Fisher v. Sierra Summit, Inc. et al., 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 185Posted: October 14, 2013
Fisher v. Sierra Summit, Inc. et al., 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 185
John G. Fisher, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Sierra Summit, Inc. et al., Defendants and Respondents.
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 185
January 11, 2011, Filed
NOTICE: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 8.1115(a), PROHIBITS COURTS AND PARTIES FROM CITING OR RELYING ON OPINIONS NOT CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED, EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BY RULE 8.1115(b). THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED FOR THE PURPOSES OF RULE 8.1115.
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Super. Ct. No. 08CECG00198. Donald S. Black, Judge.
CORE TERMS: ski, patrollers, summary judgment, skiing, user, hole, rented, slope, emergency, snow-sliding, negligently, ambiguous, patrol, bad faith, bleachers, triable, skied, scene, crash, skier, snow, grossly negligent, triable issue, gross negligence, public policy, groomed, manufacturers, distributors, customer, arms
COUNSEL: Lang, Richert & Patch, Robert L. Patch II, David T. Richards, and Ana de Alba for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Patrick M. Kelly, Steven R. Parminter, and Kathleen M. Bragg for Defendants and Respondents.
JUDGES: Wiseman, Acting P.J.; Kane, J., Poochigian, J. concurred.
OPINION BY: Wiseman
Plaintiff John G. Fisher was severely injured when he crashed while skiing at the Sierra Summit ski resort. He sued defendants Sierra Summit, Inc., and Snow Summit Ski Corporation, contending he crashed because he skied into a hole in the snow that was present because of their negligence. He also claimed that ski patrol personnel at Sierra Summit contributed to his injuries by providing first aid negligently.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that Fisher’s claim that he was injured by a dangerous condition negligently allowed to exist on the property was barred by a release he signed when he rented his skis, a release in which he expressly assumed the risk of being injured while skiing. It ruled that his claim of negligent first [*2] aid was barred by Health and Safety Code section 1799.102, 1 a Good Samaritan statute that immunizes from tort liability those who, at the scene of an emergency, render emergency care in good faith and not for compensation.
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise noted.
We affirm the judgment. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the risks Fisher expressly assumed when he signed the release included the risk of the accident he suffered. On the ski patrol issue, however, we will not reach the issue of whether section 1799.102 applies. This would require us to decide whether “for compensation” in that statute means for any compensation or for compensation specifically by the injured person–a question which, under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to decide. Instead, we hold that the claim of negligent first aid by the ski patrollers is barred by section 1799.108, which immunizes those certified to provide prehospital emergency field care treatment at the scene of an emergency except where their conduct is grossly negligent or not in good faith. There is no triable issue of fact regarding whether the ski patrollers were grossly [*3] negligent or acted in bad faith, so summary judgment on this claim properly was granted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES
Fisher filed his complaint on January 17, 2008. It alleged that on January 20, 2007, “while skiing at a safe speed and in-bounds [on] a properly marked ski slope, [Fisher] encountered a large hole in the snow which was not naturally occurring or obvious.” He crashed. When ski patrol personnel came to the scene, they allegedly failed to provide proper assistance. The accident resulted in Fisher’s quadriplegia. The complaint alleged three causes of action: (1) negligence in defendants’ maintenance of the property, resulting in the hole into which Fisher skied; (2) negligence in defendants’ provision of ski equipment to Fisher; and (3) negligence in defendants’ provision of first aid at the scene of the accident. Fisher voluntarily dismissed the second cause of action, pertaining to equipment, on March 19, 2009.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. With it, they submitted a copy of a release Fisher signed when he rented his skis at the ski shop at Sierra Summit on the day of the accident. The document, a single sheet of 8-by-14-inch paper, printed in four columns [*4] going down the narrow axis of the paper, sets out two distinct agreements, with two separate places for the customer’s signature. The first agreement, occupying the first column, pertains exclusively to equipment. It reads:
“PLEASE READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING EQUIPMENT RENTAL AGREEMENT & RELEASE OF LIABILITY DO NOT SIGN UNTIL YOU HAVE RECEIVED YOUR EQUIPMENT
“I understand how this ski (snowboard, skiboard) boot-binding system works and I have been fully instructed in its proper use. Any questions I have had about this equipment have been satisfactorily answered. I agree that the binding release/retention setting numbers appearing in the visual indicator windows on the binding correspond to those recorded on this form (Alpine only).
