Overturned by the PA Supreme Court: Bourgeois v. Snow Time, Inc., 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2938; 2018 WL 3868670Posted: October 25, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Legal Case, Pennsylvania, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Skiing / Snow Boarding, Snow Tubing, Uncategorized | Tags: anti-fatigue, bottom, deceleration, deposition, expert report, fail to meet, folded, grant summary judgment, Gross negligence, Incl, issues, kitchen, Mats, matter of law, patron's, Reckless, Resort, rider's, rubber, run-out, serious injury, Ski, Ski Roundtop, Ski Roundtop Operating Corporation, Snow, Snow Time, speed, Standard of Care, stopping, Summary judgment, summary judgment motion, Trial court, tubers, Tubing | Leave a comment
Bourgeois v. Snow Time, Inc., 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2938 *; 2018 WL 3868670
Bourgeois v. Snow Time, Inc.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
August 14, 2018, Decided; August 14, 2018, Filed
No. 1086 MDA 2017
2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2938 *; 2018 WL 3868670
RAY M. BOURGEOIS AND MARY ANN I. BOURGEOIS, Appellants v. SNOW TIME, INC. AND SKI ROUNDTOP OPERATING CORPORATION
Notice: DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
Prior History: [*1] Appeal from the Order Entered June 19, 2017. In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s): 2015-SU-001900-71.
Judges: BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER,* J. Judge Ott joins the memorandum. Judge Strassburger files a dissenting memorandum.
Appellants, Ray M. Bourgeois and Mary Ann I. Bourgeois, appeal from the Order entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas granting the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Appellees, Snow Time, Inc. and Ski Roundtop Operating Corporation.1 Appellants challenge the trial court’s finding that Appellants could not establish that Appellees acted recklessly or with gross negligence. After careful review, we agree with the trial court that Appellants failed to provide an expert report that articulated a relevant standard of care. As a result, Appellants failed to establish that Appellees had a duty to Appellants and, thus, acted recklessly or were grossly negligent in placing deceleration mats at the end of the tubing run. We affirm the Order of the trial court.
In the instant matter, Appellant Ray Bourgeois was seriously injured while snow tubing when his tube crossed folded anti-fatigue rubber kitchen [*2] mats which Appellees had placed in the deceleration area of the snow tubing run. Appellants’ theory of the case is that Appellees acted recklessly and with gross negligence by placing the mats at the end of the tubing run to aid in tube deceleration.
Appellants filed a Complaint against Appellees on July 24, 2015, asserting claims for negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and loss of consortium.
On February 14, 2017, Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the trial court granted on June 19, 2017.
This timely appeal followed. Appellants filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal. The trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, incorporating its Opinion in Support of the Order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Appellants raise the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court err in granting [Appellees’] Motion for Summary Judgment when it disregarded [Appellants’] liability expert reports, which support the conclusion that, based on the evidence of record, that in placing large rubber kitchen mats, folded in half, on the snow and in the path of its patrons who were traveling at high speeds, [Appellees] acted recklessly and/or with gross negligence? [*3]
2. Did the trial court err in granting [Appellees’] Motion for Summary Judgment, by holding that, as a matter of law, [Appellees] were not reckless and/or grossly negligent, in that the trial court disregarded genuine issues of material fact showing recklessness and/or gross negligence, including but not limited to the following:
(a) the manufacturer of the inner tube [Appellees] provided Mr. Bourgeois specifically warned [Appellees] not to place obstacles, such as large folded rubber kitchen mats, in the path of tubing participants;
(b) [Appellees] deliberately placed obstacles-large, heavy, folded kitchen mats that [Appellees] knew were not designed for snow tubing and which would cause tubing participants to come to an abrupt stop during high-speed conditions-directly in Mr. Bourgeois’s path;
(c) [Appellees] knew that folding the large mats made them obstacles as the mats were fixed heavy masses that protruded high off the surface of the snow;
(d) [Appellees] had actual and/or constructive knowledge of similar incidents involving the folded kitchen mats prior to Mr. Bourgeois’s catastrophic accident;
(e) [Appellees] acknowledged in their written warnings that their tubing runs-including [*4] their use of large rubber mats to stop speeding tubing patrons-posed a risk of grievous injury or death to its patrons; and
(f) the risk of grave harm posed by the folded rubber kitchen mats to [Appellees’] snow tubing patrons was obvious and readily apparent to a reasonable person?
