ACA trained expert witness was hired by injured plaintiff to prove a claim against a summer camp. Again, camp money is used to train expert who then is used against the camp.
State: New York, Supreme Court of New York, Richmond County
Plaintiff: Marvin Staten, an Infant Over the Age of 14 years by his Parent and Natural Guardian Cassandra Dozier and Cassandra Dozier, Individually
Defendant: The City of New York, The New York City Department of Education, Camp Chen-A-Wanda, Inc., Louis Cintron, Sr., Louis Cintron, Jr., an infant over the age of 14 years by his Parent and Natural Guardian, Louis Cintron, Sr., Barbara Rose Cintron and Louis Cintron, Jr. an infant over the age of 14 years by his Parent and Natural guardian, Barbara Rose Cintron, Defendants
Plaintiff Claims: Negligent supervision and maintenance of the premises
Holding: For the defendant Camp
American Camp Association (ACA) trained expert witness used ACA material to try and prove the summer camp was liable for the injuries of a camper. The summer camp had passed the duty to control the kids to the school district that had rented the camp and as such was not liable.
To be able to sue for emotional damages under New York law, the parent must have financial damages also. Lacking that, the mother’s claims were dismissed.
This ruling is the result of several motions filed by different parties and can be confusing.
The minors were at a summer week long football camp. The camp was rented by the defendant New York Department of Education. The camp, Camp Chen-A-Wanda, Inc., was located in Pennsylvania.
The plaintiff was looking through the cabin window where he was bunking to see if anyone was messing with his stuff. The defendant minor punched the plaintiff through the window, injuring the plaintiff with the broken glass from the window. The plaintiff’s expert identified this action as horseplay?
At his deposition, plaintiff testified that shortly after dinner on the date of the accident, he was standing outside his cabin, looking in through a window to “see if anybody was messing around with [his] stuff” when, after a few seconds, defendant Cintron “punched [through] the glass”
The defendant minor had been disciplined before by the school district for fighting.
There was a written agreement between the Defendant Camp and the school district, where the school district agreed to provide one adult (person over age 19) per cabin. In the cabin where the incident took place, the supervisors were two seniors, one of whom was the defendant minor.
The agreement gave control of the people at the camp, including campers to the school district renting the facilities.
This is the decision concerning the various motions.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The camp filed a motion for summary judgment arguing:
(1) it owed no duty to supervise plaintiff or to otherwise protect him from horseplay; (2) no facts have been adduced in support of plaintiffs’ claim that the subject window constituted a “defective condition”; and (3) since the proximate cause of the accident was the sudden, unanticipated independent actions of Cintron (i.e., punching the glass), the Camp cannot be found liable for plaintiff’s injury.
The plaintiff argued the camp was negligent and negligent per se. The negligence per se claim was based on a regulation that required safety glass to be used in windows of bunkhouses. The plaintiff also argued the camp was negligent for failing to exercise risk management and supervise the campers.
I’ve never seen a claim that it was negligent to fail to exercise risk management.
The expert hired by the plaintiff had “44 years in the camping industry and a co-author of the American Camp Association’s ‘2006 Camp Accreditation Process Guide’.” However, the court found the testimony of the expert was conclusory and insufficient to raise a question of fact.
…”conclusory testimony” offered by plaintiff’s expert was “insufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether [the Camp] breached its duty to maintain [its] property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the in-jury, and the burden of avoiding the risk” and, further, that the failure of plaintiff’s expert to quote any “authority, treatise [or] standard” in support thereof rendered his ultimate opinion speculative and/or “unsupported by any evidentiary foundation…[sufficient] to withstand summary judgment.
The basis of the plaintiff’s expert witness testimony was based on the 2006 American Camp Association Accreditation Process Guide. However, he failed to demonstrate how, where or when the guide had “been accepted as an authoritative reference work in any court of law, or its applicability to a camp constructed in the 1940s.”
The court also found the expert witnesses reliance on the building codes was misplaced because the camp had been built thirty years prior to the creation of the building code.
The court then stated, “the Camp’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint and any cross claims as against this defendant are hereby severed and dismissed.”
The court then looked at the cities (New York’s) motions. The court found the duty to supervise the youth was contractually assumed by the city in its contract with the camp. The school also had knowledge of the propensity of the defendant minor to get in fights.
In this regard, actual or constructive notice to the school of prior similar conduct is generally required, since school personnel cannot be reasonably expected to guard against all of the sudden and spontaneous acts that take place among students on a daily basis
The it was foreseeable the fight could occur.
The plaintiff’s mothers claim against the city were dismissed.
However, it is well settled that a parent cannot recover for the loss of society and companionship of a child who was negligently injured, while a claim for the loss of a child’s services must be capable of monetarization in order to be compensable. Here, plaintiff’s mother has offered no proof of the value of any services rendered to her by her son. As a result, so much of the complaint as seeks an award of damages in her individual capacity for the loss of her son’s services must be severed and dismissed.
The defendant camp was dismissed from the lawsuit. The mother’s claims were dismissed from the lawsuit because she could not prove actual damages, only emotional damages, which are not a cause of action in New York.
So Now What?
Here again an ACA trained expert witness tries to use ACA material to prove a camp is negligent. The expert would have been successful if he had better training as an expert witness and knew had to get his guide into evidence.
There are great organizations doing great things for their membership. ACA is one of those organizations. However, like others, the attempt to help their membership be better is making their lives in court a living hell.
What would you think if the person sitting across from you being deposed or on the witness stand says you are a crummy operation and negligent. And you know that your association money went into training him and creating the documents he is using to prove you were negligent.
The final issue is many states are reducing or eliminating who can sue for emotional damages when they witness or are relatives of the plaintiff. Here New York has said you can’t sue for emotional damages for the injury your child received if you don’t have financial damages in the game also.
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Staten Et. Al. v. The City of New York Et. Al., 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4257; 2013 NY Slip Op 32252(U)Posted: April 17, 2018
[**1] Marvin Staten, an Infant Over the Age of 14 years by his Parent and Natural Guardian Cassandra Dozier and Cassandra Dozier, Individually, Plaintiffs, -against- The City of New York, The New York City Department of Education, Camp Chen-A-Wanda, Inc., Louis Cintron, Sr., Louis Cintron, Jr., an infant over the age of 14 years by his Parent and Natural Guardian, Louis Cintron, Sr., Barbara Rose Cintron and Louis Cintron, Jr. an infant over the age of 14 years by his Parent and Natural guardian, Barbara Rose Cintron, Defendants.