“I agree to have user check this equipment before each use, including the binding anti-friction device (Alpine only), and that I will not use this equipment or if I am not the user permit the user to use this equipment if any parts are worn, damaged, or missing. If I am not the user I will provide all of this information to the user.
“I understand that I may return at any time to have this equipment examined, replaced or repaired.
Fisher’s [*5] signature appears on the line. The second column is filled with a box for the customer’s name, address, shoe size, and other information necessary for providing equipment. Fisher filled out this box.
The second agreement occupies the third and fourth columns. It refers to equipment as well, but also contains a more general release of liability. It reads:
“RELEASE OF LIABILITY “1) READ CONTRACT COMPLETELY, SIGN/INITIAL “2) PROCEED TO CASHIER, HAVE DRIVER’S LICENSE/I.D. READY.
“1. I will read the EQUIPMENT RENTAL AGREEMENT & RELEASE OF LIABILITY of this agreement, and will be responsible for obtaining all of the information required by that section and will provide a copy of same to the user of this agreement. I will make no misrepresentations to the ski shop regarding the user’s height, weight, and age or skier type.
“2. I understand that ALL FORMS OF SNOW-SLIDING, including skiing and snowboarding, are HAZARDOUS activities. I also understand that all forms of snow-sliding have inherent and other RISKS OF INJURY, INCLUDING DEATH, that reasonable care, caution, instruction and expertise cannot eliminate. I further understand that injuries are common and ordinary occurrences during these [*6] activities. I hereby agree to freely, voluntarily and expressly ASSUME and accept any and ALL RISKS of any injury to any part of the user’s body while engaging in any form of snow-sliding.
“(Please Initial )
“3. I understand that the Alpine ski equipment being furnished by Snow Summit, Inc., and/or by Sierra Summit, Inc., and/or by Bear Mountain, Inc., any of their respective agents, employees, or affiliated corporations (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Summit”), forms all or part of a ski-boot-binding system which will NOT RELEASE OR RETAIN AT ALL TIMES OR UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. I further agree and understand that any ski-boot-binding system does NOT ELIMINATE THE RISK of injuries to any part of the user’s body. If SkiBoard or Snowboard or any other equipment is being furnished, I understand that these systems are designed to NOT RELEASE and do NOT PROTECT against injuries to any part of this user’s body.
“(Please Initial )
“4. I hereby FOREVER RELEASE SUMMIT, as well as the equipment manufacturers and distributors from, and agree to indemnify them and hold them harmless for, any and all responsibility or legal liability for any injuries or damages to any user of any equipment [*7] rented with this form, whether or not such injuries or damages are caused by the NEGLIGENCE OF SUMMIT. I agree NOT to make a claim against or sue Summit, or any of the equipment manufacturers and distributors for injuries or damages relating to or arising from the use of chairlifts or surface tows, any snow-sliding activities and/or the use of this equipment. I accept full responsibility for any and all such injuries and damages.
“(Please Initial )
“5. Summit provides NO WARRANTIES, express or implied. This equipment is accepted “AS IS.” I will accept full responsibility for the care of the listed equipment. I agree to return all rented equipment by the agreed date to avoid additional charges.
“(Please Initial )
“6. I have read this agreement and understand its terms. I am aware that this is a binding contract which provides a comprehensive release of liability. However, it is not intended to assert any claims or defenses that are prohibited by law. I agree that the foregoing agreement is intended to be as broad and inclusive as is permitted by law and that if any portion or paragraph is held invalid, the balance shall continue in full legal force and effect.
Fisher [*8] signed at the bottom and initialed in each place indicated.
Defendants argued that this release constituted Fisher’s express assumption of the risk of having the accident he had and that it formed the basis of a complete defense to all Fisher’s claims. Defendants argued that, apart from the release, all Fisher’s claims were also barred by the common-law doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, set out in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 and its progeny. They further contended that Fisher could not produce evidence to support his claims that they were negligent in maintaining the property or providing first aid.