3. Did the trial court err in granting [Appellees’] Motion for Summary Judgment, in that the trial court relied upon the testimony of [Appellees’] own employees-in contravention of the Nanty-Glo2 holding-to conclude as a matter of law that [Appellees] did not know or have reason to know that using folded kitchen mats to bring its fast-moving snow-tubing patrons to an abrupt stop did not pose a risk of serious bodily harm or death to its patrons?
4. Did the trial court err in granting [Appellees’] Motion for Summary Judgment as to [Appellee] Snow Time, Inc., when (a) the Release signed by Mr. Bourgeois did not name Snow Time as a signatory, and (b) there were genuine issues of fact that [Appellee] Snow Time directly participated and acted negligently with regard to Mr. Bourgeois?
Appellants’ Brief at 6-7.
Issues 1 and 2 – Summary Judgment
In their first two issues, Appellants argue that the trial court erred [*5] in granting Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment by disregarding the conclusions of their experts that Appellees’ conduct was reckless and grossly negligent. Appellants’ Brief at 35, 42. In support, Appellants emphasize certain evidence and argue that the record contains genuine issues of material fact that make the grant of summary judgment inappropriate. Based on the following discussion, however, we find that Appellants did not establish a prima facie claim for recklessness or gross negligence and thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on these issues.
Our standard of review of the grant of a Motion for Summary Judgment is as follows. We “may reverse a grant of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294, 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010). However, when there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and the only issue on appeal is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo.” Id.
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party “must adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof such that a jury could return a verdict in his favor.” Washington v. Baxter, 553 Pa. 434, 719 A.2d 733, 737 (Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). If the non-moving [*6] party fails to establish one of the essential elements of her claim, the movant has valid grounds for summary judgment. Babb v. Ctr. Cmty. Hosp., 2012 PA Super 125, 47 A.3d 1214, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
It is well-established that when a trial court considers a motion for summary judgment that includes an expert report, the trial court must determine, inter alia, whether the expert sufficiently supports his conclusions in his expert report:
At the summary judgment stage, a trial court is required to take all facts of record, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. This clearly includes all expert testimony and reports submitted by the non moving party or provided during discovery; and, so long as the conclusions contained within those reports are sufficiently supported, the trial judge cannot sua sponte assail them in an order and opinion granting summary judgment. Contrarily, the trial judge must defer to those conclusions, and should those conclusions be disputed, resolution of that dispute must be left to the trier of fact.
Summers, supra at 1161 (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that Appellants could not establish a claim for recklessness or gross negligence. The trial [*7] court reasoned that since Appellants’ experts had not articulated the standard of care that Appellees failed to meet, a factfinder could not conclude that Appellees were aware of that standard of care and disregarded it and, thus, acted recklessly or with grossly negligence:
[Appellants] have not produced sufficient evidence to show that an industry standard exists for placing the mats at the bottom of hills for snow tubers. . . . The absence of any standard on the record makes it difficult for the [c]ourt to find that [Appellees] knew that their conduct of using deceleration mats to stop snow tubers in the runout area would be placing [Appellant] at a higher unreasonable risk of harm than if [Appellees] had placed mats in a different manner, selected to purchase a different kind of mat, or used a different method for stopping the snow tubers.
Trial Ct. Op., 7/19/17, at 18-19. The trial court similarly found no evidence that Appellees “knew or had reason to know that folding the mats created an unreasonable risk of physical harm.” Id. Appellants challenge these conclusions.
We first turn to the definitions of recklessness and gross negligence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing the [*8] Restatement (Second) of Torts, found that a defendant acts recklessly, when, inter alia, he owes a duty to the plaintiff and fails to meet that duty. That is, a defendant is reckless when:
he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 616 Pa. 385, 47 A.3d 1190, 1200 (Pa. 2012), citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (emphasis added). Therefore, an element of recklessness is the failure of the defendant to do any act that he has a duty to do for the plaintiff.
