Lewis v. Habitat for Humanity of Greater New Haven, Inc., 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 146
Posted: April 9, 2012 Filed under: Connecticut, Cycling, Legal Case | Tags: Assumption of risk, Charity, Connecticut, Cycling, Cycling Event, Fun Raiser, Habitat for Humanity, Summary judgment Leave a commentLewis v. Habitat for Humanity of Greater New Haven, Inc., 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 146
Daniel Lewis v. Habitat for Humanity of Greater New Haven, Inc.
CV095030268S
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEW HAVEN AT NEW HAVEN
2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 146
January 9, 2012, Decided
January 9, 2012, Filed
NOTICE: THIS DECISION IS UNREPORTED AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW. COUNSEL IS CAUTIONED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION OF THE STATUS OF THIS CASE.
JUDGES: [*1] Matthew E. Frechette, J.
OPINION BY: Matthew E. Frechette
OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE RULING ON DEFENDANT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Presently before the court is the defendant Habitat for Humanity of Greater New Haven, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment filed on June 10, 2011. For the reasons set forth herein, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiffs, Daniel Lewis, as well as Hal C. Lewis and Jeanne Dise-Lewis, co-conservators of Daniel Lewis, bring this action against the defendant, Habitat for Humanity of Greater New Haven, Inc.1 for alleged negligence that resulted in severe bodily injuries to Daniel Lewis while he was participating in an event known as the 2007 Habitat Bicycle Challenge (“HBC”). On October 20, 2009, the plaintiffs submitted a revised two-count complaint in response to the defendant’s request to revise. The first count of the revised complaint alleges the following facts.
1 Habitat for Humanity International, Inc. is also a defendant in the present case. Nevertheless, only Habitat for Humanity of Greater New Haven, Inc., moves for summary judgment in the present motion, and it is referred to as the defendant in this memorandum.
The defendant [*2] organized, promoted and sanctioned the HBC, which is an annual fund-raising cycling event which required all participants to cycle across the entire country during a time period of approximately nine weeks. Despite having a history of injuries and deaths during prior HBC events, the defendant made the decision to organize, promote and sanction another HBC event in 2007. That year, the cross county ride began in New Haven, Connecticut on June 2, 2007. At all relevant times, the defendant was in control of said event and was responsible for taking the necessary precautions to provide for the safety needs of the bicycle riders participating in the HBC. The defendant was responsible for selecting “trip leaders” with sufficient skill, maturity, knowledge and training to appropriately and safely coordinate the HBC. The defendant was also responsible for properly evaluating prospective participants for the HBC event and for making sure that all participants had a sufficient skill level to safely participate in the HBC event. In the fall of 2006, Daniel Lewis applied to participate, and he complied with the application and training requirements to participate in the event, including signing [*3] all the paper work presented by the defendant without any opportunity to negotiate or modify any of the terms.
The defendant chose Daniel Lewis to participate in the “south” team, which commenced on its cross-country ride on June 2, 2007, from New Haven, and was intended to culminate in San Francisco, California, at the end of the summer. The south team was provided with a support van known as the “SAG” van, which pulled a trailer with a sign for the HBC event. The defendant had not made any provision for signage along the route or any other means of warning or advising the public, including drivers on the highway, of the presence of the cyclists. The defendant did not coordinate efforts with local or state public safety officials to implement any safety precautions for the bicycle riders. The HBC scheduled the cyclists to ride fifty to seventy miles per day with only one day of rest out of thirty-five days of travel.
On the day in question, Daniel Lewis was acting as one of two sweep riders, riding at the end of the group traveling westward on Kansas Highway 18. There was no SAG van traveling behind them because someone was being taken to the hospital. When Daniel Lewis realized his [*4] sweep partner, Liana Woskie, was no longer immediately behind him, he crossed the highway and began cycling in an eastbound direction, and he was struck by a vehicle also traveling in an eastbound direction. As a result, Daniel Lewis suffered catastrophic and life-altering injuries.
The plaintiffs further allege that it was reasonably foreseeable that HBC participants were at risk of significant injury or death, and the defendant continued to promote and sanction the event without taking reasonable and prudent steps to minimize that risk. Particularly, the plaintiffs assert that the accident was caused by the defendant’s negligence including: organizing the event with knowledge that there had been two fatalities and other injuries in the past; failing to restrict the size or scope of the event to maximize safety; failing to properly supervise and train the participants; failing to properly gauge the skill level of the participants; failing to supervise and train the trip leaders; failing to limit days when dangerous weather conditions existed; failing to provide proper ongoing oversight and safety policy enforcement by experienced individuals during the event; failing to coordinate [*5] with public safety officials; failing to clearly post warnings and other signs about the event, in advance of and during the event, to alert the public of the presence of the cyclists; failing to require the cyclists to stay together to increase visibility; allowing financial and public relations aspects to outweigh prudent safety concerns and; choosing to conduct three separate trips when there were inadequate resources. As a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s negligence, Daniel Lewis sustained serious injuries of a permanent nature, and the plaintiffs seek damages for the costs already expended in his care and the future loss of his wages.