Index No. 104585/07
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, RICHMOND COUNTY
2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4257; 2013 NY Slip Op 32252(U)
August 18, 2013, Decided
NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE PRINTED OFFICIAL REPORTS
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Affirmed in part and reversed in part by, Summary judgment granted by, Dismissed by, in part Staten v. City of New York, 2015 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3334 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t, Apr. 22, 2015)
PRIOR HISTORY: Staten v. City of New York, 90 A.D.3d 893, 935 N.Y.S.2d 80, 2011 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9134 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t, 2011)
CORE TERMS: window, glass, summary judgment, inter alia, bunk, high school, supervision, severed, horseplay, cabin, spontaneous, hazardous, engaging, breached, sudden, coach, adult, individual capacity, safety glass, building code, constructive notice, supervising, speculative, fighting, infant, fellow, leader, notice, cross claims, negligent supervision
JUDGES: [*1] Present: HON. THOMAS P. ALIOTTA
OPINION BY: THOMAS P. ALIOTTA
DECISION AND ORDER
[**2] Upon the foregoing papers, the motion for summary judgment (No. 1415-005) of defendant Camp Chen-A-Wanda, Inc. (hereinafter the “Camp”) is granted; the cross motion for summary judgment (No. 1471-006) of defendants The City of New York and The New York City Department of Education (hereinafter “City”) is granted to the extent of dismissing the claims of the individual plaintiff, Cassandra Dozier. The balance of the cross motion is denied.
This matter arises out of an incident which occurred on August 25, 2007 at the Camp’s premises in Pennsylvania, where the infant plaintiff, Marvin Staten (hereinafter “plaintiff”) was enrolled in a week-long football camp with the balance of his high school football team. Plaintiff, who was entering his sophomore year at Tottenville High School on Staten Island, claims to have sustained extensive injuries to his left eye when he was struck by glass from a window pane which had allegedly been broken by a punch thrown by defendant and fellow teammate, Louis Cintron, Jr. (hereinafter “Cintron”). It appears undisputed that the window broke while plaintiff and/or Cintron were engaging in [*2] “horseplay.”
At his deposition, plaintiff testified that shortly after dinner on the date of the accident, he was standing outside his cabin, looking in through a window at eye-level to “see if anybody was messing around with [his] stuff” when, after a few seconds, defendant Cintron “punched [through] the glass” (see Plaintiff’s March 27, 2009 EBT, pp 70-71; Camp’s Exhibit F). No criminal charges were filed against plaintiff’s teammate, who was, however, dismissed from the camp, “cut” from his high school team, and suspended from Tottenville High School following the incident.
The claims against the Camp and the City are grounded in allegations of negligent supervision and maintenance of the premises where the incident occurred (see Plaintiffs’ Amended Verified Complaint, Camp’s Exhibit A, para “Thirty-Sixth”).
[**3] It is noted that prior to this incident, i.e., on February 14, 2006, Cintron had been disciplined by Tottenville High School for engaging in disruptive conduct with another student (see City’s Exhibit I; see also Staten v. City of New York, 90 AD3d 893, 935 N.Y.S.2d 80). It is likewise noted that pursuant to a written contract drawn on Camp Chen-A-Wanda letterhead, dated and signed August 20, [*3] 2007, Tottenville High School coach Jim Munson agreed that “each bunk will be supervised by a coach, former player, or other adult who is at least nineteen years of age” (see City’s Exhibit C). To the extent relevant, the bunk “leaders” supervising plaintiff’s bunk were two seniors, one of whom was defendant Cintron.
In moving for summary judgment, Camp argues, inter alia, that: (1) it owed no duty to supervise plaintiff or to otherwise protect him from horseplay; (2) no facts have been adduced in support of plaintiffs’ claim that the subject window constituted a “defective condition”; and (3) since the proximate cause of the accident was the sudden, unanticipated independent actions of Cintron (i.e., punching the glass), the Camp cannot be found liable for plaintiff’s injury.
In opposition to the motion, plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that not only was the Camp negligent in its maintenance of the premises, but that it was negligent: (1) per se in using ordinary or “annealed” glass for the cabin windows rather than safety glass, in violation of Pennsylvania State and International Building Codes (see June 12, 2013 affidavit of Plaintiff’s Expert, Michael J. Peterson, Plaintiff’s Exhibit [*4] H); (2) in failing to properly exercise risk management, and (3) in failing to supervise its post-season campers and protect them against horseplay. Plaintiff further argues that while Cintron’s actions might be considered “intervening,” his conduct was not a superseding cause of the accident. Notably, plaintiff submits the affidavit of Michael J. Peterson (see Plaintiffs’ Exhibit H), an “expert with 44 years in the camping industry and a co-author of the American Camp Association’s ‘2006 Camp Accreditation Process Guide'” (see Plaintiffs’ [**4] Memorandum of Law), who opined, inter alia, “with a reasonable degree of professional certainty of the camping industry…that [the Camp] should have begun and completed replacement of all non-reinforced glass in hazardous or even marginally hazardous locations within [its] camp with safety impact rated glass, plexi glass (plastic),…safety film, or…reinforced…small gauge hardware cloth wire a full two decades before this accident.” The expert further opined that had these steps been taken, the punch “would not [have] shattered safety impact rated glass, plexi-glass, glass covered with safety film or reinforced glass” (id.).
As previously indicated, [*5] the Camp’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint and any cross claims as against this defendant are hereby severed and dismissed.
In the opinion of this Court, it is constrained by the 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals in Buchholz v. Trump 767 Fifth Avenue, (5 NY3d 1, 831 N.E.2d 960, 798 N.Y.S.2d 715) to hold that the “conclusory testimony” offered by plaintiff’s expert was “insufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether [the Camp] breached its duty to maintain [its] property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk” and, further, that the failure of plaintiff’s expert to quote any “authority, treatise [or] standard” in support thereof rendered his ultimate opinion speculative and/or “unsupported by any evidentiary foundation…[sufficient] to withstand summary judgment (id. at 9 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Diaz v. New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542, 544, 784 N.E.2d 68, 754 N.Y.S.2d 195).1
1 The decedent in Buchholz was pushed and fell through an office window after engaging in “play fighting” with three co-workers following their attendance at a St. Patrick’s Day Parade [*6] in 1999 (id. at 4). Plaintiff alleged that the premises’ owner was negligent, inter alia, in failing to furnish shatterproof glass windows and a safety rail across the window’s face in contravention of certain sections of the New York City Administrative Code, particularly §27-651 (“Panels subject to human impact loads”). Plaintiff’s expert, a registered architect and licensed engineer, submitted an affidavit opining that the window’s very low sill was problematic, and further, that “good and accepted engineering and building safety practices dictated that a protective barrier bar be installed” (id. at 6). Nevertheless, the trial court’s denial of the owner’s summary judgment motion was reversed on appeal (see Buchholz v. Trump 767 Fifth Ave., LLC, 4 AD3d 178, 772 N.Y.S.2d 257) and affirmed by the Court of Appeals based, inter alia, on the speculative nature of the opinion of plaintiff’s expert.
