2015-2016 In bound ski/board fatalities
Posted: April 27, 2016 Filed under: Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Aspen, Bear Valley, Blue Mountain, Blue Mountain Ski Area, Burke Mountain, Burke Mountain Ski Area, Cascade Mountain, Cascade Mountain Ski Hill, Chair Lift, fatality, Heavenly Mountain, Jackson Hole, Mount Snow, Mt. Waterman, Park City, Park City Mtn Resort, ski area, skiing, Snoqualmie Pass, Snowbasin, snowboarding, Solider Mountain, Squaw Valley resort, Steamboat Springs Ski Resort, Tubing, Vail, Whiteface, Winter Park Leave a commentThis list is not guaranteed to be accurate. The information is found from web searches and news dispatches. Those references are part of the chart. If you have a source for information on any fatality please leave a comment or contact me. Thank you.
If this information is incorrect or incomplete please let me know. This is up to date as of April 21, 2016. Thanks.
Skiing and Snowboarding are still safer than being in your kitchen or bathroom. This information is not to scare you away from skiing but to help you understand the risks.
Red type is natural or medical conditions that occurred inbounds on the slopes
Green Type is Fatalities while sledding at the Resort
Blue Type is a Lift Accidents
Purple Tye is Employee or Ski Patroller
2015 – 2016 Ski Season Fatalities
|
# |
Date |
State |
Resort |
Where |
Trail Difficulty |
How |
Cause |
Ski/ Board |
Age |
Sex |
Home town |
Helmet |
Reference |
Ref # 2 |
|
1 |
11/29/15 |
CA |
Bear Mountain |
|
|
she collided with a metal stairway |
|
Ski |
21 |
F |
Jackson Township CA |
|
||
|
2 |
12/7/15 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Moran Run |
Blue |
Hit tree |
|
Board |
23 |
F |
Boston, MA |
Y |
||
|
3 |
12/15/15 |
CO |
Steamboat |
|
|
fell, landing face down in the snow |
|
Ski |
70 |
M |
Louisville CO |
|
||
|
4 |
12/19/15 |
WA |
Snoqualmie Pass |
Silver Fir |
|
tree-well |
|
Ski |
50 |
M |
North Bend, WA |
|
||
|
5 |
12/22/15 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Sundance run |
|
found inverted in a tree well |
|
Ski |
25 |
F |
Jackson Hole, WY |
Y |
||
|
6 |
12/23/15 |
NY |
Whiteface Lake Placid |
Summit Express |
Blue |
fell and struck his head |
blunt impact to the head |
Board |
26 |
M |
Litiz, PA |
N |
|
|
|
7 |
12/23/15 |
CA |
Bear Valley |
|
|
|
|
Ski |
71 |
M |
|
|
||
|
8 |
1/6/16 |
CO |
Vail |
|
|
|
tree well |
Board |
25 |
M |
Avon, CO |
|
||
|
9 |
1/12/16 |
UT |
Park City |
|
Intermediate |
|
|
|
60 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
10 |
1/20 |
CO |
Keystone |
Elk Run |
|
Hit a tree |
|
|
27 |
M |
Boulder, CO |
|
||
|
11 |
1/24/16 |
VT |
Mount Snow |
Ripcord |
Double Diamond |
Hit Tree |
Blunt Force Trauma |
Board |
57 |
M |
Simsbury CT |
Yes |
||
|
12 |
1/28/16 |
CO |
Winter Park |
|
|
|
|
Skier |
24 |
M |
Kalamazoo, MI |
|
|
|
|
13 |
1/30/16 |
ID |
Solider Mountain |
|
|
Hit building |
|
Ski |
14 |
F |
Twin Falls, ID |
Yes |
||
|
14 |
2/3/16 |
PA |
Blue Mountain Ski Area |
|
|
|
blunt-force trauma |
|
35 |
M |
Tacoma, WA |
|
||
|
15 |
2/6 |
CA |
Mt. Waterman |
|
|
struck a tree |
|
|
60 |
M |
Winnetka, CA |
|
||
|
16 |
2/6 |
WI |
Cascade Mountain Ski Hill |
|
|
struck a tree |
|
|
24 |
F |
Oconto Falls, WI |
No |
||
|
17 |
2/6 |
UT |
Park City Mtn Resort |
Tombstone |
|
collapsed |
|
|
67 |
M |
UT |
|
|
|
|
18 |
2/15/16 |
VT |
Burke Mountain Ski Area |
Big Dipper Trail |
|
collided with a tree |
|
|
58 |
M |
Watertown |
No |
||
|
19 |
2/16 |
NV |
Heavenly Mountain Resort |
Crossover and Comet ski runs |
|
striking a tree |
|
|
77 |
F |
Madison, WI |
|
||
|
20 |
2/22/16 |
UT |
Snowbasin Ski |
Janis’ trail |
|
crashing into a tree, |
|
|
56 |
M |
NJ |
N |
|
|
|
21 |
2/22/16 (2/15) |
CO |
Aspen |
|
Taking Lesson |
Fell down |
Head injury |
|
68 |
M |
CO, |
|
||
|
22 |
2/22/16 |
NY |
Gore Mountain Ski Center |
|
Double Black Diamond |
struck several trees |
|
|
65 |
M |
Minerva, NY |
Y |
||
|
23 |
2/25 |
CO |
Beaver Creek |
|
Intermediate |
Hit a sign attached to a wooden post between runs |
blunt force trauma to the chest |
|
39 |
M |
Knoxville, TN |
Y |
||
|
24 |
2/26 |
MI |
Crystal Mountain |
Cheers Race Course |
Intermediate |
Lost control & slid backward |
|
|
58 |
M |
Traverse City, MI |
Y |
||
|
25 |
2/27 |
PA |
Seven Springs |
Wagner Trail |
|
Skier v. Skier Collision |
|
|
51 |
M |
Delmont |
|
||
|
26 |
2/27 |
|
Squaw Valley resort |
Headwall |
|
fell and slid down the slope through a stand of trees, suffering multiple injuries |
|
|
62 |
F |
Olympic Valley |
Y |
||
|
27 |
3/1 |
CO |
Breckenridge Ski Resort |
Sundown |
intermediate |
he collided with another skier, lost control and ran into a tree |
blunt force trauma injuries |
|
26 |
M |
Breckenridge, CO |
N |
||
|
28 |
|
|
Beaver Mountain Ski Resort |
|
|
struck a tree |
|
|
18 |
M |
Camano Island, WA |
|
||
|
|
3/6 |
WI |
Cascade Mountain Ski Hill |
|
|
running into a tree |
|
|
|
F |
Oconto Falls, WI |
N |
|
|
|
30 |
3/6 |
NV |
Mt. Rose Ski Tahoe |
Galena run |
|
reportedly fallen or collapsed |
|
|
43 |
M |
Reno, NV |
|
||
|
31 |
3/9 |
CO |
Telluride Ski Resort |
Gold Hill |
|
lost his skis and tumbled down a steep, wooded terrain |
|
|
49 |
M |
Colorado Springs, CO |
|
|
|
|
32 |
3/9 |
CO |
Copper Mountain |
American Flyer |
Intermediate |
hit a tree |
blunt force trauma injuries |
|
19 |
M |
Arlington, VA |
Y |
||
|
33 |
|
MT |
|
|
|
in some trees near a ski lift |
|
|
82 |
M |
CA |
|
|
|
|
34 |
3/19 |
CO |
Telluride |
Coonskin |
Black Diamond |
skis detached from his boots |
crashed into trees |
|
69 |
M |
Greenwood, S.C. |
|
||
|
35 |
3/20 |
UT |
Snowbird |
Chip’s Run |
|
|
hit a rock before losing control and colliding with the tree |
|
57 |
M |
|
|
||
|
36 |
3/24 |
CO |
Steamboat Ski Area |
Nastar Course |
|
Fell |
|
|
|
M |
|
|
||
|
37 |
3/27 |
NH |
Cannon Mtn |
Upper Ravine Trail |
|
sharp turn and struck a tree |
Massive head trauma |
|
29 |
M |
Holden, MA |
N |
||
|
38 |
4/2 |
UT |
Park City |
|
Advanced |
collided with a tree |
|
|
48 |
M |
Aspen, CO |
|
||
|
39 |
4/4 |
CO |
Breckenridge |
Tiger |
Expert |
Collided with another skier |
|
|
43 |
M |
Randolph, NJ |
|
||
|
40 |
4/6 |
CO |
Breckenridge |
Claimjumper |
Intermediate |
snowboarder collided with a tree |
blunt force trauma |
Board |
32 |
M |
|
Y |
||
|
41 |
4/9 |
ID |
Bald Mountain Ski Area |
Upper Greyhawk |
|
speed flying |
|
Ski |
24 |
M |
|
|
Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the ski areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
If you cannot read the entire chart you can download it here.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2016 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
Facebook: Rec.Law.Now
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Skiing, Snowboarding, Fatality, Ski Area, Tubing, Chair Lift, Jackson Hole, Steamboat Springs Ski Resort, Snoqualmie Pass, Mount Snow, Park City, Vail, Bear Valley, Whiteface, Snoqualmie Pass, Burke Mountain Ski Area, Park City Mtn Resort, Cascade Mountain Ski Hill, Mt. Waterman, Blue Mountain Ski Area, Solider Mountain, Solider Mountain, Winter Park, Aspen, Snowbasin, Heavenly Mountain, Burke Mountain, Park City, Cascade Mountain, Blue Mountain, Mt. Waterman, Squaw Valley resort,
Why is the Standard of Care lower in Skiing than in other Sports?
Posted: April 6, 2016 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Ski Area, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Assumed Risk, assumption of the risk, Collision, Ordinary Negligence, Reckless, skier v. skier, skiing, snowboarding, Standard of Care Leave a commentSport and Recreation Law Association Annual conference 2016
Merry Moiseichik, R.Ed, J.D, University of Arkansas
Jim Moss, Esq, Recreation Law
Why is the Standard of Care lower in Skiing than in other Sports?
This presentation looks at the different standards of care applied to collisions between people on a ski slope. Some states apply a negligence standard, some a reckless standard and some say the participants assume the risk of their injury in the sport.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Author: Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law
Copyright 2016 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
Facebook: Rec.Law.Now
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Skiing, Snowboarding, Collision, Skier v. Skier, Standard of Care, Ordinary Negligence, Reckless, Assumed Risk, Assumption of the Risk
2015-2016 In bound ski/board fatalities
Posted: March 23, 2016 Filed under: Avalanche, Ski Area, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Aspen, Bear Valley, Blue Mountain, Blue Mountain Ski Area, Burke Mountain, Burke Mountain Ski Area, Cascade Mountain, Cascade Mountain Ski Hill, Chair Lift, fatality, Heavenly Mountain, Jackson Hole, Mount Snow, Mt. Waterman, Park City, Park City Mtn Resort, ski area, skiing, Snoqualmie Pass, Snowbasin, snowboarding, Solider Mountain, Squaw Valley resort, Steamboat Springs Ski Resort, Tubing, Vail, Whiteface, Winter Park Leave a commentThis list is not guaranteed to be accurate. The information is found from web searches and news dispatches. Those references are part of the chart. If you have a source for information on any fatality please leave a comment or contact me. Thank you.
If this information is incorrect or incomplete please let me know. This is up to date as of March 21, 2016. Thanks.
Skiing and Snowboarding are still safer than being in your kitchen or bathroom. This information is not to scare you away from skiing but to help you understand the risks.
