Indemnification fails again in a release. Parent of child having a birthday at climbing gym signed release for the injured child, not her own child.
Posted: September 14, 2020 Filed under: Climbing Wall, Connecticut, Minors, Youth, Children, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: adhesion, Adhesion Contract, apportionment, bargaining, Birthday Party, Climb, Climbing Wall, common law, contractual, discovery, Electronic Signature, genuine, Horseback, Indemnification, Indemnification Clause, indemnify, Indemnity, negotiation, patron's, quotation, recreational, Release, riding, rock, Rock Climb Fairfield, safe, signor, Snow Tubing, Third Party, training, visitor, Waiver Leave a commentIndemnification is rarely if upheld in a release. The language does not meet the requirements needed under the law in most states to be an indemnification agreement.
Cannon v. Rock Climb Fairfield, LLC, 2020 Conn. Super. LEXIS 261
State: Connecticut, Superior Court of, Judicial District of Fairfield At Bridgeport
Plaintiff: Cindy Cannon PPA Emma Cannon
Defendant: Rock Climb Fairfield, LLC, Carabiners Fairfield, LLC and Matthew Conroy
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Indemnification by third party
Holding: for the Plaintiff
Year: 2020
Summary
Connecticut climbing gym had mother of a group of girls at a gym for a birthday party sign release for all the girls. After one of the girls was injured and sued, the climbing gym attempted to recover money from the mother who signed the release based on the language of the release in its indemnification clause. That failed.
If failed so badly the court voided the entire release finding it to be an adhesion contract.
Indemnification agreements in releases never work to recover damages from an injured plaintiff.
Facts
We are never made aware of the facts that gave rise to the injury that created this decision. However, since the issue is solely who is liable under contract (release) for the injury it is not really relevant.
The case arises from an incident where the minor plaintiff, Emma Cannon, fell from a climbing wall at the Rock Climb defendant’s indoor rock climbing facility located in Fairfield, Connecticut. The minor plaintiff claims she sustained personal injuries. On behalf of her minor child, Cindy Cannon instituted the present action alleging the facility, its agents and employees were negligent in supervising the rock climbing activities, thereby causing the minor plaintiff’s injuries. The defendants have filed an answer and eight special defenses to the amended complaint.
Thereafter, the Rock Climb defendants filed an apportionment complaint against the defendant Kate Licata, who brought the minor plaintiff, Emma Cannon, and several other girls to the facility for a group birthday party event. The apportionment complaint is dated February 6, 2019.4 The apportionment complaint alleges that Licata was negligent in numerous ways and seeks an apportionment of liability and damages as to Licata for the percentage of negligence attributable to her. The apportionment complaint is not the subject of the motion for summary judgment that is presently before the court. The Rock Climb defendants also filed a cross claim against Licata alleging contractual and common-law indemnity. The cross claim, which is the subject of Licata’s motion for summary judgment, is dated February 22, 2019.
So, the parent of the birthday child signed releases for the children attending the birthday party. When one child was injured and sued the climbing gym, the climbing gym brought the parent who signed the release into the lawsuit based on the indemnification language in the releases she signed.
The release was signed electronically; however, this was not an issue the court seemed interested in looking at.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The cross claim alleges that the Rock Climb defendants, who are the third-party plaintiffs, require all invitees to its facility to complete a “Release of Liability and Assumption of Risk” form before participating in rock climbing activities. If the participant is a minor, the form must be signed by the minor’s parent or court-appointed guardian, which Licata was not.
The defendant climbing gym filed a motion for summary judgement arguing the mother should be liable for any damages they pay out on behalf of the injured minor child. This was based on two legal theories the first was the indemnification language found in the release itself.
The release form contains language to the effect that the parent or guardian of the minor has explained the inherent risks of the activity to the minor and the minor understands the said risks and that the minor, nonetheless, wishes to participate in the activities. The release form further provides that “the parent of the minor visitor . . . forever discharge, and agree to indemnify . . . Carabiners Fairfield, LLC, its agents, owners, officers, volunteers, employees, and all other persons or entities acting in any capacity on its behalf . . . from any and all claims, suits, demands, causes of action, which are in any way connected with my or the minor visitor’s visit to the RCF activity site . . . My agreement of indemnity is intended to include claims arising out of losses suffered by me (an adult climber or parent) or the child and losses caused by me or the child. The agreements of indemnity and release include claims of negligence . . . of a Released Party.” The Rock Climb defendants allege that Licata completed an online version of the Release form and electronically signed it on behalf of the minor plaintiff Emma Cannon on October 3, 2016. Thus, Licata is contractually obligated to defend and indemnify the Rock Climb defendants for the injuries and damages resulting from Emma Cannon’s fall at the Rock Climb defendants’ facility pursuant to General Statutes §52-102a.5
The second defense or reason why the mother should be liable was based on common-law indemnification.
The Rock Climb defendants also allege Licata is liable for common-law indemnification, claiming that any injuries sustained by the minor plaintiff were proximately caused, in whole or part, by Licata’s negligence and carelessness in multiple ways. Among these allegations are failing to supervise and monitor the minor; failing to instruct the minor; and failing to warn the minor of the dangerous nature and risks of the activity. Lastly, the Rock Climb defendants argue that a substantial amount of discovery remains outstanding and various issues of fact are yet to be settled, and therefore, it argues that Licata’s summary judgment motion should be denied.
To succeed on an indemnification agreement the court found under Connecticut law the defendant climbing gym must show the following.
A party may bring an indemnification claim based on the terms of an indemnity agreement . . . [A]llegations of contractual indemnification must be supported by the terms of the contract or the contract itself . . . Under Connecticut law, to state a contract-based indemnification claim, the claimant must allege either an express or implied contractual right to indemnification . . . There is no requirement that a party seeking indemnification must assert allegations of exclusive control (or any of the other elements of a claim for indemnification based on active-passive negligence) in order to state a legally sufficient claim for contractual indemnification.
An indemnification agreement in Connecticut has four elements.
“The essential elements for a cause of action based on breach of contract are (1) the formation of an agreement, (2) performance by one party, (3) breach of the agreement by the opposing party, and (4) damages . . . [and] causation.”
The plaintiff argued that the entire release was void because of two prior Connecticut court decisions.