On December 12, 2009, the defendant filed an answer, which included a special defense alleging Daniel Lewis’ comparative negligence as well as one stating that the plaintiffs’ claims are contractually barred due to Daniel Lewis’ signing of a Release and Waiver of Liability, Assumption of Risk and Indemnity Agreement (“exculpatory agreement”). On June 10, 2011, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Daniel Lewis signed the exculpatory agreement. Furthermore, [*6] the defendant argues that it did not owe a duty to Daniel Lewis, and his injuries were not caused by the defendant’s conduct. In support of its motion, the defendant submitted evidence, which included affidavits and the accident report. On August 8, 2011, the plaintiffs objected to the defendant’s motion on the grounds that the exculpatory agreement is invalid and against public policy, that the defendant owes the plaintiffs a duty of care, and that the defendant’s negligence was the legal cause of Daniel Lewis’s injuries. The plaintiffs submitted exhibits in support of their objection that included affidavits, deposition transcripts, as well as promotional materials and policy manuals distributed by the defendant. The defendant submitted a reply on August 22, 2011. The plaintiffs filed a surreply on September 22, 2011, and submitted additional exhibits including tax returns and other financial information about the defendant and the HBC fundraiser. On October 3, 2011, oral arguments were held, and the plaintiff submitted an additional page of deposition testimony by John Allen, an expert on the bicycle industry. On October 11, 2011, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of Craig Clark, [*7] a participant in the 2007 HBC.
DISCUSSION
[HN1] “Practice Book §17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010). “[S]ince litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury . . . the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard . . . of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kakadelis v. DeFabritis, 191 Conn. 276, 282, 464 A.2d 57 (1983). “Summary judgment in favor of the defendant is properly granted if the defendant in its motion raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff’s claim and involves no triable issue of fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Serrano v. Burns, 248 Conn. 419, 424, 727 A.2d 1276 (1999). [*8] “Only one of the [defendant’s] defenses needs to be valid in order to overcome [a] motion for summary judgment. [S]ince a single valid defense may defeat recovery, [a movant’s] motion for summary judgment should be denied when any defense presents significant fact issues that should be tried.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Union Trust Co. v. Jackson, 42 Conn.App. 413, 417, 679 A.2d 421 (1996).
In the present case, the defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that Daniel Lewis signed an exculpatory agreement that releases the defendant from liability. The plaintiffs have objected on the grounds that the exculpatory agreement is not sufficiently clear to avoid liability, and furthermore, that the agreement is void as against public policy. The defendant further argues that it did not owe Daniel Lewis a duty of care to prevent injuries that he sustained and its actions were not the proximate cause of his injuries. The court first examines the threshold issue of whether the exculpatory agreement is valid before addressing the nature of the duties owed to the plaintiffs.
I. Exculpatory Agreement
[HN2] In deciding whether to enforce an exculpatory agreement, Connecticut courts first [*9] look at whether the language of the agreement expressly provides that the party will be exculpated for its own negligence. See Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 321-22, 885 A.2d 734 (2005). If the agreement is clear, it must nevertheless be consistent with public policy. Id., 326-27. The agreement in the present case is unenforceable for both lack of clarity and public policy reasons.
A. Lack of Clarity
[HN3] “[U]nless the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an exculpatory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from liability for his own negligent acts . . . [I]t must appear plainly and precisely that the limitation of liability extends to negligence or other fault of the party attempting to shed his ordinary responsibility . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 322. “[A] party cannot be released from liability for injuries resulting from its future negligence in the absence of language that expressly so provides.” Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut Inc., 265 Conn. 636, 643, 829 A.2d 827 (2003).
At oral arguments on October 3, 2011, the plaintiffs argued that [*10] the waiver was not valid because it was not a clear and conspicuous waiver of the plaintiffs’ rights. They argued that the language in the exculpatory agreement was not as strong as the language in cases where courts have found such agreements enforceable.2
2 The plaintiffs also argued that the waiver did not effectively include “conservators” among the group of individuals that were barred from bringing suit, so even if it were effective against Daniel Lewis, his parents, as conservators would be able to bring this claim against the defendant. Since the agreement is deemed unenforceable for other reasons, this court need not address whether a conservator is included within this particular agreement.
In Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 636, the court held that it could not enforce an exculpatory agreement which only referred to the risks involved in snowtubing, but which made no reference to the possible negligence of the defendant. Id., 643. In Hanks, in contrast, the court found that an exculpatory agreement that explicitly used the word “negligence” several times, and in all capital letters in contrast to the surrounding test, was sufficiently [*11] clear to be enforceable, but disallowed the agreement as invalid under public policy considerations. Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 324. A subsequent exculpatory agreement case, Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, 280 Conn. 153, 162, n.9, 905 A.2d 1156 (2006), dealt with an agreement that used the word negligence, but did not highlight or emphasize the text in the agreement. The Reardon court, however, did not address whether the exculpatory agreement was sufficiently explicit, but found that public policy dictated that it was unenforceable. Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, supra, 280 Conn. 158. Thus, [HN4] our appellate courts have left open the question of whether a mere mention of negligence is always sufficient to make an exculpatory agreement enforceable.
There is nevertheless helpful language throughout the cases. Terms must be unambiguous as well as understandable. Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 322. “[T]his does not imply that only simple or monosyllabic language can be used in such clauses. Rather, what the law demands is that such provisions be clear and coherent . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The question is whether [*12] “an ordinary person of reasonable intelligence would understand that, by signing the agreement, he or she was releasing the defendants from liability for their future negligence.” Id., 324-25.