To support the contention that Fisher could not prove negligent maintenance of the property, defendants produced evidence that their personnel had inspected the area where Fisher crashed a number of times the day before and the day of the accident and did not find any condition requiring marking or correction. Defendants also pointed to Fisher’s deposition testimony, implying that he was not on a groomed ski run when he crashed: “And when I skied from one run to the next, I encountered a hole that seemed to be between the two runs.”
To support the contention that Fisher [*9] could not prove negligent first aid, defendants produced evidence that Fisher told the ski patrollers when they first arrived, and before he was moved, that he had no feeling in his feet or legs. He became agitated and combative and sat up and waved his arms; the ski patrollers told him he might injure himself more and should stop. Defendants argued that these facts showed Fisher had already become paralyzed in the crash and that his injuries could not have been caused by anything done by the ski patrollers. Defendants also argued that there was no evidence of any act or omission by the ski patrollers that would have caused additional injury to Fisher.
On the claim of negligent first aid alone, defendants also relied on section 1799.102. At the time, 2 that section provided:
“No person who in good faith, and not for compensation, renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency shall be liable for any civil damages resulting from any act or omission. The scene of an emergency shall not include emergency departments and other places where medical care is usually offered.”
Defendants argued that their ski patrollers were immunized by this statute because they did not receive any compensation [*10] from Fisher. They acknowledged that no published California case has interpreted the phrase “not for compensation” in this statute; they relied on out-of-state cases applying other states’ similar statutes.
2 Section 1799.102 was amended effective August 6, 2009. (Stats. 2009, ch. 77, § 1.) The former version applies to this case.
Defendants additionally relied on section 1799.108, which provides:
“Any person who has a certificate issued pursuant to this division from a certifying agency to provide prehospital emergency field care treatment at the scene of an emergency, as defined in Section 1799.102, shall be liable for civil damages only for acts or omissions performed in a grossly negligent manner or acts or omissions not performed in good faith.”
Defendants presented evidence that all the ski patrollers involved had the certification required by this section. They argued that Fisher could present no evidence that the patrollers who assisted him acted in bad faith or with gross negligence.
In opposing the motion for summary judgment, Fisher argued that the release did not apply to his accident because it only released defendants’ liability for injuries arising from problems with the rented [*11] equipment. The court could not grant summary judgment based on the release, he argued, because this was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous contract. It was patently ambiguous, he argued, because a reasonable person could interpret its terms to mean that liability was released only for injuries related to equipment failures. It was latently ambiguous because defendants asked skiers to sign it when renting equipment and did not obtain any release from skiers who brought their own equipment, suggesting that liability for equipment failure was its only subject matter. Even if the release did relate to liability for accidents resulting from the condition of the slopes, Fisher argued, it would not bar an action for a dangerous condition that existed because of defendants’ negligence. In addition, even if the release covered defendants’ negligence, it did not cover the particular kind of negligence that caused Fisher’s injuries because releasing liability for injuries caused by falling in an artificially created hole was not reasonably related to the parties’ purpose in entering into the release.
Responding to defendants’ argument that there was no evidence to support his claim that [*12] the accident resulted from their negligent maintenance of the slopes, Fisher submitted evidence intended to show that the hole was on a groomed slope, meant to be skied on by defendants’ patrons, and was not naturally occurring. He cited his own deposition in which he testified that he did not ski on any ungroomed areas. He further testified that there was a wall of ice on the far side of the hole as he skied into it and that the wall of ice “seemed to have a groomed edge on the top of it ….” Fisher also submitted a declaration asserting that the hole was “manmade.” The declaration does not, however, explain how Fisher knew it was manmade. In addition, Fisher pointed to deposition testimony by Sierra Summit personnel acknowledging that holes or walls in the snow can inadvertently be created by snow grooming equipment.
In response to defendants’ claim that Fisher could not produce evidence of negligent first aid, Fisher argued that if he could sit up and wave his arms at the time when the ski patrollers found him, that could mean the patrollers added to his injuries through their first aid. He also claimed the defense was not entitled to summary judgment on the claim unless it offered [*13] expert medical testimony that the ski patrollers acted reasonably.
Fisher argued that the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk does not apply to this case. He said the doctrine applies only to risks inherent in the risky activity, and the risk of an accident like his is not inherent in skiing if the hole was artificial and was present because of defendants’ negligence.