[**5] Here, plaintiff’s expert placed substantial reliance on the language of the 2006 American Camp Association Accreditation Process Guide in formulating his opinion. However, although alleged to have been tested “numerous times in litigation”, Mr. Peterson failed to demonstrate, e.g., where or when this guide has [*7] been accepted as an authoritative reference work in any court of law, or its applicability to a camp constructed in the 1940s. Moreover, his opinion that the failure to replace unannealed windows violated certain Pennsylvania codes or statutes is not compelling or binding upon this Court. To the contrary, Peterson’s reliance on 34 Pa. Admin. Code §47.398, to require the use of “safety glass” in bunk windows represents a misreading of the statute, as the provision in question was not adopted until 1972 (some thirty years after the Camp began its operations), and neither it nor any other Pennsylvania building code or regulation has been cited requiring that bunk windows be retrofitted to conform to the 1972 requirements (cf. Buchholz v. Trump 767 Fifth Avenue, 5 NY3d at 9). Moreover, he failed to show that the window in question was actually in a “hazardous” location for purposes of the cited codes, i.e., within 24 inches of the bunkhouse door. In fact, no measurement was provided. “Although noncompliance with…a customary practice or industry standard may be evidence of negligence, the failure to abide by guidelines or recommendations that are not generally-accepted standards in an [*8] industry will not suffice to raise an issue of fact as to a defendant’s negligence” (Diaz v. New York Downtown Hosp., 287 AD2d 357, 358, 731 N.Y.S.2d 694, affd 99 NY2d 542, 784 N.E.2d 68, 754 N.Y.S.2d 195 [citations omitted]; see also Ambrosio v. South Huntington Union Free School Dist., 249 AD2d 346, 671 N.Y.S.2d 110). This, similarly to Buchholz, is just such a case2.
2 Also worthy of note is the Camp’s uncontroverted representation that no similar incidents (other than, e.g., windows broken by vandalism) occurred during its sixty-year history (see February 3, 2010 EBT of Craig Neier, Camp’s Exhibit C).
The City’s cross motion for summary judgment is granted in part, and denied, in part, as hereinafter provided.
[**6] In arguing for dismissal of the negligent supervision claim, the City argues that (1) it provided more than enough chaperones at the training camp, (2) issued oral and written instructions against the type of conduct which caused plaintiff’s injury; (3) the sudden, spontaneous and unforeseeable nature of defendant Cintron’s actions were such that no reasonable amount of supervision could have prevented the injury, and (4) it had no prior notice of the latter’s propensity to engage in the type of conduct that caused plaintiff’s injury. Moreover, [*9] the City maintains that it did not legally own, occupy, or control the Camp; that Cintron’s independent and spontaneous actions breached any chain of causation connected to the condition or maintenance of the camp and/or its cabin windows; and that it possessed no actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition regarding the composition of the window itself.
In opposition, plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that the lack of supervision which encouraged the horseplay causing the injury is evident by the City’s failure to (1) place an adult in each cabin, as required under plaintiff’s interpretation of the terms of its contract with the Camp (see City’s Exhibit C); (2) adhere to the Regulations of the Chancellor governing adult supervision on school trips (see City’s Exhibit D), and (3) comply with American Camp Association standard HR-10A and 10B regarding the supervision of campers (see June 12, 2013 affidavit of plaintiffs’ expert, Michael J. Peterson, “Opinions 1”).
Here, the duty of supervising the student/athletes was contractually assumed by the City. In determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts [*10] of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the injury. Put simply, the third-party acts must reasonably have been anticipated (see Brandy B. v. Eden Cent. School Dist., 15 NY3d 297, 302, 934 N.E.2d 304, 907 N.Y.S.2d 735; Mirand v. City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49, 637 N.E.2d 263, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372; [**7] Shannea M. v. City of New York, 66 AD3d 667, 886 N.Y.S.2d 483; Doe v. Department of Educ. of City of NY, 54 AD3d 352, 862 N.Y.S.2d 598). In this regard, actual or constructive notice to the school of prior similar conduct is generally required, since school personnel cannot be reasonably expected to guard against all of the sudden and spontaneous acts that take place among students on a daily basis.
Here, the proof of Cintron’s 2006 suspension for fighting at school serves to preclude the City from demonstrating prima facie that his designation as bunk “leader” was reasonable as a matter of law (see Staten v. City of New York and Camp Chen-A-Wanda, Inc., 90 AD3d 893, 935 N.Y.S.2d 80; see also September 16, 2009 EBT of James Munson, pp 16, 33, 39-42; the Camp’s Exhibit E). Neither is Coach Munson’s investigation purportedly uncovering a conflicting version of the events in which the breaking of the glass [*11] is attributed to plaintiff “put[ting] his face” against it (see EBT of James Munson, p 54) sufficient to warrant dismissal of the cause of action pleaded on behalf of the infant plaintiff.
However, it is well settled that a parent cannot recover for the loss of society and companionship of a child who was negligently injured (see White v. City of New York, 37 AD2d 603, 322 N.Y.S.2d 920), while a claim for the loss of a child’s services must be capable of monetarization in order to be compensable (see DeVito v. Opatich, 215 AD2d 714, 627 N.Y.S.2d 441). Here, plaintiff’s mother has offered no proof of the value of any services rendered to her by her son. As a result, so much of the complaint as seeks an award of damages in her individual capacity for the loss of her son’s services must be severed and dismissed.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that the motion for summary judgment of defendant Camp Chen-A-Wanda Inc. is granted, and the complaint and any cross claims as against this defendant are hereby severed and dismissed; and it is further
[**8] ORDERED, that the cross motion for summary judgment of defendants The City of New York and The New York City Department of Education is granted to the extent that the cause(s) of action asserted [*12] by plaintiff Cassandra Dozier in her individual capacity are hereby severed and dismissed, and it is further
ORDERED that the remainder of the cross motion for summary judgment is denied.
Hon. Thomas P. Aliotta
Dated: September 18, 2013
Conning v. Dietrich, 2011 NY Slip Op 51340U; 32 Misc. 3d 1215A; 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3481
Suzanne M. Conning, Plaintiff, against Robert J. Dietrich, BROOKLYN TRIATHLON CLUB and JOHN STEWART, Defendants.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, KINGS COUNTY
2011 NY Slip Op 51340U; 32 Misc. 3d 1215A; 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3481
July 15, 2011, Decided
NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE PRINTED OFFICIAL REPORTS.