That failure, however, must be an intentional failure. In other words, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant consciously acted or failed to act. Thus, recklessness is more closely aligned with intentional conduct than with negligence, which suggests “unconscious inadvertence.” Id.
Similarly, an element of gross negligence is the deviation from a standard of care. More precisely, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant’s conduct grossly and flagrantly deviated from “the ordinary [*9] standard of care.” Bloom v. Dubois Regional Medical Center, 409 Pa. Super. 83, 597 A.2d 671, 679 (Pa. Super. 1991).
Generally, it is for the jury to determine whether a party acted grossly negligent. Colloi v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 332 Pa. Super. 284, 481 A.2d 616, 621 (Pa. Super. 1984). However, a court may decide this question as a matter of law where the case is entirely free from doubt and there is no possibility that a reasonable jury could find gross negligence. Id.
Expert testimony is often required to opine about a defendant’s duty to the plaintiff, i.e., the standard of care that defendant failed to meet. In particular, an expert must opine about the relevant standard of care, the manner in which defendant’s actions deviated from the standard, and the manner in which that deviation caused the plaintiff’s harm. See Toogood v. Owen J. Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 573 Pa. 245, 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003) (medical expert report must describe standard of care so as to establish duty, breach of duty, and causation). See also Zokaites Contracting Inc. v. Trant Corp., 2009 PA Super 35, 968 A.2d 1282, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2009) (in a professional negligence action, expert testimony is required to establish the “relevant standard of care applicable to the rendition of the professional services” and that the defendant’s conduct fell below that standard); Truax v. Roulhac, 2015 PA Super 217, 126 A.3d 991, 997-99 (Pa. Super. 2015) (discussing plaintiff’s use of an engineer’s expert testimony to establish the elements of negligence in a premises liability action).3 If the expert fails to provide the required information, a trial [*10] court may conclude that the report is insufficient as a matter of law. Id.
We now turn to the theory of Appellants’ case. Appellants allege in their Complaint, inter alia, that Appellees’ use of folded deceleration mats at the base of its tubing run was reckless and grossly negligent because the use of the mats caused Appellant’s snow tube to stop suddenly and unexpectedly, resulting in the serious injuries that Appellant sustained. Appellants assert the same theory on appeal by arguing that Appellees engaged in reckless and grossly negligent conduct when they placed “large, heavy rubber mats in [Appellant’s] path … and that the mats could bring [Appellant] to an abrupt, immediate stop.”4
See Appellants’ Brief at 36.
In support of Appellants’ response to Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellants presented two expert reports that concluded that Appellees engaged in reckless and grossly negligent conduct. Neither expert, however, set forth a relevant standard of care and, thus, the duty that Appellees failed to meet.
Appellants’ first expert, Mark DiNola, is an expert in the field of ski and snow tubing risk management. When addressing Appellees’ standard of care, he did so generally [*11] and failed to articulate a specific standard of care or industry standard for the use of deceleration mats in a tubing run-out area. In particular, DiNola first concluded generally that Appellees’ “decision to use deliberately deployed folded anti-fatigue rubber mats as a deceleration device constitutes an extreme departure from the ordinary standards of conduct for a tubing park operator.” DiNola Report, 3/15/17, at 40 (emphasis added). DiNola, however, did not cite or explain the “ordinary standards of conduct for a tubing park operator” from which Appellees’ conduct had departed. He just baldly opined that the use of the mats departs from ordinary standards of conduct.
In another portion of the report, however, DiNola discusses a standard of care set forth in National Ski Areas Association’s “Tubing and Operations Resource Guide.”5 That “standard of care,” however, addresses the length of a tubing run-out, not a standard of care for the use of mats as deceleration devices. Thus, this portion of the expert report does not sufficiently articulate the applicable standard of care or conduct to support Appellants’ theory of this case.
The second expert report, written by Gordon Moskowitz, [*12] Ph.D., a mechanical and biomechanical engineering expert, does not set forth any standards of care for tubing operators. Thus, this report is not relevant to the determination of whether Appellees engaged in reckless or grossly negligent conduct in failing to meet a standard of care by using folded rubber mats in the deceleration area.
