Just because you have a piece of paper saying you are an additional insured, it does not mean there is any coverage under any policy to protect you.
Posted: August 14, 2017 Filed under: Challenge or Ropes Course, Insurance, Minors, Youth, Children, Missouri, Summer Camp, Youth Camps, Zip Line | Tags: Additional Insured, Ambiguity, Ambiguous, Camper, certificate, Certificate of Insurance, challenge course, church, Church Camp, coverage, declarations, denial letter, dining hall, duty to defend, endorsement, Guest, Insurance policy, insured, latent ambiguity, Lawsuit, lease, leased, liability arising, liability coverage, Liability insurance, lodge, lodging, meal, named insured, ordinary person, owes, Ropes course, space, Summary judgment, tenant, Youth Camp, zip line Leave a commentAdditional insured certificates are limited by two things, what the underlying policy provides coverage for and what the certificate of insurance says it will cover. Lacking coverage under the policy or lacking the necessary language in the additional insured certificate you are hanging in the wind without any insurance coverage.
For an additional insured certificate to be valid, you must put together three things. A contract which identifies the requirements or insurance you are looking for. An insurance policy that insures those requirements and a certificate of insurance that covers those requirements or better states as the requirements are set forth in the original contract. Lacking any, one of those and you are just wasting paper.
When you get a certificate of insurance, you must then read it to make sure you meet the requirements it may set out. If there is a limitation on the amount of time you have to file a claim or a specific way to notify the insured, make sure you follow those procedures.
Finally, whenever you file any claim with any insurance company for coverage, follow the procedures the policy requires then follow up with a letter providing notice the insurance company in writing.
State: Missouri, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Central Division
Plaintiff: Great American Alliance Insurance Company
Defendant: Windermere Baptist Conference Center, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff Claims: Great American now moves for summary judgment on its requested declaratory judgment that: (1) no liability coverage exists under its policy issued to Student Life for any claims asserted in the underlying lawsuit against Windermere or Windermere’s employees, including Kendra Brown; (2) Great American owes no duty to defend Windermere, Kendra Brown, or any other Windermere employees in the underlying lawsuit; and
(3) no medical payments coverage exists for Karlee Richards.
Defendant Defenses: No coverage provided under the policy or certificate of insurance
Holding: Split decision, however the insurance company will not pay anything under the certificate of insurance
Year: 2017
This is a legally complicated case with simple facts. A church rented a camp from Student Life, which had contracted with a church camp called Windermere. The reservation form and simple agreement between the camp and the church required the issuance of a certificate of insurance.
A camper, part of the church group fell while riding the zip line. She sued. That lawsuit was still pending when this lawsuit was started to determine whose insurance was required to defend against the camper’s lawsuit.
In that case, damages are being sought against them for injuries sustained by Karlee Richards after she fell while zip-lining at The Edge, a ropes course at Windermere’s Conference Center. Kendra Brown was an employee of Windermere, working at the Edge at the time of the accident.
The injured camper Richards was with the Searcy Baptist Church. They rented the camp through Student Life. Student Life rented the camp from Windermere. The contract between Student Life and Windermere is the one at question here. Windermere required a certificate of insurance from Student Life.
June 2014, Karlee Richards and her Searcy Baptist Church youth group were attending a summer camp at Windermere’s Conference Center, which was sponsored by Lifeway Christian Resources of the Southern Baptist Conference, d.b.a. Student Life. Student Life contracted with Windermere to hold the church camp at Windermere’s facility in Missouri. Student Life had a liability policy with Great American, and Windermere was an additional insured on that policy. The additional insured endorsement provides that the additional insured, in this case Windermere, is only covered for “liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that portion of the premises leased to Great American contends that Windermere is not entitled to coverage for Kaylee Richards’s injuries because Windermere did not “lease” the Edge to Student Life because the Edge was not specifically mentioned in Student Life’s written agreement with Windermere.
The first issue the court skipped was the policy that Student Life had, was restrictive and had minimal coverage. It had a requirement that all claims had to be made in one year. This may not be bad, but if the statute of limitations for the type of injury is two years or three, you may not have coverage for a claim because you did not know you had one until after the time period had run.
Student Life is the named insured on a Commercial General Liability policy with Great American. The policy requires that all requests for medical payments be made within one year of the accident that gives rise to the insurance claim. Also, when there is other valid and collectible excess insurance coverage, the Great American policy provides that Great American will have no duty to defend its insured against a claim for damages.
On top of the claim limitation period, the coverage was solely excess coverage. Meaning the coverage did on top of any other coverage the insured had and had no duty to defend or pay for attorneys. It only had to pay for a claim after the
limits of the underlying policy were exhausted. No underlying policy was ever mentioned in the case so it is unknown if one existed.
If this is the only policy, Student Life purchased, they bought the wrong one!
Another issue was whether the student life policy would provide coverage for employees of Windermere that were sued based on the accident.
This suit was brought by the Student Life insurance company, Great American Alliance Insurance Company, asking the court to tell Student Life it was not going to pay or defend any of the claims brought by the injured camper against Windermere.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The court first looked at whether the additional insured certificate was ambiguous. If so, then the court had to interpret the ambiguity under Missouri’s law.
An ambiguity is an uncertainty in the meaning of the policy.
