Kendall v. USA Cycling, Inc. et al., 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5025

Kendall v. USA Cycling, Inc. et al., 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5025

Judith Kendall, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. USA Cycling, Inc. et al., Defendants and Respondents.



2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5025

June 8, 2005, Filed


PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BC 259296. Jon M. Mayeda, Judge.

COUNSEL: Gelfand and Gelfand, Robert E. Fisher, Gary B. Gelfand, and Raymond J. Feinberg for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Anthony J. Ellrod and Sylvia Havens for Defendants and Respondents.

JUDGES: RUBIN, J.; COOPER, P.J., FLIER, J. concurred.



Judith Kendall appeals from the summary judgment and attorney’s fee award entered for USA Cycling, Inc. and Huntsman World Senior Games in her negligence lawsuit against them. We affirm.


In October 2000, Judith Kendall was 59 years old and living in California when she entered a bicycle road race in Utah. The race was part of the Huntsman World Senior Games (Huntsman), organized and sponsored by Huntsman and USA [*2] Cycling, Inc. To participate in the race, Kendall, who had in the previous ten years ridden in about 30 bicycle races, tours, and endurance events, signed two release and waiver forms. The Huntsman release stated:

Recitals [P] I, the undersigned, acknowledge and fully understand that by participating in the World Senior Games, Inc. I will be engaging in activities or competition that may involve serious risks including bodily injury, permanent disability and death . . . which might result not only from my own actions, inactions or negligence, but the actions, inactions or negligence of others . . .; and that there may be other risks not known or not reasonably foreseeable. [P] . . . [P] Assumption of Risks. Except as otherwise specifically agreed herein, I assume all of the risks described in the Recitals section above and accept personal responsibility for any and all damages of any kind resulting from any injury, permanent disability and/or death. [P] Release of Liability. I hereby release, waive all claims of liability against, discharge and hold harmless the World Senior Games, Inc., its affiliated organizations, [and] its sponsors, including [*3] but not limited to Huntsman Corporation . . . from any and all liability of the undersigned, my heirs and next of kin, for any claims, demands, causes of action, losses or damages, on account of bodily injury [or] death . . . caused or alleged to be caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the persons or entities hereby released, and/or by the negligence of other participants . . . in connection with my participation in the World Senior Games events or activities.”

The USA Cycling release stated:

“I acknowledge that cycling is an inherently dangerous sport and fully realize the dangers of participating in a bicycle race and FULLY ASSUME THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH PARTICIPATION INCLUDING, by way of example, and not limitation, the following: the dangers of collision with . . . other racers . . .; THE RELEASEES’ OWN NEGLIGENCE; . . . and the possibility of serious physical and/or mental trauma or injury associated with athletic cycling competition. [P] . . . I HEREBY WAIVE, RELEASE, DISCHARGE, HOLD HARMLESS, AND PROMISE TO INDEMNIFY AND NOT SUE organizations . . . and their respective agents, officials, and employees through or by which the events will be [*4] held, (the foregoing are also collectively deemed to be Releasees), FROM ANY and all rights and CLAIMS INCLUDING CLAIMS ARISING FROM THE RELEASEES’ OWN NEGLIGENCE, which I have or which may hereafter accrue to me and from any and all damages which may be sustained by me directly or indirectly in connection with, or arising out of, my participation in or association with the event . . . .”

The race began at the appointed time, with Kendall and her female competitors starting first, followed five minutes later by the senior male racers. During the race, a male racer overtook Kendall and, in passing her, their bike wheels tangled. Kendall vainly struggled to keep her balance, but fell and suffered severe injuries.

Kendall sued USA Cycling Inc. and Huntsman for negligence in starting the men’s race on the same road five minutes after the women’s race began. Huntsman and USA Cycling moved for summary judgment, arguing that even if they had been negligent, the waiver and releases were a complete defense barring Kendall’s complaint. The court agreed, and entered judgment for respondents.

