Under California law, increasing the risk or changing the inherent risk of a sport or race eliminates the defense of assumption of the risk. Defendant found grossly negligent in its course design.

Posted: April 13, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Racing | Tags: Assumption of the Risk Doctrine. Comparative Fault, competitors, cones, contends, crash, elimination, elite, exit, Gross negligence, Inherent Risk, lanes, left turn, map, Marathon, material fact, matter of law, racecourse, racers, Racing, Risks, speed, Sport, street, substantial evidence, Traffic, turn-by-turn, undisputed, vehicle traffic, video, west lane, wheelchair | Leave a comment

Wheel chair racer able to recover from the race organizer when he rode off the course after relying on the map and virtual tour the course director had created.

Blanchette v. Competitor Group, Inc., 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7714, 2019 WL 6167131

State: California: California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Plaintiff: Craig Blanchette

Defendant: Competitor Group, Inc

Plaintiff Claims:

Defendant Defenses:

Holding: For the Plaintiff

Year: 2019

Summary

A wheel chair racer was injured when the course was changed after the wheelchair racer had reviewed the map and the virtual tour of the course. Because the defendant had substantially increased the risk to the racers by changing the course, the defense of assumption of the risk was not available to the defendant.

Facts

Plaintiff Craig Blanchette (Plaintiff), then an elite wheelchair racer, competed in the 2014 San Diego Rock ‘n’ Roll Marathon (Marathon), which was owned and operated by defendant Competitor Group, Inc. (Defendant). During the race, Plaintiff was injured as he attempted a 90 degree left-hand turn, could not complete the turn, went through the orange traffic cones that marked the course boundary, and crashed into a car stopped at a traffic light in a lane outside the course.

Following a jury trial on one cause of action for gross negligence, the court entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $3.2 million.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The defendant argued at the appellate court that the plaintiff failed to establish gross negligence and that the defendant did not unreasonably increase the risk to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff did not unreasonably increase the risk to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff assumed the risk and could not recover for his injuries.

The court first looked at the issue of whether or not the defendant was grossly negligent.

Ordinary negligence “consists of a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would employ to protect others from harm.” ‘[M]ere nonfeasance, such as the failure to discover a dangerous condition or to perform a duty, ‘” amounts to ordinary negligence.'” In contrast, to establish gross negligence, a plaintiff must prove “either a ‘want of even scant care’ or ‘an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.’

California does not recognize gross negligence.

Rather, as our Supreme Court explained, “the distinction between ‘ordinary and gross negligence’ reflects ‘a rule of policy’ that harsher legal consequences should flow when negligence is aggravated instead of merely ordinary.”

So even though California does not recognize gross negligence as a claim, it is defined as something falling short of reckless disregard of consequences and generates a harsher legal consequence. Whether that is defined as more money is not defined in the decision.

On appeal, the appellate court must look at the facts in favor of the plaintiff. Reviewing the facts and the jury’s decision, the court found there was enough evidence to support the jury’s conclusion. “Defendant’s behavior was an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.”

Although California does not support gross negligence, according to this decision, the court found, the plaintiff proved the defendant was grossly negligent.

The court then looked at assumption of the risk.

Primary assumption of risk, when applicable, “completely bars the plaintiff’s recovery,” whereas secondary assumption of risk” ‘is merged into the comparative fault scheme, and the trier of fact, in apportioning the loss resulting from the injury, may consider the relative responsibility of the parties.'” The presence or absence of duty determines whether an application of the defense will result in a complete bar (primary assumption of the risk) or merely a determination of comparative fault (secondary assumption of the risk).

There is no duty to reduce the inherent risks in sports. Requiring a mitigation of the inherent risks of sports would alter the nature of the game.

The test for whether primary assumption of risk applies is whether the activity” ‘involv[es] an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants… where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity.'” “The test is objective; it ‘depends on the nature of the sport or activity in question and on the parties’ general relationship to the activity’ rather than ‘the particular plaintiff’s subjective knowledge and awareness[.]'”

There are three factors to be determined by the trial court in reviewing the defense of assumption of the risk. “…whether an activity is an active sport, the inherent risks of that sport, and whether the defendant has increased the risks of the activity beyond the risks inherent in the sport.”

The defendant argued it did not do anything to increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff. The defendant defined the risk as: “The pertinent inherent risk was that [P]laintiff would attempt to turn a corner at too high a speed, run off the race course, and crash.”

The court again found the plaintiff’s argument convincing. The actions of the defendant did increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff.

[Defendant] increased the risks inherent in wheelchair racing in multiple ways, including: (1) by failing to indicate on the basic course map provided to all competitors that the outside lane of 11th Avenue (the necessary ‘exit lane’ for a fast-moving wheelchair) would not be available on race day (or by failing to at least direct competitors to its much-heralded turn-by-turn directions for information regarding lane closures); (2) by affirmatively representing to racers through its ‘virtual tour’ that all lanes on 11th Avenue would be available to complete that turn; (3) by removing 13 feet… of the roadway from the critical ‘exit lane’ about an hour before the race began without ever alerting at least the… wheelchair racers to this change; and (4) by [f]ailing to take other necessary precautions (for instance, with announcements, required tours, better barricades, bigger signs, or sufficient spotters) to advise racers of that particularly precarious intersection.”

The bigger issue was the defendant changed the course from what was shown on the map and the virtual tour. The changes made by the defendant occurred where the plaintiff crashed.

According to Plaintiff, an hour before the race began with the wheelchair competitors already at the starting line; Defendant increased the risks by: eliminating the west lane of 11th Avenue, whereas the basic course map and virtual tour video did not indicate the loss of a lane; and allowing vehicle traffic in the west lane of 11th Avenue, where wheelchair racers would ordinarily complete their left turns from B Street, separating the racecourse from vehicle traffic by plastic traffic cones placed 15 feet apart.

Because there was a difference of opinion, because each side had plausible arguments to sort its theory of the case, the facts must be decided by the trier of fact, the jury. Because there was enough evidence to support the jury’s conclusion, the decision of the jury would be upheld on appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant did not meet its burden of establishing, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff assumed the risk of the injuries he sustained by competing as a wheelchair racer at the Marathon.

So Now What?

Simply, the defendant had created a course, mapped it and provided a video tour of the course to the racers. The racer’s relied on the map and video tour of the course. When the course was changed it increased the risk to the racers causing injury.

When you provide information to guests, you must expect them to rely on that information and the information is wrong, you are possibly liable for any injury arising from the changes, or the increased risk of harm to the participants.

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Blanchette v. Competitor Group, Inc., 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7714, 2019 WL 6167131

Posted: April 7, 2020 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Legal Case, Racing | Tags: assumption of the risk, Assumption of the Risk Doctrine. Comparative Fault, California, competitors, cones, contends, crash, elimination, elite, exit, Gross negligence, Inherent Risk, lanes, left turn, map, Marathon, material fact, matter of law, racecourse, racers, Racing, Risks, speed, Sport, street, substantial evidence, Traffic, turn-by-turn, undisputed, vehicle traffic, video, west lane, wheelchair, Wheelchair racer | Leave a comment

Blanchette v. Competitor Group, Inc., 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7714, 2019 WL 6167131

Craig Blanchette, Plaintiff and Respondent,

Competitor Group, Inc., Defendant and Appellant.

D073971

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

November 20, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment and postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. 37-2016-00018380- CU-PO-CTL, Richard E. L. Strauss, Judge. Affirmed.

Horvitz & Levy, S. Thomas Todd, Eric S. Boorstin; Daley & Heft, Robert H. Quayle IV, Lee H. Roistacher and Rachel B. Kushner for Defendant and Appellant.

Higgs Fletcher & Mack, John Morris, Rachel E. Moffitt; RDM Legal Group, Russell Myrick and Keith Rodenhuis for Plaintiff and Respondent.

IRION, J.

Following a jury trial on one cause of action for gross negligence, the court entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $3.2 million. On appeal, Defendant argues, as a matter of law, that it neither acted grossly negligent nor increased the risk inherent in wheelchair racing on city streets. As we explain, Defendant did not meet its burden of establishing, as a matter of law, either that it was not grossly negligent or that Plaintiff assumed the risk of the injuries he received. Thus, we will affirm the judgment and the order denying Defendant’s postjudgment motions.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND[ 1]

Due to a birth defect, Plaintiff’s femur bones are about two inches long, and Plaintiff has used a wheelchair since he was in the eighth grade. When Plaintiff was 15 years old, his grandfather bought him his first racing wheelchair. Plaintiff participated in his first professional wheelchair race two years later in 1986, placing fifth in a field of 250. He won his next eight races, setting four world records along the way. At age 20, Plaintiff won a bronze medal in the 1988 Summer Olympics; and over the next approximately 11 years of competition (i.e., prior to the year 2000), he set 21 world records and obtained sponsors.

Plaintiff took a break from wheelchair racing, competing in hand cycling for a few years. He eventually returned to wheelchair racing; and, by June of 2014, he was again “in race shape” as an elite athlete and participated in the Marathon.[ 2] Plaintiff described the “elite level” of wheelchair racing as the professional level, “allow[ing] you to make money competing[.]” Indeed, the Marathon had an elite athlete coordinator who invited Plaintiff, then a resident of Washington state, to come to San Diego to compete at the event. By that time Plaintiff had competed in hundreds of wheelchair races.

Plaintiff arrived in San Diego two days before the Marathon. Because he had not previously competed in a San Diego Rock ‘n’ Roll Marathon, during that time he “did everything” he was aware of to prepare for the race. He reviewed the basic course map; he studied “the virtual tour” video-at least 15 times-which played continuously on a monitor in the lobby of the hotel where the elite racers stayed; he went to the prerace exposition, where competitors signed in and received their racing bibs; and the night before the race, he attended the all-competitor meeting which included a general safety check, the distribution of additional copies of the basic course map, and the further opportunity to view the virtual tour video.

The basic course map that Defendant provided Plaintiff was on one piece of paper and covered the area from Balboa Avenue on the north to National Avenue/Logan Avenue on the south and from west of Interstate 5 on the west to Interstate 15 on the east. The marathon course is shown in a solid red line; the half-marathon course is shown in a solid blue line; and some of the shorter streets on the courses are unidentified. The virtual tour was a video of the entire racecourse, from start to finish, recorded from a car that traveled the streets of the course during normal daytime traffic conditions.[ 3] The entire video played at a speed that covered the entire 26.2-mile course in approximately five minutes-i.e., at a rate in excess of 300 miles per hour-and ran on a continuous loop in multiple locations.

The virtual tour video of the racecourse was especially important to Plaintiff, since wheelchair racers rely on the “racing line” they choose to maximize speed to gain an advantage during competition. According to Plaintiff, a wheelchair racer tries to “have the fastest racing line through” the turns; “you start wide, you taper down narrow,” completing the turn in “the exit lane.” In particular, from the virtual tour video, Plaintiff had studied the intersection where his accident occurred-11th Avenue just south of its intersection with B Street-and the racing line he would take as he turned left from B Street onto 11th Avenue.

According to the individual who was Defendant’s president and chief executive officer at all relevant times, [ 4] Defendant made available a one page document entitled “Turn by Turn Directions” (turn-by-turn directions) that listed each of the Marathon’s more than 40 turns and specified for each whether the entire street (“whole road”) or a portion of the street (e.g., “southbound lanes,” “east side of road,” etc.) was part of the racecourse. (See fn. 7, post.) Defendant presented evidence that these directions were available only on Defendant’s website and at an information booth at the prerace exposition. There is no evidence either that Defendant told Plaintiff about these directions or that Plaintiff knew about these directions; and Plaintiff testified that, before this lawsuit, he had never seen a copy of the turn-by-turn directions.

Defendant also presented evidence that it had provided the elite wheelchair racers with “a 24-hour concierge” who was able to answer questions they had, including information about or a tour of the racecourse. Defendant’s president and chief executive officer confirmed, however, that a competitor would have to contact the concierge and request services and that Defendant did not offer tours directly to the racers. In any event, there is no evidence that Plaintiff was aware of either the concierge or the services Defendant’s witness said the concierge could provide.

Finally, Defendant presented evidence that it provided bicycle-riding “spotters” on the racecourse who were responsible for providing visual cues to alert the elite racers-both those running and those wheeling-of course conditions. Defendant did not present evidence that any of its spotters was at or near the location of Plaintiff’s accident at any time; Defendant’s witnesses did not know the location of any of the spotters at or near the time of Plaintiff’s accident; and Plaintiff did not see any spotters on the racecourse at or near the place of his accident.

At the Marathon, Defendant hosted approximately 25, 000 athletes-five of whom competed in wheelchairs. The wheelchair racers started first, since they travel at much faster speeds than the runners.[ 5]

The accident occurred early in the race, approximately 3.9 miles from the start.[ 6] The Marathon began on 6th Avenue at Palm Street and proceeded north approximately one mile to University Avenue; the course continued east (right turn) on University Avenue for more than one-half mile to Park Boulevard; and then the course went south (right turn) on Park Boulevard for approximately two miles. The following two turns in quick succession, at times referred to “a zigzag” or “an S turn,” led to the accident: At the intersection of Park Boulevard and B Street, the racers made a 90 degree right turn (west) onto B Street; and one block later, they made a 90 degree left turn (south) onto 11th Avenue. At the speed he was traveling, Plaintiff was unable to negotiate the left turn from B Street onto 11th Avenue. Instead of completing the left turn and continuing south on 11th Avenue, at about 45 degrees, Plaintiff went off the course to the west and crashed into a car stopped at a traffic light in the western-most lane of 11th Avenue.

There are three lanes on B Street and four lanes on 11th Avenue. Under normal conditions on 11th Avenue, all four lanes of vehicle traffic travel northbound and merge into a freeway two blocks north of B Street. During the race, the far west lane of 11th Avenue was unavailable for the southbound racers; instead, it was kept open for northbound vehicle traffic from downtown to the freeway.

Approximately one hour before the race, Defendant closed the Marathon streets downtown and, as relevant to this lawsuit, set up traffic cones, 15 feet apart, which directed the Marathon racers to make the left turn from the three lanes of B Street to the three eastern lanes of 11th Avenue-thereby eliminating the west lane of 11th Avenue to wheelchair racers and making it available for vehicles traveling north to the freeway. At all times, including well in advance of the Marathon, Defendant knew that the west lane of 11th Avenue would be closed to competitors and open to vehicle traffic: Defendant was using the same course it had used in prior years; and Defendant had prepared and provided to many others “an internal working document” that contained sufficient detail to show the traffic cones and elimination of the west lane on 11th Avenue. In this latter regard, Defendant provided its “internal working document” to the course setup teams, the traffic control setup teams, the bands, the aid stations, the medical people, and “those that needed that level of detail”-but not to the elite wheelchair racers.

Not until he was racing-indeed, not until the point in time at which he was at the west end of the one block of B Street, turning left onto 11th Avenue at a speed in excess of 20 miles per hour-did Plaintiff first learn that Defendant had closed the west lane of 11th Avenue to racers and left it open to motor traffic. Nowhere in what Defendant provided-which included the basic course map, the virtual tour video of the course, and the information at the prerace exposition (sign-in) and the all-competitor safety check meeting-was Plaintiff told that, as the racecourse turned left from B Street to 11th Avenue: the west lane of 11th Avenue would be unavailable to racers; a row of orange traffic cones would separate the three east lanes of 11th Avenue (i.e., the course) from the one west lane (i.e., outside the course); or cars would be in the one west lane of 11th Avenue while the racers would be limited to the three east lanes, separated only by traffic cones 15 feet apart from one another.