Therefore, we are constrained to agree with the trial court that Appellants failed to articulate the appropriate standard of care for the use of deceleration mats. Without such a standard of care, Appellants, as a matter of law, cannot establish Appellees’ duty to Appellants and that Appellees knew or should have known about the standard of care. Since Appellants failed to meet this element of recklessness and gross negligence, the trial court properly granted Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue.
Issue 3 – Nanty-Glo Rule
In their third issue, Appellants claim that the trial court erred in concluding, solely based on Appellees’ employees’ testimony, that Appellees were not aware of the risk of harm posed by their use of anti-fatigue mats in the deceleration areas of the tubing run. Appellants’ Brief at 55.
The Nanty-Glo Rule limits the trial [*13] court’s use of affidavits or depositions to decide motions for summary judgment. The Rule provides that a trial court, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, may not rely solely upon the moving party’s own testimonial affidavits or depositions, or those of its witnesses, to determine that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Dudley v. USX Corp., 414 Pa. Super. 160, 606 A.2d 916, 918 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation and footnote omitted).
Before applying the Nanty-Glo Rule, however, the trial court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case:
Initially, it must be determined whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case. If so, the second step is to determine whether there is any discrepancy as to any facts material to the case. Finally, it must be determined whether, in granting summary judgment, the trial court has usurped improperly the role of the fact-finder by resolving any material issues of fact. It is only when the third stage is reached that Nanty-Glo comes into play.
DeArmitt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 2013 PA Super 161, 73 A.3d 578, 594-95 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted and emphasis added).
As discussed above, the trial court properly found as a matter of law that Appellants’ experts had not opined about a relevant standard of care [*14] and, thus, Appellants could not establish facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case of recklessness or gross negligence. Accordingly, Appellants have not demonstrated the applicability of the Nanty-Glo Rule. This third issue, thus, warrants no relief.
Issue 4 – The Release of Snow Time, Inc.
Lastly, Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the negligence claim against Snow Time, Inc. because the Release at issue did not specifically name or identify Snow Time, Inc. Appellants’ Brief at 61. We disagree.
The Release at issue states, in pertinent part, that Appellants release from negligence claims Appellee Ski Liberty Operating Corporation and its owners:
In consideration of being allowed to use the tubing area at Liberty, Whitetail or Roundtop, I HEREBY AGREE NOT TO SUE AND TO RELEASE, SKI LIBERTY OPERATING CORP., WHITETAIL MOUNTAIN OPERATING CORP. AND SKI ROUNDTOP OPERATING CORP., AS WELL AS THEIR OWNERS, AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES FROM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY RELATED TO INJURY, PROPERTY LOSS OR OTHERWISE RELATED TO MY USE OF THE TUBING FACILITY, REGARDLESS OF ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE SAME. I FURTHER AGREE TO INDEMNIFY AND DEFEND THE SAME, FROM ANY CLAIM FOR LIABILITY [*15] RELATED TO INJURY AS A RESULT OF MY OR MY CHILD’S USE OF THE FACILITIES, REGARDLESS OF ANY NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS OR IMPROPER CONDUCT.
Release (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that Appellee Snow Time, Inc. owns Appellee Ski Roundtop Operating Corporation. Although the Release does not specifically name Appellee Snow Time, Inc., the Release still covers Appellee Snow Time, Inc. because the Release clearly and unambiguously covers the owner of Ski Roundtop Operating Corporation.
Moreover, Appellants do not otherwise contend that the Release is ambiguous. They raise no claims as to the Release’s general validity, conspicuity, or enforceability. Further, Appellants cite no authority to support their implication that unless the Release specifically names an owner, the term “owner” does not apply to it.
We agree with the trial court that the Release applied to Appellee Snow Time, Inc., as the owner of Ski Roundtop Operating Corporation. Therefore, the Release applied to general negligence claims against Appellee Snow Time, Inc. and Appellants’ claim to the contrary is without merit.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm.
Judge Ott joins the memorandum.