Lastly, the Reardon court noted that the release that the plaintiff signed broadly indemnifying the defendants from liability for damages resulting from the defendants’ own negligence was a classic contract of adhesion of the type that this court found to be in violation of public policy in Hanks.
(See Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, et al., 280 Conn. 153; 905 A.2d 1156; 2006 Conn. LEXIS 330
and
States that do not Support the Use of a Release.)
The release stated the mother who signed the release knew that “the defendants’ [facilities or equipment] were maintained in a reasonably safe condition. The court found this to be utterly bogus (as do I). The mother had no knowledge or experience rock climbing and no clue, whether the facility was in good condition.
To the contrary, it was the defendants, not the plaintiff or the other customers, who had the “expertise and opportunity to foresee and control hazards, and to guard against the negligence of their agents and employees. They alone [could] properly maintain and inspect their premises, and train their employees in risk management.” In particular, the defendants acknowledged that they were responsible for providing their patrons with safe horses, qualified instructors, as well as properly maintained working equipment and riding surfaces.
This was the same position a Connecticut court in Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corporation et al., 276 Conn. 314; 885 A.2d 734; 2005 Conn. LEXIS 500, that the requirements in the release were absurd because the knowledge necessary to know and understand if the activity was safe or the equipment was in good working order was solely within the knowledge and experience of the defendant.
As we concluded in Hanks, it is illogical to relieve the defendants, as the party with greater expertise and information concerning the dangers associated with engaging in horseback riding at their facility, from potential claims of negligence surrounding an alleged failure to administer properly the activity.
The court then, using the issue of the ability of the mother who signed the release to contract about the equipment found the release to be a contract of adhesion.
Specifically, we have noted that the most salient feature of adhesion contracts is that they are not subject to the normal bargaining processes of ordinary contracts, and that they tend to involve a standard form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usually a consumer, who has little choice about the terms.
The issue of whether or not the release was an adhesion contract had been touched on lightly; however, the court eventually unloaded on the defendant finding the release to be a contract of adhesion, which voids releases in most states.
…that the release that the plaintiff signed broadly indemnifying the defendants from liability for damages resulting from the defendants’ own negligence was a classic contract of adhesion of the type that this court found to be in violation of public policy in Hanks.
Most states look at recreation, and since it is not a necessity, something needed for the modern survival of a person or family as not being contacts of adhesion. However, in Connecticut, there is no review of why the release is signed, just a review of the specific language in the release to determine if it is an adhesion contract.
The court then looked at the release under the requirements of the Connecticut Supreme Court and found the release lacking as well as the indemnification language in the release.
In the present case, the defendant’s facility was open to the general public regardless of a patron’s experience level. The minor plaintiff was a ten-year-old female. The defendants have admitted that they provided instruction to the group of minors attending the birthday celebration at the defendants’ facility. Neither the minor plaintiff or Licata provided any of the equipment to be used. Licata, herself, did not provide training, guidance or supervision to the minors, including the minor plaintiff. Licata possessed no special knowledge regarding rock climbing or bouldering activities including training and safety procedures other than an initial orientation by RCF employees. Maklad testified at her deposition that the orientation lasted only five to ten minutes. The RCF defendants/third-party plaintiffs admit that there was zero expectation that Licata would “train and guide climbers” or to inspect various facility equipment. RCF argues that they did expect that parents and guardians would supervise children. Thus, there is a question of fact as to whether or not Licata was adequately supervising the minor plaintiff Cannon when she fell. The court disagrees.
And then tore the release apart based on the lack of bargaining power between the parties.
In this case, signing the release provided by RCF was required as a condition of the plaintiff’s participation in the bouldering and rock climbing activities at the RCF facility. There was no opportunity for negotiation by the plaintiff, and if she was unsatisfied with the terms of the release, her only option was to not to allow the minor guests who accompanied her to the birthday party to participate. Licata had no bargaining power with respect to the negotiation of the release and in order to participate in the activity, she was required to assume the risk of the defendants’ negligence. “This condition of participation violates the stated public policy of our tort system because the plaintiff was required to bear an additional risk despite her status as a patron who was not in a position to foresee or control the alleged negligent conduct that she was confronted with, or manage and spread the risk more effectively then the defendants.”
The court then looked at the common-law indemnification argument of the climbing gym. For one party to hold the other party liable under common law, the following facts must be in place.
(1) the third party against whom indemnification is sought was negligent; (2) the third party’s active negligence, rather than the defendant’s own passive negligence, was the direct, immediate cause of the accident and the resulting harm; (3) the third party was in control of the situation to the exclusion of the defendant seeking reimbursement; and (4) the defendant did not know of the third party’s negligence, had no reason to anticipate it, and reasonably could rely on the third party not to be negligent.”
Just looking at these requirements at a climbing wall, you know the mother of a child hosting a birthday party, there is not going to meet any of these requirements.
The defendant climbing wall could not produce any evidence that the mother was in exclusive control of the situation to the exclusion of all others.
The mother’s motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff’s indemnification claims failed.
So Now What?
Overall, the language in this release did not meet Connecticut law on many counts. However, the court found the language to be so one-sided and so bad that if found multiple ways to void it. Releases must be written for the activity, the guests and the law of the state where the release will be used. When you have a state like Connecticut, where releases are always on a thing line between valid and void, the language is critical to succeed.
Indemnification claims in a release have never worked. The only way that the claims may work, would be against third parties when the liability is created by the guest. An example of something like that might be a guest on a trip starts a forest fire. The special-use permit or concession agreement generally holds the outfitter/permittee/concessionaire liable for the damages caused by the fire. The indemnification clause might work in that situation to recover some of the money to reimburse the outfitter.
(Always make sure your outfitter liability policy provides coverage for actions to third parties by your guests.)
However, I have never found a case where indemnification has worked to recover damages for an injury from parents, friends or the leader of the group of kids. Maine looked at the language of indemnification in a release and seemed to indicate it would be supported if written correctly. See Maine follows the majority and does not allow a parent to sign away a minor’s right to sue.
The situation that created this mess is classic. A group of kids is coming to your business or program, and no one has notified the parents of a requirement to sign a release in advance. Upon arrival, someone who does not know or understand or a facility that does not care just has the adult with the kids sign the paperwork. That does not work.
Either get the parent’s signatures on documents or spend most of the time creating an assumption of the risk defense by educating the kids.