This was significant to Plaintiff. In planning his speed and racing line for the S curve (right turn from Park Blvd. to B St. followed immediately by the left turn from B St. to 11th Ave.), he had to know his exit lane on 11th Avenue in order to “set up for this corner.” That is because, according to Plaintiff, “the width of the exit is the primary factor that determines the speed of entrance.” To safely set up for the S curve, for example, “you had to know the specifics of what was happening on 11th [Avenue] back on Park [Boulevard]” in order to maneuver the S curve “at the right speed.” More specifically, Plaintiff testified that he “would have needed to know about this racing lane elimination [on the west side of 11th Avenue] prior to entering the corner on [B Street]-off of Park [Boulevard].”[ 7] (Italics added.)

That did not happen. Based on the information Defendant provided Plaintiff-i.e., from studying the basic course map and the virtual tour video, and attending the prerace exposition and the all-competitor meeting-Plaintiff had no reason to suspect that his planned exit lane would be closed to wheelchair racers and open to cars. Given his speed, his “racing line,” and his view of the road, Plaintiff had only two seconds from the time he first learned that the west lane of 11th Avenue was unavailable as an exit lane until he crossed the boundary and crashed into the car in the west lane.

Plaintiff testified that, throughout his 30 years of racing, he had “never seen a lane elimination like that” on the turn from B Street to 11th Avenue at the Marathon. Consistently, another of the elite wheelchair racers who competed at the Marathon testified that, based on the approximately 140 races in which he has participated over 27 years, he would not expect motor vehicle traffic like the wheelchair racers encountered on 11th Avenue. Finally, Plaintiff’s expert testified: changing a racecourse that a wheelchair racer is expecting an hour before the race is not only misleading but “would make the race inherently more dangerous”; “on Sunday morning there can be no changes”; and the organizer of the race is responsible for ensuring the safety of the competitors.

As a result of the crash into the stopped vehicle on 11th Avenue, Plaintiff suffered personal injuries, including broken bones, and the healing process required multiple surgeries. Since the accident at the Marathon, Plaintiff has been unable to compete as an elite athlete in longer wheelchair races.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint based on the injuries he suffered during the Marathon when he crashed into the stopped vehicle on 11th Avenue. The operative complaint is a first amended complaint in which Plaintiff alleged three causes of action-negligence, gross negligence, and fraud-against Defendant and two other entities.

As to the two other entities, the trial court granted their summary judgment motion, and there is no issue on appeal as to these defendants or the claims Plaintiff alleged against them. As to Defendant, the trial court granted its motion for summary adjudication as to the claims for negligence, fraud, and punitive damages; and there is no issue on appeal regarding these claims. The case proceeded to a jury trial on Plaintiff’s one claim for gross negligence against Defendant.

Over the course of seven days in January 2018, the trial court presided over a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor, finding in relevant part: Defendant was grossly negligent (vote 9-3); Plaintiff did not assume the risk of the injury he suffered (vote 9-3); Plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of $4 million (vote 12-0); and Plaintiff was 20 percent contributorily negligent (vote 10-2). Accordingly, the court entered judgment for Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $3.2 million.

Defendant filed postjudgment motions, including supporting documentation, for a new trial and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Plaintiff filed oppositions to the motions, and Defendant filed replies to Plaintiff’s oppositions. Following hearing, in March 2018 the trial court denied Defendant’s motions.

Defendant timely appealed from both the judgment and the order denying the postjudgment motions.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the judgment should be reversed with directions to enter judgment in Defendant’s favor on either of the following two grounds: (1) As a matter of law, Plaintiff failed to establish gross negligence by Defendant; or (2) as a matter of law, Defendant established that it did not unreasonably increase the risk (i.e., Plaintiff assumed the risk) that Plaintiff would injure himself by turning from B Street to 11th Avenue at too high a speed to complete the turn.

The parties disagree as to the standard of review to be applied. Defendant argues that, because the material facts are undisputed and only one inference can reasonably be drawn, we review both issues de novo. In response, Plaintiff argues that, because material facts were disputed-or, at a minimum, conflicting inferences exist from the undisputed facts-we review both issues for substantial evidence. As we explain, under either standard we must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff; thus, in essence, we will be reviewing both issues for substantial evidence. In doing so, we apply well-established standards.

We “look to the entire record of the appeal,” and if there is substantial evidence, “it is of no consequence that the [jury] believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874, italics deleted.)” ‘[T]he test is not the presence or absence of a substantial conflict in the evidence. Rather, it is simply whether there is substantial evidence in favor of the respondent.'” (Dane-Elec Corp., USA v. Bodokh (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 761, 770.) “If this ‘substantial’ evidence is present, no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence, the judgment must be upheld.” (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631 (Howard).) The fact that the record may contain substantial evidence in support of an appellant’s claims is irrelevant to our role, which is limited to determining the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the judgment actually made. (Ibid.)

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we “may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to [the verdict] must be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded.” (Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 118, italics added; accord, Howard, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 631 [“we will look only at the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the successful party, and disregard the contrary showing”].) The testimony of a single witness, including that of a party, may be sufficient (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614; Evid. Code, § 411); whereas even uncontradicted evidence in favor of an appellant does not establish the fact for which the evidence was submitted (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 890 (Foreman)).

Under these standards, as we will explain, substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings both that Defendant was grossly negligent (i.e., Plaintiff proved Defendant’s extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care) and that Plaintiff did not assume the risk of the injury he suffered (i.e., Defendant failed to prove that it did not unreasonably increase the risks to Plaintiff over and above those inherent in wheelchair racing). Thus, as we will conclude, Defendant did not meet its burden of establishing reversible error. (See Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [“a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate… an error that justifies reversal”].)

A. Gross Negligence

The jury answered “Yes” to special verdict question No. 1, “Was [Defendant] grossly negligent?” Defendant contends that, as a matter of law, the undisputed material facts do not support the jury’s finding of gross negligence. We disagree.

1. Law

Ordinary negligence “consists of a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would employ to protect others from harm.” (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 753-754 (Santa Barbara).)” ‘” ‘[M]ere nonfeasance, such as the failure to discover a dangerous condition or to perform a duty, ‘” amounts to ordinary negligence.'” (Willhide-Michiulis v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 344, 358 (Willhide-Michiulis).) In contrast, to establish gross negligence, a plaintiff must prove “either a ‘want of even scant care’ or ‘an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.'” (Santa Barbara, at p. 754; accord, Willhide-Michiulis, at p. 358.)

California does not recognize a cause of action for “gross negligence.” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 779-780.) Rather, as our Supreme Court explained, “the distinction between ‘ordinary and gross negligence’ reflects ‘a rule of policy’ that harsher legal consequences should flow when negligence is aggravated instead of merely ordinary.” (Id. at p. 776.) For this reason,” ‘”‘ “[g]ross negligence” falls short of a reckless disregard of consequences, and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind.'” ‘” (Willhide-Michiulis, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 358.)

2. Analysis

Defendant argues for de novo review on the basis that, according to Defendant, “the material facts are undisputed and only one inference can reasonably be drawn.” Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that many material facts were disputed, conflicting inferences exist, Defendant’s appeal “presents garden-variety challenges to a jury’s factual findings”-and, accordingly, the issues Defendant raises in this appeal are subject to substantial evidence review.

Persuasively, Plaintiff relies on Cooper v. Kellogg (1935) 2 Cal.2d 504 (Cooper). In Cooper, the plaintiff was a passenger in the defendant’s car, and late at night the plaintiff was injured when the defendant fell asleep, crossed into oncoming traffic, and hit a car traveling in the opposite direction. (Id. at pp. 506-507.) Under the law in effect at the time of the accident, the plaintiff could recover from the defendant driver only if the defendant was grossly negligent. (Id. at pp. 505-506.) Thus, to recover, the plaintiff had to establish “whether defendant [driver] was grossly negligent in permitting himself to fall asleep”-i.e., not merely “whether he was negligent in the manner in which he controlled the car[.]” (Id. at p. 507.)

Following trial, the court found that the defendant had not operated the vehicle in a grossly negligent manner. (Cooper, supra, 2 Cal.2d at p. 507.) The plaintiff in Cooper argued on appeal that the uncontradicted evidence required a finding as a matter of law that the defendant driver was grossly negligent. (Id. at p. 508.) The uncontradicted evidence in Cooper included the defendant’s considerable activities during the 18 hours preceding the accident (from 8:00 a.m. until the accident at 2:00 a.m. the following morning[ 8]), and the defendant’s testimony that, despite the activities, he had no premonition or warning of sleepiness. (Id. at pp. 506-507.) The plaintiff could add nothing to the evidence of the accident, since he had fallen asleep. (Id. at p. 506.)

In response to the plaintiff’s argument that “the uncontradicted evidence requires a finding of gross negligence upon the part of [the defendant driver],” the Supreme Court disagreed, ruling: “Whether there has been such a lack of care as to constitute gross negligence is a question of fact for the determination of the trial court or jury, and this is so ‘even where there is no conflict in the evidence if different conclusions upon the subject can be rationally drawn therefrom.'” (Cooper, supra, 2 Cal.2d at pp. 508, 511, italics added.) Thus, even though the evidence concerning the defendant driver and his activities during the 18 hours preceding the accident was undisputed, the Supreme Court refused to rule as a matter of law, deferring instead to the trier of fact: Despite the undisputed facts, “we cannot say that the only reasonable conclusion the trial court could reach was that there was such a likelihood of his falling asleep, of which he knew or should have been aware, that his continuing to operate the car amounted to gross negligence as defined above.” (Id. at p. 511.)

The analysis and result are the same here. We cannot say that the only reasonable conclusion the jury could reach was that Defendant’s actions were not grossly negligent. Even if some facts are undisputed, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff-as we must (see fn. 1, ante)-” ‘different conclusions upon the subject can be rationally drawn therefrom.'” (Cooper, supra, 2 Cal.2d at p. 511.) Thus, as in Cooper, we do not apply independent review. (Ibid.) Although Defendant does not present its arguments based on substantial evidence review, by contending that the undisputed material facts require as a matter of law a ruling that Defendant was not grossly negligent, Defendant is arguing that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding of gross negligence. As we explain, we are satisfied that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant was grossly negligent-i.e., Defendant’s behavior was an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.[ 9]

Defendant argues: “As a matter of law, [Defendant] did not fail to use even scant care, or depart in an extreme way from the ordinary standard of conduct, when it posted the turn-by-turn directions on its website and made them available at its information booth, but did not physically hand a copy to [P]laintiff and the other wheelchair racers.” Very simply, this argument fails to consider or apply the appropriate standard of review.[ 10] As we introduced at footnote 1, ante-and as Defendant invites us to do, but fails to do in its analysis-we construe all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. (Mary M., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 214, fn. 6 [on appeal where appellant contends the material facts are undisputed]; Carrington, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 518 [on appeal from the judgment where appellant contends the record lacks substantial evidence to support the verdict]; Jorge, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 396 [on appeal from the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where appellant contends the record lacks substantial evidence to support the verdict].)

According to Defendant, we should credit fully the evidence presented by Defendant-including but not limited to the testimony that the turn-by-turn directions were available to Plaintiff-and discredit the evidence from the wheelchair racers that races like the Marathon do not have either lane elimination (like that on the turn from B Street to 11th Avenue) or vehicle traffic (like that in the west lane of 11th Avenue). However, this is not the appropriate standard when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. (See pt. III., before pt. III.A., ante.) To accept Defendant’s argument would result in this appellate court usurping the jury’s responsibility for determining credibility of witnesses and truth of evidence. (City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genetech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 394; Hawkins v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 [” ‘”‘ “it is the exclusive province of the [jury] to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends” ‘”‘ “; brackets in original].) Even though a material fact may be “undisputed” as argued by Defendant, on the present record this means only that contrary evidence was not presented; it does not mean that Plaintiff agreed to the fact or that the jury-or this court on appeal-must credit the undisputed fact as a matter of law. (See Hass v. RhodyCo Productions (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 11, 33 [defense summary judgment on claim of gross negligence inappropriate in part due to “credibility questions that need to be answered”].)

We consider, for example, Defendant’s actions in making the west lane of 11th Avenue unavailable for racers; in making the west lane of 11th Avenue available for vehicle traffic; in separating the wheelchair racers’ exit lane and the traffic lane with cones placed 15 feet apart; and in notifying the racers of this situation. Defendant’s president and chief economic officer testified that Defendant prepared turn-by-turn directions that communicated to racers that the west lane of 11th Avenue would not be available for racers and that Defendant made these directions available both on its website and at its information booth at the exposition.[ 11] However, Plaintiff testified that he neither saw nor knew of the turn-by-turn directions;[ 12] and the record does not contain evidence from anyone who actually saw the directions either on Defendant’s website or Defendant’s information booth. Thus, although Defendant tells us that it “is undisputed that the turn-by-turn directions were” on Defendant’s website and at Defendant’s information booth, at best the facts on which Defendant relies were uncontradicted, not undisputed; yet even uncontradicted evidence in favor of an appellant does not establish the fact for which the evidence was submitted (Foreman, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 890).

In any event, these facts raise inferences and credibility determinations that preclude a ruling-either way-whether Defendant was grossly negligent as a matter of law.

Through the basic course map and the virtual tour video it provided to the Marathon racers, Defendant represented to Plaintiff that all lanes on 11th Avenue would be open to the racers-including specifically the west lane, which Plaintiff reasonably considered and planned to use as the exit lane for his turn from B Street to 11th Avenue. At all times, however, Defendant knew that traffic cones would be used both to direct wheelchair racers to make the left turn from B Street to 11th Avenue and to eliminate the west lane of 11th Avenue to wheelchair racers. Although Defendant prepared an “internal working document” with this specific information and provided it to “those that needed that level of detail,” Defendant did not provide it to the wheelchair racers. One hour before the start of the race and with no notice to Plaintiff-at a time when Plaintiff was already near the starting line and warming up-Defendant placed traffic cones, 15 feet apart from one another, on the outside of the left turn from B Street to 11th Avenue and down the length of 11th Avenue, blocking Plaintiff from using the exit lane he had planned based on the basic course map and virtual tour video Defendant provided.

In this regard, the following evidence from two of the five elite wheelchair racers who competed at the Marathon was uncontradicted: One racer testified that, in his 30 years’ experience in wheelchair racing, he had “never seen a lane elimination” like that on the left turn from B Street to 11th Avenue; and another racer testified that, based on his 27 years’ experience in over 140 wheelchair races, he would never expect motor vehicle traffic to be in the lane next to the wheelchair racers separated only by traffic cones placed 15 feet apart. Moreover, according to Plaintiff’s expert, Defendant was responsible for ensuring the safety of all racers, and on the morning of the race “there can be no changes” made to racecourse, because to do so “would make the race inherently more dangerous” for the wheelchair competitors. Given his speed, his racing line, and his view of the racecourse as he proceeded down the one block of B Street, Plaintiff had only two seconds to attempt to change his course from when he first learned that Defendant had closed the west lane of 11th Avenue and when he crashed into the car in the west lane of 11th Avenue. Had Plaintiff known of the lane elimination on 11th Avenue, he would have been able to negotiate the turn from B Street by “com[ing] into the corner differently.”

Like Cooper, even where (as here) there is no conflict in the evidence, because various conclusions can be drawn from the evidence based on inferences and credibility, we cannot say that the only reasonable finding the jury could reach was that Defendant’s actions were not an extreme departure from what a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation to prevent harm to Plaintiff. Stated differently, the evidence and inferences from the evidence described in the preceding paragraphs substantiate the jury’s finding that Defendant was grossly negligent.