If an ambiguity exists, the policy language will be construed against the insurer. Mendota, “‘An ambiguity exists when there is
duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the language of the policy.'” “‘To test whether the language used in the policy is ambiguous, the language is considered in the light in which it would normally be understood by the lay person who bought and paid for the policy.'” Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law.”
The burden of proving there is coverage falls on the party seeking it, in this case, Windermere. An ambiguity exists if there are different interpretations of the language in the policy. There are two types of Ambiguities, Latent and patent.
A policy is ambiguous if it is “fairly open to different interpretations” because it contains “duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty of meaning.” Importantly, there are two types of ambiguities in the law: patent and latent. “A patent ambiguity is detected from the face of the document, whereas a latent ambiguity is found ‘when the particular words of a document apply equally well to two different objects or some external circumstances make their meaning uncertain.'”
Here the court found that a patent ambiguity existed.
For these reasons, a patent ambiguity exists. The disputed phrase not only should be interpreted in favor of the Defendants, but the Defendants’ interpretation is arguably the only one that would make sense to an ordinary person under these circumstances.
The court also found a latent ambiguity existed in the certificate of insurance.
A latent ambiguity exists when a contract “on its face appears clear and unambiguous, but some collateral matter makes the meaning
uncertain.” Id. In other words, an ambiguity is “latent if language, which is plain on its face, becomes uncertain upon application.”
If an ambiguity is found in an insurance policy, the ambiguity is construed against the insurance company. “In the
alternative, it is well-settled that an ambiguity within an insurance policy must be construed against the insurer.”
Consequently, the court ruled on this issue, that there was coverage for Windermere from the Student Life Policy. However, the court found against Student Life and Windermere on the other issues.
Windermere requested coverage for defending its employees, which the court denied.
Great American argues that no coverage exists for Brown or any other Windermere employee because the Additional Insured Endorsement does not provide additional insured status and/or coverage for an additional insured’s employees. Brown is not identified anywhere in Student Life’s Great American policy nor is she listed as an Additional Insured on a Certificate of Liability. Therefore, any coverage for Brown would necessarily derive from her status as Windermere’s employee, and employees are not covered as insureds by the Additional Insured Endorsement.
The court agreed with Great American that no coverage was described in the certificate of insurance.
The next issue was, whether or not there was a duty to defend. A duty to defend is to pay the cost of the lawsuit; attorney fees, expert witness fees, etc.
Under Missouri law, the duty to defend “arises whenever there is a potential or possible liability to pay based on the facts at the outset of the case and is not dependent on the probable liability to pay based on the facts ascertained through trial.”
Because there was no coverage for the Windermere employees, there was no duty to defend them either. A duty to defend must be specifically identified in the policy. In this case the policy specifically stated, there was no duty to defend.
As to whether Great American owes a duty to defend Windermere, the Endorsement makes clear that any coverage for Windermere as an additional insured would be excess, and the policy does not afford a defense when (1) its coverage is excess and (2) when the insured is being provided a defense by another carrier.
The last issue was whether medical expenses of the injured camper were owed by Great American to Windermere. Again, since the policy specifically stated there was no coverage for medical expenses this was denied. The court also found the
requirement under the policy to make a claim for medical expenses had to be done within one year, and that time had lapsed; therefore, no medical expenses were owed by the Student Life Policy with Great American.
The decision was split, however, in reality; Windermere got nothing from the decision. If Windermere lost its suit or exhausted its own liability insurance policy protection, it could, then see money from the Student Life policy with Great American, but no other coverage was owed by Great American. However, that meant the camper was going to have to win millions probably to exhaust the Windermere policy and Windermere or its insurance company was going to foot the bill with no help from the policy under the certificate of insurance.
So Now What?
This is a classic case were not knowing or checking what happens when you receive an additional insured certificate ends up costing you more money than not having one.
The underlying policy by the group coming into the camp was crap. On top of that it had major restrictions on when it would pay. Add to those issues the certificate of insurance was badly written and the company receiving the additional insured certificate received a worthless piece of paper. On top of that it cost them a lot of money I’m guessing to sue to find out they were not going to get anything from the policy.
1. Issue a request for a Certificate of Insurance in a contract or the contract. Set forth in the contract everything you must have and the type of insurance policy that must be underlying the certificate of insurance.
2. Request a copy of the insurance policy be delivered with the certificate of insurance. Again, if the policy is crap, you are getting crap.
3. Make sure the insurance policy covers what the contract says it should cover.
4. Make sure the certificate of insurance covers what the contract says it must cover.
Just collecting certificates of insurance to put in a box or file cabinet are only killing trees. It is probably not providing you any protection as in this case.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Montreat College Virtuoso Series 2 Day Outdoor Recreation Management, Insurance & Law Program
Posted: February 12, 2017 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Avalanche, Challenge or Ropes Course, Climbing, Climbing Wall, Cycling, Medical, Minors, Youth, Children, Mountain Biking, Mountaineering, Paddlesports, Racing, Risk Management, Rock Climbing, Scuba Diving, Search and Rescue (SAR), Ski Area, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Sports, Swimming, Whitewater Rafting, Zip Line | Tags: assumption of the risk, Certificate of Insurance, Insurance & Law, Montreat College, Outdoor Recreation Risk Management, releases, Risk Management, Risk Management Plans, Seminar, Virtuosos Series Leave a comment2 packed Days with information you can put to use immediately. Information compiled from 30 years in court and 45 years in the field.
