R) Michigan analytical references:
Michigan Law and Practice, Animals § 71
Michigan Law and Practice, Torts § 74
ALR notes:
Liability of owner or bailor of horse for injury by horse to hirer or bailee thereof, 6 ALR4th 358
Validity, construction, and effect of agreement exempting operator of amusement facility from liability for personal injury or death of patron, 54 ALR5th 513
Liability of owner of horse to person injured or killed when kicked, bitten, knocked down, and the like, 85 ALR2d 1161
Liability of youth camp, its agents or employees, or of scouting leader or organization, for injury to child participant in program, 88 ALR3d 1236
Michigan Digest references:
Animals § 13
Research references:
4 Am Jur 2d, Animals §§ 96-100, 105, 106, 113-115, 122, 134, 136-141
25 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 461, Failure to Use Due Care in Providing Horses for Hire
Legal periodicals:
Fayz, Annual Survey of Michigan Law, June 1, 1999-May 31, 2000: Torts, 47 Wayne L Rev 719 (2001)
§ 691.1664. Liability; exception; waiver.
Sec. 4. (1) This act does not apply to a horse race meeting that is regulated by the racing law of 1980, Act No. 327 of the Public Acts of 1980, being sections 431.61 to 431.88 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
(2) Two persons may agree in writing to a waiver of liability beyond the provisions of this act and such waiver shall be valid and binding by its terms.
HISTORY: Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 4, eff March 30, 1995.
NOTES:
Prior codification:
MSA § 12.418(4)
Editor’s notes:
Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 7, eff March 30, 1995, provides:
“Sec. 7. This act applies only to a cause of action filed on or after the effective date of this act.”.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
The Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA) provides immunity to commercial riding stables from claims for damages resulting from the inherent risks of horseback riding and being around horses, but the immunity provision does not apply to horse race meetings; a horse race meeting within the meaning of the EALA includes the activity of exercising a race horse at a track in preparation for a race; while the EALA did not confer immunity on a race track in a suit brought by a exercise rider who was injured when he was thrown from a horse, the release signed by the plaintiff was broad enough to protect the defendant from liability. Cole v. Ladbroke Racing Mich., Inc., 241 Mich. App. 1, 614 N.W.2d 169, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 110 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), app. denied, 463 Mich. 972, 623 N.W.2d 595, 2001 Mich. LEXIS 223 (Mich. 2001).
LexisNexis(R) Michigan analytical references:
Michigan Law and Practice, Animals § 71
Michigan Law and Practice, Torts § 74
ALR notes:
Liability of owner or bailor of horse for injury by horse to hirer or bailee thereof, 6 ALR4th 358
Validity, construction, and effect of agreement exempting operator of amusement facility from liability for personal injury or death of patron, 54 ALR5th 513
Liability of owner of horse to person injured or killed when kicked, bitten, knocked down, and the like, 85 ALR2d 1161
Liability of youth camp, its agents or employees, or of scouting leader or organization, for injury to child participant in program, 88 ALR3d 1236
Michigan Digest references:
Animals § 13
Research references:
4 Am Jur 2d, Animals §§ 96-100, 105, 106, 113-115, 122, 134, 136-141
25 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 461, Failure to Use Due Care in Providing Horses for Hire
Legal periodicals:
Fayz, Annual Survey of Michigan Law, June 1, 1999-May 31, 2000: Torts, 47 Wayne L Rev 719 (2001)
§ 691.1665. Liability not prevented or limited; conditions.
Sec. 5. Section 3 does not prevent or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor, equine professional, or another person if the equine activity sponsor, equine professional, or other person does any of the following:
(a) Provides equipment or tack and knows or should know that the equipment or tack is faulty, and the equipment or tack is faulty to the extent that it is a proximate cause of the injury, death, or damage.
(b) Provides an equine and fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity and to determine the ability of the participant to safely manage the particular equine. A person shall not rely upon a participant’s representations of his or her ability unless these representations are supported by reasonably sufficient detail.
(c) Owns, leases, rents, has authorized use of, or otherwise is in lawful possession and control of land or facilities on which the participant sustained injury because of a dangerous latent condition of the land or facilities that is known to the equine activity sponsor, equine professional, or other person and for which warning signs are not conspicuously posted.
(d) If the person is an equine activity sponsor or equine professional, commits an act or omission that constitutes a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and that is a proximate cause of the injury, death, or damage.
(e) If the person is not an equine activity sponsor or equine professional, commits a negligent act or omission that constitutes a proximate cause of the injury, death, or damage.
HISTORY: Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 5, eff March 30, 1995; amended by Pub Acts 2015, No. 87, eff September 21, 2015.
NOTES:
Prior codification:
MSA § 12.418(5)
Editor’s notes:
Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 7, eff March 30, 1995, provides:
“Sec. 7. This act applies only to a cause of action filed on or after the effective date of this act.”.
Amendment Notes
The 2015 amendment by PA 87 rewrote (d), which formerly read: “Commits a negligent act or omission that constitutes a proximate cause of the injury, death, or damage”; and added (e).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Judgment granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of a horse owner in a neighbor’s personal injury action was affirmed because the neighbor failed to produce evidence in support of her claims under MCL 691.1665(b) and (d) as her injury resulted from an inherent risk of an equine activity and she did not prove otherwise. The claim was barred under MCL 691.1663. Beattie v. Mickalich, 284 Mich. App. 564, 773 N.W.2d 748, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 1445 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 486 Mich. 1060, 784 N.W.2d 38, 2010 Mich. LEXIS 1452 (Mich. 2010).
Bar to liability set forth in MCL § 691.1663 of the Michigan Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA), MCL §§ 691.1661 et seq., was subject to MCL § 691.1665, which provided that § 691.1663 of the EALA did not prevent liability for a negligent act or omission that proximately caused an injury. Accordingly, the EALA did not prevent liability on a rider’s claim that a horse owner was negligent in failing to warn the rider about the horse’s dangerous and viscous propensities; and whether the owner acted reasonably by suggesting to the rider that he ride the horse and not warning the rider that the horse was in need of further training, in light of the rider’s extensive experience with horses, was clearly a question of fact for a jury. Gardner v. Simon, 445 F. Supp. 2d 786, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57228 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
Statutory references:
Section 3, above referred to, is § 691.1663.
LexisNexis(R) Michigan analytical references:
Michigan Law and Practice, Animals § 71
ALR notes:
Liability of owner or bailor of horse for injury by horse to hirer or bailee thereof, 6 ALR4th 358
Validity, construction, and effect of agreement exempting operator of amusement facility from liability for personal injury or death of patron, 54 ALR5th 513
Liability of owner of horse to person injured or killed when kicked, bitten, knocked down, and the like, 85 ALR2d 1161
Liability of youth camp, its agents or employees, or of scouting leader or organization, for injury to child participant in program, 88 ALR3d 1236
Michigan Digest references:
Animals § 15
Research references:
4 Am Jur 2d, Animals §§ 96-100, 105, 106, 113-115, 122, 134, 136-141
1C Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms, Rev, Animals, §§ 3, 132-140
25 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 461, Failure to Use Due Care in Providing Horses for Hire
Act 351 of 1994 Equine Activity Liability Act prec 691.1661
AN ACT to regulate civil liability related to equine activities; and to prescribe certain duties for equine professionals.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:
HISTORY: ACT 351, 1994, p 1749, eff March 30, 1995.
NOTES:
Editor’s notes:
Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 7, eff March 30, 1995, provides:
“Sec. 7. This act applies only to a cause of action filed on or after the effective date of this act.”
§ 691.1666. Notice; posting and maintenance of signs; contract; contents of notice.
Sec. 6. (1) An equine professional shall post and maintain signs that contain the warning notice set forth in subsection (3). The signs shall be placed in a clearly visible location in close proximity to the equine activity. The warning notice shall appear on the sign in conspicuous letters no less than 1 inch in height.
(2) A written contract entered into by an equine professional for providing professional services, instruction, or rental of equipment, tack, or an equine to a participant, whether or not the contract involves an equine activity on or off the location or site of the equine professional’s business, shall contain in clearly readable print the warning notice set forth in subsection (3).
(3) A sign or contract described in this section shall contain substantially the following warning notice:
WARNING
Under the Michigan equine activity liability act, an equine professional is not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant in an equine activity resulting from an inherent risk of the equine activity.
HISTORY: Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 6, eff March 30, 1995.
NOTES:
Prior codification:
MSA § 12.418(6)
Editor’s notes:
Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 7, eff March 30, 1995, provides:
“Sec. 7. This act applies only to a cause of action filed on or after the effective date of this act.”.
LexisNexis(R) Michigan analytical references:
Michigan Law and Practice, Animals § 72
ALR notes:
Liability of owner or bailor of horse for injury by horse to hirer or bailee thereof, 6 ALR4th 358
Validity, construction, and effect of agreement exempting operator of amusement facility from liability for personal injury or death of patron, 54 ALR5th 513
Liability of owner of horse to person injured or killed when kicked, bitten, knocked down, and the like, 85 ALR2d 1161
Liability of youth camp, its agents or employees, or of scouting leader or organization, for injury to child participant in program, 88 ALR3d 1236
§ 691.1667. Applicability of act.
Sec. 7. This act applies only to a cause of action filed on or after the effective date of this act.
HISTORY: Pub Acts 1994, No. 351, § 7, eff March 30, 1995.
NOTES:
Prior codification:
MSA § 12.418(7)
Don’t charge for your backyard BBQs and your state Recreational Use Statute probably applies
Posted: June 22, 2015 Filed under: Michigan | Tags: Backyard, Land Skis, Michigan, Recreational Use Statute Leave a commentIt also helps the defense if you have tried the activity twice already and fallen which is how you were injured the third time.
Winiecki v. Wolf, 147 Mich. App. 742; 383 N.W.2d 119; 1985 Mich. App. LEXIS 3127
State: Michigan, Court of Appeals of Michigan
Plaintiff: Diane A Winiecki
Defendant: Herbert Wolf and Katherine Wolf, landowners, and Richard George, land ski maker
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence probably, but never specifically identified
Defendant Defenses: Michigan Recreational Use Statute
Holding: For the Defendant Landowner
Year: 1985
The plaintiff was a cousin of the land owner. The land owner was hosting a family reunion in their back yard. The defendant Richard George had made a pair of “land skis” which consisted of “two wooden planks with foot holes made from pieces of inner tube.”
Two teams were formed to race around a tree and back. Everyone who tried the game fell. The plaintiff fell twice before falling a third time and injuring herself.
She sued for her injuries. The trial court dismissed her complaint and this appeal followed.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the Michigan Recreational Use Statute. The statute quoted in the case has changed. The new act is called MCL 324.73301 Liability of landowner, tenant, or lessee for injuries to persons on property for purpose of outdoor recreation or trail use, using Michigan trailway or other public trail, gleaning agricultural or farm products, fishing or hunting, or picking and purchasing agricultural or farm products at farm or “u-pick” operation; definition
The statute has been expanded considerably since this decision, however, the paragraph quoted by the quote is the same.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a cause of action shall not arise for injuries to a person who is on the land of another without paying to the owner, tenant, or lessee of the land a valuable consideration for the purpose of fishing, hunting, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, snowmobiling, or any other outdoor recreational use or trail use, with or without permission, against the owner, tenant, or lessee of the land unless the injuries were caused by the gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner, tenant, or lessee.
The plaintiff’s major attempt at defeating the statute was arguing the statute did not apply to backyards, only other tracts. The court did not find any limiting language in the statute that would prohibit the statute from being applied in this case.
The duty of the courts is to interpret statutes as we find them. A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for itself. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the Legislature beyond the words employed in the act. Ordinary words are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning.
The court also stated the statute would not protect a landowner from gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct. However there were insufficient allegations made in the complaint for either a gross negligence or a willful and wanton claim to be upheld.
The case was dismissed.
So Now What?
I doubt that being asked to supply a side dish would change this decision.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Winiecki v. Wolf, 147 Mich. App. 742; 383 N.W.2d 119; 1985 Mich. App. LEXIS 3127
Posted: June 19, 2015 Filed under: Legal Case, Michigan, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Backyard, Land Skis, Michigan, Recreational Use Statute Leave a commentWiniecki v. Wolf, 147 Mich. App. 742; 383 N.W.2d 119; 1985 Mich. App. LEXIS 3127
Diane A Winiecki, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Herbert Wolf and Katherine Wolf, Defendants-Appellees, and Richard George, Defendant
Docket No. 80207
Court of Appeals of Michigan
147 Mich. App. 742; 383 N.W.2d 119; 1985 Mich. App. LEXIS 3127
June 26, 1985, Submitted
August 22, 1985, Decided
COUNSEL: Marshal E. Hyman, Birmingham, for plaintiff.
W. J. Zotter, Coticchio, Zotter & Sullivan, P.C., Detroit, for defendants.
JUDGES: R. M. Maher, P.J., and Bronson and D. F. Walsh, JJ.
OPINION BY: PER CURIAM
OPINION
[*743] [**120] Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Macomb County Circuit Court granting defendants Wolfs’ motion for summary judgment of dismissal, GCR 1963, 117.2(1).
Defendants Herbert and Katherine Wolf held a family reunion at their home in Tuscola County. Plaintiff is a cousin of Katherine Wolf. Another cousin, defendant Richard George, brought “land skis”, two wooden planks with foot holes made from pieces of inner tube which he manufactured himself, to the reunion. A game was played with the land skis involving two teams which were to race down to a tree in the yard and back. According to defendants, everyone fell down when they played. The third time plaintiff fell, she sustained injuries to her hip and pelvis which may require [*744] long-term medical care. Plaintiff filed this action to recover damages for her injuries.
The trial court granted defendants Wolfs’ motion for summary judgment based solely on the ground that the [***2] recreational use statute, MCL 300.201; MSA 13.1485, precluded plaintiff’s action against the defendant landowners. The issue on appeal is the correctness of the trial court’s application of that statute to this case.
The recreational use statute provides:
[HN1] “No cause of action shall arise for injuries to any person who is on the lands of another without paying to such other person a valuable consideration for the purpose of fishing, hunting, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, snowmobiling, or any other outdoor recreational use, with or without permission, against the owner, tenant, or lessee of said premises unless the injuries were caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner, tenant, or lessee.”
Plaintiff, citing various indications of legislative intent, argues that the statute was not intended to protect landowners from liability for injuries occurring in their backyards. Defendants Wolf own a tract of land measuring 7.8 acres, but the land ski game was allegedly played on the lawn behind the garage.
[HN2] The duty of the courts is to interpret statutes as we find them. Melia v Employment Security Comm, 346 Mich 544, 561; 78 [***3] NW2d 273 (1956). A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for itself. Lansing v Lansing Twp, 356 Mich 641, 649; 97 NW2d 804 (1959). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the Legislature beyond the words employed in the act. Id. Ordinary words are to be given their plain and [*745] ordinary meaning. Carter Metropolitan Christian Methodist Episcopal Church v Liquor Control Comm, 107 Mich App 22, 28; 308 NW2d 677 (1981).