Respondents moved under the attorney’s fee clause of the USA Cycling release to recover more [*5] than $ 32,000 in attorney’s fees. 1 Kendall opposed the motion, claiming respondents had not supported it with sufficient admissible evidence. She also opposed any fee award for Huntsman in particular because the Huntsman release did not have an attorney’s fee clause. In response, the court ordered respondents to support their motion with detailed billing statements. After respondents filed their billing statements, the court overruled Kendall’s evidentiary objections and awarded respondents slightly less than $ 32,000 in fees. Kendall appeals from the judgment and the fee award.

1 Respondents also sought and recovered their costs, but those costs are not at issue in this appeal.


Kendall contends the court erred when it enforced the releases. She attacks the releases on several grounds. None is persuasive.

1. Utah Law Did Not Apply

Kendall contends the court erred by not applying Utah law to reject the releases. Her contention raises the question of which state’s laws apply: [*6] Utah-where the injury occurred-or California-where Kendall lives and filed suit. Under governing choice of law principles which weigh Utah’s and California’s governmental interests in seeing their laws enforced, we first consider whether a material difference exists between the two states’ laws. If their laws do not differ, we need not address whether Utah law applies, and may instead look solely to California law. (Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 919-920; Reich v. Purcell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 551, 555, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31; Tucci v. Club Mediterranee (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 180, 189.)

Kendall asserts two material differences exist between Utah and California law that are important to her lawsuit against respondents. The central difference, according to her, is Utah prohibits bicycle road races. It follows, she argues, that Utah would not enforce the releases because they violate public policy by waiving liability for an unlawful activity. Kendall’s contention fails, however, because she mischaracterizes Utah law. Utah does not ban bicycle road races outright; instead, it merely requires that organizers of a [*7] road race get permission from state or local highway officials for the race. The pertinent Utah statute states, “(1) Bicycle racing on highways is prohibited . . . except as authorized in this section. [P] (2) Bicycle racing on a highway is permitted when a racing event is approved by state or local authorities on any highway under their respective jurisdictions. . . .” (Utah Code Annotated (1953) 41-6-87.9.) Kendall cites no evidence that respondents did not get permission for the race, and indeed all the evidence in the record which touches on the subject points the other way.

But, even if the absence of a permit in the record means the race was unpermitted, the result would not change. The permit’s purpose is traffic control, not micromanaging the particulars of how the race is conducted. In its entirety, the statute states,

“(1) Bicycle racing on highways is prohibited under Section 41-6-51, except as authorized in this section. [P] (2) Bicycle racing on a highway is permitted when a racing event is approved by state or local authorities on any highway under their respective jurisdictions. Approval of bicycle highway racing events may be granted only under conditions which [*8] assure reasonable safety for all race participants, spectators, and other highway users, and which prevent unreasonable interference with traffic flow which would seriously inconvenience other highway users. [P] (3) By agreement with the approving authority, participants in an approved bicycle highway racing event may be exempted from compliance with any traffic laws otherwise applicable, if traffic control is adequate to assure the safety of all highway users.”

Emphasizing the focus on traffic, the statute cross-references only one section in the Utah Administrative Code. That regulation, entitled “Permit Required for Special Road Use or Event: Special Road Use,” states in its entirety that the Utah Department of Transportation:

“. . . shall promote safe utilization of highways for parades, marathons, and bicycle races. Special Road Use permits shall be required for any use of state routes other than normal traffic movement. Permits may be obtained by fulfilling requirements of DOT [Department of Transportation] form ‘Special Road Use Permit’. Policy applies to all routes under jurisdiction of DOT. Permittee shall hold DOT harmless in event of litigation. A traffic control plan, [*9] in accordance with latest edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices and Barricading and Construction Standard Drawings, shall be provided to, and approved by Dept. District Traffic Engineer or Permittee shall restore the particular road segment to its original condition, free from litter, etc. All applications for permits shall be made a minimum of 15 days prior to the specified activity.” (UT ADC R920-4-1)