In absence of further illumination, the Supreme Court has referred to statutory authority as well as treatises and other persuasive decisions indicating that [HN5] conspicuousness was a requirement for enforcing such a waiver. See Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc. supra, 265 Conn. 641-43. The court has relied on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which provides that “[l]anguage inserted by a party in an agreement for the purpose of exempting him from liability for negligent conduct is scrutinized with particular care and a court may require specific and conspicuous reference to negligence under the general principle that language is interpreted against the draftsman.” Id., 642, citing 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts §195, comment (b) (1981). Additionally, while not binding, General Statutes §42a-1-201(b)(10), which is part of the Uniform Commercial Code, provides persuasive guidance. It provides: “‘Conspicuous’, with reference to a term, means so written, displayed or [*13] presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is conspicuous or not is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the following: (A) A heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and (B) Language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language.” General Statutes §42a-1-201(b)(10); see also Emlee Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Waterbury Transmission, Inc., 31 Conn.App. 455, 471, 626 A.2d 307 (1993) (applying §42a-l-201(10) to determine the validity of a disclaimer, and finding that the relevant language was sufficiently conspicuous because it was capitalized and set off from the rest of the text).
Additionally, a comment to the Restatement (Third), Torts, Apportionment of Liability §2, on Contractual Limitations on Liability, states: [HN6] “A party invoking a contractual limitation on liability [*14] must prove the existence and application of the contract . . . A contract that limits liability must be expressed in clear, definite, and unambiguous language and cannot be inferred from general language . . . When an individual plaintiff passively accepts a contract drafted by the defendant, the contract is construed strictly, favoring reasonable interpretations against the defendant. A contract is not unenforceable merely because it fails to use specific language naming the causes of action to which it applies. In a written consumer contract, the fact that language is in small print or otherwise is not conspicuous is a factor in determining whether the agreement is enforceable.” Restatement (Third), Torts, Apportionment of Liability §2, comment (d).
[HN7] Judges of this court have reached different outcomes in evaluating whether exculpatory agreements are sufficiently clear. While “[i]t is clear that explicit reference to negligence is required to render valid an agreement releasing a party from liability for his/her own negligence”; Colagiovanni v. New Haven Acquisition Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 03 048041 (November 15, 2006, Robinson, J.) (42 Conn. L. Rptr. 423, 425, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3387, *13); [*15] it is not clear whether that is always sufficient. For instance it has been held that the phrase “ordinary negligence,” contained within an exculpatory agreement, is confusing and does not “unambiguously and explicitly [purport] to release the defendants from their prospective liability for negligence as required by Hanks.” Schneeloch v. Glastonbury Fitness & Wellness, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 5007348 (February 2, 2009, Domnarski, J.) (47 Conn. L. Rptr. 183, 185, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 191, *7); but see Corso v. United States Surgical Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 487002, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1373 (May 25, 2005, Levin, J.) (granting summary judgment in favor of a defendant because the release waiver explicitly referred to the defendant’s future negligence).
In the present case, the agreement’s language states in relevant part: “I agree, for myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, to not sue and to release, indemnify and hold harmless Habitat for Humanity of Greater New Haven, its affiliates, officers, directors, volunteers and employees and all sponsoring businesses and organizations and their agents and employees, from any and all liability, [*16] claims, demands and causes of action whatsoever, arising out of my participation in the Challenge and related activities–whether it results from the negligence of any of the above or from any other cause. I agree not to make a claim against or sue Habitat for Humanity or other sponsors or affiliated organizations for injuries or damages related to bicycling and/or other activities during the Challenge.”
The court agrees with the plaintiff that the agreement does not meet the level of clarity that was present in the agreement in Hanks. Here, the mere use of the word “negligence of any of the above,” within the text of a lengthy sentence consisting of multiple interrelated clauses, does not rise to the level of clarity required to enforce an exculpatory agreement against an individual. The language waiving the plaintiffs’ right to sue the defendants for the defendants negligence is not conspicuous, as no effort has been made to set the word negligence off from the rest of the text. Furthermore, the particular paragraph in which the provision appears is not set off by headings or any other marker from the remainder of the two-page agreement. The court concludes that a reasonable individual [*17] reading such an agreement would not be sufficiently informed that he or she is waiving the right to sue the defendant for its own negligent conduct. On the face of the agreement, it is insufficiently clear or explicit to be enforceable. Accordingly, the defendant may not prevail on its motion for summary judgment on the basis of the agreement.
B. Public Policy
[HN8] Even if an exculpatory agreement is clear enough to be enforced, it is nevertheless unenforceable if it violates public policy. See Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 326. The defendant argues that the exculpatory agreement does not violate public policy under the circumstances and thus bars the plaintiffs from bringing a claim for negligence. The plaintiffs argue that the exculpatory agreement violates public policy under Connecticut law. The court agrees with the plaintiffs.
[HN9] “Although it is well established that parties are free to contract for whatever terms on which they may agree . . . it is equally well established that contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable . . . [T]he question [of] whether a contract is against public policy is [a] question of law dependent on the circumstances of the [*18] particular case . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 326-27. The Supreme Court has adopted the six-factor test established in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), as part of the standard for establishing whether a exculpatory agreement violates public policy. Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 328-30.