This statute, as the trial court has already observed, is clear and unambiguous. Plaintiff was a person on the lands of another, without paying a consideration, for the purpose of an outdoor recreational use. [HN3] The statute offers nothing on its face excluding from its application the backyard of residential property. If the Legislature did not intend the statute to apply to parcels of land this size, it was within its power to insert words limiting the statute’s application, e.g., to lands in their natural state. As we, however, are constrained to apply the statute as written, we cannot say that the trial court erred in relieving defendants of liability based on the [***4] recreational use statue.
[HN4] The recreational use statute does not protect landowners from liability for gross negligence or for wilful and wanton misconduct. Plaintiff’s complaint, however, does not include allegations sufficient to make out a claim either of gross negligence or of wilful and wanton misconduct. McNeal v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 140 Mich App 625, 633; 364 NW2d 768 (1985); Matthews v Detroit, 141 Mich App 712, 717-718; 367 NW2d 440 (1985). The trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff had failed to state a claim of gross negligence or of wilful and wanton misconduct.
Affirmed.
Making statements contrary to release can be barred by a release, maybe, but may be gross, wilful and wanton negligence which the release does not stop.
Posted: August 11, 2014 Filed under: Michigan, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: #race, Defendant, Gross negligence, Michigan, Negligence, Obstacle Course, Plaintiff, Red Frog Events, Release, Spartan Race, Tough Mudder, Warrior Dash, Wilful and Wanton Misconduct 3 CommentsPlaintiff signed a release to participate in the Warrior Dash race. An employee of the race was encouraging participants to dive into a mud pit. Plaintiff dove into the mud pit rendering himself a quadriplegic.
Sa v. Red Frog Events, LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 767; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151355
State: Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
Plaintiff: James Sa
Defendant: Red Frog Events, LLC, an Illinois corporation
Plaintiff Claims: negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton misconduct
Defendant Defenses: release and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
Holding: for the defendant on the negligence claim because of the release, for the plaintiff on the gross negligence, and willful and wanton misconduct claims
Year: 2013
This case is possible still ongoing. How the final decision will evolve is unknown. However, the federal district court did arrive at some great analysis of the case.
This case comes out of the new fad, extreme obstacle racing. In these races participants run through live electrical wires, jump through fire and here, crawl through a mud pit. These races are known by various names, Warrior Dash, Spartan Race and Tough Mudder are the most well-known.
In this case, the plaintiff signed up for a Warrior Dash 5K race and signed a release. The release specifically warned against diving into the mud pit. The mud pit was right in front of the bleachers and the last obstacle on the course.
At the mud, pit was an employee of the defendant with a microphone, and loudspeaker “acting as an emcee” for the event.
Over the course of the event, this individual continually enticed, encouraged, and specifically told participants to dive into the mud pit. It was common knowledge among participants that diving into the mud pit was not only permitted, but encouraged.
So many people were diving into the mud pit that people were blogging about it and posting photos online.
The plaintiff followed the emcee’s “encouragement” and dove into the mud pit resulting in paralysis from the chest down. The plaintiff sued, and the defendant filed a motion to dismiss.
A motion to dismiss is usually filed by the defendant prior to filing an answer. The basis is the pleadings are so lacking in any facts or there is no law to support a claim. In reviewing the motion, the court must accept the allegations and facts in the complaint as true. It is unclear in reading this case when the motion to dismiss was filed. This opinion is the court’s response to the motion to dismiss.
Summary of the case
The court first looked at whether the release acted to stop the negligence claims of the plaintiff. Releases are valid in Michigan. Under Michigan law a release’s validity:
…turns on the intent of the parties. A release must be fairly and knowingly made to be valid. If the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is ascertained from the plain and ordinary meaning of the language.
Whether the release is valid is a question of law. The plaintiff did not argue that he signed the release. The court pointed out possible ways the plaintiff could void the release which the plaintiff did not use.
He does not argue, for example, that (1) he “was “dazed, in shock, or under the influence” when he signed the Waiver; (2) “the nature of the instrument was misrepresented, or (3) there was other fraudulent or overreaching conduct.
Ninety-nine percent of the time plaintiff’s attack the validity of the release based on their competence or understanding of the release. In not doing so, I would guess the plaintiff shocked the judge so he put in this language. The plaintiff’s first argued the release was invalid because:
…that “Red Frog fails to indemnify itself from its own negligent acts” because it “did not use the term ‘negligent’ and/or ‘negligence’ anywhere within the four corners of it’s (sic) Waiver & Release Agreement.
(This argument has been used endlessly and is so easily avoided. Use the word negligence in your release.)
Here the language used by the defendant met the requirements to put the plaintiff on notice that he was giving up his rights to sue for negligence. “…although an indemnity provision does not expressly state that the indemnitee will be shielded from its own negligence, such language is not mandatory to provide such indemnification.”
The release language under Michigan’s law is called the indemnity provision or clause. That translation of the phrase is different from most other states. Here, it is like saying, by signing the release the plaintiff agrees to indemnify himself for his injuries.
…the Waiver, titled as a “Waiver and Release of Claims, Assumption of Risk and Warning of Risk,” informed Plaintiff that he was relinquishing his right to sue Defendant for claims resulting from his participation in the Warrior Dash.
The next argument of the plaintiff’s is brilliant and if successful would bring down hundreds of releases across the United States. Releases written by attorneys or non-attorneys in an attempt to soften the blow will put statements in the release about how safe the activity is, how well run the operation is or that accidents rarely happen.
The plaintiff argued that other statements in the release gave the plaintiff the impression that the defendant would not be negligent in the operation of the race.
For support, Plaintiff points to the disclaimer portion of the Waiver stating that Red Frog: (1) “is committed to conducting its race and activities in a safe manner and holds the safety of participants in high regard;” and (2) “continually strives to reduce such risks and insists that all participants follow safety rules and instructions that are designed to protect the participants’ safety.
The court did not accept this argument because the paragraph this language was in went on stating there was a risk of injury entering the race.
The final argument by the plaintiff was also unique and if accepted would invalidate dozens of releases. The plaintiff argued that the statements by the employee of the defendant, the emcee, invalidated the release. In legal language, the statements of the emcee “constituted a waiver and modification of the release of liability.”
In sum, Plaintiff argues, “[t]his conduct led James [the plaintiff] to believe a waiver had occurred and it was okay and safe to dive into the mud pit. Red Frog failed to correct the actions of participants who dove into the mud pit or further instruct through the speaker system that this type of behavior was not permitted.”
Under Michigan’s law, any waiver of a written contract must be in writing unless the waiver language is consistent with the strict compliance language of the contract. Meaning the waiver language must be of the same type and of the same legal tone as the original contract.
Even assuming that Michigan law permits parties to orally modify a waiver and release, the most Plaintiff has alleged is that Defendant’s actions modified the provision prohibiting Plaintiff from diving into the mud pit head first. Defendant’s actions cannot be interpreted, as pled by Plaintiff, as an agreement to modify the Waiver such that Plaintiff could hold Defendant liable for negligence due to injuries arising out of his participation in the Warrior Dash. Therefore, the Waiver bars Plaintiff’s negligence claim.
The court upheld the validity of the release and held the release stopped the simple negligence claims of the plaintiff.
On the second and third claims, gross negligence, and willful and wanton misconduct, a release under Michigan’s law does not work. The issue then becomes are there enough allegations to the facts in the complaint and documents filed with the court to this point to support the plaintiff’s claim of gross negligence, and willful and wanton misconduct.
Under Michigan’s law:
Gross negligence is “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether injury results.” M.C.L. § 600.2945(d); Xu, 257 Mich. App. at 269. “Evidence of ordinary negligence does not create a question of fact regarding gross negligence.”
Under Michigan’s law, a release does not stop claims for gross negligence. So the gross negligence claim survives the defense of release. The issue then is whether the plaintiff as plead enough facts that a jury may find give rise to gross negligence.
…it is plausible that the act of encouraging Plaintiff — and other participants — to dive into the mud pit head first was so reckless to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury would result.
The court, based upon the statements of the emcee at the mud pit encouraging people to dive into the pit were enough to possibly support a claim for gross negligence.
Under Michigan’s law, Wilful and Want misconduct is different and distinct from gross negligence.
“[W]ilful and wanton misconduct . . . [is] qualitatively different from and more blameworthy than ordinary, or even gross, negligence.”). The elements of a willful and wanton misconduct claim are: “(1) knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to an-other, (2) ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of the means at hand, and (3) the omission to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened danger, when to the ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove disastrous to another.”
…willful and wanton misconduct is made out only if the conduct alleged shows an intent to harm or, if not that, such indifference to whether harm will result as to be the equivalent of a willingness that it does. Willful and wanton misconduct is not . . . a high degree of carelessness.
Here again, the court found the actions of the emcee in encouraging participants to dive into the mud pit might be found to be an intent to harm or an indifference.
Here, a reasonable jury might conclude that the act of encouraging participants to jump head-first into the mud pit despite knowing the risks, to the contrary — at the end of a grueling physical endurance challenge when participants are likely to be physically and mentally exhausted — could be interpreted as such “indifferen[ce] to the likelihood that catastrophe would come to a [race participant.]”
Consequently, the court granted the motion to dismiss on the negligence claims and denied the motion to dismiss on the claims of gross negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct.
Again, this case probably is not over yet.
So Now What?
Don’t give an injured participant the opportunity to sue you. Don’t dance with the possibility that your language you use instead of the word negligence will meet the requirements of the law.
JUST USE THE WORD NEGLIGENCE IN YOUR RELEASE!
Second, don’t allow anyone who is an employee or may appear to participants to be an employee to encourage people to take actions that might injure them or is contrary to the rules of your activity.
It seems to be common sense; however, in the heat of the activity or an unfounded belief the release is ironclad, people get excited and might encourage a participant to take risks they are not expected or ready for.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss #Authorrank
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Sa v. Red Frog Events, LlC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 767; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151355
Posted: August 4, 2014 Filed under: Legal Case, Michigan, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: #race, Gross negligence, Michigan, Obstacle Course, Release, Spartan Race, Tough Mudder, Warrior Dash, Wilful and Wanton Misconduct Leave a commentSa v. Red Frog Events, LlC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 767; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151355
James Sa, Plaintiff, vs. Red Frog Events, LlC, an Illinois corporation, Defendant.
No. 2:13-cv-10294
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN DIVISION
979 F. Supp. 2d 767; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151355
October 22, 2013, Decided
October 22, 2013, Filed
CORE TERMS: mud, dive, pit, own negligence, willful, wanton misconduct, obstacle, gross negligence, diving, indemnity, negligence claim, indemnitee, indemnify, negligent acts, indemnification, disclaim, pit head, risk of injury, citation omitted, unambiguous, encouraged, summary judgment, claim arising, recreational activities, reasonable care, encouraging, disclaimer, hazardous, choosing, ladder
COUNSEL: [**1] For James Sa, Plaintiff: Michael J. Behm, Behm and Behm, Flint, MI.
For Red Frog Events, LLC, Defendant: Brian T. McGorisk, Plunkett & Cooney, Flint, MI.
JUDGES: Hon. GERALD E. ROSEN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
OPINION BY: GERALD E. ROSEN
OPINION
[*769] OPINION AND ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
This action arises out of an unfortunate and tragic accident during a running race organized by Defendant Red Frog Events, resulting in Plaintiff James Sa’s paralysis from his chest down. On January 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a three-count Complaint, asserting negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton misconduct. 1 Defendant has now moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff waived his negligence claim and that his two other claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 2 Having reviewed and considered the parties’ briefs and supporting documents and the entire record of this matter, the Court has determined that the pertinent allegations and legal arguments are sufficiently addressed in these materials and that oral [*770] argument would not assist in the resolution of these motions. Accordingly, the Court will decide Defendant’s [**2] motion “on the briefs.” See L.R. 7.1(f)(2). This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court’s ruling.
1 Michigan courts use “willful” and “wilful” interchangeably. For consistency, this Court uses the former, unless in the context of a direct quote.
2 Though captioned as a “Motion for Summary Judgment,” Defendant’s Motion makes clear that it seeks dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or alternatively, pursuant to Rule 56. As discussed in more detail in footnotes 3 and 4, this Court applies Rule 12(b)(6) to this Motion.
II. PERTIENT FACTS
In July 2011, Plaintiff participated in a two-day event known as the “Warrior Dash” in Mt. Morris, Michigan. (Plf’s Compl., Dkt. # 1, at ¶¶ 5, 8). The Warrior Dash is a 5k running race with obstacles, including jumping over fire, wall climbing, and a mud pit. (Id. at ¶ 7). Plaintiff was injured as a result of diving head first into the mud pit. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-22).
Positioned directly across from bleachers and right before the finish line, the mud pit was the last obstacle of the race. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14). One of Defendant’s employees or agents was stationed near the mud pit with a microphone and loudspeaker, acting as an emcee for the [**3] event. (Id. at ¶ 15). Over the course of the event, this individual continually enticed, encouraged, and specifically told participants to dive into the mud pit. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 26, 27). It was common knowledge among participants that diving into the mud pit was not only permitted, but encouraged. (Id. at ¶ 17). As an example of this “common knowledge,” bloggers commented about mud diving online. (Id. at ¶ 18). One noted the following:
When I arrived at the Warrior Dash on Saturday morning I found out rather quickly that “mud diving” was rather popular on the last obstacle before the finish line. . . . A good mud dive at this point makes perfect sense since runners are tired from the grueling course yet rejuvenated as they see the last obstacle. I’m sure the spectator attention also gives a little more motivation for participants to bring their best mud dive as well. . . . Hopefully this joy is worth the pain they may have endured to make this happen since my brother-in-law had to go to the hospital after attempting a cannon ball.
(Id.). This same person also posted “sweet pictures of an assortment of some of the best mud dives” and requested that readers “vote” for their favorite. (Id.).
Before [**4] Plaintiff’s race wave began, he witnessed many participants dive into the mud pit, heard the emcee encourage others to dive into the mud pit, and never saw anyone tell participants not to dive into the mud pit. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 27). Defendant also did not post any signs instructing individuals not to dive into the mud pit. (Id. at ¶ 20). Accordingly, Plaintiff followed the emcee’s encouragement and the lead of other participants and dove into the mud pit, resulting in paralysis from the chest down. (Id. at ¶ 22).