Judge Strassburger files a [*16] dissenting memorandum.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:
In this case, the learned Majority holds that the trial court correctly concluded that Appellants could not establish a claim for recklessness or gross negligence as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage.1 Because I believe a reasonable jury could find that the facts constitute gross negligence and/or recklessness, I respectfully dissent. See Albright v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 548 Pa. 268, 696 A.2d 1159, 1164 (Pa. 1997) (holding that a court may only take issue of gross negligence away from jury and decide the issue as a matter of law “if the conduct in question falls short of gross negligence, the case is entirely free from doubt, and no reasonable jury could find gross negligence“).
This case stems from an incident that occurred while Appellant Ray Bourgeois (Bourgeois) was snow tubing at Roundtop Mountain Resort (the Resort), which is owned and operated by Appellees. As described by the trial court, Bourgeois
went down the hill on his stomach, [head first] on his tube, and proceeded to reach the run-out area at the bottom of the hill. To aid snow tubers in slowing down and stopping at the bottom of the hill, [Appellees] utilized deceleration mats. On his final [*17] run, [Bourgeois’s] snow tube came into contact with a deceleration mat, causing his tube to come to an abrupt stop. [Bourgeois’s] body continued forward in motion after his tube stopped, causing him to land [head first] into the snow. The resulting collision caused a hyperextension of [Bourgeois’s] spinal cord in his neck that has left him quadriplegic with limited mobility from his neck down.
Trial Court Order Granting Summary Judgment,2 6/19/2017, at 2-3.
What the trial court refers to as “deceleration mats” are actually rubber anti-fatigue mats commonly used as a walking surface in commercial kitchens. Spahr Deposition, 7/14/2016, at 25; Weeden Deposition, 7/20/2016, at 64-65; Whitcomb Deposition, 9/1/2016, at 95-96. The Resort inherited some of the mats from another resort. Whitcomb Deposition, 9/1/2016, at 96. When the Resort needed additional mats, Matt Weeden, the manager of the tubing park at the Resort, testified that he attempted to match the mats in use and “asked [the Resort’s] food and beverage guy where he got his and basically shopped around and compared the mats and figured out exactly what they were and ordered them.” Weeden Deposition, 7/20/2016, at 65. The mats are [*18] not specifically designed for snow tubing. Id. Appellees used the mats to assist the snow tube rider to slow down at the bottom of the hill and to minimize collisions between a snow tube and people walking around at the bottom of the hill. Reichert Deposition, 7/13/2016, at 34-35; Whitcomb Deposition, 9/1/2016, at 81, 89.
The vinyl snow tubes used by the Resort have a written warning stating that the product is designed to be used on hills with no obstacles with adequate room to stop. Appellants’ Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/16/2017, at Exhibit E. Appellees never conducted any studies as to the effect of a vinyl tube encountering a rubber mat. Whitcomb Deposition, 9/1/2016, at 96. In 2004, Appellees added elevation to the snow-tubing hill in order to create a more fun experience for their customers. Whitcomb Deposition, 9/1/2016, at 53-54. When they did so, they extended the runout “a little bit,” because making the hill higher resulted in the riders traveling faster down the hill and a farther distance at the bottom. Id. at 54-56.
Two of the safeties3 testified that they are aware that the speed that riders travel depends on various factors, including weather conditions, [*19] the time of day, and the number of people going down a slope at a time. For example, riders went faster when it was colder. Spahr Deposition, 7/14/2016, at 34; Reichert Deposition, 7/13/2016, at 35-37. Nevertheless, the Resort did not measure speed other than by observation. The safeties and tubing supervisors determined when and how to use the mats depending on their observations of how the lanes were running, the speed riders were moving, and where the tubes were stopping, but there were no formal policies or procedures about when and how to use the mats. Reichert Deposition, 7/13/2016, at 35-38, 45; Whitcomb Deposition, 9/1/2016, at 98. The mats sometimes lay flat; sometimes they were folded. One of the tubing safeties observed that folded mats usually slowed down the rider more than flat mats due to an increase in friction. Reichert Deposition, 7/13/2016, at 36.