Red type is natural or medical conditions that occurred inbounds on the slopes
Green Type is Fatalities while sledding at the Resort
Blue Type is a Lift Accidents
Purple Tye is Employee or Ski Patroller
2015 – 2016 Ski Season Fatalities
|
# |
Date |
State |
Resort |
Where |
Trail Difficulty |
How |
Cause |
Ski/ Board |
Age |
Sex |
Home town |
Helmet |
Reference |
Ref # 2 |
|
1 |
11/29/15 |
CA |
Bear Mountain |
|
|
she collided with a metal stairway |
|
Ski |
21 |
F |
Jackson Township CA |
|
||
|
2 |
12/7/15 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Moran Run |
Blue |
Hit tree |
|
Board |
23 |
F |
Boston, MA |
Y |
||
|
3 |
12/15/15 |
CO |
Steamboat |
|
|
fell, landing face down in the snow |
|
Ski |
70 |
M |
Louisville CO |
|
||
|
4 |
12/19/15 |
WA |
Snoqualmie Pass |
Silver Fir |
|
tree-well |
|
Ski |
50 |
M |
North Bend, WA |
|
||
|
5 |
12/22/15 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Sundance run |
|
found inverted in a tree well |
|
Ski |
25 |
F |
Jackson Hole, WY |
Y |
||
|
6 |
12/23/15 |
NY |
Whiteface Lake Placid |
Summit Express |
Blue |
fell and struck his head |
blunt impact to the head |
Board |
26 |
M |
Litiz, PA |
N |
|
|
|
7 |
12/23/15 |
CA |
Bear Valley |
|
|
|
|
Ski |
71 |
M |
|
|
||
|
8 |
1/6/16 |
CO |
Vail |
|
|
|
tree well |
Board |
25 |
M |
Avon, CO |
|
||
|
9 |
1/12/16 |
UT |
Park City |
|
Intermediate |
|
|
|
60 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
10 |
1/20 |
CO |
Keystone |
Elk Run |
|
Hit a tree |
|
|
27 |
M |
Boulder, CO |
|
||
|
11 |
1/24/16 |
VT |
Mount Snow |
Ripcord |
Double Diamond |
Hit Tree |
Blunt Force Trauma |
Board |
57 |
M |
Simsbury CT |
Yes |
||
|
12 |
1/28/16 |
CO |
Winter Park |
|
|
|
|
Skier |
24 |
M |
Kalamazoo, MI |
|
|
|
|
13 |
1/30/16 |
ID |
Solider Mountain |
|
|
Hit building |
|
Ski |
14 |
F |
Twin Falls, ID |
Yes |
||
|
14 |
2/3/16 |
PA |
Blue Mountain Ski Area |
|
|
|
blunt-force trauma |
|
35 |
M |
Tacoma, WA |
|
||
|
15 |
2/6 |
CA |
Mt. Waterman |
|
|
struck a tree |
|
|
60 |
M |
Winnetka, CA |
|
||
|
16 |
2/6 |
WI |
Cascade Mountain Ski Hill |
|
|
struck a tree |
|
|
24 |
F |
Oconto Falls, WI |
No |
||
|
17 |
2/6 |
UT |
Park City Mtn Resort |
Tombstone |
|
collapsed |
|
|
67 |
M |
UT |
|
|
|
|
18 |
2/15/16 |
VT |
Burke Mountain Ski Area |
Big Dipper Trail |
|
collided with a tree |
|
|
58 |
M |
Watertown |
No |
||
|
19 |
2/16 |
NV |
Heavenly Mountain Resort |
Crossover and Comet ski runs |
|
striking a tree |
|
|
77 |
F |
Madison, WI |
|
||
|
20 |
2/22/16 |
UT |
Snowbasin Ski |
Janis’ trail |
|
crashing into a tree, |
|
|
56 |
M |
NJ |
N |
|
|
|
21 |
2/22/16 (2/15) |
CO |
Aspen |
|
Taking Lesson |
Fell down |
Head injury |
|
68 |
M |
CO, |
|
||
|
22 |
2/22/16 |
NY |
Gore Mountain Ski Center |
|
Double Black Diamond |
struck several trees |
|
|
65 |
M |
Minerva, NY |
Y |
||
|
23 |
2/25 |
CO |
Beaver Creek |
|
Intermediate |
Hit a sign attached to a wooden post between runs |
blunt force trauma to the chest |
|
39 |
M |
Knoxville, TN |
Y |
||
|
24 |
2/26 |
MI |
Crystal Mountain |
Cheers Race Course |
Intermediate |
Lost control & slid backward |
|
|
58 |
M |
Traverse City, MI |
Y |
||
|
25 |
2/27 |
PA |
Seven Springs |
Wagner Trail |
|
Skier v. Skier Collision |
|
|
51 |
M |
Delmont |
|
||
|
26 |
2/27 |
|
Squaw Valley resort |
Headwall |
|
fell and slid down the slope through a stand of trees, suffering multiple injuries |
|
|
62 |
F |
Olympic Valley |
Y |
||
|
27 |
3/1 |
CO |
Breckenridge Ski Resort |
Sundown |
intermediate |
he collided with another skier, lost control and ran into a tree |
blunt force trauma injuries |
|
26 |
M |
Breckenridge, CO |
N |
||
|
28 |
|
|
Beaver Mountain Ski Resort |
|
|
struck a tree |
|
|
18 |
M |
Camano Island, WA |
|
||
|
|
3/6 |
WI |
Cascade Mountain Ski Hill |
|
|
running into a tree |
|
|
|
F |
Oconto Falls, WI |
N |
|
|
|
30 |
3/6 |
NV |
Mt. Rose Ski Tahoe |
Galena run |
|
reportedly fallen or collapsed |
|
|
43 |
M |
Reno, NV |
|
||
|
31 |
3/9 |
CO |
Telluride Ski Resort |
Gold Hill |
|
lost his skis and tumbled down a steep, wooded terrain |
|
|
49 |
M |
Colorado Springs, CO |
|
|
|
|
32 |
3/9 |
CO |
Copper Mountain |
American Flyer |
Intermediate |
hit a tree |
blunt force trauma injuries |
|
19 |
M |
Arlington, VA |
Y |
||
|
33 |
|
MT |
|
|
|
in some trees near a ski lift |
|
|
82 |
M |
CA |
|
|
|
|
34 |
3/19 |
CO |
Telluride |
Coonskin |
Black Diamond |
skis detached from his boots |
crashed into trees |
|
69 |
M |
Greenwood, S.C. |
|
||
|
35 |
3/20 |
UT |
Snowbird |
Chip’s Run |
|
|
hitting a rock |
|
55 |
m |
|
|
Download a PDF of this chart here.
Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the ski areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2016 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
Facebook: Rec.Law.Now
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Skiing, Snowboarding, Fatality, Ski Area, Tubing, Chair Lift, Jackson Hole, Steamboat Springs Ski Resort, Snoqualmie Pass, Mount Snow, Park City,
Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the ski areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
If you cannot read the entire chart you can download it here.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2016 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
Facebook: Rec.Law.Now
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
Vail, Bear Valley, Whiteface, Snoqualmie Pass, Burke Mountain Ski Area, Park City Mtn Resort, Cascade Mountain Ski Hill, Mt. Waterman, Blue Mountain Ski Area, Solider Mountain, Solider Mountain, Winter Park, Aspen, Snowbasin, Heavenly Mountain, Burke Mountain, Park City, Cascade Mountain, Blue Mountain, Mt. Waterman, Squaw Valley resort,
2015-2016 In bound ski/board fatalities
Posted: March 9, 2016 Filed under: Avalanche, Ski Area, Skier v. Skier, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Aspen, Bear Valley, Blue Mountain, Blue Mountain Ski Area, Burke Mountain, Burke Mountain Ski Area, Cascade Mountain, Cascade Mountain Ski Hill, Chair Lift, fatality, Heavenly Mountain, Jackson Hole, Mount Snow, Mt. Waterman, Park City, Park City Mtn Resort, ski area, skiing, Snoqualmie Pass, Snowbasin, snowboarding, Solider Mountain, Squaw Valley resort, Steamboat Springs Ski Resort, Tubing, Vail, Whiteface, Winter Park 2 CommentsThis list is not guaranteed to be accurate. The information is found from web searches and news dispatches. Those references are part of the chart. If you have a source for information on any fatality please leave a comment or contact me. Thank you.
If this information is incorrect or incomplete please let me know. This is up to date as of March 1, 2016. Thanks.
Skiing and Snowboarding are still safer than being in your kitchen or bathroom. This information is not to scare you away from skiing but to help you understand the risks.
Red type is natural or medical conditions that occurred inbounds on the slopes
Green Type is Fatalities while sledding at the Resort
Blue Type is a Lift Accidents
Purple Tye is Employee or Ski Patroller
2015 – 2016 Ski Season Fatalities
|
# |
Date |
State |
Resort |
Where |
Trail Difficulty |
How |
Cause |
Ski/ Board |
Age |
Sex |
Home town |
Helmet |
Reference |
Ref # 2 |
|
1 |
11/29/15 |
CA |
Bear Mountain |
|
|
she collided with a metal stairway |
|
Ski |
21 |
F |
Jackson Township CA |
|
||
|
2 |
12/7/15 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Moran Run |
Blue |
Hit tree |
|
Board |
23 |
F |
Boston, MA |
Y |
||
|
3 |
12/15/15 |
CO |
Steamboat |
|
|
fell, landing face down in the snow |
|
Ski |
70 |
M |
Louisville CO |
|
||
|
4 |
12/19/15 |
WA |
Snoqualmie Pass |
Silver Fir |
|
tree-well |
|
Ski |
50 |
M |
North Bend, WA |
|
||
|
5 |
12/22/15 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Sundance run |
|
found inverted in a tree well |
|
Ski |
25 |
F |
Jackson Hole, WY |
Y |
||
|
6 |
12/23/15 |
NY |
Whiteface Lake Placid |
Summit Express |
Blue |
fell and struck his head |
blunt impact to the head |
Board |
26 |
M |
Litiz, PA |
N |
|
|
|
7 |
12/23/15 |
CA |
Bear Valley |
|
|
|
|
Ski |
71 |
M |
|
|
||
|
8 |
1/6/16 |
CO |
Vail |
|
|
|
tree well |
Board |
25 |
M |
Avon, CO |
|
||
|
9 |
1/12/16 |
UT |
Park City |
|
Intermediate |
|
|
|
60 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
10 |
1/20 |
CO |
Keystone |
Elk Run |
|
Hit a tree |
|
|
27 |
M |
Boulder, CO |
|
||
|
11 |
1/24/16 |
VT |
Mount Snow |
Ripcord |
Double Diamond |
Hit Tree |
Blunt Force Trauma |
Board |
57 |
M |
Simsbury CT |
Yes |
||
|
12 |
1/28/16 |
CO |
Winter Park |
|
|
|
|
Skier |
24 |
M |
Kalamazoo, MI |
|
|
|
|
13 |
1/30/16 |
ID |
Solider Mountain |
|
|
Hit building |
|
Ski |
14 |
F |
Twin Falls, ID |
Yes |
||
|
14 |
2/3/16 |
PA |
Blue Mountain Ski Area |
|
|
|
blunt-force trauma |
|
35 |
M |
Tacoma, WA |
|
||
|
15 |
2/6 |
CA |
Mt. Waterman |
|
|
struck a tree |
|
|
60 |
M |
Winnetka, CA |
|
||
|
16 |
2/6 |
WI |
Cascade Mountain Ski Hill |
|
|
struck a tree |
|
|
24 |
F |
Oconto Falls, WI |
No |
||
|
17 |
2/6 |
UT |
Park City Mtn Resort |
Tombstone |
|
collapsed |
|
|
67 |
M |
UT |
|
|
|
|
18 |
2/15/16 |
VT |
Burke Mountain Ski Area |
Big Dipper Trail |
|
collided with a tree |
|
|
58 |
M |
Watertown |
No |
||
|
19 |
2/16 |
NV |
Heavenly Mountain Resort |
Crossover and Comet ski runs |
|
striking a tree |
|
|
77 |
F |
Madison, WI |
|
||
|
20 |
2/22/16 |
UT |
Snowbasin Ski |
Janis’ trail |
|
crashing into a tree, |
|
|
56 |
M |
NJ |
N |
|
|
|
21 |
2/22/16 (2/15) |
CO |
Aspen |
|
Taking Lesson |
Fell down |
Head injury |
|
68 |
M |
CO, |
|
||
|
22 |
2/22/16 |
NY |
Gore Mountain Ski Center |
|
Double Black Diamond |
struck several trees |
|
|
65 |
M |
Minerva, NY |
Y |
||
|
23 |
2/25 |
CO |
Beaver Creek |
|
Intermediate |
|
|
|
39 |
M |
Knoxville, TN |
|
||
|
24 |
2/26 |
MI |
Crystal Mountain |
Cheers Race Course |
Intermediate |
Lost control & slid backward |
|
|
58 |
M |
Traverse City, MI |
Y |
||
|
25 |
2/27 |
PA |
Seven Springs |
Wagner Trail |
|
Skier v. Skier Collision |
|
|
51 |
M |
Delmont |
|
||
|
26 |
2/27 |
|
Squaw Valley resort |
Headwall |
|
fell and slid down the slope through a stand of trees, suffering multiple injuries |
|
|
62 |
F |
Olympic Valley |
Y |
Download a PDF of this Chart Here: 2015 – 2016 Ski Season Deaths 3.2.16
Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the ski areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
If you cannot read the entire chart you can download it here.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2015 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
Facebook: Rec.Law.Now
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Skiing, Snowboarding, Fatality, Ski Area, Tubing, Chair Lift, Jackson Hole, Steamboat Springs Ski Resort, Snoqualmie Pass, Mount Snow, Park City, Vail, Bear Valley, Whiteface, Snoqualmie Pass, Burke Mountain Ski Area, Park City Mtn Resort, Cascade Mountain Ski Hill, Mt. Waterman, Blue Mountain Ski Area, Solider Mountain, Solider Mountain, Winter Park, Aspen, Snowbasin, Heavenly Mountain, Burke Mountain, Park City, Cascade Mountain, Blue Mountain, Mt. Waterman, Squaw Valley resort,
2015-2016 In bound ski/board fatalities
Posted: February 3, 2016 Filed under: Avalanche, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Bear Mountain, Bear Valley, Chair Lift, fatality, Jackson Hole, Mount Snow, Park City, ski area, skiing, Snoqualmie Pass, snowboarding, Steamboat, Tubing, Vail, Whiteface Leave a commentThis list is not guaranteed to be accurate. The information is found from web searches and news dispatches. Those references are part of the chart. If you have a source for information on any fatality please leave a comment or contact me. Thank you.
If this information is incorrect or incomplete please let me know. This is up to date as of January 15, 2016. Thanks.