Prior to participating in the Warrior Dash, Plaintiff — as well as all other participants — signed a “Waiver and Release of Claims” (Waiver). (Id. at ¶ 9). The Waiver provides, in no uncertain terms, that Plaintiff “agree[s] not to dive into or enter the mud pit head first.” (Ex. A. to Def’s Br., Dkt. # 4-1, at ¶ 17). 3 Other pertinent language includes:
1. I understand that entering Warrior Dash is a hazardous activity.
2. I understand that Warrior Dash presents extreme obstacles including, but not limited to: fire, mud [*771] pits with barbed wire, cargo climbs, junk cars, and steep hills.
* * *
7. I assume all risks associated with competing in Warrior Dash, including, but not limited [**5] to: falls, contact with other participants, negligent or wanton acts of other participants, completing all obstacles, any defects or conditions of premises, and the effects of weather including high heat and/or humidity, all such risks being known and appreciated by me.
* * *
DISCLAIMER
I understand that Red Frog Events, LLC is committed to conducting its race and activities in a safe manner and holds the safety of participants in high regard. I understand that Red Frog Events, LLC continually strives to reduce such risks and insists that all participants follow safety rules and instructions that are designed to protect the participants’ safety. I also understand, however, that participants . . . registering for the race, programs, and activities must recognize that there is an inherent risk of injury when choosing to participate in recreational activities and programs.
* * *
WAIVER & RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS; ASSUMPTION OF RISK
I recognize and acknowledge that there are certain risks of physical injury to participants in Warrior Dash, and voluntarily assume the full risk of any and all injuries, damages, or loss, regardless of severity, that I . . . may sustain as a result of said participation. [**6] . . . I assume all risks and hazards incidental to such participation in Warrior Dash, and I hereby waive, release, absolve, indemnify, and agree to hold harmless . . . Red Frog Events, LLC . . . for any claim arising out of an injury to me . . . and from any and all claims, causes of action, obligations, lawsuits, charges, complaints, contracts, controversies, covenants, agreements, promises, damages, costs, expenses, responsibilities, of whatsoever kind, nature, or description, whether direct or indirect, in law or in equity, in contract or tort, or otherwise, whether known or unknown, arising out of or connected with my . . . participation in Warrior Dash.
(Id.) In accepting these terms, Plaintiff checked that he had read and fully understood the Waiver and signed with his own free act and deed. (Id.).
3 Defendant attached a signed copy of the Waiver in support of its Motion. This Court may consider this document without treating Defendant’s Motion as one for summary judgment because it is referred to in Plaintiff’s Complaint and is central to his claim. Weiner v. Klais and Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standards
1. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In [**7] deciding a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). To withstand a motion to dismiss, however, a complaint “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The factual allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). “The plausibility of [*772] an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for defendant’s conduct.” 16630 Southfield Limited P’ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013).
The Sixth [**8] Circuit has emphasized that the “combined effect of Twombly and Iqbal [is to] require [a] plaintiff to have a greater knowledge . . . of factual details in order to draft a ‘plausible complaint.'” New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Put another way, complaints must contain “plausible statements as to when, where, in what or by whom,” Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir. 2011), in order to avoid merely pleading “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
2. Application of Michigan law
This Court applies Michigan law as enunciated by the Michigan Supreme Court because subject matter jurisdiction in the matter is premised solely on diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Corrigan v. U.S. Steel Corp., 478 F.3d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 2007); Garden City Osteopathic Hosp. v. HBE Corp., 55 F.3d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir. 1995). “Where the Michigan Supreme Court has not addressed an issue, [courts] may look to opinions issued by the Michigan appellate courts and should follow their reasoning unless [they] are ‘convinced by other persuasive data that the [**9] highest court of the state would decide otherwise.'” Tooling, Mfg. & Technologies Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 665, 670 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2001)).
B. The Waiver bars Plaintiff’s negligence claim (Count I)
In Michigan, “the validity of a release turns on the intent of the parties. A release must be fairly and knowingly made to be valid. If the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is ascertained from the plain and ordinary meaning of the language.” Batshon v. Mar-Que Gen. Contractors, Inc., 463 Mich. 646, 650 n.4, 624 N.W.2d 903 (2001). “The interpretation of [a] release [is] a question of law.” Cole v. Ladbroke Racing Michigan, Inc., 241 Mich. App. 1, 13, 614 N.W.2d 169 (2000).
Michigan law expressly permits “a party to contract against liability or damages caused by its own ordinary negligence.” Skotak v. Vic Tanny Intern., Inc., 203 Mich. App. 616, 617-18, 513 N.W.2d 428 (1994). Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the Waiver and provides no factual support to avoid the consequences of the Waiver. He does not argue, for example, that (1) he “was “dazed, in shock, or under the influence” when he signed the Waiver; [**10] (2) “the nature of the instrument was misrepresented, or (3) there was other fraudulent or overreaching conduct.” Xu v. Gay, 257 Mich. App. 263, 273, 668 N.W.2d 166 (2003). 4 Rather, Plaintiff asserts [*773] that “Red Frog fails to indemnify itself from its own negligent acts” because it “did not use the term ‘negligent’ and/or ‘negligence’ anywhere within the four corners of it’s (sic) Waiver & Release Agreement.” (Plf’s Resp., Dkt. # 8, at 6). For this proposition, Plaintiff begins with a citation to an Eastern District of Michigan case, Buffa v. General Motors Corporation, 131 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Mich. 1955), finding that “a contract of indemnity which purportedly indemnifies against the consequences of one’s own negligence is subject to strict construction and will not be so construed unless it clearly appears from the language used that it was intended to have that effect.” Id. at 482.
4 In response to Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiff submitted various materials outside the pleadings, including an unsigned and different version of the Waiver, an affidavit from Plaintiff, affidavits from two participants, a press release from Defendant regarding the Warrior Dash, and an excerpt from the above quoted blog picturing [**11] participants’ dives and requesting that readers vote for the best dive. To the unsigned Waiver, the Court notes that while slightly different, the material language at issue is the same — including that Plaintiff agreed to “not dive into or enter the mud pit head first,” that the Warrior Dash is a “hazardous activity,” that he “assum[ed] the full risk of any and all injuries,” and that he agreed to release Defendant from “any and all” claims. Plaintiff’s affidavit also fails to raise any issues challenging the factual circumstances of his signing of the Waiver. Finally, the remaining materials just supplement his Complaint assertions — namely, that Defendant’s agent encouraged participants to dive into the mud pit. Such materials “simply fill[] in the contours and details of the [P]laintiff’s complaint, and add[] nothing new.” Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997). In short, nothing in these materials provides the Court with any basis for finding that there would be any facts that could be developed through discovery that would provide a factual predicate to support Plaintiff’s negligence cause of action. Accordingly, the Court declines to consider [**12] these materials and therefore evaluates the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
There is no doubt that Michigan courts have adopted this general proposition, but not in the manner in which Plaintiff suggests. See, e.g., Skinner v. D-M-E Corp., 124 Mich. App. 580, 586, 335 N.W.2d 90 (1983) (“It is universally recognized that a contract which purports to confer an express right to indemnification against the consequences of one’s own negligence is subject to strict construction and will not be so construed unless the contract language clearly evidences that such was the intended effect.”). Instead, Michigan courts hold that “indemnity clauses need not expressly mention the indemnitee’s own acts to provide coverage for them.” Badiee v. Brighton Area Sch., 265 Mich. App. 343, 353, 695 N.W.2d 521 (2005) (citing Sherman v. DeMaria Bldg. Co., Inc., 203 Mich. App. 593, 513 N.W.2d 187 (1994)). As the Sherman court explained:
Michigan courts have discarded the additional rule of construction that indemnity contracts will not be construed to provide indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence unless such an intent is expressed clearly and unequivocally in the contract. Instead, broad indemnity [**13] language may be interpreted to protect the indemnitee against its own negligence if this intent can be ascertained from “other language in the contract, surrounding circumstances, or from the purpose sought to be accomplished by the parties.”
Sherman, 203 Mich. App. at 596-97 (citation omitted); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brencal Contractors, Inc., 146 Mich. App. 766, 771, 381 N.W.2d 814 (1985) (“Earlier cases imposed the additional rule of construction that indemnification contracts will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses from his own negligent acts unless such an intent is expressed in unequivocal terms. That rule of construction no longer applies.”) (internal citations omitted). Put another way, “although an indemnity provision does not expressly state that the indemnitee will be shielded from its own negligence, such language is not mandatory to provide such indemnification.” Fischbach-Natkin Co. v. Power Process Piping, Inc., 157 Mich. App. 448, 452-53, 403 N.W.2d 569 (1987); Harbenski v. Upper Peninsula Power Co., 118 Mich. App. 440, 454, 325 N.W.2d 785 (1982) (“The [*774] contention that the intent to indemnify an indemnitee against his own negligence must be expressly stated has been rejected.”) (citing Vanden Bosch v. Consumers Power Co., 394 Mich. 428, 230 N.W.2d 271 (1975)).
Plaintiff [**14] contends that Sherman does not so hold, and rather only stands for the narrow proposition that “if there is no unequivocal language in the agreement indemnifying defendant for its own negligent acts then the indemnity language may be interpreted to protect the indemnitee against its own negligence if this intent can be ascertained from other language in the contract, surrounding circumstances, or from the purpose sought to be accomplished by the parties.” (Plf’s Resp., Dkt. # 8, at 8) (citation and internal quotations omitted). For support, Plaintiff argues that the presence of an exclusionary clause in Sherman — excluding indemnification for claims based on the defendant’s sole negligence — “evince[d the] . . . intent to indemnify [defendant] against losses from its own negligence but not from loses caused solely by [defendant].” (Id.) (quoting Sherman, 203 Mich. App. at 598-99). 5 Though the Waiver here contains no such clause, Sherman cannot be read as requiring such juxtaposing language to either read in or read out coverage for a party’s own negligence. Instead, Sherman counsels that courts must examine, among other things, the contract’s “other language” in the absence of an [**15] unequivocal statement regarding a party’s own negligence.
5 Sherman also notes that the waiver referenced the “owner’s continuing operations, which indicated that the parties realized their employees would be on the job site at the same time . . . [t]hus, the possibility that an injury or damage could result from [the defendant]’s negligence was apparent at the time the parties entered the contract.” Sherman, 203 Mich. App. at 599. The Court addresses this language below.
Here, the Waiver’s “other language” “clearly expresses [D]efendant’s intention to disclaim liability for all negligence, including its own.” Skotak, 203 Mich. App. at 619. Michigan law plainly holds that the phrases “‘any’ and ‘all’ and of the phrase ‘any and all’ . . . include[s] one’s own negligence.” Paquin v. Harnischfeger Corp., 113 Mich. App. 43, 50, 317 N.W.2d 279 (1982). This is because “there cannot be any broader classification than the word ‘all.’ In ‘its ordinary and natural meaning, the word “all” leaves no room for exceptions.'” Id. (citation omitted).
In personal injury cases interpreting language nearly identical to the Waiver’s language, Michigan courts find that such phrases disclaim one’s own negligence. Take Skotak [**16] for example. There, the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed the scope of a waiver in a matter alleging negligence — failing to train staff to respond to a heart attack — against a health club after a club member suffered a fatal heart attack while sitting in a steam room. 203 Mich. App. at 617. In construing the waiver to include the defendant’s own negligence, the Skotak court noted that the waiver’s “inclusive language, ‘any and all claims, demands, damages, rights of action, or causes of action, . . . arising out of the Member’s . . . use of the . . . facilities,’ clearly expresses defendant’s intention to disclaim liability for all negligence, including its own.” Id. at 619 (alterations in original). The Skotak court also emphasized the breadth of the word “all,” rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that it covered certain kinds of negligence (slip and fall injuries resulting from use of exercise equipment), but not others (like negligent training and supervision):
[*775] We fail to see how such a line can be drawn. We do not believe that the risk that medical assistance might not be available is somehow less foreseeable than the danger of a slip and fall injury. In any event, there is no [**17] broader classification than the word “all.” In its ordinary and natural meaning, the word “all” leaves no room for exceptions. Therefore, assuming that defendant was negligent in failing adequately to train and supervise its employees, any claim arising out of that negligence would be barred by the release clause the decedent signed.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Other personal injury cases — of which Defendant features prominently and Plaintiff avoids all together — also interpret similar waiver language to include one’s own negligence. 6 See Cole, 241 Mich. App. at 14 (release covering “all risks of any injury that the undersigned may sustain while on the premises . . . clearly expressed defendant’s intention to disclaim liability for all injuries, including those attributable to its own negligence”); Gara v. Woodbridge Tavern, 224 Mich. App. 63, 67, 568 N.W.2d 138 (1997) (“The language whereby the participant agreed to assume ‘any risks inherent in any other activities connected with this event in which I may voluntarily participate’ and to take responsibility for ‘any and all injuries (including death) and accidents which may occur as a result of my participation in this event . . . ‘ clearly [**18] expressed defendants’ intention to disclaim liability for all negligence, including their own.”).
6 None of the cases cited by Plaintiff discuss this line of cases. Instead, he relies upon older cases that do not hold that releases must include the magic words of “negligence” or “negligent acts” and do not substantively analyze whether “any” or “all” language covers negligence claims. See, e.g., Gen. Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Finegan & Burgess, Inc., 351 F.2d 168 (6th Cir. 1965); Tope v. Waterford Hills Racing Corp., 81 Mich. App. 591, 265 N.W.2d 761 (1978). He also distinguishes this matter from a recent unpublished Sixth Circuit case, Fish v. Home Depot USA, Inc. 455 F. App’x 575 (6th Cir. 2012). There, the Sixth Circuit found that a ladder rental contract favored indemnification for several reasons: (1) the waiver included a rental “as is” provision; (2) the waiver had an acknowledgment that the plaintiff inspected the ladder; (3) the plaintiff had rented other equipment from the defendant before; and (4) because the plaintiff was renting and not purchasing the ladder, he was “undoubtedly aware” that others had used the ladder before him, and was therefore aware that there was a possibility [**19] that “latent equipment problems can be caused by ordinary wear and tear.” Id. at 580. Plaintiff distinguishes Fish, asserting that he did not agree to an “as is” provision,” had not dealt with Red Frog or the Warrior Dash before, did not inspect the course beforehand, and was not aware that the course would “become dangerous though the ‘wear and tear’ of other participants.” (Plf’s Resp., Dkt. # 8, at 10). Fish is not binding authority, and even if it was, it is not applicable to the instant matter because it still does not address the core issue of whether the Waiver’s “any” or “all” language covered Defendant’s own negligent conduct.
More recently, the Michigan Court of Appeals distinguished this line of cases in Xu v. Gay. In that matter, a man using a treadmill at a fitness center fell, hit his head, and died. 257 Mich. App. at 265. Distinguishing Skotak and Cole, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the notion that the parties intended to release the fitness center from liability stemming from its own negligence:
We find that the language in the alleged release is unambiguous, and clearly states that defendant would not assume responsibility for “any injuries and/or sicknesses [**20] incurred to [sic] me or any accompanying minor person as a result of entering the premises and/or using any of the facilities.” However, this provision does not inform the reader that he is solely responsible for injuries [*776] incurred or that he waives defendant’s liability by relinquishing his right to sue, nor does it contain the words “waiver,” “disclaim,” or similar language that would clearly indicate to the reader that by accepting its terms he is giving up the right to assert a negligence claim.