CORE TERMS: bicycle, training, triathlon, route, summary judgment, shoulder, weekend, roadway, ride, cyclist, riding, participating, cycling, recreational, risk of injuries, issues of fact, participated, cross-claims, bicyclist, verified, hazard, sport, assumption of risk, experienced, recreation, amusement, triable, speed, mile, paceline
[**1215A] Negligence–Assumption of Risk–Injury during Cycling Event. Release–Scope of Release.
COUNSEL: [***1] For CONNING, Plaintiff: Alan T. Rothbard, Esq., Harrison & Rothbard, P.C., forest Hills, NY.
For DIETRICH, Defendant: Michael J. Caulfield, Esq., Connors & Connors, PC, Staten Island NY.
For STEWART & BTC, Defendant: French & Casey LLP, NY NY.
JUDGES: HON. ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J. S. C.
OPINION BY: ARTHUR M. SCHACK
Arthur M. Schack, J. [*2]
Plaintiff SUZANNE M. CONNING (CONNING), a resident of Brooklyn (Kings County), fell off a bicycle while participating in an August 2, 2008 triathlon training ride on New York State Route 28, a designated state bicycle route, in Ulster County. After her fall she was struck by an automobile owned and operated by defendant ROBERT J. DIETRICH (DIETRICH). Plaintiff had been training intensively for two upcoming triathlons she planned to enter. Defendant BROOKLYN TRIATHLON CLUB (BTC) organized weekend trips to allow triathletes, such as plaintiff CONNING, to train for upcoming events. Defendant BTC designated defendant JOHN STEWART (STEWART) to lead its cycling training the weekend of plaintiff CONNING’s accident.
Defendants BTC and STEWART move for summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff’s verified complaint and all cross-claims against them, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3212, alleging, among [***2] other things, that: plaintiff CONNING assumed the risk of injuries she sustained by voluntarily participating in defendant BTC’s triathlon training weekend; and, plaintiff CONNING signed a valid waiver of liability releasing defendants BTC and STEWART from any liability that they may sustain in a BTC event. Defendant DIETRICH moves for summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff’s verified complaint and all cross-claims against him, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3212, alleging that: plaintiff CONNING caused her own accident by following the cyclist in front of her too closely; and, there is no evidence that defendant DIETRICH failed to use reasonable care in the operation of his motor vehicle. Plaintiff opposes both motions. For the reasons to follow, the Court grants summary judgment to defendants BTC and STEWART and denies summary judgment to defendant DIETRICH.
Plaintiff CONNING had experience as a “triathalete” before the subject accident, having participated in three prior triathlons and other organized bicycling events, including a thirty-five (35) mile bike tour in September or October 2006. When plaintiff lived in Arizona, from 2001-2005, she participated several times per [***3] month in organized and informal cycling rides and mountain biked several times per year. Subsequently, plaintiff moved to New York and joined BTC in November 2007. In 2008, plaintiff began participating in instructional cycling rides with BTC members. Plaintiff Conning testified in her examination before trial (EBT) that: she gradually increased the frequency of her rides and the distance covered to develop endurance and strength; her training rides included bike paths in Brooklyn with pedestrians and highways with motor vehicles; and, she was aware of the potential hazards a cyclist encounters on roads, including small stones, ruts and cracks.
Defendant BTC organized a triathlon training weekend for the first weekend of August 2008, based in Phoenicia, New York, to train its members in the skills necessary for triathlon events. Plaintiff signed BTC’s waiver of liability, on July 29, 2008, before commencing training with BTC. Then, plaintiff CONNING voluntarily took part in BTC’s three (3) day training camp in preparation for her planned participation in upcoming triathlons. Plaintiff testified, in her [*3] EBT, that on Friday, August 1, 2008, she participated in a twenty (20) mile bicycle [***4] ride and then chose to take a thirty-five (35) mile ride the next day, led by defendant STEWART. In the August 2, 2008-ride, the six riders stayed in a paceline if the road was straight and level. In a paceline, bicycle riders, to reduce wind resistance, ride in a line with each bicycle approximately twelve to eighteen inches behind each other.
After the group traveled about twenty-five (25) miles, while on Route 28, plaintiff CONNING was last in the paceline, to keep weaker cyclists in front of her. The paceline was on the shoulder of Route 28, separated from vehicular traffic by a white line. Plaintiff CONNING testified, in her EBT, that while she was following a fellow cyclist, Cindy Kaplan, she observed the shoulder narrowing and a difference in elevation between the shoulder and the gravel area to the right of the shoulder. When plaintiff observed Ms. Kaplan leave the shoulder and swerve right onto the gravel surface, plaintiff voluntarily followed. Plaintiff testified, in her EBT, that she then attempted to get her bicycle back onto the shoulder, at which point the front wheel of her bicycle caught the slight rise in the shoulder’s elevation. This caused her wheels to stop and [***5] plaintiff CONNING was propelled over her bicycle’s handlebars onto Route 28’s roadway. Then, plaintiff CONNING was struck by defendant DIETRICH’s vehicle, which was traveling on Route 28. Further, plaintiff admitted that prior to the accident she never complained about roadway conditions to STEWART.
Summary Judgment Standard
The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case. (See Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320, 324, 501 N.E.2d 572, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923 ; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562, 404 N.E.2d 718, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595 ; Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404, 144 N.E.2d 387, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498 ). Failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers. (Winegrad v New York University Medical Center, 64 NY2d 851, 476 N.E.2d 642, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316 ; Qlisanr, LLC v Hollis Park Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 51 AD3d 651, 652, 857 N.Y.S.2d 234 [2d Dept 2008]; Greenberg v Manlon Realty, 43 AD2d 968, 969, 352 N.Y.S.2d 494 [2nd Dept 1974]).
CPLR Rule 3212 (b) requires that for a court to grant summary judgment the court must determine if the movant’s papers justify holding as a matter of law [***6] “that there is no defense to the cause of action or that the cause of action or defense has no merit.” The evidence submitted in support of the movant must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. (Boyd v Rome Realty Leasing Ltd. Partnership, 21 AD3d 920, 921, 801 N.Y.S.2d 340 [2d Dept 2005]; Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v Dino & Artie’s Automatic Transmission Co., 168 AD2d 610, 563 N.Y.S.2d 449 [2d Dept 1990]). Summary judgment shall be granted only when there are no issues of material fact and the evidence requires the court to direct judgment in favor of the movant as a matter of law. (Friends of Animals, Inc., v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 390 N.E.2d 298, 416 N.Y.S.2d 790 ; Fotiatis v Cambridge Hall Tenants Corp., 70 AD3d 631, 632, 895 N.Y.S.2d 456 [2d Dept 2010]).