Defendant’s legal authorities do not support a different analysis or result. Defendant first cites seven cases-each followed by a one sentence (or less) parenthetical describing facts or quoting language-in which intermediate appellate courts ruled that a plaintiff could not establish a lack of gross negligence as matter of law. Defendant continues by citing five cases-each followed by a one sentence (or less) parenthetical describing facts or quoting language-in which intermediate appellate courts ruled that a defendant failed to establish a lack of gross negligence as a matter of law. Defendant then concludes by stating without discussion or argument: “Contrasting the facts of the cases that find no gross negligence as a matter of law with the facts of the cases that find possible gross negligence, it is apparent that our case falls in the former category.” Defendant does not suggest the reason, and we decline to speculate as to what “is apparent” to Defendant. In short, Defendant’s one-sentence argument is neither helpful nor persuasive.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant did not meet its burden of establishing, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff failed to prove gross negligence.

B. Assumption of the Risk

The jury answered “Yes” to special verdict question No. 3, “Did [Defendant] do something or fail to do something that unreasonably increased the risks to [Plaintiff] over and above those inherent in marathon wheelchair racing?” Defendant contends that, as a matter of law, the undisputed material facts do not support the jury’s finding that Defendant unreasonably increased the risks inherent in marathon wheelchair racing. Stated differently, Defendant contends that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff assumed the risk of the injuries he sustained by competing as an elite wheelchair racer at the Marathon. We disagree.

1. Law

Assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense to a plaintiff’s claim of negligence. (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Torts, § 1437(2), p. 758.) Primary assumption of risk, when applicable, “completely bars the plaintiff’s recovery,” whereas secondary assumption of risk” ‘is merged into the comparative fault scheme, and the trier of fact, in apportioning the loss resulting from the injury, may consider the relative responsibility of the parties.'” (Cheong v. Antablin (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1063, 1068 (Cheong); see Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 314-315 (Knight ).) The presence or absence of duty determines whether an application of the defense will result in a complete bar (primary assumption of the risk) or merely a determination of comparative fault (secondary assumption of the risk). (6 Witkin, supra, § 1437(2) at p. 758.)

” ‘Although persons generally owe a duty of due care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a)), some activities-and, specifically, many sports-are inherently dangerous. Imposing a duty to mitigate those inherent dangers could alter the nature of the activity or inhibit vigorous participation.'” (Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1148, 1154 (Nalwa).) Primary assumption of risk is a doctrine of limited duty which was “developed to avoid such a chilling effect.” (Ibid.) If it applies to a recreational activity like the Marathon, an event sponsor like Defendant owes the “participants only the duty not to act so as to increase the risk of injury over that inherent in the activity.” (Ibid. [primary assumption of the risk applied as a complete defense to bumper car passenger’s action against amusement park owner for injuries sustained when bumper cars collided].)

In Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, our Supreme Court considered the proper application of the assumption of risk doctrine in terms of duty, given the court’s adoption of comparative fault principles in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804.[ 13] The court “distinguished between (1) primary assumption of risk-‘those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is “no duty” on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk’-and (2) secondary assumption of risk-‘those instances in which the defendant does owe a duty of care to the plaintiff but the plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk of injury caused by the defendant’s breach of that duty.'” (Cheong, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 1068-1069, quoting Knight, at p. 308.)

The test for whether primary assumption of risk applies is whether the activity” ‘involv[es] an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants… where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity.'” (Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1156.) “The test is objective; it ‘depends on the nature of the sport or activity in question and on the parties’ general relationship to the activity’ rather than ‘the particular plaintiff’s subjective knowledge and awareness[.]'” (Cheong, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1068, quoting Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 313.)

In determining whether the doctrine of assumption of the risk will be a defense to a claim of negligence in a sporting activity, the trial court must consider three issues:”‘ “whether an activity is an active sport, the inherent risks of that sport, and whether the defendant has increased the risks of the activity beyond the risks inherent in the sport.” ‘” (Fazio v. Fairbanks Ranch Country Club (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1061 (Fazio); see Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 317 [in analyzing the duty of an owner/operator of a sporting event, courts should consider “the risks inherent in the sport not only by virtue of the nature of the sport itself, but also by reference to the steps the sponsoring business entity reasonably should be obligated to take in order to minimize the risks without altering the nature of the sport” (italics added)].) The first two issues, which relate to duty, are determined by the court, and the third-viz., increased risk-is a question to be decided by the trier of fact.[ 14] (Fazio, at pp. 1061-1063.)

2. Analysis

In its opening brief, Defendant explained that, at trial, in response to Defendant’s prima facie showing in support of its affirmative defense of primary assumption of the risk, “[P]laintiff had to prove that [Defendant] unreasonably increased the risk to him over and above the risks inherent in wheelchair racing on city streets.”[ 15] In this context, Defendant characterized the risk at issue as follows:

“The pertinent inherent risk was that [P]laintiff would attempt to turn a corner at too high a speed, run off the race course, and crash.”

In this context, Defendant described the issue on appeal to be:

“[W]hether [Defendant], by not physically handing [P]laintiff a copy of the turn-by-turn directions, in addition to making them available on its website and at its information booth, unreasonably increased the inherent risk that [P]laintiff would attempt to turn a corner at too high a speed, run off the race course, and crash.”

Defendant accordingly limited its substantive argument on appeal to establishing, as a matter of law, that it did nothing to increase the risk that “[P]laintiff would attempt to turn a corner too fast, run his wheelchair off the race course, and crash” and that it was not required to undertake any affirmative efforts to decrease that risk.

In its brief, Plaintiff criticized Defendant for “tak[ing] too narrow a view of its duty here (framing this issue as simply as whether it ‘unreasonably increased the inherent risk’ that [Plaintiff] would ‘roll over or run off the race course and crash’).” Plaintiff disagreed with Defendant’s “formulation,” corrected Defendant’s statement of the inherent risk at issue, and explained his position as follows:

“The ‘precise issue,’ instead, is whether… [Defendant] increased the risks inherent in wheelchair racing in multiple ways, including: (1) by failing to indicate on the basic course map provided to all competitors that the outside lane of 11th Avenue (the necessary ‘exit lane’ for a fast-moving wheelchair) would not be available on race day (or by failing to at least direct competitors to its much-heralded turn-by-turn directions for information regarding lane closures); (2) by affirmatively representing to racers through its ‘virtual tour’ that all lanes on 11th Avenue would be available to complete that turn; (3) by removing 13 feet… of the roadway from the critical ‘exit lane’ about an hour before the race began without ever alerting at least the… wheelchair racers to this change; and (4) by [f]ailing to take other necessary precautions (for instance, with announcements, required tours, better barricades, bigger signs, or sufficient spotters) to advise racers of that particularly precarious intersection.”

In its argument, consistent with its position on gross negligence, Plaintiff emphasized that Defendant affirmatively increased the inherent risks of marathon wheelchair racing by changing the racecourse from that shown on the basic course map and the virtual tour video. According to Plaintiff, an hour before the race began with the wheelchair competitors already at the starting line, Defendant increased the risks by: eliminating the west lane of 11th Avenue, whereas the basic course map and virtual tour video did not indicate the loss of a lane; and allowing vehicle traffic in the west lane of 11th Avenue, where wheelchair racers would ordinarily complete their left turns from B Street, separating the racecourse from vehicle traffic by plastic traffic cones placed 15 feet apart. In support of his argument, Plaintiff relied on the following testimony: In his 30 years of wheelchair racing, Plaintiff had “never seen a lane elimination like that” on the turn from B Street to 11th Avenue; and based on his 27 years of wheelchair racing, another Marathon wheelchair competitor would never have expected the motor vehicle traffic that the wheelchair racers encountered on 11th Avenue-i.e., motor vehicles traveling in the lane next to the wheelchair racers’ exit lane, where competitors were racing at speeds exceeding 20 miles per her, separated only by traffic cones placed 15 feet apart.

In its reply brief, Defendant acknowledged that Plaintiff considered Defendant’s increase to the inherent risks in wheelchair racing to be the elimination of the west lane of 11th Avenue without notice, but continued with its position from its opening brief, restating it in part as follows:

“Stated in terms of legal requirements, [Defendant] had no duty to eliminate or minimize the inherent risks of wheelchair road racing, one of which is that [P]laintiff would attempt to go too fast around a corner, run off the race course and crash. [¶] In the opening brief, we said the precise issue on appeal is whether [Defendant] unreasonably increased the inherent risk of injury by making the turn-by-turn directions available on its website and at its manned information booth, but not physically handing [P]laintiff a copy of the directions.”

Defendant again argued that it did not increase the inherent risks associated with wheelchair racing by eliminating the west lane and allowing vehicle traffic on 11th Avenue, because Defendant prepared turn-by-turn directions that a defense witness said were available on Defendant’s website and at Defendant’s information booth at the exposition.

The parties again disagree as to the standard of review. Defendant contends that, because the facts are undisputed, we are to review the judgment de novo; whereas Plaintiff contends that, because many facts-and inferences from the facts-are disputed, we are to review the judgment for substantial evidence. As before, Plaintiff has the better position.

As we explained in reviewing whether Defendant was grossly negligent (see pt. III.A.2, ante), even if some facts are undisputed, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff-as we must (see fn. 1, ante)-” ‘different conclusions upon the subject can be rationally drawn therefrom’ “; and if different conclusions can be drawn, then the issue to be determined is a question of fact” ‘even where there is no conflict in the evidence.'” (Cooper, supra, 2 Cal.2d at p. 511 [uncontradicted evidence of arguably gross negligence does not require a finding of gross negligence as a matter of law].) Since the same “undisputed” evidence is at issue in reviewing whether Defendant increased the risks of injury to the wheelchair racers at the Marathon, we apply the same standard of review-i.e., substantial evidence.

The determination of whether Defendant increased the risks for wheelchair racers beyond those inherent in the sport of marathon wheelchair racing is an issue of fact.[ 16] (Fazio, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1061; see pt. III.B.1., ante.) As we discuss, the same substantial evidence that supported the jury’s finding of gross negligence (see pt. III.A.2., ante) also supports the jury’s finding that Defendant affirmatively increased the risks associated with marathon wheelchair racing.[ 17]

Through the basic course map and the virtual tour video it provided to Plaintiff, Defendant represented that all lanes on 11th Avenue would be open to the racers-including specifically the west lane, which Plaintiff reasonably considered and planned to use as the exit lane for his left turn from B Street to 11th Avenue. One hour before the start of the race and with no notice to Plaintiff-at a time when Plaintiff was already near the starting line and warming up-Defendant placed traffic cones, 15 feet apart from one another, on the outside of the left turn from B Street to 11th Avenue and down the length of 11th Avenue, blocking Plaintiff from using the exit lane he had planned. This action increased the risks otherwise inherent in wheelchair racing, because: Neither lane elimination on the racecourse nor vehicle traffic separated by traffic cones next to the wheelchair racers’ exit lane on the racecourse is a risk inherent in marathon wheelchair racing; yet Defendant’s actions both eliminated a lane on 11th Avenue and allowed for a lane of vehicle traffic on 11th Avenue next to the exit lane for the left turn from B Street, separated only by traffic cones 15 feet apart.

Thus, the record contains substantial evidence to support the finding that Defendant increased the risks inherent in marathon wheelchair racing. In short, the record contains evidence that Defendant changed the racecourse from what Defendant showed Plaintiff on the basic course map and virtual tour video-merely one hour before the start of the race-without disclosing the change to Plaintiff or the other wheelchair racers.

Consistent with its argument as to gross negligence, Defendant contends that, with regard to assumption of the risk, although “it is the racers’ responsibility to become sufficiently familiar with the race course to successfully negotiate its features,” Plaintiff failed to “go on [Defendant’s] website, visit [Defendant’s] information booth, or consult [Defendant’s] knowledgeable personnel” where Plaintiff could have received a copy of the turn-by-turn directions. Consistent with our ruling on gross negligence (see pt. III.A.2., ante), Defendant does not cite to evidence that Plaintiff knew of such resources, let alone that those resources had turn-by-turn directions or other information which disclosed the changes to the racecourse from the information Defendant affirmatively provided him in the basic course map and virtual tour video.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment and the order denying Defendant’s postjudgment motions are affirmed. Plaintiff is entitled to his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

WE CONCUR: HALLER, Acting P. J., O’ROURKE, J.

———

Notes:

[ 1] Defendant argues for de novo review of the two issues (gross negligence and assumption of the risk) based on its contention that “the material facts are undisputed and only one inference can reasonably be drawn.” Defendant’s principal authority for this standard is Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202 (Mary M.), which instructs that, when applying this standard, the facts must be considered “in the light most favorable” to the prevailing party. (Id. at p. 214, fn. 6.) Indeed, citing this same footnote in Mary M., Defendant acknowledges that, under this standard, even “[d]isputed material facts can become undisputed by construing them in the manner most favorable to the opposing party.” Construction of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party is consistent with established standards of review following a jury verdict and the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (Carrington v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 518 (Carrington) [appeal from judgment where appellant contends the record lacks substantial evidence to support the verdict]; Jorge v. Culinary Institute of America (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 382, 396 (Jorge) [appeal from order denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict].)

[ 2] The Marathon was 26.2 miles. It began just north of downtown San Diego (on 6th Ave. near Palm St., west of Balboa Park) and finished in the south end of downtown San Diego (on 13th St. near K St., east of Petco Park).

[ 3] A copy of the virtual tour video was not available for trial. As described by Plaintiff, on one-way streets where the racers would be traveling against the flow of the traffic during the recording session, the camera was placed in the rear of the car, and when the video was prepared, the portions recorded from the rear of the car were spliced into the video in reverse.

[ 4] We describe this evidence-and the evidence in the subsequent two paragraphs of the text-since Defendant emphasizes it in Defendant’s appellate briefing. However, this is not evidence we consider when analyzing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, as previewed at footnote 1, ante, and discussed at parts III.A.2. and III.B.2., post.

[ 5] The Marathon course diagram, which is an internal document that the course operations team prepares, indicates that the wheelchair racers were scheduled to start 5 minutes before the first group of runners.

[ 6] The reporter’s transcript contains testimony from Defendant’s president and chief executive officer that the accident happened “at a little less than a fourth of a mile” from the start line. Based on the course map and the testimony of two racers, apparently either the witness misspoke or the reporter’s transcript contains an error.

[ 7] Plaintiff testified that, had he been given advance notice that the west lane of 11th Avenue had been eliminated from the course he had seen on the virtual tour video, he would have planned for a different racing line and successfully completed the turn from B Street to 11th Avenue. The turn-by-turn directions-the existence of which was never made known to Plaintiff-described the S curve from Park Boulevard to 11th Avenue as follows: “1.6 [miles] Right (south) turn on Park Blvd[.], southbound lanes only “3.8 [miles] Right (west) turn on B St[.], whole road “3.9 [miles] Left (south, against traffic) turn on 11th Ave[.], east side of road[.]” Notably, these directions do not disclose either that the west lane of 11th Avenue would be unavailable to racers or that vehicle traffic would be traveling northbound in the west lane of 11th Avenue.

[ 8] The plaintiff and defendant left Santa Rosa around 8:00 a.m.; more than two hours later they had lunch in San Francisco; they drove to San Mateo and attended a football game; after the game, they drove to San Francisco, where they had dinner and attended the theater; they took the ferry to Sausalito around midnight; and the accident occurred as the defendant drove from Sausalito back to Santa Rosa. (Cooper, supra, 2 Cal.2d at p. 506.)

[ 9] Consistent with CACI No. 425, the court instructed the jury: “Gross negligence is the lack of any care or an extreme departure from what a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation to prevent harm to oneself or to others. [¶] A person can be grossly negligent by acting or by failing to act.”

[ 10] Defendant’s argument also implies that Plaintiff should have requested or taken advantage of the turn-by-turn directions. However, since there is no evidence suggesting that Plaintiff knew such information was available, we question how Plaintiff could have requested or taken advantage of it.

[ 11] Defendant does not contend that its turn-by-turn directions or any other evidence told Plaintiff that the west lane of 11th Avenue would be open to vehicle traffic or separated from the racecourse only by traffic cones 15 feet apart.

