Results of this injury during a sailing race are scary. Federal judge unloaded on the defendant when a girl could not figure out to move when the boom shifts. Judge wanted to see safety orientation and warning labels on a personal sailboat!
Posted: April 9, 2018 Filed under: South Carolina | Tags: admiralty, Admiralty Law, Boat, BRAIN, captain, citation omitted, Concussion, crew members, Duty of care, emotional, experienced, Guest, gybe, headaches, hit, lookout, maneuver, medication, opined, pain, passenger, present value, safe, Sailboat, Sailboat Race, Sailing, sheet, sit, sitting, suffering, Symptoms, traumatic, vessel Leave a commentThe liability created by this decision will hopefully remain off shore and solely related to sailing and admiralty law; If not, never take someone outdoors again.
When your buddy wants to bring his bartender your boat for a sailing race, don’t let him. Court created liability when it found no safety training or warning labels for a group of people going sailing.
Ray v. Lesniak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28301
State: South Carolina, United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Charleston Division
Plaintiff: Raven Renee Ray
Defendant: Steve A. Lesniak
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence
Defendant Defenses: never could figure that out
Holding: for the plaintiff
Year: 2018
Summary
Either the defendant failed to present a defense or the court ignored it. Either way, this decision creates massive liability on the part of a trip leader in what was once referred to as common adventure activities. A group of people going out to recreate together on the weekend.
Facts
It is going to be easier to pull quotes from the decision than to outline the facts in this case. It will also give you a better understanding of the court’s position from the beginning.
At the time of the incident at issue, Ray was a 29-year-old female working two jobs in the food and beverage industry, volunteering at an acupuncture clinic, and simultaneously pursuing advanced degrees in psychology and clinical counseling at The Citadel. Ray had never been on a sailboat before the day of the incident.
Colin Skinner (“Skinner”), who Ray knew as a “regular” customer at the Oak Bar Tavern where she worked. Skinner was a crew member on the Celadon. Skinner has been sailing with Lesniak for “[r]oughly five years.” Lesniak allowed Skinner to invite a guest on the boat.
Lesniak did not give safety instructions to any of the guests, including Ray, who was on the Celadon. He also did not give any written instructions to guests. Furthermore, he did not have a written safety checklist or conduct a safety and operational briefing before the Celadon left the marina. At the time of the incident, there were no safety placards or visual displays on the Celadon stating that there were dangerous places to sit on the boat, such as “around any rope, boom.” Lesniak delegated the giving of safety instructions to two crew members, neither of whom testified during the trial.
Lesniak testified that members of his crew told Ray to move “several times” and that the crew members were aware that she did not move–even after Lesniak had called for the gybe maneuver. For example, Truog was aware that Ray was sitting in front of the main sheet when Lesniak gybed. Truog saw “the boom [come] over, and that [Ray] was pushed down to the side of the boat.”
If Lesniak had waited to gybe or made sure that Ray was in a safe location, Ray would not have been hit by the main sheet.
After Lesniak did the gybe maneuver, Ray was hit by the main sheet, the force of which threw her from her seated position onto the deck of the boat.
The plaintiff said she was OK; the race continued. Later that day and the next week she again said she was OK. However, eventually, she sued.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The defendant, owner of the board, did not put up a good defense. In fact, the way the court restated his positions, it seemed the court thought he was pretty arrogant. The plaintiff hired an expert witness who started out stating the personal sailboat should be labeled like an amusement ride.
There were also no written instructions on the “hull or deck of the boat or bow or the stern, starboard side” that said where to sit, and no one gave written instructions to Ray when she was on the boat. There was also no formal verbal safety briefing.
The plaintiff’s expert further stated that only experts should have been on the boat.
Wahl opined that competitive sailboat racing “requires a large number of experienced crew to adequately handle the fast-paced activities normally observed during this often dangerous and close quarters style of competitive sailing.” Wahl further opined that “[o]nly highly experienced persons should be aboard for these events.” Id. Based on his review of the evidence, Wahl testified that “there appeared to be a lot of people” on the Celadon, and that “safe places . . . were probably a little bit difficult to find.”
Based on the one-sided statement of facts and testimony only from the plaintiff’s expert, the court easily found the defendant liable.
Lesniak had a duty to: (1) properly administer safety briefings to Ray that included where the safe places to sit on the boat were during the race; (2) warn Ray that the gybe maneuver was going to be undertaken; (3) not gybe until Ray was no longer sitting in front of the main sheet; and (4) not hit Ray with the main sheet rope during the gybe maneuver.
The court then piled it on, following basic first-year law school tort classes in explaining why the defendant was liable.
The court further finds that it was completely foreseeable to Lesniak that Ray could be injured by his failure to warn her that a gybe maneuver was going to be undertaken that would involve moving the main sheet that she was sitting directly in front of, and his failure to prevent the main sheet from hitting Ray. Lesniak’s negligence was a proximate cause of Ray’s injuries; but for this breach of duty, Ray’s injuries would not have occurred.
The court then proceeded to find all four required components of negligence were proven. The first was whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty.
It is well-established in general maritime law that a vessel operator has a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of his passengers. Lesniak was the captain, and so was in charge of the vessel at the time of Ray’s injury. As such, he was charged with a duty of care to his passengers. This standard of care owed to a passenger by a vessel operator under maritime law is reasonable care under the circumstances at that particular time in each case. “The extent to which circumstances surrounding maritime travel are different than those encountered in daily life and involve more danger to passengers, will deter-mine how high a degree is reasonable in each case.
However, the court’s findings were just out there. The court found the defendant had a duty to determine if the plaintiff had any prior sailing experience.
In this case, the circumstances surrounding a sailboat participating in a race in the Charleston harbor call for a heightened degree of care. Additionally, before stepping on board the Celadon, Ray had never before been on a sailboat, a fact of which Lesniak was unaware of and failed to inquire about.
Second was whether the defendant had breached that duty to the plaintiff.
The court finds that Lesniak failed to act as a prudent mariner in failing to: (1) provide adequate posted, written, or verbal warnings to Ray regarding the potential dangers of movement and position on the Celadon and how to avoid those dangers; and (2) in failing to make sure that his passengers were in a safe location at all times, especially before performing a gybe maneuver which causes the boom and its related parts to swing quickly from port to starboard or vice versa. The court finds that these acts and omissions constitute a breach of Rule 5 of the Inland Navigation Rules, the common-law lookout duty, and the general duty of due care under Admiralty and South Carolina law.
For causation, the court determined it was the defendant’s job to prove there was no causation. That is not how causation normally works!
The court’s determination that Lesniak breached his duty to keep a proper lookout imposes upon him the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that his breach of duty did not contribute to the incident. The record here does not support such a showing. Therefore, the court concludes that Lesniak’s negligence caused the main sheet to strike Ray’s head and, therefore, Ray’s resulting injuries.
The judge did find the plaintiff was 25% liable for her injuries under the theory of comparative negligence.
Specifically, Ray failed to pay attention to warnings from multiple crew members to move from her position in front of the main sheet rope. Ray was to blame, in part, for being hit by the main sheet. The court finds that Ray was 25% to blame, and so reduces her damages by 25%.
The court found the following four specific times when the plaintiff was liable.
1. Ray was told to move away from the main sheet by multiple crew members, including Truog and Becker, but did not move.
2. After getting hit by the main sheet, Ray did not ask anyone for medical attention and did not appear to be in need of any medical attention.
3. When Ray got off the Celadon at the conclusion of the race, Lesniak asked her if she was “okay” and she replied that “she was fine.”
4. A few days after the incident, Lesniak contacted Ray to give her the option of going to see Bill Lynch, a crew member on the Celadon during the incident and a doctor, at no cost. Ray declined.
The judge then started looking at damages and found every single medical damage the plaintiff had presented had been proved and gave the plaintiff all the damages she requested including pain and suffering, past and future emotional distress and loss of enjoyment of life. Basically, the trifecta of damages.
Those damages totaled:
$958,758.15,6 plus prejudgment interest in the amount of twenty-two thousand, nine-hundred and fifty-two dollars and forty-four cents $22,151.44, and postjudgment interest at the legal rate from the date of this order.
So Now What?
The defendant did not put up a fight, or if he did it was ignored by the court. In fact, the entire decision is a review of the plaintiff’s case and nothing more.
What is scary, is the requirements that a trip leader on a common adventure now has a duty to enquire, duty to educate and a duty to warn.
Sailboats are not going to come with stickers and warning labels.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Ray v. Lesniak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28301
Posted: April 8, 2018 Filed under: Legal Case, Racing, South Carolina | Tags: admiralty, Admiralty Law, Boat, BRAIN, captain, citation omitted, Concussion, crew members, Duty of care, emotional, experienced, Guest, gybe, headaches, hit, lookout, maneuver, medication, opined, pain, passenger, present value, safe, Sailboat, Sailboat Race, Sailing, sheet, sit, sitting, suffering, Symptoms, traumatic, vessel Leave a commentRay v. Lesniak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28301
Raven Renee Ray, Plaintiff, v. Steve A. Lesniak, Defendant.
No.: 2:16-cv-1752-DCN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, CHARLESTON DIVISION
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28301
February 22, 2018, Decided
February 22, 2018, Filed
CORE TERMS: sheet, boat, brain, crew members, traumatic, pain, sailboat, captain, gybe, admiralty, passenger, maneuver, sailing, vessel, medication, symptoms, present value, guest, experienced, emotional, headaches, safe, hit, suffering, lookout, sit, citation omitted, concussion, sitting, opined
COUNSEL: [*1] For Raven Renee Ray, Plaintiff: Benjamin Catlett Smoot, II, William P Early, LEAD ATTORNEY, Pierce Herns Sloan and McLeod, Charleston, SC; Theodore Augustus Consta Hargrove, II, Pierce Herns Sloan and Wilson LLC, Charleston, SC.