Appellants obtained the opinions of two experts. The first, Mark A. Di Nola, is an expert in ski and snow tubing risk management. The second, Gordon Moskowitz, Ph.D., is a an expert in mechanical and biomechanical engineering.
Di Nola opined that Bourgeois was severely injured as a direct result of Appellees’ deliberate actions, [*20] which include the following:
[1.] [Appellees’] conscious decision to employ an operationally reckless company policy mandating the deployment of deliberately placed folded anti-fatigue rubber mats at the bottom of the tubing hill as deceleration devices with explicit knowledge that the deliberately deployed folded anti-fatigue rubber mats were not designed or tested for use as deceleration devices[.]
[2.] [Appellees’] conscious decision to attempt to transfer the increased risks to their guests rather than make the tubing experience safer for consumers by eliminating the increased risk as they did only after [Bourgeois’s] tragic incident, placing their corporate financial needs over the needs of their guests.
[3.] [Appellees] consciously deployed snow tubes and provided them to their patrons in a manner that directly violated the manufacturer’s warning label by using the tubes on hill with deliberately placed obstacles that were set out in an attempt to offset the fact that the hill did not provide adequate room to stop.
[4.] [Appellees’] conscious decisions described above increased the risk of serious bodily injury to riders over and above those inherent in the activity of snow tubing [*21] in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
[5.] [Appellees’] conscious decisions increased the risk of serious injury to riders over and above those inherent in the activity of snow tubing in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and constitute an extreme departure from the ordinary standards of conduct for a ski area in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
[6.] [Appellees’] conscious decisions increased the risk of serious injury to riders over and above those inherent in the activity of snow tubing in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and are a proximate cause of [Bourgeois’s] injuries.
Di Nola Report, 3/15/2017, at 41-42.
Moskowitz opined, inter alia, that
2. The use of folded anti-fatigue mats as a deceleration device would expose tube riders to the likelihood of their tube encountering a sudden abrupt stop, particularly when the mats were folded with the ‘nubs’ exposed to the surface of the tube.
3. The stopping effect of a tube encountering a folded anti-fatigue mat with nubs exposed should have been readily apparent to [Appellees] well before [Bourgeois’s] accident of February 17, 2013.
4. Tube riders who travelled head  first (on their stomachs) on ‘fast’ days would be subject to a greater [*22] risk of suffering injuries similar to those experienced by  Bourgeois.
6. Arranging the mats in a folded position enhances the risk of a sudden tube stop.
7. The variations in weather … would have resulted in [Bourgeois’s] tubing experience being significantly faster at or around 3:00 p.m. when his accident occurred than [on Bourgeois’s previous runs down the hill].
Moskowitz Report, 3/14/2017, at 20. Moskowitz also opined that Appellees
knew or should have known that tubers traveling at a high rate of speed would find their tube brought to an abrupt stop when it encountered a folded mat, with that risk increasing further when the mat was folded with the nubs exposed to the bottom of the tube. Analysis indicates that a tube and rider in the prone position with [Bourgeois’s] physical measurements, facing forward and traveling at approximately 15 mph would enter into a flipping motion upon contact with a folded mat due to the resulting friction and the fold. [B]ased upon the known weather conditions and [Bourgeois’s] weight, his speed at the point of encountering the folded mat was well in excess of this speed.
Id. at 16.
After discovery closed, Appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing, [*23]
inter alia, that Appellants failed to support claims for reckless conduct, because Appellants used the mats in a matter customary to the industry without incident up until the incident. Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/14/2017, at ¶¶ 28-41; Appellees’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/14/2017, at 17-20 (pagination supplied). Appellees later argued that the record also did not support a claim of gross negligence. Appellees’ Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/31/2017, at 24. Appellees contended that Appellants’ expert, Moskowitz, attributed Bourgeois’s injuries to a “confluence of … interlinked events” and thus, Appellees would have no way of knowing or any reason to have known such events could have arisen to cause harm. Id. Appellants opposed Appellees’ motion for summary judgment by presenting the evidence referenced supra.