[ 12] In its reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff was unaware of turn-by-turn directions because “Plaintiff chose not go on the website, visit the information booth, or consult the knowledgeable personnel.” (Italics added.) Defendant cites no evidence-and in our review of the record, we are unaware of evidence-that Plaintiff chose not to take advantage of those services. While that is one inference that can be drawn from Plaintiff’s testimony, that is not the only inference. Other reasonable inferences include that Plaintiff failed to take advantage of those services either: because he did not know they were available; or, since Plaintiff had never seen a lane eliminated like on 11th Avenue and elite wheelchair racers do not expect motor vehicle traffic to be separated from the competitors by traffic cones, he would not think to ask about such services. As Defendant acknowledges, because multiple inferences can be drawn from Plaintiff’s failure to take advantage of those services, such failure is not an “undisputed fact” for purposes of our appellate review. (Mary M., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 213.)

[ 13] Knight was a plurality opinion, but a unanimous court later “restated the basic principles of Knight‘s lead opinion as the controlling law.” (Cheong, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1067, citing Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 532, 537-538.)

[ 14] We recognize-as we did in Fazio, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at page 1061-that Court of Appeal decisions conflict as to whether the issue of increased risk is a legal question for the court or a factual question for the jury. (Id. at pp. 1061-1063.) We have no reason to reconsider our ruling and analysis in Fazio, and Defendant does not suggest otherwise. (See fn. 16, post.)

[ 15] In this regard, the trial court instructed the jury as follows, consistent with CACI No. 472, entitled “Primary Assumption of Risk-Exception to Nonliability-… Event Sponsors”: “[Plaintiff] claims he was harmed while participating in a wheelchair race as part of [Defendant’s] Rock and Roll Marathon. To establish this claim, [Plaintiff] must prove all of the following: [¶] 1. That [Defendant] was the operator of the Rock and Roll Marathon; [¶] 2. That [Defendant] unreasonably increased the risks to [Plaintiff] over and above those inherent in the sport of wheelchair marathon racing[; ¶] 3. That [Plaintiff] was harmed; and [¶] 4. That [Defendant’s] conduct was a substantial factor in causing [Plaintiff’s] harm.” (Italics added.)

[ 16] As we introduced ante, the other two issues associated with the potential application of the doctrine of assumption of the risk-whether marathon wheelchair racing is “an active sport” and “the risks inherent in that sport”-are legal issues that are reviewed de novo. (Fazio, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1061.) Although Defendant does not directly raise either of those issues in its appeal, we have no difficulty concluding that: Marathon wheelchair is an active sport; and turning a corner at too high a speed and running off the racecourse is a risk inherent in marathon wheelchair racing. In its reply brief, Defendant suggests that we apply a de novo standard of review because “this appeal involves a mixed question of law and fact.” We disagree that this appeal involves a mixed question. Each of the three issues under Fazio is decided and reviewed separately: two are issues of law, and one-i.e., whether the defendant increased the risks inherent in the sport-is an issue of fact. (Fazio, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1061-1063.) This appeal involves only the last issue, and as an issue of fact, it is reviewed on appeal for substantial evidence.

[ 17] In its reply brief, for the first time, Defendant “note[d]” that, in Fazio, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th 1053, “this court held that, in the summary judgment context, if there are disputed material facts, the jury will decide whether the defendant increased the inherent risk.” We agree that, if there are disputed material facts, then the jury must decide the factual dispute; and that is what happened in this case. Defendant then argues “that, after trial, if the case goes up on appeal, the appellate court is bound by the jury’s resolution of the factual disputes, but not by the jury’s determination that the defendant increased the inherent risk,” suggesting instead that “[t]he appellate court, based on the now-established facts, decides de novo whether the defendant increased the inherent risk.” Not only does Defendant fail to provide authority for its suggestion, in the context of the present appeal, the suggestion makes no sense. Here, the jury resolved the ultimate factual dispute-i.e., whether the defendant increased the inherent risk: “[Defendant] d[id] something or fail[ed] to do something that unreasonably increased the risks to [Plaintiff] over and above those inherent in marathon wheelchair racing.” As we ruled in Fazio: “[R]esolving the question of whether [the defendant] increased the risk of [the harm the plaintiff suffered] is properly decided by the trier of fact. This question… ‘requires application of the governing standard of care (the duty not to increase the [inherent risks]) to the facts of this particular case-the traditional role of the trier of fact.'” (Fazio, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1062-1063; italics and second and third brackets added.) For these reasons, we disagree with Defendant’s reply argument in support of de novo review.

California decision imposes three specific requirements for a release to be valid. On requirement is a release must be understood by a person untrained in the law.

Posted: September 24, 2018 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: altering, Appellate Court, Cardiac Arrest, cases, decedent, Doctrine of Primary Assumption of the Risk, finish line, Gross negligence, heirs, Inherent Risk, long-distance, Marathon, operators, Ordinary Negligence, organizer, participants, Primary Assumption of Risk, Primary Assumption of the Risk, Public Policy, recreational, recreational activity, riding, Risks, Services, Ski, Sport, Summary judgment, summary judgment motion, Trial court, Whitewater, wrongful death action, wrongful death claim | Leave a comment

Lawsuit filed by family of deceased runner who died of cardiac arrest after crossing the finish line of a race. Release and assumption of the risk blocked all claims except the claim for gross negligence.

Hass v. RhodyCo Productions, 2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 710

State: California, Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, Division Four

Plaintiff: Eden Gonzalez Hass et al

Defendant: Rhodyco Productions

Plaintiff Claims: negligently organized and planned the Half Marathon; negligently “hired, retained, … supervised, [and] controlled” the medical team; and negligently “managed, trained, supervised and controlled emergency and medical resources.

Defendant Defenses: Release and Primary Assumption of the Risk

Holding: Split decision, however case to continue on issue of gross negligence

Year: 2018

Summary

This California Appellate decision added some new requirements for releases to be valid in California. Two of those new requirements stem from the requirements of the California wrongful death statute. The other two are simple.

Under California law, inherent is a limiting word when it is used to describe the risks in a release, and a release must be understandable by a non-lawyer.

Facts

The deceased, Peter Hass, crossed the finish line of the 2011 Kaiser Permanente San Francisco Half Marathon, suffered a cardiac arrest, collapsed and died. His wife and his two children, referred to as the Hess Family in the opinion, sued the event organizer for negligence.

Before entering the race, the deceased signed a release online.

The race organizer had been putting on events for twenty-five year. This even had approval from the city which approval required providing an emergency management plan. The plan stated that a medical team and ambulance would be at the finish line and stationed on the course. The medical team the family argued was inadequate.

Family highlighted the use of chiropractors rather than medical doctors, the use of chiropractic students rather than EMTs, the lack of ambulance personnel at the finish line, inadequate communication and communication devices, and inadequate AEDs and ambulances.

The Hess family sued. Initially, the trial court granted the defendant RhodyCo’s motion for summary judgment based on the release and assumption of the risk. The family objected and argued in a hearing they should have the right to amend their complaint and bring additional claims. After the hearing, the trial court agreed and granted the Hess family’s motion for a new trial.

Specifically, the court agreed with the Hass Family that primary assumption of the risk was inapplicable on these facts and further determined that the Hass Family should have been allowed to amend the Complaint to plead gross negligence. Although it refused to rule on the existence of a triable issue with respect to gross negligence pending the filing of the amended Complaint, it did reject RhodyCo’s argument that the Hass Family had not moved with diligence in taking the deposition of Dr. Brown.

The defendant RhodyCo filed a notice of appeal, and the Hess family filed a notice of cross appeal bringing the matter to the California Court of Appeals, which issued the opinion here.

Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.

The appellate court first looked at the wrongful-death claim of the plaintiff Hess family. Under California law, a wrongful-death claim is not a derivative claim. Meaning the claim does not arise from a superior claim of the plaintiff. It is a claim, in and of itself, and not a claim of the deceased by a claim of the deceased’s family.

In other words, although a decedent cannot release or waive a subsequent wrongful-death claim by the decedent’s heirs, that decedents “express agreement to waive the defendant’s negligence and assume all risks” acts as a complete defense to such a wrongful-death action.

Consequently, a release must be written differently under California law if it is to be used to stop a wrongful-death claim.

The longstanding rule is that a wrongful death action is a separate and distinct right belonging to the heirs, and it does not arise until the death of the decedent.'” “Because a wrongful death claim is not derivative of the decedent’s claims, an agreement by the decedent to release or waive liability for [his or] her death does not necessarily bar a subsequent wrongful death cause of action

For a release to block a wrongful-death claim, the language in the release, not the law of releases. Looking at the entire document, is it clear the parties expressed the intent to assume the risk, thus blocking the wrongful-death claim.

Under California law for a release to block a claim for wrongful death, it must also be an assumption of risk agreement that on its face shows the parties intended for the deceased to assume the risk.

…in the instant case, we conclude that Hass intended both to assume all risks associated with his participation in the race, up to and including the risk of death, and to release RhodyCo (on behalf of himself and his heirs) from any and all liability with respect to any injuries he might suffer as a result of his participation. This was sufficient to block the Hass Family’s wrongful death claim for ordinary negligence.

The plaintiff Hess family argued the assumption of the risk language was insufficient to make that claim because the release used the term “inherent” to describe the risks. As such the risks that killed the deceased were not covered in the release.

Again, the release used terms that limited the scope of the risks the deceased was to assume, which limited the breath of the release.

Use of the term Inherent in describing risks in a release limits the risks that can be assumed by the signor.

The court found that the language in other parts of the release were broad enough to cover the risks the deceased undertook and thus assumed.

Here, reading the Release as a whole—as would an ordinary person untrained in the law—we are convinced it expresses Hass’s intent to assume all risks arising from his participation in the Half Marathon, including any risks related to RhodyCo’s negligence.

California also has a requirement that the “release should be understood as speaking to an ordinary person untrained in the law.” This requirement was argued stated twice in the decision.

A release under California law must be written so that an ordinary person untrained in the law can understand it.

The Hess family then argued the release was void because it violated public policy. The Hess Family claimed the defendants were negligent in providing the medical care that responded, and medical care is a necessity and as such should not be protected by a release.

The Hass Family, however, argues that, even if the Release might otherwise be deemed a valid bar to their negligence claim, it is void as against public policy to the extent it purports to apply to the provision of emergency medical services, as such services implicate the public interest. Civil Code section 1668 provides that “[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”

California Civil code § 1668 does not allow a release to be sued to stop a claim if the service or the nature of the contract is based on public policy.

All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.

There is a six-part test to determine if the agreement is one affecting the public interest. Not all six of the requirements must be met.

“‘[1] It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. [2] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. [3] The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least any member coming within certain established standards. [4] As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. [5] In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. [6] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.'”

However, courts in California have declined to find releases used for recreational activities as violating the statute and thus being void because of the public interest argument.

Most recreational activities may require first aid or greater medical services. However, people do not engage in the sport or activity because of the first aid or medical issues. The first aid and medical issues are ancillary to the activity and as such not the main purpose for the activity or the release.

Many recreational activities may require the ancillary provision of first aid or emergency medical services by event organizers, but that fact alone does not change such pursuits into anything other than the voluntary leisure pastimes that they are. In particular, with reference to the Tunkl factors, we note that half marathons are not an activity of great importance to the general public and are certainly not a matter of necessity. No racer is required to enter a particular event or to run it in any particular way.

The next issue was the issues of pleading the claim for gross negligence. California like most, if not all, other states do not allow a release to stop a gross negligence claim. If the Hess family is able to argue to the trier of fact that the actions of the defendant, RhodyCo rose to the level of gross negligence the release is not a defense.

Under California law, gross negligence is a want of even scant care.

…”‘[g]ross negligence’ long has been defined in California and other jurisdictions as either a ‘”‘want of even scant care'”‘ or ‘”‘an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.'”‘[G]ross negligence” falls short of a reckless disregard of consequences, and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind.'” In assessing where on the spectrum a particular negligent act falls, “‘[t]he amount of care demanded by the standard of reasonable conduct must be in proportion to the apparent risk. As the danger becomes greater, the actor is required to exercise caution commensurate with it.'”

Normally, to appeal an issue or even argue an issue at the trial court level, you must first include the claim in your complaint or amend your complaint to bring a new issue in. The Hass family did not include any claim in their complaint for gross negligence.

However, the court found that there was no need in California to specifically plead gross negligence as it was part of negligence, sort of. The court never specifically stated why it was reviewing the gross negligence claim, only that other courts had found that it was not necessary to specifically plead gross negligence.

The court then found the plaintiff’s complaint, and arguments had raised enough issues that the plaintiffs might have a claim for gross negligence.

In this case, there are clearly factual and credibility questions that need to be answered regarding exactly what was required under the terms of the EMS Plan. For example, there is conflicting evidence as to whether the “finish line” included the crowded postrace expo area for purposes of compliance with the EMS Plan, and it must also be established exactly what medical personnel and equipment were required to be stationed at the finish line. We will not here catalogue every conceivable argument that the Hass Family could present in an attempt to prove grossly negligent conduct by RhodyCo in this context.

Primary assumption of the risk was the final issue reviewed by the court. Primary assumption of the risk is a complete bar to negligence claims, including gross negligence claims because it removes any duty on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff. Meaning, the defendant cannot be negligent because they have not duty to the plaintiff.

Specifically, our high court distinguished between two different types of assumption of the risk: primary assumption of the risk—”those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk”—and secondary assumption of risk—”those instances in which the defendant does owe a duty of care to the plaintiff but the plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk of injury caused by the defendant’s breach of that duty.”

When applicable, primary assumption of the risk “operate[s] as a complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.”

Primary assumption of risk arose out of sports and recreational activities so that the activities could be played with the intensity and vigor so that the reason, and sport of the game was not lost.

The primary assumption of risk doctrine, a rule of limited duty, developed to avoid such a chilling effect. Where the doctrine applies to a recreational activity, operators, instructors and participants in the activity owe other participants only the duty not to act so as to increase the risk of injury over that inherent in the activity.”

The issue then becomes what duty is owed by the defendant to the plaintiff that was not assumed by the plaintiff to the extent that it was then breached by the defendant.

Here, RhodyCo asserts that the primary assumption of the risk doctrine serves as a complete bar to the Hass Family’s negligence claim, and thus the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. Specifically, RhodyCo argues that the risk of cardiac arrest is inherent to the sport of long-distance running and that, since it did nothing to increase Hass’s risk of suffering cardiac arrest in the way it conducted the Half Marathon, it owed no further duty to the Hass Family.

The court then stated that the organizer of the even does not have a duty to decrease the risk of any activity or event. However, there is a duty to minimize extrinsic risks.

While the operator or organizer of a recreational activity has no duty to decrease risks inherent to the sport, it does have a duty to reasonably minimize extrinsic risks so as not to unreasonably expose participants to an increased risk of harm.

The court reasoned this was a necessary departure from the encompassing defense provided by assumption of the risk to keep owners and organizers from avoiding “accountability for their gross negligence in this context, based on the primary assumption of the risk doctrine, would contravene public policy, not support it.”

The court did not point out specific facts or risks that created the issue that the defendant RhodyCo had been grossly negligent.

The case was sent back to trial on the sole issue on whether or not the actions of the defendant were grossly negligent.

So Now What?

At the end of the decision, the court awarded costs to the Hess family. Costs on appeal are awarded to the winner of the appeal, in terms of overall and in terms of the number of claims. The defendant won all but one of the issues on appeal in this case. The only claim the defendant did not win was the plaintiffs did not plead gross negligence in their complaint, so they cannot argue it now.

Yet the court still awarded costs to the plaintiffs. It is only a guess, but does this indicate leaning in favor of the plaintiff’s in this case?