Id. at 275.
Here, as with Skotak, Cole, and Gara, the Waiver unambiguously covered Defendant’s own negligence. The Waiver warned Plaintiff that “enter[ing] Warrior Dash [was] a hazardous activity” and that it presented “extreme obstacles.” Plaintiff agreed to “assume all risks associated with competing in Warrior Dash” and acknowledged that there was “an inherent risk of injury when choosing to participate in recreational activities and programs.” Most critically, Plaintiff “voluntarily assume[d] the full risk of any and all injuries, damages or loss, regardless of severity, that [he] . . . may sustain as a result of . . . participation [in the Warrior Dash].” Likewise, he also agreed to “waive, [**21] release, absolve, indemnify, and agree to hold harmless . . . Red Frog Events, LLC . . . for any claim arising out of an injury to me and from any and all claims . . . [including] tort . . . arising out of or connected with [his] participation in Warrior Dash.” 7 The Waiver therefore unambiguously covered Defendant’s own negligence. Finally and unlike Xu, the Waiver, titled as a “Waiver and Release of Claims, Assumption of Risk and Warning of Risk,” informed Plaintiff that he was relinquishing his right to sue Defendant for claims resulting from his participation in the Warrior Dash.
7 Plaintiff’s argument that “[t]here was nothing in Red Frog’s indemnity provision that warned participants that Red Frog’s agents would be interfering with the actual race or to notify James that there was potential that the risks of the race would be or could be heightened by the presence of Red Frog’s agents, or that injury could result from the negligence of Red Frog or its agents” misses the mark. (Plf’s Resp., Dkt. # 8, at 9) (contrasting with Sherman, see footnote 5). Whether the indemnity provision warned of certain negligent acts or not, just as in Skotak, any claim arising out of negligence is [**22] barred given the Waiver’s express and unambiguous language.
Notwithstanding this clear language, Plaintiff claims other language contained in the Waiver “gave James the false impression that Red Frog would not be negligent in the operation and performance of this racing event.” (Plf’s Resp., Dkt. # 8, at 10). For support, Plaintiff points to the disclaimer portion of the Waiver stating that Red Frog: (1) “is committed to conducting its race and activities in a safe manner and holds the safety of participants in high regard;” and (2) “continually strives to reduce such risks and insists that all participants follow safety rules and instructions that are designed to protect the participants’ safety.” Plaintiff omits, however, the remainder of the disclaimer, which provides that “participants . . . registering for the race, programs, and activities must recognize that there is an inherent risk of injury when choosing to participate in recreational activities and programs.”
This argument is without merit. In Cole, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument in a personal injury case arising out of an accident at a horse-racing facility. There, the plaintiff “acknowledge[d] [**23] that due to the unique combination of dangerous factors in the restricted area associated with the stabling, exercising and training of a large number of horses, and the presence of tradespeople, jockeys, owner and other personnel in the area, there are inherent dangers in the restricted area which [the defendant] cannot eliminate after exercising [*777] reasonable care.” 241 Mich. App. at 14. In rejecting the argument that the “which [the defendant] cannot eliminate after exercising reasonable care” language limited the scope of the release (to not cover negligent acts), the court reasoned that the language “specifically addressed the dangerous conditions and inherent dangers in the restricted area of the racetrack.” Id. The “reasonable care” language was, therefore, “an unambiguous emphasis of the fact that being in the restricted area entails dangers that cannot be eliminated by exercising reasonable care.” Id.
Just as in Cole, the Waiver’s language here regarding Defendant’s commitment to conducting the Warrior Dash in a safe manner and to reducing risks cannot be read to carve out Defendant’s negligence from the Waiver’s scope. The very next sentence expressly warns participants of the [**24] “inherent risk of injury when choosing to participate in recreational activities and programs.” The disclaimer language, read in toto, and pursuant to Cole, serves only as “an unambiguous emphasis” that participating in the Warrior Dash carries a risk of injury. This is especially true when, as discussed above, read in conjunction with the fact that the Waiver releases liability with respect to “any and all injuries” sustained as a result of participation in the Warrior Dash. Id. at 14-15.
In the alternative, Plaintiff presents an interesting theory with respect to the Waiver’s enforceability: Defendant’s conduct — the emcee’s statements encouraging participants to dive head first into the mud pit — “constituted a waiver and modification of the release of liability.” (Plf’s Resp., Dkt. # 8, at 14). In sum, Plaintiff argues, “[t]his conduct led James to believe a waiver had occurred and it was okay and safe to dive into the mud pit. Red Frog failed to correct the actions of participants who dove into the mud pit or further instruct through the speaker system that this type of behavior was not permitted.” (Id.)
To find an implied waiver, the conduct of the party against whom waiver is [**25] asserted must be inconsistent with strict compliance with the terms of the contract. H J Tucker & Associates, Inc. v Allied Chucker & Eng’g Co., 234 Mich. App 550, 564-65, 595 N.W.2d 176 (1999). Though Plaintiff does not articulate this theory as such, Plaintiff essentially argues a waiver by estoppel theory. “[A] waiver by estoppel implied from conduct focuses not on the intent or purpose of the waiving party but on the effect of its conduct on the other party.” 13 Williston on Contracts § 39:29 (4th ed). “To prove waiver by estoppel, a party need only show that it was misled to its prejudice by the conduct of the other party into the honest and reasonable belief that the latter was not insisting on, and was therefore giving up, some right.” Id.
Plaintiff’s argument, however, is untenable. Even assuming that Michigan law permits parties to orally modify a waiver and release, 8 the most Plaintiff has alleged is that Defendant’s actions modified the provision prohibiting Plaintiff from diving into the mud pit head first. Defendant’s actions cannot be interpreted, as pled by Plaintiff, as an agreement to modify the Waiver such that Plaintiff could hold Defendant liable for negligence due to injuries [**26] arising out of his participation in the Warrior Dash. Therefore, the Waiver bars Plaintiff’s negligence claim.
8 Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant briefed this issue. The Court also notes that the Waiver does not include an integration clause.
[*778] C. Plaintiff’s gross negligence (Count II) and willful and wanton misconduct (Count III) claims9
9 These claims are not within the Waiver’s scope as “a party may not insulate himself against liability for gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct.” Lamp v. Reynolds, 249 Mich. App. 591, 594, 645 N.W.2d 311 (2002).
1. Plaintiff has stated a claim for gross negligence
Gross negligence is “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether injury results.” M.C.L. § 600.2945(d); Xu, 257 Mich. App. at 269. “Evidence of ordinary negligence does not create a question of fact regarding gross negligence.” Xu, 257 Mich. App. at 271. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Plaintiff’s gross negligence count states a claim for relief. As Plaintiff emphasizes, Defendant not only made participants acknowledge that the Warrior Dash is a “hazardous” activity and that it presents “extreme obstacles,” it expressly enumerated rules regarding how participants [**27] were to enter the mud pit without doing so for other obstacles. Simply, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendant was aware of the dangers presented by the obstacles throughout the Warrior Dash and especially those presented by diving headfirst into the mud pit. Despite this awareness, it is plausible that the act of encouraging Plaintiff — and other participants — to dive into the mud pit head first was so reckless to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether injury would result. Cf. Kahn v. East Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 1012-13, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 103, 75 P.3d 30 (2003) (finding issue of fact regarding swimming coach’s recklessness where a student broke her neck after diving into shallow water after the coach, among other things, allegedly “ignored her overwhelming fears and made a last-minute demand that she dive during competition, in breach of a previous promise that she would not be required to dive”); Falgoust v. Richardson Indus., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming apportionment of fault to pool owner who “not only failed to warn or reprimand plaintiff [for diving into a non-diving pool], but [who also] encouraged diving by doing it himself”).
This is therefore [**28] distinguishable from the case relied upon by Defendant where the plaintiff just alleged that the defendant “acted in a grossly negligent manner.” See Thomas v. Rijos, 780 F. Supp. 2d 376, 380 (D.V.I. 2011). Moreover, that “there are no specific allegations that [Defendant] knew when Plaintiff approached the mud pit that he would dive into it or that he would be injured,” as Defendant asserts (Def’s Br., Dkt. # 4, at 19), is irrelevant to the present inquiry. Defendant’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s intent before he dove into the mud pit is immaterial as to whether the act of encouraging Plaintiff to dive head first demonstrated a substantial lack of concern for whether injury would result. 10
10 Defendant urges this Court to “take into account the undisputed fact that Plaintiff expressly acknowledged the danger prior to encountering it when he signed the Waiver . . . and was specifically instructed not to ‘dive or enter the mud pit head first.'” (Def’s Br., Dkt. # 4, at 19). Such an argument has no bearing on whether Defendant demonstrated a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results with respect to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant encouraged Plaintiff to dive head first into [**29] the mud pit. This is not to say that Defendant’s argument might not have some merit down the road as, for example, Michigan law requires the allocation of damages “in direct proportion to the person’s percentage of fault.” M.C.L. § 600.2957(1).
[*779] In sum, Plaintiff has stated a claim for gross negligence.
2. Plaintiff has stated a claim for willful and wanton misconduct
Willful and wanton misconduct is separate and distinct from gross negligence. Xu, 257 Mich. App. at 269 n.3 (citing Jennings v. Southwood, 446 Mich. 125, 138, 521 N.W.2d 230 (1994)); Burnett v. City of Adrian, 414 Mich. 448, 462, 326 N.W.2d 810 (1982) (Moody, J., concurring) (“[W]ilful and wanton misconduct . . . [is] qualitatively different from and more blameworthy than ordinary, or even gross, negligence.”). The elements of a willful and wanton misconduct claim are: “(1) knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to another, (2) ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of the means at hand, and (3) the omission to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened danger, when to the ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove disastrous [**30] to another.” Miller v. Bock, 223 Mich. App. 159, 166, 567 N.W.2d 253 (1997) (citing Jennings, 446 Mich. at 137). Michigan’s Supreme Court has clarified that “willful and wanton misconduct is made out only if the conduct alleged shows an intent to harm or, if not that, such indifference to whether harm will result as to be the equivalent of a willingness that it does. Willful and wanton misconduct is not . . . a high degree of carelessness.” Jennings, 446 Mich. at 138 (1994) (emphasis omitted). It is, therefore, “in the same class as intentional wrongdoing.” Boumelhem v. Bic Corp., 211 Mich. App. 175, 185, 535 N.W.2d 574 (1995).
The seminal Michigan case on point with respect to willful and wanton misconduct is Burnett v. City of Adrian. In that case, the City of Adrian created Lake Adrian to use as a reservoir for its water treatment facilities. 414 Mich. at 458. According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, a 14-year old boy drowned after walking off the edge of a submerged structure that the City of Adrian failed to destroy or level when it created the lake. Id. The boy drowned after being swept away by “an unnatural current” created by the submerged structure. Id. Finally, the complaint alleged that “that the city [**31] knew that the structure existed from maps at the time of flooding and from the fact that the structure is visible when the water level is low; that the city knew or had reason to know of the potential harm created for swimmers, including children, who used the area; and that it failed to avert the danger by destroying the structure, fencing the lake, or posting warnings.” Id. at 458-59. Taking these allegations as true, the Michigan Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs “barely” asserted enough facts to make out the claim that the City of Adrian “was indifferent to the likelihood that catastrophe would come to a member of the public using the lake, an indifference essentially equivalent to a willingness that it occur.” Id. at 456.
Applying this standard, it is plausible — though barely — that Defendant’s actions amounted to willful and wanton misconduct. The Michigan Supreme Court has often noted that “[i]t is most difficult to determine, in a particular case, where negligence ends and wilful and wanton begins.” Id. at 477 (Moody, J, concurring) (citing Goss v. Overton, 266 Mich. 62, 253 N.W. 217 (1934) and Finkler v. Zimmer, 258 Mich. 336, 241 N.W. 851 (1932)). “This caution is appropriate in the case at hand, [**32] because the [gross] negligence claim stands.” Bondie v. BIC Corp., 739 F. Supp. 346, 352 [*780] (E.D. Mich. 1990). Here, a reasonable jury might conclude that the act of encouraging participants to jump head first into the mud pit despite knowing the risks to the contrary — at the end of a grueling physical endurance challenge when participants are likely to be physically and mentally exhausted — could be interpreted as such “indifferen[ce] to the likelihood that catastrophe would come to a [race participant.]” Burnett, 414 Mich. at 456. The Court reaches this conclusion with some significant reservation as to whether discovery will produce such facts. However, giving Plaintiff the benefit of every doubt and knowing that he need only “nudge[ his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” in order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, it seems appropriate here to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to try to develop his case. This is particularly so given that the facts set forth in Burnett also “barely” stated a claim and that Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim also survives. Accordingly, Plaintiff has pled enough facts sufficient to plausibly [**33] state a claim for willful and wanton misconduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 4) is partially granted. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Count I (negligence) with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 22, 2013
/s/ Gerald E. Rosen
GERALD E. ROSEN
CHIEF, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Court writes clear decision a jump in a terrain park is an open and obvious risk
Posted: October 28, 2013 Filed under: Michigan, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Features, Half Pipe, Jump, MI, Michigan, Rails, Ramps, skiing, Snowboard, snowboarding, Terrain park Leave a commentIf you practice law in this area, you should hold on to this decision because of its statements on the risks of a terrain park.
Anderson v Boyne USA, Inc., 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 1725
Plaintiff: Patrick N. Anderson
Defendant: Boyne USA, Inc.,
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Michigan Ski Area Safety Act
Holding: for the defendant
This is a pretty simple Michigan case applying the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act (SASA) to an injury in a terrain park.
The plaintiff was paralyzed after go off a jump at a terrain park. The plaintiff sued, and the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act. The motion was granted the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court upheld the trial court decision.
The plaintiff went off the jump the previous day. On the second day of skiing, when he was injured, he had not inspected the jump. The plaintiff knew that the features of the park would change over time, including overnight.
Summary of the case
What is striking and great about this case is the court’s frankness in describing the terrain park and its risks. The Michigan Ski Area Safety Act, MCL 408.342 provides:
(1) While in a ski area, each skier shall do all of the following:
(a) Maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.
(b) Stay clear of snow-grooming vehicles and equipment in the ski area.
(c) Heed all posted signs and warnings.
(d) Ski only in ski areas which are marked as open for skiing on the trail board described in section 6a(e).
(2) Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snowmaking or snow-grooming equipment.
As long as the risks or hazards of skiing are open and obvious to the sport, then the statute provides immunity to the ski area from suit.