Skiing and Snowboarding are still safer than being in your kitchen or bathroom. This information is not to scare you away from skiing but to help you understand the risks.
Red type is natural or medical conditions that occurred inbounds on the slopes
Green Type is Fatalities while sledding at the Resort
Blue Type is a Lift Accidents
2015 – 2016 Ski Season Fatalities
|
# |
Date |
State |
Resort |
Where |
Trail Difficulty |
How |
Cause |
Ski/ Board |
Age |
Sex |
Home town |
Helmet |
Reference |
Ref # 2 |
|
1 |
11/29 |
CA |
Bear Mountain |
|
|
she collided with a metal stairway[i] |
|
Ski |
21 |
F |
Jackson Township, CA |
|
||
|
2 |
12/7 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Moran Run |
Blue |
Hit tree |
|
Board |
23 |
F |
Boston, MA |
Y |
||
|
3 |
12/15 |
CO |
Steamboat |
|
|
fell, landing face down in the snow |
|
Ski |
70 |
M |
Louisville, CO |
|
||
|
4 |
12/19 |
WA |
Snoqualmie Pass |
Silver Fir |
|
tree-well |
|
Ski |
50 |
M |
North Bend, WA |
|
||
|
5 |
12/22 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Sundance run |
|
found inverted in a tree well |
|
Ski |
25 |
F |
Jackson Hole, WY |
Y |
||
|
6 |
12/23 |
NY |
Whiteface Lake Placid |
Summit Express |
Blue |
fell and struck his head |
blunt impact to the head |
Board |
26 |
M |
Litiz, PA |
N |
|
|
|
7 |
12/23 |
CA |
Bear Valley |
|
|
|
|
Ski |
71 |
M |
|
|
||
|
8 |
1/6 |
CO |
Vail |
|
|
|
tree well |
Board |
25 |
M |
Avon, CO |
|
||
|
9 |
1/12 |
UT |
Park City |
|
Intermediate |
|
|
|
60 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
10 |
1/24 |
VT |
Mount Snow |
|
|
|
|
Board |
56 |
M |
Simsbury, CT |
|
Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the ski areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
You can download a PDF of this chart here: 2015 – 2016 Ski Season Deaths 1.15.16.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB,
Download a PDF of this chart here.
Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the ski areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB,
Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2015 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
Facebook: Rec.Law.Now
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Skiing, Snowboarding, Fatality, Ski Area, Tubing, Breckenridge, Chair Lift, Hunter Mountain, Jackson Hole, Pine Knob, Eldora, Keystone, Breckenridge, Eldora, Keystone, Pine Knob, Jackson Hole, Hunter Mtn, Mt. Hood Skibowl, Snowbird Ski Resort, Nashoba Valley Ski Area, Northstar California ski resort, Arizona Snowbowl, Copper Mtn, Keystone Resort, Stowe Mountain Resort, Mission Ridge Ski, Crested Butte, Breckenridge, Mr. Bachelor, White Pass Ski Area, Deer Valley Ski Resort, Steamboat Springs Ski Resort, Snoqualmie Pass, Mount Snow, Park City, Vail,
2015-2016 In bound ski/board fatalities
Posted: January 6, 2016 Filed under: Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Arizona Snowbowl, Breckenridge, Chair Lift, Copper Mtn, Crested Butte, Deer Valley Ski Resort, Eldora, fatality, Hunter Mountain, Hunter Mtn, Jackson Hole, Keystone, Keystone Resort, Mission Ridge Ski, Mr. Bachelor, Mt. Hood Skibowl, Nashoba Valley Ski Area, Northstar California ski resort, Pine Knob, ski area, skiing, Snoqualmie Pass, Snowbird Ski Resort, snowboarding, Steamboat Springs Ski Resort, Stowe Mountain Resort, Tubing, White Pass Ski Area Leave a commentThis list is not guaranteed to be accurate. The information is found from web searches and news dispatches. Those references are part of the chart. If you have a source for information on any fatality please leave a comment or contact me. Thank you.
If this information is incorrect or incomplete please let me know. This is up to date as of December 30, 2015. Thanks.
Skiing and Snowboarding are still safer than being in your kitchen or bathroom. This information is not to scare you away from skiing but to help you understand the risks.
Red type is natural or medical conditions that occurred inbounds on the slopes
Green Type is Fatalities while sledding at the Resort
Blue Type is a Lift Accidents
2015 – 2016 Ski Season Fatalities
|
# |
Date |
State |
Resort |
Where |
Trail Difficulty |
How |
Cause |
Ski/ Board |
Age |
Sex |
Home town |
Helmet |
Reference |
Ref # 2 |
|
1 |
11/29 |
CA |
Bear Mountain |
|
|
she collided with a metal stairway[i] |
|
Ski |
21 |
F |
Jackson Township, CA |
|
||
|
2 |
12/7 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Moran Run |
Blue |
Hit tree |
|
Board |
23 |
F |
Boston, MA |
Y |
||
|
3 |
12/15 |
CO |
Steamboat |
|
|
fell, landing face down in the snow |
|
Ski |
70 |
M |
Louisville, CO |
|
||
|
|
12/19 |
WA |
Snoqualmie Pass |
Silver Fir |
|
tree-well |
|
Ski |
50 |
M |
North Bend, WA |
|
||
|
|
12/22 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Sundance run |
|
found inverted in a tree well |
|
Ski |
25 |
F |
Jackson Hole, WY |
Y |
||
|
|
12/23 |
NY |
Whiteface Lake Placid |
Summit Express |
Blue |
fell and struck his head |
blunt impact to the head |
Board |
26 |
M |
Litiz, PA |
N |
|
Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the ski areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
If you are unable to view the entire table Email me at Jim@Rec-law.us and put Ski Area Fatality Chart in the subject line. I’ll reply with a PDF of the chart.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2015 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
Facebook: Rec.Law.Now
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Skiing, Snowboarding, Fatality, Ski Area, Tubing, Breckenridge, Chair Lift, Hunter Mountain, Jackson Hole, Pine Knob, Eldora, Keystone, Breckenridge, Eldora, Keystone, Pine Knob, Jackson Hole, Hunter Mtn, Mt. Hood Skibowl, Snowbird Ski Resort, Nashoba Valley Ski Area, Northstar California ski resort, Arizona Snowbowl, Copper Mtn, Keystone Resort, Stowe Mountain Resort, Mission Ridge Ski, Crested Butte, Breckenridge, Mr. Bachelor, White Pass Ski Area, Deer Valley Ski Resort, Steamboat Springs Ski Resort, Snoqualmie Pass
[i] the staircase was at the end of a ski trail and led to a patio area.
Protect Our Winters is fighting to end Climate Change
Posted: December 17, 2015 Filed under: Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Climate change, POW, Protect Our Winters, skiing, snowboarding, style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri" Leave a comment
|
Protect Our Winters
PO Box 38
Pacific Palisades CA 90272 United States
In most cases, you assume the risk of the risks of the sport (but not all) unless the defendant did something to increase that risk to you.
Posted: October 12, 2015 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: assumption of the risk, California, Heavenly Valley Ski Area, Inherent Risk, skiing, snowboarding Leave a commentIn this case, the defendant was snowboarding without a retention strap. His snowboard got away from him hitting a young girl. The California Appellate Court held this was not a risk the plaintiff assumed when she went skiing.
State: California
Plaintiff: Jennifer Campbell
Defendant: Eric Derylo
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Assumption of the Risk
Holding: For the Plaintiff
Year: 1999
Snowboarders argue they don’t have to wear retention straps because their binding keeps their snowboards attached to them. Snowboard bindings are not releasable. That is true until the Snowboarder sits down to adjust his board or boots and takes his bindings off or tears his bindings off his board.
Working at a ski area you see snowboards coming down the hill that have escaped from borders.
Most state laws also say that you cannot board a lift without a retention strap.
In this case, the plaintiff was skiing down a run at Heavenly Valley Ski Resort. She skied to an icy section, took off her skis and hiked down the icy section. She was sitting on the snow putting her skis back on when the accident occurred.
The defendant was snowboarding on the same run when he encountered the icy section. He sat down to take his snowboard off to walk down the icy section when his snowboard got away from him. The snowboard hit the plaintiff in the lower back.
California does not have a skier safety statute. El Dorado County, the county where Heavenly Valley Ski Resort is located does have a county ordinance requiring all skiers and boarders to have a safety retention strap on their skis and boards.
The skier responsibility code also used by Heavenly requires retention straps.
The plaintiff filed this lawsuit, and the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on assumption of the risk. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appealed.
Analysis: making sense of the law based on these facts.
The trial court’s supporting argument for granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was:
The trial court concluded that primary assumption of the risk barred plaintiff’s action because injury from runaway snowboards is an “everyday risk in the sport of skiing or snowboarding.” Plaintiff contends that primary assumption of risk does not bar this action because defendant’s use of a snowboard unequipped with a retention strap amounted to conduct outside the inherent nature of the sport.
The Appellate Court first went to the deciding case in California (and relied upon in most other states) concerning assumption of the risk. Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 296 [11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 834 P.2d 696]. The California Supreme Court in Knight defined assumption of the risk.
…ordinary duty of care to avoid injury to others is modified by the doctrine of “primary assumption of risk.” Primary assumption of the risk negates duty and constitutes a complete bar to recovery. .) Whether primary assumption of the risk applies depends on the nature of the sport or activity in question and the parties’ relationship to that activity. In the context of sports, the question turns on “whether a given injury is within the ‘inherent’ risk of the sport.”
The court then looked at California cases dealing with skiing where assumption of the risk was a basis for the defense.
…assumption of the risk applies to bar recovery for “. . . moguls on a ski run, trees bordering a ski run, snow-covered stumps, and numerous other conditions or obstacles such as variations in terrain, changes in surface or subsurface snow conditions, bare spots, other skiers, snow-making equipment, and myriad other hazards which must be considered inherent in the sport of skiing.”
Knight, Id, however, does not grant immunity to “all defendants participating in sporting activity.” Defendants have a duty of care not to increase the risks to another participant “over and above those inherent in the sport.”
Meaning if you increase the risk of a sport to another participant, you have eliminated the inherent risk from the sport. Inherent risks of a sport are assumed by the participants, whether or not those risks are truly inherent or identified as inherent by statute.
The court then applied a quasi but for test to determine if the actions of the defendants in cases increased the risk unnecessarily. In a baseball game, the actions of the mascot took a spectator’s attention away from the game, and he was hit with a foul bar. The game of baseball could be played without a mascot; therefore, having the mascot increased the risk to the spectators.
In a skiing case, you could ski without alcohol. Therefore, skiing drunk increases or changes the risk to the other skiers on the slope placing them at greater risk of a collision. Therefore, the inherent risk of skiing was changed when the defendant was drunk.
The court then looked at the present case as: “the question whether defendant’s use of a snowboard without a retention strap could be found by a jury to have increased the inherent risk of injury to coparticipants from a runaway snowboard.”
The court found that both the county ordinance and the Heavenly Valley Skier Responsibility Code which was posted at the resort require the use of a retention strap. Therefore, there was a demonstrated recognition that retention straps were a necessary safety equipment to reduce the risk of runaway ski equipment.
A jury could find that, by using a snowboard without the retention strap, in violation of the rules of the ski resort and a county ordinance, defendant unnecessarily increased the danger that his snowboard might escape his control and injure other participants such as plaintiff. The absence of a retention strap could therefore constitute conduct not inherent to the sport which increased the risk of injury.
A test in the drunken skier case upheld this conclusion.
[C]onduct is totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport (and thus any risks resulting from that conduct are not inherent to the sport) if the prohibition of that conduct would neither deter vigorous participation in the sport nor otherwise fundamentally alter the nature of the sport.”
When you assume the risk, those risks are the normal risks, even if they occur infrequently or rarely. More so, the risks you assume in a sport are not changed by the individual actions of one person.
The defendant also argued there was no proximate cause between this action in taking off his board and the injury the plaintiff suffered because the board could have gotten away from him at any time when he was taking it off to walk down the hill. The court looked at statements from the Defendant’s expert witness to refute that argument.
However, the declaration of plaintiff’s expert established that, used properly; the retention strap would have tethered defendant’s leg or boot to his snowboard. Defendant offered no evidence to refute the possibility that the strap would have provided him an opportunity to secure control of the board and prevent the accident.
The court reversed and sent the case back to the lower court for trial because “We conclude that defendant owed a duty of care not to increase the risks of skiing beyond those inherent to the sport.”
So Now What?
The first obvious issue is, do not snowboard without a retention strap or a way to secure your board from getting away. Even if you take your board off to walk down the slope or work on your board/binding you need to secure the board. Skis all have breaks nowadays, and if you drop a ski on the slope, it will stop.
More importantly, this case looks at the upper limit of assumption of an inherent risk in a sport.
The inherent risks of a sport are those risks that are part and parcel of the sport or activity. Without those risks, the sport would not be what it is. Remove the inherent risks and the sport has no value to the players.
In skiing, most ski area safety statutes have broadened the definition of the inherent risk of skiing to include numerous other risks. Several other state statutes have done the same for other activities.