There are three specific takeaways from this decision affecting the law of California and releases.

1. Consequently, a release must be written differently under California law if it is to be used to stop a wrongful-death claim.

2. Under California law for a release to block a claim for wrongful death, it must also be an assumption of risk agreement that on its face shows the parties intended for the deceased to assume the risk.

3. Use of the term Inherent in describing risks in a release limits the risks that can be assumed by the signor.

4. A release under California law must be written so that an ordinary person untrained in the law can understand it.

The final issue to come out of this decision a new back door to defeating the primary assumption of the risk claim. Now if the risk is not enumerated in the release, the plaintiff is going to argue it is extrinsic and therefore, not covered by the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk to defeat the defense.

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Hass v. RhodyCo Productions, 2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 710

Posted: September 10, 2018 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Legal Case, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: altering, Appellate Court, Cardiac Arrest, cases, decedent, Doctrine of Primary Assumption of the Risk, finish line, Gross negligence, heirs, Inherent Risk, long-distance, Marathon, operators, Ordinary Negligence, organizer, participants, Primary Assumption of Risk, Primary Assumption of the Risk, Public Policy, recreational, recreational activity, riding, Risks, Services, Ski, Sport, Summary judgment, summary judgment motion, Trial court, Whitewater, wrongful death action, wrongful death claim | Leave a comment

Hass v. RhodyCo Productions, 2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 710

Hass v. RhodyCo Productions

Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, Division Four

August 13, 2018, Opinion Filed

2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 710 *; 2018 WL 3830002

EDEN GONZALEZ HASS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. RHODYCO PRODUCTIONS, Defendant and Appellant.

Prior History: [*1] Superior Court of San Francisco of City and County, No. CGC-12-520492, A. James Robertson II, Judge.

Counsel: Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Jeffry A. Miller, Lann G. McIntyre, Shawn A. Toliver, Helen L. Greenberg for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Office of Gerald Clausen, Gerald Clausen, Abramson Smith Waldsmith LLP, Robert J. Waldsmith, Jeffrey R. Smith for Defendant and Respondent.

Judges: Opinion by Reardon, J., with Streeter, Acting P. J., and Smith, J.*, concurring.

Opinion by: Reardon, J.

Opinion

REARDON, J.—After crossing the finish line at the 2011 Kaiser Permanente San Francisco Half Marathon, Peter Hass (Hass) tragically suffered a cardiac arrest, collapsed, and died. Hass’s wife, Eden Gonzalez Hass, and his two minor children (collectively, the Hass Family) consequently filed this wrongful death action, alleging that numerous race-affiliated individuals and entities—including event organizer David Rhody, individually and doing business as RhodyCo Productions (RhodyCo)—were negligent in the organization and management of the race, particularly with respect to the provision of emergency medical services.1 The trial court initially granted RhodyCo’s summary judgment motion in this matter, concluding that the instant action was barred [*2] under theories of primary assumption of the risk and express waiver. However, after the Hass Family filed a motion for new trial, the trial court reversed itself. Specifically, the court found that primary assumption of the risk was inapplicable on these facts and further determined that the Hass Family should have been allowed to amend their complaint to plead gross negligence, conduct falling outside of the scope of the written waiver and release. On appeal, RhodyCo argues that the trial court’s initial grant of summary judgment was correct, even if the issue of gross negligence is considered on its merits. The Hass Family, in contrast, generally champions the court’s new trial order, but argues that the express release in this case was invalid on additional grounds rejected by the trial court and that the court should have concluded on the evidence before it that a triable issue of material fact exists as to RhodyCo’s gross negligence. We agree with the trial court that summary judgment was not warranted in this case based on primary assumption of the risk. However, we believe the trial court erred in requiring amendment of the complaint to plead gross negligence and determine, [*3] based on our independent review of the record before us, that a triable issue of material fact exists on this issue. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part, with instructions to enter a denial of RhodyCo’s summary judgment motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The annual Kaiser Permanente San Francisco Half Marathon & 5K Run in Golden Gate Park (Half Marathon) consists of two different events—a 13.1-mile half marathon and a five-kilometer run. In 2011, the anticipated attendance for the two races was estimated to include 10,000 participants and 600 volunteers. RhodyCo provided event management and production services for the Half Marathon from 2006 through 2011. In order to obtain the necessary temporary street closure permit for the event, RhodyCo was required to submit an emergency medical services plan (EMS Plan) to the City and County of San Francisco (City) for review and approval by the City’s emergency medical services agency (Agency).

The approved EMS Plan for 2011 stated, as it had in previous years, that the medical personnel at the Half Marathon would be provided by Palmer College of Chiropractic-West (PCCW) and American Medical Response (AMR). More specifically, [*4] it asserted that PCCW would “‘provide event trained Medical Personnel for the event, (students are all CPR certified and have taken emergency response class). Med Teams will be located at key areas (Start Line, Finish Lines, Postrace Medical Tent, and mobile units on the course). The head clinician event day, Dr. Hal Rosenberg [phone number], will be onsite at the Postrace Medical Tent. AMR will provide an [emergency medical technician] who will be posted with PCCW Med Team in the postrace Medical Tent at the Finish of the race—AMR is also providing an ALS ambulance to respond [to] medical emergencies—the standby will be posted on Lincoln at the Great Hwy … . The Standby and Medical Team will be equipped with cellphone active Nextel radios with direct communication to the Event Coordinator and each other.'” Other portions of the approved EMS Plan, however, indicated that one M.D., 6+ EMTs, and one automatic external defibrillator (AED) would be located at the finish line.

Having signed a release (Release) in which he agreed, among other things, to “accept the inherent dangers and risks” arising from his participation in the race and to release RhodyCo from “any and all claims” [*5] based on injuries he might suffer “at or enroute to and from this event,” Hass participated in the Half Marathon on February 6, 2011. Almost immediately after crossing the finish line at 10:05:34 a.m., Hass suffered a sudden cardiac arrest and collapsed. Another runner, Dr. Charles Whitehill, crossed the finish line 13 seconds after Hass and heard him fall. Dr. Whitehill—who had significant experience in providing and overseeing resuscitation efforts for patients—began to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on Hass within 30 to 60 seconds of arriving at Hass’s side. Dr. Whitehill was involved in CPR efforts for five to eight minutes, after which CPR was continued by another bystander who identified himself as an off-duty paramedic. Approximately 11 minutes after Hass collapsed a third bystander brought the AED from the postrace tent, which was located somewhere between 100 and 200 yards beyond the finish line. When the AED was applied, it showed that Hass had no shockable heart rhythm. CPR efforts were then continued until paramedics from the City’s fire department arrived at approximately 10:31 a.m. and took over treatment. Unfortunately, Hass was pronounced dead shortly thereafter [*6] at 10:49 a.m. RhodyCo has provided event management and production services for over 25 years, including at least 400 running, walking, and other events involving over 1.5 million participants. Hass’s tragic death was the only fatality ever experienced at a RhodyCo-managed event.

On May 3, 2012, the Hass Family filed this wrongful death action (Complaint), alleging, among other things, that RhodyCo had negligently organized and planned the Half Marathon; negligently “hired, retained, … supervised, [and] controlled” the medical team; and negligently “managed, trained, supervised and controlled emergency and medical resources.” In particular, the Hass Family highlighted the use of chiropractors rather than medical doctors, the use of chiropractic students rather than EMTs, the lack of ambulance personnel at the finish line, inadequate communication and communication devices, and inadequate AEDs and ambulances. RhodyCo answered, generally denying the Complaint allegations and asserting several affirmative defenses, including primary assumption of the risk and express contractual assumption of the risk and release of liability.

RhodyCo then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing [*7] that the Hass Family’s wrongful death action was completely barred based on the two aforementioned affirmative defenses. Specifically, RhodyCo claimed that Hass had agreed to be bound by the Release when he registered for the Half Marathon, which included a waiver of liability and assumption of the risk agreement that was binding on his heirs. In addition, RhodyCo asserted that sudden cardiac arrest is an inherent risk of long-distance running and that it had done nothing to increase this risk. Under these circumstances, RhodyCo opined, the Hass Family’s action was barred under the primary assumption of the risk doctrine.

In opposition to the summary judgment motion, the Hass Family argued with respect to the Release that it was void to the extent it purported to cover emergency medical services, as such services implicate the public interest; that it was not a clear and unambiguous waiver of future liability for a wrongful death claim; and that it was ineffective to exempt RhodyCo from liability for gross negligence. With respect to the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, the Hass Family agreed that cardiac arrest is an inherent risk of long-distance running, but argued that [*8] a sponsoring entity is nevertheless obligated to take reasonable steps to minimize inherent risks to the extent it is able to do so without altering the nature of the sport. They further maintained that RhodyCo had increased the risk of death beyond that inherent in the sport by failing to comply with the EMS Plan.

On the issue of negligence, the Hass Family presented evidence indicating that medical emergencies (including cardiac arrests) are more likely to occur near the finish line of a race because runners tend to push themselves to improve their times, causing an adrenaline rush and an arrhythmia. Moreover, as the City, itself, has recognized: “[C]losing off several major streets at the same time to accommodate a race often causes … potential interference with emergency services.” (San Francisco Transportation Code, § 6.11, subd. (a).) The Hass Family argued that, although RhodyCo’s EMS Plan for the Half Marathon properly identified the finish line as a “‘key area'” and indicated numerous resources would be stationed there—including a medical doctor, AED, and “6+” EMTs—the only medical personnel assigned to the finish line were Dr. Rosenberg (a chiropractor) and the event coordinator (a chiropractic [*9] student), neither of whom were actually at the finish line when Hass collapsed. They further claimed that the AED was in the medical tent located approximately 200 yards away, in the postrace expo area; that no event medical personnel arrived at the scene until 10 minutes after Hass collapsed; and that, when a bystander arrived with the AED at the 11-minute mark, it was too late to help Hass. The Hass Family also found fault with the communications equipment provided by RhodyCo for the Half Marathon. Although the EMS Plan represented that “all event safety personnel” would have “cell phone active radios,” the Hass Family averred that only six or seven radios were provided to the medical team; that no radio was provided to the ambulance or to either chiropractic doctor onsite; and that there was no radio in the medical tent. Finally, the Hass Family presented declarations from several experts indicating that the standard of care for an event like the Half Marathon is to have a competent medical director who is a medical doctor and to follow the medical plan. Moreover, according to one of the Hass Family’s experts, because races like the Half Marathon can disrupt the local 911 system, [*10] the standard of care additionally requires enough onsite ambulances (and/or backfilling of ambulances) to provide for rapid medical care for runners who collapse due to sudden cardiac arrest, particularly near the finish line.2

As stated above, the trial court initially granted RhodyCo’s summary judgment motion, concluding that the Hass Family’s wrongful death action was barred under theories of primary assumption of the risk and express waiver. The Hass Family then filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court had erred in its legal analysis of the primary assumption of the risk doctrine. In addition, they asserted that all of the trial court’s conclusions with respect to the Release were erroneous. In particular, they argued that they were not required to plead gross negligence in the Complaint and that, in any event, it was an abuse of discretion to deny their request to amend the Complaint to cure any such perceived defect. The Hass Family also provided new evidence that they alleged supported finding a triable issue with respect to gross negligence—the deposition testimony of Dr. Brown, the head of the Agency, stating that nothing in the EMS Plan indicated [*11] that chiropractic students would be substituted for EMTs at the finish line and that his discussions with RhodyCo regarding the use of chiropractic students was limited to their use on the mobile teams. Dr. Brown also testified that he had never discussed with RhodyCo the propriety of substituting a chiropractic doctor for a medical doctor as race supervisor. RhodyCo opposed the motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court’s initial decision was correct under the law; that Dr. Brown’s deposition testimony should not be considered as the Hass Family had not acted with diligence in producing it; and that, regardless, the statements from the deposition highlighted by the Hass Family were undercut by other deposition testimony.

After hearing, the trial court granted the Hass Family’s new trial motion. Specifically, the court agreed with the Hass Family that primary assumption of the risk was inapplicable on these facts and further determined that the Hass Family should have been allowed to amend the Complaint to plead gross negligence. Although it refused to rule on the existence of a triable issue with respect to gross negligence pending the filing of the amended Complaint, it did [*12] reject RhodyCo’s argument that the Hass Family had not moved with diligence in taking the deposition of Dr. Brown.

RhodyCo’s notice of appeal and the Hass Family’s notice of cross-appeal now bring the matter before this court.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

CA(1)[] (1) As described above, the procedural posture of this case is somewhat convoluted. Although the trial court initially granted RhodyCo’s summary judgment motion, it subsequently reversed itself on one ground (primary assumption of the risk) and then deferred ruling on another ground it had previously rejected (gross negligence) pending amendment of the Complaint, effectively granting a new trial on both issues. HN1[] Such an order is appealable. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 858 [107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 24 P.3d 493] (Aguilar) [noting, in finding appealability under similar circumstances, that it “makes no difference” that an order granting a new trial following an order granting summary judgment “may operate like an order denying summary judgment, which is nonappealable”].) Further, HN2[] although orders granting a new trial are generally examined for abuse of discretion, any determination underlying the new trial order is scrutinized using “the test appropriate for that determination.” (Douglas v. Fidelity National Ins. Co. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 392, 407 [177 Cal. Rptr. 3d 271]; see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 859–860.)

Here, then, [*13] the trial court’s conclusions with respect to the appropriateness of summary judgment are subject to our de novo review. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 860; In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 127, 150 [204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330] (Automobile Antitrust Cases).) In this regard, we review the trial court’s ruling; not its rationale. (Automobile Antitrust Cases, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 150.) “Thus, ‘[t]he sole question properly before us on review of the summary judgment [order] is whether the judge reached the right result … whatever path he [or she] might have taken to get there.'” (Id. at pp. 150–151.)

CA(2)[] (2) Moreover, HN3[] the underlying issues implicated by RhodyCo’s summary judgment motion are also subject to our independent review. For instance, HN4[] “‘[c]ontract principles apply when interpreting a release, and “normally the meaning of contract language, including a release, is a legal question.” [Citation.] “Where, as here, no conflicting parol evidence is introduced concerning the interpretation of the document, ‘construction of the instrument is a question of law, and the appellate court will independently construe the writing.'”‘” (Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1483 [72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471] (Cohen); see also Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 748, 754–755 [29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177] (Paralift).) CA(3)[] (3) Similarly, it has long been recognized that HN5[] application of the primary assumption of the risk doctrine is a legal question, to be determined by the courts as a matter of law. (See Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1003–1004; see also Honeycutt v. Meridian Sports Club, LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 251, 257 [179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473] [“‘[T]he legal question of duty, [*14] and specifically the question of whether a particular risk is an inherent part of a sport, “is necessarily reached from the common knowledge of judges, and not the opinions of experts”‘”].) In our resolution of this matter, then, we are writing on what is essentially a clean slate, bearing in mind that HN6[] we should resolve any evidentiary doubts in the Hass Family’s favor, given that they are the party opposing summary judgment. (Automobile Antitrust Cases, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 151 [“In undertaking our analysis, we ‘”accept as true the facts … in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.”‘”].)