Whatever type of Program you have, you’ll find information and answers to your risk management, insurance and legal questions.
You’ll also receive a copy of my new book Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management, and Law
Get these Questions Answered
What has changed in the law Concerning Releases? What states still allow releases and which ones do not. What changes have been made in how releases are written? How can you make sure your release is not as affected by these changes?
Everyone is excited about Certificates of Insurance. Why this excitement is not valid and why most of them don’t work. What must you do to make a certificate of insurance work for your program?
What is an assumption of risk document and why are they important. How can your website be used to prove assumption of the risk.
How should you write a risk management plan that does not end up being used against you in court?
How do you handle an accident so it does not become a claim or a lawsuit.
Put February 24 & 25th on your Calendar Now.
Course Curriculum
1. Assumption of the Risk
1.1. Still a valid defense in all states
1.2. Defense for claims by minors in all states
1.3. Proof of your guests assuming the risk is the tough part.
1.3.1. Paperwork proves what they know
1.3.1.1. Applications
1.3.1.2. Releases
1.3.1.3. Brochures
1.3.2. The best education is from your website
1.3.2.1. Words
1.3.2.2. Pictures
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2.1. Where they work
2.1.1. Where they work for kids
2.2. Why they work
2.2.1. Contract
2.2.2. Exculpatory Clause
2.2.3. Necessary Language
2.2.4. What kills Releases
2.2.4.1. Jurisdiction & Venue
2.2.4.2. Assumption of the Risk
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2.2.4.4.
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3.1. Why yours won’t work
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4.1. Why people sue
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Additional Insured Certificates: they are just a piece of paper, unless they are part of a contract or there is an insurable interest
Posted: November 30, 2016 Filed under: Contract, Insurance | Tags: Additional Insured, Certificate of Insurance, Insurable Interest, Insurance Company Leave a commentThere seems to be a hue and cry about collecting additional insured certificates. Unless you need TP or want to wall paper an office wall, they are worthless unless the insurance company/business issuing the certificate recognizes an insurance defined insurable interest, in advance, or you have a contract that identifies an insurable interest and recognizes the need for the certificate.
The latest catch word after this fall’s conferences runs seems to be collect additional insured certificates from everyone. Although this sound’s good and an easy way to solve a problem, legally, it is just another way to kill trees. If nothing else, it will keep you in litigation for another decade between your insurance company and the one issuing the certificate fighting over whether it is valid.
Most Additional Insured Certificates of Zero value to you from an insurance standpoint.
The basis for issuing a certificate listing someone else as an additional insured, or covered by a particular policy is there must be an insurable interest.
Indemnity – Insurable Interest
Insurable interest arose out of defining indemnity. You agree to indemnify another party of their loss. The simplest way to look at this is your relationship with you and your automobile insurance policy. If you have a loss to your car, your insurance policy will indemnify you for that loss. Insurance companies have taken that one step further these days by taking over the loss and doing all the legwork, including paying the repair facility directly.
When those indemnification agreements were larger than the money on hand or the value of the business issuing the indemnification, other ways were developed to “come up with the money” to cover the indemnification. Eventually, insurance played a role in indemnifying a third party for the losses they might incur, even though the insurance policy is issued in the name of the insured.
Think about you, a certificate of insurance is issued to the insured, which was underwritten and covers someone else who was not. Don’t you think there is more to this than just issuing a piece of paper?
Issuing Policy must cover risks of the claims identified in the certificate or the agreement.
By the very nature of the definition, simplified above, you can see there are several issues present. The insurance policy is only going to cover the third party for risks that are insured. That means if the policy issued to you says it will only cover A, B and C as risks, then a claim of Z by the third party will not be covered. No matter what the certificate of insurance says, it only covers the risks insured by the original policy for the original insured.
So even before we get to whether the certificate is valid, you must make sure the policy issuing the certificate lists the claims that the certificate is expected to cover.
You have to look at the certificate itself and see if it covers anything, let alone what you need.
Legally recognizable insurable interest
The next issue is insurance policies only cover if there is a legally recognizable interest in the possible loss. That is called an “insurable interest.”
An insurable interest means the person buying the policy has a legally recognized loss that the policy will cover. The best examples are in the negative. I cannot buy an insurance policy on my neighbor’s house. I don’t own the house; the house does not secure a debt the neighbor owes me. I have nothing invested in the neighbor’s house; therefore, I have no insurable interest in the neighbor’s house.
Another example would be life insurance. I do not have an insurable interest that would be recognized to buy a life insurance policy on my neighbor. My neighbor’s death would not cause me a loss.
Normally, life insurance policies are only issued to relatives of the insured. The exception is if you could prove an economic loss to you because someone died. So business partners can buy life insurance policies on each other because if one partner died, the other would have to hire someone to do that partners work, and you might have to buy the surviving family members of the deceased interest in the business.
Example; my neighbor and I contractually agreed upon the death of one of us to take care of the other’s property. I would then suffer a loss if my neighbor died so I might be able to purchase a life insurance policy on my neighbor. I would have to prove the contract existed and that a real value existed for the loss I might incur. I would have to prove by contract that I have an insurable interest in my neighbor.
I’m using examples in property insurance, life and health insurance and liability insurance to get these points across. An insurable interest is different in the different types of polices, health, life, property or liability, but not enough to worry about for this discussion.