Plaintiff’s assumption of risk
Defendants BTC and STEWART make a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment and dismissal of the verified complaint and cross-claims against them because plaintiff CONNING assumed any risks involved with bicycle riding and she executed defendant BTC’s valid waiver of liability. The Court of Appeals, in Turcotte v Fell (68 NY2d 432, 502 N.E.2d 964, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 ), held, at 437: [*4]
It is fundamental that to recover in a negligence action a plaintiff must establish that the defendant [***7] owed him a duty to use reasonable care, and that it breached that duty . . . The statement that there is or is not a duty, however, begs the essential question — whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct. Thus, while the determination of the existence of a duty and the concomitant scope of that duty involve a consideration not only of the wrongfulness of the defendant’s action or inaction, they also necessitate an examination of plaintiff’s reasonable expectations of the care owed to him by others.
Further, in Turcotte at 438-439, the Court instructed that risks involved with sporting events:
are incidental to a relationship of free association between the defendant and the plaintiff in the sense that either party is perfectly free to engage in the activity or not as he wishes. Defendant’s duty under such circumstances is a duty to exercise care to make the conditions as safe as they appear to be. If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has performed its duty.
The doctrine of assumption of risk is “intended to facilitate free and vigorous participation [***8] in athletic activities.” (Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650, 657, 541 N.E.2d 29, 543 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1989). However, “[a]s a general rule, [sporting event] participants may be held to have consented, by their participation, to those injury-causing events which are known, apparent or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the participation (see Maddox v City of New York, 66 NY2d 270, 277-278, 487 N.E.2d 553, 496 N.Y.S.2d 726 ).” (Turcotte at 439). (See Benitez at 657; Murphy v Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 NY 479, 482, 166 N.E. 173 ). To establish plaintiff’s assumption of risk, “it is not necessary . . . that the injured plaintiff have foreseen the exact manner in which the injury occurred, so long as he or she is aware of the potential for injury from the mechanism from which the injury results.” (Maddox at 278). “If a participant makes an informed estimate of the risks involved in the activity and willingly undertakes them, then there can be no liability if he is injured as a result of those risks.” (Turcotte at 437). Further, the Turcotte Court, at 438, in defining the risk assumed, instructed that:
in its most basic sense it “means that the plaintiff, in advance, has given his * * * consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation [***9] of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone. The situation is then the same as where the plaintiff consents to the infliction of what would otherwise be an intentional tort, except that the consent is to run the risk of unintended injury * * * The result is that the defendant is relieved of legal duty to the plaintiff; and being under no duty, he cannot be charged with negligence” (Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 68, at 480-481 [5th ed]; 4 Harper, James & Gray, [*5] Torts § 21.0 et seq. [2d ed]; Restatement [Second] of Torts § 496A comments b, c; see also, Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 Harv. L Rev 14 [assumption of risk is another way of finding no duty of care]; Comment, Assumption of Risk and Vicarious Liability in Personal Injury Actions Brought by Professional Athletes, 1980 Duke LJ 742).
Assumption of risk is frequently invoked in connection with voluntary participation in sports and recreational activities. “By engaging in a sport or recreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly-appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and [***10] flow from such participation.” (Rivera v Glen Oaks Village Owners, Inc., 41 AD3d 817, 820, 839 N.Y.S.2d 183 [2d Dept 2007]). In Sanchez v City of New York (25 AD3d 776, 808 N.Y.S.2d 422 [2d Dept 2006]), the Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint because “the injured plaintiff assumed the risks inherent in playing baseball in the gymnasium where she sustained her injuries, including those risks associated with any readily observable defect or obstacle in the place where the sport was played.” In Cuesta v Immaculate Conception Roman Catholic Church (168 AD2d 411, 562 N.Y.S.2d 537 [2d Dept 1990]) the Court granted summary judgment to defendant. Plaintiff, voluntarily acted as an umpire in his son’s Little League game. While standing behind the pitcher, he was struck in the eye by a ball thrown by the catcher. The Court held, at 411, that “[t]he injury is one common to the sport of baseball, and was foreseeable by the plaintiff prior to accepting the job as umpire.” In an assumption of risk case, “[p]laintiff can avoid summary judgment only by demonstrating that the risk of injury was somehow unreasonably increased or concealed in the instant circumstances.” (Mondelice v Valley Stream Cent. High School Dist., 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1292, 2002 NY Slip Op 50403 [U], *3 [***11] [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2002, Winslow, J.]).
Plaintiff CONNING, in the instant action, was aware of the inherent risks involved in triathlon participation. She was an experienced cyclist and prior to her accident previously participated in triathlons and cycling events. In addition, she participated in weekly training for triathlon events. At the time of her accident no risks inherent in bicycling were veiled or concealed from her. “[B]y engaging in a sport or recreation activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation.” (Morgan v State, 90 NY2d 471, 484, 685 N.E.2d 202, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421 ). (See Marino v Bingler, 60 AD3d 645, 874 N.Y.S.2d 542 [2d Dept 2009]; Lumley v Motts, 1 AD3d 573, 768 N.Y.S.2d 24 [2d Dept 2003]; Cook v Komorowski, 300 AD2d 1040, 752 N.Y.S.2d 475 [4th Dept 2002]). “A reasonable person of participatory age or experience must be expected to know” that there are risks inherent with cycling. (Morgan at 488) A known, apparent or reasonably foreseeable consequence of participating in a sporting activity will be considered an inherent risk. (See Turcotte at 439; Tilson v Russo, 30 AD3d 856, 857, 818 N.Y.S.2d 311 [3d Dept. 2006]; Rubenstein v Woodstock Riding Club, 208 AD2d 1160, 617 N.Y.S.2d 603 [3d Dept. 1994]). [***12] Plaintiff, an experienced bicyclist, was aware of risks, in cycling on Route 28, when she left the shoulder where her training group was riding and went onto adjacent gravel. She should have been aware that road bikes of the type she was riding are designed to be ridden on pavement and their handling is greatly compromised on gravel.
Moreover, whether the risk of injury is open and obvious is a determinative factor in assessing plaintiff’s comparative fault. (See Palladino v Lindenhurst Union Free School Dist., 84 AD3d 1194, 924 N.Y.S.2d 474 [2d Dept 2011]; Krebs v Town of Wallkill, 84 AD3d 742, 922 N.Y.S.2d 516 [2d Dept 2011]; Bendig v [*6] Bethpage Union Free School Dist., 74 AD3d 1263, 1264, 904 N.Y.S.2d 731 [2d Dept 2010]; Mondelli v County of Nassau, 49 A.D.3d 826, 827, 854 N.Y.S.2d 224 [2d Dept 2008]; Mendoza v Village of Greenport, 52 AD3d 788, 861 N.Y.S.2d 738[2d Dept 2008]). Plaintiff CONNING, in the instant matter, alleges that defendants BTC and STEWART were negligent in allowing her to ride on “a decrepit and narrow path.” However, plaintiff rode her bicycle on the shoulder of Route 28 for one-tenth of a mile (about two city blocks) before her accident. She was able to observe the roadway as she was riding on the shoulder. Also, despite observing the narrowing of the [***13] shoulder, she continued to ride. Plaintiff, did not, as she knew she could have, slowed down or stopped.