[HN10] The six factors that the Tunkl court established, and the Supreme Court has adopted for application in Connecticut are: “[1] [The agreement] concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. [2] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. [3] The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards. [4] As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a [*19] decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. [5] In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. [6] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 328.
[HN11] The Tunkl factors, however, are not purely dispositive of this issue as “[t]he ultimate determination of what constitutes the public interest must be made considering the totality of the circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 330. Whether an exculpatory agreement is enforceable may be further determined by “any other factors that may be relevant given the factual circumstances of the case and current societal expectations.” Id. “[A]n exculpatory agreement may affect the public interest adversely even if some of the Tunkl [*20] factors are not satisfied.” Id., 328.
[HN12] “Exculpatory provisions, in general, undermine the public policy considerations governing our tort system. ‘[T]he fundamental policy purposes of the tort compensation system [are] compensation of innocent parties, shifting the loss to responsible parties or distributing it among appropriate entities, and deterrence of wrongful conduct . . . It is sometimes said that compensation for losses is the primary function of tort law . . . [but it] is perhaps more accurate to describe the primary function as one of determining when compensation [is] required. An equally compelling function of the tort system is the prophylactic factor of preventing future harm . . . The courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer.’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 246 Conn. 563, 578-79, 717 A.2d 215 (1998).” Colagiovanni v. New Haven Acquisition Corp., supra, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 426, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3387, *18. “[I]t is consistent with public policy to posit the risk of negligence upon the actor and, if this policy is to be abandoned, it has generally been to allow or require that the risk shift [*21] to another party better or equally able to bear it, not to shift the risk to the weak bargainer.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dow-Westbrook, Inc. v. Candlewood Equine Practice, LLC., 119 Conn.App. 703, 716, 989 A.2d 1075 (2010).
Analysis under the Tunkl factors and the totality of the circumstances weighs in favor of the plaintiffs, and against enforcement of the exculpatory agreement that Daniel Lewis signed before embarking on the HBC. The facts relating to each individual factors are not always clearly delineated and tend to overlap, but overall the factors weigh against enforcing the present exculpatory agreement under the circumstances.
The court first looks at the first factor, which concerns whether “[the agreement] concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation.” Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 328. Regarding the first factor, the agreement concerns the HBC, where the defendant was engaged in an activity suitable for public regulation. The defendant was raising funds for a charitable purpose, recruiting students to act as volunteer fundraisers and representatives while they engaged in a cycling expedition across [*22] the continental United States. The HBC is a fund raising program for a not-for-profit organization, and such organizations are susceptible to rules and regulations in order to maintain their tax exempt status. Moreover, the specific activity central to the parties’ agreement involved travel on public highways used for motor vehicles. [HN13] Highway travel and related public safety issues are areas which are subject to heavy regulation on a state and federal level. See e.g., General Statutes §§14-1 through 14-249 (regulating the areas of motor vehicles and use of the highway by vehicles).
In the present case, the defendant argues that organized bicycle racing is not a subject of public regulation. The defendant cites foreign case law, including Okura v. United States Cycling Federation, Inc. 186 Cal.App.3d 1462, 1465-68, 231 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1986), for this premise. While the HBC was organized around cycling, the event in question was not the same as an ordinary sporting competition. Here, the participants were not simply engaging in a recreational bicycle ride, but were involved in the larger mission of the defendant, raising funds and awareness through presentations; P. Exh. 7, Affidavit [Af.] [*23] of Sara Barz; participating at building sites across the country; P. Exh. 4, Af. of Liana Woskie; Defendant’s [D] Exh. 2, Af. of William Casey; Exh. 6, Af. of Patrick Muha ¶16; and complying with specific conduct requirements for participants in the event. P. Exh. 5, Af. of Christopher Gombeski.
The second factor weighs whether “[t]he party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public.” Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 328. The defendant is engaged, ultimately, in a service that is important to the public, namely fund-raising to meet the goal of building houses for the poor. Nevertheless, the HBC may be somewhat tangential to that defendant’s central charitable goals. The defendant argues that this case does not involve an issue of great importance because the HBC was similar to an organized leisure time activity. However, as discussed above, the participants in the HBC were working not only on their trip across the country, but making daily presentations, building houses, and raising funds to build homes for the poor. Thus, the HBC did involve [*24] tasks and goals that are important to the public rather than just cycling for its own sake.
Thirdly, the court evaluates whether “[t]he party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards.” Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 328. In the present case, any individual could apply to participate in the HBC.3 There were certain criteria for admissions, but the court credits the plaintiffs’ argument that the admissions criteria did “not negate the public aspect of the event.” The evidence shows that the event was roughly comprised half of Yale students and half of “distant” riders, who were individuals that did not attend Yale and applied to be a part of the event.4 See P. Exh. 10, pp.4-6. While HBC applicants had to meet certain criteria in order to ultimately participate, it was not so limiting as to remove the event from the public sphere. This was therefore a situation in which the defendant sought participation of members of the public meeting certain established standards.
3 The criteria for selecting applicants indicates that a wide range of individuals [*25] would apply to the program, and instructs the group leaders to choose individuals within a certain age range to avoid group dynamics that may develop with older participants. See P. Exh. 14, p. 16.
4 It is also worth noting that “distant” participants were subject to different training regimens, and largely had to find ways of training on their own in their location. See P. Exh. 14.