Insurable interest
Insurable interests arise “naturally” in the law. When a building is purchased the bank making the loan to finance the purchase has an insurable interest. If the property is destroyed, then the banks’ chances of receiving the rest of the loan are diminished, therefore, there is an insurable interest in the bank to insure against loss. Either the bank can buy a policy covering the property or the bank can require as part of the loan that the owner/borrower insure the property for the value of the property listing the bank as an additional insured.
Landlords have a similar insurable interest. They are listed as additional insured’s under their tenant’s policy. If the property is destroyed by actions of the tenant, the landlord will lose the property or at least the rental income. Therefore, they have an insurable interest recognized by the insurance company issuing the tenant’s policy.
Another example is a ski area operating on US Forest Service land. The US Forest Service is the landowner or landlord, and the ski area is the tenant. If the ski area destroys the property, the US Forest Service suffers a loss. So the US Forest Service is listed under the ski area’s policy as an additional insured, and the Forest Service is reimbursed for the loss of value to their land.
This particular insurable interest covers two issues for the US Forest Service. It covers any loss to the property the Forest Service may have, and it protects them from lawsuits if they are joined in a suit with the ski area. The ski area, as the permittee (or tenant) was responsible for the property at the time of the injury to the guest skiing. The US Forest Service did not make the snow, groom or run the lifts; however, as the landlord or owner of the property, the Forest Service maybe sued. As such, the US Forest Service has an insurable interest covered by the ski area for a possible lawsuit.
General or Special Liability Policies and Insurable Interest
Liability interests work the same way. If a skier hits a tree in the ski area and suffers injury, the skier can sue the ski area or the US Forest Service. The ski area is the tenant who received value for the skier being on the land, and the US Forest Service owns the tree. Both can be sued. The agreement between the Forest Service and the ski area then says the ski area must protect the Forest Service from any lawsuit due to the ski area’s occupation or control of the land. By contract and law, the Forest Service has an insurable interest that will be recognized by the ski area’s insurance company.
The owner of the land where a rafting company takes their passenger’s and boats out of the water has an insurable interest. If someone falls down getting out of the boat, both may be sued. Was it the rafting companies fault for where they put the boat or the landowner’s for how the takeout was created? Since the landowner has limited control over the takeout while being used by the rafting company, he should be covered as an additional insured because he has an insurable interest. The chance of a lost due to the acts of someone he contracts with creating liability for him.
What about a restaurant that provides lunches to the rafting company? Who should receive the certificate of additional insured from whom? The rafting company could be sued because the lunch made a customer ill. The rafting company should receive a certificate of insurance from the lunch provider. At the same time, the illness may have been caused by the way the lunch was stored or prepared, so therefore the lunch provider should be an additional insured on the Rafting company’s policy.
It is these situations where both insurance companies can struggle during litigation or a contract properly written in advance might save one or both company’s time and money.
What if the rafting company stops and has their customers walk up the bank and have lunch in a restaurant at the side of the river? If the lunches are part of the trip and the restaurant is the only option, maybe the rafting company should receive a certificate of insurance from the restaurant. However, if the customer is free to pick any meal, they want from one of the several restaurants, probably not. That would be like a restaurant on the side of an interstate asking for certificates of insurance from all trucking companies.
Would the possible insurable interest change if the rafting company received a commission from the restaurant? Yes, the insurable interest would be more compelling because there is a clear financial benefit flowing between the parties. What if the restaurant provided free lunches to the raft guides?
Unless the insurance company recognizes, either by industry or insurance practice that an insurable interest exists or that one is created by contract, that is covered under the policy, having a piece of paper with additional insured on it with you name means nothing. You must prove an insurable interest to prove legal coverage.
(And that is not even getting into the disclaimers listed on many certificates.)
Where are certificates of insurance valid by practice in the outdoor recreation industry? Between:
· Retailers and Manufacturers
· Landlords and Tenants
· Federal Land Managers and Concession or Permit Holders
· Contractors and the Hiring Company
Every other situation you should check with your attorney or get a contract that identifies the insurable interest and requires a certificate of insurance is issued with coverage for the issue. Even better, require that the contract be given to the insuring insurance company and the necessary language into the contract be incorporated into the certificate of insurance. Otherwise, you may spend more time and money litigating with the certificate issues covers the issue that was litigated.
Issuing additional insured certificates without thinking the process through is also a risk. First insurance companies look at how many and who you issue certificates too. If they see large number or risks or big risks, they can and do increase your premium to cover the additional risks. So make sure you understand why and the value of issuing a certificate of insurance from your policy also.
Every year when prior to your policy coming up for renewal, you should look through your list of parties you issue certificates of insurance to and see if they still need to be issued. Once you list someone the list is never reduced or culled except by you. I’ve seen insurance policies with over a hundred business listed as insurable interests. When we got done, we only had twenty certificates to issue. Many of the old certificates were issued to companies the client was no longer doing business with or with business who had gone out of business.
This does affect your premium so be aware!
Do Something
Without an insurable interest, a certificate of insurance is worthless and probably is going to be costly. Any insurance company paying a claim is going to look for anyone else to share in that claim. Consequently, they will pull the insured into the claim knowing it may not be valid, but willing to fight that issue out in later years. You requesting your insurance company to issue certificates could pull you into litigation both the original and the later certificate validity litigation for years, for something you had no legal interest in.