For Steve A Lesniak, Defendant: Joseph R Weston, Stephanie A Phillips, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Weston Law Firm, Mt Pleasant, SC.
JUDGES: DAVID C. NORTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
OPINION BY: DAVID C. NORTON
OPINION
Plaintiff Raven Renee Ray (“Ray”) brought this admiralty action against Defendant Steve A. Lesniak (“Lesniak”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h). Ray is suing Lesniak for personal injuries and other damages she sustained as a result of being struck by the main sheet during a sailing race on Lesniak’s boat “the Celadon.”
The court tried this case without a jury on September 18, 2017. Having considered the testimony and the exhibits admitted at trial, as well as the parties’ pre-trial briefs and post-trial proposed findings and conclusions, the court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). It finds that Lesniak was negligent in his captaining of the Celadon, that Ray suffered an injury while an invited guest on the Celadon as a result of Lesniak’s negligence, and [*2] that as a result of this injury Ray has a permanent traumatic brain injury. It awards $958,758.15 in damages. This award, in the court’s eyes, gives Ray what she deserves–“just some justice, some recognition and help.” Tr. 135:24.
FINDINGS OF FACT1
1 These findings are based on the preponderance of the evidence presented to the court.
1. At the time of the incident at issue, Ray was a 29-year-old female working two jobs in the food and beverage industry, volunteering at an acupuncture clinic, and simultaneously pursuing advanced degrees in psychology and clinical counseling at The Citadel. Ray had never been on a sailboat before the day of the incident.
2. At the time of the incident, 57-year-old Lesniak was the owner, operator, and captain of the sailboat Celadon on which the incident occurred. Lesniak is an experienced captain, who has 35 years of sailing experience–including 25 years of sailing experience in Charleston. Tr. 205:15-17. He has captained “several hundred, maybe a thousand” sailboat races. Tr. 205:18-20. He has been sailing with some of the crew members that were on the Celadon at the time of the incident for “15, 20 years.” Tr. 205:24-206:7.
3. The sailboat Celadon on which the incident occurred is a fifty-one foot, 1995 Beneteau Oceanis 510 registered in [*3] Charleston County, South Carolina. At the time of the incident, Lesniak had owned and operated the Celadon for approximately fifteen years.
4. Operation of the sailboat during a race requires several crewmembers. Thirteen crewmembers and a number of guests were aboard the sailboat on the day of the incident. Tr. 182:1-183:1.
A. The Accident:
1. The court now turns to the day of the incident, May 21, 2014. Ray was invited to a sailboat race by Colin Skinner (“Skinner”), who Ray knew as a “regular” customer at the Oak Bar Tavern where she worked. Tr. 106:14-20. Skinner was a crew member on the Celadon. Tr. 184:3-6. Skinner has been sailing with Lesniak for “[r]oughly five years.” Tr. 206:20-22. Lesniak allowed Skinner to invite a guest on the boat. Tr. 184:5-6.
2. The other crew members who were on the Celadon during the incident had years of sailing experience, many as crew members with Lesniak. Tr. 206:10-208:4. Of the crew members on the boat at the time of the incident, at least three had medical backgrounds, ranging from Emergency Room nurse to thoracic surgeon. Tr. 206:10-208:9. Lesniak testified that these crew members had previously taken action if anyone suffered an injury on the [*4] boat during sailing races and trips. Tr. 209:21-210:5.
3. Lesniak testified that all of his crew members “[knew] to look after new people.” Tr. 208:18-21.
4. Lesniak authorized crew members to perform tasks during the race, including telling guests when and where to move during the course of the race. Tr. 209:1-20.
5. Ray and Skinner arrived at the Carolina Yacht Club, the marina where the yacht was docked. Tr. 107:7-12. When she got to the boat, there were “many” people on the boat, including crew members and guests. Tr. 108:1-4. Ray testified that she did not know anyone on the boat other than Skinner. Tr. 108:5-6.
6. Before May 21st, 2014, Ray had never been on a sailboat. Tr. 106:21-107:1. She knew nothing about how a sailboat worked. Tr. 107:2-4.
7. Lesniak did not give safety instructions to any of the guests, including Ray, who was on the Celadon. Tr. 184:12-17. He also did not give any written instructions to guests. Tr. 187:2-6. Furthermore, he did not have a written safety checklist or conduct a safety and operational briefing before the Celadon left the marina. Tr. 187:16-21. At the time of the incident, there were no safety placards or visual displays on the Celadon stating [*5] that there were dangerous places to sit on the boat, such as “around any rope, boom.” Tr. 186:20-187:1. Lesniak delegated the giving of safety instructions to two crew members, neither of whom testified during the trial. Tr. 14:16-185:6. Lesniak did not hear what safety talks were given to guests because he was at the helm of the boat. Tr. 185:5-9.
8. Ray was late to the start of the boat race and was given an abbreviated version of the “safety talk” by crew members, which involved an instruction on where not to sit on the boat. Tr. 192:10-18.
9. Upon arriving on the Celadon, Skinner placed Ray at the position where she was sitting when the main sheet hit her. Tr. 264:8-265:19. Ray was seated on the deck of the Celadon, near the main sheet. Ex. 13.
10. The crew was aware of where Ray was sitting. Tr. 204:4-6.
11. Within 5-10 minutes of Ray stepping on board the Celadon, the incident occurred. Tr. 194:2-5.
12. Before she was hit, Ray was given instructions by crew members to “get more neighborly, get closer together.” Tr. 114:2-3. Specifically, crew member Dawn Truog (“Truog”) asked Ray, who was sitting in front of the main sheet, to “move back from the [main] sheet.” Tr. 250:16-25. There [*6] was no evidence presented that Ray knew what a “main sheet” was. Crew member Mary Anne Becker (“Becker”) also testified, stating that she “told [Ray] specifically to move, move up front, move forward” multiple times, because Ray “was going to be brushed by the sheets” when the boat gybed. Tr. 257:6-12. Becker further testified that even after these verbal warnings to move, Ray “didn’t move,” and “the next thing” Becker knew was Ray “down on the gutter” of the boat. Tr. 257:17-20.
13. Lesniak made the decision to gybe, which is the action that caused the main sheet to strike Ray. Tr. 199:16-17. When the captain executes a gybe maneuver, as Lesniak did here, the main sheet moves across the deck of the boat. Tr. 221:14-25.
14. Lesniak testified that members of his crew told Ray to move “several times” and that the crew members were aware that she did not move–even after Lesniak had called for the gybe maneuver. Tr. 213:22-214:5. For example, Truog was aware that Ray was sitting in front of the main sheet when Lesniak gybed. Tr. 254:25-255:3. Truog saw “the boom [come] over, and that [Ray] was pushed down to the side of the boat.” Tr. 251:9-18.
15. If Lesniak had waited to gybe or made sure [*7] that Ray was in a safe location, Ray would not have been hit by the main sheet. Tr. 202:9-13.
16. After Lesniak did the gybe maneuver, Ray was hit by the main sheet, the force of which threw her from her seated position onto the deck of the boat. Tr. 115:14-20. The main sheet carries a significant amount of pressure, “absolutely” enough to cause a serious injury. Tr. 237:6-25. Lesniak saw the main sheet strike Ray. Tr. 198:25-199:6.
17. The court considered the testimony of various crew members who were on the Celadon during the incident. For example, Dr. Bill Lynch testified about the main sheet hitting Ray. Additionally, he testified that he did not give any safety instructions to Ray, and was not aware of any sailing experience that she had. Tr. 247:1-6.
18. Ray was left with an abrasion on her forehead as a result of the main sheet hitting her. Pl.’s Ex. 2.
19. After Ray was injured, Lesniak did not turn the boat around. Tr. 117:5-12. Lesniak continued with the boat race. Tr. 148:10-18.
B. Breach of Safety Protocol:
1. Ray testified about the instructions she was given when she got on the Celadon. Specifically, Ray stated that she was “told where the lines were” and where to sit. Tr. [*8] 109:18-23. She was given these instructions and told where to sit by a crew member, “Peggy.” Tr. 110:6-9. She was not warned that she “might get hit in the head with a boom or a rope or anything like that.” Tr. 110:10-17. There were also no written instructions on the “hull or deck of the boat or bow or the stern, starboard side” that said where to sit, and no one gave written instructions to Ray when she was on the boat. Tr. 110:18-24. There was also no formal verbal safety briefing. Tr. 111:4-7.
2. Ray did not hear, and “wouldn’t have understood” any instructions on whether the boom or main sheet were going to swing during the course of the race. Tr. 115:1-4.
3. The court also credits the testimony of Ray’s expert Captain Ken Wahl (“Wahl”), who the court qualified as a boating expert and marine safety consultant. Tr. 214:20-215:9. Wahl opined that competitive sailboat racing “requires a large number of experienced crew to adequately handle the fast-paced activities normally observed during this often dangerous and close quarters style of competitive sailing.” Ex. 1 at 8. Wahl further opined that “[o]nly highly experienced persons should be aboard for these events.” Id. Based on his [*9] review of the evidence, Wahl testified that “there appeared to be a lot of people” on the Celadon, and that “safe places . . . were probably a little bit difficult to find.” Tr. 220:1-9.
4. Wahl opined that Lesniak, who had captained hundreds of races, became “complacent” by delegating the “safety orientation” for guests to crew members. Tr. 225:9-226:3.
5. Wahl testified that when a boat race begins, “[t]here’s some very dangerous places to be on board the boat . . . [a]nd it’s certainly not a safe place to be right near the main sheet.” Tr. 221:10-13. Accordingly, Ray, who was seated on the deck of the boat near the main sheet, was in a dangerous position. Tr. 222:1-6.
6. Specifically, Wahl opined that “[m]oving isn’t quite enough” “when somebody doesn’t know anything about a sailboat, because they don’t know where to move to.” Tr. 223:23-25. The proper procedure for a crew member to ensure that Ray was moved safely to another area of the boat was for Lesniak or a crew member to physically ensure that she had been moved to a safer place. Tr. 226:14-227:16. Simply telling a novice passenger like Ray who had never been on a sailboat to move was insufficient, and a breach of safety protocol. [*10] Tr. 227:9-21.