California has not defined the inherent risk of skiing except through case law. Consequently, each new injury a skier suffers on the slope is defined afterward by the courts as being an assumed risk or not, rather than before the injured guest starts skiing.
Here, the inherent risks of skiing were tightened in California, and I would guess most other courts would come to the same conclusion.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Jim Moss is an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the outdoor recreation community. He represents guides, guide services, and outfitters both as businesses and individuals and the products they use for their business. He has defended Mt. Everest guide services, summer camps, climbing rope manufacturers; avalanche beacon manufacturers, and many more manufacturers and outdoor industries. Contact Jim at Jim@Rec-Law.us |
Jim is the author or co-author of eight books about the legal issues in the outdoor recreation world; the latest is Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk
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Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823; 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 519; 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS 915; 99 Cal. Daily Op. Service 8401; 99 Daily Journal DAR 10709
Posted: October 10, 2015 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, California, Legal Case, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: assumption of the risk, California, Heavenly Valley Ski Area, Inherent Risk, skiing, snowboarding Leave a commentTo Read an Analysis of this decision see
In most cases you assume the risk of the risks of the sport (but not all) unless the defendant did something to increase that risk to you.
Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823; 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 519; 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS 915; 99 Cal. Daily Op. Service 8401; 99 Daily Journal DAR 10709
JENNIFER CAMPBELL, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ERIC DERYLO, Defendant and Respondent.
No. C030104.
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
75 Cal. App. 4th 823; 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 519; 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS 915; 99 Cal. Daily Op. Service 8401; 99 Daily Journal DAR 10709
October 14, 1999, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***1] Review Denied January 13, 2000, Reported at: 2000 Cal. LEXIS 132.
PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of El Dorado County. Super. Ct. No. SV1129. Suzanne N. Kingsbury, Judge.
DISPOSITION: The judgment is reversed. Plaintiff shall recover costs.
COUNSEL: Law offices of Edwin E. Williams and Edwin E. Williams for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Caulfield, Davies & Donahue, James R. Donahue and Catherine A. Woodbridge for Defendant and Respondent.
JUDGES: Opinion by Callahan, J., with Kolkey, J., concurring. Blease, Acting P. J., concurred in the result.
OPINION BY: CALLAHAN
OPINION
[*825] [**520] CALLAHAN, J.
Jamie Xelowski, as guardian ad litem of her daughter Jennifer Campbell, a minor, plaintiff, appeals from a judgment granting defendant summary judgment in this negligence action against defendant Eric Derylo. The trial court ruled that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk precluded plaintiff from recovering for injuries [**521] sustained when defendant’s runaway snowboard hit Jennifer in the back. We shall reverse the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 29, 1994, Jennifer, then 11 years old, was skiing down the World Cup [***2] ski run at the Heavenly Valley Ski Resort when she stopped and removed her skis due to ice on the slope. She walked down the remainder of the hill and at the bottom sat down to put her skis back on. At this time defendant Derylo, then age 17, was snowboarding down the same run. He stopped approximately 100 yards from the bottom and removed his snowboard due to fatigue and ice on the slope. After he had removed his feet from the bindings, the snowboard slid out of his control and down the slope, hitting Jennifer in the lower back.
An El Dorado County ordinance, as well as the skier responsibility code posted at Heavenly Valley, require participants to wear a retention strap that attaches to the bindings of the board and is secured to the snowboarder’s leg or boot. For purposes of this motion, it is uncontested that defendant’s snowboard was not equipped with such a strap on the day of the accident.
[*826] Defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of assumption of risk. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that the danger of being injured by runaway snowboards was inherent in the sport of skiing and there was no evidence of recklessness on the part of defendant. [***3] Plaintiff appeals.
DISCUSSION
(1) [HN1] On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the reviewing court conducts a de novo examination of the record to determine whether the moving party was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law or whether genuine issues of material fact remain. ( [HN2] Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal. App. 3d 205, 212 [285 Cal. Rptr. 717].)
“We independently review the parties’ papers supporting and opposing the motion, using the same method of analysis as the trial court. . . . [HN3] The moving party bears the burden of proving that the claims of the adverse party are entirely without merit on any legal theory. . . . The opposition must demonstrate only the existence of at least one triable issue of fact . . ., and all doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion must be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion.” ( Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal. App. 4th 1830, 1836 [20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913], [***4] citations omitted.)
The trial court concluded that primary assumption of the risk barred plaintiff’s action because injury from runaway snowboards is an “everyday risk in the sport of skiing or snowboarding.” Plaintiff contends that primary assumption of risk does not bar this action because defendant’s use of a snowboard unequipped with a retention strap amounted to conduct outside the inherent nature of the sport.
(2a) In Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 296 [11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 834 P.2d 696] and its companion case Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 339 [11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30, 834 P.2d 724, 34 A.L.R.5th 769], the Supreme Court concluded that the [HN4] ordinary duty of care to avoid injury to others is modified by the doctrine of “primary assumption of risk.” Primary assumption of the risk negates duty and constitutes a complete bar to recovery. ( [HN5] Knight, supra, at pp. 309-310, 314-316.) Whether primary assumption of the risk applies depends on the nature [***5] of the sport or activity in question and the parties’ relationship to that activity. ( Id. at p. 313.) In the context of sports, the question turns on “whether a given injury is within the ‘inherent’ risk of the sport.” ( Staten v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal. App. 4th 1628, 1635 [53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 657].)
In Knight, a defendant carelessly knocked over a coparticipant and stepped [**522] on her hand during a touch football game. (3 Cal. 4th at pp. 300-301.) The [*827] conduct was deemed an inherent risk of the sport and therefore recovery was barred under primary assumption of risk. ( Id. at p. 321.) The court in Knight reasoned that “. . . vigorous participation in such sporting events likely would be chilled if legal liability were to be imposed on a participant on the basis of his or her ordinary careless conduct.” ( Id. at p. 318.)
In the context of skiing, courts have held that primary assumption of the risk applies to bar recovery for “. . . moguls on a ski run ( Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 315-316), trees bordering a ski run ( Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Associates, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 111 [266 Cal. Rptr. 749]), [***6] snow-covered stumps ( Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift (D.Vt. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 786), and numerous other conditions or obstacles such as variations in terrain, changes in surface or subsurface snow conditions, bare spots, other skiers, snow-making equipment, and myriad other hazards which must be considered inherent in the sport of skiing.” ( O’Donoghue v. Bear Mountain Ski Resort (1994) 30 Cal. App. 4th 188, 193 [35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467].) A runaway snowboard resulting from ordinary skier carelessness would seem to fit within the realm of those risks inherent to the sport. 1
1 We quickly dismiss plaintiff’s contention that there is a triable issue over whether plaintiff and defendant were coparticipants. At Heavenly Valley Ski Resort, skiers and snowboarders share the same slope. Both parties were in a designated ski area; moreover, putting on and taking off equipment is an integral part of the sport. Skiing, like ice skating, is a sport which may be engaged in just as well alone as with others. There is no requirement that athletes be acquainted with each other or join together in order to be considered coparticipants within the meaning of Knight. (See Staten v. Superior Court, supra, 45 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1633 [figure skater assumes risk of collision with other skaters even when skating solo, where “proximity to one another created certain risks of collision”].)
[***7] Knight however does not grant unbridled legal immunity to all defendants participating in sporting activity. The Supreme Court has stated that [HN6] “. . . it is well established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the sport.” (3 Cal. 4th at pp. 315-316, italics added.) Thus, even though “defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself,” they may not increase the likelihood of injury above that which is inherent. ( Id. at p. 315.)
The principle is illustrated in the skiing context in Freeman v. Hale (1994) 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1396 [36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418]. In Freeman the defendant had consumed alcoholic beverages to the point of inebriation prior to skiing. While on the slopes defendant collided with plaintiff coparticipant, rendering her a quadriplegic. ( Id. at p. 1391.) The defendant claimed he was immune from liability because the plaintiff had assumed [***8] the risk of harm by participating in the sport. (Ibid.) The Fourth District reversed summary judgment for the defendant.
[*828] While conceding that inadvertent collisions are an inherent risk of skiing and therefore assumed by participants (30 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1395), Freeman pointed out that the consumption of alcoholic beverages, an activity not ordinarily associated with skiing, may have unnecessarily increased the risk of collision. Furthermore, “the increased risks presented by the consumption of alcohol are not inherent in the sport of skiing.” ( Id. at p. 1396.) A skier has a duty not to increase the risks of the sport beyond those inherent, and summary judgment is improper where the [**523] circumstances suggest that the defendant engaged in activity that increased the risk. ( Id. at p. 1397.)
In Lowe v. California League of Prof. Baseball (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 112, 123 [65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105], the plaintiff was a spectator at a minor league baseball game. He was sitting in an uncovered section of the stadium when a foul ball struck him in the face. Immediately prior to being struck, the [***9] team’s mascot was behind the plaintiff and his tail was hitting the plaintiff on the head and shoulders. The plaintiff turned to see what the mascot was doing and as he was turning back around to face the field, a foul ball hit him. ( Id. at pp. 116-118.)
While agreeing that the risk of being hit with a foul ball was inherent in the sport of baseball and therefore assumed by spectators, the court, relying on Knight, held that the defendant had a duty not to increase the risk of a spectator being struck. ( Lowe v. California League of Prof. Baseball, supra, 56 Cal. App. 4th at p. 123.) Summary judgment was improper because, “. . . whether such antics [by the mascot] increased the inherent risk to plaintiff is an issue of fact to be resolved at trial.” (Ibid.; see also Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc. (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 184, 193 [43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392] [bicycle jump’s unsafe design may have increased risk to bicycle racers].)
Finally, in Yancey v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal. App. 4th 558 [33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777], the court ruled that a participant in discus throwing owed a duty to a coparticipant [***10] to ascertain that the target area was clear before releasing the discus onto the playing field. In reversing summary judgment, the court found that the inherent risks of discus throwing do not include being injured by a discus thrown with no regard for its potential path. ( Id. at p. 566.)
(3a) Here, we are confronted with the question whether defendant’s use of a snowboard without a retention strap could be found by a jury to have [*829] increased the inherent risk of injury to coparticipants from a runaway snowboard. 2 The factual showing below demonstrates triable issues of fact.
2 At the hearing on the motion, plaintiff’s counsel listed four separate acts or omissions by defendant which he contended went beyond “ordinary careless conduct” and increased the inherent risk to Jennifer: (1) failure to wear a retention strap; (2) taking the board off on a steep slope without consideration for downhill skiers; (3) failure to move to the edge of the slope before removing his snowboard; and (4) failure to leave one foot in his snowboard and walk down the slope. This appeal focuses solely on the absence of a retention strap. We agree with plaintiff’s implicit concession that each of the other instances of misfeasance mentioned by counsel constitutes mere ordinary negligence which is not actionable under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk.
[***11] Both El Dorado County Ordinance No. 9.20.040, subdivision A6, and the skier responsibility code which was posted at Heavenly Valley Ski Resort, require the use of a retention strap. These safety regulations demonstrate a recognition that retention straps reduce the risk of injury from runaway ski equipment. As the declaration of plaintiff’s expert explains, this requirement is especially important when it comes to snowboards because, unlike skis which are equipped with automatic braking devices, snowboards have no built-in stopping mechanism. A jury could find that, by using a snowboard without the retention strap, in violation of the rules of the ski resort and a county ordinance, defendant unnecessarily increased the danger that his snowboard might escape his control and injure other participants such as plaintiff. The absence of a retention strap could therefore constitute conduct not inherent to the sport which increased the risk of injury. 3
3 We decline to address the issue of whether Evidence Code section 669, read in conjunction with El Dorado County Ordinance No. 9.20.040, subdivision A6, establishes an independent duty of care which overrides the primary assumption of risk doctrine. The Supreme Court granted review in Cheong v. Antablin (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 1063 [68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 946 P.2d 817], purportedly to settle this question, but ended up avoiding it by concluding that the ordinance evinced “no clear intent to modify common law assumption of risk principles.” ( Id. at p. 1069.) As evidenced by the four separate concurring opinions in Cheong (including one by the author of the majority opinion, Justice Chin), there appears to be no clear consensus on the high court about this issue.
[***12] [**524] (2b) Our conclusion is consistent with the test advanced by Freeman to determine what risks are inherent in a sport: [HN7] “[C]onduct is totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport (and thus any risks resulting from that conduct are not inherent to the sport) if the prohibition of that conduct would neither deter vigorous participation in the sport nor otherwise fundamentally alter the nature of the sport.” (30 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1394.) Freeman found that “[t]he consumption of alcoholic beverages could be prohibited during or shortly before skiing without fundamentally altering the nature of the sport.” ( Id. at p. 1396.) The doctrine of primary assumption of risk was not an absolute bar to recovery because the risks associated with skiing while under the influence of alcohol are not inherent in the sport and thus not assumed by fellow participants.
[*830] In Lowe the court used similar reasoning, to conclude that “. . . the antics of the mascot are not an essential or integral part of the playing of a baseball [***13] game,” and “the game can be played in the absence of such antics.” (56 Cal. App. 4th at p. 123.)