B. Express Waiver

During the online registration process for the Half Marathon, Hass was presented with the following warning regarding his need to execute the Release: “Please read any waiver carefully. It includes a release of liability and waiver of legal rights and deprives you of the ability to sue certain parties. Do not agree to this document unless you have read and understood it in its entirety. By agreeing electronically, you acknowledge that you have both read and understood all text presented to you as part of the registration process. You also understand and agree [*15] that events carry certain inherent dangers and risks which may not be readily foreseeable, including without limitation personal injury, property damage, or death. Your ability to participate in the event(s) is/are subject to your agreement to the waiver and by agreeing herein, you accept and agree to the terms of the waiver and release agreement.” (Italics added.) The document referenced in this warning—which could either be printed out or read in its entirety online—is entitled “Waivers” and reads in pertinent part as follows: “I understand that by registering I have accepted and agreed to the waiver and release agreement(s) presented to me during registration and that these documents include a release of liability and waiver of legal rights and deprive me of the right to sue certain parties. By agreeing electronically, I have acknowledged that I have both read and understand any waiver and release agreement(s) presented to me as part of the registration process and accept the inherent dangers and risks which may or may not be readily foreseeable, including without limitation personal injury, property damage or death that arise from participation in the event. [¶] In consideration [*16] of your accepting this entry … , I, intending to be legally bound, do hereby for myself, my heirs, executors, and/or administrators, waive and release any and all claims for damages I may accrue against … RhodyCo … any and all contractors, their employees, representatives, agents and heirs from any and all injuries that may be suffered by me at or enroute to or from this event. I attest that I am physically fit and sufficiently trained for this strenuous competition. I will assume my own medical and emergency expenses in the event of an accident or other incapacity or injury resulting from or occurring in my participation. …” (Italics added.)3

As stated above, RhodyCo argued in its summary judgment motion that the Release signed by Hass acted as a complete bar to the instant action. The trial court initially agreed, rejecting the Hass Family’s arguments that the wording of the Release was insufficient to exempt RhodyCo from wrongful death claims and that the Release was void on public policy grounds. In addition, because gross negligence was not specifically alleged in the Complaint, the court refused to consider the Hass Family’s third argument—that RhodyCo [*17] had engaged in gross negligence falling outside of the scope of the Release. However, the trial court later granted a new trial on this issue, stating it would allow the Hass Family to amend its Complaint to cure this defect. The court declined to determine whether a triable issue as to RhodyCo’s alleged gross negligence existed, pending the filing of the amendment. In this appeal and cross-appeal, the parties raise all three of these issues involving the impact of the executed Release as potential grounds either supporting or undermining the trial court’s summary judgment decision. We therefore address each contention in turn.

1. Waiver of Wrongful Death Claim

CA(4)[] (4) Our high court has explained that HN7[] wrongful death claims “are not derivative claims but are independent actions accruing to a decedent’s heirs.” (Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 841 [114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 263, 237 P.3d 584]; see also Madison v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 589, 596 [250 Cal. Rptr. 299] (Madison) [“‘The longstanding rule is that a wrongful death action is a separate and distinct right belonging to the heirs, and it does not arise until the death of the decedent.'”].) “Because a wrongful death claim is not derivative of the decedent’s claims, an agreement by the decedent to release or waive liability for [his or] her death does not necessarily bar a [*18] subsequent wrongful death cause of action … .” (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 708, 725 [183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234].) Rather, a distinction is made in these circumstances “between the legal ineffectiveness of a decedent’s preinjury release of his [or her] heirs'[] subsequent wrongful death action and the legal effectiveness of an express release of negligence by a decedent which provides a defendant with ‘a complete defense.‘” (Madison, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 597.) In other words, although a decedent cannot release or waive a subsequent wrongful death claim by the decedent’s heirs, that decedent’s “express agreement to waive the defendant’s negligence and assume all risks” acts as a complete defense to such a wrongful death action. (Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, Inc. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 758, 763–764 [276 Cal. Rptr. 672] (Saenz); see also Ruiz, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 851–852 [“although an individual involved in a dangerous activity cannot by signing a release extinguish his [or her] heirs’ wrongful death claim, the heirs will be bound by the decedent’s agreement to waive a defendant’s negligence and assume all risk”].) Under such circumstances, the releasor is essentially agreeing not to expect the other party to act carefully, thus eliminating that person’s duty of care. (Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming, Inc. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1, 7 [236 Cal. Rptr. 181] (Coates).)

As an example, in Coates, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 1, the decedent, a dirtbike rider, signed a release before using the defendant’s motorcycle park. (Id. at pp. 3–4.) After [*19] the decedent was fatally injured, his heirs sued, arguing that the defendant had been negligent in the design and maintenance of the trail on which the decedent was hurt. (Ibid.) The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the decedent’s release barred the subsequent wrongful death action. Specifically, the court noted that, in the first half of the release, the decedent “expressly waived liability for injuries or death which might result from respondents’ ordinary negligence in the future. In the second half, he expressly assumed all risk of injury from dangers inherent in dirtbike riding on respondents’ premises.” (Id. at p. 7; see also id. at p. 4 & fn. 2.) The court concluded that this express assumption of the risk also bound the decedent’s heirs. (Id. at p. 8.) The court additionally opined that whether or not the decedent had “sufficient knowledge of the particular risk which resulted in his death” was irrelevant under the circumstances of the case because “knowledge of a particular risk is unnecessary when there is an express agreement to assume all risk.” (Id. at pp. 8–9.)

CA(5)[] (5) Our own decision in Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d 758 is in accord. There, the decedent fell out of a raft on a white-water rafting trip hosted by Whitewater, a commercial rafting [*20] company, and drowned. (Id. at pp. 759, 762.) Prior to this fatal incident, the decedent had signed a release, stating: “‘I am aware that certain risks and dangers may occur on any river trip with Whitewater … . These risks include, but are not limited to, hazards of and injury to person and property while traveling in rafts on the river, accident or illness in remote places without medical facilities, the forces of nature … . [¶] … I hereby assume all of the above risks and, except in the case of gross negligence, will hold Whitewater … harmless from any and all liability, actions, causes of action, debts, claims, and demands of every kind and nature whatsoever which I now have or which may arise out of or in connection with my trip or participation in any activities with Whitewater … .’ The agreement further stated it operated as a release and assumption of risk for his heirs.” (Id. at p. 763, fn. 7, italics added.) Noting that “drafting a legally valid release is no easy task,” we opined that HN8[] “‘[t]o be effective, a release need not achieve perfection … . It suffices that a release be clear, unambiguous, and explicit, and that it express an agreement not to hold the released party liable for negligence.'” [*21] (Id. at p. 765.) Given that the plain language of the Saenz release indicated that the decedent consented to assume the risks associated with white-water rafting and release Whitewater from any and all liability arising out of the trip, the fact that the exculpatory sentence did not explicitly state that it covered Whitewater’s negligence and did not specifically mention death or drowning was insufficient to invalidate the otherwise clear release. (Id. at pp. 765–766; see also Cohen, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485 [“‘If a release of all liability is given, the release applies to any negligence of the defendant.'” (italics added)].)

Indeed, generally speaking, “‘[w]hether a release bars recovery against a negligent party “turns primarily on contractual interpretation, and it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the agreement that should control.”‘” (Sanchez v. Bally’s Total Fitness Corp. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 62, 66–67 [79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902].) Moreover, in this regard, “‘[o]ur analysis is not based on the mechanical application of some formula. The presence or absence of the words “negligence” or “bodily injury” is not dispositive. We look instead to the intention of the parties as it appears in the release forms before the court.'” (Id. at p. 67; see also Cohen, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488
[noting that release should be understood as speaking to an ordinary person untrained in the law].) By [*22] signing the Release in the instant case, we conclude that Hass intended both to assume all risks associated with his participation in the race, up to and including the risk of death, and to release RhodyCo (on behalf of himself and his heirs) from any and all liability with respect to any injuries he might suffer as a result of his participation. This was sufficient to block the Hass Family’s wrongful death claim for ordinary negligence.

The Hass Family, however, argues that the Release executed by Hass in this case is ineffective as a defense to their wrongful death claim because the express assumption of the risk language is limited solely to risks “inherent” in race participation—I “accept the inherent dangers and risks … that arise from participation in the event”—which does not include any potentially negligent conduct by RhodyCo that may have increased those inherent risks. They further contend that the release language contained in the next sentence of the Release is similarly ineffectual in the wrongful death context because it is limited to “any and all claims for damages I [i.e., Hass] may accrue,” thus excluding claims accrued by his heirs. We are not persuaded.

HN9[] CA(6)[] (6) “With [*23] respect to the question of express waiver, the legal issue is not whether the particular risk of injury appellant suffered is inherent in the recreational activity to which the Release applies [citations], but simply the scope of the Release.” (Cohen, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1484.) Here, reading the Release as a whole—as would an ordinary person untrained in the law—we are convinced it expresses Hass’s intent to assume all risks arising from his participation in the Half Marathon, including any risks related to RhodyCo’s negligence. In particular, and as we remarked in Saenz (also a wrongful death action), we believe that the juxtaposition of the assumption of risk language and the blanket release language conveys the message that Hass assumed all risks related to participation in the Half Marathon while excusing RhodyCo from any liability arising from the race. (See Paralift, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 756–757 [considering broad release language as well as assumption language in upholding release in wrongful death action]; Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 765 [same]; Coates, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at pp. 7, 9 & fn. 2 [release valid where decedent waived all liability for injury or death and assumed risk of injury from dangers inherent in riding dirt bike on premises]; see also National & Internat. Brotherhood of Street Racers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 934, 937–938, 940 [264 Cal. Rptr. 44] (Street Racers) [in case claiming lack of competent medical [*24] attention/rescue equipment, release is valid even though it included an assumption of “‘all risk inherent in racing'” because it also released “in unqualified terms … all claims arising from plaintiff’s participation in the race”].)4

We similarly reject the Hass Family’s assertion that the assumption of risk language used in the Release—I “accept the inherent dangers and risks … that arise from participation in the event”—is ambiguous as “accept” in this context could reasonably mean “understand” as well as “assume.” (See Cohen, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485 [an ambiguity in a release exists when a party can identify an alternative, semantically reasonable, candidate of meaning; an ambiguity “‘should normally be construed against the drafter'” of the release].) The complete sentence at issue reads: “By agreeing electronically, I have acknowledged that I have both read and understand any waiver and release agreement(s) presented to me as part of the registration process and accept the inherent dangers and risks which may or may not be readily foreseeable, including without limitation personal injury, property damage or death that arise from [*25] participation in the event.” (Italics added.) Since the signator, in the first part of the sentence, has already acknowledged understanding the contents of the waiver—which includes the statement that there are risks inherent in participating—it seems unlikely that he or she would be asked to acknowledge such an understanding a second time in the latter part of the sentence. Rather, the much more reasonable interpretation of this second clause is that the signator is agreeing to shoulder—i.e., take on or otherwise assume—the dangers and risks inherent in the activity.

Finally, in construing the Release, we are cognizant of the fact that “[i]n cases arising from hazardous recreational pursuits, to permit released claims to be brought to trial defeats the purpose for which releases are requested and given, regardless of which party ultimately wins the verdict. Defense costs are devastating. Unless courts are willing to dismiss such actions without trial, many popular and lawful recreational activities are destined for extinction.” (Street Racers, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 938.) While certainly imperfect, we believe that the Release was intended to be, and was accepted as, a comprehensive assumption of all risks associated [*26] with race participation. We therefore agree with the trial court that the Release constitutes a complete defense to a wrongful death action based on ordinary negligence.

2. Public Policy

CA(7)[] (7) The Hass Family, however, argues that, even if the Release might otherwise be deemed a valid bar to their negligence claim, it is void as against public policy to the extent it purports to apply to the provision of emergency medical services, as such services implicate the public interest. Civil Code section 1668 provides that “[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”
HN10[] A contractual provision exculpating a party from liability is invalid under this statute if it “affects the public interest.” (Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92, 96, 98 [32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441] (Tunkl).)

CA(8)[] (8) In Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d 92, HN11[] our high court identified six characteristics typical of contracts affecting the public interest: “‘[1] It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. [2] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often [*27] a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. [3] The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least any member coming within certain established standards. [4] As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. [5] In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. [6] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.'” (Id. at pp. 98–101, fns. omitted.) Not all of these factors need to be present for an exculpatory contract to be voided as affecting the public interest. (Id. at p. 98.) However, in Tunkl, the Supreme Court found all six factors were implicated and, on that basis, concluded that a release from liability [*28] for future negligence imposed as a condition for admission to a charitable research hospital affected the public interest and was thus invalid. (Id. at pp. 94, 101–102.) In making this determination, our high court found “hardly open to question” the fact that “the services of the hospital to those members of the public who are in special need of the particular skill of its staff and facilities constitute a practical and crucial necessity.” (Id. at p. 101.)

In contrast, California courts have consistently declined to apply the Tunkl factors to invalidate exculpatory agreements in the recreational sports context. (See Street Racers, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 934 [upholding release in case claiming lack of competent medical attention/rescue equipment]; see also Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1259 [128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885] [fall from chairlift during ski lesson]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 161–162 [21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245] [swim class]; Paralift, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [skydiving]; Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 764 [commercial river rafting]; Madison, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 593, 597–599 [scuba diving]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1462, 1464, 1466–1468 [231 Cal. Rptr. 429] [bicycle race].) Although they acknowledge the current state of California law, the Hass Family invites us to revisit the issue based on an analysis of the Tunkl factors by the Washington Supreme Court in Vodopest v. MacGregor (1996) 128 Wn.2d 840 [913 P.2d 779] (Vodopest). In that case, the plaintiff agreed to join a mountain trek that was designed as a research trip to test the efficacy of a breathing technique used to eliminate high altitude [*29] sickness. (Id. at pp. 843–844.) Portions of the research proposal were submitted to the University of Washington Human Subjects Review Committee (University) for approval. (Id. at p. 845.) Prior to the trek, the plaintiff executed a broad release in researcher MacGregor’s favor. (Ibid.) A similar release which included the University was rejected by the University as invalid because “releases from liability for negligence are not allowed as a part of any approved study, as the federal government does not allow exculpatory language in human subject experimentation.” (Id. at p. 846.) Ultimately, the plaintiff suffered a cerebral edema from altitude sickness on the trek and sued MacGregor for negligence and gross negligence. (Id. at p. 847.)

The sole issue on appeal in Vodopest was whether the release signed by the plaintiff violated public policy and was thus unenforceable. (Vodopest, supra, 128 Wn.2d at p. 848.) The court noted that medical research was a significant component of the trek and that the “critical question” in the case was “whether the alleged conduct giving rise to the cause of action for negligence occurred in the context of the mountain trekking or within the scope of the research project.” (Id. at pp. 850, 852–853.) It concluded—after consideration of the six Tunkl factors—that to [*30] the extent MacGregor attempted to use the release “to release herself as a researcher from negligent acts performed in the furtherance of medical research,” it was unenforceable as violative of public policy. (Id. at p. 853; see id. at pp. 853–862.) In particular, the court opined that “there are critical public policy reasons to maintain the usual standard of care in settings where one person is using another as a medical research subject.” (Id. at p. 856.)

CA(9)[] (9) Vodopest is obviously distinguishable on its facts and we reject the Hass Family’s invitation to depart from long-existing California precedent based on this Washington decision. HN12[] Many recreational activities may require the ancillary provision of first aid or emergency medical services by event organizers, but that fact alone does not change such pursuits into anything other than the voluntary leisure pastimes that they are. In particular, with reference to the Tunkl factors, we note that half marathons are not an activity of great importance to the general public and are certainly not a matter of necessity. No racer is required to enter a particular event or to run it in any particular way. (Cf. Okura, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 1468 [bicycle race participant retains complete control and can drop out of the race or [*31] adjust his pace at any time; organizers have no control over how the participant approaches the race].) The Tunkl court, itself, made clear that such private, voluntary exculpatory contracts are permissible: “While obviously no public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one party, for a consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have placed upon the other party, the above circumstances [admission to research hospital] pose a different situation. In this situation the releasing party does not really acquiesce voluntarily in the contractual shifting of the risk, nor can we be reasonably certain that he receives an adequate consideration for the transfer.” (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 101.) Here, Hass was permitted to make the voluntary decision, in return for being allowed to participate in the race, to shoulder the risk of RhodyCo’s potential negligence. “‘”‘The power of the courts to declare a contract void for being in contravention of sound public policy is a very delicate and undefined power, and … should be exercised only in cases free from doubt.'”‘” (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 777, fn. 53 [62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 161 P.3d 1095] (Santa Barbara).) We decline to exercise it here.