Don’t waste the paper or electrons having a youth leader or mother responsible of the group sign the release for the rest of the children in attendance. It just does not work.
This will be the fourth article I’ve written about Connecticut courts voiding releases. If you work or operate in Connecticut you are probably working in a state that does not support the use of a release.
For more information about indemnification see:
Indemnification agreements? What are you signing?
What do you think? Leave a comment.
Copyright 2020 Recreation Law (720) 334 8529
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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
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Colorado Electronic Signature Act
Posted: November 14, 2014 Filed under: Colorado, Contract | Tags: CO, Colorado, Colorado Electronic Signature Act, Contract, Electronic Signature, Electronic Signatures 2 CommentsColorado Electronic Signature Act
24-71-101. Electronic signatures – construction with other laws
(1) As used in this article, “electronic signature” means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.
(2) In any written communication in which a signature is required or used, any party to the communication may affix a signature by use of an electronic signature that complies with the requirements of article 71.3 of this title for electronic signatures.
(3) The use or acceptance of an electronic signature shall be at the option of the parties. Nothing in this section shall require any person to use or permit the use of an electronic signature.
(4) In the event of any conflict between article 71.3 of this title and this article, said article 71.3 shall control, but only to the extent of such conflict.
24-71.3-102. Definitions
As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) “Agreement” means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances and from rules, regulations, and procedures given the effect of agreements under laws otherwise applicable to a particular transaction.
(2) “Automated transaction” means a transaction conducted or performed, in whole or in part, by electronic means or electronic records in which the acts or records of one or both parties are not reviewed by an individual in the ordinary course in forming a contract, performing under an existing contract, or fulfilling an obligation required by the transaction.
(3) “Computer program” means a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in an information processing system in order to bring about a certain result.
(4) “Contract” means the total legal obligation resulting from the parties’ agreement as affected by this article and other applicable law.
(5) “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
(6) “Electronic agent” means a computer program or an electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances, in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual.
(7) “Electronic record” means a record created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.
(8) “Electronic signature” means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.
(9) “Governmental agency” means an executive agency, department, board, commission, authority, institution, or instrumentality of the federal government or of a state or of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of a state.
(10) “Information” means data, text, images, sounds, codes, computer programs, software, databases, or the like.
(11) “Information processing system” means an electronic system for creating, generating, sending, receiving, storing, displaying, or processing information.
(12) “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, governmental agency, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(13) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(14) “Security procedure” means a procedure employed for the purpose of verifying that an electronic signature, record, or performance is that of a specific person or for detecting changes or errors in the information in an electronic record. The term includes a procedure that requires the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, or callback or other acknowledgment procedures.
(15) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan native village, that is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
(16) “Transaction” means an action or set of actions occurring between two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial, charitable, or governmental affairs. For the purpose of this article, “transaction” shall not mean any ballot cast in any election or any petition related to any department, board, commission, authority, institution, or instrumentality of the state or any county, municipality, or of their political subdivisions, or any of their instrumentalities.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, this article applies to electronic records and electronic signatures relating to a transaction.
(2) This article does not apply to a transaction to the extent it is governed by:
(a) A law governing the creation and execution of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts;
(b) The “Uniform Commercial Code”, title 4, C.R.S., other than sections 4-1-107 and 4-1-206, C.R.S., and articles 2 and 2.5 of title 4, C.R.S.
(3) Additional exceptions. This article shall not apply to:
(a) Court orders or notices or official court documents, including briefs, pleadings, and other writings, required to be executed in connection with court proceedings;
(b) Any notice of:
(I) The cancellation or termination of utility services, including water, heat, and power;
(II) Default, acceleration, repossession, foreclosure, or eviction, or the right to cure, under a credit agreement secured by, or a rental agreement for, a primary residence of an individual;
(III) The cancellation or termination of health insurance or benefits or life insurance benefits, excluding annuities; or
(IV) Recall of a product, or material failure of a product, that risks endangering health or safety; or
(c) Any document required to accompany any transportation or handling of hazardous materials, pesticides, or other toxic or dangerous materials.
(4) This article applies to an electronic record or electronic signature otherwise excluded from the application of this article under subsection (2) of this section to the extent it is governed by a law other than those specified in said subsection (2).
(5) A transaction subject to this article is also subject to other applicable substantive law.
(6) (a) This article is not intended to limit, modify, or supercede the requirements of section 101 (d), 101 (e), 102 (c), 103 (a), or 103 (b) of the federal “Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act”, 15 U.S.C. sec. 7001 (d), 7001 (e), 7002 (c), 7003 (a), and 7003 (b).
(b) The consumer disclosures contained in section 101 (c) of the federal “Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act”, 15 U.S.C. sec. 7001 (c), are incorporated by reference and shall also apply to intrastate transactions.
24-71.3-104. Prospective application
This article applies to any electronic record or electronic signature created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored on or after May 30, 2002.
24-71.3-105. Use of electronic records and electronic signatures – variation by agreement
(1) This article does not require a record or signature to be created, generated, sent, communicated, received, stored, or otherwise processed or used by electronic means or in electronic form.
(2) This article applies only to transactions between parties each of which has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means. Whether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances, including the parties’ conduct.
(3) A party that agrees to conduct a transaction by electronic means may refuse to conduct other transactions by electronic means. The right granted by this subsection (3) may not be waived by agreement.
(4) Except as otherwise provided in this article, the effect of any of its provisions may be varied by agreement. The presence in certain provisions of this article of the words “unless otherwise agreed”, or words of similar import, does not imply that the effect of other provisions may not be varied by agreement.
(5) Whether an electronic record or electronic signature has legal consequences is determined by this article and other applicable law.
24-71.3-106. Construction and application
(1) This article must be construed and applied:
(a) To facilitate electronic transactions consistent with other applicable law;
(b) To be consistent with reasonable practices concerning electronic transactions and with the continued expansion of those practices; and
(c) To effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this article among states enacting it.
24-71.3-107. Legal recognition of electronic records, electronic signatures, and electronic contracts
(1) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.
(2) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.
(3) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law.
(4) If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.