Just issuing the certificate or receiving one is not enough. You must identify when and how it is valid. That requires a contract. That contract must say more than you will issue a certificate of insurance. It must identify what the certificate is insuring and why. It must identify an insurable interest.
Insurance companies are not going to issue a check just because they issued a certificate. Make sure everyone understands how, when and why, and you’ll make that process quicker, easier and without litigation.
Think about all the work you had to go through to purchase the policy in the first place. Do you believe your insurance company is going to issue another policy just because you said so? Not unless the insurance company believes the chances of paying a claim under the certificate is very very slim.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Indemnification between businesses requires a contract outlining the type of indemnification and a certificate of insurance from one party to the other so the insurance company knows it is on the hook.
Posted: May 30, 2016 Filed under: Insurance, Massachusetts | Tags: Certificate of Insurance, Coaster, Indemnification, Jiminy Peak, Navigator, Wiegand 1 CommentBecause no certificate of insurance was issued by the third-party insurance company, company, the contract requiring indemnification between the ski area and the manufacturer failed.
Jiminy Peak Mountain Report, LLC, v. Wiegand Sports, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34209
State: Massachusetts, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
Plaintiff: Jiminy Peak Mountain Report, LLC
Defendant: Wiegand Sports, LLC, and, Navigators Specialty Insurance, CO.
Plaintiff Claims: Indemnification
Defendant Defenses: No contract
Holding: for the Defense
Year: 2016
Obviously, this is not your normal injured guest case. This case looks at the relationship between a resort and a manufacturer who installed a ride at the resort.
In 2006 the defendant Wiegand built an Alpine Coaster for the plaintiff ski area Jiminy Peak Mountain Resort, LLC. The construction/purchase agreement (Consulting, Purchase, Delivery, Assembly and Inspection Contract) also contained language requiring the manufacturer to defend any claims that were brought against the plaintiff for injuries after the ride was built.
The construction agreement required Jiminy Peak to pay part of the premiums for the insurance policy. However, the policy was only in the name of the defendant Wiegand, and did not list Jiminy Peak as an additional insured or co-insured.
Section 8 of the Contract, titled “Rights and Obligations of [Jiminy]” included in its final subsection, 8(j), language stating that Wiegand would purchase product liability insurance for the Coaster, but that Jiminy was required to pay a portion of the premium, the amount of which would be determined based on the purchase price of the Coaster, and Jiminy would then be listed as an additional insured.
The agreement also stated that Wiegand would defend and pay for any claim that Jiminy Peak received.
…in the event of a product liability suit against [Wiegand], [Wiegand] “shall, at its own expense, defend any suit or proceeding brought against [Jiminy] and shall fully protect and indemnify [Jiminy] against any and all losses, liability, cost, recovery, or other expense in or resulting from such . . . suit (provided, however, [Jiminy] has fully performed all ongoing maintenance obligations).
In 2012, two minors were seriously injured riding the coaster. Wiegand had a commercial liability policy with the defendant Navigators Insurance Company. However, Navigators did not issue a certificate of insurance covering Jiminy Peak. The parents of the injured minors filed suit against Jiminy Peak and Wiegand. Jiminy Peak sued Wiegand and Navigator seeking a declaratory judgment requiring Wiegand and Navigator to pay the cost of defending those suits.
A declaratory judgment is a quick request for a court to issue an order. Jiminy and Wiegand dismissed their claims against each other and just were fighting the lawsuit against them. The case between Jiminy and Navigator then is the subject of this decision.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
Navigator argued that there was a duty to defend someone who was not a named insured. Jiminy Peak was not listed on the policy as an insured, co-insured or additional insured. Navigator also argued that it had no legal relationship with Jiminy Peak; therefore, it owed Jiminy Peak no money.
Navigators argues that as an insurer it owes a duty to defend its insured, Wiegand, but it does not owe a direct duty to defend Jiminy because Jiminy is not an additional insured under the Policy. Further, the duty Navigators has under the Policy to pay defense costs to a non-insured party pursuant to a contractual liability of its insured only requires it to make payments to the insured, and only when the insured has actually requested payment. In this case, Navigators asserts that even if Wiegand is found to owe Jiminy its defense costs, it will be up to Wiegand to determine whether it wishes to pay the amount or to make a claim to Navigators. Since Navigators owes no duty directly to Jiminy and it would be up to Wiegand to determine whether to make a claim in the event judgment is entered against it with respect to Jiminy’s defense costs…
Jiminy Peak responded by arguing the contract between it, and Wiegand was enough to force Navigator to pay. (You and I go to dinner and try to convince the waiter that your friend who is not at the table should pay for our meal.)
The court looked into the requirements for an insurance company to defend under Massachusetts law.
The court begins its analysis by considering whether Massachusetts law allows Jiminy to compel payment from Navigators based on Navigators’ obligations to its insured, Wiegand. Massachusetts law imposes on insurers a “broad duty to defend its insured against any claims that create a potential for indemnity.” This duty is broad and attaches whenever the claims in the complaint match up with the language in the policy.
However, the broad language of the policy only applies to the companies named in the policy as an insured. Jiminy Peak was not named in any way under the policy.
The Contract also included provisions regarding both additional insureds and “insured contracts,” suggesting that Jiminy, like Navigators and Wiegand, understood that Wiegand’s promise to pay Jiminy’s defense costs would not grant Jiminy the status of an “additional insured” with respect to Navigators.