Moreover, even for experienced cyclists “[t]he risk of striking a hole and falling is an inherent risk of riding a bicycle on most outdoor surfaces.” (Goldberg v Town of Hempstead, 289 AD2d 198, 733 N.Y.S.2d 691 [2d Dept. 2001]). Similarly, “the risk of encountering ruts and bumps while riding a bicycle over a rough roadway . . . is so obvious . . . or should be to an experienced bicyclist . . . that, as a matter of law, plaintiff assumed any risk inherent in the activity.” (Furgang v Club Med, 299 AD2d 162, 753 N.Y.S.2d 359 [1d Dept 2002]). Plaintiff, in the instant action, was participating in a guided bicycle tour conducted by defendants BTC and STEWART when she hit a rut, an inherent risk, and fell off her bicycle. (See Rivera v Glen Oaks Village Owners, Inc. at 820-821; Reistano v Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 13 AD3d 432, 785 N.Y.S.2d 711 [2d Dept 2004]). In Werbelow v State of New York (7 Misc 3d 1011[A], 801 N.Y.S.2d 244, 2005 NY Slip Op 50549[U] [Ct Cl, 2005]), a self-proclaimed “rather competent rollerblader” was injured after she fell over a “crack” on a New York State bicycle path and the Court found that plaintiff assumed the risk of injury. The Werbelow Court held, at *3, [***14] that “there is no indication that there were unreasonably increased risks’ in this case, or that defendant acted recklessly, intentionally, or concealed the risks, such that the doctrine of assumption of risk would not apply.” “Since the risk of striking a hole and falling is an inherent risk in riding a bicycle on most outdoor surfaces and the defective condition in this case was open and obvious, the infant plaintiff assumed the risk of riding her bicycle on the ballfield.” (Goldberg at 692). (See Rivera v Glen Oaks Village Owners, Inc. at 820). In the instant action, a rut in the road surface or a change in elevation between the shoulder and gravel area or a “decrepit and narrow” shoulder were not unique conditions created by either STEWART or BTC.
It is clear that defendants BTC and STEWART did not take plaintiff on an unreasonably dangerous roadway surface. The EBT testimony demonstrates that the cyclists did not anticipate that every patch of the roadway would be smooth. Cindy Kaplan, one of the cyclists in plaintiff’s training group, testified that “[i]n general the entire route was appropriate, the entire weekend was appropriate because that’s how the roads are Upstate . . . [***15] I guess you can’t expect it to be perfectly paved the whole time.” Plaintiff CONNING came into contact with a ledge or lip in the roadway while trying to get back on the path she diverged from. Unable to navigate the ledge or lip, she fell and was then struck by defendant DIETRICH’s passing car. Prior to plaintiff’s accident, defendant STEWART was diligent in pointing any roadway hazards to the bicycle riders in his group. The shoulder narrowing cannot be considered a roadway hazard because it was open, obvious and not something for cyclists to avoid. Thus, it is manifest that CONNING understood and assumed the risks of the activities she partook in based upon her prior participation in triathlons and cycling events before the date of her accident. Plaintiff CONNING assumed the risk in choosing to participate in the August 2, 2008 cycling event on Route 28 conducted by defendant BTC and led by defendant STEWART, with its known and obvious [*7] risks.
Plaintiff’s waiver of liability
Plaintiff CONNING, on July 29, 2008, signed defendant BTC’s waiver of liability making her aware of the risk of injury prior to her participation in BTC’s triathlon training weekend. This waiver states, in pertinent [***16] part:
I ACKNOWLEDGE that there may be traffic or persons ON THE course route, and I ASSUME THE RISK OF RUNNING, BIKING, SWIMMING OR PARTICIPATING IN ANY OTHER BTC EVENT. I also ASSUME ANY AND ALL OTHER RISKS associated with participating in BTC events including but not limited to falls, contact and/or effects with other participants, effects of weather including heat and/or humidity, defective equipment, the condition of the roads, water hazards, contact with other swimmers or boats, and any hazard that may be posed by spectators or volunteers. All such risks being known and appreciated by me, I further acknowledge that these risks include risks that may be the result of the negligence of the persons or entities mentioned above . . . or of other persons [or] entities. I AGREE NOT TO SUE any of the person or entities mentioned above . . . for any of the claims, losses or liabilities that I have waived, released or discharged herein. [Emphasis added]
It is undisputed that plaintiff CONNING, prior to and as a condition of participating in BTC’s training weekend, read and executed BTC’s waiver of liability. Therefore, she was aware of the risks explicitly stated in the waiver. Once “risks [***17] of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious” to plaintiff, plaintiff is deemed to have accepted the risks by taking part in the activity. (Turcotte at 439).
It is firmly established that a valid release which is clear and unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and voluntarily entered into will be enforced as a private agreement between parties.” (Appel v Ford Motor Co., 111 AD2d 731, 732, 490 N.Y.S.2d 228 [2d Dept 1985]). Absent fraud, duress or undue influence, a party who signs a waiver will be bound by its terms. (Skluth v United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 163 AD2d 104, 106, 559 N.Y.S.2d 280 [1d Dept. 1990]). Plaintiff CONNING does not claim that she was fraudulently induced or unduly influenced or forced to sign BTC’s waiver of liability. She participated in BTC’s training weekend of her own free will and signed BTC’s waiver of liability as a condition of her participation in BTC’s events. A plain reading of the waiver of liability demonstrates that it relieves BTC and STEWART from liability for any injuries sustained by plaintiff CONNING, whether or not caused by defendants’ negligence.
In Castellanos v Nassau/Suffolk Dek Hockey, Inc. (232 AD2d 354, 648 N.Y.S.2d 143 [2d Dept 1996]), the Court found that the [***18] injury waiver form executed by plaintiff, an experienced deck hockey player, who participated in a deck hockey game at premises owned by one defendant and maintained or controlled by another defendant, was enforceable. The Court held, at 355, that:
The language of the agreement clearly expresses the intention of the parties to relieve the “organizers, sponsors, supervisors, participants, owners of the business and owners of the premises” of liability (see Lago v Krollage, 78 NY2d 95, 99-100, 575 N.E.2d 107, 571 N.Y.S.2d 689 ). Moreover, the [*8] agreement is similarly clear in reciting that the plaintiff was aware of and assumed the risks associated with participating in the game of deck hockey (see Chieco v Paramarketing, Inc., 228 AD2d 462, 643 N.Y.S.2d 668 [2d Dept 1996]).