24-71.3-108. Provision of information in writing – presentation of records
(1) If parties have agreed to conduct a transaction by electronic means and a law requires a person to provide, send, or deliver information in writing to another person, the requirement is satisfied if the information is provided, sent, or delivered, as the case may be, in an electronic record capable of retention by the recipient at the time of receipt. An electronic record is not capable of retention by the recipient if the sender or its information processing system inhibits the ability of the recipient to print or store the electronic record.
(2) If a law other than this article requires a record to be posted or displayed in a certain manner, to be sent, communicated, or transmitted by a specified method, or to contain information that is formatted in a certain manner, the following rules apply:
(a) The record must be posted or displayed in the manner specified in the other law.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of this section, the record must be sent, communicated, or transmitted by the method specified in the other law.
(c) The record must contain the information formatted in the manner specified in the other law.
(3) If a sender inhibits the ability of a recipient to store or print an electronic record, the electronic record is not enforceable against the recipient.
(4) The requirements of this section may not be varied by agreement, but:
(a) To the extent a law other than this article requires information to be provided, sent, or delivered in writing but permits that requirement to be varied by agreement, the requirement under subsection (1) of this section that the information be in the form of an electronic record capable of retention may also be varied by agreement; and
(b) A requirement under a law other than this article to send, communicate, or transmit a record by first-class mail, postage prepaid, or regular United States mail may be varied by agreement to the extent permitted by the other law.
24-71.3-109. Attribution and effect of electronic record and electronic signature
(1) An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.
(2) The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a person under subsection (1) of this section is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the parties’ agreement, if any, and otherwise as provided by law.
24-71.3-110. Effect of change or error
(1) If a change or error in an electronic record occurs in a transmission between parties to a transaction, the following rules apply:
(a) If the parties have agreed to use a security procedure to detect changes or errors and one party has conformed to the procedure, but the other party has not, and the nonconforming party would have detected the change or error had that party also conformed, the conforming party may avoid the effect of the changed or erroneous electronic record.
(b) In an automated transaction involving an individual, the individual may avoid the effect of an electronic record that resulted from an error made by the individual in dealing with the electronic agent of another person if the electronic agent did not provide an opportunity for the prevention or correction of the error and, at the time the individual learns of the error, the individual:
(I) Promptly notifies the other person of the error and that the individual did not intend to be bound by the electronic record received by the other person;
(II) Takes reasonable steps, including steps that conform to the other person’s reasonable instructions, to return to the other person or, if instructed by the other person, to destroy the consideration received, if any, as a result of the erroneous electronic record; and
(III) Has not used or received any benefit or value from the consideration, if any, received from the other person.
(c) If neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) applies, the change or error has the effect provided by other law, including the law of mistake, and the parties’ contract, if any.
(d) Paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection (1) may not be varied by agreement.
24-71.3-111. Notarization and acknowledgment
If a law requires a signature or record to be notarized, acknowledged, verified, or made under oath, the requirement is satisfied if the electronic signature of the person authorized to perform those acts, together with all other information required to be included by other applicable law, is attached to or logically associated with the signature or record.
24-71.3-112. Retention of electronic records – originals
(1) If a law requires that a record be retained, the requirement is satisfied by retaining an electronic record of the information in the record that:
(a) Accurately reflects the information set forth in the record after it was first generated in its final form as an electronic record or otherwise; and
(b) Remains accessible for later reference.
(2) A requirement to retain a record in accordance with subsection (1) of this section does not apply to any information the sole purpose of which is to enable the record to be sent, communicated, or received.
(3) A person may satisfy subsection (1) of this section by using the services of another person if the requirements of said subsection (1) are satisfied.
(4) If a law requires a record to be presented or retained in its original form, or provides consequences if the record is not presented or retained in its original form, that law is satisfied by an electronic record retained in accordance with subsection (1) of this section.
(5) If a law requires retention of a check, that requirement is satisfied by retention of an electronic record of the information on the front and back of the check in accordance with subsection (1) of this section.
(6) A record retained as an electronic record in accordance with subsection (1) of this section satisfies a law requiring a person to retain a record for evidentiary, audit, or like purposes unless a law enacted after May 30, 2002, specifically prohibits the use of an electronic record for the specified purpose.
(7) This section does not preclude a governmental agency of this state from specifying additional requirements for the retention of a record subject to the agency’s jurisdiction.
24-71.3-113. Admissibility in evidence
In a proceeding, evidence of a record or signature may not be excluded solely because it is in electronic form.
24-71.3-114. Automated transaction
(1) In an automated transaction, the following rules apply:
(a) A contract may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents of the parties, even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the electronic agents’ actions or the resulting terms and agreements.
(b) A contract may be formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an individual, acting on the individual’s own behalf or for another person, including by an interaction in which the individual performs actions that the individual is free to refuse to perform and that the individual knows or has reason to know will cause the electronic agent to complete the transaction or performance.
(c) The terms of the contract are determined by the substantive law applicable to it.
24-71.3-115. Time and place of sending and receipt
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between the sender and the recipient, an electronic record is sent when it:
(a) Is addressed properly or otherwise directed properly to an information processing system that the recipient has designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic records or information of the type sent and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record;
(b) Is in a form capable of being processed by that system; and
(c) Enters an information processing system outside the control of the sender or of a person that sent the electronic record on behalf of the sender or enters a region of the information processing system designated or used by the recipient that is under the control of the recipient.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed between a sender and the recipient, an electronic record is received when:
(a) It enters an information processing system that the recipient has designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic records or information of the type sent and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record; and
(b) It is in a form capable of being processed by that system.
(3) Subsection (2) of this section applies even if the place the information processing system is located is different from the place the electronic record is deemed to be received under subsection (4) of this section.
(4) Unless otherwise expressly provided in the electronic record or agreed between the sender and the recipient, an electronic record is deemed to be sent from the sender’s place of business and to be received at the recipient’s place of business. For purposes of this subsection (4), the following rules apply:
(a) If the sender or recipient has more than one place of business, the place of business of that person is the place having the closest relationship to the underlying transaction.
(b) If the sender or the recipient does not have a place of business, the place of business is the sender’s or recipient’s residence, as the case may be.
(5) An electronic record is received under subsection (2) of this section even if no individual is aware of its receipt.
(6) Receipt of an electronic acknowledgment from an information processing system described in subsection (2) of this section establishes that a record was received but, by itself, does not establish that the content sent corresponds to the content received.