On the ski patrol claim, Fisher contended that section 1799.102 was inapplicable because the ski patrollers were compensated by defendants. He argued that the statute requires simply that aid be given “not for compensation”; that defendants’ view would read words into the statute that are not there; and that this would be improper, regardless of what out-of-state cases interpreting other statutes might say. Fisher also argued that summary judgment could not be granted based on section 1799.108 because of the facts that he was combative and tried to sit up while he was being aided, combined with defendants’ failure to produce an expert opinion. Fisher did not explicitly say how these points helped him, but presumably he meant they showed there was a triable issue of whether the ski patrollers were grossly negligent. [*14] Fisher also did not explicitly say why his ski patrol claim fell outside the release or outside the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, but his arguments on those topics implied that neither defense would apply because the risk of negligent first aid was not related to equipment failure and not an inherent risk of skiing.
The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, basing its ruling on the release and on section 1799.102. It held that the release barred Fisher’s claim that his crash was caused by a hole negligently allowed to exist on a slope because the release “clearly and unambiguously releases defendant from liability for injuries or damages caused by defendant’s negligence and which occur to any user of rented equipment, a status which plaintiff indisputably occupied.” It stressed that the release “clearly expresses plaintiff’s agreement not to sue defendant and to accept full responsibility for all injuries and damages relating to or arising from … ‘any snow-sliding activities ….'” The court rejected Fisher’s contention that the release was ambiguous: “[B]y its express terms [it] is not limited to damages or injuries caused by the equipment, but extends to [*15] any claims relating to or arising from snow-sliding activities.” In applying section 1799.102 to the negligent first-aid claim, the court acknowledged that no California cases have interpreted the phrase “not for compensation.” It agreed with defendants’ view that the phrase means not for compensation by the injured party.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860.) We independently review the record and apply the same rules and standards as the trial court. (Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925.) The trial court must grant the motion if “all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, at p. 850.) We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and assume [*16] that, for purposes of our analysis, his version of all disputed facts is correct. (Sheffield v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Social Services (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 153, 159.) A moving defendant can establish its entitlement to summary judgment by either (1) demonstrating that an essential element of the plaintiff’s case cannot be established, or (2) establishing a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o).)
I. Dangerous condition of property claim
Fisher contends that the trial court erred in applying the release of liability he signed to bar his claim that defendants caused his injuries by negligently allowing the existence of the hole into which he skied. We disagree.
A contract in which a party expressly assumes a risk of injury is, if applicable, a complete bar to a negligence action. (Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, 308, fn. 4; Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1372.)
“In order for a release of liability to be held enforceable against a plaintiff, it ‘must be clear, unambiguous and explicit in expressing the intent of the parties’ [citation]; the act of negligence that results in injury to the releasee must be reasonably related to the object [*17] or purpose for which the release is given [citation]; and the release cannot contravene public policy [citation]. A release need not be perfect to be enforceable. [Citation.]” (Sweat v. Big Time Auto Racing, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1304-1305 (Sweat).)
We address each requirement in turn.
A. The release is clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent of the parties
We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the release Fisher signed applied unambiguously to injuries arising from skiing accidents, including the injuries Fisher suffered, even if caused by defendants’ negligence. The release stated that Fisher “agree[d] to freely, voluntarily and expressly ASSUME and accept any and ALL RISKS of any injury to any party of the user’s body while engaging in any form of snow-sliding.” He agreed to “FOREVER RELEASE SUMMIT,” as well as the equipment manufacturers and distributors, from “any and all responsibility or legal liability for any injuries or damages to any user of any equipment rented with this forms, whether or not such injuries or damages are caused by the NEGLIGENCE OF SUMMIT.” He also agreed “NOT to make a claim against or sue Summit, or any of the equipment [*18] manufacturers and distributors for injuries or damages relating to or arising from the use of chairlifts or surface tows, any snow-sliding activities and/or the use of this equipment.” He accepted “full responsibility for any and all such injuries and damages” and stated that he was “aware that this is a binding contract which provides a comprehensive release of liability” and “is intended to be as broad and inclusive as is permitted by law ….” This language applies to personal injuries sustained by a skier who crashes while skiing at the resort, even if the crash is caused by a defect in the snow or ground surface caused by defendants’ negligent maintenance of the property. Fisher’s argument that the agreement is patently ambiguous because it contains references to the rented equipment and the equipment manufacturers and distributors is not persuasive. The agreement plainly states that Fisher releases the ski resort and the equipment manufacturers and distributors from liability for injuries caused by skiing as well as those caused by equipment problems.