The last three Tunkl factors are as follows: “[4] As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. [5] In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. [6] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 328.
In [*26] analyzing these elements, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Soh is instructive. In that case, the court held “that [HN14] exculpatory agreements in the employment context violate Connecticut public policy.” Brown v. Soh, supra, 280 Conn. 503. In reaching that conclusion, the court stated: “We further note than an employer . . . possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against the plaintiff employee. Considering the economic compulsion facing those in search of employment . . . [t]o suppose that [a] plaintiff . . . had any bargaining power whatsoever defies reality . . . It is also highly significant that, in exercising this superior bargaining power, the [defendant] confronted the plaintiff with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation. The agreement signed by the plaintiff was offered . . . on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis . . . The most salient feature [of adhesion contracts] is that they are not subject to the normal bargaining processes of ordinary contracts, and they tend to involve standard form contract[s] prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, [usually] a consumer, who has little choice about the terms . . . [I]t would ignore [*27] reality to conclude that the plaintiff wielded the same bargaining power to determine the terms of the exculpatory agreement as the [defendant], which required him to sign it. He had nearly zero bargaining power with respect to the negotiation of the [exculpatory agreement] and in order to participate in the activity [the plaintiff] was required to assume the risk of the defendants’ negligence . . . [HN15] Another important consideration in deciding if an exculpatory agreement violates public policy is whether the signatory will be under the control of the person seeking exculpation from negligence and subject to the risk of that person’s carelessness. By definition, an employee agrees to be under the control of the employer and is therefore exposed to the employer’s carelessness . . . In the employment context, the employer generally has the greater ability to avoid harm because the employer chooses the workplace and assigns tasks to the employees. As we previously have noted, it is consistent with public policy to posit the risk of negligence upon the actor and, if this policy is to be abandoned, it has generally been to allow or require that the risk shift to another party better or equally [*28] able to bear it, not to shift the risk to the weak bargainer . . . If employers were permitted to obtain broad waivers of their liability, an important incentive to manage risk would be removed. It would be unwise, in these circumstances, to undermine the public policy underlying the allocation of risk in tort law by allowing employees to bear risks they have no ability or right to control. Moreover, we note that our conclusion is consistent with the view of the American Law Institute, as embodied in 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts §195 (1981), and 2 Restatement (Second), Torts §496B, comment (f) (1965).” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brown v. Soh, supra, 280 Conn. 504-06.
The analysis of the Brown court applies to the facts of the present case as well. While there was not a formal employment relationship between Daniel Lewis and the defendant, it is apparent that the defendant had control over the plaintiff in many aspects of the relationship. Firstly, the defendant had power in selection and dismissal over the participants in the HBC. During the course of the summer-long event, all of the participants were subject to the defendant’s control. While the defendant [*29] could not control weather or other road conditions, it did control most other aspects of the cross-country event. The defendant determined the route of travel, the daily mileage traveled, availability of signage warning drivers of the cyclists’ presence, notification of local authorities who could coordinate safety measures on the local level, the selection of trip leaders and sweep riders, the presence of support vehicles, the participants’ training and riding tests, and finally, the locations of the stops along the way and the time table which set the pace by which the cyclists had to reach each destination. There were many factors that participants could not adjust even if based on a participant’s own judgment or knowledge.
The “HBC Rules and Policies” offered into evidence by the plaintiffs illustrate that the defendant was indeed in control of Daniel Lewis while he was engaged in the HBC. There were prohibited behaviors and language specifically stating that the riders “represent Habitat for Humanity.” There were specific rules regarding safety on the cycling path and the conduct of participants, including regimented daily schedules, rules regarding relationships between participants, [*30] language, alcohol and drug use, and how participants were to conduct themselves in the presence of their hosts along the route. See P. Exh. 10. The cyclists wore jerseys with the defendant’s logo on them; P. Exh. 15, Photographs of Habitat Shirts; and rode bicycles that were purchased for them by the defendant. See P. Exh. 14, pp. 39-42. Participants had to comply with these requirements and rules in order to continue their journey.5 Even though there is some evidence that the policies were inadequately enforced, the participants were not completely free actors of their own will and they were similar to employees in that many aspects of their participation were under the defendant’s control and they could be dismissed by the defendant for violation of policies.
5 The materials in evidence stated: “Reckless biking will not be tolerated and is grounds for immediate expulsion from the trip . . . Helmet use is required at all times while riding on the Habitat Bicycle Challenge. No riding while intoxicated or under the influence of any drug. Not only is this dangerous, it is also illegal almost everywhere and it is grounds for immediate expulsion from the trip. No riding after dark. No riding [*31] while wearing headphones . . . Never ride on an interstate unless a leader tells you to and the leader has checked with the state police . . . Never ride more than double file . . . Bike in the shoulder, not in the lane with traffic . . . Never cross the yellow line into oncoming traffic . . . Only leaders can drive the van. This is for insurance reasons.” P. Exh. 14 p. 64, HBC Rules and Policies.