Based on the statute, the Michigan Supreme court in another case (of the same name Anderson) found there were two types of inherent dangers in skiing: natural and unnatural hazards. The court then applied a legal principle, ejusdem generis which states: “general terms include those “of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated.” Application of this principal provided a greater number of risks, more than those just listed in the statute.
Once hazards fall within the covered category, only if they are unnecessary or not obvious is the ski operator liable.” Id. The Court stated that the Legislature enacted the statute to remove these matters “from the common-law arena” and to grant immunity to ski-area operators. Id. Therefore, the reasonableness of the placement of the shack was not a consideration for the fact-finder.
The court found the jump in the terrain park was a hazard of skiing, even if created by the ski area; it was still a “variation in the terrain that a snowboarder would expect to see if he or she entered a terrain park. The court continued with this great statement.
Even if the jump were not inside the terrain park, it would still be a danger inherent in the sport of skiing; a snowboarder accepts the risks associated with snowboarding, regardless of whether he is snowboarding down a slope or performing tricks in a terrain park.
The court then went further and stated:
While it is true one can snowboard without jumps, a snowboarder enters a terrain park expecting to use jumps, rails, and boxes. Without those features, there would not be a terrain park. If a snowboarder did not want to use those features, he or she would not enter a terrain park. Instead, the snowboarder would simply propel down a ski hill. Therefore, a jump is a necessary feature of a terrain park.
There were signs posted at the entrance of the terrain park stating that skiers were responsible for familiarizing themselves with the terrain throughout its use, especially because the features change constantly due to snow conditions, weather, and usage. The jump was not a hidden feature of the park, and plaintiff would have seen it had he heeded all posted signs and warnings, as required by the statute.
The court looked at the plaintiff’s final argument that the jump was not obvious because the plaintiff was not aware of the dangerous it created by being improperly constructed. The plaintiff had an expert witness who opined that the jump could have been constructed in a “safer way.”
The court stated whether there was a safer way to make the jump was irrelevant. The statute removed this issue from litigation.
So Now What?
There are two statements by the court that you need to remember, and hopefully apply in your state. The first is:
Even if the jump were not inside the terrain park, it would still be a danger inherent in the sport of skiing; a snowboarder accepts the risks associated with snowboarding, regardless of whether he is snowboarding down a slope or performing tricks in a terrain park.
The creation of the terrain park or creating features in the terrain park does nothing to change the risks of skiing. The fact the feature is in a terrain park provides greater notice and ability to see and understand the risks to a skier or boarder. However, a jump, in or out of a terrain park, is still a risk to be assumed by someone on the slope.
The second is:
Without those features, there would not be a terrain park. If a snowboarder did not want to use those features, he or she would not enter a terrain park. Instead, the snowboarder would simply propel down a ski hill. Therefore, a jump is a necessary feature of a terrain park.
A terrain park is a hill without jumps, ramps, rails, half-pipes and other features. Without those features there is no terrain park. If you enter a terrain park there are going to be jumps, ramps, rails, half-pipes and other features.
Both of these would require that the language of your states Ski Area Statute is written similarly to Michigan’s. However both create great legal language for arguing that when you enter the terrain park you assume the risks of everything in the terrain park, even if you don’t understand or fail to inspect the features in it. But for the signs and ropes, a terrain park is no different from any other part of the ski slope.
This court put in an appeal the things many people have been saying for years.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Copyright 2013 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
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You can’t sue for a danger which you could have seen when biking on someone’s land
Posted: September 2, 2013 Filed under: Cycling, Michigan, Mountain Biking | Tags: Bicycle motocross, Bicycle Racing, bicycle track, bicyclist, bike park, biking, BMX, Bradley J. R. Cottom, Cycling, dirt bike race track, dirt track, Inc., Licensee, Melissa Cottom, Michigan, race track, Summary judgment, USA Cycling Leave a commentBesides riding a BMX course before it is open is not smart.
Cottom v. USA Cycling, Inc, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6745 (W.D. Mich. 2002)
Plaintiff: Bradley J. R. Cottom and Melissa Cottom
Defendant: USA Cycling, Inc.
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence
Defendant Defenses: the danger which injured the plaintiff was Open and Obvious
Holding: for the defendant on its motion for summary judgment
In this Federal District Court case from Michigan, the court discusses the open and obvious rule applied to a mountain biker on someone else’s land. In this case, the plaintiff entered upon an unfinished BMX or dirt bike track being built by USA Cycling, Inc. and was injured in loose dirt. Because the condition of the track was open and obvious, he could not recover from the defendant.
The plaintiff was a fairly experienced BMX rider. He had seen a dirt track being built and went over to investigate. He saw construction workers as well as cyclists on the track. Talking to one construction worker, he as assured the track was safe. He rode around the track once without incident. On the second lap, he fell when he hit a rock or slipped on loose gravel and hyperextended his knee and broke his leg.
Summary of the case
Under Michigan’s law, the plaintiff was identified as a licensee. A licensee is someone who:
…is a person who is privileged to enter the land of another by virtue of the possessor’s consent. A landowner owes a licensee a duty only to warn the licensee of any hidden dangers the owner knows or has reason to know of, if the licensee does not know or have reason to know of the dangers involved. The landowner owes no duty of inspection or affirmative care to make the premises safe for the licensee’s visit.
The other two categories describing people on another’s land are trespasser and invitee. A trespasser is there without any benefit for the land owner generally, and an invitee is one who is there for the benefit to the landowner and at the bequest of the landowner.
The defense is whether the danger that injured the plaintiff was hidden or open and obvious.
USA Cycling [defendant] argues that because the condition of the track was open and obvious, it did not owe Cottom [plaintiff] a duty of protection or warning. USA Cycling notes that Cottom was able to observe the track prior to riding, that he rode around the track one time without falling, and that he was able to get a feel for the track conditions prior to his accident. Thus, according to USA Cycling, there were no hidden dangers present and it cannot be held liable for Cottom’s accident.
To prove the danger that injured the plaintiff was not open and obvious the plaintiff must complete a two-step test. Plaintiff must prove that the defendant should have known of the potentially dangerous condition and that the plaintiff did not know about the dangerous condition. The court stated the plaintiff failed to prove the second part of the test because there is no requirement to safeguard licensees from dangers that are open and obvious because those dangers come with their own warnings. The open and obvious test is an objective one, whether a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would have foreseen the danger.
…there is no duty to take steps to safeguard licensees from conditions that are open and obvious, for “such dangers come with their own warning. A danger is open and obvious if “‘an average user with ordinary intelligence [would] have been able to discover the danger and the risk presented upon casual inspection.”
The plaintiff’s experience, visual review of the track and one lap without incident defeated his claim.
Cottom, an experienced BMX cyclist, was able to casually inspect the track and the track conditions before his accident by watching other bikers on the track and then riding on the track once himself. A reasonable person in this position would foresee the dangers the track presented, making the condition of the track open and obvious. In fact, most Americans have ridden bicycles in their youth and know that bike riders lose control of their bikes in loose dirt or that a rock will cause a bike to tip over.
First, the unpacked, gravelly condition of the track surface did not make the likelihood of injury higher than an ordinary, complete bike track. It is just as difficult for an ordinarily prudent person to ride a bike on a race track of loose dirt without losing control of the bike or falling as it is on any other dirt track. Second, there was not a high potential for severe harm. Thousands of people ride bikes every day, and many of them fall while riding their bikes on sidewalks, bike paths, tracks or trails. Bumps, bruises, and scrapes, or occasionally broken bones or more serious injuries, are the normal incidents of bike riding, especially BMX bike riding as in this case.
Because the plaintiff was able to inspect the track himself, had seen other bikers on the track and ridden the track once before falling on this second lap the plaintiff had a chance to see any dangers. The danger that cased the injury, therefore, was open and obvious and the defendant did not owe any greater duty to the defendant licensee.
Once this burden was met by the defendant the only option left to the plaintiff was to argue the danger was unreasonable. Whether there were special aspects of the danger that created or differentiated the risk. The court explained the differences this way.
For example, a pothole in a parking lot presents an open and obvious risk for which the premise’s owner would not normally be liable if someone were to trip and fall because of the hole. An unguarded, 30-foot-deep pit might present an unreasonable risk, however, because of the danger of death or severe injury.
The plaintiff was unable to argue that a rock on a dirt track was an unreasonable danger.
Thousands of people ride bikes everyday, and many of them fall while riding their bikes on sidewalks, bike paths, tracks or trails. Bumps, bruises, and scrapes, or occasionally broken bones or more serious injuries, are the normal incidents of bike riding, especially BMX bike riding as in this case.
The risks of the track were ordinary, not an unguarded deep pit. Nor was he able to prove the person who gave him the assurance that the track was safe was an employee of the defendant or that the person providing the warning had any greater knowledge about the track than the plaintiff.
The court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment.
So Now What?
This decision besides explaining the landowner’s duty for hidden dangers and the defense of open and obvious danger has great language in it for any cycling decision. The court sets forth facts that falling is a part of cycling. “Bumps, bruises, and scrapes or occasionally broken bones or more serious injures” are normal for bike riders. If you are a land owner, bike rental company, or cycling retailer, this is important language to keep available or even incorporate into your release.
If you are a land owner offering your land to someone, you should review your risks with an attorney specializing in real estate. You have multiple defenses available to you so you can allow people the opportunity to recreate. The first is all states have a statute that provides indemnity for landowners who allow others to recreate for free. These laws are called Recreational Use statutes. They differ wildly from state to state and the amount of protections they provide. Make sure you understand what you must and must not do to qualify for this protection.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Michigan Ski Safety Act
Posted: July 22, 2013 Filed under: Michigan, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Michigan, Michigan Ski Safety Act, Ski, ski area, Ski lift, Ski Resort, Skier, Skier Safety Act, Snowboarder Leave a commentMichigan Ski Safety Act
MICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS SERVICE
CHAPTER 408 LABOR
SKI AREA SAFETY ACT OF 1962
Go to the Michigan Code Archive Directory
MCLS prec § 408.321 (2012)
MCL § 408.321
Table of Contents
§ 408.321. Ski area safety act of 1962; short title. 2
§ 408.323. Ski area safety board; creation; composition; qualifications; ex officio members. 5
§ 408.324. Ski area safety board; appointment and terms of members; vacancies. 5
§ 408.326. Rules; proposed legislation establishing fee schedule. 6
§ 408.326a. Duties of ski area operator. 6
§ 408.327. Promulgation of rules. 8
§ 408.328. Commissioner of labor; administration of act. 8
§ 408.329. Ski lifts; permits requirement, inspection. 8
§ 408.330. Ski lifts; temporary permits. 9
§ 408.331. Ski lifts; permits, issuance, expiration. 9
§ 408.332. Ski lifts; erection, alteration, moving, plans and specifications; rope tows. 9
§ 408.333. Ski lifts; order to cease operation. 10
§ 408.334. Ski lifts; existing installations. 10
§ 408.335. Ski lifts; rules and regulations, modification for hardship, record. 10
§ 408.336. Ski lifts; fees. 10
§ 408.337. Chief inspector; inspection service. 11
§ 408.338. Revenue; disbursements. 11
§ 408.339. Notice of public hearing. 12
§ 408.340. Violations; penalties; rules. 12
§ 408.341. Skier conduct; prohibited conduct in ski area. 13
§ 408.342. Duties of skier in ski area; acceptance of dangers. 13
§ 408.343. Accidents causing injury; notice; identification; misdemeanor; penalty. 16
§ 408.344. Violation of act; liability. 17
Preceding § 408.321
An act to provide for the inspection, licensing, and regulation of ski areas and ski lifts; to provide for the safety of skiers, spectators, and the public using ski areas; to provide for certain presumptions relative to liability for an injury or damage sustained by skiers; to prescribe the duties of skiers and ski area operators; to create a ski area safety board; to provide for the disposition of revenues; to provide for liability for damages which result from a violation of this act; to provide civil fines for certain violations of this act; and to provide criminal penalties for certain violations of this act. (Amended by Pub Acts 1981, No. 86, imd eff July 2, 1981; 1995, No. 120, imd eff June 30, 1995.)
§ 408.321. Ski area safety act of 1962; short title.
Sec. 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the “ski area safety act of 1962”.
§ 408.322. Definitions.
Sec. 2. As used in this act:
(a) “Board” means the ski area safety board.
(b) “Commissioner” means the director of commerce or an authorized representative of the director.
(c) “Department” means the state department of commerce.
(d) “Operator” means a person who owns or controls, or who has operational responsibility for, a ski area or ski lift. An operator includes this state or a political subdivision of this state.
(e) “Passenger” means a person, skier or nonskier, who boards, disembarks from, or is transported by a ski lift, regardless of whether the ski lift is being used during the skiing season or nonskiing season, and includes a person waiting for or moving away from the loading or unloading point of a ski lift.
(f) “Ski area” means an area used for skiing and served by 1 or more ski lifts.
(g) “Skier” means a person wearing skis or utilizing a device that attaches to at least 1 foot or the lower torso for the purpose of sliding on a slope. The device slides on the snow or other surface of a slope and is capable of being maneuvered and controlled by the person using the device. Skier includes a person not wearing skis or a skiing device while the person is in a ski area for the purpose of skiing.
(h) “Ski lift” means a device for transporting persons uphill on skis, or in cars on tracks, or suspended in the air by the use of cables, chains, belts, or ropes, and usually supported by trestles or towers with 1 or more spans. Ski lift includes a rope tow.
§ 408.323. Ski area safety board; creation; composition; qualifications; ex officio members.
Sec. 3. A ski area safety board consisting of 7 members is created within the office of the commissioner. The board consists of 3 ski area managers, 1 from the Upper Peninsula and 2 from the Lower Peninsula; 1 engineer with skiing experience; 1 member of the central United States ski association, a nonprofit corporation; 1 person with skiing experience from the Upper Peninsula representing the general public; and 1 with skiing experience from the Lower Peninsula representing the general public. The commissioner and an officer of the Michigan tourist council are ex officio members of the board without vote.
§ 408.324. Ski area safety board; appointment and terms of members; vacancies.
Sec. 4. Members of the board shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate for terms of 4 years and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Vacancies in the board shall be filled for the unexpired term.
§ 408.325. Ski area safety board; conducting business at public meeting; notice; election of chairperson and other officers; quorum; meetings; compensation and expenses.
Sec. 5. (1) The business which the board may perform shall be conducted at a public meeting of the board held in compliance with Act No. 267 of the Public Acts of 1976, being sections 15.261 to 15.275 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. Public notice of the time, date, and place of the meeting shall be given in the manner required by Act No. 267 of the Public Acts of 1976. The board shall elect a chairperson and other officers it considers necessary to perform its duties between meetings. A majority of the 7 voting members shall constitute a quorum. The board shall meet not less than once yearly on the call of the chairperson or by written request of not less than 3 members.