7. Wahl further opined that it was in contravention of boat safety protocol for Lesniak to gybe while Ray was sitting next to the main sheet, as gybing the boat necessarily causes a movement of the main sheet. Tr. 223:14-19. Wahl offered suggestions on what safety protocol Lesniak should have followed in that scenario, such as “[d]elay the gybe, get somebody to move that person, tell them where to sit, where the safe spot is.” Tr. 223:16-22. Lesniak did none of these things.
8. When a captain changes the position of the sails, such as the gybe maneuver that Lesniak performed, Wahl testified that the captain “typically” will call out to the crew and let the crew members know that he will be changing the position of the sails. Tr. 238:16-239:4.
C. Comparative Negligence:
1. Ray was told to move away from the main sheet by multiple crew members, including Truog and Becker, but did not move. Tr. 257:17-20.
2. After getting hit by the main sheet, Ray did not ask anyone for medical attention and did not appear to be in need of any medical attention. Tr. 210:6-23.
3. When Ray got off the Celadon at the conclusion of the race, Lesniak asked her if she was “okay” and she replied that [*11] “she was fine.” Tr. 210:24-25.
4. A few days after the incident, Lesniak contacted Ray to give her the option of going to see Bill Lynch, a crew member on the Celadon during the incident and a doctor, at no cost. Tr. 210:1-5. Ray declined. Tr. 210:1-5.
D. Causation of Traumatic Brain Injury:
1. Two days after the incident, Ray went to Nason Medical Center because she was experiencing “extreme body pain.” Tr. 119:17-24. Within seven days of the incident, Ray began experiencing different symptoms–namely, debilitating nausea and headaches. Tr. 120:11-21. Ray was “extremely” confused when she went to the Medical University of South Carolina (“MUSC”) the week after the incident as a result of her new symptoms. Tr. 121:1-6. At MUSC, Ray was referred to a neurologist who diagnosed Ray with a concussion and prescribed medications for a head injury. Tr. 121:7-25.
2. The only medical expert who testified during the trial was Dr. Marshall Allen White (“Dr. White”), a board-certified neurologist.2 Tr. 8:15-16. Dr. White treats patients with traumatic brain injuries as part of his practice on “nearly a daily basis,” and has done so since 1991. Dr. White has testified in the past as to both the diagnoses [*12] and causation of traumatic brain injuries. The court credits Dr. White as an expert in the field of traumatic brain injuries. Tr. 9:21-10:17. Dr. White examined Ray, and reviewed the following medical records: (1) Nason Medical Center; (2) MUSC; (3) Dr. Jeffrey Buncher, a pain management physician in Charleston, South Carolina; (4) physical therapy records; (5) acupuncture records; (6) neuropsychological testing performed by Dr. Randolph Waid; and (7) psychiatric records from Dr. Kurtzman. Tr. 11:1-21. Dr. White testified that, based on his examination of Ray, a review of her medical records, and consulting with peer-reviewed articles, Ray sustained a traumatic brain injury. Tr. 12:5-12. Specifically, Dr. White testified that Ray had the symptoms of a concussion immediately following the incident, in that she was “dazed, confused,” and the morning after the event she felt “that she was not going to be able to wake up,” which Dr. White testified indicated “a level of hypersomnolence, which is typical following a concussion.” Tr. 12:17-13:1. Dr. White further testified that compared to “baseline records” that were “pretty close in proximity” to the incident, he observed that Ray had [*13] “heightened levels of anxiety, trepidation, moodiness, difficulty sleeping after the period of hypersomnolence, difficulty focusing, poor memory, and anxiety levels which were dramatically increased from her baseline levels.” Tr. 13:2-10. All of these symptoms of traumatic brain injury, according to Dr. White, were caused by the head trauma that Ray suffered during the incident. Tr. 13:11-15.
3. According to Dr. White, Ray’s traumatic brain injury is “permanent.” Tr. 13:16-18. All three of these opinions–that Ray had a traumatic brain injury, that the brain injury was permanent, and that the brain injury was the result of the incident on the Celadon–Dr. White testified that he held to a “reasonable degree of medical certainty.” Tr. 13:19-22. Specifically, in his report, Dr. White states that:
It is my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Ms. Ray experienced traumatic brain injury as a result of her sailing incident, which occurred in 2014. There is ample evidence of headache, nausea, vomiting, and worsening in her neuropsychiatric syndrome and cognitive abilities following the incident . . . It is further my opinion that Ms. Ray would clearly have academic, social [*14] and occupational difficulties throughout every facet of her life.
Pl.’s Ex. 4. Dr. White further testified that when he examined Ray, she was having emotional and concentration issues that he attributed to her “residual [traumatic brain injury] symptomology,” and that this was consistent with a patient with her level of brain injury. Tr. 28:13-23.
4. Dr. White also testified at length about Ray’s post-incident treatment in the week after the incident, based on his review of her medical records. At Nason, Dr. White testified that no diagnostic testing was performed, and instead Nason “basically gave her pain medicine and sent her home.” Tr. 17:9-11. Then, Ray went to the MUSC emergency room, where she was “evaluated and treated” for “neck and back pain.” Tr. 17:14-15. Ray then returned to MUSC with “complaints of pain,” and returned once again within five days of the injury “complaining of headaches” as well as nausea and vomiting. Tr. 17:19-23. These symptoms of headaches, nausea, and vomiting, were, Dr. White testified, symptoms of a concussion. Tr. 18:11-14. Based on his review of Ray’s medical records and after taking her medical history, Dr. White concluded that Ray had “a lot” of [*15] the symptoms of the postconcussive syndrome. Tr. 20:5-9.
5. Lesniak argued at various points during the bench trial that Ray did not immediately experience any symptoms of headaches, nausea, and vomiting while on the Celadon or the next day. However, Dr. White testified that there can be “delayed effects from concussion.” Tr. 35:24. Furthermore, Ray had consumed at least one beer immediately before the incident. Alcohol consumption, Dr. White testified, would impair Ray’s ability to recognize her symptoms. Tr. 36:6-11.
6. Dr. White testified that postconcussive headaches such as the ones that Ray experienced can be developed “within seven days of the concussion itself.” Tr. 18:22-24. Indeed, Dr. White testified on the types of symptoms during the “days and weeks” after a concussion, and stated that there can be “difficulty concentrating, moodiness, hypersomnolence . . . [a]nxiety . . . headaches, nausea, and vomiting.” Tr. 19:1-17.
7. Ray had a CT scan done at MUSC, which had normal results, but Dr. White testified that the normal CT scan did not disturb his opinion that Ray had a traumatic brain injury, as mild traumatic brain injury patients will have “under almost all circumstances [*16] . . . normal imaging.” Tr. 21:18-22:2. Indeed, Dr. White testified that a normal CT scan was “expected” for patients with mild traumatic brain injury. Tr. 22:3-6.
8. The court considered that Ray was not diagnosed with traumatic brain injury, or indeed any injury at all, by any emergency room physicians in her visits to Nason or the MUSC ER. But, according to Dr. White, the peer-reviewed literature in the field is clear that mild traumatic brain injuries “can be overlooked,” even by emergency room physicians. Tr. 36:2-5. Furthermore, in none of the medical visits that Ray had in the immediate aftermath of the incident did she have any cognitive testing done that would have detected such cases of traumatic brain injury. Tr. 52:11-60:4.
9. Dr. Kurtzman, a psychiatrist who examined Ray on May 1st before the incident, indicated that Ray was working on her graduate thesis and had no “uncontrolled anxiety or crying spells.” This psychiatric record is closest in proximity to the incident. Tr. 14:13-15:11. Dr. Kurtzman’s psychiatric record further indicates that as of May 1st, Ray was a “student, working doing marketing, volunteering, and doing research–all while supporting herself financially.” [*17] Tr. 15:12-20. In his treatment notes for Ray after the incident, Dr. Kurtzman stated that Ray had “suffered . . . emotionally and physically from an injury sustained from being hit by a sailboat boom . . . I’m concerned about her emotional prognosis and her emotional upset secondary to the accident.” Tr. 23:6-24:4. Dr. Kurtzman also prescribed Ray the medication Adderall, which Dr. White testified is an “amphetamine stimulant” that is “used for patients with [traumatic brain injury] who are having difficulty concentrating.” Tr. 24:5-15. Concentration and attention problems such as those treated with Adderall are consistent with the diagnosis of mild traumatic brain injury, Dr. White testified. Tr. 24:16. Dr. White further testified that during his examination and interview with Ray, she stated that she experienced those symptoms for the first time after the date of the incident. Tr. 24:19-22. Ray testified that she had never been prescribed Adderall or psychostimulants before the incident. Tr. 101:14-102:7. At the direction of her doctor, Ray has been taking Adderall in increasing doses since the incident. Tr. 126:22-11.
10. The court acknowledges that prior to the incident, Ray was [*18] on the medication Klonopin to treat anxiety. Tr. 16:2-9. However, Dr. Kurtzman was on a successful program to wean Ray off of Klonopin. Tr. 16:10-16. Ray testified that she was in the process of “taper[ing] off” the anti-anxiety medication. Tr. 102:16-103:4. The court also acknowledges that Ray suffered from general anxiety disorder, which can have symptoms similar to those found in someone with a concussion. Relatedly, the court has considered Ray’s testimony about the circumstances of her unfortunate upbringing, including her time in foster care and her intermittent history with prescribed antidepressants and anti-anxiety medication. Tr. 92:1-99:3. The court credits Dr. White’s opinion–that the temporal relationship between the incident and the onset of symptoms supports a finding that Ray was not suffering from her historical general anxiety disorder, but from the head trauma she received as a result of the incident. Tr. 48:4-20.