“In the absence of a contravening public policy, exculpatory provisions in a contract, purporting to insulate one of the parties from liability resulting from that party’s own negligence, although disfavored by the courts, generally are enforced, subject to various qualifications.” (Lago v Krollage at 99). However, an exculpatory agreement, as a matter of public policy, is void, “where it purports to grant exemption from liability for willful or grossly negligent [***19] acts or where a special relationship exists between the parties such that an overriding public interest demands that such a contract provision be rendered ineffectual.” (Lago v Krollage at 100). Thus, “it is clear . . . that the law looks with disfavor upon agreements intended to absolve an individual from the consequences of his negligence . . . and although they are, with certain exceptions, enforceable like any other contract . . . such agreements are always subjected to the closest of judicial scrutiny and will be strictly construed against their drawer.” (Abramowitz v New York University Dental Center, College of Dentistry, 110 AD2d 343, 345, 494 N.Y.S.2d 721 [2d Dept 1985]). (See Lago v Krollage at 100; Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 106-107, 400 N.E.2d 306, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 ; Sterling Investors Services, Inc. v 1155 Nobo Associates, LLC, 30 AD3d 579, 581, 818 N.Y.S.2d 513 [2d Dept 2006]; Dubovsky & Sons, Inc. v Honeywell, Inc., 89 AD2d 993, 994, 454 N.Y.S.2d 329 [2d Dept 1982]).
In 1996, the New York Legislature, as a matter of public policy, enacted General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-326, which states:
“[e]very covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with . . . any contract . . . entered into between the owner or operator of any . . . place of [***20] amusement or recreation . . . and the user of such facilities, pursuant to which such owner or operator receives a fee or other compensation for the use of such facilities, which exempts the said owner or operator from liability for damages caused by or resulting from the negligence of the owner, operator or person in charge of such establishment, or their agents, servants or employees, shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.
Despite plaintiff CONNING’s contention that GOL § 5-326 applies to the instant action, it does not. Plaintiff CONNING did not sign BTC’s waiver of liability to participate in a “place of amusement or recreation” owned or operated by defendant BTC. Clearly, BTC does not own or operate Route 28 and plaintiff paid a fee to defendant BTC for training weekend expenses, not for her use of Route 28. Moreover, GOL § 5-326 does not apply to participants engaged in training events, because they are not recreational. The primary purpose of plaintiff CONNING’s August 2, 2008-ride was triathlon training.
Plaintiff, in Tedesco v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth. (250 AD2d 758, 673 N.Y.S.2d 181 [2d Dept. 1998]), was injured on the Verrazano Narrows Bridge during [***21] a “five borough bicycle tour.” The Court held, at 758, that the release plaintiff signed was enforceable “since the Verrazano Narrows Bridge, where the plaintiff Tedesco was injured, is not a place of amusement or recreation.'” Similarly, in Brookner v New York Roadrunners Club, Inc. (51 AD3d 841, 858 N.Y.S.2d 348 [2d Dept 2008]), [*9] plaintiff sustained injuries in the 2004 New York Marathon, while running on a Brooklyn street. Plaintiff, prior to the race, signed defendant’s waiver of liability. The Court held GOL § 5-326 inapplicable to plaintiff because he paid an entry fee to participate in the Marathon, not an admission fee for use of a city-owned street. Further, the Court held, at 842, that “the public roadway in Brooklyn where the plaintiff alleges that he was injured is not a place of amusement or recreation.'” Similarly, in Bufano v. National Inline Roller Hockey Ass’n. (272 A.D.2d 359, 707 N.Y.S.2d 223 [2d Dept 2000]), the Court held that a member of an inline roller hockey league assumed the risk of injuries sustained from a fight with another player during a game. The Court held, at 359, that GOL § 5-326 did not “void the release Bufano signed, since the $25 he paid was not paid to the owner or operator of a recreational [***22] facility.” Further, the Court instructed, at 359-360, that “the liability release he signed expressed in clear and unequivocal language the intent to relieve the defendants of all liability for personal injuries to Bufano caused by defendants’ negligence. Thus, the release is enforceable.”
Plaintiff CONNING, in the instant action, paid $40 annual membership dues to BTC and paid BTC a registration fee for the August 2008 triathlon training weekend. She signed BTC’s waiver of liability to train on a “course route,” and did not pay a fee to use a “place of amusement or recreation.” Thus, GOL § 5-326 does not void the BTC waiver of liability signed by CONNING. (See Lago v Krollage at 101; Schwartz v Martin, 82 AD3d 1201, 1203, 919 N.Y.S.2d 217 [2d Dept 2011]; Fazzinga v Westchester Track Club, 48 AD3d 410, 411-412, 851 N.Y.S.2d 278 [2d Dept 2008]; Millan v Brown, 295 AD2d 409, 411, 743 N.Y.S.2d 539 [2d Dept 2002]). Further, the waiver of liability signed by plaintiff CONNING expressly relieves defendant BTC and its “employees, representatives, and any agents,” such as defendant STEWART from liability for injuries she sustained during the triathlon training weekend.
New York State Courts have uniformly found that when a sporting activity is [***23] “instructional” rather than “recreational” a waiver of liability will not be deemed void under GOL § 5-326. The Court in Boateng v Motorcycle Safety School, Inc. (51 AD3d 702, 703, 858 N.Y.S.2d 312 [2d Dept. 2008]), held that the release signed by a student motorcyclist, who fell from a motorcycle during a training session, was enforceable and not voided by GOL § 5-326 because “the defendants submitted evidence that the raceway premises, which the defendant leased to conduct its classes, were used for instructional, not recreational or amusement purposes.” (See Thiele v Oakland Valley, Inc., 72 AD3d 803, 898 N.Y.S.2d 481 [2d Dept 2010]; Baschuk v Diver’s Way Scuba, Inc. 209 AD2d 369, 370, 618 N.Y.S.2d 428 [2d Dept 1994]). Plaintiff CONNING, at the time of her accident was not taking a recreational bicycle ride but engaged in triathlon training supervised by defendant STEWART, an agent of defendant BTC. Plaintiff registered with BTC to participate in a triathlon training weekend to train for upcoming triathlons in which she planned to participate. Defendant BTC advertised the August 2008 training weekend as instructional, for participants to develop triathlon skills. Plaintiff confirmed this in her EBT testimony.