(7) If a person is aware that an electronic record purportedly sent under subsection (1) of this section or purportedly received under subsection (2) of this section was not actually sent or received, the legal effect of the sending or receipt is determined by other applicable law. Except to the extent permitted by the other law, the requirements of this subsection (7) may not be varied by agreement.
24-71.3-116. Transferable records
(1) In this section, “transferable record” means an electronic record that:
(a) Would be a note under article 3 of the “Uniform Commercial Code”, title 4, C.R.S., or a document under article 7 of the “Uniform Commercial Code”, if the electronic record were in writing; and
(b) The issuer of the electronic record expressly has agreed is a transferable record.
(2) A person has control of a transferable record if a system employed for evidencing the transfer of interests in the transferable record reliably establishes that person as the person to which the transferable record was issued or transferred.
(3) A system satisfies subsection (2) of this section, and a person is deemed to have control of a transferable record, if the transferable record is created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that:
(a) A single authoritative copy of the transferable record exists that is unique, identifiable, and, except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (d), (e), and (f) of this subsection (3), unalterable;
(b) The authoritative copy identifies the person asserting control as:
(I) The person to which the transferable record was issued; or
(II) If the authoritative copy indicates that the transferable record has been transferred, the person to which the transferable record was most recently transferred;
(c) The authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the person asserting control or its designated custodian;
(d) Copies or revisions that add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy can be made only with the consent of the person asserting control;
(e) Each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a copy is readily identifiable as a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and
(f) Any revision of the authoritative copy is readily identifiable as authorized or unauthorized.
(4) Except as otherwise agreed, a person having control of a transferable record is the holder, as defined in section 4-1-201 (20), C.R.S., of the transferable record and has the same rights and defenses as a holder of an equivalent record or writing under the “Uniform Commercial Code”, title 4, C.R.S., including, if the applicable statutory requirements under section 4-3-302 (a), 4-7-501, or 4-9-308, C.R.S., are satisfied, the rights and defenses of a holder in due course, a holder to which a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated, or a purchaser, respectively. Delivery, possession, and indorsement are not required to obtain or exercise any of the rights under this subsection (4).
(5) Except as otherwise agreed, an obligor under a transferable record has the same rights and defenses as an equivalent obligor under equivalent records or writings under the “Uniform Commercial Code”, title 4, C.R.S.
(6) If requested by a person against which enforcement is sought, the person seeking to enforce the transferable record shall provide reasonable proof that the person is in control of the transferable record. Proof may include access to the authoritative copy of the transferable record and related business records sufficient to review the terms of the transferable record and to establish the identity of the person having control of the transferable record.
24-71.3-117. Creation and retention of electronic records by political subdivisions
Each department, board, commission, authority, institution, or instrumentality of the state, in accordance with the policies, standards, and guidelines set forth by the office of innovation and technology of this state, may determine whether, and the extent to which, such department, board, commission, authority, institution, or instrumentality shall create and retain electronic records and convert written records to electronic records. A county, municipality, or other political subdivision, or any of their instrumentalities, shall have the general power, in relation to the administration of the affairs of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision, or any of their instrumentalities, to determine the extent to which it will create and retain electronic records and electronic signatures.
24-71.3-118. Acceptance and distribution of electronic records by governmental agencies – rules
(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 24-71.3-112 (6), each department, board, commission, authority, institution, or instrumentality of the state may determine the extent to which such department, board, commission, authority, institution, or instrumentality shall send and accept electronic records and electronic signatures to and from other persons and otherwise create, generate, communicate, store, process, use, and rely upon electronic records and electronic signatures. A county, municipality, or other political subdivision, or any of their instrumentalities, shall have the general power, in relation to the administration of the affairs of a county, municipality, or of their political subdivision, or any of their instrumentalities, to determine the extent to which it will send and accept electronic records and electronic signatures to and from other persons and otherwise create, generate, communicate, store, process, use, and rely upon electronic records and electronic signatures.
(2) Except in relation to electronic payments, which shall be governed by the state treasurer, to the extent that a department, board, commission, authority, institution, or instrumentality of this state uses electronic records and electronic signatures under subsection (1) of this section, the secretary of state, giving due consideration to security, shall by rule specify:
(a) The manner and format in which the electronic records must be created, generated, sent, communicated, received, and stored and the systems established for those purposes;
(b) If electronic records must be signed by electronic means, the type of electronic signature required, the manner and format in which the electronic signature must be affixed to the electronic record, and the identity of, or criteria that must be met by, any third party used by a person filing a document to facilitate the process;
(c) Control processes and procedures as appropriate to ensure adequate preservation, disposition, integrity, security, confidentiality, and auditability of electronic records; and
(d) Any other required attributes for electronic records that are specified for corresponding nonelectronic records or reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in section 24-71.3-112 (6), this article does not require a governmental agency of this state to use or permit the use of electronic records or electronic signatures.
(4) Repealed.
The secretary of state may, in adopting rules promulgated pursuant to section 24-71.3-118, encourage and promote consistency and interoperability with similar requirements adopted by other governmental agencies of this and other states and the federal government and nongovernmental persons interacting with governmental agencies of this state. If appropriate, such rules may specify differing levels of standards from which governmental agencies of this state may choose in implementing the most appropriate standard for a particular application.
24-71.3-120. Severability clause
If any provision of this article or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this article that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this article are hereby expressly declared to be severable.
24-71.3-121. Construction with other laws
In the event of any conflict between article 71 of this title and this article, this article shall control, but only to the extent of such conflict.
13-25-134. Electronic records and signatures – admissibility in evidence – originals
Pursuant to the provisions of article 71.3 of title 24, C.R.S., in any legal proceeding, nothing in the application of the rules of evidence shall apply so as to deny the admissibility of an electronic record or electronic signature into evidence on the sole ground that it is an electronic record or electronic signature or on the grounds that it is not in its original form or is not an original.
South Carolina Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
Posted: November 12, 2014 Filed under: Contract, South Carolina | Tags: #SC, Electronic Signature, Electronic Signature Act, South Carolina Leave a commentSouth Carolina Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
TITLE 26. NOTARIES PUBLIC AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
CHAPTER 6. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT
Contents
§ 26-6-10. Short title; purpose.
§ 26-6-40. Prospective application of chapter.