11. Ray was seen by Dr. Woodard, a neurologist at MUSC, “several months” after the incident. Dr. Woodard also diagnosed Ray as having postconcussion syndrome, and placed her on gabapentin and nortriptyline. Nortriptyline is used to treat headaches, while [*19] gabapentin is used to treat headaches, mood disturbances, and sleep. Tr. 20:12-21:14.
12. On July 28, 2015, Ray had neuropsychological testing, which discerns whether there are “cognitive or emotional deficits related to injury” performed by Dr. Randolph Waid. Tr. 25:1-14. Specifically, Dr. Waid employed the Conners Continuous Performance Test II to assess Ray’s “attentional abilities.” Tr. 25:14-24. Based on Ray’s pre-incident level of functioning, Dr. Waid felt that Ray’s concentration abilities, which were in the ninth percentile, were low. Tr. 26:2-5. Ray had a “very high GPA” in her college and graduate work before the incident. Tr. 26:11-12. Ray had a 3.7 GPA at the College of Charleston. Tr. 101:5-7. The cause of the decrease in Ray’s attention between college and the day that Dr. Waid performed his neurophysical testing was, in Dr. White’s opinion, the traumatic brain injury that she suffered as a result of the incident. Tr. 26:15-18.
13. Ray also saw Dr. Jeffrey Buncher for injuries related to the incident. Ray had pain management issues before the incident, specifically with chronic neck and back pain. Ex. 8. But Ray’s pain problems with her sacrum were, in Dr. White’s opinion, [*20] “exacerbated” by the incident. Tr. 27:1-21.
14. Dr. White offered a future treatment plan to treat Ray’s permanent condition and opined that “there are a number of interventions that ought to be taken in her care that are currently not being taken” and that Ray was not receiving treatment from any doctors who treated traumatic brain injuries. Tr. 30:1-32:2. Dr. White also testified about the cash prices of the drugs necessary for the future treatment plan. Tr. 32:14-33:15.
15. The court also considered the testimony of Chad Houfek (“Houfek”), an acupuncturist and the owner of Charleston Community Acupuncture. Tr. 81:11-23. Houfek knew Ray as a patient as well as a volunteer at Charleston Community Acupuncture. Tr. 82:2. In her capacity as a volunteer, Ray worked answering phones, scheduling appointments, and also helped with bookkeeping. Tr. 82:11-83:8. Houfek testified about how Ray was different after the incident, from a treatment perspective, explaining that she came in for acupuncture a week after the incident, and that “she had a big mark on her temple, and she was very upset, she was crying and very scared, didn’t really know what to do, and she had a lot of neck pain.” Tr. 83:9-19. [*21] When Ray had her acupuncture appointment on May 28th, approximately one week after the incident, Houfek recorded in his session notes that Ray was “postconcussion,” and that what she was experiencing included sensitivity to stimulus and headaches. Tr. 84:9-18. After the incident, Houfek continued to treat Ray, and stated that he was treating her mostly for neck pain and lower back pain, as well as insomnia, and “extreme emotional.” Tr. 87:4-9.
16. Houfek also testified about the changes in Ray as a volunteer after the incident. Before the incident, Houfek described Ray as “awesome,” as an employee who was “very friendly,” who “always showed up on time,” and “took initiative.” Tr. 85:7-15. But after the incident, Houfek testified that Ray was “always late,” “very very scattered,” and that “communicating with her was difficult.” Tr. 85:17-25. Houfek further testified that he had not experienced any of those problems with Ray before the incident. Tr. 86:2-4.
17. The court has considered the reports and treatments notes of the doctors, including pain management specialists and neurologists, that Ray has seen since the incident. Ex. 10. In conjunction with Dr. White’s testimony, these medical [*22] documents support the conclusion that Ray suffered a traumatic brain injury as a result of the injury she suffered on the Celadon.
18. Prior to the incident, Ray testified that “[l]ife was great,” and that she “was excited for finishing” her master’s thesis at the Citadel and continuing on for her Ph.D. Tr. 103:18-25. In addition to being in the master’s program at the Citadel, Ray was also working at the restaurant Oak Barrel four nights a week, Tr. 104:19-24, in the tasting room at the restaurant Freehouse two nights a week, Tr. 104:15-105:1. She was also volunteering with Charleston Community Acupuncture and doing research. Tr. 105:17-24. She testified that despite this busy schedule she never had any problems with attention before the incident. Tr. 106:1-11.
19. Since the incident, Ray has had suicidal ideations. Tr. 124:22-125:9. She has also been suffering from giggling issues and other inappropriate responses to stimuli, which never occurred before the incident. Tr. 127:19-25. As a result of these issues, as well as the problems in concentration and attention, her professors at the Citadel have expressed “legitimate concerns” about her ability to complete the graduate program. [*23] Tr. 127:19-25; 132:1-9. Furthermore, since the incident Ray has lost her jobs at the Oak Barrel and the Freehouse. Tr. 128:16-19. Ray attributes both of these job losses to the incident. For example, as a result of the injuries she sustained, Ray has had to ask her customers and friends to come and help her while she was at the bar. Tr. 129:1-10. Additionally, when there were stimuli such as music or “certain sounds,” Ray would run out of the bar and “leave the entire bar empty, and cry in the alley.” Tr. 129:4-11. Before the incident, Ray did not have these problems at work.
20. Since the incident, Ray has had physical and psychological problems. Physically, she has had trouble sleeping, has “nerve pain down the back of her leg,” and tension headaches. Tr. 130:13-131:21. She now also has communication issues, which have affected her interpersonal, professional, and educational goals. Tr. 136:21-137:13.
21. The court considered the medical bills that Ray has incurred, between the date of the incident and present. Pl.’s Ex. 10. Ray does not have health insurance. Tr. 123:4-7. The total medical bills for her injury totaled $20, 480.70. Pl.’s Ex. 10. By the time of trial, Ray had incurred [*24] the following expenses to treat her injuries:
| a. | Nason Medical Center | $127.00 |
| b. | MUSC | $4,654.00 |
| c. | MUSC Physicians | $1,194.00 |
| d. | Dr. Waid | $1,125.00 |
| e. | Dr. Kurtzman | $2,050.00 |
| f. | Dr. Buncher | $5,945.00 |
| g. | Charleston Community Acunpuncture | $3,130.00 |
| h. | EnterpriseRx | $74.82 |
| i. | Publix Pharmacy | $228.36 |
| j. | Walgreens Pharmacy | $1,952.52 |
| Total: $20,480.70 |
2 Lesniak objects to allowing Dr. White to testify on the subject of future treatment. However, Ray disclosed Dr. White as one of her treating physicians and produced Dr. White’s medical evaluation of Ray, wherein Dr. White opined that Ray had sustained a permanent traumatic brain injury. The court is convinced that Dr. White’s written report and opinion of Ray’s permanent injury gave Lesniak adequate notice that Ray would need continued medical evaluation and treatment for her condition for the rest of her life. Ray disclosed Dr. White as an expert in neurological medicine and pain management in compliance with all relevant expert disclosure requirements and deadlines. Lesniak made the decision to decline to take Dr. White’s deposition, offer his own medical expert disputing the diagnosis of traumatic brain injury or offer an alternative future treatment plan, or to request any additional information from Dr. White regarding his evaluation of Ray. At the very least, Lesniak was on notice that as a result of the incident, Ray had already spent a significant amount of money on medical treatment including $2,255.70 on medication alone. Certainly, Ray’s medical bills were turned over during discovery. Therefore, the court overrules Lesniak’s objection.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the testimony of all of Lesniak’s crew members and all experts, including Ray’s expert Captain Wahl, Lesniak was negligent in doing a gybe maneuver when he and his crew members knew or should have known that Ray was sitting in front of the main sheet which is a dangerous place to sit. Prior to undertaking the gybe maneuver during the sailboat race, Lesniak had a duty to: (1) properly administer safety briefings to Ray that included where the safe places to sit on the boat were during the race; (2) warn Ray that the gybe maneuver was going to be undertaken; (3) not gybe until Ray was no longer sitting in front of the main sheet; and (4) not hit Ray with the main sheet rope during the gybe maneuver. A failure to follow safety precautions, including telling Ray where to move and delaying the gybe maneuver until Ray had moved to a safe place, was [*25] a breach of Lesniak’s duty to Ray. The court further finds that it was completely foreseeable to Lesniak that Ray could be injured by his failure to warn her that a gybe maneuver was going to be undertaken that would involve moving the main sheet that she was sitting directly in front of, and his failure to prevent the main sheet from hitting Ray. Lesniak’s negligence was a proximate cause of Ray’s injuries; but for this breach of duty, Ray’s injuries would not have occurred.
However, Lesniak has presented sufficient evidence to support the allegation in his Answer that Ray was comparatively negligent. Specifically, Ray failed to pay attention to warnings from multiple crew members to move from her position in front of the main sheet rope. Ray was to blame, in part, for being hit by the main sheet. The court finds that Ray was 25% to blame, and so reduces her damages by 25%.
As a direct result of Lesniak’s failure to exercise the proper degree of skill required, Ray sustained injuries and damages, as discussed below. In making the above findings of fact, reference has been made to pertinent portions of the testimony and exhibits introduced into evidence; however, the court has taken [*26] into consideration all of the evidence presented. The court specifically finds the evidence, after considering the appearance, demeanor and qualifications of the witnesses and the testimony as a whole, supports each of its findings by a preponderance of the evidence.
A. Jurisdiction and Applicable Law
Federal admiralty jurisdiction exists where, as here, conditions of both (1) location and (2) a connection with maritime activity are satisfied. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S. Ct. 1043, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1024, (1995). Admiralty jurisdiction extends to injuries involving recreational vessels such as the Celadon. See Oliver by Oliver v. Hardesty, 745 F.2d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 1984) (admiralty jurisdiction exists over a case involving a collision between a swimmer and a pleasure boat because the claim was based on an allegation of negligent navigation of the boat). The portion of the Charleston Harbor where the incident occurred constitutes navigable waters of the United States, and being struck by the main sheet of a racing sailboat has a connection to maritime activity. Accordingly, the court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 364-65, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 111 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1990).