Outside of traffic effects, and the concomitant general safety concerns whenever bicycles and motor vehicles are in close proximity, nothing within the permitting scheme suggests Utah authorities concerned themselves with a race’s details beyond its being “reasonably safe” for all concerned. Nothing hints that the approval of Utah authorities depended on the number of riders, their gender, or their starting times. Thus, Kendall’s injuries were not within the scope of the permitting statute’s purpose. Consequently, there was no legal nexus between the statutory violation of an unpermitted race (assuming that occurred) and Kendall’s damages.

A second difference, according to Kendall, between Utah and California law is Utah views preinjury liability releases more [*10] skeptically than does California. In support, she cites Hawkins ex rel. Hawkins v. Peart (Utah 2001) 2001 UT 94, 37 P.3d 1062 (Hawkins). That decision refused to enforce a preinjury release signed by a parent for her child because Utah expressly prohibits parents from signing away their children’s rights. (Id. at pp. 1065-1066.) In its discussion, Hawkins noted courts must scrutinize preinjury releases to make sure they are fairly bargained. (Id. at p. 1066.) Hawkins does not, however, as Kendall states, prohibit preinjury releases.

But even if suspicion of preinjury releases existed in Utah law, the releases here would pass muster. Hawkins noted that Utah permits preinjury releases except when the activity affects the public interest. The Hawkins court explained, “It is generally held that those who are not engaged in public service may properly bargain against liability for harm caused by their ordinary negligence in performance of contractual duty . . . . Thus, most courts allow release of liability for prospective negligence, except where there is a strong public interest in the services provided.” (Hawkins, supra, 37 P.3d at p. 1065, [*11] fn. omitted; see also Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc. (Utah App. 1995) 905 P.2d 901, 905 [preinjury releases lawful in Utah].) Kendall cites no authority, and we know of none, that a voluntary recreational activity such as a bike race implicates the public interest.

In sum, Kendall’s two examples of differences between Utah and California law are unavailing. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it applied California law below. (Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 919-920; Reich v. Purcell, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 555; Tucci v. Club Mediterranee, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 189.)

2. The Releases Are Enforceable

The elements of a valid release are well established. First, it must be clear and unambiguous. Second, it must not violate public policy-an element we can quickly pass over here because a release covering recreational sports is not against public policy or the public interest. (Lund v. Bally’s Aerobic Plus, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 733, 739 (Lund); Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1373 (Allan); Buchan v. United States Cycling Federation, Inc. (1991) 227 Cal. App. 3d 134, 277 Cal. Rptr. 887 [*12] [bicycle racing does not involve public interest].) And third, the injury at issue must be reasonably related to the release’s object and purpose. (Lund, at pp. 738-739; Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 748, 757.) Kendall contends the USA Cycling and Huntsman releases are unenforceable because (1) they are ambiguous, and (2) did not cover the risk of her sharing the road with male racers.

a. Not Ambiguous

Kendall’s assertion that the USA Cycling release was ambiguous turns on its placement of two signature lines: a signature line for the entrant, and, if the entrant were a minor, a signature line for the minor’s parent or guardian. Kendall signed on the parent’s line, not, as one might suppose, the entrant’s line. She argues her signature’s placement makes the release ambiguous.

The test for ambiguity is whether Kendall’s placement of her signature is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. (Solis v. Kirkwood Resort Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 354, 360.) She offers no explanation to challenge the obvious inference that she simply misplaced her signature. She does not deny that she wanted to enter [*13] the race, and does not dispute that she needed to sign the form to be allowed in. Never does she claim she was signing on a minor’s behalf. In short, she offers no interpretation of her signature’s placement on the parental consent line other than her innocent mistake. As such, her signature is not susceptible to more than one interpretation.