(2) The per diem compensation of the members of the board, other than the commissioner, and the schedule for reimbursement of expenses shall be established annually by the legislature.
§ 408.326. Rules; proposed legislation establishing fee schedule.
Sec. 6. (1) The board shall promulgate rules for the safe construction, installation, repair, use, operation, maintenance, and inspection of all ski areas and ski lifts as the board finds necessary for protection of the general public while using ski areas and ski lifts. The rules shall be reasonable and based upon generally accepted engineering standards, formulas, and practices.
(2) The board, with the advice of the commissioner, shall propose legislation to establish the fee schedule for permits, inspections, and plan review activities. The fees shall reflect the actual costs and expenses of the department for issuing permits and conducting inspections and plan reviews.
§ 408.326a. Duties of ski area operator.
Sec. 6a. Each ski area operator shall, with respect to operation of a ski area, do all of the following:
(a) Equip each snow-grooming vehicle and any other authorized vehicle, except a snowmobile, with a flashing or rotating yellow light conspicuously located on the vehicle, and operate the flashing or rotating yellow light while the vehicle is moving on, or in the vicinity of, a ski run. A snowmobile operated in a ski area shall be operated with at least 1 operating white light located on the front of the snowmobile.
(b) Mark with a visible sign or other warning device the location of any hydrant or similar fixture or equipment used in snow-making operations located on a ski run, as prescribed by rules promulgated under section 20(3).
(c) Mark the top of or entrance to each ski run, slope, and trail to be used by skiers for the purpose of skiing, with an appropriate symbol indicating the relative degree of difficulty of the run, slope, or trail, using a symbols code prescribed by rules promulgated under section 20(3).
(d) Mark the top of or entrance to each ski run, slope, and trail which is closed to skiing, with an appropriate symbol indicating that the run, slope, or trail is closed, as prescribed by rules promulgated under section 20(3).
(e) Maintain 1 or more trail boards at prominent locations in each ski area displaying that area’s network of ski runs, slopes, and trails and the relative degree of difficulty of each ski run, slope, and trail, using the symbols code required under subdivision (c) and containing a key to that code, and indicating which runs, slopes, and trails are open or closed to skiing.
(f) Place or cause to be placed, if snow-grooming or snow-making operations are being performed on a ski run, slope, or trail while the run, slope, or trail is open to the public, a conspicuous notice at or near the top of or entrance to the run, slope, or trail indicating that those operations are being performed.
(g) Post the duties of skiers and passengers as prescribed in sections 21 and 22 and the duties, obligations, and liabilities of operators as prescribed in this section in and around the ski area in conspicuous places open to the public.
(h) Maintain the stability and legibility of all required signs, symbols, and posted notices.
§ 408.327. Promulgation of rules.
Sec. 7. The rules shall be promulgated pursuant to Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, as amended, being sections 24.201 to 24.315 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
§ 408.328. Commissioner of labor; administration of act.
Sec. 8. The commissioner, subject to the limitations herein contained and the rules and regulations of the board, shall administer and enforce the provisions of this act.
§ 408.329. Ski lifts; permits requirement, inspection.
Sec. 9. No person shall operate a ski lift without a permit issued by the commissioner. On or before October 1 of each year an operator shall apply for a permit to the commissioner on a form furnished by the commissioner and containing such information as the board may require. All ski lifts shall be inspected before they are originally put into operation for the public’s use and thereafter at least once every 12 months, unless permitted to operate on a temporary permit.
§ 408.330. Ski lifts; temporary permits.
Sec. 10. The commissioner may issue a temporary permit for 30 calendar days to an operator, who has previously been operating in this state on a regular or annual basis, to continue operation. An inspection of his ski lifts shall be made within 30 days from the issuance of the permit. A ski lift inspected and covered by a permit in the preceding year may operate on a temporary basis until further inspected.
§ 408.331. Ski lifts; permits, issuance, expiration.
Sec. 11. If upon inspection a ski lift is found to comply with the rules and regulations of the board, the commissioner shall issue a permit to operate. A permit shall expire on September 30 of the following year.
§ 408.332. Ski lifts; erection, alteration, moving, plans and specifications; rope tows.
Sec. 12. Before a new ski lift is erected, or before a presently existing ski lift is moved to a different location, or whenever any additions or alterations are made which change the structure, mechanism, classification or capacity of any ski lift, the operator shall file with the department detailed, duplicate plans and specifications of such work. The plans and specifications shall be prepared by a qualified tramway firm or by an engineer, licensed in this state as a professional engineer, in accordance with Act No. 240 of the Public Acts of 1937, as amended, being sections 338.551 to 338.576 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. Upon approval of plans and specifications, the department shall issue a permit for such work. All rope tows shall be excluded from this section.
§ 408.333. Ski lifts; order to cease operation.
Sec. 13. The commissioner or board may order, in writing, a temporary cessation of operation of a ski lift if it has been determined after inspection to be hazardous or unsafe. Operation shall not resume until such conditions are corrected to the satisfaction of the commissioner or board.
§ 408.334. Ski lifts; existing installations.
Sec. 14. This act shall not be construed to prevent the use of any existing installation, upon inspection found to be in a safe condition and to conform with the rules and regulations of the board.
§ 408.335. Ski lifts; rules and regulations, modification for hardship, record.
Sec. 15. If there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships for an operator to comply with the rules and regulations under this act, the commissioner, with the approval of the board, may modify the application of such rules or regulations to such a situation, if the spirit of the provisions shall be observed and the public safety is secured. Any operator may make a written request to the board stating his grounds and applying for such modification. Any authorization by the commissioner and the board shall be in writing and shall describe the conditions under which the modification is permitted. A record of all modifications shall be kept in the department and open to the public.
§ 408.336. Ski lifts; fees.
Sec. 16. (a) An application for a permit shall be accompanied by fees of:
$25.00 for an annual permit; or
$2.00 for each rope tow,
$5.00 for each T bar, J bar or platter pull,
$15.00 for each chair lift or skimobile, and
$30.00 for each aerial tramway,
if greater than the $25.00 annual permit fee.
(b) Inspection fees shall be as follows:
$8.00 for each rope tow,
$20.00 for each T bar, J bar or platter pull,
$60.00 for each chair lift or skimobile,
$120.00 for each aerial tramway, and
$50.00 for reinspections or special inspections at an operator’s request.
Any operator may employ any person, partnership or corporation, approved by the commissioner and board, to make the inspections. Inspections made by any person, partnership, or corporation, that may be employed by an operator, shall be on forms furnished or approved by the department. Inspection fees shall be waived when the annual permit application is accompanied by such an inspection report.
(c) Fees for review and approval of plans prior to construction shall be $200.00 for a chair lift, T bar, J bar, platter pull or tramway.
Fees for review and approval of plans for modification and alteration of an existing lift shall be $50.00.
(d) Fees shall be paid to the department, which shall give receipts therefor.
§ 408.337. Chief inspector; inspection service.
Sec. 17. The department, with the advice and consent of the board, shall employ or retain a person qualified in engineering and training who shall be designated chief inspector. The chief inspector and such additional inspectors and other employees as may be necessary to properly administer this act may be hired on a temporary basis or borrowed from other state departments, or the department may contract with persons, partnerships or corporations for such inspection services on an independent basis.
§ 408.338. Revenue; disbursements.
Sec. 18. All fees for permits or inspections, or any other income received under this act, shall be paid into the general fund. All salaries and other moneys expended under this act shall be paid by the state treasurer from a fund appropriated by the legislature.
§ 408.339. Notice of public hearing.
Sec. 19. (1) In addition to the notice prescribed in section 5(1) notice of a public hearing held under this act shall be published not less than once and not less than 10 days before the hearing, in newspapers of general circulation prescribed by the commissioner.
§ 408.340. Violations; penalties; rules.
Sec. 20. (1) Except for sections 21 to 24, and except as provided in subsection (2), a person who violates this act, or a rule or order promulgated or issued pursuant to this act, or a person who interferes with, impedes, or obstructs the commissioner, an authorized representative of the commissioner, or a board member in the performance of duties prescribed by this act, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Each day a violation or other act continues shall be considered a separate offense.
(2) A member of the board who intentionally violates section 5(1) shall be subject to the penalties prescribed in Act No. 267 of the Public Acts of 1976, as amended.
(3) Not more than 270 days after the effective date of this subsection, the board shall, pursuant to section 7, promulgate rules consistent with this act to implement this act, except for subsection (2) and sections 21, 22, 23, and 24, not to exceed $50.00 for each violation.
§ 408.341. Skier conduct; prohibited conduct in ski area.
Sec. 21. (1) A skier shall conduct himself or herself within the limits of his or her individual ability and shall not act or ski in a manner that may contribute to his or her injury or to the injury of any other person. A skier shall be the sole judge of his or her ability to negotiate a track, trail, or slope.
(2) While in a ski area, a skier or passenger shall not do any of the following:
(a) Board a ski lift which has been designated as closed.
(b) Wilfully board or embark upon, or disembark from, a ski lift, except at an area designated for those purposes.
(c) Intentionally drop, throw, or expel an object from a ski lift while riding on the lift.
(d) Do any act which interferes with the running or operation of a ski lift, such as, but not limited to: swinging or bouncing on an aerial lift, attempting to contact supporting towers, machinery, guides, or guards while riding on a ski lift; or skiing out of the designated ski track on a surface lift or tow.
(e) Use a ski lift, unless the skier or passenger has the ability to use the lift safely without instruction on use of the lift by a ski area owner, manager, operator, or employee, or unless the skier or passenger requests and receives instruction before entering the boarding area of the ski lift.
(f) Use a ski lift or ski without properly engaging and using ski restraining devices, brakes, or restraining straps.
§ 408.342. Duties of skier in ski area; acceptance of dangers.
Sec. 22. (1) While in a ski area, each skier shall do all of the following:
(a) Maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.
(b) Stay clear of snow-grooming vehicles and equipment in the ski area.
(c) Heed all posted signs and warnings.
(d) Ski only in ski areas which are marked as open for skiing on the trail board described in section 6a(e).
(2) Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment.
§ 408.343. Accidents causing injury; notice; identification; misdemeanor; penalty.
Sec. 23. (1) A skier involved in an accident causing an injury to another person shall to the extent that he or she is reasonably able to do so immediately notify the ski patrol or the operator, or law enforcement or emergency personnel, and shall clearly identify himself or herself. A skier who wilfully fails to give identification after involvement in a skiing accident with another person, or a skier who is reasonably able to do so who fails to notify the proper authorities or to obtain assistance when the skier knows that another person involved in the accident is in need of medical or other assistance, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or a fine of not more than $100.00, or both.
(2) A skier involved in an accident causing an injury to himself or herself, but not to another person, shall immediately notify the ski patrol or the operator, or law enforcement or emergency personnel, if the accident created a known hazardous condition in the area where the accident occurred.
§ 408.344. Violation of act; liability.
Sec. 24. A skier or passenger who violates this act, or an operator who violates this act shall be liable for that portion of the loss or damage resulting from that violation.
2013 National Extension Tourism (NET) Conference Registration is Open
Posted: May 18, 2013 Filed under: Uncategorized | Tags: #Tourism, Detroit, Fort Shelby, Michigan, Outdoor recreation, Rock climbing, Social Sciences, summer camp, x, y, z Leave a commentColleagues: For your information, registration for the 2013 National Extension Tourism (NET) Conference, to be held in Detroit, MI, August 6-9, 2013, is now open. Visit http://extensiontourism.net/conference/net-2013-registration/ for more information.
Steven W. Burr, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Recreation Resources Management
Director, Institute for Outdoor Recreation and Tourism
Extension Specialist in Outdoor Recreation and Tourism
5220 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322-5220
(435) 797-7094 Office
(435) 797-4048 Fax
email: steve.burr
website: www.extension.usu.edu/iort
The 2013 National Extension Tourism (NET) Conference will be held August 6-9, 2013, in Fort Shelby, Michigan. Visit the NET website at http://www.extensiontourism.net/ for more information.
2013 NET Conference Flyer_final.pdf
Gamze v Camp Sea-Gull, Inc., 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 1227 (Mich App 2012)
Posted: May 13, 2013 Filed under: Legal Case, Michigan, Summer Camp, Youth Camps | Tags: Camp, Camp Sea-Gull, Capture the Flag, duty, Emily Lisner, Inc., Jonathan C. Gamze, Julie Gamze, Michigan, Michigan Court of Appeals, Negligence, Proximate Cause, Standard of review, summer camp, William P. Schulman, Youth Camp Leave a commentGamze v Camp Sea-Gull, Inc., 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 1227 (Mich App 2012)
JONATHAN C. GAMZE, as Next Friend for JULIE GAMZE, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v CAMP SEA-GULL, INC. and WILLIAM P. SCHULMAN, Defendants-Appellees, and EMILY LISNER, Defendant.
No. 299433
COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN
2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 1227
June 21, 2012, Decided
NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS RULES, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE NOT PRECEDENTIALLY BINDING UNDER THE RULES OF STARE DECISIS.
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
Charlevoix Circuit Court. LC No. 09-054822-NO.
CORE TERMS: camper, flag, flagpole, towel, capture, foreseeable, premises liability, team’s, material fact, circle, lying, pole, matter of law, genuine issues, proximate cause, proximately, counselor, favorable, causation, grabbing, owed, top, pick, order granting, negligence claim, final order, proper instructions, dangerous condition, foreseeability, depositions
JUDGES: Before: WILDER, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BORRELLO, JJ.
OPINION
Per Curiam.
In this case, plaintiff appeals from an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants1 Camp Sea-Gull, Inc. (the Camp) and William Schulman, a part-owner and associate director of the Camp, on plaintiff’s claims of negligence and premises liability. Because genuine issues of material fact remain regarding plaintiff’s negligence claim, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.2
1 Emily Lisner was dismissed by stipulation and is not involved in this appeal. Thus, our reference to “defendants” will refer to appellees.
2 Defendants have raised a question as to this Court’s jurisdiction over the appeal. Plaintiff filed the initial appeal of the order granting summary disposition before Lisner had been dismissed from the case. Accordingly, this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Gamze v Camp Sea-Gull, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 13, 2010 (Docket No. 298202). We informed plaintiff, however, that he could seek to appeal the grant of summary disposition by filing a delayed application for leave under MCR 7.205(F). Defendants [*2] subsequently requested that the trial court tax their costs against plaintiff. On July 29, 2010, the trial court denied this motion except for a $20 motion fee. Plaintiff then filed the current appeal. The arguments on appeal do not concern the motion for costs but, instead, are exclusively aimed at the trial court’s decision to grant the motion for summary disposition.