The release also is not latently ambiguous. The parties disagree about whether extrinsic evidence should be considered to determine [*19] whether the release is latently ambiguous, but we need not resolve that debate because no latent ambiguity appears even if the extrinsic evidence Fisher relies on is considered. Fisher relies on evidence that the release is given to customers when they rent equipment; that neither it nor any other release is obtained from customers who ski without renting equipment; and that because of these circumstances he assumed, without reading the release, that it applied only to injuries caused by problems with the rented equipment. None of this detracts from the clarity of the release’s language or renders reasonable an interpretation according to which the release applies only to injuries arising from the rented equipment.
B. The alleged negligence that resulted in the injury was reasonably related to the purpose for which the release was given
The purpose of releases like the one signed by Fisher is to make skiing facilities available to the public by removing liability exposure that would make the operation of those facilities economically infeasible. (National & Internat. Brotherhood of Street Racers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 934, 938 [if releases of liability in cases [*20] arising from hazardous recreational pursuits are not enforced, “many popular and lawful recreational activities are destined for extinction”].) The alleged negligence in maintenance of the property that Fisher says caused his injuries has a reasonable relationship with this purpose.
Fisher argues that the release’s purpose is not reasonably related to the conditions that caused his accident because the release only applies to accidents caused by equipment problems and was only given to customers renting equipment. We have already explained why the release cannot reasonably be understood as applying only to accidents caused by equipment problems. The fact that the resort gave the release only to skiers who rented equipment does not show that its purpose is limited to accidents arising from equipment, for its plain meaning is to the contrary. It may be that the release fails fully to achieve its economic purpose if the resort does not obtain it from all skiers, but that does not prove it has a different purpose.
Fisher also argues that the release’s purpose is not reasonably related to the conditions that caused his accident because the risk of skiing into an artificially created hole [*21] in a groomed part of a slope is not a reasonably foreseeable risk, and there is at least a triable question of whether the hole he skied into was artificially created and in a groomed part of a slope. He cites Bennett v. United States Cycling Federation (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1490-1491 (Bennett), which reversed summary judgment against the signer of an agreement releasing the defendants from liability for injuries, including injuries caused by the defendants’ negligence, sustained by the signer in a bicycle race. The court held that there was a triable question of whether the accident–a collision with a car on a race course that was closed to traffic–was reasonably foreseeable.
The Bennett court did not cite any authority directly supporting the proposition that an agreement releasing liability for negligence applies only to harms arising from reasonably foreseeable negligence. It relied instead on quotations from the Restatement Second of Torts and the treatise of Prosser and Keeton to the effect that releases apply only to harm-causing conduct of the defendant that was within the contemplation of the parties. (Bennett, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 1490.) It is not by any means [*22] clear to us that, as a general proposition, parties who enter into a release of liability for negligent conduct related to a hazardous recreational activity intend the release to apply only to negligent conduct that the parties can reasonably be expected to think of in advance. This is especially implausible where, as here, the release explicitly applies to all skiing-related injuries even if caused by defendants’ negligence. To the extent that Bennett is in conflict with these views, we decline to follow it. Further, even if we were applying the holding of Bennett, we would not conclude that it stands in the way of summary judgment here. Even assuming there are triable questions of whether the hole was artificial and whether it was on a groomed portion of the slope, Fisher has suggested no persuasive reasons why a crash caused by negligently maintained slope conditions would not be reasonably foreseeable. What sort of negligence would be more likely to cause a skiing accident than negligence in failing to keep the slopes in good condition?