Thus, “. . . the key inquiry here is whether the risk which led to plaintiff’s injury involved some feature or aspect of the game which is inevitable or unavoidable in the actual playing of the game.” ( Lowe v. California League of Prof. Baseball, supra, 56 Cal. App. 4th at p. 123.) (3b) Use of a mandatory retention strap would not impede or alter the sport of snowboarding. On the contrary, retention straps can be used “without fundamentally altering the nature of the sport.” ( Freeman v. Hale, supra, 30 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1396.) Furthermore, use of a retention strap would in no way chill or deter vigorous participation in skiing or snowboarding. ( Knight v. Jewitt, supra, 3 Cal. 4th at p. 317.)
Defendant claims that he was entitled to summary judgment in any event, because he would necessarily have removed the strap in order to walk down the slope. According to this argument, the board would have hit plaintiff regardless of whether it was equipped with a strap. Defendant is essentially arguing that proximate cause [***14] was lacking as a matter of law.
However, the declaration of plaintiff’s expert established that, used properly, the retention strap would have tethered defendant’s leg or boot to his snowboard. Defendant offered no evidence to refute the possibility that the strap would have provided him an opportunity to secure control of the board and prevent the accident. The record therefore presents a triable issue as to whether defendant’s use of a snowboard without a retention strap was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Since all inferences in a summary judgment dispute are to be drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion ( Tully v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 654, 660 [65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 545]), defendant did not eliminate proximate cause as a triable issue.
We conclude that defendant owed a duty of care not to increase the risks of skiing beyond those inherent to the sport. The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk is not an absolute bar to recovery on these facts, because the lack of a retention strap could be found by a jury to have increased the risk of harm to plaintiff beyond what was inherent in the sport of skiing. Defendant [***15] also did not establish as a matter of law that the lack of a retention strap was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Accordingly, summary judgment was improperly granted.
[*831] [**525] DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Plaintiff shall recover costs.
Kolkey, J., concurred. Blease, Acting P. J., concurred in the result.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 13, 2000. Kennard, J., and Chin, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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2014-2015 In bound ski/board fatalities
Posted: May 13, 2015 Filed under: Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding, Snow Tubing | Tags: fatality, ski area, skiing, snowboarding, Tubing Leave a commentIt is depressing to start working on this every year. I hope it at some point in time can provide answers rather than news.
Fatalities are high even though the number of skiers is down?
This list is not guaranteed to be accurate. The information is found from web searches and news dispatches. Those references are part of the chart. If you have a source for information on any fatality please leave a comment or contact me. Thank you.
If this information is incorrect or incomplete please let me know. This is up to date as of April 4, 2015. Thanks.
Skiing and Snowboarding are still safer than being in your kitchen or bathroom. This information is not to scare you away from skiing but to help you understand the risks.
Red type is natural or medical conditions that occurred in-bounds on the slopes
Green Type is Fatalities while sledding at the Resort
Blue Type is a Lift Accidents
2014 – 2015 Ski Season Fatalities
|
# |
Date |
State |
Resort |
Where |
Trail Difficulty |
How |
Cause |
Ski/ Board |
Age |
Sex |
Home town |
Helmet |
Reference |
Ref # 2 |
|
1 |
11/15 |
CO |
Breckenridge |
|
|
|
Natural |
|
48 |
M |
Boulder, CO |
|
|
|
|
2 |
12/8 |
CO |
Eldora |
Jolly Jug |
|
Hit tree |
|
Ski |
22 |
M |
Coral Springs, FL (CU student) |
Yes |
||
|
3 |
12/12 |
CO |
Keystone |
Spring Dipper |
Intermediate |
Hit Tree |
Blunt force trauma |
Boarder |
26 |
M |
Silverthorne |
Yes |
||
|
4 |
|
MI |
Pine Knob |
|
|
Hit tree |
|
Ski |
51 |
F |
Shelby Township |
|
||
|
5 |
12/28 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Brush Alley |
|
Found inverted in the snow |
Asphyxiation |
Skier |
54 |
M |
Pepper Pike, OH |
|
||
|
6 |
12/30 |
NY |
Hunter Mtn |
D Lift |
|
Ski caught lift tower |
Fall |
Skier |
44 |
F |
Brooklyn, NY |
|
||
|
7 |
1/31 |
OR |
Mt. Hood Skibowl |
Middle Reynolds Trail |
Expert |
Caught an edge, fell, landing on his head and chest |
blunt-force head trauma |
Skier |
37 |
M |
Medford, OR |
|
||
|
8 |
|
CO |
Keystone Resort |
Elk Run |
Intermediate |
|
|
|
18 |
M |
|
Yes |
||
|
9 |
1/7 |
UT |
Snowbird Ski Resort |
base of the Little Cloud chairlift |
|
struck a tree |
|
Skier |
63 |
M |
Salt Lake City, UT |
Yes |
||
|
10 |
1/13 |
NH |
Nashoba Valley Ski Area |
|
|
Hit a tree |
|
|
13 |
M |
Westford, NH |
|
|
|
|
11 |
1/17 |
MA |
Nashoba Valley Ski Area |
Lobo trail |
Expert |
Hit a tree |
|
Skier |
13 |
M |
Westford |
Yes |
||
|
12 |
1/18 |
CA |
Northstar California ski resort |
Rail Splitter |
Advanced |
|
|
Skier |
67 |
M |
Van Nuys |
|
|
|
|
13 |
1/18 |
AZ |
Arizona Snowbowl |
|
|
Medical episode & fell to snow |
|
Skier |
46 |
M |
Newbury, CA |
|
||
|
14 |
1/19 |
CO |
Copper Mtn |
|
|
Medical |
|
Board |
55 |
F |
Reeds Spring, MO |
Yes |
||
|
15 |
1/22 |
VT |
Stowe Mountain Resort |
|
|
|
|
|
64 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
16 |
1/23 |
WA |
Mission Ridge Ski |
|
|
lost control on a ski run |
|
Skier |
17 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
17 |
1/23 |
CO |
Crested Butte |
Lower Treasury |
Intermediate |
Hit a tree |
multiple traumatic chest injuries |
Skier |
13 |
M |
Olathe, CO |
Yes |
||
|
18 |
|
VT |
Stowe Mountain Resort |
|
|
|
medical-related |
Skier |
64 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
19 |
2/6 |
VT |
Burke Mountain Resort |
|
|
Hit a tree |
|
Skier |
27 |
F |
St. Johnsbury, VT |
Yes |
||
|
20 |
2/7 |
UT |
Park City Mtn Resort |
|
|
hit a padded pole |
aorta ruptured |
Skier |
25 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
21 |
2/11 |
CO |
Keystone Resort |
Anticipation |
Intermediate |
Hit a tree |
blunt force trauma |
Skier |
43 |
M |
Conifer, CO |
Yes |
||
|
22 |
2/14 |
NM |
Ski Santa Fe |
|
|
struck a tree |
|
Skier |
33 |
F |
El Paso, Texas |
|
|
|
|
23 |
2/7 |
CO |
|
|
|
|
|
Skier |
60 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
24 |
2/23 |
CO |
Breckenridge Ski Resort |
|
|
|
multiple skull fractures |
Skier |
22 |
M |
|
No |
||
|
25 |
2/26 |
CO |
Breckenridge Ski Resort |
Northstar |
Intermediate |
Hit tree |
|
Skier |
46 |
M |
Rolling Meadows, IL |
Yes |
||
|
26 |
2/25 |
WI |
Granite Peak |
|
|
Went off a jump came down on his neck and head area |
Severe brain injury |
Boarder |
29 |
M |
Oshkosh, WI |
Yes |
||
|
27 |
3/9 |
NH |
Wildcat Mtn |
Lower Polecat trail |
|
lost control, tumbled down the trail and fell over a 60-foot drop |
|
Skier |
34 |
M |
North Conway, NH |
Yes |
||
|
28 |
3/8 |
WA |
Lookout Pass |
Rainbow Ridge |
|
hit a tree |
|
|
61 |
F |
Silverton, ID |
Yes |
||
|
29 |
3/9 |
CO |
Winter Park |
|
|
|
|
|
34 |
M |
North Conway, NH |
|
|
|
|
30 |
3/9 |
NH |
Wildcat Mountain |
|
|
veered into a tree-covered area |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
31 |
2/14 |
WI |
|
|
|
|
traumatic brain injury |
Boarder |
25 |
F |
Chicago, IL |
|
||
|
32 |
3/17 |
NH |
Bretton Woods Ski Resort |
|
|
|
|
Boarder |
23 |
M |
Pelham |
|
||
|
33 |
3/22 |
VT |
Killington Resort |
High Road Trail |
Intermediate |
Hit a Tree |
|
Skier |
23 |
M |
Nashua, NH |
Yes |
||
|
34 |
3/25 |
ME |
Sunday River ski resort |
Black Hole |
Expert |
Went off trail |
|
Skier |
35 |
M |
Bethel, ME |
Yes |
||
|
35 |
3/25 |
WV |
Snowshoe Mountain |
|
|
|
|
Skier |
|
M |
|
|
|
|
|
37 |
3/29 |
MI |
Crystal Mountain |
North Face |
|
lose control, striking a tree |
|
Skier |
40 |
M |
Ludington, MI |
Yes |
||
|
38 |
3/28 |
WY |
Jackson Hole Mountain Resort |
|
|
collapsed during the alpine leg of Saturday’s Pole Pedal Paddle race |
cerebral aneurism |
Skier |
58 |
F |
|
|
||
|
39 |
4/12 |
UT |
Deer Valley Resort |
Birdseye run |
Intermediate |
Hit lift tower |
|
Skier |
42 |
M |
Pinebrook, UT |
|
|
|
|
40 |
4/9 |
CO |
Steamboat Ski Area |
Rainbow trail |
|
|
complicated fractures to his C1 and C2 cervical vertebrae |
Skier |
63 |
M |
Steamboat Springs, CO |
|
||
|
41 |
4/19 |
WA |
White Pass Ski Area |
Cool Air |
|
started falling backward. She tried to right herself. The woman crashed into a tree, |
blunt force injuries |
Skier |
60 |
F |
Olympia. WA |
|
||
|
42 |
4/30 |
OR |
Mount Bachelor |
Leeway run |
|
lost control and hit a tree. |
|
Skier |
29 |
M |
Bend, OR |
Yes |
Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
5 Medical causes, 1 lift accident and 17-18 fatalities 16 hitting trees or 2 hitting lift towers.
The numbers were relatively low through the middle of February and then started to climb recently. 20 fatalities in the West, 5 in the Midwest and 10 in the East. I suspect that was based on weather. No snow in the West and too much snow in the East.
If you are unable to view the entire table Email me at Jim@Rec-law.us and put Ski Area Fatality Chart in the subject line. I’ll reply with a PDF of the chart.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Copyright 2015 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
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Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Skiing, Snowboarding, Fatality, Ski Area, Tubing, Breckenridge, Chair Lift, Hunter Mountain, Jackson Hole, Pine Knob, Eldora, Keystone, Breckenridge, Eldora, Keystone, Pine Knob, Jackson Hole, Hunter Mtn, Mt. Hood Skibowl, Snowbird Ski Resort, Nashoba Valley Ski Area, Northstar California ski resort, Arizona Snowbowl, Copper Mtn, Keystone Resort, Stowe Mountain Resort, Mission Ridge Ski, Crested Butte, Breckenridge, Mr. Bachelor, White Pass Ski Area, Deer Valley Ski Resort, Steamboat Springs Ski Resort,
Flow Sports Inc. Recalls Snowboard Bindings Due to Fall Hazard
Posted: March 5, 2015 Filed under: Uncategorized | Tags: Consumer Product Safety Council, CPSC, Flite, Flite LTD, Flite MTN, Flow, Flow Sports, Flow Sports Inc., Haylo, Micron Youth, Recall, Snowboard Binding, snowboarding Leave a commentName of Product: Flow 2014 Flite-series snowboard bindings
Hazard: A pin can disengage and cause the binding to open, posing a fall hazard.
Remedy: Repair, replace, refund
Consumers should immediately stop using the recalled snowboard bindings and contact Flow Sports for a free repair or to return the bindings for free replacement bindings or a full refund.
Consumer Contact: Flow Sports toll-free at (855) 920-9955 from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. PT Monday through Friday, or online at http://www.flow.com and click on “Safety Notice” for more information.
Units: About 10,400
Description: This recall involves Flow 2014 Flite-series snowboard bindings with model names Flite, Haylo, Micron Youth, Flite LTD and Flite MTN. The bindings have a snaplock lever on the rear, a cable adjustment dial on the side of the baseplate, a matte texture finish on the baseplate and a glossy “Flow” and Flow’s logo on the hiback. They are black; black and white; black, white and blue; or black, white, blue and yellow. “Flow” is printed on the side of the bindings.
Incidents/Injuries: Flow Sports has received 30 reports of the pins disengaging from the bindings. No injuries have been reported.
Sold at: Dick’s Sporting Goods, EVO, SNSboards, Sport Chalet, The House, Wired Sport, Zumiez and other stores nationwide and online from July 2014 through February 2015 for between $110 and $150 for the bindings.