§ 26-6-50. Agreement of parties to conduct transactions by electronic means.
§ 26-6-60. Construction and application.
§ 26-6-70. Legality of electronic contracts, records, and signatures.
§ 26-6-110. Satisfying requirement that signature or record be notarized.
§ 26-6-120. Satisfying law requiring a record to be maintained; checks.
§ 26-6-130. Admissibility as evidence.
§ 26-6-140. Automated transactions; formation of contract.
§ 26-6-150. When electronic record sent and received.
§ 26-6-170. Creation and retention of electronic records by government agencies.
§ 26-6-180. Government agencies sending and accepting electronic records and signatures; format.
§ 26-6-190. Development of standards and procedures; service of process.
§ 26-6-195. Service of process to e-mail address by government agency.
§ 26-6-210. Applicability of Computer Crime Act.
§ 26-6-10. Short title; purpose.
(A) This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Electronic Transactions Act”.
(B) Consistent with the provisions of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7002(a), this chapter provides alternative procedures or requirements for the use of electronic records to establish the legal effect or validity of records in electronic transactions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) “Agreement” means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances and from rules, regulations, and procedures giving the effect of agreements under law otherwise applicable to a particular transaction.
(2) “Automated transaction” means a transaction conducted or performed, in whole or in part, by electronic means or electronic records, in which the acts or records of any of the parties are not reviewed by an individual in the ordinary course in forming a contract, performing under an existing contract, or fulfilling an obligation required by the transaction.
(3) “Computer program” means a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in an information processing system to bring about a certain result.
(4) “Contract” means the total legal obligation resulting from the agreement of the parties as affected by this chapter and other applicable law.
(5) “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
(6) “Electronic agent” means a computer program or an electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual.
(7) “Electronic record” means a record created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.
(8) “Electronic signature” means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.
(9) “Governmental agency” means an executive, legislative, or judicial agency, department, board, commission, authority, institution, or instrumentality of the federal government or of a state or of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of a state.
(10) “Individual” means a single natural person; one human being.
(11) “Information” means data, text, images, sounds, codes, computer programs, software, databases, or other forms for the communication or reception of knowledge.
(12) “Information processing system” means an electronic system for creating, generating, sending, receiving, storing, displaying, or processing information.
(13) “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, governmental agency, public corporation, or other legal or commercial entity.
(14) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(15) “Security procedure” means a procedure employed for the purpose of verifying that an electronic signature, record, or performance is that of a specific person or for detecting changes or errors in the information in an electronic record. The term includes a procedure that requires the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, or callback or other acknowledgment procedures.
(16) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan native village, which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
(17) “Transaction” means an action or set of actions occurring between two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial, or governmental affairs.
(18) “United States Postal Service Electronic Postmark” means an electronic service provided by the United States Postal Service that provides evidentiary proof that an electronic document existed in a certain form at a certain time and the electronic document was opened or the contents of the electronic document were displayed at a time and date documented by the United States Post Office.
§ 26-6-30. Applicability to electronic records and electronic signatures relating to transaction; exceptions.
(A) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (B), this chapter applies to electronic records and electronic signatures relating to a transaction.
(B) This chapter does not apply to a transaction:
(1) in connection with an order for prescription drugs; or
(2) to the extent the transaction is governed by:
(a) a law governing the creation and execution of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts;
(b) the Uniform Commercial Code, other than Sections 36-1-107 and 36-1-206, Chapter 2 of Title 36, and Chapter 2A of Title 36; or
(c) the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 114 Stat. 464, 15 U.S.C. at 7001 et seq., but it is not intended to limit, modify, or supersede Section 101(c) of the act, and to the extent that the notices exempted below are excluded from the scope of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 114 Stat. 464, 15 U.S.C. at 7003, this chapter of Title 26 does not apply to a notice required by law regarding:
(i) the cancellation or termination of utility services (including water, heat, and power);
(ii) default, acceleration, repossession, foreclosure, eviction, or the right to cure under a credit agreement secured by a primary residence of an individual or a rental agreement for a primary residence of an individual;
(iii) the cancellation or termination of health insurance or benefits or life insurance benefits, excluding annuities;
(iv) the recall of a product or material failure of a product, that risks endangering health or safety; or
(v) a law requiring a document to accompany any transportation or handling of hazardous materials, pesticides, or other toxic or dangerous materials.
(C) This chapter applies to an electronic record or electronic signature otherwise excluded from the application of the chapter pursuant to subsection (B) to the extent it is governed by a law other than those specified in subsection (B).
(D) A transaction subject to this chapter is also subject to other applicable substantive law.
§ 26-6-40. Prospective application of chapter.
This chapter applies to an electronic record or electronic signature created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored on or after the effective date of this chapter.
§ 26-6-50. Agreement of parties to conduct transactions by electronic means.
(A) This chapter does not require a record or signature to be created, generated, sent, communicated, received, stored, or otherwise processed or used by electronic means or in electronic form.
(B) This chapter applies only to transactions between parties who agree to conduct transactions by electronic means. Whether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances, including the conduct of the parties.
(C) A party that agrees to conduct a transaction by electronic means may refuse to conduct other transactions by electronic means. This right of refusal shall not be waived by agreement.
(D) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the effect of its provisions may be varied by agreement. The presence in certain provisions of this chapter of the words “unless otherwise agreed”, or words of similar import, does not imply that the effect of other provisions may not be varied by agreement.
(E) Whether an electronic record or electronic signature has legal consequences is determined by this chapter and other applicable laws.
§ 26-6-60. Construction and application.
This chapter must be construed and applied to:
(1) facilitate electronic transactions consistent with other applicable law;
(2) be consistent with reasonable practice concerning electronic transactions and with continued expansion of those practices; and
(3) effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.
§ 26-6-70. Legality of electronic contracts, records, and signatures.
(A) A record or signature must not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.
(B) A contract must not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record is used in its formation.
(C) An electronic record satisfies a law requiring a record to be in writing.
(D) An electronic signature satisfies a law requiring a signature.
§ 26-6-80. Satisfying requirement that information be in writing; complying with manner of transmission and format requirements; exceptions.
(A) If parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means and a law requires a person to provide, send, or deliver information in writing to another person, the requirement is satisfied if the information is provided, sent, or delivered in an electronic record capable of retention by the recipient at the time of receipt. An electronic record is not capable of retention by the recipient if the sender or its information processing system inhibits the ability of the recipient to print or store the electronic record.