It is also apparent that, as a prospective applicant for the HBC, Daniel Lewis would have been subject to a power imbalance when presented with an exculpatory agreement. Applicants were required to sign the exculpatory agreement before being allowed to participate. As in Brown, this created a “take it or leave it” situation in which HBC participants were virtually powerless in affecting the terms of the exculpatory agreement. Moreover, there is no evidence that there was a possibility of negotiation between the parties before the exculpatory agreement was signed by Daniel Lewis or any other participant.6
6 The defendant argues that the plaintiffs fail to offer any evidence that Daniel Lewis ever attempted to negotiate the contract or that other participants had made such an attempt. The court [*32] notes, however, that [HN16] “[i]n seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10-11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008). Accordingly, it is incumbent on the defendant, as the summary judgment movant, to establish that individuals were in fact able to negotiate the exculpatory agreement before signing it.
Daniel Lewis was clearly in the relatively weaker position as an individual student applicant when compared to a not-for-profit organization that had arranged and managed this expansive event for several years. Furthermore, there is no indication that [*33] Daniel Lewis had an opportunity to raise more funds or pay a fee in exchange for more protection from the defendant’s negligence or even to obtain from the defendant additional insurance to cover himself while he was traveling on its behalf.7 The facts presented by the record indicate that this agreement was indeed an adhesion contract, and not an agreement that was negotiated between two parties on equal footing.
7 The training materials state that “Habitat for Humanity provides a supplemental insurance policy which will help cover medical expenses your personal insurance does not.” P. Exh. 10, Rider Manual, p. 30. There is no indication what the scope of this insurance was, and the defendant has not provided evidence that the participants were indeed able to purchase additional coverage.
In addition to the Tunkl factors, the totality of the circumstances indicate that this exculpatory agreement is unenforceable as a matter of public policy. While it is noteworthy that the defendant was engaged in a worthwhile cause, namely, alleviating poverty and homelessness, there is no indication that the organization should be allowed to place the risk of its potential negligence on the individual [*34] participants if there was no way to organize this event in a safer manner. Placing the burden of the defendant’s potential negligent conduct on the individual participants who are attempting to contribute to a charitable cause flies in the face of current societal expectations.
Furthermore, the defendant maintains a $5 million insurance policy, which further indicates the defendant’s status as the party in the best position to assume the risk of its own negligence.8 In this case, given the totality of the circumstances, the defendant should not be allowed to be exculpated from its potential negligence in hosting and organizing the HBC. Ultimately, enforcing this agreement would effectively allow the defendant to receive all of the benefits of having individuals raise money through the HBC event, but bear none of the risks caused by its own actions in organizing such an event. Accordingly, the court finds, based on the guidance provided in Tunkl and established in Connecticut law by Hanks and Brown, that the exculpatory provision in this case violates public policy and thus is unenforceable.
8 [HN17] The Supreme Court has considered insurance coverage, or the ability to carry insurance as a factor [*35] in deciding whether to uphold an exculpatory agreement. See Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 332-33 (finding that an agreement was unenforceable where the party excusing itself was more able to insure itself and spread the cost of insurance than the signatory).
II. Duty
The defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it did not owe Daniel Lewis a duty of care. The plaintiffs argue in response that the defendant owed Daniel Lewis a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect his safety because his injuries were foreseeable and because public policy supports recognition of a duty under the circumstances presented here.
[HN18] “Negligence involves the violation of a legal duty [that] one owes to another, in respect to care for the safety of the person or property of that other . . . The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury.” O’Donnell v. Feneque, 120 Conn.App. 167, 171, 991 A.2d 643, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010). “Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.” [*36] (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984). “Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where . . . the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation . . . [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975).
However, [HN19] “[t]he issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003). “The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neuhaus v. Decholnoky, 280 Conn. 190, 217, 905 A.2d 1135 (2006). “Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships between [*37] individuals, made after the fact, and imperative to a negligence cause of action. The nature of the duty, and the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined by the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the individual.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Allen v. Cox, 285 Conn. 603, 609, 942 A.2d 296 (2008).
[HN20] “The test for determining legal duty is a two-pronged analysis that includes: (1) a determination of foreseeability; and (2) public policy analysis.” Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 273 Conn. 108, 114, 869 A.2d 179 (2005). “[O]ur threshold inquiry has always been whether the specific harm alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant. The ultimate test of the existence of the duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised . . . By that is not meant that one charged with negligence must be found actually to have foreseen the probability of harm or that the particular injury which resulted was foreseeable, but the test is, would the ordinary [person] in the defendant’s position, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result?” (Citations [*38] omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Allen v. Cox, supra, 285 Conn. 610.
The defendant and plaintiffs disagree on the scope of foreseeability in this instance. The defendant argues that, in order for it to have owed Daniel Lewis a duty of care, it must have been specifically foreseeable that Daniel Lewis would suddenly veer in front of a car when participating in the HBC. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the foreseeability requirement is met if it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that, if it did not take additional steps to ensure the safety of cyclists, it increases the likelihood that cyclists would be struck by vehicles and seriously injured, regardless of the exact chain of events leading to the collision. The court agrees with the plaintiffs.
As previously stated, it is well established Connecticut law that “the test [for foreseeability] is, would the ordinary [person] in the defendant’s position, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result?” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Allen v. Cox, supra, 285 Conn. 610. Accordingly, there is no legal basis for [*39] the defendant’s assertion that Daniel Lewis’ injuries in the present case were unforeseeable because the defendant could not have foreseen the very specific mechanism by which the injuries occurred, namely, that Daniel Lewis suddenly and without warning veered in front of a moving vehicle. Rather, the question for the court to determine is whether an ordinary person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would have anticipated that serious injuries to cyclists were likely to occur as a result of collisions with motor vehicles. The evidence submitted in connection with the present motion leads to a conclusion that such injuries were reasonably foreseeable.