Cases involving a tort committed on navigable waters are governed by federal admiralty law. Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 617 (4th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). However, if there is no admiralty rule for a particular [*27] issue, the court looks to state law to supply the rule of decision. Id. “This rule is especially true in negligence causes of action,” which is the cause of action that Ray asserts. Schumacher v. Cooper, 850 F. Supp. 438, 447 (D.S.C. 1994) (citation omitted). Therefore, to the extent admiralty law is not directly on point, ordinary negligence law applies.
B. Lesniak’s Liability
To establish her claim, Ray must prove that Lesniak’s negligent operation of the Celadon harmed her. The elements of negligence are duty, a breach of that duty, proximate cause, and resulting injury. Schumacher, 850 F.Supp. at 447 (internal citations omitted).
a. Duty
It is well-established in general maritime law that a vessel operator has a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of his passengers. See Bubla v. Bradshaw, 795 F.2d 349, 353 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630, 79 S. Ct. 406, 3 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1959)). Lesniak was the captain, and so was in charge of the vessel at the time of Ray’s injury. As such, he was charged with a duty of care to his passengers. This standard of care owed to a passenger by a vessel operator under maritime law is reasonable care under the circumstances at that particular time in each case. Id. “The extent to which circumstances surrounding maritime travel are different than those encountered in daily life and involve more danger to passengers, will determine [*28] how high a degree is reasonable in each case.” Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Rainey v. Paquet Cruises, Inc., 709 F.2d 169, 172 (2nd Cir. 1983)). In this case, the circumstances surrounding a sailboat participating in a race in the Charleston harbor call for a heightened degree of care. Additionally, before stepping on board the Celadon, Ray had never before been on a sailboat, a fact of which Lesniak was unaware of and failed to inquire about.
A vessel operator also “has a duty to maintain a proper lookout by sight and by hearing” while the boat is travelling through navigable waters. Schumacher, 850 F.Supp. at 447. “This duty stems from general concepts of prudent seamanship as well as from the [regulations] governing the navigation of vessels.” Id. As a matter of prudent seamanship, “the performance of lookout duty is an inexorable requirement of prudent navigation.” Anthony v. Int’l Paper Co., 289 F.2d 574, 580 (4th Cir. 1961). Rule 5 of the Inland Navigation Rules states that “[e]very vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.” 33 C.F.R. § 83.05. Rule 5 perpetuates the common-law duty discussed in Anthony. Schumacher, 850 F.Supp. at 448 (citation omitted). It imposes a duty of proper lookout upon the operator of a pleasure [*29] craft such as the Celadon. See Todd v. Schneider, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25192, 2003 WL 23514560, at *11 (D.S.C. Dec. 8, 2003). Importantly, “[w]hoever is keeping a lookout must be able to give proper attention to that task and should not . . . undertake duties that would interfere with this function.” Schumacher, 850 F.Supp. at 448 (citation omitted).
“The duty to maintain a proper look-out, whether regulatory or customary, varies with the circumstances of each situation. When circumstances demand unusual care in navigation, such care should be used.” Id. at 449-50 (internal citations omitted). That higher level of care was required here, as Ray was an invited guest aboard a sailboat involved in a race in the Charleston harbor.
Lesniak was the owner, captain, and operator of the sailboat and was in control of its operation at all times. Ray was Lesniak’s passenger and guest. Although Lesniak designated his crewmembers to administer safety instructions to the passengers, as captain, Lesniak was ultimately responsible for the safety of the crewmembers and guests. Thus, Lesniak owed Ray a duty to maintain a proper lookout at all times during the Celadon’s outing.
b. Breach
Ray offered the testimony of Captain Wahl as her liability expert with regard to safe vessel operation. Captain Wahl has extensive knowledge about the safe [*30] operation of vessels. He obtained this knowledge from his many years of personally operating vessels, obtaining credentials, holding an array of maritime positions, authoring several books, and teaching well over 18,000 students in the subject. The court finds the testimony of Captain Wahl to be credible. Lesniak offered no liability expert at trial.
Captain Wahl testified that as the captain of the Celadon at the time of the incident, good seamanship practices required Lesniak to have the ultimate responsibility to look out for persons aboard his vessel–even if he delegated some of those responsibilities to crew members. Wahl testified that this ultimate responsibility includes providing adequate instructions, warnings, guidance, or lessons to all passengers, including late arriving ones, regarding the potential dangers of movement and position on his vessel and how to avoid those dangers. He also testified that looking out for passengers aboard a vessel includes refraining from performing a gybe maneuver until ensuring that all of the passengers are seated safely out of the path of the boom and its related parts such as the main sheet. Captain Wahl further testified that, even if [*31] a passenger is told verbally to move from a certain spot before a maneuver is performed, it would be a best practice to physically ensure that the person, especially if that person is a novice passenger with no sailing experience, has been moved to a safer place on the sailboat before proceeding to perform the maneuver. It is also Captain Wahl’s opinion that only highly experienced persons should be aboard for racing events, because inexperienced persons may not be able to handle the fast-paced activities normally observed during competitive sailing.
The court finds that Lesniak failed to act as a prudent mariner in failing to: (1) provide adequate posted, written, or verbal warnings to Ray regarding the potential dangers of movement and position on the Celadon and how to avoid those dangers; and (2) in failing to make sure that his passengers were in a safe location at all times, especially before performing a gybe maneuver which causes the boom and its related parts to swing quickly from port to starboard or vice versa. The court finds that these acts and omissions constitute a breach of Rule 5 of the Inland Navigation Rules, the common-law lookout duty, and the general duty of due care [*32] under Admiralty and South Carolina law.
c. Causation
General tort principles require a plaintiff asserting a negligence claim to show that the defendant’s breach of duty proximately caused her injuries. Schumacher, 850 F.Supp. at 451. However, a finding that the defendant breached his duty to maintain a proper lookout imposes upon him the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that such failure did not contribute to the accident. Id. This burden shift occurs regardless of whether the breach is viewed as a violation of Rule 5 or as breach of the common-law lookout duty. Id.
The court’s determination that Lesniak breached his duty to keep a proper lookout imposes upon him the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that his breach of duty did not contribute to the incident. The record here does not support such a showing. Therefore, the court concludes that Lesniak’s negligence caused the main sheet to strike Ray’s head and, therefore, Ray’s resulting injuries.
d. Comparative Negligence
Since jurisdiction is premised upon admiralty, federal common law governs. As such, the doctrine of comparative negligence applies. See, e.g., Mullenix v. United States, 984 F.2d 101, 104 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 407, 411, 95 S. Ct. 1708, 44 L. Ed. 2d 251, (1975)). Thus, in the context of an admiralty case, damages should “[b]e allocated [*33] among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault.” Reliable Transfer Co., Inc. 421 U.S. at 411, 95 S.Ct. 1708.
The court finds that Ray’s recovery should be reduced because Ray shares in the fault attributable as a result of the incident. Lesniak is required to prove the elements of duty, breach, causation, and injury as to Ray’s alleged negligence. Schumacher, 850 F. Supp. at 452 (citing Wilson v. Marshall, 260 S.C. 271, 195 S.E.2d 610, 612 (S.C. 1973)). Namely, an individual has a “duty to exercise due care for one’s own safety.” Id. The court finds that Ray’s conduct contributed to her injuries, and reduces her damages by 25%.
The court finds that Ray was instructed by multiple crew members on multiple occasions on safety protocol, including where to sit. Ray admits that she was aware of potential dangers on the Celadon, and that she was told to “get closer together” and to “get more neighborly” in the moments immediately before the main sheet hit her. Lesniak and all four members of his crew who testified at trial indicated that there was a safety protocol, that Becker, an individual with sixty plus years of sailing experience, and her fellow crew member Truog, were delegated the duty of administering safety instructions and watching out for new, inexperienced passengers. Becker and Truog testified at trial [*34] that these were duties bestowed by their captain, Lesniak, and that they had a present-day recollection of communicating with Ray directly. The court further finds that Ray did not follow the instructions to move. Thus, Ray failed to take responsibility for herself, a duty which is imposed under the law. However, the court considers Ray’s inaction against the backdrop of Captain Wahl’s testimony that Ray as a novice passenger would not know what the safe places were on the boat without being physically guided to those places.
C. Damages
Substantive admiralty law governs all cases brought under federal admiralty jurisdiction; however, it does not automatically displace state law. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 116 S. Ct. 619, 133 L. Ed. 2d 578 (1996). If there is no admiralty law on point, the court may look to the laws enacted by the state legislature or declared to be law by the state’s highest courts. Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 617 (4th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, the court may look to the law of the State of South Carolina in regard to the award of damages arising out of a negligence cause of action in admiralty. Id.
In a personal injury case such as this, the elements of damages potentially recoverable “include past and future medical expenses, past and future pain and suffering, past and future loss [*35] of income and earning power, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of family services.” Schumacher, 850 F.Supp. at 453 (citing Watson v. Wilkinson Trucking Co., 244 S.C. 217, 136 S.E.2d 286, 291 (S.C. 1964)). Mathematical precision in ascertaining damages is not required. Brooks v. United States, 273 F.Supp. 619, 629 (D.S.C. 1967). Instead, the injured party must be awarded damages sufficiently proportionate to the injuries sustained. Drennan v. Southern Railway, 91 S.C. 507, 75 S.E. 45 (S.C. 1912).