If Jiminy Peak had been named in the policy or listed as an additional insured, then coverage would have been provided under Navigator’s policy issued to Wiegand.
In the absence of a contractual relationship between Navigators and Jiminy, the court finds no legal basis for ordering Navigators to pay Jiminy’s defense costs directly. Any obligation upon Navigators to pay such costs will arise only after an insured, in this case Wiegand, makes a claim for payment and then its only obligation will be to Wiegand.
Jiminy Peak may still be indemnified by Navigator’s policy. However, to be covered Wiegand will have to make a claim under the policy and if Wiegand was negligent and did something defined under the policy as an insured, then coverage will be provided.
However, I doubt any coverage will be provided unless Jiminy Peak can prove that Wiegand was negligent in its relationship. The contract only applies to product liability or negligence claims of the insured, Wiegand.
So Now What?
Insurance policies are written so the language is clear. The insured or persons covered by the policy are listed on the first page, the declaration page, or as additional insured on the policy. The coverage provided by a policy is broader than the language usually required by state law. However, the broad coverage is only extended to the people listed in the policy.
If you name is not on a piece of paper issued by the insurance company you are not covered under the policy.
A certificate of insurance request by Jiminy Peak would have solved the problem.
However, requesting a certificate of insurance does not solve all problems, in fact it only solves very limited problems. For a simple certificate of insurance to provide protection, the named insured must have done something to create liability for the insured under the certificate of insurance.
Just requesting a certificate of insurance without an agreement outlining what is to be covered is worthless.
Every day I see situations were one company requests a certificate of insurance believing that provides coverage. It does not. To be effective a certificate of insurance should be issued based on a contract which outlines what is to be covered under the certificate of insurance. The certificate of insurance must confirm to the contract between the parties.
A certificate of insurance, by itself is pretty worthless. (If they had real value would insurance companies issue them so easily?)
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Jiminy Peak Mountain Report, LLC, v. Wiegand Sports, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34209
Posted: April 23, 2016 Filed under: Contract, Insurance, Legal Case, Massachusetts | Tags: Certificate of Insurance, Coaster, Indemnification, Jimmy Peak, Navigator, Wiegand Leave a commentJiminy Peak Mountain Report, LLC, v. Wiegand Sports, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34209
Jiminy Peak Mountain Report, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Wiegand Sports, LLC, and, Navigators Specialty Insurance, CO., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 14-40115-MGM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34209
March 16, 2016, Decided
March 16, 2016, Filed
CORE TERMS: insured, insurer, duty to defend, liability insurance, owe, cross-motions, liability claims, bodily injury’, declaratory, premium, state law, insurance policy, amount in controversy, threshold amount, principal place of business, wholly-owned subsidiary, disclosures, publicly, disputed, traded, judgment ordering, seriously injured, own expense, fully performed, negligence claim, indemnification, cross-claims, contractual, separately, asserting
COUNSEL: [*1] For Jiminy Peak Mountain Resort, LLC, Plaintiff: Jennifer C. Sheehan, Matthew D. Sweet, Richard J. Shea, Hamel, Marcin, Dunn, Reardon & Shea, P.C., Boston, MA.
For Navigators Specialty Insurance Company, Defendant: David A. Grossbaum, LEAD ATTORNEY, Matthew R. Watson, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Boston, MA.
JUDGES: MARK G. MASTROIANNI, United States District Judge.
OPINION BY: MARK G. MASTROIANNI
OPINION
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
(Dkt. Nos. 40 & 42)
MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.
I. Introduction
Plaintiff, Jiminy Peak Mountain Resort, LLC (“Jiminy”) operates a ski area in Hancock, Massachusetts. In 2005 it entered into a contract with Defendant, Wiegand Sports, LLC (“Wiegand”), to purchase a Wiegand, Alpine Coaster (the “Coaster”). The Coaster opened to the public in 2006. In August of 2012, two minors were seriously injured while riding the Coaster. The parents of the minors subsequently filed two lawsuits (together, the “Underlying Action”), each asserting claims against Jiminy and Wiegand. Jiminy subsequently filed this suit against Wiegand and Defendant, Navigators Specialty Insurance, Co. (“Navigators”), Wiegand’s insurer at the time the minors were injured, seeking a declaratory judgment [*2] ordering Wiegand and Navigators to pay the defense costs incurred by Jiminy in the Underlying Action. Before the court are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings from Jiminy and Navigators. Jiminy and Wiegand have stipulated to the dismissal of their cross-claims, agreeing to litigate those claims in the Underlying Action, rather than in this lawsuit.
II. Jurisdiction
In this action, Jiminy seeks an order requiring Navigators to pay Jiminy’s past and future defense costs in the Underlying Action based on the terms of the contract between Jiminy and Wiegand and the insurance policy Navigators issued to Wiegand. The relief is requested pursuant to state law. Federal courts have jurisdiction over suits brought pursuant to state law where there is complete diversity of citizenship between the adversaries and the amount in controversy exceeds a threshold amount of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1097 (2006). Based on the content of the complaint and the corporate disclosures filed by the parties (Dkt. Nos. 20, 21, 55), the court finds that (1) Jiminy is a Massachusetts limited liability company, owned by two other Massachusetts limited liability companies, which in turn are owned by members who reside in Massachusetts [*3] and (2) Navigators is incorporated in Delaware, has its principal place of business in Connecticut, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the publicly traded Navigators Group, Inc., less than ten percent (10%) of which is owned by any other single publicly traded corporation.1 Plaintiff asserts the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory threshold amount. In the absence of any challenge from Defendant, the court finds it has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
1 Though Jiminy is no longer pursuing its claim against Wiegand, the court notes that Wiegand, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of a German entity with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah, is also diverse with respect to Jiminy. (Compl. ¶ 7, Dkt. No. 1, Corp. Disclosure, ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 19.)