3. Gross Negligence

CA(10)[] (10) The final issue with respect to the impact [*32] of the Release in this matter is whether the Hass Family has raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether RhodyCo acted with gross negligence in its management of the Half Marathon. Even if the Release was sufficient to block a claim for ordinary negligence—as we have held—HN13[] it is insufficient, as a matter of public policy, to preclude liability for gross negligence. (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 751 [“an agreement made in the context of sports or recreational programs or services, purporting to release liability for future gross negligence, generally is unenforceable as a matter of public policy”].) For purposes of this distinction, ordinary negligence “consists of a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would employ to protect others from harm.” (Id. at pp. 753–754.) “‘[M]ere nonfeasance, such as the failure to discover a dangerous condition or to perform a duty,'” amounts to ordinary negligence. (Frittelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 35, 48 [135 Cal.Rptr. 761].) In contrast, “‘[g]ross negligence‘ long has been defined in California and other jurisdictions as either a ‘”‘want of even scant care'”‘ or ‘”‘an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.'”‘” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 754.) “‘“[G]ross negligence” falls short of a reckless disregard of consequences, [*33] and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind.‘” (Gore v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 184, 197 [167 Cal. Rptr. 881]; see also Anderson v. Fitness Internat., LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 867, 881 [208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 792].) In assessing where on the spectrum a particular negligent act falls, “‘[t]he amount of care demanded by the standard of reasonable conduct must be in proportion to the apparent risk. As the danger becomes greater, the actor is required to exercise caution commensurate with it.'” (Gore, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 198.)

CA(11)[] (11) In the present case, we agree with both parties that the trial court erred by refusing to consider the Hass Family’s claim of gross negligence because they had not pled gross negligence in their Complaint. Several appellate courts have opined that California does not recognize a separate cause of action for gross negligence. (Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 766, fn. 9; Ordway v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 98, 108, fn. 5 [243 Cal. Rptr. 536], disapproved on other grounds in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 306–309 [11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 834 P.2d 696] (Knight).) In Santa Barbara, the Supreme Court did not definitively resolve this issue, commenting only that it did not view its holding invalidating releases for future gross negligence “as recognizing a cause of action for gross negligence.” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 779–780.) Instead, as is more relevant here, the high court went on to declare: “Our holding simply imposes a limitation on the defense that is provided by a release. HN14[] A plaintiff is not required to anticipate such a defense [citation]; [*34] instead, the defendant bears the burden of raising the defense and establishing the validity of a release as applied to the case at hand.” (Id. at 780, fn. 58.) Thus, regardless of whether gross negligence can be a separate cause of action, and/or the Hass Family could have alleged gross negligence in the Complaint in anticipation of RhodyCo’s likely defense, they were not required to do so. The consequences of this pleading decision in the context of a summary judgment motion were summarized in Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1715 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 781]—which involved alleged negligence by a ski rental company in the adjustment of ski bindings—as follows: “Had plaintiff anticipated the defense of the release agreement in his complaint and alleged facts suggesting [its invalidity], the matter would have been a material issue which defendants would have had to refute in order to obtain summary adjudication.” (Id. at pp. 1723–1724, 1739–1740; see also id. at p. 1740 [“‘If … the plaintiff pleads several theories or anticipates affirmative defenses by a show of excusing events or conditions, the challenge to the opponent is made by the complaint, requiring the moving defendant to affirmatively react to each theory and excusing or justifying event, or condition which supports a theory, if the motion is [*35] to be successful'”].) In contrast, “[s]ince plaintiff’s complaint said nothing about the agreement, the matter of [its validity] was not a material issue for purposes of defendants’ initial showing on its motion for summary adjudication. [The defendant] met its initial burden by adducing evidence of the … agreement and plaintiff’s execution. The burden thereafter shifted to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.” (Id. at p. 1740.)

Similarly, here, although the Hass Family set forth certain facts in the Complaint which could be viewed as supporting a claim of gross negligence, it cannot be said that the Complaint—which does not even mention the Release—anticipated the Release defense or raised gross negligence as a material issue which RhodyCo was required to refute in order to succeed on summary judgment. Instead, RhodyCo met its initial burden by producing evidence of the existence of the Release and its execution by Hass. The burden then shifted to the Hass Family to raise a triable issue of material fact as to gross negligence.

CA(12)[] (12) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Hass Family, we believe they have met their burden in this case, making summary judgment inappropriate. [*36] 5
It is true that HN15[] summary judgment on the issue of gross negligence may be warranted where the facts fail to establish an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care as a matter of law. However, “[g]enerally it is a triable issue of fact whether there has been such a lack of care as to constitute gross negligence.” (Decker v. City of Imperial Beach (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 349, 358 [257 Cal. Rptr. 356].) In this case, there are clearly factual and credibility questions that need to be answered regarding exactly what was required under the terms of the EMS Plan. For example, there is conflicting evidence as to whether the “finish line” included the crowded postrace expo area for purposes of compliance with the EMS Plan, and it must also be established exactly what medical personnel and equipment were required to be stationed at the finish line. We will not here catalogue every conceivable argument that the Hass Family could present in an attempt to prove grossly negligent conduct by RhodyCo in this context. We conclude only that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to them, it is possible that the Hass Family could establish that, despite the potential for grave risk of harm in the sport of long-distance running, RhodyCo failed to implement the EMS Plan in several [*37] material ways and that its management of the Half Marathon—in particular with respect to the allocation of medical resources to the finish line and communication among race personnel—constituted an extreme departure from the standard of care for events of its type. This is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to gross negligence.6

In sum, we have concluded that the Release is not void on public policy grounds and that it is adequate to bar the Hass Family’s action for ordinary negligence. However, since we have additionally determined that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether RhodyCo’s provision of emergency medical services was grossly negligent, the trial court’s new trial order reversing its initial grant of summary judgment was appropriate, unless the Hass Family’s negligence action is completely barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk. We therefore turn finally to that question.

C. Primary Assumption of the Risk

CA(13)[] (13) In Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, the Supreme Court considered the continued applicability of the assumption of the risk doctrine in light of the court’s prior adoption of comparative fault principles. (Id. at pp. 299–300.) Specifically, [*38] HN16[] our high court distinguished between two different types of assumption of the risk: primary assumption of the risk—”those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk”—and secondary assumption of
risk—”those instances in which the defendant does owe a duty of care to the plaintiff but the plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk of injury caused by the defendant’s breach of that duty.” (Id. at p. 308.) When applicable, primary assumption of the risk “operate[s] as a complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.” (Id. at p. 315.) In contrast, secondary assumption of the risk “is merged into the comparative fault scheme, and the trier of fact, in apportioning the loss resulting from the injury, may consider the relative responsibility of the parties.” (Ibid.; id. at p. 314 [“a jury in a ‘secondary assumption of risk’ case would be entitled to take into consideration a plaintiff’s voluntary action in choosing to engage in an unusually risky sport … in determining whether the plaintiff properly should bear some share of responsibility for the injuries he or she suffered”]; see also Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1003 [in a secondary assumption [*39] of the risk case, “the plaintiff’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of the risk functions as a form of contributory negligence“].)

CA(14)[] (14) The Supreme Court further concluded in Knight that HN17[] “the question whether the defendant owed a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk of harm … [turns] on the nature of the activity or sport in which the defendant is engaged and the relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff to that activity or sport.” (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 309.) Although Knight dealt with the duty owed by a coparticipant in recreational activity (an informal touch football game on Super Bowl Sunday), it also discussed the potential liability here at issue, that of operators and organizers of recreational events. (Id. at pp. 300–301, 315–317.) For instance, the Knight court opined: “In the sports setting … conditions or conduct that otherwise might be viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the sport itself. Thus, although moguls on a ski run pose a risk of harm to skiers that might not exist were these configurations removed, the challenge and risks posed by the moguls are part of the sport of skiing, and a ski resort has no duty to eliminate them. [Citation.] … [¶] Although defendants generally [*40] have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, it is well established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the sport. Thus, although a ski resort has no duty to remove moguls from a ski run, it clearly does have a duty to use due care to maintain its towropes in a safe, working condition so as not to expose skiers to an increased risk of harm. The cases establish that the latter type of risk, posed by a ski resort’s negligence, clearly is not a risk (inherent in the sport) that is assumed by a participant.” (Id. at pp. 315–316, italics added.) The high court also cited with approval a case involving an injury from a thrown baseball bat in which the jury returned a verdict in favor of the baseball player (since throwing bats is inherent in the game), but implicitly recognized “the duty of the stadium owner to provide a reasonably safe stadium with regard to the relatively common (but particularly dangerous) hazard of a thrown bat.” (Id. at p. 317.) Finally, Knight acknowledged a line of cases in which the duty of an operator is defined “by reference to the steps the [*41] sponsoring business entity reasonably should be obligated to take in order to minimize the risks without altering the nature of the sport.” (Id. at p. 317.)

CA(15)[] (15) Twenty years later, in Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1148 [150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551, 290 P.3d 1158] (Nalwa), the Supreme Court revisited the scope of the primary assumption of the risk doctrine in the specific context of the duty owed by an operator/organizer. The Nalwa court summarized the doctrine as follows: HN18[] “‘Although persons generally owe a duty of due care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a)), some activities—and, specifically, many sports—are inherently dangerous. Imposing a duty to mitigate those inherent dangers could alter the nature of the activity or inhibit vigorous participation.’ [Citation.] The primary assumption of risk doctrine, a rule of limited duty, developed to avoid such a chilling effect. [Citations.] Where the doctrine applies to a recreational activity, operators, instructors and participants in the activity owe other participants only the duty not to act so as to increase the risk of injury over that inherent in the activity.” (Id. at p. 1154.) Applying this analytical framework to the case at hand, the high court concluded that the operator of a bumper car ride at an amusement park had [*42] no duty to protect the plaintiff from the collision which fractured her wrist. (Id. at pp. 1152, 1157–1158, 1162–1163.) Rather, “[l]ow-speed collisions between the padded, independently operated cars are inherent in—are the whole point of—a bumper car ride.” (Id. at p. 1157.) Thus, “‘[i]mposing liability would have the likely effect of the amusement park either eliminating the ride altogether or altering its character to such a degree—by, for example, significantly decreasing the speed at which the minicars could operate—that the fun of bumping would be eliminated, thereby discouraging patrons from riding.'” (Id. at pp. 1157–1158.)

Here, RhodyCo asserts that the primary assumption of the risk doctrine serves as a complete bar to the Hass Family’s negligence claim, and thus the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. Specifically, RhodyCo argues that the risk of cardiac arrest is inherent to the sport of long-distance running and that, since it did nothing to increase Hass’s risk of suffering cardiac arrest in the way it conducted the Half Marathon, it owed no further duty to the Hass Family. In particular, according to RhodyCo—under the test articulated in Nalwa—it had no duty to minimize Hass’s risk of death from cardiac arrest. Or, put another way, it had no duty to [*43] reduce the natural consequences of Hass’s cardiac arrest or increase his chances of recovery.

In taking this position, RhodyCo acknowledges that the appellate court in Saffro v. Elite Racing, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 173 [119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497] (Saffro) held that a race producer has a duty to conduct a “reasonably safe event,” which “requires it to take reasonable steps to ‘minimize the risks without altering the nature of the sport.'” (Id. at p. 175.) In Saffro, a marathon runner suffered a grand mal seizure after a race and was diagnosed with severe hyponatremia, likely caused by his inability to consume adequate amounts of water and fluids containing electrolytes (such as Gatorade) during the race. (Id. at p. 176.) Although the race organizer sent written materials to participants prior to the event indicating that such liquids would be provided in sufficient quantities, the evidence suggested that they were not. (Id. at pp. 176–177.) The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the race organizer, concluding that hyponatremia is an inherent risk of running a marathon. (Id. at pp. 177–178.) The appellate court reversed, stating that a race organizer’s duty to conduct a reasonably safe event includes “the obligation to minimize the risks of dehydration and hyponatremia by providing adequate water and electrolyte [*44] fluids,” especially where the race organizer had made representations to the participants that such fluids would be available. (Id. at p. 179.) Since Saffro had presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the race organizer had breached this duty, summary judgment was improper. (Id. at pp. 179–181; see also Rosencrans, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1079, 1082–1083 [although collisions with coparticipants are an inherent risk of motocross, operator of a motocross track has a duty to minimize this risk without altering the nature of the sport by providing a warning system, such as caution flaggers; triable issue of fact existed as to whether failure to provide a caution flagger constituted gross negligence].) RhodyCo claims that Saffro is inapplicable both because it is a secondary assumption of the risk case and because the “duty to minimize risk” language from Knight that Saffro and other cases have “latched onto” is dictum which has been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Nalwa.

We disagree with RhodyCo that the Nalwa court’s formulation of the primary assumption of the risk doctrine somehow supplanted the high court’s earlier discussion of the matter in Knight, particularly with respect to the Supreme Court’s statements [*45] regarding an organizer/operator’s duty “to minimize the risks without altering the nature of the sport.” (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 317.) Rather, Nalwa—far from disagreeing with Knight—referenced it as the “seminal decision explicating and applying primary assumption of risk in the recreational context.” (Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1155.) Moreover, Nalwa‘s formulation of the limited duty existing in a primary assumption of the risk case—”the duty not to act so as to increase the risk of injury over that inherent in the activity”—comes directly from Knight. (Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 1154–1155, 1162–1163.) Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, Nalwa did not reject cases such as Saffro and Rosencrans which concluded, based on language found in Knight, that operators/organizers have a duty to minimize risks without altering the nature of the sport. (Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1163 & fn. 7.) Instead, it characterized them as “decisions addressing the duty to reduce extrinsic risks of an activity” and found them distinguishable in that particular case because it concluded that the risk of injury from bumping—at any angle—was not an extrinsic risk, but was instead a risk inherent to riding bumper cars. (Id. at pp. 1157–1158, 1163.)

CA(16)[] (16) Indeed, Nalwa expressly states that “[t]he operator of a bumper car ride might violate its ‘duty to use due care not to [*46] increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent’ in the activity (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 316) by failing to provide routine safety measures such as seatbelts, functioning bumpers and appropriate speed control.” (Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1163.) Thus, Nalwa actually reaffirms Knight‘s conclusions regarding the duties owed to participants by operators/organizers of recreational activities. In short, HN19[] such operators and organizers have two distinct duties: the limited duty not to increase the inherent risks of an activity under the primary assumption of the risk doctrine and the ordinary duty of due care with respect to the extrinsic risks of the activity, which should reasonably be minimized to the extent possible without altering the nature of the activity. Nalwa explains the interplay between these two types of duties by confirming that an operator’s or organizer’s negligence with respect to extrinsic risks “might violate its ‘duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent’ in the activity.” (Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1163.)