Kendall notes that we must interpret the release by objective manifestations of her intent, not her subjective intent. Hence, according to her, it does not matter what she subjectively intended when she signed the release; what matters is the objective manifestation of her signature on the parental release line, which she argues compels us to find the release did not bind her (or at best was ambiguous) because she did not sign it as an entrant.

We conclude that the objective manifestation of Kendall’s intent cuts the other way. Although the face of the release shows she signed as a parent, she offers no explanation for her signature being there other than her desire to join the race. The objective manifestation of her intent, therefore, is she signed as an entrant-albeit on the wrong line. (Lopez v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1233-1234 [*14] [“The test is ‘what the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to believe.’ [Citation.]”].)

Kendall’s reliance on Roth v. Malson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 552 (Roth), does not change the result because the facts are distinguishable. Roth involved a real estate sale agreement with two signature lines: one to accept the agreement and one to make a counteroffer. The real estate buyer signed on the counteroffer line and returned the agreement to the seller. The seller rejected the ostensible “counteroffer” and sold the property to someone else. The buyer sued to enforce the agreement, claiming he had signed on the counteroffer line by mistake, and had intended to sign on the acceptance line. He argued his signature was subject to no reasonable interpretation other than an acceptance because he did not add any new conditions to the counteroffer, meaning the counteroffer was not truly a counter. The Roth court rejected that argument, noting that divining the buyer’s intent as an acceptance with no new conditions would have required a time consuming comparison of the offers and counteroffers exchanged between the parties, a comparison [*15] no one was obligated to make. The court therefore refused to enforce the agreement because it was plausible the buyer intended to counter, instead of accept, the seller’s offer. (Id. at pp. 558-559.) Here, in contrast, Kendall offers no plausible explanation for her signature on the parental release line-in a senior’s race no less-than that she intended her signature to show her acceptance of the release’s terms.

Kendall contends the Huntsman release is also ambiguous, and therefore cannot be enforced against her. In support, she notes language in the release suggests she was releasing herself as the release’s “undersigned” from any liability: “I hereby release, waive all claims of liability against, discharge and hold harmless the World Senior Games, Inc. [and others], . . . from any and all liability of the undersigned, my heirs and next of kin, for any claims, demands, causes of action, losses or damages . . . .” (Italics added.) We need not address possible drafting errors in the Huntsman release because the USA Cycling release covered all organizations involved in the race. The USA Cycling release stated it covered the “organizations . . . and their [*16] respective agents, officials, and employees through or by which the events will be held . . . .” Such language encompassed Huntsman, making Huntsman’s own release superfluous as to this point.

b. Injury Within Scope of Release

Kendall contends the releases did not apply to her because she did not know or reasonably foresee she would be sharing the road with male racers in what she believed was a women-only race. She argues respondents thus wrongfully increased the risk she had assumed in entering an all-female race. Kendall’s focus on whether she could have foreseen colliding with a male racer misses the mark because foreseeability is irrelevant when a tortfeasor relies on an express, written release. (Allan, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372.) For a written release, the focus instead is whether Kendall’s injuries related to the release’s object and purpose. (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1357.) When a risk is expressly assumed, the assumption is a complete defense to a negligence claim. (Allan, at p. 1372.) Here, the release covered anyone participating in the Huntsman World Senior Games and included collisions [*17] with “other racers,” not just female racers. The release’s language thus covered Kendall’s accident.