The evidence in this case reveals Ray has suffered and will suffer such past and future damages, and she is entitled to recover for all of them.
a. Past Medical Expenses
Ray seeks to recover certain expenses for her prior medical care. At trial, she submitted a medical bill summary totaling $20,480.70 in prior care. Those expenses are recoverable, as they consist of services such as emergency medical treatment, imaging, physical therapy, psychiatric treatment, and pain management. Those expenses resulted from Lesniak’s negligence and were reasonably necessary. See Sossamon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 552, 135 S.E.2d 87, 91 (S.C. 1964). Moreover, the court is satisfied that the invoiced amounts are reasonable. See Haselden v. Davis, 353 S.C. 481, 579 S.E.2d 293, 295 (S.C. 2003) (citation omitted). Therefore, the court awards Ray $20,480.70 in past medical expenses.
b. Future Medical Expenses
Ray seeks damages to cover her anticipated future medical expenses. “[R]ecovery of damages based on future consequences of an injury may be had only if [*36] such consequences are reasonably probable or reasonably certain.” Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1986). “Reasonably certain” is “a consequence ‘which follows the original act complained of in the usual, ordinary, and experienced course of events.'” Rabb v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 677 F.Supp. 424, 426 (D.S.C. 1987) (quoting Ford v. AAA Highway Express, Inc., 204 S.C. 433, 29 S.E.2d 760, 762 (S.C. 1944)). In other words, damages can be recovered only if there is “[a] greater than 50% chance that a future consequence will occur.” Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1160.
Dr. White, the only medical expert offered in this case, testified at trial that Ray’s condition is permanent and will require ongoing future treatment and medication. The court concludes that Ray has established a reasonable certainty that her condition is permanent and will require ongoing future treatment, including seeing a psychiatrist and a neurologist quarterly, and medication, potentially including anti-inflammatories (anti-inflammatory patch), amphetamines or an amphetamine substitute (Nuvigil), a benzodiazepine (Klonopin), a sedative-hypnotic (Belsomra), an anxiolytic (Buspar), and a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (Cymbalta). Dr. White testified that Nuvigil costs approximately $800.00 per month, Cymbalta costs approximately $200.00-300.00 per month, and Belsomra costs approximately $400.00-500.00 per month.
Ray’s birthday [*37] is May 8, 1985. At the time of the incident she was 29 years old. Thus, at the time of the incident, Ray had a life expectancy of 52.53 years, or 630.36 months, under S.C. Code Ann. § 19-1-150.
Adjusted for present value,3 the future medications, frequency, current cost, duration, and present value are as follows:
| Medication | Frequency | Current Cost | Duration | Present Value |
| Nuvigil | annual | $9,600/yr | 2018-life | $330,345 |
| Cymbalta | annual | $2,400-$3,600/yr | 2018-life | $82,585-$123,870 |
| Belsomra | annual | $4,800-$6,000/yr | 2018-life | $165,170-$206,465 |
3 Lesniak contends that Ray needs an expert economist on the issue of present value of future damages and needed to present evidence at trial on the calculation of present value discounts. However, he cites no caselaw–and the court is aware of none–that there is a requirement of obtaining expert testimony on the issue of present value of future damages. The court can find no clear requirement in relevant federal case law that plaintiff must present expert evidence of the present value of her claim for future damages. The court draws guidance from the Western District of North Carolina’s recent opinion in Talley v. City of Charlotte, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17604, 2016 WL 1212369, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 12, 2016), appeal dismissed (Aug. 31, 2016), which observed:
[t]he courts are split on whether it is necessary to introduce expert testimony to explain the concept of discounting an award to present value or to supply suggested discount and inflation rates and/or mathematical calculations. While some courts have permitted, for example, a local banker to testify as to the fair return on a safe investment, or a mathematician an actuary, or an accountant to testify concerning the procedure by which the reduction to present value should be calculated, other courts have held that expert testimony is permitted but not required, and that the jury should generally be left to its own discretion as to what discount factors should be used.
Here, the court calculated the present value discounts employing a discount rate of five percent to damages for future medical care. See Faust v. S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 527 F. Supp. 1021, 1036 (D.S.C. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 721 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1983) (“I find that he is entitled to be properly compensated for his pain, suffering, damages and permanent partial disability, before and after trial, and taking into consideration future pain and suffering and discomfort, and reducing that amount to its present cash value by use of a discount rate of five (5%) percent, which this court feels is reasonable and fair.”).
Future [*38] medication costs are increased at an expected inflation rate for prescription drugs of 3.61 percent, compounded annually.4 The present value of the total future medications that Dr. White opined were reasonable and necessary for Ray’s treatment ranges in cost from $578,100 (using the low figures of the cost of medicine needed) to $660,689 (using the high figures of the cost of medicine needed).5 The court awards the average of the cost of medicine needed, and so awards $619,394.50 for future medical expenses associated with her injuries resulting from the May 21, 2014, incident.
4 This rate is based on inflation rates as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the period 1992-2016.
5 All future medication costs are discounted to present value at a rate of 5 percent, compounded annually. This is a rate that an ordinary person with average financial knowledge, with access to commonly available investment outlets, and facing the full range of financial risks might be expected to earn over a long period of time.
d. Pain and Suffering
Ray’s pain and suffering because of this incident is well documented through her deposition and trial testimony as well as her medical records. She endured months of frequent headaches, nausea, muscle pain, and back pain as a result of her physical injuries. Raven Ray seeks $75,000.00 for past and future pain and suffering. Based on the entire record, the court concludes that $50,000.00 is the appropriate amount of compensation for both past and future pain and suffering. See Schumacher, 850 F.Supp. at 453.
e. Past and Future Emotional Distress
Injured plaintiffs are entitled to recover for mental anguish and permanent emotional [*39] scarring. Steeves v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 446, 458 (D.S.C. 1968). Ray’s severe psychological and emotional injuries because of this incident are well-documented by Houfek. Testimony from Ray and Houfek, in addition to Dr. Kurtzman’s and Dr. Waid’s records, show the extent and severity of Ray’s psychological and emotional injuries proximately caused by Lesniak’s negligence. After a careful review of the entire record, the court finds $75,000.00 for her psychological and emotional injuries reasonable. Therefore, it awards judgment against Lesniak in the amount of $75,000.00 for Ray’s past and future psychological and emotional injuries.
f. Loss of Enjoyment of Life and Permanent Impairment
Next, Ray seeks $100,000.00 as compensation for losing her ability to enjoy the athletic and recreational activities in which she used to participate, as well as her loss of enjoyment of other normal activities of life. Based on the entire record, the court concludes that $100,000.00 is the appropriate amount of compensation for this loss.
Additionally, Ray is permanently impaired due to this traumatic brain injury and must be compensated for her permanent impairment. Ray’s birthday is May 8, 1985. At the time of the incident, she was 29 years old. Thus, [*40] at the time of the incident, Ray had a life expectancy of 52.53 years, or 19,173.45 days, under S.C. Code Ann. § 19-1-150. Finding a valuation of a traumatic brain injury at $20.00 per day to be reasonable, the court awards Ray $383,469.00 for her impairment. In sum, the Court awards Raven Ray $483,469.00 for her loss of enjoyment of life and permanent impairment.
g. Lost Wages/Inconvenience and Disruption of Normal Daily Life
At the time of the incident, Ray was working in the food and beverage industry and attending The Citadel to obtain a graduate degree. Because of her injuries resulting from Lesniak’s negligence, Ray was forced to miss work and experienced difficulty in completing her graduate coursework at The Citadel. The court finds $30,000.00 to be appropriate compensation for Ray’s lost wages and difficulties experienced in completing her graduate coursework at The Citadel. See Schumacher, 850 F.Supp. at 453.
D. Prejudgment Interest
Ray asks the court to add prejudgment interest to her damages. In maritime injury cases, “the awarding of prejudgment interest is the rule rather than the exception, and, in practice, is well-nigh automatic.” U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 966 F.2d 820, 828 (4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). The court may decline to award prejudgment interest when it finds that “peculiar [*41] circumstances” would make such relief inequitable. Id. This is an action instituted under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction and no peculiar or exceptional circumstances existed that would prevent Ray from recovering pre-judgment interest. This court, in its discretion, finds no such peculiar circumstances here and finds that Ray is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount of $22,952.44 from the date of the accident until the date of this order.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that judgment be entered for Ray against Lesniak in the sum of nine-hundred and fifty-eight, and seven-hundred and fifty-eight dollars and fifteen cents $958,758.15,6 plus prejudgment interest in the amount of twenty-two thousand, nine-hundred and fifty-two dollars and forty-four cents $22,151.44, and postjudgment interest at the legal rate from the date of this order.
6 The tabulation of damages is $1,278,344.20 before the application of a 25% reduction in proportion to Ray’s comparative negligence. After applying the 25% reduction, the total damages award is $958, 758.15.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ David C. Norton
DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
February 22, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina
Dolores River Boating Advocates needs some volunteers next week
Posted: July 19, 2014 Filed under: Rivers and Waterways | Tags: Boat, Colorado, Dolores, Dolores River, McPhee Reservoir, x, y, z Leave a comment
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West Virginia Whitewater Responsibility Act.
Posted: May 12, 2014 Filed under: West Virginia, Whitewater Rafting | Tags: Boat, Commercial Whitewater Rafting, Kayak, Outfitter, Rafting, Recreation, West Virginia, Whitewater Rafting, Whitewater Responsibility Act Leave a commentWest Virginia Whitewater Responsibility Act.
Chapter 20. Natural Resources.
Article 3B. Whitewater Responsibility Act.
GO TO WEST VIRGINIA STATUTES ARCHIVE DIRECTORY
W. Va. Code Ch. 20, Art. 3B Notes (2014)
Article 3B. Whitewater Responsibility Act. Notes
A.L.R. references.
Validity, construction, and effect of agreement exempting operator of amusement facility from liability for personal injury or death of patron, 54 A.L.R.5th 513.
§ 20-3B-1. Legislative purposes.