In the present case, both parties acknowledge that cardiac arrest is an inherent risk of the sport of long-distance running. Further, it is not suggested on these facts that RhodyCo did [*47] anything that increased the risk that Hass would have a heart attack.7 Moreover, requiring runners to slow down or take breaks in order to decrease this inherent risk would alter the character of racing to such a degree that it would likely discourage runners from participating. However, as both Knight and Nalwa teach us, this is not the end of the inquiry. While the operator or organizer of a recreational activity has no duty to decrease risks inherent to the sport, it does have a duty to reasonably minimize extrinsic risks so as not to unreasonably expose participants to an increased risk of harm. (Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1163 [while risk of injury from bumping bumper cars is generally low, an operator could violate its duty not to increase this inherent risk by failing to provide routine safety measures]; Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 315–316 [negligent maintenance of towropes by ski resort could violate duty not to expose skiers to increased risk of harm]; Grotheer v. Escape Adventures, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1283, 1297–1302 [222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633] [crash landings caused by failure to safely pilot a hot air balloon are an inherent risk of hot air ballooning, but an operator has a duty not to increase that risk by failing to instruct participants on safe landing procedures, a customary practice in the ballooning industry]; Jimenez v. Roseville City School Dist. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 594, 610–611 [202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 536] [although [*48] contact with the floor is an inherent risk in dancing, school may have increased student’s risk of harm through failure to properly disseminate its no-flip policy]; Rosencrans, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1083–1086 [negligent failure to provide collision warning system in motocross]; Saffro, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 175, 179–181 [duty not to increase risk of dehydration and hyponatremia by unreasonably failing to provide adequate fluids]; Solis v. Kirkwood Resort Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 354, 364–367 [114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265] [although falling is an inherent risk of skiing, failure to mark off race area containing jumps which an ordinary skier would not expect to encounter may breach duty not to increase inherent risk]; Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 127 [40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249] [although being hit by a golf ball is an inherent risk of golfing, golf course owner had a duty to design course to minimize the risk of being hit where possible without altering the nature of golf].) As the Fourth District recently opined in Grotheer, “[w]hat the primary assumption of risk doctrine does not do … is absolve operators of any obligation to protect the safety of their customers. (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 317–318.) As a general rule, where an operator can take a measure that would increase safety and minimize the risks of the activity without also altering the nature of the activity, the operator is required to do so.” (Grotheer, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1300.) And, in Solis, the appellate court succinctly [*49] illustrated the issue raised by these cases as follows: “[F]alling off a horse is an inherent risk of horseback riding. But if a person put a barrel in the middle of the Churchill Downs racetrack, causing a collision and fall, we would not say that person owed no duty to the injured riders, because falling is an inherent risk of horseback riding.” (Solis, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 365.)

When viewed under this analytical framework, Rotolo v. San Jose Sports & Entertainment, LLC (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 307 [59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770], disapproved on another ground as stated in Verdugo v. Target Corp. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 312, 327 [173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 662, 327 P.3d 774], and Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 8 [45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855]—two cases relied upon by RhodyCo—are not inconsistent. In Rotolo, parents of a teenager who died as a result of sudden cardiac arrest while playing ice hockey sued the ice hockey facility for wrongful death, claiming that the facility had a duty to notify facility users of the existence and location of the facility’s AED. (Rotolo, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 313.) The appellate court disagreed, noting that sudden cardiac arrest is a risk inherent in playing strenuous sports and that the facility had done nothing to increase this risk. (Id. at p. 334.) During the course of its analysis, the Rotolo court stated: “We have found no authority for the proposition that a sports facility operator has a duty to reduce the effects of an injury that is an inherent risk in the sport, or to increase [*50] the chances of full recovery of a participant who has suffered such a sports-related injury, or to give notice regarding any first aid equipment that may be available for such a purpose.” (Id. at pp. 334–335.) In making this determination, however, the Rotolo court searched exhaustively for a duty that the facility could have breached in this context and could not find one. (Id. at pp. 319–339.) In particular, it noted that the facility had not breached its duties to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition or to summon emergency medical aid.8 (Rotolo, at pp. 316–317, 332–334.) Since the sports facility had not acted negligently with respect to any risks extrinsic to the sport of hockey, thereby increasing its inherent risks, the primary assumption of the risk doctrine barred recovery. (Id. at pp. 334–335.) Similarly, in Connelly, the plaintiff argued that the ski resort had insufficiently padded a ski lift tower, thereby causing him serious injury when he collided with it. (Connelly, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 10–11.) The appellate court concluded that colliding with a ski lift tower is an inherent risk of skiing and that the ski resort had done nothing to increase this risk by padding the towers, which the resort had no duty to do in the first place. (Id. at pp. 12–13.) In essence, the court concluded that the ski [*51] resort had not breached its underlying duty to provide a reasonably safe ski resort and thus the primary assumption of the risk doctrine barred the plaintiff’s negligence action. (See id. at pp. 11–14.)

CA(17)[] (17) It is undisputed in this case that RhodyCo has provided event management and production services for “high profile” running and walking events for over 25 years and that, while these events involved over 1.5 million participants, Hass was the first fatality. Thus, while death from cardiac arrest is undeniably a risk associated with long-distance running, it appears from RhodyCo’s own facts to be a slight one. The question therefore remains whether RhodyCo, as the organizer of the Half Marathon, acted negligently in its provision of emergency medical services—a risk extrinsic to the sport of long-distance running—in such a way that it exposed Hass to an increased risk of harm over and above that generally inherent in the activity itself. Since we have previously concluded that the Hass Family has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether RhodyCo was grossly negligent in this regard, the primary assumption of the risk doctrine does not act as a complete bar to the present negligence action. [*52] 9 The trial court’s decision to reverse itself on this ground and allow the case to continue was therefore not error.

CA(18)[] (18) As a final matter, we note that HN20[] imposing a duty of due care with respect to “extrinsic” risks for operators and organizers of recreational activities makes sense based on the policies underlying the primary assumption of the risk doctrine. As stated above and as articulated in Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pages 1156–1157: “The primary assumption of risk doctrine rests on a straightforward policy foundation: the need to avoid chilling vigorous participation in or sponsorship of recreational activities by imposing a tort duty to eliminate or reduce the risks of harm inherent in those activities. It operates on the premise that imposing such a legal duty ‘would work a basic alteration—or cause abandonment’ of the activity. … [¶] … Allowing voluntary participants in an active recreational pursuit to sue other participants or sponsors for failing to eliminate or mitigate the activity’s inherent risks would threaten the activity’s very existence and nature.” (Id. at pp. 1156–1157.) Moreover, “active recreation, because it involves physical activity and is not essential to daily life, is particularly vulnerable to the chilling effects [*53] of potential tort liability for ordinary negligence.” (Id. at p. 1157.) The Nalwa court counseled that the doctrine’s parameters should be drawn according to this underlying policy goal. (Ibid.) Obviously, requiring an operator or organizer of recreational activities to provide a reasonably safe event, reasonably maintained attractions, and/or customary safety warnings—far from chilling vigorous participation in such activities—would almost certainly increase their attractiveness to potential participants. Moreover, an owner or event organizer is still protected from liability with respect to the inherent risks of these activities. And, given that participation in these recreational pursuits is almost always contingent on the signing of a release, such owners and organizers are generally also relieved of the consequences of their ordinary negligence. Allowing owners and organizers to avoid accountability for their gross negligence in this context, based on the primary assumption of the risk doctrine, would contravene public policy, not support it. (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 750–751; see also id. at pp. 767–776 [rejecting as unsupported by empirical evidence the assertion that refusing to uphold agreements releasing liability for future gross negligence [*54] will lead to the extinction of many popular and lawful recreational activities].)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In particular, the trial court is instructed to enter an order denying RhodyCo’s motion for summary judgment. The Hass Family is entitled to its costs on appeal.

REARDON, J.

We concur:

STREETER, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.*

Is an entry form for a race, event or tour a contract? Maybe (it’s a legal answer!)

Posted: February 13, 2013 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Contract, Racing | Tags: Acceptance, Contract, Entry Form, Legal Capacity, Marathon, New York City Marathon, Offer, Offer and acceptance | Leave a comment

It depends on what the agreement says and what you agree too. I.e what is a contract?

This issue popped up when the New York City Marathon was canceled because of Hurricane Sandy. See Is A Race Entry a Contract? The issue in that discussion was whether or not the entry fees would or could be refunded.

Instead of looking at dozens of entry forms let’s look at how you can determine whether you have created a contract or not with your entry form.

First: You should have a release for your event. Your release should not be part of your entry form or entry contract. This also separates the known contract, the release from what you are making. If you do not want to have a contract, then separating it from the release will assist in this goal.

Second: Are you making promises which the entrants are going to rely upon? Are you expecting the entrants to rely upon your statements or promises? The promises have to be important, substantial and something that you can do or would be expected by your guests or entrants.

See If you make a promise to attract participants, you must come through on your promises.

Third: Have your created a contract?

Was there an offer to enter a contract? If you give me money, I’ll give you a race/tour/event usually meets that requirement. Is there an acceptance of the offer? Again if the participants pay their money, they have accepted your offer.

Most times the offer is pretty easy. Advertising, websites or brochures are offers. Acceptance is equally easy, a credit card or check along with the information required in the offer (entry form) are completed.

Is there a meeting of the minds? Do both sides of the agreement agree there is an agreement, a contract? Do both sides understand what they are giving and getting by entering the contract? Is there consideration, money or something of value flowing between the parties?

In a race example, the race organizer is offering a race, t-shirt, prizes for winners and maybe aid stations. If that offer is accepted by the racer paying the entry fee and signing any required form or contract. The entrant gets a race, and the race organizer gets a participant.

Both sides must have the legal capacity to contract. This means that both sides cannot be minors, and both sides must be competent. Legally competent is defined by state law; however, in general this is a very low threshold test.

The sole issue of whether or not there is a contract is the issue of whether the parties intend to be legally bound by the terms of the agreement. Either side can argue that it was not a contract, the side not wanting to be bound by a contract. The other side will want the agreement to be a contract. However, in most cases there is a presumption that if the other issues outlined above are met there is a contract between the parties.

The original question posed in the article was whether or not people would get their money back. If the contract said the entry fee was non-refundable, then no. If there was a contract between the parties, and it was silent as to whether of the entry fees were refundable, then the courts would look to the usage in the industry. Honestly, this could be a toss-up or no. The organizer would argue the money was spent and cannot be refunded.

Do Something

1. Separate your release from your entry agreement.

2. Determine whether you want your entry to be a contract or not.

3. Make sure you understand what promises you are making with or without a contract and make sure you fulfill those promises.

For more articles about contracts see:

Athlete Contracts; as a manufacture do you need one? http://rec-law.us/zxhJaP

Plaintiff raised argument in work/team building situation that they were forced to sign release http://rec-law.us/XiKRug

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss Jim Moss

#RecreationLaw, #@RecreationLaw, #Cycling.Law #Fitness.Law, #Ski.Law, #Outside.Law, #Recreation.Law, #Recreation-Law.com, #Outdoor Law, #Recreation Law, #Outdoor Recreation Law, #Adventure Travel Law, #law, #Travel Law, #Jim Moss, #James H. Moss, #Attorney at Law, #Tourism, #Adventure Tourism, #Rec-Law, #Rec-Law Blog, #Recreation Law, #Recreation Law Blog, #Risk Management, #Human Powered, #Human Powered Recreation,# Cycling Law, #Bicycling Law, #Fitness Law, #Recreation-Law.com, #Backpacking, #Hiking, #Mountaineering, #Ice Climbing, #Rock Climbing, #Ropes Course, #Challenge Course, #Summer Camp, #Camps, #Youth Camps, #Skiing, #Ski Areas, #Negligence, #Snowboarding, #RecreationLaw, #@RecreationLaw, #Cycling.Law #Fitness.Law, #SkiLaw, #Outside.Law, #Recreation.Law, #RecreationLaw.com, #OutdoorLaw, #RecreationLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #AdventureTravelLaw, #Law, #TravelLaw, #JimMoss, #JamesHMoss, #AttorneyatLaw, #Tourism, #AdventureTourism, #RecLaw, #RecLawBlog, #RecreationLawBlog, #RiskManagement, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation,# CyclingLaw, #BicyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #RecreationLaw.com, #Backpacking, #Hiking, #Mountaineering, #IceClimbing, #RockClimbing, #RopesCourse, #ChallengeCourse, #SummerCamp, #Camps, #YouthCamps, #Skiing, #Ski Areas, #Negligence, #Snowboarding, sport and recreation laws, ski law, cycling law, Colorado law, law for recreation and sport managers, bicycling and the law, cycling and the law, ski helmet law, skiers code, skiing accidents, Recreation Lawyer, Ski Lawyer, Paddlesports Lawyer, Cycling Lawyer, Recreational Lawyer, Fitness Lawyer, Rec Lawyer, Challenge Course Lawyer, Ropes Course Lawyer, Zip Line Lawyer, Rock Climbing Lawyer, Adventure Travel Lawyer, Outside Lawyer, Recreation Lawyer, Ski Lawyer, Paddlesports Lawyer, Cycling Lawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #FitnessLawyer, #RecLawyer, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #RopesCourseLawyer, #ZipLineLawyer, #RockClimbingLawyer, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #OutsideLawyer, Entry Form, Offer, Acceptance, Contract, Legal Capacity, Marathon, New York City Marathon,

WordPress Tags: event,Maybe,agreement,York,Marathon,Hurricane,Sandy,Race,Entry,Contract,discussion,Instead,dozens,goal,Second,entrants,statements,guests,participants,Third,money,requirement,acceptance,Again,Most,brochures,card,information,example,organizer,shirt,winners,racer,entrant,participant,Both,minors,threshold,Either,presumption,article,usage,industry,Separate,Determine,Make,Athlete,Contracts,Plaintiff,argument,team,situation,XiKRug,Leave,FaceBook,Twitter,LinkedIn,Recreation,Edit,Email,RecreationLaw,Page,Outdoor,Adventure,Travel,Blog,Mobile,Site,Outside,Moss,James,Attorney,Tourism,Risk,Management,Human,Rock,Ropes,Course,Challenge,Summer,Camp,Camps,Youth,Areas,Negligence,SkiLaw,OutdoorLaw,OutdoorRecreationLaw,AdventureTravelLaw,TravelLaw,JimMoss,JamesHMoss,AttorneyatLaw,AdventureTourism,RecLaw,RecLawBlog,RecreationLawBlog,RiskManagement,HumanPoweredRecreation,CyclingLaw,BicyclingLaw,FitnessLaw,RopesCourse,ChallengeCourse,SummerCamp,YouthCamps,Colorado,managers,helmet,accidents,Lawyer,Paddlesports,Recreational,Line,RecreationalLawyer,FitnessLawyer,RecLawyer,ChallengeCourseLawyer,RopesCourseLawyer,ZipLineLawyer,RockClimbingLawyer,AdventureTravelLawyer,OutsideLawyer,Form,Offer,Legal,whether,upon,refundable

Recreation Law

It's not what I write, It's what you Learn

Under California law, increasing the risk or changing the inherent risk of a sport or race eliminates the defense of assumption of the risk. Defendant found grossly negligent in its course design.

Blanchette v. Competitor Group, Inc., 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7714, 2019 WL 6167131

California decision imposes three specific requirements for a release to be valid. On requirement is a release must be understood by a person untrained in the law.

Hass v. RhodyCo Productions, 2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 710

Is an entry form for a race, event or tour a contract? Maybe (it’s a legal answer!)

35 Years of Outdoor Retailer

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Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Insurance & Law

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Recreation Law

It's not what I write, It's what you Learn

Under California law, increasing the risk or changing the inherent risk of a sport or race eliminates the defense of assumption of the risk. Defendant found grossly negligent in its course design.

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Blanchette v. Competitor Group, Inc., 2019 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7714, 2019 WL 6167131

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California decision imposes three specific requirements for a release to be valid. On requirement is a release must be understood by a person untrained in the law.

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Hass v. RhodyCo Productions, 2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 710

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Like this:

Is an entry form for a race, event or tour a contract? Maybe (it’s a legal answer!)

Rate this:

Share this:

Like this:

35 Years of Outdoor Retailer

Recognized as the Go to Lawyer by the Outdoor Recreation Industry

If you want to book an appointment?

Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, Insurance & Law

My New Book: Boating the Grand Canyon: A “How To” for Private Boaters

Enter your email address to follow this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

James H. Moss, J.D.

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Recreation Law

Follow Blog via Email

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