Importer: Flow Sports Inc., of San Clemente, Calif.
Manufactured in: China
Retailers: If you are a retailer of a recalled product you have a duty to notify your customers of a recall. If you can, email your clients or include the recall information in your next marketing communication to your clients. Post any Recall Poster at your stores and contact the manufacturer to determine how you will handle any recalls.
For more information on this see:
For Retailers
Recalls Call for Retailer Action
Combination of a Products Liability statute, an Expert Witness Report that was just not direct enough and odd facts holds a retailer liable as manufacture for product defect.
Product Liability takes a different turn. You must pay attention, just not rely on the CPSC.
Retailer has no duty to fit or instruct on fitting bicycle helmet
Summary Judgment granted for bicycle manufacturer and retailer on a breach of warranty and product liability claim.
For Manufacturers
The legal relationship created between manufactures and US consumers
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Copyright 2015 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
Facebook: Rec.Law.Now
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Recall, Recall, CPSC, Consumer Product Safety Council, Flow, Snowboarding, Snowboard Binding, Flite, Haylo, Micron Youth, Flite LTD, Flite MTN, Flow Sports Inc., Flow Sports,
2014-2015 In bound ski/board fatalities
Posted: March 4, 2015 Filed under: Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Arizona Snowbowl, Breckenridge, Chair Lift, Copper Mtn, Crested Butte, Eldora, fatality, Hunter Mountain, Hunter Mtn, Jackson Hole, Keystone, Keystone Resort, Mission Ridge Ski, Mt. Hood Skibowl, Nashoba Valley Ski Area, Northstar California ski resort, Pine Knob, ski area, skiing, Snowbird Ski Resort, snowboarding, Stowe Mountain Resort, Tubing 2 CommentsIt is depressing to start working on this every year. I hope it at some point in time can provide answers rather than news.
This list is not guaranteed to be accurate. The information is found from web searches and news dispatches. Those references are part of the chart. If you have a source for information on any fatality please leave a comment or contact me. Thank you.
If this information is incorrect or incomplete please let me know. This is up to date as of February 26, 2015. Thanks.
Skiing and Snowboarding are still safer than being in your kitchen or bathroom. This information is not to scare you away from skiing but to help you understand the risks.
Red type is natural or medical conditions that occurred inbounds on the slopes
Green Type is Fatalities while sledding at the Resort
Blue Type is a Lift Accidents
2014 – 2015 Ski Season Fatalities
|
# |
Date |
State |
Resort |
Where |
Trail Difficulty |
How |
Cause |
Ski/ Board |
Age |
Sex |
Home town |
Helmet |
Reference |
Ref # 2 |
|
1 |
11/15 |
CO |
Breckenridge |
|
|
|
Natural |
|
48 |
M |
Boulder, CO |
|
|
|
|
2 |
12/8 |
CO |
Eldora |
Jolly Jug |
|
Hit tree |
|
Ski |
22 |
M |
Coral Springs, FL (CU student) |
Yes |
||
|
3 |
12/12 |
CO |
Keystone |
Spring Dipper |
Intermediate |
Hit Tree |
Blunt force trauma |
Boarder |
26 |
M |
Silverthorne |
Yes |
||
|
4 |
|
MI |
Pine Knob |
|
|
Hit tree |
|
Ski |
51 |
F |
Shelby Township |
|
||
|
5 |
12/28 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Brush Alley |
|
Found inverted in the snow |
Asphyxiation |
Skier |
54 |
M |
Pepper Pike, OH |
|
||
|
6 |
12/30 |
NY |
Hunter Mtn |
D Lift |
|
Ski caught lift tower |
Fall |
Skier |
44 |
F |
Brooklyn, NY |
|
||
|
7 |
1/31 |
OR |
Mt. Hood Skibowl |
Middle Reynolds Trail |
Expert |
Caught an edge, fell, landing on his head and chest |
blunt-force head trauma |
Skier |
37 |
M |
Medford, OR |
|
||
|
8 |
|
CO |
Keystone Resort |
Elk Run |
Intermediate |
|
|
|
18 |
M |
|
Yes |
||
|
9 |
1/7 |
UT |
Snowbird Ski Resort |
base of the Little Cloud chairlift |
|
struck a tree |
|
Skier |
63 |
M |
Salt Lake City, UT |
Yes |
||
|
10 |
1/17 |
MA |
Nashoba Valley Ski Area |
Lobo trail |
Expert |
Hit a tree |
|
Skier |
13 |
M |
Westford |
Yes |
||
|
11 |
1/18 |
CA |
Northstar California ski resort |
Rail Splitter |
Advanced |
|
|
Skier |
67 |
M |
Van Nuys |
|
|
|
|
12 |
1/18 |
AZ |
Arizona Snowbowl |
|
|
Medical episode & fell to snow |
|
Skier |
46 |
M |
Newbury, CA |
|
||
|
13 |
1/19 |
CO |
Copper Mtn |
|
|
Medical |
|
Board |
55 |
F |
Reeds Spring, MO |
Yes |
||
|
14 |
1/22 |
VT |
Stowe Mountain Resort |
|
|
|
|
|
64 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
15 |
1/23 |
WA |
Mission Ridge Ski |
|
|
lost control on a ski run |
|
Skier |
17 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
16 |
1/23 |
CO |
Crested Butte |
Lower Treasury |
Intermediate |
Hit a tree |
multiple traumatic chest injuries |
Skier |
13 |
M |
Olathe, CO |
Yes |
||
|
17 |
|
VT |
Stowe Mountain Resort |
|
|
|
medical-related |
Skier |
64 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
18 |
2/6 |
VT |
Burke Mountain Resort |
|
|
Hit a tree |
|
Skier |
27 |
F |
St. Johnsbury, VT |
Yes |
||
|
19 |
2/7 |
UT |
Park City Mtn Resort |
|
|
hit a padded pole |
aorta ruptured |
Skier |
25 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
20 |
2/11 |
CO |
Keystone Resort |
Anticipation |
Intermediate |
Hit a tree |
blunt force trauma |
Skier |
43 |
M |
Conifer, CO |
Yes |
||
|
21 |
2/14 |
NM |
Ski Santa Fe |
|
|
struck a tree |
|
Skier |
33 |
F |
El Paso, Texas |
|
|
|
|
22 |
2/7 |
CO |
|
|
|
|
|
Skier |
60 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
22 |
2/23 |
CO |
Breckenridge Ski Resort |
|
|
|
multiple skull fractures |
Skier |
22 |
M |
|
No |
||
|
23 |
2/26 |
CO |
Breckenridge Ski Resort |
Northstar |
Intermediate |
Hit tree |
|
Skier |
46 |
M |
Rolling Meadows, IL |
Yes |
|
Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
5 Medical causes, 1 lift accident and 17-18 fatalities 11 hitting trees or a pole
If you are unable to view the entire table Email me at Jim@Rec-law.us and put Ski Area Fatality Chart in the subject line. I’ll reply with a PDF of the chart.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2015 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-
Our Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
5 Medical causes, 1 lift accident and 17-18 fatalities 11 hitting trees or a pole
If you are unable to view the entire table Email me at Jim@Rec-law.us and put Ski Area Fatality Chart in the subject line. I’ll reply with a PDF of the chart.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2015 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
Facebook: Rec.Law.Now
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Skiing, Snowboarding, Fatality, Ski Area, Tubing, Breckenridge, Chair Lift, Hunter Mountain, Jackson Hole, Pine Knob, Eldora, Keystone, Breckenridge, Eldora, Keystone, Pine Knob, Jackson Hole, Hunter Mtn, Mt. Hood Skibowl, Snowbird Ski Resort, Nashoba Valley Ski Area, Northstar California ski resort, Arizona Snowbowl, Copper Mtn, Keystone Resort, Stowe Mountain Resort, Mission Ridge Ski, Crested Butte, Breckenridge,
2014-2015 In bound ski/board fatalities
Posted: January 28, 2015 Filed under: Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Arizona Snowbowl, Breckenridge, Chair Lift, Copper Mtn, Crested Butte, Eldora, fatality, Hunter Mountain, Hunter Mtn, Jackson Hole, Keystone, Keystone Resort, Mission Ridge Ski, Mt. Hood Skibowl, Nashoba Valley Ski Area, Northstar California ski resort, Pine Knob, ski area, skiing, Snowbird Ski Resort, snowboarding, Stowe Mountain Resort, Tubing Leave a commentIt is depressing to start working on this every year. I hope it at some point in time can provide answers rather than news.
This list is not guaranteed to be accurate. The information is found from web searches and news dispatches. Those references are part of the chart. If you have a source for information on any fatality please leave a comment or contact me. Thank you.
If this information is incorrect or incomplete please let me know. This is up to date as of January 25, 2015. Thanks.
Skiing and Snowboarding are still safer than being in your kitchen or bathroom. This information is not to scare you away from skiing but to help you understand the risks.
Red type is natural or medical conditions that occurred inbounds on the slopes
Green Type is Fatalities while sledding at the Resort
Blue Type is a Lift Accidents
2014 – 2015 Ski Season Fatalities
|
# |
Date |
State |
Resort |
Where |
Trail Difficulty |
How |
Cause |
Ski/ Board |
Age |
Sex |
Home town |
Helmet |
Reference |
Ref # 2 |
|
1 |
11/15 |
CO |
Breckenridge |
|
|
|
Natural |
|
48 |
M |
Boulder, CO |
|
|
|
|
2 |
12/8 |
CO |
Eldora |
Jolly Jug |
|
Hit tree |
|
Ski |
22 |
M |
Coral Springs, FL (CU student) |
Yes |
||
|
3 |
12/12 |
CO |
Keystone |
Spring Dipper |
Intermediate |
Hit Tree |
Blunt force trauma |
Boarder |
26 |
M |
Silverthorne |
Yes |
||
|
4 |
|
MI |
Pine Knob |
|
|
Hit tree |
|
Ski |
51 |
F |
Shelby Township |
|
||
|
5 |
12/28 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Brush Alley |
|
Found inverted in the snow |
Asphyxiation |
Skier |
54 |
M |
Pepper Pike, OH |
|
||
|
6 |
12/30 |
NY |
Hunter Mtn |
D Lift |
|
Ski caught lift tower |
Fall |
Skier |
44 |
F |
Brooklyn, NY |
|
||
|
7 |
1/31 |
OR |
Mt. Hood Skibowl |
Middle Reynolds Trail |
Expert |
Caught an edge, fell, landing on his head and chest |
blunt-force head trauma |
Skier |
37 |
M |
Medford, OR |
|
||
|
8 |
|
CO |
Keystone Resort |
Elk Run |
Intermediate |
|
|
|
18 |
M |
|
Yes |
||
|
9 |
1/7 |
UT |
Snowbird Ski Resort |
base of the Little Cloud chairlift |
|
struck a tree |
|
Skier |
63 |
M |
Salt Lake City, UT |
Yes |
||
|
10 |
1/17 |
MA |
Nashoba Valley Ski Area |
Lobo trail |
Expert |
Hit a tree |
|
Skier |
13 |
M |
Westford |
Yes |
||
|
11 |
1/18 |
CA |
Northstar California ski resort |
Rail Splitter |
Advanced |
|
|
Skier |
67 |
M |
Van Nuys |
|
|
|
|
12 |
1/18 |
AZ |
Arizona Snowbowl |
|
|
Medical episode & fell to snow |
|
Skier |
46 |
M |
Newbury, CA |
|
||
|
13 |
1/19 |
CO |
Copper Mtn |
|
|
Medical |
|
Board |
55 |
F |
Reeds Spring, MO |
Yes |
||
|
14 |
1/22 |
VT |
Stowe Mountain Resort |
|
|
|
|
|
64 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
15 |
1/23 |
WA |
Mission Ridge Ski |
|
|
lost control on a ski run |
|
Skier |
17 |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
16 |
1/23 |
CO |
Crested Butte |
Lower Treasury |
Intermediate |
Hit a tree |
multiple traumatic chest injuries |
Skier |
13 |
M |
Olathe, CO |
Yes |
Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
If you are unable to view the entire table Email me at Jim@Rec-law.us and put Ski Area Fatality Chart in the subject line. I’ll reply with a PDF of the chart.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2015 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
Facebook: Rec.Law.Now
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Skiing, Snowboarding, Fatality, Ski Area, Tubing, Breckenridge, Chair Lift, Hunter Mountain, Jackson Hole, Pine Knob, Eldora, Keystone, Breckenridge, Eldora, Keystone, Pine Knob, Jackson Hole, Hunter Mtn, Mt. Hood Skibowl, Snowbird Ski Resort, Nashoba Valley Ski Area, Northstar California ski resort, Arizona Snowbowl, Copper Mtn, Keystone Resort, Stowe Mountain Resort, Mission Ridge Ski, Crested Butte,
2014-2013 In bound ski/board fatalities
Posted: January 7, 2015 Filed under: Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Breckenridge, Chair Lift, Eldora, fatality, Hunter Mountain, Jackson Hole, Keystone, Pine Knob, ski area, skiing, snowboarding, Tubing Leave a commentIt is depressing to start working on this every year. I hope it at some point in time can provide answers rather than news.