Fisher relies also on Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 1301, in which we held that a release did not apply because the defendant’s negligence was not [*23] reasonably related to the purpose of the release. In that case, the plaintiff attended an auto race where, if an audience member sat in the bleachers in the pit area, the track owners required him or her to sign a release of liability for any claim of injury arising while the audience member was in that area, even if caused by the owners’ negligence. The plaintiff signed the release, sat in the pit area bleachers, and was injured when the bleachers collapsed. After a bench trial, the court found this release was a complete defense. We reversed (id. at p. 1303), concluding that the release was ambiguous; that extrinsic evidence was necessary to resolve the ambiguity; and that, in light of that evidence, the release’s only purpose was to allow audience members to observe the race from the pit area. The collapse of the bleachers had no causal relation to dangers arising from the race, so the release was not applicable to liability for injuries resulting from that collapse. (Id. at pp. 1305-1308.)
Sweat is distinguishable from this case. Here we have an unambiguous release barring negligence liability for any injury resulting from skiing, among other activities. A skiing accident caused [*24] by a negligently maintained ski trail falls within the scope of the release.
The final paragraph of our analysis in Sweat is instructive:
“Here, appellant’s express assumption of risk would cover all hazards related to the automobile race and its observation. As appellant points out, those might include a tire separating from a car and hitting someone, a car leaving the track and striking a spectator, or someone being burned by a crash. This is not an exhaustive list. One can even anticipate the flying tire, the errantly driven car, or the flames from the crash causing the collapse of bleachers. The race activity might lead to less dramatic accidents: a person slipping on automotive grease in the pit area, or even a race observer slipping on spilled soda while keenly watching the race as he or she steps through the bleachers. The release agreement here does not, however, contractually charge appellant with assuming the risk of injury from defectively constructed or maintained bleachers, should a full trial on the merits establish such facts.” (Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1308.)
The accident in Sweat fell outside the release because it was causally unrelated to the race, to allow [*25] the observation of which was the purpose of the release. An accident unrelated to skiing, such as a fall inside a ski lodge caused by a defect in the floor unreasonably allowed to be present, would be comparable to the accident in Sweat and would fall outside the release, for it would be causally unrelated to skiing or any of the other activities mentioned in the release. Here, however, if the skiing accident were caused by defendant’s negligent maintenance of the slopes, as Fisher claims, it would be comparable to an accident caused by something negligently allowed to remain on the floor in the race-observation area–grease or soda–by the track owners in Sweat. That cause is reasonably related to skiing and consequently to the purpose of the release.
C. The release is not against public policy
Fisher argues that there is a public policy of “fundamental fairness,” and that the release violates this policy because it “appears, on its face, to only relate to the rental equipment ….” As we have said, this is not the case. Fisher also repeats here the argument that, because the release was obtained only from skiers who rented equipment, it is only applicable to accidents caused by the equipment. [*26] Again, this circumstance does not negate the explicit statements in the agreement releasing defendants from liability for any injuries sustained while the customer engages in snow-sliding activities.
Fisher also argues that the release violates public policy because it allows defendants to be negligent in maintaining their ski slopes without incurring liability. As we have seen, however, the law allows releases of liability for injuries caused by negligence during hazardous recreational activities, and does so in order to prevent exposure to liability from making those activities economically infeasible. Finally, Fisher argues that public policy was violated because defendants obtained releases only from those renting equipment but did not “make it unquestionably clear” that it was doing so. There is no public policy that requires this be done. A release must be clear about what is being released, and the release at issue here satisfied that requirement, as we have said.
The parties have extensively briefed the subject of primary assumption of the risk, but our holding on the release makes it unnecessary for us to address that issue.
II. Negligent first-aid claim
Fisher argues that the [*27] trial court erred when it held that section 1799.102 barred his claim of negligent first aid by the ski patrollers. He says summary judgment could not properly be granted on this basis because there was evidence that the ski patrollers received compensation for performing their duties. We need not break ground in this unsettled area because an alternative basis for the judgment–a basis raised by defendants in the trial court–is available. (California School of Culinary Arts v. Lujan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 16, 22 [appellate court may affirm summary judgment on any correct legal theory raised by parties in trial court].)