The evidence shows that the defendant had experience in planning the HBC as an annual event for many years before the 2007 event was organized, so it was in the position to know more about the risks and dangers that were foreseeable with the event. See D. Exh. 2, Af. of William Casey. The HBC event had resulted in past injuries and deaths including the death of a cyclist as a result of a collision with a vehicle during the 2005 HBC. P. Exh. 8, Af. of Sam Gutner; P. Exh. 20, HBC Risk Management [*40] document. There is also evidence of an additional death associated with the HBC. P. Exh. 9, Af. of Andrew Wagner; P. Exh. 20, HBC Risk Management document. Several of the participants had accidents during the 2007 HBC including one individual being swiped by a car, and one “flipping” over the handlebars when losing concentration. P. Exh. 9, Af. of Andrew Wagner.
Notwithstanding this past history of serious injuries and death associated with the event, there was little to no coordination with law enforcement agencies or officials along the HBC south route. Moreover, other than the Habitat for Humanity sign on the back of the support van and the HBC jerseys worn by the riders, there were no signs or other notices to the public along the route warning of the presence of cyclists. P. Exh. 8, Af. of Sam Gutner.
The plaintiffs have provided further evidence that on the day in question, the temperature was high and there was low humidity. See P. Exh. 8, Af. of Sam Gutner; Exh. 6, Af. of Patrick Muha. Other conditions along the route in Kansas included winds and nearly continuous sun exposure along the route. Id. The south route was considered the most difficult and challenging of the HBC routes. [*41] P. Exh. 8; P. Exh. 9, Af. of Andrew Wagner; P. Exh. 14. The plaintiffs offer testimony that Kansas in particular was difficult because it was “boring and monotonous” and because of the “long stretches of low hills, the heat and the wind, and the fact that it occurs after several weeks of cycling.” P. Exh. 6; P. Exh. 8; P. Exh. 9. There is evidence that cyclists can suffer from “Directed Attention Fatigue” as a complication of cycling over long distances in monotonous circumstances. P. Exh. 22, Af. of Glen Steimling, Ph.D. ¶9; P. Exh. 27, Af. of Jeffry L. Kashuk, M.D., ¶¶17-21. The participants were never trained in rural conditions outside of New Haven before embarking on the HBC in 2007. See P. Exh. 17, Af. of Elizabeth J. Sanders. A participant has stated she felt unprepared and that she did not think the trip was a safe venture. Id.
In sum, the plaintiff has submitted ample evidence indicating that the defendant was aware of prior injuries, including deaths, that had occurred as a result of collisions between cyclists and vehicles during the HBC in years prior to 2007. The plaintiffs’ evidence also indicates that, notwithstanding the defendant’s knowledge of these past serious injuries, [*42] it continued to hold the cross-country cycling event, along a very difficult route, without significant coordination with local law enforcement authorities, and without instituting measures to provide signs or other notices along the route cautioning drivers of the presence of cyclists. While not conclusive at this stage in the proceedings, this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrates that it was foreseeable to the defendant, in light of all of the information available to it at the time that there was a likelihood of future serious injuries to cyclists caused by collisions with vehicles during the HBC. The defendant has failed to demonstrate the nonexistence of a duty on foreseeability grounds.
Nor can the defendant prevail on its argument that there is no duty as a matter of public policy. [HN21] “Foreseeability notwithstanding, it is well established that Connecticut courts will not impose a duty of care on the defendants if doing so would be inconsistent with public policy.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, supra, 273 Conn. 116. “[I]n considering whether public policy suggests the imposition [*43] of a duty, we . . . consider the following four factors: (1) the normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review; (2) the public policy of encouraging participation in the activity, while weighing the safety of the participants; (3) the avoidance of increased litigation; and (4) the decisions of other jurisdictions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 118.
These enumerated factors weigh heavily in support of recognizing a duty in the present case. The normal expectation of volunteers in a cross-country cycling event organized by a not-for-profit organization for fund raising and awareness purposes would be that the organization will take reasonable steps for their safety while participating in the event. At the same time, the organizers of the event should expect that such an event creates countless opportunities for injuries and should expect to have to take such reasonable steps to promote safety. Furthermore, imposing a duty that the organizer exercise due care to keep participants safe will both encourage participation in such events and increase the safety of participants. While imposing a duty could be expected to increase litigation somewhat, the type [*44] of event organized by the defendant is not so common that there is any serious risk of an unreasonable or inappropriate increase in litigation. See Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 269 Conn. 672, 703, 849 A.2d 813 (2004) (“this third factor focuses upon the diminishment of an inappropriate flood of litigation” [emphasis in original]). Finally, due to the very unique facts of the present case, there is a dearth of case law from other jurisdictions shedding light on this issue. Nevertheless, because all of the other prongs of the public policy analysis strongly favor recognition of a duty in the present case, the defendant cannot prevail on its argument that it owed Daniel Lewis no duty.