When an appeal of right is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or is not timely filed, an appellant may file an application for leave to appeal up to 12 months after entry of the final order to be appealed. MCR 7.205(F)(1) and (F)(3). Plaintiff filed this appeal on August 2, 2010, less than 12 months after May 21, 2010. Given the trial court’s notation in the orders below concerning which order was–or was not–intended as the final order in this case, we treat plaintiff’s claim of appeal as an application for leave and hereby grant it. MCR 7.205(D)(2); see also In re Morton, 258 Mich App 507, 508 n 2; 671 NW2d 570 (2003).
I. BASIC FACTS
Julie Gamze and defendant Emily Lisner were both campers at the Camp in the summer of 2007. As part of a “Pirate Day” on July 15, 2007, the Camp organized a game of capture the flag on a [*3] large field divided into two halves. In the middle of each half was a circle, and in the middle of the circle was a five-foot tall flagpole3 with a colored flag on top. While the object of the game was to “capture” the opposing team’s “flag,” the “flag” to be seized was actually a piece of cloth or towel lying on the ground at the base of the flagpole. Participants were not supposed to attempt to capture the flag on top of the pole or the pole itself. Lisner testified that no one told her that the flagpole flag was not the correct flag to capture, and the counselor who explained the rules does not remember if she clarified that point. In the course of the game, Lisner grabbed the flagpole and began running with it. Gamze was running nearby, being chased by another camper, and the metal stake at the bottom end of the flagpole hit her in the mouth. She lost one tooth, and three others were broken.
3 The flagpole also had a metal tapered end or “stake” so it could be inserted and anchored into the ground.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition and stated the following at the hearing:
I [*4] can’t see where the camp and Mr. Schulman did anything wrong. I can’t see where this individual’s grabbing of the marker was a foreseeable event by the camp and those in charge of this particular camp and the camp’s owner.
Anything that they did or failed to do was not the proximate cause of this Plaintiff’s injury. And, I don’t believe there is any material facts that are in dispute that would prevent the granting for the Motion for Summary Disposition under [MCR 2.116(C)(10)]. So that’s my ruling.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Auto Club Group Ins Co v Burchell, 249 Mich App 468, 479; 642 NW2d 406 (2001). When reviewing a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 551-552; 739 NW2d 313 (2007). A grant of summary disposition “is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 552.
III. ANALYSIS
A. NEGLIGENCE
The elements of a negligence claim are “(1) a duty [*5] owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages.” Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000). It is not entirely clear which element(s) the trial court found to be deficient in plaintiff’s claim. While only explicitly referencing causation, the trial court’s statement seemed to encompass three of the elements: duty (“I can’t see where this individual’s grabbing of the marker was a foreseeable event . . . .”; breach (“I can’t see where the [defendants] did anything wrong.”; and causation (“[a]nything that they did or failed to do was not the proximate cause of this Plaintiff’s injury.”). With the damages element not being disputed, we will address the remaining three elements.
The question of whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care is a question of law. Cummins v Robinson Twp, 283 Mich App 677, 692; 770 NW2d 421 (2009). When determining whether a duty should be imposed, the ultimate inquiry is “whether the social benefits of imposing a duty outweigh the social costs of imposing a duty.” In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist Court of Appeals of Texas, 479 Mich 498, 505; 740 NW2d 206 (2007). “This inquiry [*6] involves considering, among any other relevant considerations, the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of the harm, the burden on the defendant, and the nature of the risk presented.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). But the most important factor is the relationship of the parties. Id.
Here, we conclude that defendants owed Gamze a duty to provide proper instructions for the game of “capture the flag.” In 2007, Gamze was a summer camper at the Camp. She and her family entrusted defendants with her safety during her stay. It was foreseeable that if the campers were not properly instructed, then a camper could pick up the actual flagpole instead of picking up the flag/towel lying on the ground next to the flagpole. It is also foreseeable that, if a camper did remove the flagpole from the ground, the camper could injure another camper while running with the pole.4 Finally, the burden to properly instruct the campers to pick up the towel from the ground is negligible.
4 This is especially foreseeable when the opposing team’s goal is to pursue and tag the flag carrier.
Once the existence of a duty toward Gamze is established, the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is a question [*7] of fact for the jury. Arias v Talon Development Group, Inc, 239 Mich App 265, 268; 608 NW2d 484 (2000). Thus, the next question is whether there is a genuine issue regarding whether defendants breached this duty by failing to provide the proper instructions.
In support of their motion for summary disposition, defendants provided, inter alia, the unsworn “statements” from two people who were camp counselors at the time of the accident. However, these statements do not comply with the requirements of MCR 2.116(G)(2) since they are not “affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence,” and consequently cannot be considered. Marlo Beauty Supply, Inc v Farmers Ins Group of Cos, 227 Mich App 309, 321; 575 NW2d 324 (2009). Moreover, even if the statements were considered, they would not support granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. The first statement was by Leah Glowacki, who was the programming counselor at the time of the incident. With regard to the instructions, she stated, “I instructed the campers to attempt to obtain the flag that was inside the circle on the opposite side of the field from where their team was stationed.” This statement does not establish [*8] that the correct instructions were given. In fact, when viewing the statement in a light most favorable to plaintiff, one could conclude that Glowacki’s instructions might possibly have been construed by at least some campers as a directive to remove the flag itself instead of the towel on the ground. The other statement was provided by Stephanie Plaine, who stated that she instructed the campers “to capture the team’s flag on the other side of the field which was located inside the circles drawn onto the grass.” Again, this statement does not specify that the instruction was to get the towel lying next to the flag.
Defendants did properly submit the depositions of six people, however. But none of the submitted testimony indicated that the campers were instructed to ignore the flagpole and only pick up the towel on the ground: Gamze could not recall what specific instructions were given; Lisner testified that she did not hear any specific instructions to take the towel on the ground instead of the pole itself; Jack Schulman and William Schulman both admitted that they did not hear the instructions that Glowacki and Plaine provided; Marsha Schulman admitted that she was not present when [*9] the instructions were given; and Plaine, herself, testified that she could not recall the specifics of the instructions that she gave. Therefore, when viewing all of this evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there is a question of material fact on whether the Camp instructed the campers to only take the towel lying at the base of the flagpole instead of the flag or flagpole itself.
Finally, the trial court indicated that it found as a matter of law that defendants could not have proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries. But proximate cause is a factual question for the jury unless reasonable minds could not differ. Lockridge v Oakwood Hosp, 285 Mich App 678, 684; 777 NW2d 511 (2009). Proximate cause normally involves examining the foreseeability of consequences and whether a defendant should be held liable for those consequences. Campbell v Kovich, 273 Mich App 227, 232; 731 NW2d 112 (2006). Here, a reasonable juror could have concluded that a failure to instruct the campers properly could foreseeably result in an enthusiastic camper grabbing and removing the flagpole in order to “capture the flag” affixed to the top of it. And because the object of the game was for the camper [*10] to run the flag back to her team’s territory while other campers tried to tag her, a reasonable person could conclude that it was foreseeable that other campers might be hit and injured by the five-foot tall flagpole as it was being moved. Therefore, the trial court erred by holding as a matter of law that defendants could not have proximately caused Gamze’s injuries.
B. PREMISES LIABILITY
We now turn to plaintiff’s premises liability claim. Because Gamze was an invitee on the Camp’s premises, defendants owed a duty to “‘exercise reasonable care to protect [her] from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land.'” Benton v Dart Properties, Inc, 270 Mich App 437, 440; 715 NW2d 335 (2006), quoting Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001) (emphasis added). Plaintiff must show that the duty was breached and that the breach proximately caused her injuries. Benton, 270 Mich App at 440.
However, Gamze was not harmed by a dangerous condition “on the land.” Instead, she was harmed when Lisner pulled the flagpole out of the ground and began running with it. The danger arose solely because of the actions of the participants and not because of [*11] an inherent condition of the premises. Thus, plaintiff’s claim properly sounds in negligence, not premises liability.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. No costs are taxable pursuant to MCR 7.219, neither party having prevailed in full.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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Michigan Sales Representative
Posted: March 17, 2013 Filed under: Michigan | Tags: Commission (remuneration), Contract, IC, Independent Sales Rep, Manufacture, Michigan, Rep, Sales Leave a commentMICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS SERVICE
CHAPTER 600 REVISED JUDICATURE ACT OF 1961
REVISED JUDICATURE ACT OF 1961
CHAPTER 29. PROVISIONS CONCERNING SPECIFIC ACTIONS
Go to the Michigan Code Archive Directory
MCLS § 600.2961 (2012)
MCL § 600.2961
§ 600.2961. Definitions; determining when commission due; payment of commissions; liability; attorney fees and costs; jurisdiction; contract waiver void; applicability of section.
Sec. 2961. (1) As used in this section:
(a) “Commission” means compensation accruing to a sales representative for payment by a principal, the rate of which is expressed as a percentage of the amount of orders or sales or as a percentage of the dollar amount of profits.
(b) “Person” means an individual, corporation, partnership, association, governmental entity, or any other legal entity.
(c) “Prevailing party” means a party who wins on all the allegations of the complaint or on all of the responses to the complaint.
(d) “Principal” means a person that does either of the following:
(i) Manufactures, produces, imports, sells, or distributes a product in this state.
(ii) Contracts with a sales representative to solicit orders for or sell a product in this state.
(e) “Sales representative” means a person who contracts with or is employed by a principal for the solicitation of orders or sale of goods and is paid, in whole or in part, by commission. Sales representative does not include a person who places an order or sale for a product on his or her own account for resale by that sales representative.
(2) The terms of the contract between the principal and sales representative shall determine when a commission becomes due.
(3) If the time when the commission is due cannot be determined by a contract between the principal and sales representative, the past practices between the parties shall control or, if there are no past practices, the custom and usage prevalent in this state for the business that is the subject of the relationship between the parties.
(4) All commissions that are due at the time of termination of a contract between a sales representative and principal shall be paid within 45 days after the date of termination. Commissions that become due after the termination date shall be paid within 45 days after the date on which the commission became due.
(5) A principal who fails to comply with this section is liable to the sales representative for both of the following:
(a) Actual damages caused by the failure to pay the commissions when due.
(b) If the principal is found to have intentionally failed to pay the commission when due, an amount equal to 2 times the amount of commissions due but not paid as required by this section or $100,000.00, whichever is less.
(6) If a sales representative brings a cause of action pursuant to this section, the court shall award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and court costs.
(7) In an action brought under this section, jurisdiction shall be determined in accordance with chapter 7.
(8) A provision in a contract between a principal and a sales representative purporting to waive any right under this section is void.
(9) This section does not affect the rights of a principal or sales representative that are otherwise provided by law.
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The 2013 National Outdoor Recreation Conference and IUFRO Conference on Forests for People
Posted: October 4, 2012 Filed under: Uncategorized | Tags: #Paper, Conference, Forest, Management Science, Michigan, NORC, Poster session, SORP, Traverse City, Traverse City Michigan, West Virginia University Leave a comment
Call for Presentation and Poster Proposals
The 2013 National Outdoor Recreation Conference and IUFRO Conference on Forests for People
The Society of Outdoor Recreation Professionals is proud to be sponsoring the 2013 National Outdoor Recreation Conference in conjunction with the second annual International Union of Forest Research Organizations Conference on Forests for People in Traverse City, Michigan from May 19-23, 2013.
We are pleased to offer this exciting and unique joint forum. These two educational programs will be seamlessly blended, while still retaining the individual identity of the two host organizations. You will have the opportunity to submit a presentation(s), host a poster session, and attend any session of these two educational programs.
One registration form and one registration fee will cover both conferences. The program will offer several joint sessions and field workshops, along with separate concurrent sessions tailored directly to the related themes of each conference. The sessions will be carefully synchronized to allow participants to move across as many as seven choices.
This joint call for presentations and posters allows you to target your presentation and/or poster session to the conference and theme that meets your needs.
This is a new model for professional education and development tailored for these difficult economic times. With the co-location and the joint administration of the programs, participants will have more opportunities and a greater experience.
More information about the 2013 National Outdoor Recreation and Forests for People Conference is at www.recpro.org/2013-sorp-ffp-conference. Check back often, as updates will be made regularly as the program develops.
Click here to download the Call for Proposals and Abstract Submission Form package.
Don’t delay, the deadline to submit a proposal is November 16, 2012.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Brenda Adams-Weyant
Association Manager
Society of Outdoor Recreation Professionals
(formerly NARRP)
PO Box 221
Marienville, PA 16239
(814) 927-8212
(814) 927-6659 FAX
Brenda
Robert C. Burns, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
6125 Percival Hall
Morgantown, WV 26506-6125
(office) 304-293-6781
(fax) 304-293-2441
Michigan appellate court supports dismissal of a case based on Michigan Ski Area Safety Act
Posted: October 1, 2012 Filed under: Michigan, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Anderson, Boyne Mountain, Boyne USA, Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, Michigan, Michigan Supreme Court, Ski, Ski Resort, skiing, snowboarding, Terrain park Leave a commentAnderson v Boyne USA, Inc., 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 1725
Decision is definitive about the issues identifying how the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act is to be interpreted.
This decision is recent and can still be appealed by the plaintiff. However, the decision is written well, short, and thorough. In the case, the plaintiff was paralyzed on a jump in the terrain park at Boyne Mountain Ski Area. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit based on the Michigan Ski Safety Act, (SASA), MCL 408.341 et seq.
The plaintiff had been skiing at Boyne the prior day and had boarded through the terrain park. The terrain park was marked and had warning signs posted near the entrance into the terrain park. The court stated, “The jump was not a hidden feature of the park, and plaintiff would have seen it had he heeded all posted signs and warnings, as required by the statute.”
Summary of the case
The court in the first paragraph stated the Michigan Ski Safety Act barred the plaintiff’s claims because the jump was “an inherent, obvious, and necessary danger of snowboarding.” The reasoning was based on the SASA MCL 408.342 which states:
(1) While in a ski area, each skier shall do all of the following:
(a) Maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.
(b) Stay clear of snow-grooming vehicles and equipment in the ski area.
(c) Heed all posted signs and warnings.
(d) Ski only in ski areas which are marked as open for skiing on the trail board described in section 6a(e).
(2) Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snowmaking or snow-grooming equipment.
The court then interpreted a prior Michigan Supreme Court decision Anderson v Pine Knob Ski Resort, Inc, 469 Mich 20; 664 NW2d 756 (2003) which stated: “in the hazards is that they all inhere in the sport of skiing and, as long as they are obvious and necessary to the sport, there is immunity from suit.”
The court looked at the jump in the terrain park as a “variation of terrain” which is listed as an inherent risk of skiing in the SASA. The jump was also something the plaintiff should expect to see if one entered the terrain park. A skier or snowboarder must accept the risks associated with the sport, whether going down the slope or “performing tricks in a terrain park.”
The court also looked at the terrain park not as some special part of the ski area but as part of the ski area. The following quote should be used in every motion over terrain park injuries in the future. It shows a true understanding of what a terrain park is.