This basis is section 1799.108, which immunizes certified first-aid providers except in cases of gross negligence or actions not taken in good faith. In support of their motion, defendants submitted evidence that all the ski patrollers who aided Fisher were properly certified. They also submitted evidence of the aid the patrollers gave, arguing that nothing in their actions or the surrounding circumstances gave any support to a claim of gross negligence or bad faith. This evidence included Fisher’s own statement in his deposition that the only thing he remembered about [*28] the people who aided him was that they insisted he lie still. It also included declarations by three patrollers who assisted Fisher: Mary Warner, Russ Bassett, and Richard Bailey. According to these declarations, a guest was helping Fisher when the ski patrollers first arrived. The guest said he was an EMT. The patrollers brought a toboggan, a backboard, a cervical collar, splints, and oxygen. Fisher was on the ground and the guest was correctly supporting his cervical spine, according to one of the patrollers. Fisher repeatedly yelled that his arms, legs, and back were broken and that he was going into shock. When one of the patrollers pinched Fisher’s leg and determined that he had no feeling in it, Fisher said he was paralyzed and became agitated. He swung his arms and tried to sit up until the patrollers calmed him and persuaded him to be still. The patrollers used the toboggan and backboard to bring Fisher to the first-aid patrol room, where his care was taken over by paramedics. The paramedics decided to transport Fisher to the hospital by ambulance.
In his opposition to the motion, Fisher presented no additional evidence. He only pointed to the evidence that he waved his arms [*29] and tried to sit up. Presumably his point was that, in the end, his injuries were too severe to allow this and therefore the patrollers might have made the injuries worse. He did not say so explicitly, however, and presented no supporting evidence. He also pointed out that defendants did not present an expert’s opinion that the patrollers did not act negligently.
A defendant moving for summary judgment has, at all stages, the burden of persuading the court that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of his cause of action. The defendant need not conclusively negate an element of the cause of action, however. Rather, the defendant must first bear a burden of producing evidence making a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of a triable issue of material fact. The burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving plaintiff, who must produce evidence making a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851, 853-855.)
In this case, Fisher does not claim there is a triable issue about whether the ski patrollers were certified. 3 He only claims there is a triable issue about whether they were [*30] grossly negligent or acted in bad faith. Defendants sustained their burden of producing evidence making a prima facie showing that there is no triable issue on the element of gross negligence or bad faith. As described in the ski patrollers’ declarations, the first aid they gave included nothing upon which a claim of gross negligence or bad faith could be founded. The fact that Fisher sat up and waved his arms, or attempted to do so, does not show that the ski patrollers made his injuries worse. There was no evidence that the sitting and waving or attempted sitting and waving were actions that later became impossible for Fisher, and no evidence that even if they did, this was because of anything done or omitted by the ski patrollers. Contrary to Fisher’s argument, there is no authority for the view that summary judgment can be obtained by a defendant on a claim of grossly negligent first aid only if the defendant presents an expert opinion that there was no gross negligence. Fisher presented no evidence to sustain his burden of making a prima facie showing that a triable issue exists on the element of gross negligence or bad faith. Defendants have sustained their ultimate burden of [*31] persuasion that Fisher cannot prove an essential element of this cause of action.
3 At oral argument, Fisher claimed, for the first time, that “some” of the ski patrollers were not certified. This claim does not appear in his discussion of this issue in his opening brief or his reply brief. It did not appear in his memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion for summary judgment or the errata he filed to that memorandum. In their statement of undisputed facts, defendants stated that responders Russ Bassett, Richard Bailey, Marc Smith, Tim Crosby, and Mary Warner were qualified in first aid through, or were first-aid instructors for, the American Red Cross or the National Ski Patrol. Fisher agreed that these facts were undisputed. He did not argue that these credentials did not amount to certification within the meaning of section 1799.108. His separate statement of disputed facts did not state any contrary evidence or assert that any uncertified patrollers administered first aid. A factually unsupported claim made for the first time at oral argument on appeal is not grounds for reversing summary judgment.
Defendants argue that the release, the doctrine of primary [*32] assumption of the risk, and section 1799.102 all also support the court’s decision. We need not address these additional theories. 4
4 In their appellate brief, defendants assert that the trial court “implicitly determined the Release did not apply to the actions of the ski patrol” because it granted summary judgment on that claim on a different basis. This is not correct. A court does not implicitly reject a theory merely by basing a decision on another theory. “[A]n opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2.)
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded costs on appeal.
Wiseman, Acting P.J.