This list is not guaranteed to be accurate. The information is found from web searches and news dispatches. Those references are part of the chart. If you have a source for information on any fatality please leave a comment or contact me. Thank you.
If this information is incorrect or incomplete please let me know. This is up to date as of January 1, 2015. Thanks.
Skiing and Snowboarding are still safer than being in your kitchen or bathroom. This information is not to scare you away from skiing but to help you understand the risks.
Red type is natural or medical conditions that occurred inbounds on the slopes
Green Type is Fatalities while sledding at the Resort
Blue Type is a Lift Accidents
2013 – 2014 Ski Season Fatalities
|
# |
Date |
State |
Resort |
Where |
Trail Difficulty |
How |
Cause |
Ski/ Board |
Age |
Sex |
Home town |
Helmet |
Reference |
Ref # 2 |
|
1 |
11/15 |
CO |
Breckenridge |
|
|
|
Natural |
|
48 |
M |
Boulder, CO |
|
|
|
|
2 |
12/8 |
CO |
Eldora |
Jolly Jug |
|
Hit tree |
|
Ski |
22 |
M |
Coral Springs, FL (CU student) |
Yes |
||
|
3 |
12/12 |
CO |
Keystone |
Spring Dipper |
Intermediate |
Hit Tree |
Blunt force trauma |
Boarder |
26 |
M |
Silverthorne |
Yes |
||
|
4 |
|
MI |
Pine Knob |
|
|
Hit tree |
|
Ski |
51 |
F |
Shelby Township |
|
||
|
5 |
12/28 |
WY |
Jackson Hole |
Brush Alley |
|
Found inverted in the snow |
Asphyxiation |
Skier |
54 |
M |
Pepper Pike, OH |
|
|
|
|
6 |
12/30 |
NY |
Hunter Mtn |
D Lift |
|
Ski caught lift tower |
Fall |
Skier |
44 |
F |
Brooklyn, NY |
|
Our condolences go to the families of the deceased. Our thoughts extend to the families and staff at the areas who have to deal with these tragedies.
If you are unable to view the entire table Email me at Jim@Rec-law.us and put Ski Area Fatality Chart in the subject line. I’ll reply with a PDF of the chart.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn
Copyright 2013 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law
Email: Rec-law@recreation-law.com
Google+: +Recreation
Twitter: RecreationLaw
Facebook: Rec.Law.Now
Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Blog: www.recreation-law.com
Mobile Site: http://m.recreation-law.com
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Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., dba Mt. Bachelor Ski and Summer Resort, 2014 Ore. LEXIS 994
Posted: December 22, 2014 Filed under: Legal Case, Oregon, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Age of Majority, Boarder, Boarding, Disaffirm, Inc., Mount Bachelor, Mt. Bachelor, Mt. Bachelor Ski and Summer Resort, Myles A. Bagley, Oregon, Release, ski area, Ski Resort, Snowboard, Snowboarder, snowboarding, Terrain park Leave a commentTo Read an Analysis of this decision see: Oregon Supreme Court finds release signed at ski area is void as a violation of public policy. Less than a week later the lawsuits are being filed in droves.
Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., dba Mt. Bachelor Ski and Summer Resort, 2014 Ore. LEXIS 994
Myles A. Bagley, individually, Petitioner on Review, and Al Bagley, individually; and Lauren Bagley, individually, Plaintiffs, v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., dba Mt. Bachelor Ski and Summer Resort, Respondent on Review, and John DOES 1-10, Defendants.
SC S061821
SUPREME COURT OF OREGON
2014 Ore. LEXIS 994
May 7, 2014, Argued and Submitted
December 18, 2014, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: CC 08CV0118SF; CA A148231. On review from the Court of Appeals. [*1] *
* Appeal from Deschutes County Circuit Court, Stephen P. Forte, Judge. 258Or App 390, 310 P3d 692 (2013).
COUNSEL: Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. With her on the briefs was Arthur C. Johnson.
Andrew C. Balyeat, Balyeat & Eager, LLP, Bend, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Michael J. Estok, Lindsay Hart, LLP, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Association of Defense Counsel.
Kristian Roggendorf, Roggendorf Law LLC, Lake Oswego, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
JUDGES: BREWER, J.
OPINION BY: BREWER
OPINION
En Banc
BREWER, J.
The issue on review in this case is whether an anticipatory release1 of a ski area operator’s liability for its own negligence in a ski pass agreement is enforceable in the face of an assertion that the release violates public policy and is unconscionable. Plaintiff suffered serious injuries while snowboarding over a jump in defendant ski area operator’s “terrain [*2] park,” and brought this action alleging that defendant was negligent in the design, construction, maintenance, and inspection of the jump. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense of release; plaintiff filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that the release was unenforceable as a matter of law. The trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion. Plaintiff appealed, asserting, among other arguments, that the trial court erred in concluding that the release did not violate public policy and that it was neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 258 Or App 390, 310 P3d 692 (2013). Because we conclude that enforcement of the release would be unconscionable, we reverse and remand.
1 By “anticipatory release,” we refer to an exculpatory agreement that purports to immunize–before an injury occurs–the released party from liability for its own tortious conduct.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We review the trial court’s rulings on summary judgment to determine whether “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and whether “the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” [*3] ORCP 47 C. We view the historical facts set out in the summary judgment record, along with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party–plaintiff on defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and defendant on plaintiff’s cross-motion. Id.; Vaughn v. First Transit, Inc., 346 Or 128, 132, 206 P3d 181 (2009). The historical facts in the record largely relate to the enforceability of the release at issue. Defendant’s summary judgment motion did not address the issues of negligence, causation, or damages. Therefore, insofar as those issues are relevant to the enforceability of the release, we accept as true the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint. ORCP 47 C (adverse party on summary judgment has burden of producing evidence only “on any issue raised in the motion as to which adverse party would have burden of persuasion at trial”).
On September 29, 2005, plaintiff purchased a season pass from defendant for use at defendant’s ski area. Plaintiff was a skilled and experienced snowboarder, having purchased season passes from defendant for each of the preceding three years and having classified his skill level as of early 2006, before being injured, as an “advanced expert.” Upon purchasing the season pass, plaintiff [*4] executed a written “release and indemnity agreement” that defendant required of all its patrons. That document provided, in pertinent part:
“In consideration of the use of a Mt. Bachelor pass and/or Mt. Bachelor’s premises, I/we agree to release and indemnify Mt. Bachelor, Inc., its officers and directors, owners, agents, landowners, affiliated companies, and employees (hereinafter ‘Mt. Bachelor, Inc.’) from any and all claims for property damage, injury, or death which I/we may suffer or for which I/we may be liable to others, in any way connected with skiing, snowboarding, or snowriding. This release and indemnity agreement shall apply to any claim even if caused by negligence. The only claims not released are those based upon intentional misconduct.
“* * * * *
“The undersigned(s) have carefully read and understand this agreement and all of its terms on both sides of this document. This includes, but is not limited to, the duties of skiers, snowboarders, or snowriders. The undersigned(s) understand that this document is an agreement of release and indemnity which will prevent the undersigned(s) or the undersigneds’ estate from recovering damages from Mt. Bachelor, Inc. in the event [*5] of death or injury to person or property. The undersigned(s), nevertheless, enter into this agreement freely and voluntarily and agree it is binding on the undersigned(s) and the undersigneds’ heirs and legal representatives.
“By my/our signature(s) below, I/we agree that this release and indemnity agreement will remain in full force and effect and I will be bound by its terms throughout this season and all subsequent seasons for which I/we renew this season pass.
“See reverse side of this sheet * * * for duties of skiers, snowboarders, or snow riders which you must observe.”
(Capitalization omitted.)2 The reverse side of the document detailed the “Duties of Skiers” under ORS 30.985 and ORS 30.990 and also included a printed notification that “Skiers/Snowboarders/Snowriders Assume Certain Risks” under ORS 30.975–the “inherent risks of skiing.”3
2 Although defendant relies on several documents that, it asserts, separately and collectively released it from liability for plaintiff’s injuries, for convenience we refer to those documents in the singular throughout this opinion as “the release.” In addition to the releases discussed in the text, plaintiff’s father also executed a “minor release and indemnity agreement” on plaintiff’s [*6] behalf, containing essentially the same terms as the other releases, because plaintiff was not yet eighteen years old when he bought the season pass. Plaintiff asserted before the trial court and the Court of Appeals that he was entitled to–and effectively did–disavow the release after he reached majority. For reasons explained in its opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rejection of that argument. Plaintiff did not seek review of that holding in this court and we do not address it here.
3 As elaborated below, Oregon has enacted statutes specifically pertaining to skiing and ski areas. See ORS 30.970 – 30.990. Those statutes, among other provisions, set out the “duties” of skiers, require that ski area operators inform skiers of those duties, establish notice requirements and a statute of limitations pertaining specifically to injury or death while skiing, and provide that those who engage in the sport of skiing accept and assume the risks inherent in that activity.
On November 18, 2005, plaintiff began using the pass, which stated, in part:
“Read this release agreement
“In consideration for each lift ride, the ticket user releases and agrees to hold harmless and indemnify Mt. Bachelor, [*7] Inc., and its employees and agents from all claims for property damage, injury or death even if caused by negligence. The only claims not released are those based upon intentional misconduct.”
(Capitalization omitted.) Further, the following sign was posted at each of defendant’s ski lift terminals:
“YOUR TICKET IS A RELEASE
“The back of your ticket contains a release of all claims against Mt. Bachelor, Inc. and its employees or agents. Read the back of your ticket before you ride any lifts or use any of the facilities of Mt. Bachelor, Inc. If you purchase a ticket from someone else, you must provide this ticket release information to that person or persons.
“Skiers and lift passengers who use tickets at this resort release and agree to hold harmless and indemnify Mt. Bachelor, Inc., its employees and agents from all claims for property damage, injury or death which he/she may suffer or for which he/she may be liable to others, arising out of the use of Mt. Bachelor’s premises, whether such claims are for negligence or any other theory of recovery, except for intentional misconduct.
“If you do not agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of the sale of your ticket, please do not purchase [*8] the ticket or use the facilities at Mt. Bachelor.
“Presentation of this ticket to gain access to the premises and facilities of this area is an acknowledgment of your agreement to the terms and conditions outlined above.”
(Capitalization in original.)
Beginning on November 18, 2005, plaintiff used his season pass to ride defendant’s lifts at least 119 times over the course of 26 days that he spent snowboarding at the ski area. On February 16, 2006, while snowboarding over a human-made jump in defendant’s “air chamber” terrain park, plaintiff sustained serious injuries resulting in his permanent paralysis. Approximately four months later, plaintiff provided defendant with notice of his injuries under ORS 30.980(1), which requires that “[a] ski area operator shall be notified of any injury to a skier * * * within 180 days after the injury[.]” Within two years after he was injured, plaintiff brought this action; his complaint alleged negligence on defendant’s part in designing, constructing, maintaining, and inspecting the jump on which plaintiff was injured. Defendant answered, in part, by invoking the affirmative defense of release, pointing to the above-quoted documents.
In its summary judgment motion, [*9] defendant asserted that plaintiff “admittedly understood that he [had] entered into a release agreement and was snowboarding under its terms on the date of [the] accident.” Defendant argued that the release conspicuously and unambiguously disclaimed its future liability for negligence, and that the release was neither unconscionable nor contrary to public policy under Oregon law, because “skiers and snowboarders voluntarily choose to ski and snowboard and ski resorts do not provide essential public services.” Thus, defendant reasoned, there was no material issue of fact as to whether the release barred plaintiff’s action, and defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In his cross-motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiff asserted that the release was unenforceable because it was contrary to public policy and was “both substantively and procedurally unconscionable.” The trial court rejected plaintiff’s public policy and unconscionability arguments, reasoning that “[s]now riding is not such an essential service which requires someone such as [p]laintiff to be forced to sign a release in order to obtain the service.” Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment in defendant’s [*10] favor and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment.
As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court initially observed that the line between the public policy and unconscionability doctrines on which plaintiff relied was not clearly delineated:
“We assume without deciding that the ‘void as contrary to public policy’ doctrine pertaining to this type of case has not been superseded by later-evolved principles concerning substantive unconscionability. See Restatement[(Second) of Contracts], § 208 comment a [(1981)] (unconscionability analysis generally ‘overlaps’ with public-policy analysis).”
Bagley, 258 Or App at 403 n 7. The court then proceeded separately to analyze plaintiff’s arguments. It first concluded that the release did not violate public policy. In particular, the court understood plaintiff to rely on an uncodified Oregon public policy that gives primacy to the tort duties of landowners and business operators to provide safe premises for invitees. In rejecting plaintiff’s argument, the Court of Appeals relied on several factors. First, the court observed that the release “clearly and unequivocally” expressed defendant’s intent to disclaim liability for negligence. Id. at 405 (“[W]e are hard-pressed to envision [*11] a more unambiguous expression of ‘the expectations under the contract'[.]”). Second, the court noted that anticipatory releases that disclaim liability only for ordinary negligence do not necessarily offend public policy where they pertain exclusively to recreational activities and, most importantly, where the party seeking to relieve itself from liability does not provide an essential public service. Id. The court noted that a ski resort primarily offers recreational activities that, with possible exceptions that do not apply in this case, such as training for search-and-rescue personnel, do not constitute essential public services. Id. at 406. Third, the court stated that plaintiff’s claims were based on ordinary negligence and did not implicate a violation of any heightened duty of care. Id.