(B) If another provision of law requires a record to be posed or displayed in a certain manner, be sent, communicated, or transmitted by a specified method, or contain information formatted in a certain manner, the record must:
(1) be posted or displayed in the manner specified in the other law;
(2) be sent, communicated, or transmitted by the method specified in the other law, except as otherwise provided in subsection (D)(2); and
(3) contain the information formatted in the manner specified in the other law.
(C) The electronic record is not enforceable against the recipient if a sender inhibits the ability of a recipient to store or print an electronic record.
(D) The requirements of this section shall not be varied by agreement, except that:
(1) to the extent a law other than this chapter requires information to be provided, sent, or delivered in writing but permits that requirement to be varied by agreement, the requirement pursuant to subsection (A) that the information be in the form of an electronic record capable of retention also may be varied by agreement; and
(2) a requirement pursuant to a law other than this chapter to send, communicate, or transmit a record by first-class mail, postage prepaid, or regular United States mail, may be varied by agreement to the extent permitted by the other law.
§ 26-6-90. Showing that electronic record or signature is attributable to a person; effect of electronic record or signature.
(A) An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it is the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of a security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.
(B) The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a person pursuant to subsection (A) is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the parties’ agreement, if any, and as otherwise provided by law.
§ 26-6-100. Change or error in transmission of electronic record; circumstances under which effect may be avoided; applicability of other law.
(A) If a change or error occurs in the transmission of an electronic record between parties to a transaction:
(1) the conforming party may avoid the effect of the changed or erroneous electronic record, if the parties have agreed to use a security procedure to detect changes or errors and one party has conformed to the procedure but the other party has not and the nonconforming party would have detected the change or error had he also conformed;
(2) an individual may avoid the effect of an electronic record that resulted from an error made by the individual in dealing with the electronic agent of another person if the electronic agent did not provide an opportunity for the prevention or correction of the error and, at the time the individual learns of the error, the individual:
(a) promptly notifies the other person of the error and that the individual did not intend to be bound by the electronic record received by the other person;
(b) takes reasonable steps, including steps that conform to the reasonable instructions of the other person, to return or destroy, as instructed, the consideration received as a result of the erroneous electronic record; and
(c) has not used or received any benefit or value from the consideration received from the other person.
(B) If subsection (A) does not apply, the change or error has the effect provided by other law, including the law of mistake, and the parties’ contract, if any.
(C) The provisions of subsections (A)(2) and (B) shall not be varied by agreement.
§ 26-6-110. Satisfying requirement that signature or record be notarized.
A law requiring a signature or record to be notarized, acknowledged, verified, or made under oath is satisfied if the electronic signature of the person authorized to perform those acts, together with all other information required to be included by other applicable law, is attached to or logically associated with the signature or record.
§ 26-6-120. Satisfying law requiring a record to be maintained; checks.
(A) A law requiring a record to be retained is satisfied by retaining an electronic record of the information that:
(1) accurately reflects the information in the record after it was first generated in its final form as an electronic record or otherwise; and
(2) remains accessible for later reference.
(B) A requirement to retain a record in accordance with subsection (A) does not apply to information whose only purpose is to enable the record to be sent, communicated, or received.
(C) A person may satisfy subsection (A) by using the services of another person if the requirements of that subsection are satisfied otherwise.
(D) A law requiring a record to be presented or retained in its original form, or providing consequences if the record is not presented or retained in its original form, is satisfied by an electronic record retained in accordance with subsection (A).
(E) A law requiring retention of a check is satisfied by retention of an electronic record of the information on the front and back of the check in accordance with subsection (A).
(F) A record retained as an electronic record in accordance with subsection (A) satisfies a law requiring a person to retain a record for evidentiary, audit, or like purposes, unless a law enacted after the effective date of this chapter specifically prohibits the use of an electronic record for the specified purpose.
(G) This section does not preclude a governmental agency of this State from specifying additional requirements for the retention of a record subject to the agency’s jurisdiction.
§ 26-6-130. Admissibility as evidence.
Evidence of a record or signature may not be excluded in a proceeding solely because the record or signature is in electronic form.
§ 26-6-140. Automated transactions; formation of contract.
In an automated transaction:
(1) a contract may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents of the parties, even if an individual was not aware of or reviewed the electronic agents’ actions or the resulting terms and agreements;
(2) a contract may be formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an individual, acting on the individual’s own behalf or for another person, including by an interaction in which the individual performs actions that the individual is free to refuse to perform and which the individual knows or has reason to know will cause the electronic agent to complete the transaction or performance; and
(3) the terms of the contract are determined by the substantive law applicable to it.
§ 26-6-150. When electronic record sent and received.
(A) Unless otherwise agreed between the sender and the recipient, an electronic record is sent when it:
(1) is addressed properly or otherwise directed properly to an information processing system that the recipient has designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic records or information of the type sent and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record;
(2) is in a form capable of being processed by that system; and
(3) enters an information processing system outside the control of the sender or of a person that sent the electronic record on behalf of the sender or enters a region of the information processing system designated or used by the recipient and under the control of the recipient.
(B) Unless otherwise agreed between a sender and the recipient, an electronic record is received when it:
(1) enters an information processing system that the recipient has designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic records or information of the type sent and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record; and
(2) is in a form capable of being processed by that system.
(C) Subsection (B) applies even if the place the information processing system is located is different from the place the electronic record is considered to be received pursuant to subsection (D).
(D) Unless otherwise expressly provided in the electronic record or agreed between the sender and the recipient, an electronic record is considered to be sent from the sender’s place of business and to be received at the recipient’s place of business. For purposes of this subsection, the place of business is:
(1) the place having the closest relationship to the underlying transaction, if the sender or recipient has more than one place of business; and
(2) the sender’s or recipient’s residence, if the sender or the recipient does not have a place of business.
(E) An electronic record is received pursuant to subsection (B) even if an individual is not aware of its receipt.
(F) Receipt of an electronic acknowledgment from an information processing system described in subsection (B) establishes that a record was received but is not sufficient to establish that the content sent corresponds to the content received.