III. Standard of Review
“‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings [under Rule 12(c)] is treated much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,’ with the court viewing ‘the facts contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences therefrom.'” In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 14-2071, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3049, 2016 WL 698077, at *8 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2016) (quoting Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008)). Where, as here, the court is presented with cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, the court’s role is [*4] “to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed.” Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted)). As in the case of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is permitted to consider documents central to the plaintiff’s claims where the authenticity of the documents is not disputed and the complaint adequately references the documents. Id. (citing Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)).
IV. Background
In December of 2005, Jiminy and Wiegand entered into a “Consulting, Purchase, Delivery, Assembly and Inspection Contract” (the “Contract”). (Compl. ¶ 9, Dkt. No. 1.) Pursuant to this contract, Jiminy agreed to purchase the Coaster and Wiegand agreed to deliver, assemble, and inspect it. (Id.) Section 8 of the Contract, titled “Rights and Obligations of [Jiminy]” included in its final subsection, 8(j), language stating that Wiegand would purchase product liability insurance for the Coaster, but that Jiminy was required to pay a portion of the premium, the amount of which would be determined based on the purchase price of the Coaster, and Jiminy would then be listed as an additional insured. (Compl. Ex. A, Contract, § 8(j), Dkt. No. 1-1.) (Id.) The Contract did not set forth the term during which Wiegand’s product [*5] liability insurance policy would apply, but did provide that Jiminy would have the option to continue as an additional insured during subsequent periods, provided it continued to pay the “same premium ratio.” Id. The same section also provided that Jiminy would separately maintain a personal injury insurance policy “at its own expense at all times so long as [it] operates [the Coaster].” (Id.) The Complaint does not assert that Jiminy continued to pay premiums to remain an additional insured under Wiegand’s product liability insurance policy.
Separately at Section 12, titled “Indemnification,” the Contract provided that:
in the event of a product liability suit against [Wiegand], [Wiegand] “shall, at its own expense, defend any suit or proceeding brought against [Jiminy] and shall fully protect and indemnify [Jiminy] against any and all losses, liability, cost, recovery, or other expense in or resulting from such . . . suit (provided, however, [Jiminy] has fully performed all ongoing maintenance obligations).
(Id. at § 12(A)(1).)
The following paragraph then provided that Jiminy would
protect, indemnify, defend and hold [Wiegand] harmless from and against any and all losses of [Wiegand] arising out of or sustained, [*6] in each case, directly or indirectly, from . . . any default by [Jiminy] . . . including without limitation, from defective/bad maintenance and/or operation of the Alpine Coaster caused by [Jiminy’s] gross negligence or willful misconduct.
(Id. at § 12(A)(2).)
Under Section 18, the Contract is to be interpreted in accordance with Massachusetts law.
(Id. at § 18.)
The Coaster was installed and became operational in 2006. In August of 2012, two minors were seriously injured while riding the Coaster. At the time of the accident, Wiegand had a general commercial liability insurance policy with Navigators (“Policy”). (Policy, Ex. C, Dkt. No. 1-3.) The Policy Period ran from March 1, 2012 through March 1, 2013. Id. Pursuant to Section I(1)(a), the Policy provided that Navigators would “pay those sums that [Wiegand] becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ . . . to which [the Policy] applies.” (Id. at Section I(1)(a).) The obligation established under Section I(1)(a) is further defined in Section I(2)(b) as excluding certain types of damages, including those assumed in a contract, unless assumed in an “insured contract.” (Id. at Section I(2)(b).) In the case of an “insured contract,” “reasonable [*7] attorney fees and necessary litigation expenses incurred by or for a party other than an insured [was] deemed to be damages because of ‘bodily injury’ . . . , provided . . . that the party’s defense [had] also been assumed in the same ‘insured contract'” and the damages arise in a suit to which the Policy applied. (Id.) An “insured contract” is defined in the Policy as including “[t]hat part of any other contract or agreement pertaining to [Wiegand’s] business . . . under which [Wiegand] assume[d] the tort liability of another party to pay for ‘bodily injury’ . . . to a third person or organization.” (Id. at Section V(9)(f)). “Tort liabililty” is, in turn, defined as “a liability that would be imposed by law in the absence of any contract or agreement.” (Id.)
The parents of the minors injured on the Coaster in August of 2012 subsequently filed the Underlying Action against Jiminy and Wiegand.2 (Compl., Ex. B, Compls. in Underlying Action, Dkt. No. 1-2.) The six-count complaints3 both include a negligence claim against Jiminy (Count I), a negligence claim against Wiegand (Count II), products liability claims against Wiegand (Counts III and IV), breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim against [*8] Wiegand (Count V), and a loss of consortium claim against Wiegand and Jiminy (Count VI). (Id.) After the Underlying Action was filed, Jiminy filed this action against Wiegand and Navigators, seeking a declaratory judgment ordering Wiegand and Navigators to pay the defense costs incurred by Jiminy in connection with the Underlying Action. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) As mentioned above, Jiminy and Wiegand agreed to the dismissal of Jiminy’s claim seeking declaratory judgment from Wiegand in this action and instead are litigating the issues in the Underlying Action.