Defendants BTC and STEWART [***24] demonstrated that plaintiff CONNING knowingly and voluntarily executed a valid waiver of liability and assumed the risk of injury by riding her bicycle on a public roadway. Plaintiff CONNING’s arguments, in opposition to the instant motion of defendants BTC and STEWART, that her August 2, 2008-ride was “recreational” are mistaken. Moreover, the risks inherent in plaintiff CONNING’s August 2, 2008-instructional [*10] bicycle ride, that she consented to, were fully comprehended by plaintiff and obvious to her as an experienced cyclist. Therefore, without material issues of fact, the motion of defendants BTC and STEWART for summary judgment and dismissal of the verified complaint against them and all cross-claims against them is granted.
Defendant DIETRICH’s motion for summary judgment
Defendant DIETRICH’S summary judgment motion on liability is denied because of the existence of triable issues of fact. “It is well established that on a motion for summary judgment the court is not to engage in the weighing of evidence. Rather, the court’s function is to determine whether by no rational process could the trier of facts find for the nonmoving party’ (Jastrzebski v North Shore School Dist., 223 AD2d 677, 637 N.Y.S.2d 439 [2d Dept 1996]).” [***25] (Scott v Long Island Power Authority, 294 AD2d 348, 741 N.Y.S.2d 708 [2d Dept 2002]). Moreover, “[s]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy which should only be employed when there is no doubt as to the absence of triable issues.” (Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d 18, 23, 918 N.Y.S.2d 176 [2d Dept 2011]). As will be explained, there is no doubt that in the instant action, there are triable issues of fact that must be resolved at trial by the finder of fact. (Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. at 404).
Defendant DIETRICH, the owner and operator of the motor vehicle that collided with plaintiff CONNING, admitted in his deposition that he was aware of the presence of plaintiff CONNING and other bicycle riders about 200 feet before the accident occurred [EBT – p. 19]. He also acknowledged that in the seconds before the accident, his wife, the front seat passenger “said I see a line of bikers up there. Slow down. Be careful.’ Then she said one of them might hit a stone or something in the road and fall into the road. [EBT – p. 17, lines 10-14].'” Further, defendant DIETRICH testified [EBT – p. 18] that he clearly saw the bicycle riders that his wife had spoken about and that the section of Route 28 where the subject accident [***26] occurred was straight [EBT – p. 20]. Moreover, defendant DIETRICH lived near the scene of the accident [EBT – p.10], on many prior occasions had observed bicycle riders on Route 28 [EBT – p. 22] and knew that Route 28 was a designated state bike route [EBT – p. 26]. Defendant DIETRICH stated that the speed limit on Route 28 was 55 miles per hour [EDT – p.23] and prior to the accident he was driving at that rate of speed [EBT – p. 24] until he saw the bikers and reduced his speed [EBT – pp. 39-40].
Defendant DIETRICH’s counsel, in P 22 of his affirmation in support of the motion, offers conjecture, without expert opinion, that “the plaintiff was following the bicyclist in front of her too closely which prevented her from properly using her senses to see what was before her. This caused her to lose control of the bicycle and to fall into the side of the defendant’s vehicle.” Plaintiff CONNING and the other cyclists were traveling in a paceline. If counsel for defendant DIETRICH believes that the paceline or the spacing of the bicycles was improper, counsel for defendant DIETRICH was obligated to present expert opinion in evidentiary form. However, counsel for defendant DIETRICH failed [***27] to do so.
Both plaintiff CONNING and defendant DIETRICH were under the same duty to operate their respective bicycle and motor vehicle in a safe manner, keep a safe lookout and avoid collisions. “A person riding a bicycle on a roadway is subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] § 1231). (Thoresz v Vallone, 70 AD3d 1031, 894 N.Y.S.2d 769 [2d Dept 2010]). The Court, in Palma v Sherman (55 AD3d 891, 867 N.Y.S.2d 111 [2d Dept 2009], instructed: [*11]
In general, a motorist is required to keep a reasonably vigilant lookout for bicyclists, to sound the vehicle’s horn when a reasonably prudent person would do so in order to warn a bicyclist of danger, and to operate the vehicle with reasonable care to avoid colliding with anyone on the road. A bicyclist is required to use reasonable care for his or her own safety, to keep a reasonably vigilant lookout for vehicles, and to avoid placing himself or herself in a dangerous position (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146; Rosenberg v Kotsek, 41 AD3d 573, 837 N.Y.S.2d 343 [2d Dept 2007]; Trzepacz v Jara, 11 AD3d 531, 782 N.Y.S.2d 852 [2d Dept 2004]; Redcross v State of New York, 241 AD2d 787, 660 N.Y.S.2d 211 [3d Dept 1997]; PJI 2:76A). Each is required to obey the statutes governing [***28] traffic and is entitled to assume that the other also will do so (see Rosenberg v Kotsek, 41 AD3d 573, 837 N.Y.S.2d 343 [2d Dept 2007]; Trzepacz v Jara, 11 AD3d 531, 782 N.Y.S.2d 852 [2d Dept 2004]; Redcross v State of New York, 241 AD2d 787, 660 N.Y.S.2d 211 [3d Dept 1997]; PJI 2:76A).
In the instant action there are material issues of fact whether defendant DIETRICH used that level of ordinary care that a reasonably prudent person would have used under the same circumstances and if not, whether the subject accident was foreseeable. (See PJI 2:10; PJI 2:12). “Whether a breach of duty has occurred, of course, depends upon whether the resulting injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendants’ conduct.” (Danielenko v Kinney Rent A Car, Inc., 57 NY2d 198, 204, 441 N.E.2d 1073, 455 N.Y.S.2d 555 ). Defendant DIETRICH had a duty of care to keep his vehicle under control and to reduce his speed to a safe level, which is clear from his acknowledgment that he took his foot off the gas pedal prior to the accident. VTL § 1180 (a) states that “[n]o person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing [Emphasis added].” Thus, there is a triable issue [***29] of fact whether defendant DIETRICH’s rate of speed was “reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing.” Also, VTL § 1146 requires a driver to “exercise due care to avoid colliding with any bicyclist.” It is a triable issue whether defendant DIETRICH could have avoided his collision with plaintiff CONNING.
The Court, by determining that triable issues of fact exist, denies defendant DIETRICH’s motion for summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff’s verified complaint and all cross-claims against him.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that the motion of defendants BROOKLYN TRIATHLON CLUB and JOHN STEWART for summary judgment and dismissal of the verified complaint and all cross-claims against them, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3212, is granted; and it is further;
ORDERED, that the motion of defendant ROBERT J. DIETRICH for summary judgment [*12] and dismissal of the verified complaint and all cross-claims against him, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3212, is denied.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
HON. ARTHUR M. SCHACK
J. S. C.