III. Causation
The defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because any negligence on its part was not a proximate cause of Daniel Lewis’ injuries. Specifically, the defendant repeats its argument that the immediate cause of Daniel Lewis’ injuries was the plaintiff veering into oncoming traffic, which was too remote and unforeseeable from any actions of the defendant to provide a basis for liability. The defendant also argues that all of the allegations of negligence against it [*45] are premised on the inherent and unavoidable risks of long distance cycling. The plaintiffs respond that they have alleged specific acts of negligence by the defendant that created or increased the risk that Daniel Lewis would collide with a vehicle, and that there is evidence supporting a conclusion that such negligence was a substantial factor in causing his injuries.
[HN22] To show legal cause, “[a] plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct legally caused the injuries . . . The first component of legal cause is causation in fact. Causation in fact is the purest legal application of . . . legal cause. The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor’s conduct . . . The second component of legal cause is proximate cause . . . [T]he test of proximate cause is whether the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s injuries . . . The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection . . . This causal connection must be based upon more than conjecture and surmise.” O’Donnell v. Feneque, supra, 120 Conn.App. 172. [*46] “[T]he question of proximate causation generally belongs to the trier of fact because causation is essentially a factual issue . . . It becomes a conclusion of law only when the mind of a fair and reasonable [person] could reach only one conclusion; if there is room for a reasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined by the trier as a matter of fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Levesque v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 286 Conn. 234, 249, 943 A.2d 430 (2008). Compare Kumah v. Brown, 130 Conn.App. 343, 351, 23 A.3d 758 (2011) (finding that the defendant could not have reasonably been found to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries when the defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident several hours beforehand).
The defendant’s argument regarding foreseeability of the particular accident that occurred in the present case has already been addressed in the section of this memorandum dealing with duty. As stated there, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrates that it was foreseeable that there was a likelihood of future serious injuries to cyclists caused by collisions with vehicles during the HBC if the defendant [*47] failed to exercise reasonable care to provide for the safety of participants. The defendant need not have anticipated the exact scenario under which the collision actually occurred.
Furthermore, the court disagrees with the defendant that all of the allegations of negligence here are based on inherent and unavoidable risks of long distance cycling. On the contrary, the gravamen of the allegations of negligence is that the risks associated with the HBC could have been lessened or eliminated had the defendant not been negligent. For example, as stated previously, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant could have taken actions such as restricting the size or scope of the event to maximize safety, limiting cyclists’ exposure to extreme weather conditions, coordinating with local public safety officials, and posting warnings and other signs about the event to alert the public of the presence of the cyclists.
Although the defendant asserts that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate causation, “[i]n seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment [*48] has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10-11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008). [HN23] “On a motion by the defendant for summary judgment the burden is on [the] defendant to negate each claim as framed by the complaint . . . It necessarily follows that it is only [o]nce [the] defendant’s burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Baldwin v. Curtis, 105 Conn.App. 844, 850-51, 939 A.2d 1249 (2008).
Accordingly, on the causation issue, it is the defendant’s burden to negate each claim set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint by submitting [*49] evidence that establishes the nonexistence of any genuine issue of fact. In other words, the defendant must demonstrate that Daniel Lewis’ injuries were not proximately caused by any of the alleged negligent acts or omissions set forth in the plaintiffs’ complaint. The defendant has failed to do so. For example, to take just two of the allegations of the complaint, the defendant has not submitted evidence demonstrating that the lack of signs along the event route or the failure of the defendant to coordinate with local authorities were not substantial factors in bringing about Daniel Lewis’ injuries. See O’Donnell v. Feneque, supra, 120 Conn.App. 172 (“[t]he test of proximate cause is whether the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s injuries”).
Moreover, even if the defendant had made a sufficient showing to meet its burden as the movant for summary judgment, the plaintiff’s evidence presents issues of material fact as to the proximate cause of Daniel Lewis’s injuries. The plaintiff’s have presented evidence and testimony of experts and witnesses that could support a finding that the defendant’s actions proximately caused the alleged injuries. [*50] See P. Exh. 21 Af. and Supplemental Af. of W. Preston Tyree, III; P. Exh. 22, Af. of Glenn Steimling, Ph.D; P. Exh. 27, Af. of Jeffry Kashuk, MD. The plaintiffs provide the testimony of Preston Tyree, an expert on cycling safety, which states that the way the event was organized, including the routes and the lengths of the days, was of such a nature that it could reasonably be expected to cause physical and mental fatigue that could affect cyclists’ alertness and judgment. He also testifies that races and long-term cycling should be organized to allow the cyclists to make as few decisions as possible including whether they should have a break or drink water. P. Exh. 23, transcript of deposition of Tyree. There is evidence that on the day in question, the conditions were “brutal” where it was hot and “very, very windy” in addition to the monotony of the Kansas roads. P. Exh. 6 ¶18; P. Exh. 8 ¶¶24-25. Daniel Lewis is unable to testify as to his condition or mental state at the time of the accident, but the plaintiffs have offered evidence that there is potentially a causal link between the actions of the defendant and the injuries sustained by Daniel Lewis, particularly in planning the [*51] event, providing the participants support and adjusting for the conditions the participants were facing.
Because the defendant has failed to demonstrate that, as a matter of law, its alleged acts and omissions were not substantial factors in causing Daniel Lewis’ injuries, the court will not grant summary judgment on the basis of causation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant Habitat for Humanity of Greater New Haven, Inc. is denied.
Frechette, J.
Recreation Law 