2 These suits were initially filed in the Eastern District of New York, but have since been transferred to this court where they are proceeding as a consolidated case – 13-cv-30108-MGM. The claims brought on behalf of the minors have already been settled. The only remaining claims in those cases are the cross-claims between Jiminy and Wiegand.
3 In both complaints, the claims are actually labeled 1-5 and 7.
V. Discussion
Both Jiminy and Navigators have moved for judgment on the pleadings. Navigators argues that as an insurer it owes a duty to defend its insured, Wiegand, but it does not owe a direct duty to defend Jiminy because Jiminy [*9] is not an additional insured under the Policy.4 Further, the duty Navigators has under the Policy to pay defense costs to a non-insured party pursuant to a contractual liability of its insured only requires it to make payments to the insured, and only when the insured has actually requested payment. In this case, Navigators asserts that even if Wiegand is found to owe Jiminy its defense costs, it will be up to Wiegand to determine whether it wishes to pay the amount or to make a claim to Navigators. Since Navigators owes no duty directly to Jiminy and it would be up to Wiegand to determine whether to make a claim in the event judgment is entered against it with respect to Jiminy’s defense costs, Navigators argues judgment on the pleadings should enter in its favor.
4 In its filings and at oral argument, Jiminy was clear that it was not claiming to be an additional insured under the Policy.
For its part, Jiminy begins its argument with the Contract, asserting first that the language in the Contract at § 12(A)(1) clearly establishes that Wiegand has a duty to pay Jiminy’s defense costs regardless of any potential factual disputes between Jiminy and Wiegand, provided (1) the defense costs are incurred [*10] in litigation in which there is a product liability claim against Wiegand and (2) Jiminy is also a defendant named in the action.5 As the Underlying Action includes product liability claims against Wiegand, as well as other claims against Jiminy, Jiminy asserts the two requirements are met. Jiminy then turns to the Policy, arguing that the Contract is an “insured contract” for purposes of the Policy. Finally, Jiminy argues that since the Policy provides coverage for liability assumed by Wiegand in an “insured contract,” Navigator, as an insurer, is required under Massachusetts law, to pay for Jiminy’s defense, without regard to the resolution of the dispute between Wiegand and Jiminy.
5 Initially, in its memorandum in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings, Jiminy argued that it would also be necessary to establish that there were no disputes as to whether Jiminy had “fully performed all ongoing maintenance obligations.” (Compl., Ex. B, Contract §12(A)(1).) Subsequently, in its opposition to Navigators’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, Jiminy instead argued that the requirement regarding maintenance obligations applied only to indemnification claims.
Navigators has not contested, [*11] at least relative to the purpose of the motions currently before the court, that the Contract between Jiminy and Wiegand is an “insured contract” for purposes of the Policy. Also, Navigators does not dispute or that the Underlying Action is the type of litigation covered under the Policy. The court begins its analysis by considering whether Massachusetts law allows Jiminy to compel payment from Navigators based on Navigators’ obligations to its insured, Wiegand. Massachusetts law imposes on insurers a “broad duty to defend its insured against any claims that create a potential for indemnity.” Doe v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 423 Mass. 366, 667 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Mass. 1996). This duty is broad and attaches whenever the claims in the complaint match up with the language in the policy. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. SCA Services, Inc., 412 Mass. 330, 588 N.E.2d 1346, 1347 (Mass. 1992). However, the cases cited by the parties all involve cases in which the court discussed the duty in the context of the insured.
Jiminy has not cited any cases in which a court imposed on an insurer a duty to defend a third-party beneficiary of a policy. Instead, Jiminy argues the language of the Policy providing coverage for defense costs of a third-party pursuant to an “insured contract” shows the parties’ intention that Navigators would pay such costs and, therefore, such language [*12] should be construed to impose upon Navigators a duty to make payment directly to Jiminy. The court disagrees. As demonstrated by the provisions in the Policy that allow for the designation of an additional insured, Navigators and Wiegand knew how to extend Navigators’ duties as an insurer to other parties. Damages, including defense costs, associated with “insured contracts” were handled differently, indicating that Navigators and Wiegand did not, in fact, intend that in a case like this one Navigators would have any direct obligations to Jiminy based on the Contract. The Contract also included provisions regarding both additional insureds and “insured contracts,” suggesting that Jiminy, like Navigators and Wiegand, understood that Wiegand’s promise to pay Jiminy’s defense costs would not grant Jiminy the status of an “additional insured” with respect to Navigators.
In the absence of a contractual relationship between Navigators and Jiminy, the court finds no legal basis for ordering Navigators to pay Jiminy’s defense costs directly. Any obligation upon Navigators to pay such costs will arise only after an insured, in this case Wiegand, makes a claim for payment and then its only obligation [*13] will be to Wiegand. Judgment on the pleadings in favor of Navigators is, therefore, appropriate.
VI. Conclusion
For the Foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby ALLOWED.
It is So Ordered.
/s/ Mark G. Mastroianni
MARK G. MASTROIANNI
United States District Judge