In support of limiting an express waiver to foreseeable risks, Kendall cites Bennett v. United States Cycling Federation (1987) 193 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 239 Cal. Rptr. 55 (Bennett), a case involving a release in a bicycle race on closed roads where a car struck the plaintiff. Finding that the release applied only to obvious or foreseeable hazards, the Bennett court held it was a triable issue whether an automobile on the race course was a reasonably foreseeable risk within the scope of the release. (Id. at pp. 1490-1491.) Likening her collision with a male racer in what she thought was a female only race to a collision with a car on closed roads, Kendall argues she could not have reasonably foreseen respondents would permit male racers on the same course only five minutes after she started. We conclude that even if one accepts Bennett’s injection of foreseeability into an express written release (but see Madison v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d 589, 601, fn. 9, 250 Cal. Rptr. 299 [criticizing Bennett for confusing [*18] foreseeability with scope of release]), the result would not change here. Kendall received a race map and brochure when she submitted her race application. Those documents showed men and women would be using the same road course, and would be segregated by age, but not sex. That Kendall apparently chose not to read the documents (an inference we draw from her professed ignorance that men would be on the same course) does not make male racers unforeseeable or the scope of the release narrower. Moreover, the court here found the risk of being hit by another racer is inherent to bicycle racing. The Bennett court itself notes the foreseeability of such collisions. It stated: “There is little doubt that a subscriber of the bicycle release at issue here must be held to have waived any hazards relating to bicycle racing that are obvious or that might reasonably have been foreseen. . . . these hazards include ‘collisions with other riders . . . .’ ” (Bennett, supra, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 1490; see also Buchan v. United States Cycling Federation, Inc., supra, 227 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 148, 151-152 [collisions and falls are foreseeable risk in bike racing]. [*19] ) The trial court thus did not err in concluding Kendall’s accident was legally foreseeable.

3. Attorney’s Fees

The trial court awarded respondents $ 31,978.50 in attorney’s fees. We review the award for abuse of discretion. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Avikian v. WTC Financial Corp. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1119.)

Respondents supported their motion for fees with billing statements and a declaration by a partner in their counsel’s firm. The billing statements showed the hours worked, the rates charged, and the work done (with privileged information redacted). The partner stated he was familiar with how his firm generated its bills and that the fees stated on the bills had been incurred. Kendall contends the bills and declaration were inadmissible hearsay. Courts have held otherwise. The trial court is best placed to assess the appropriateness of the work done and the fees incurred. A verified bill on which the items appear proper is sufficient to support a fee award. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal. App. 3d 618, 624, 134 Cal. Rptr. 602.) Indeed, given a trial court’s first-hand familiarity [*20] with the work done by counsel, billing statements themselves can be superfluous. (Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293 [“there is no legal requirement that [billing ] statements be offered in evidence. An attorney’s testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.”].)

Kendall notes that only the USA Cycling release had an attorney’s fee provision. She contends that even if USA Cycling is entitled to its fees, the motion should have been denied as to Huntsman. In support, she cites Super 7 Motel Associates v. Wang (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 541 (Super 7 Motel), for the proposition that a party in a multiple contract transaction involving several parties cannot recover its attorney’s fees unless its particular contract has a fee provision. (Id. at pp. 545-547.) Super 7 Motel is distinguishable, however, because its facts permitted allocation of the legal work and fees to the various parties. Super 7 Motel did not address fee awards when the legal work and fees cannot be allocated. Here, [*21] allocation appears difficult, if not impossible. Kendall filed one complaint against respondents, to which they replied with a shared answer and defeated with a shared motion for summary judgment. The evidence and legal arguments in support of respondents’ motion for summary judgment overlapped substantively and procedurally. The record does not show that respondents’ counsel would have spent any less time or that its arguments would have been any different if only USA Cycling had been a defendant. Because it is not fatal to a fee award if apportionment between issues and arguments is difficult, or even impossible, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees for counsel’s work representing USA Cycling and Huntsman. (Liton Gen. Engineering Contractor, Inc. v. United Pacific Insurance (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 577, 588 [no allocation of two parties’ liability required]; accord Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129-130, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1 [“Attorney’s fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed.”); [*22] Abdallah v. United Savings Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1111 [multiple causes of action may be so intertwined that it would be “impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the multitude of conjoined activities into compensable or noncompensable time units.”].)


The judgment and fee award are affirmed. Each side to bear its own costs on appeal.


We concur:




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