Every year, in rapidly increasing numbers, the inhabitants of the State of West Virginia and nonresidents are enjoying the recreational value of West Virginia rivers and streams. The tourist trade is of vital importance to the State of West Virginia and the services offered by commercial whitewater outfitters and commercial whitewater guides significantly contribute to the economy of the State of West Virginia. The Legislature recognizes that there are inherent risks in the recreational activities provided by commercial whitewater outfitters and commercial whitewater guides which should be understood by each participant. It is essentially impossible for commercial whitewater outfitters and commercial whitewater guides to eliminate these risks. It is the purpose of this article to define those areas of responsibility and affirmative acts for which commercial whitewater outfitters and commercial whitewater guides are liable for loss, damage or injury.
Exemption from tort liability.
Section 20-3B-3 imposes a standard of care, and a clause in an agreement purporting to exempt a party from tort liability to a member of the protected class for failure to conform to that statutory standard is unenforceable. Murphy v. North Am. River Runners, 186 W. Va. 310, 412 S.E.2d 504, 1991 W. Va. LEXIS 222 (1991).
Quoted in
River Riders, Inc. v. Steptoe, 223 W. Va. 240, 672 S.E.2d 376, 2008 W. Va. LEXIS 116 (2008).
Cited in
Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 185 W. Va. 684, 408 S.E.2d 634, 1991 W. Va. LEXIS 126 (1991).
W. Va. Law Review.
Fahey, “Landlord Liability in West Virginia for Criminal Acts on the Premises,” 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 659 (1996).
§ 20-3B-2. Definitions.
Unless the context of usage clearly requires otherwise:
(a) “Commercial whitewater outfitter” means any person, partnership, corporation or other organization, or any combination thereof, as defined in section twenty-three [§ 20-2-23], article two of this chapter.
(b) “Commercial whitewater guide” means any person as defined in section twenty-three [§ 20-2-23], article two of this chapter.
(c) “Participant” means any person using the services of a commercial whitewater outfitter or commercial whitewater guide on any river, portions of rivers or waters of the State.
Quoted in
Murphy v. North Am. River Runners, Inc., 186 W. Va. 310, 412 S.E.2d 504, 1991 W. Va. LEXIS 222 (1991).
§ 20-3B-3.Duties of commercial whitewater outfitters and commercial whitewater guides.
(a) All commercial whitewater outfitters and commercial whitewater guides offering professional services in this State shall provide facilities, equipment and services as advertised or as agreed to by the commercial whitewater outfitter, commercial whitewater guide and the participant. All services, facilities and equipment provided by commercial white-water outfitters and commercial whitewater guides in this State shall conform to safety and other requirements set forth in article two [§§ 20-2-1 et seq.] of this chapter and in the rules promulgated by the commercial whitewater advisory board created by section twenty-three-a [§ 20-2-23a], article two of this chapter.
(b) In addition to the duties set forth in subsection (a) of this section, all commercial whitewater guides providing services for whitewater expeditions in this state shall, while providing such services, conform to the standard of care expected of members of their profession.
Exemption from tort liability.
This section imposes a standard of care, and a clause in an agreement purporting to exempt a party from tort liability to a member of the protected class for failure to conform to that statutory standard is unenforceable. Murphy v. North Am. River Runners, 186 W. Va. 310, 412 S.E.2d 504, 1991 W. Va. LEXIS 222 (1991).
Whitewater rafting not governed by maritime law.
In consolidated actions involving wrongful death and negligence arising from a commercial white water rafting accident against a commercial white water rafting outfitter and a guide (defendants), defendants’ petition for a writ of prohibition was granted to the extent of vacating the trial court’s determination that maritime law applied to the case. The trial court erred by determining that maritime law applied to the case as white water rafting, as a matter of law, did not constitute traditional maritime activity and was, therefore, not governed by maritime law. River Riders, Inc. v. Steptoe, 223 W. Va. 240, 672 S.E.2d 376, 2008 W. Va. LEXIS 116 (2008).
Cited in
Pingley v. Perfection Plus Turbo-Dry, LLC, 2013 W. Va. LEXIS 422 (Apr 26, 2013).
§ 20-3B-4.Duties of participants.
(a) Participants have a duty to act as would a reasonably prudent person when engaging in recreational activities offered by commercial whitewater outfitters and commercial whitewater guides in this State.
(b) No participant may:
(1) Board upon or embark upon any commercial whitewater expedition when intoxicated or under the influence of nonintoxicating beer, intoxicating beverages or controlled substances; or
(2) Fail to advise the trip leader or the trip guide of any known health problems or medical disability and any prescribed medication that may be used in the treatment of such health problems during the course of the commercial whitewater expedition; or
(3) Engage in harmful conduct or willfully or negligently engage in any type of conduct which contributes to or causes injury to any person or personal property; or
(4) Perform any act which interferes with the safe running and operation of the expedition, including failure to use safety equipment provided by the commercial whitewater outfitter or failure to follow the instructions of the trip leader or trip guide in regard to the safety measures and conduct requested of the participants; or
(5) Fail to inform or notify the trip guide or trip leader of any incident or accident involving personal injury or illness experienced during the course of any commercial whitewater expedition. If such injury or illness occurs, the participant shall leave personal identification, including name and address, with the commercial whitewater outfitter’s agent or employee.
§ 20-3B-5.Liability of commercial whitewater outfitters and commercial whitewater guides.
It is recognized that some recreational activities conducted by commercial whitewater outfitters and commercial whitewater guides are hazardous to participants regardless of all feasible safety measures which can be taken.
(a) No licensed commercial whitewater outfitter or commercial whitewater guide acting in the course of his employment is liable to a participant for damages or injuries to such participant unless such damage or injury was directly caused by failure of the commercial whitewater outfitter or commercial whitewater guide to comply with duties placed on him by article two [§§ 20-2-1 et seq.] of this chapter, by the rules of the Commercial Whitewater Advisory Board, or by the duties placed on such commercial whitewater outfitter or commercial whitewater guide by the provisions of this article.
(b) The limitations on liability created by this article apply only to commercial whitewater outfitters li-censed under the provisions of article two of this chapter and to commercial whitewater guides who are agents or employees of licensed commercial whitewater outfitters, and only when the commercial whitewater outfitter or commercial whitewater guide is acting within the course of his employment.
Exemption from tort liability.
Section 20-3B-3 imposes a standard of care, and a clause in an agreement purporting to exempt a party from tort liability to a member of the protected class for failure to conform to that statutory standard is unenforceable. Murphy v. North Am. River Runners, 186 W. Va. 310, 412 S.E.2d 504, 1991 W. Va. LEXIS 222 (1991).
Whitewater rafting not governed by maritime law.
In consolidated actions involving wrongful death and negligence arising from a commercial white water rafting accident against a commercial white water rafting outfitter and a guide (defendants), defendants’ petition for a writ of prohibition was granted to the extent of vacating the trial court’s determination that maritime law applied to the case. The trial court erred by determining that maritime law applied to the case as white water rafting, as a matter of law, did not constitute traditional maritime activity and was, therefore, not governed by maritime law. River Riders, Inc. v. Steptoe, 223 W. Va. 240, 672 S.E.2d 376, 2008 W. Va. LEXIS 116 (2008).
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Down River Spring Boat Swap and Grand Re-Opening
Posted: March 23, 2014 Filed under: Whitewater Rafting | Tags: Boat, Canoes and Kayaks, Columbia River, Friday, Sports, Water Sports, x, y, z Leave a comment
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| Down River Equipment Company | 12100 W 52nd Ave | Unit #101 | Wheat Ridge | CO | 80033 |
Plaintiff tried multiple ways to sue whitewater rafting company
Posted: June 24, 2013 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Maryland, Whitewater Rafting | Tags: Boat, Common Carrier, Failure to Rescue, Federal Rule of Evidence, first aid, Laurel Highlands River Tours, MARYLAND, MD, Paddling, Raft, Raft guide, Recreation, Whitewater Rafting Leave a commentPlaintiff premises claims do not apply to a whitewater rafting company.
Sanders v. Laurel Highlands River Tours, Incorporated, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15094 (4th Cir 1992)
Plaintiff: James A. Sanders
Defendant: Laurel Highlands River Tours, Incorporated; Laurel Highlands River Tours of Maryland, Incorporated
Plaintiff Claims: (1) he properly presented a “failure to warn claim”; (2) Laurel was strictly liable as a common carrier; (3) the district court abused its discretion in refusing to permit him to supplement the medical expert’s affidavit; (4) the district court erred in finding that the original affidavits were insufficient; and (5) the district court erred in finding that he failed to offer proof from which a reasonable jury could find Laurel negligent in failing to rescue him sooner
Defendant Defenses: no duty to warn Sanders of the dangers of the white-water rafting trip; that he failed to produce evidence that Laurel breached a duty to rescue him at the earliest opportunity; and that he failed to establish causation as to his claim that Laurel failed to adequately treat his injury
Holding: for the defendant
The plaintiff in this case went whitewater rafting previously with the defendant. During his second trip, he fell out of the raft injuring his knee. He later developed a staph infection from the injury. Cases where the plaintiff argues the first aid care was improper or negligent are extremely rare. However, the court rules on a technicality that throws out the plaintiff’s first aid claim and does not provide us with any direction in this area of the law.
During the trip, the plaintiff fell out of the raft and swam about 100 yards until he was rescued. During the swim, he was injured when he struck his knee on something. An employee of the defendant applied an ice bag and an elastic bandage on the trip. The Plaintiff eventually went to a hospital where he was diagnosed with a laceration and a fractured knee cap. The plaintiff later had surgery but developed a staph infection.
The plaintiff asserted the raft guide had the opportunity to rescue him but “the raft guide instructed his companions not to attempt to retrieve him until they got to calmer water.”
The plaintiff filed suit claiming, “that Laurel breached a duty to warn him of the dangers of rafting and that Laurel failed to rescue him at the earliest opportunity. His main claim, as the district court perceived it, was that Laurel failed to render proper first aid, and this was the cause of his subsequent infection.”