While it is true, one can snowboard without jumps, a snowboarder enters a terrain park expecting to use jumps, rails, and boxes. Without those features, there would not be a terrain park. If a snowboarder did not want to use those features, he or she would not enter a terrain park. Instead, the snowboarder would simply propel down a ski hill. Therefore, a jump is a necessary feature of a terrain park.
The court looked at the jump the plaintiff was injured jumping and found it was obvious. The plaintiff also knew of the jump, seeing it the previous day.
The court also took on the plaintiff’s expert witness. The plaintiff, through its expert argued the jump was designed or constructed incorrectly. The court found this to be irrelevant. How it was constructed does not matter because it is a risk that the plaintiff assumed as set forth in the statute. The Michigan legislature removed this argument from the case when it passed the law.
So Now What?
Finally, a decision concerning a terrain park from a court that understands what a terrain park is, part of a ski area. However, as stated above, this decision could still be appealed, which may result in a different decision.
This case shows an evolution of the courts understanding of snowboarding and terrain parks. Decisions in the past either failed to comprehend what a terrain park was or held the resort liable because the terrain park was outside the protection of the statute and obviously dangerous. See Dunbar v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corporation, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 25807 where the court found the half pipe to be a high-risk feature when the plaintiff fell into it (not fell while in it, but fell from the berm into it.)
Here the court saw the park as just another part of the ski area. Like a roller or a bump made by grooming outside of the terrain park, whether or not the injury was caused in or out of the terrain, park does not matter. The jump is part of the resort as such covered by the definitions in the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act.
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Short and Sweet Michigan case backs up the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act
Posted: June 25, 2012 Filed under: Michigan, Ski Area | Tags: Appellate Court, Boyne Mountain, Half Pipe, Michigan, Michigan Ski Safety Act, Ski, Ski Resort, Terrain park, Winter sport Leave a commentMarshall v. Boyne USA, Inc., 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 928
If you have seen the terrain park and half pipe in the morning, it is hard to argue it was not marked in the afternoon.
The Michigan Appellate Court in a concise three-page decision overruled the lower court and held that the Michigan Ski Safety Act bars the plaintiff’s claims.
The plaintiff was skiing at Boyne Mountain ski area in Michigan. He skied into the Terrain Park earlier in the day. He had seen, but not read the warning sign before entering the park. After lunch, he and his friend went back into the park. After going off several jumps the plaintiff skied across the slope and went off another jump. As he was stopping he slid over the lip of the half pipe and fell into the half pipe suffering severe injuries. (This is the second case I’ve read where the person was injured in the half pipe not by going into the half pipe, but by falling into the half pipe from the berm. The first was Dunbar v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corporation, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 25807.)
The court correctly described the half pipe in its decision. “The terrain park contained a half pipe that was about twenty feet deep. A half pipe is a ski attraction created by a trench in the snow that extends downhill. Skier’s ski inside of the half pipe.” In the Dunbar case, where the court held for the plaintiff, the court had no idea what a half pipe was based on the description of the half pipe.
The plaintiff sued for negligently failing to adequately mark the boundaries of the half pipe. The defendants argued the Michigan Ski Safety Act, MCL 408.321 et seq., and two releases signed by the plaintiff protected them from suit.
So?
The court’s analysis of the legal issues was short and sweet. The court looked at the Michigan Ski Safety Act (SASA) and found no violation of the act and found nothing done by the ski area created liability not imposed by the act.
The SASA imposes a duty in the ski area to identify unnecessary or not obvious dangers. The act requires skiers to assume the risks of numerous items, including variations in terrain. The half pipe the court found was not unnecessary and was obvious because the plaintiff had seen it in the morning and because the terrain park had the required warning sign at the top of the ski run. The SASA requires that hazards involve equipment and fixtures to be marked. The terrain park was neither.
By choosing to ski in the terrain park, which was marked with signage as required by the SASA, and which contained the half pipe that plaintiff saw earlier that day, plaintiff is held to have accepted the danger as a matter of law.
The ski area did not violate the SASA.
The court after coming to this conclusion did not look at the other defenses of the defendant, the two releases. One release had been signed by the plaintiff when he rented his ski equipment and one release was on the back of the lift ticket. The second argument would have been interesting; only one court has found the lift ticket to be a contract which could hold the defendant not liable. Most courts hold the language is simply warning language because there is not meeting of the minds to create a contract when you are just handed a piece of paper.
So Now What?
It is quite clear here that one of the reasons why the court held the way it did was because it understood what a half pipe was. In a similar case where the plaintiff got lost in the terrain park and fell into the half pipe the court held for the plaintiff, however, it was obvious from the decision the court had no clue about what a half pipe was or why the resort had one. (Dunbar v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corporation, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 25807)
It is important to remember that you need to educate the courts, the same way you educate your clients if you expect to keep both happy. Clients who do not understand what they are about to experience are more susceptible to getting hurt (based on my experience) and are not prepared for the experience. If your documentation shows you educated the client, the court in reviewing the evidence is more likely to also understand what the plaintiff knew and can easily find on your behalf.
If you did not adequately educate your client, then you leave it to your attorney to educate the court. This means you have to educate two people. You have to make sure your attorney understands what you do and why, and then you have to make sure your attorney can pass that information on to the court.
If your client does not understand the risks, then your attorney and the court are not going to understand leaving you writing a check for any injuries.
Education is important even after school is over.
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Marshall v Boyne USA, Inc., 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 928
Posted: June 25, 2012 Filed under: Legal Case, Michigan, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Boyne Mountain, Boyne Resorts, Boyne USA, Charlevoix County Michigan, Defendant, Half Pipe, Michigan, Plaintiff, ski area, Terrain park Leave a commentMarshall v Boyne USA, Inc., 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 928
Marvin Marshall and Christine Marshall, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v Boyne USA, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 301725
COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN
2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 928
May 15, 2012, Decided
NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS RULES, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE NOT PRECEDENTIALLY BINDING UNDER THE RULES OF STARE DECISIS.
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
Charlevoix Circuit Court. LC No. 10-091822-NF.
CORE TERMS: half pipe, terrain, skiing, ski, jump, skied, hit, inhere, hazard, trail, sport, downhill, feet, Safety Act SASA, ski resort, skier, slope, top, morning, timing, reversing, booth, edge
JUDGES: Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and SAWYER and SAAD, JJ. HOEKSTRA, P.J., (concurring).
OPINION
Per Curiam.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from the circuit court’s order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand.
In 2009, plaintiff Marvin Marshall was skiing at defendant’s ski resort at Boyne Mountain in Charlevoix County with a friend, Randy. They skied several trails that morning, and also skied in the terrain park. Plaintiff was familiar with and had skied in terrain parks, which he described as having “jumps and different obstacles[.]” Plaintiff saw a warning sign at the entrance to the terrain park, but he did not read it.
The terrain park contained a half pipe that was about twenty feet deep. A half pipe is a ski attraction created by a trench in the snow that extends downhill. Skiers ski inside of the half pipe. On the morning of February 5, plaintiff saw the half pipe in the terrain park, but he did not ski into it. Plaintiff skied in an area just to the right of the half pipe.
After lunch, plaintiff and his friend went into the terrain park for a second time. They entered the terrain park from the left side this time. [*2] Plaintiff skied down the terrain park and hit the edges of a series of jumps. When plaintiff was halfway down the hill, Randy yelled to him and plaintiff stopped. Randy said that there was a good jump to their right that would be “good to hit.” Randy went first, and plaintiff followed. Plaintiff proceeded laterally across the hill (to the right, if one is facing downhill). Plaintiff “came almost straight across because there was enough of an incline . . . [he] didn’t have to come downhill much.”
Plaintiff successfully navigated the jump, which caused him to go up into the air about 12 to 15 feet. He landed and came to a stop by turning quickly to the right and power-sliding to a stop. As he looked around for Randy, plaintiff felt his feet go over the edge of the half pipe. He slid down the side a little bit, and then hit the bottom. Plaintiff shattered his left calcaneus (heel) and the top of his tibia, and broke his hip and right arm. He also fractured his left eye socket where his pole hit his head when he fell.
Plaintiffs filed the instant action, alleging that defendant was negligent in failing to adequately mark the boundaries of the half pipe. Defendant moved for summary disposition, [*3] arguing that plaintiffs’ claim was barred both under the Ski Area Safety Act (SASA), MCL 408.321 et seq., and by reason of two liability releases, one that plaintiff signed when he rented the ski equipment and a second that was printed on the back of his lift ticket. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that there remained issues of fact. Thereafter, we granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal. We review the trial court’s decision de novo. Anderson v Pine Knob Ski Resort, Inc, 469 Mich 20, 23; 664 NW2d 756 (2003).
We agree with defendant that SASA bars plaintiffs’ claim. Under SASA, a skier assumes the risk for those dangers that inhere in the sport of skiing unless those dangers are unnecessary or not obvious. Anderson, 469 Mich at 26. Among the risks assumed are “variations in terrain.” MCL 408.342(2). Moreover, defendant did not breach a duty imposed under the act. MCL 408.326a imposes a duty on the ski resort to mark certain hazards involving equipment and fixtures, which is not relevant here, as well as a duty to place a sign at the top of a run, slope or trail with certain information regarding the difficulty of that run, slope or trail. There is no dispute that [*4] defendant complied with this requirement. Rather, plaintiffs argue that defendant breached a duty not imposed by the statute: to mark the half pipe itself. But Anderson makes clear that when SASA resolves a matter, common-law principles are no longer a consideration. Anderson, 469 Mich at 26-27. By choosing to ski in the terrain park, which was marked with signage as required by the SASA, and which contained the half pipe that plaintiff saw earlier that day, plaintiff is held to have accepted the danger as a matter of law. Anderson, 469 Mich at 25-26.
Accordingly, defendant was entitled to summary disposition by application of SASA. In light of this conclusion, we need not consider whether defendant was also entitled to summary disposition under the liability waivers.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter an order of summary disposition in defendant’s favor. We do not retain jurisdiction. Defendant may tax costs.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Henry William Saad
CONCUR BY: HOEKSTRA
CONCUR
Hoekstra, P.J., (concurring).
Although I join with the majority in reversing, I write separately because my reason for reversing differs from that of the majority.
In Anderson v Pine Knob Ski Resort, Inc, 469 Mich 20, 26; 664 NW2d 756 (2003), [*5] the Supreme Court concluded that if a hazard inheres in the sport of skiing, it is covered by the Michigan’s Ski Area Safety Act (SASA), MCL 408.321 et seq., unless it is unnecessary or not obvious.
Here, it is undisputed that the half pipe, like the timing booth in Anderson, inheres to the sport of skiing and is a necessary installation in a terrain park. But unlike the timing booth in Anderson, plaintiff, in my opinion, makes an arguable claim that the half pipe was not obvious to persons skiing cross-hill. It appears that this argument persuaded the trial court to deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
But even assuming a fact question exists regarding whether the half pipe was not obvious, plaintiff admitted to actual knowledge of the location of the half pipe from having observed it earlier that same day while skiing. When skiing, a plaintiff is required by the SASA to “maintain reasonable control of his speed and course at all times,” MCL 408.342 (emphasis added). I would conclude that the obligation to reasonably control one’s course includes the expectation that a plaintiff will avoid known hazards. Here, plaintiff’s failure to reasonably control his course of travel after [*6] executing a jump resulted in him coming up to and falling into the half pipe that he admittedly knew was located in that area of the terrain pipe. For that reason, I would reverse and remand.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
Poorly written release gave the plaintiffs the only chance they had to win
Posted: November 14, 2011 Filed under: Climbing Wall, Michigan | Tags: Climbing, Climbing Wall, Gross negligence, Lawsuit, Michigan, Negligence, Release, Summary judgment Leave a commentLucas v Norton Pines Athletic Club, Inc., 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 1066
A release should be written to stop litigation, not encourage it.
Wood climbing wall at a camp in Wisconsin,USA (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In Lucas v. Norton Pines Athletic Club, Inc. the lawsuit stems from the plaintiff falling from the climbing wall in the club. The club was using auto-belay systems, which worked. However, the plaintiff failed to clip into the carabiner on the auto-belay.
When the plaintiff joined the athletic club, he signed a release titled Participant Release of Liability and Assumption of Risk Agreement. To climb on the climbing wall, he had to sign a second release titled Climbing Wall Release of Liability.
The first release, the general club release had a clause that stated release specifically did not cover claims “arising from the willful or wanton negligence of Norton Pines Athletic Club or its officers, agents, or employees.”
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the releases. The court granted the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed. The only issue was whether the actions of the defendant were willful or wanton negligence.
The factual issue giving rise to the willful and wanton claim was the club had rules on how to use the climbing wall. The rules required that a member of the club had to have an employee of the club clip them and out of the carabiner before and after climbing.
The plaintiff was an accomplished climber and had developed a routine where he would look at the employee on duty who would visually inspect the carabiner connection to his harness and not physical inspect it.
The plaintiff on this climb did not check with the employee and climbed. Approximately, 20’ up the wall he fell to the ground.
So?
Under Michigan’s law, a release stops claims for ordinary negligence but not for gross negligence. Willful and wanton negligence is the same as gross negligence under Michigan’s law. See Utah’s decision upholds a release for simple negligence but not gross negligence in a ski accident, Good Release stops lawsuit against Michigan bicycle renter based on marginal acts of bicycle renter and Gross Negligence beats a release…but after the trial.
Willful or wanton negligence under Michigan’s law is “if the conduct alleged shows an intent to harm or if not that, such indifference to whether harm will result as to be the equivalent of a willingness that it does.”
One who is properly charged with recklessness or wantonness is not simply more careless than one who is only guilty of negligence. His conduct must be such as to put him in the class with the willful doer of wrong. The only respect in which his attitude is less blameworthy than that of the intentional wrongdoer is that, instead of affirmatively wishing to injure another, he is merely willing to do so. The difference is that between him who casts a missile intending that it shall strike another and him who casts it where he has reason to believe it will strike another, being indifferent whether it does so or not.”
Because the plaintiff’s only pleaded general negligence and reckless misconduct, the release stopped the claims. On top of that, there was no evidence that the club employee acted intentional or affirmatively, only negligently.
So Now What?
There were two major mistakes in this case that in another state or even another judge could have gone the wrong way.
First never tell the person signing your release how to sue you. You want the release to say to everyone who signs it, that you cannot be sued. If you tell them in the release, the release is not good against X, Y and Z, the claims of the plaintiff will be pled to show you did X, Y and Z. Why not, the plaintiff has nothing to lose. But, for the education you provided in the release, you would not have been sued.
Second if you make rules, they cannot be ignored. More so, when the rules you make are tied to your release. Here, the rule was that employees have to clip people in. If you make a rule, and you do not follow it, you set yourself up for a lawsuit.
Releases work if you do not do something that voids them. Always make sure when you have your release written that everything makes sense and does not create a situation where you can void your own release.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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