As the Majority recounts, the trial court stated the following regarding its determination that Appellants failed to set forth evidence support their claims of gross negligence and recklessness:
[Appellants] have not produced sufficient evidence to show that an industry standard exists for placing the [*24] mats at the bottom of hills for snow tubers. … The absence of any standard on the record makes it difficult for the [c]ourt to find that [Appellees] knew that their conduct of using deceleration mats to stop snow tubers in the runout area would be placing [Bourgeois] at a higher unreasonable risk of harm than if [Appellees] had placed mats in a different manner, selected to purchase a different kind of mat, or used a different method for stopping the snow tubers.
Trial Court Order Granting Summary Judgment, 6/19/17, at 18-19.
The trial court further found no evidence that Appellees “knew or had reason to know that folding the mats created an unreasonable risk of physical harm.” Id. at 19. See also id. at 22-23 (discussing gross negligence).
Noticeably absent from the trial court’s discussion is any mention of Appellants’ expert reports. “At the summary judgment stage, a trial court is required to take all facts of record, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Greely v. W. Penn Power Co., 2017 PA Super 33, 156 A.3d 276, 282-84 (Pa. Super. 2017). This includes all expert reports. In fact, this Court has held that when a trial court’s opinion does not reflect consideration of the non-moving party’s expert reports, this is error as it signals [*25] a failure to consider all evidence of record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
The Majority simply ignores the trial court’s failure to consider Appellants’ expert reports and undergoes its own analysis of the reports. It concludes that neither expert set forth a relevant standard of care and thus, the duty that Appellees failed to meet. Majority Memorandum at 8-10. The Majority dismisses the Moskowitz report entirely as irrelevant, and rejects the Di Nola report as conclusory. Id.
However, in my view, both experts satisfactorily assisted Appellants in establishing gross negligence and recklessness. Woven throughout the reports are detailed references to the way that Appellees grossly deviated from the standard of care. One cannot seriously dispute that Appellees owe their patrons, who are riding on a vinyl tube without a steering or stopping mechanism down a steep snow-covered hill on a course that Appellees designed, a duty to ensure that the patrons are able to stop safely without serious injury at the bottom. One hardly needs an expert to establish that placing a stationary object, which is designed for an entirely different use, in the path of a fast-travelling [*26] snow tube rider in the hopes of slowing down the rider could instead, under certain foreseeable conditions, cause the rider to stop abruptly and eject the rider in a manner resulting in serious injury. This is particularly the case when Appellees have not conducted or reviewed studies to determine the effect of placing the mat in the rider’s path under various conditions. Further, a jury could find that risk of serious injury was substantially increased without a standardized method to measure riders’ specific speeds, assess conditions, or arrange the mats. Moreover, not only were the mats used by Appellees not designed for the purpose for which Appellees used them, they used the snow tubes in a manner that was contradicted expressly by the warning on the label – a label, by the way, which was illegible on Appellant’s tube.
The trial court states “[t]here is no evidence that [Appellants] were made aware of the risks of folding the deceleration mats and no evidence that any other incidents happened on the day Plaintiff suffered his injury[,] which would have put [Appellants] on notice that the mats were a problem. Trial Court Order Granting Summary Judgment, 6/19/2017, at 20 (emphasis [*27] added). However, Appellants need not prove that Appellees actually were aware of the risks, just that Appellants had reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable person to realize that the person’s conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another and that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make the person’s conduct negligent. Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1200-01.4
In my view, Appellants have put forth enough evidence at this [*29] stage for the jury to decide the issue. I disagree with the sole focus of the Majority and trial court on the use of the folded mats, when that is but one piece of Appellants’ claims. See Appellants’ Brief at 45-47 (discussing the facts Appellees knew or should have known, including the conditions contributing to speeds as high as 30-35 miles per hour, the risk of serious injuries when a fast-traveling snow tube abruptly collides with an obstacle, the lack of sufficient run-out area, and the use of mats not designed for use in snow tubing).5 Both experts explained the ways in which Appellees’ conduct deviated from the standard of care, based upon the facts established through depositions of Appellees’ employees and officers. It is clear to me that a jury could have determined that the series of conscious decisions made by Appellees worked together to create an unreasonable risk of physical harm to Bourgeois that was substantially greater than ordinary negligence. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for trial.
End of Document