Summary of the case
The Plaintiff was a citizen of Alabama. The defendant raft company was located in Pennsylvania. The river where the accident occurred is the upper Youghiogheny in Maryland. The plaintiff sued the defendant in Federal District Court. The parties agreed that a Maryland court, the state where the accident occurred was the proper site for the venue of the case.
This section of the Youghiogheny was described by the court as “most difficult of all categories of river runs.” The court made that determination by using a book that describes the rivers and ratings in the east. The court is silent on how this book was accepted by the court and introduced into evidence.
Most books like this are brought into the evidentiary change through the Federal Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) 803(18) Learned Treatises. The rules of evidence control what evidence is introduced at trial both as documents or things and what witnesses may say. F.R.E. 803(18) states:
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
Normally, the rules of evidence require a person to prove the document or book as what the evidence is, and that it is real. If you were trying to introduce the raft company brochure as a piece of evidence, you would have to have the owner or a corporate officer of the company on the stand and testify that the brochure was the brochure.
A Learned Treatise is different in two ways. The first is you do not need the author or the publisher to admit the treatise, the book into evidence. If the treatise is relied upon by an expert witness, testified as a reliable authority in the field or recognized as the authority by the court or the general public, the information in the treatise is accepted in the case. The second issue is everything in the treatise is accepted without additional testimony. Normally, it might take two or three experts to examine a river section and applying the American Whitewater Associations rating system determine the river rating. However, a book that is generally accepted in the whitewater community or by a recognized expert in the field is accepted by the court as a learned treatise under F.R.E. 803(18). Once the book is admitted, every page and statement in the book is admitted.
An important point in most recreational cases is what information the plaintiff had to assist him in his decision to engage in the sport. If the information is lacking the plaintiff introduces the evidence to prove the defendant was hiding things or did not give proper notice of the release or the dangers. If the brochure does a good job of pointing out the risks and the requirements, the defense introduces the brochure into trial. In this case, the plaintiff was mailed a brochure by the defendant. The brochure was reviewed by the court, and the Court pointed out three points in the brochure.
1) Although we spare no effort to assure you a safe trip, it must be understood that whitewater rafting does include some danger. We can assume no responsibility for personal safety . . . . We will ask that you sign a liability form.
2. Experience is a must everyone in your group should have rafted the Cheat [a river classified as lower in difficulty than the upper Youghiogheny] several times at various water levels.
3. Upper Youghiogheny – advanced to expert level. The upper Youghiogheny . . . is the ultimate challenge in white-water rafting.
The defendant also gave the trip participants a safety talk, oral warnings as the court described them at the meeting point and at the river put in. The plaintiff denies hearing the warnings. However, the court referenced the warnings in the opinion giving credibility to them. Finally, the plaintiff signed a release for this trip; the second release signed by the defendant, which the court quoted from:
As a condition of acceptance, I certify that I am an able swimmer, in good health, and understand the sport of white-water rafting. I further understand the potential hazards of the sport of white-water touring and realize that I could fall out of the raft or even capsize in a raft in rough water (rapids). I realize this could possibly result in serious injury. I relieve and save harmless Laurel Highland River Tours, Inc., their Directors, Officers, Stockholders, Employees and Helpers, of any responsibility for all claims of any nature whatsoever . . . .
Failure to Rescue
The Appellate court adopted the District Court’s analysis and finding regarding the claim that the defendant was not rescued quickly. Because the only testimony about whether the rescue was quick enough was the plaintiff’s there was no proof to validate the claim. The court stated an expert witnesses needed to testify that the plaintiff should have been rescued sooner. The plaintiff’s statements were insufficient under Maryland law to prove a claim of negligence.
This claim and the court’s review did not investigate the issue of keeping the majority safe at the expense of one. In a raft and in some cases on a mountain, the guide must evaluate the risk of the rescue to the entire boat, not to the swimming customer. If rescuing the one customer in the river will put the entire boat at risk, the customer will swim a while longer. This point must be made and explained to your guests both in writing and in any safety talk. It is important for the customer in the water to know that their rescue is up to them. It is important for the people in the boat to understand they have to get the boat to a safe area and then rescue so they do not risk themselves needlessly or just quit paddling believing they should grab the swimmer.
Negligent in failing to render first aid.
The claim of negligently failing to properly render first aid is an extremely rare claim. The court again looked at the evidence presented and ruled the evidence was insufficient to meet a claim of negligence; “that the medical evidence failed to show that the infection was caused by improper first aid.” By this court the court stated, there was nothing but the plaintiff’s allegations about how he was injured. Courts want expert testimony from people in the field to rule on scientific, technical or areas of information outside of the general knowledge of the public.
Failure to Warn
The plaintiff argued that the defendant failed to “warn Sanders [the plaintiff] of the extreme danger of the particular section of river they would be traversing.”
The court first examined whether there was a general duty to warn in a non-landowner liability case. The court found that a general duty to warn exists in numerous situations. The court used the example that a stable had a duty to warn a rider of a horse with dangerous propensities.
To establish a duty to warn, the court must look at the following factors: “foreseeability and certainty of harm; policy of preventing harm; closeness of connection between conduct and harm; moral blame; burden on defendant; and insurability.” Looking at the factors the court determined that “A white-water outfitter who arranges and guides customers on rafting trips owes a general duty of care to its customers. The general duty may require, in some circumstances, that Laurel provide a warning to its patrons.”
The warnings that the defendant gave the plaintiff were adequate as a matter of law according to the court. Warnings only need to be reasonable, not the best warnings possible. The court also found the plaintiff had notice of the risks because he had taken a prior whitewater rafting trip and because the risks of whitewater rafting are obvious: “…the general danger of white-water rafting is a risk apparent to anyone about to embark on such a trip.”
Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff’s claim that whitewater rafting was a common carrier, and thus due to a higher standard of care was without merit. By this the court meant, there was no legal or factual basis to discuss the issue.
So Now What?
There is no real information you can take from this case that we have not previously discussed. However, it does show how far some plaintiffs will go to get around and sue for an injury. The defendant had done a good job of putting out to the public information on the risks of the activity which allowed the court to make the decisions to deny the plaintiff’s claims.
Other Common Carrier Cases
WA Zip line lawsuit dismissed because the plaintiff admitted he should have understood the risk http://rec-law.us/L3IfG1
Electronic release upheld in Florida federal court for surfing on a cruise ship http://rec-law.us/LPSLWS
New Hampshire season pass release protects ski area from claim for injury due to snowmobile accident http://rec-law.us/XaQSpf
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Be Part of a World Record of People Wearing PFD’s (life jackets)
Posted: May 16, 2013 Filed under: Colorado | Tags: Boat, BSA, Life Jacket, Lifejacket, National Safe Boating Council, National Safe Boating Week, Paddlesports, PFD, Scouting, Sea Scout, United States Coast Guard Auxiliary Leave a commentCALLING ALL DENVER AREA COUNCIL CUB SCOUTS, BOY SCOUTS, VARSITY TEAMS, VENTURING CREWS AND SEA SCOUTS SHIPS —
National Safe Boating Council (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
YOU ARE INVITED TO COME JOIN THE COAST GUARD AUXILIARY AT CHATFIELD STATE PARK, SATURDAY, MAY 18, @ THE SOUTH MARINA RAMP AREA
TO HELP SET A NEW WORLD RECORD OF PEOPLE WEARING LIFE JACKETS.
This event is the kickoff to National Safe Boating Week, May 18-24, 2013, by the National Safe Boating Council. All Scouts in full uniform (bring your life jacket with you though) will be admitted at the Park’s entrance on Saturday morning for this photo opportunity. Arrive prior to 11:45 a.m. to allow time for parking. Gather by 11:45 a.m. at the grassy area adjacent to the South Marina ramp area. There will be Auxiliary signs posted for your convenience. A group photo, like the one above, will be taken at Noon and submitted later to the National Safe Boating Council so they can add up the numbers. LET’S BREAK 4,000 THIS YEAR!
Auxiliarists will be on hand to answer questions from scouts and parents about Recreational Boating Safety as well as be available for vessel safety checks on any and all boats you or your unit might be using this boating season. The Auxiliary hopes to have their Patrol Boats in the water on Saturday as well. Scouts would be allowed to view these facilities and ask questions about what the Auxiliary members do while on patrol on our reservoirs. (However, U.S.C.G. regulations prohibit anyone other than Auxiliarists be on board these facilities. Sorry Scouts.)
Any questions or concerns please call Amy McNeil at (303) 973-6207. Hope to see you all there.
English: United States Coast Guard Chief Director Auxiliary (“The Director of the Auxiliary is the direct representative of the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard to the United States Coast Guard Auxiliary” (Title 14 United States Code Chapter 23) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Fish and Wildlife Service in Vernal – Looking For Whitewater Boatmen
Posted: January 12, 2013 Filed under: Whitewater Rafting | Tags: Boat, Employment, Fish, Rafting, Recreation, United States, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Vernal, Vernal Utah, Whitewater Rafting Leave a commentFish & Wildlife Service – Vernal – Looking For Boatmen
The FWS offices in Vernal and Grand Junction are recruiting people for seasonal work operating boats for fish work. In particular, we are looking for folks with solid whitewater rafting skills who can operate heavy oar rafts. This job is not the same as our seasonal fish tech job, so it focuses on boat operation, although all staff will eventually be proficient on the fish end of things. The link for the announcement is below. The announcement will be open for 2 weeks, starting today.
If you know any boaters looking to have a long season, are maybe a little burned out on taking care of guests, or want to see what’s been living under their boat all these years, please pass this along. There may also be an opportunity for guides looking for early season work before they go to their guiding job for the summer. We really need people in April and May.
From: FWS HR Sent: Friday, January 04, 2013 10:00 AM Subject: Seasonal Small Craft Operator link to USA Jobs
Good morning, below is a link to the Small Craft Operator announcement, which opened today on USA Jobs:
R6-13-813050-D https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/334857400
Recreation Law 