(G) If a person is aware that an electronic record purportedly sent pursuant to subsection (A), or purportedly received pursuant to subsection (B), was not actually sent or received, the legal effect of the sending or receipt is determined by other applicable law. Except to the extent permitted by the other law, the requirements of this subsection shall not be varied by agreement.
§ 26-6-160. Establishing person as having control of transferable record; rights and defenses; proof of control.
(A) In this section, “transferable record” means an electronic record that:
(1) would be a negotiable instrument under Chapter 3 of Title 36 or a document of title under Chapter 7 of Title 36 if the electronic record were in writing; and
(2) the issuer of the electronic record expressly has agreed is a transferable record.
(B) A person has control of a transferable record if a system employed for evidencing the transfer of interests in the transferable record reliably establishes that person as the person to which the transferable record was issued or transferred.
(C) A system satisfies subsection (B), and a person is considered to have control of a transferable record, if the transferable record is created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that:
(1) there exists a single authoritative copy of the transferable record that is unique, identifiable, and, except as otherwise provided in items (4), (5), and (6), unalterable;
(2) the authoritative copy identifies the person asserting control as the person to which the transferable record was:
(a) issued; or
(b) most recently transferred, if the authoritative copy indicates that the transferable record has been transferred;
(3) the authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the person asserting control or its designated custodian;
(4) copies or revisions that add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy are made only with the consent of the person asserting control;
(5) each copy of the authoritative copy and a copy of a copy are readily identifiable as copies that are not the authoritative copy; and
(6) a revision of the authoritative copy is readily identifiable as authorized or unauthorized.
(D) Except as otherwise agreed, a person having control of a transferable record is the holder, as defined in Section 36-1-201(20), of the transferable record and has the same rights and defenses as a holder of an equivalent record or writing pursuant to Title 36, including the rights and defenses of a holder in due course, a holder to which a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated, or a purchaser, respectively if the applicable statutory requirements pursuant to Section 36-3-302, 36-7-501, or 36-9-308 are satisfied. Delivery, possession, and endorsement are not required to obtain or exercise the rights pursuant to this subsection.
(E) Except as otherwise agreed, an obligor under a transferable record has the same rights and defenses as an equivalent obligor under equivalent records or writings pursuant to Title 36.
(F) The person seeking to enforce the transferable record shall provide, upon request, reasonable proof that he is in control of the transferable record. Proof may include access to the authoritative copy of the transferable record and related business records sufficient to review the terms of the transferable record and to establish the identity of the person having control of the transferable record.
§ 26-6-170. Creation and retention of electronic records by government agencies.
Each governmental agency of this State shall determine if, and the extent to which, it will create and retain electronic records and convert written records to electronic records.
§ 26-6-180. Government agencies sending and accepting electronic records and signatures; format.
(A) Each governmental agency of this State shall determine if, and the extent to which, it will send and accept electronic records and electronic signatures to and from other persons and otherwise create, generate, communicate, store, process, use, and rely upon electronic records and electronic signatures.
(B) To the extent that a governmental agency uses electronic records and electronic signatures pursuant to subsection (A), the governmental agency, in consultation with the South Carolina State Budget and Control Board, giving due consideration to security, may specify:
(1) the manner and format in which the electronic records must be created, generated, sent, communicated, received, and stored and the systems established for those purposes;
(2) if electronic records must be signed by electronic means, the type of electronic signature required, the manner and format in which the electronic signature must be affixed to the electronic record, and the identity of, or criteria that must be met by, a third party used by a person filing a document to facilitate the process;
(3) control processes and procedures appropriate to ensure adequate preservation, disposition, integrity, security, confidentiality, and auditability of electronic records; and
(4) other attributes required for electronic records which are specified for corresponding nonelectronic records or reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
(C) Except as otherwise provided in Section 26-6-120, this chapter does not require a governmental agency of this State to use or permit the use of electronic records or electronic signatures.
§ 26-6-190. Development of standards and procedures; service of process.
(A) The South Carolina State Budget and Control Board shall adopt standards to coordinate, create, implement, and facilitate the use of common approaches and technical infrastructure, as appropriate, to enhance the utilization of electronic records, electronic signatures, and security procedures by and for public entities of the State. Local political subdivisions may consent to be governed by these standards.
(B) The Secretary of State may develop, implement, and facilitate the use of model procedures for the use of electronic records, electronic signatures, and security procedures for all other purposes, including private commercial transactions and contracts. The Secretary of State also may promulgate regulations as to methods, means, and standards for secure electronic transactions including administration by the Secretary of State or the licensing of third parties to serve in that capacity, or both.
(C) In accordance with Sections 26-6-20(18) and 26-6-195, and in reference to all South Carolina laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to service of process where service shall be made on entities described in Rule 4(d)(3) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, those entities shall be served under Rule 4(d)(8) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure by:
(1) registered or certified mail-return receipt requested, addressed to the office of the registered agent;
(2) registered or certified mail-return receipt requested, addressed to the office of the secretary of the corporation at its principal office;
(3) e-mailing the service of process that has been postmarked by a United States Postal Service Electronic Postmark in a manner approved by the South Carolina Supreme Court to an e-mail address registered with the Secretary of State for the corporation; or
(4) e-mailing the service of process that has been postmarked by a United States Postal Service Electronic Postmark in a manner approved by the South Carolina Supreme Court to an e-mail address registered with the Secretary of State for the agent for service of process for the corporation.
§ 26-6-195. Service of process to e-mail address by government agency.
Notwithstanding any other provisions in this chapter, a governmental agency may use, in accordance with policies and procedures developed by the South Carolina Budget and Control Board and as circumstances allow, in order to perfect service of process of any communication, an e-mail address from any vendor, entity, or individual the governmental agency regulates or does business with, or an e-mail address from the agent for service of process of that vendor, entity, or individual. Such communication postmarked by a United States Postal Service Electronic Postmark shall have the same force of law as the United States Post Office certified mail-return receipt requested. The South Carolina Budget and Control Board shall devise policies and procedures for the use of the United States Postal Service Electronic Postmark in respect to state agencies and operations. These policies and procedures, where necessary, must consider the persons or entities which do not have an e-mail address.
§ 26-6-210. Applicability of Computer Crime Act.
The Computer Crime Act, as contained in Chapter 16 of Title 16, is expressly made applicable to and incorporated into this chapter.
Recreation Law 