The court then rejected plaintiff’s unconscionability argument for essentially the same reasons. First, the court concluded, the release was not procedurally unconscionable in that it did not surprise plaintiff (that is, it was conspicuous and unambiguous) and it was not impermissibly oppressive, because, even though offered on a “take it or leave it basis,” plaintiff always could choose not to engage [*12] in the non-essential recreational activity that defendant offered. Id. at 407-08. The court also concluded that the release was not essentially unfair and, therefore, was not substantively unconscionable. Id. at 409. Although “favorable” to defendant, the release was not impermissibly so, the court stated, because a person does not need to ski or snowboard, but rather merely desires to do so. That is, the patron is free to walk away rather than accept unjust terms. Id. at 409-10. For those reasons, the court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment rulings and its dismissal of plaintiff’s action.
ANALYSIS
The parties’ dispute in this case involves a topic–the validity of exculpatory agreements–that this court has not comprehensively addressed in decades. Although the specific issue on review–the validity of an anticipatory release of a ski area operator’s liability for negligence–is finite and particular, it has broader implications insofar as it lies at the intersection of two traditional common law domains–contract and tort–where, at least in part, the legislature has established statutory rights and duties that affect the reach of otherwise governing common law principles.
It is a truism that a contract validly [*13] made between competent parties is not to be set aside lightly. Bliss v. Southern Pacific Co. et al, 212 Or 634, 646, 321 P2d 324 (1958) (“When two or more persons competent for that purpose, upon a sufficient consideration, voluntarily agree to do or not to do a particular thing which may be lawfully done or omitted, they should be held to the consequences of their bargain.”). The right to contract privately is part of the liberty of citizenship, and an important office of the courts is to enforce contractual rights and obligations. W. J. Seufert Land Co. v. Greenfield, 262 Or 83, 90-91, 496 P2d 197 (1972) (so stating). As this court has stated, however, “contract rights are [not] absolute; * * * [e]qually fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.” Christian v. La Forge, 194 Or 450, 469, 242 P2d 797 (1952) (internal quotation marks omitted).
That “common,” or public, interest is embodied, in part, in the principles of tort law. As a leading treatise explains:
“It is sometimes said that compensation for losses is the primary function of tort law * * * [but it] is perhaps more accurate to describe the primary function as one of determining when compensation is to be required.
“* * * * *
“[Additionally, t]he ‘prophylactic’ factor of preventing future harm has been quite important in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with compensation [*14] of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer.”
W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 4, 20-25 (5th ed 1984). See also Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 8, 12 (2000) (most commonly mentioned aims of tort law are compensation of injured persons and deterrence of undesirable behavior). A related function of the tort system is to distribute the risk of injury to or among responsible parties. Prosser and Keeton, § 4, 24-25.4
4 See also Rizutto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn 225, 235, 905 A2d 1165 (2006) (fundamental purposes of the tort system are “compensation of innocent parties, shifting the loss to responsible parties or distributing it among appropriate entities, and deterrence of wrongful conduct.”).
One way in which courts have placed limits on the freedom of contract is by refusing to enforce agreements that are illegal. Uhlmann v. Kin Daw, 97 Or 681, 688, 193 P 435 (1920) (an illegal agreement is void and unenforceable). According to Uhlmann:
“An agreement is illegal if it is contrary to law, morality or public policy. Plain examples of illegality are found in agreements made in violation of some statute; and, stating the rule broadly, an agreement is illegal if it violates a statute or cannot be performed without violating a statute.”
Id. at 689 (internal citation omitted); see also Eldridge et al. v. Johnston, 195 Or 379, 405, 245 P2d 239 (1952) (“It is elementary that [*15] public policy requires that * * * contracts [between competent parties], when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by the courts of justice, and it is only when some other overpowering rule of public policy * * * intervenes, rendering such agreement illegal, that it will not be enforced.”).
In determining whether an agreement is illegal because it is contrary to public policy, “[t]he test is the evil tendency of the contract and not its actual injury to the public in a particular instance.” Pyle v. Kernan, 148 Or 666, 673-74, 36 P2d 580 (1934). The fact that the effect of a contract provision may be harsh as applied to one of the contracting parties does not mean that the agreement is, for that reason alone, contrary to public policy, particularly where “the contract in question was freely entered into between parties in equal bargaining positions and did not involve a contract of adhesion, such as some retail installment contracts and insurance policies.” Seufert, 262 Or at 92.
As we discuss in more detail below, courts determine whether a contract is illegal by determining whether it violates public policy as expressed in relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and in case law, see, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l, Inc., 297 Or 10, 681 P2d 114 (1984) (looking to those [*16] sources to determine whether discharge of at-will employee violated public policy), and by considering whether it is unconscionable. With respect to the doctrine of unconscionability, one commentator has explained:
“The concept of unconscionability was meant to counteract two generic forms of abuses: the first of which relates to procedural deficiencies in the contract formation process, such as deception or a refusal to bargain over contract terms, today often analyzed in terms of whether the imposedupon party had meaningful choice about whether and how to enter the transaction; and the second of which relates to the substantive contract terms themselves and whether those terms are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party, such as terms that impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy; terms (usually of an adhesion or boilerplate nature) that attempt to alter in an impermissible manner fundamental duties otherwise imposed by the law, fine-print terms, or provisions that seek to negate the reasonable expectations of the nondrafting party, or unreasonably and unexpectedly harsh terms having nothing to do with price [*17] or other central aspects of the transaction.”
Richard A. Lord, 8 Williston on Contracts § 18.10, 91 (4th ed 2010). As that passage suggests, the doctrine of unconscionability reflects concerns related specifically to the parties and their formation of the contract, but it also has a broader dimension that converges with an analysis of whether a contract or contract term is illegal because it violates public policy.5
5 This court has not distinguished between contracts that are illegal because they violate public policy and contracts that are unenforceable because they are unconscionable. However, a difference in focus between the two concepts has been described in this way:
“[O]ur public policy analysis asks whether the contract provision at issue threatens harm to the public as a whole, including by contravening the constitution, statutes, or judicial decisions of [this state]. In contrast, an unconscionability analysis asks whether the agreement, by its formation or by its terms, is so unfair that the court cannot enforce it consistent with the interests of justice.”
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Rosen, 242 Ill 2d 48, 61, 949 NE2d 639 (2011). As that passage suggests, the two doctrines are aimed at similar concerns: unfairness or oppression in contract formation or terms that [*18] are sufficiently serious as to justify the conclusion that the contract contravenes the interests of justice.
Recognizing that convergence, this court often has relied on public policy considerations to determine whether a contract or contract term is sufficiently unfair or oppressive to be deemed unconscionable. See, e.g., William C. Cornitius, Inc. v. Wheeler, 276 Or 747, 754-55, 556 P2d 666 (1976) (treating lessee’s unconscionability defense as grounded in public policy); Cone v. Gilmore, 79 Or 349, 352-54, 155 P 192 (1916) (analyzing unconscionability challenge to contract enforcement based on public policy considerations); Balfour v. Davis 14 Or 47, 53, 12 P 89 (1886) (referring to unconscionability interchangeably with public policy considerations). Other authorities also have described the two doctrines in functionally the same terms, see, e.g., E. Allen Farnsworth, 1 Farnsworth on Contracts, § 4.28, 577 (3d ed 2004) (comparing unconscionability to violation of public policy), or as involving substantially overlapping considerations, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 comment a (1981) (policy against unconscionable contracts or contract terms “overlaps with rules which render particular bargains or terms unenforceable on grounds of public policy”).
As discussed, the Court of Appeals concluded that the release at issue here did not violate public policy and was not [*19] unconscionable for essentially the same reasons: it was conspicuous and unambiguous, and it related to a recreational activity, not an essential public service. Likewise, neither party has suggested that different legal standards apply in determining whether the release at issue in this case violates public policy or is unconscionable. Thus, for the sake of convenience–if not doctrinal convergence–we address the parties’ public policy arguments in the context of our analysis of whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, enforcement of the release would be unconscionable.6
6 We emphasize that it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the doctrines always are identical in practical effect or whether they may vary in their application depending on the particular circumstances of a given case. It suffices to say that we discern no difference in their practical application in this case and, therefore, for the sake of convenience, we consider plaintiff’s violation of public policy theory in the context of his unconscionability arguments.
Oregon courts have recognized their authority to refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts since the nineteenth century. See Balfour, 14 Or 47 (refusing [*20] to award attorney fees because amount specified in contract was unconscionable); see also Caples v. Steel, 7 Or 491 (1879) (court may refuse specific performance if bargain is unconscionable). Unconscionability is “assessed as of the time of contract formation,” and the doctrine “applies to contract terms rather than to contract performance.” Best v. U.S. National Bank, 303 Or 557, 560, 739 P2d 554 (1987) (“Unconscionability is a legal issue that must be assessed as of the time of contract formation.”); Tolbert v. First National Bank, 312 Or 485, 492 n 4, 823 P2d 965 (1991) (same).
Unconscionability may be procedural or substantive. Procedural unconscionability refers to the conditions of contract formation and focuses on two factors: oppression and surprise. See, e.g., John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts § 96(b), 555-56 (4th ed 2001) (describing components of procedural unconscionability). Oppression exists when there is inequality in bargaining power between the parties, resulting in no real opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract and the absence of meaningful choice. Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Oregon, Inc., 210 Or App 553, 566-567, 152 P3d 940, 948 (2007); Acorn v. Household Intern. Inc., 211 F Supp 2d 1160, 1168 (ND Cal. 2002). Surprise involves whether terms were hidden or obscure from the vantage of the party seeking to avoid them. Id. Generally speaking, factors such as ambiguous contract wording and fine print are the hallmarks of surprise. In contrast, the existence of gross inequality of [*21] bargaining power, a takeit- or-leave-it bargaining stance, and the fact that a contract involves a consumer transaction, rather than a commercial bargain, can be evidence of oppression.
Substantive unconscionability, on the other hand, generally refers to the terms of the contract, rather than the circumstances of formation, and focuses on whether the substantive terms contravene the public interest or public policy.7 See Restatement § 208 comment a; Williston on Contracts § 18.10 at 91. Both procedural and substantive deficiencies–frequently in combination–can preclude enforcement of a contract or contract term on unconscionability grounds. Restatement § 208 comment a.8
7 It sometimes can be difficult to categorize the factors on which a determination of unconscionability may be based as distinctly procedural or substantive, and even factors usually considered in assessing procedural unconscionability can help establish a violation of public policy. For example, the passage quoted above from Williston on Contracts § 18.10, 356 Or at suggests that adhesive and fine-print terms may be substantively unconscionable. Indeed, the author goes on to say that “[t]he distinction between procedural and substantive abuses * * * may become quite blurred.” [*22] Williston on Contracts § 18.10 at 108-111.
8 In some jurisdictions, courts require both procedural and substantive unconscionability before they will invalidate a contract. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal 4th 83, 114, 99 Cal Rptr 2d 745, 6 P3d 669, 690 (2000) (procedural and substantive unconscionability must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability); Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. v. Rigas, 923 So 2d 1077, 1087 (Ala 2005) (“To avoid an arbitration provision on the ground of unconscionability, the party objecting to arbitration must show both procedural and substantive unconscionability.”). This court has not addressed that issue, and because, as explained below, we conclude that both procedural and substantive considerations support the conclusion that the release here is unconscionable, we do not decide that issue in this case.
Identifying whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable requires consideration of evidence related to the specific circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract at issue. By contrast, the inquiry into substantive unconscionability can be more complicated. To discern whether, in the context of a particular transaction, substantive concerns relating to unfairness or oppression are sufficiently [*23] important to warrant interference with the parties’ freedom to contract as they see fit, courts frequently look to legislation for relevant indicia of public policy. When relevant public policy is expressed in a statute, the issue is one of legislative intent. See Uhlmann, 97 Or at 689-90 (so stating). In that situation, the court must examine the statutory text and context to determine whether the legislature intended to invalidate the contract term at issue.9 Id.
9 Many jurisdictions that limit or prohibit the use of anticipatory releases from negligence liability on public policy grounds do so as a matter of statutory enactment, rather than common law. For example, Great Britain and the States of Louisiana and Montana have statutory provisions that forbid contracts exculpating one party from liability for negligence that results in personal injury. Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977, ch 50, § 2(1) (Eng) (“A person cannot by reference to any contract term or to a notice given to persons generally or to particular persons exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence.”); La Civ Code Ann art 2004 (“Any clause is null that, in advance, excludes or limits the liability of one party for causing physical injury [*24] to the other party.”); Mont Code Ann § 28-2-702 (“All contracts that have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility * * * for violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”); see also Miller v. Fallon County, 222 Mont 214, 221, 721 P2d 342 (1986) (under statute, prospective release from liability for negligence is against the policy of the law and illegal, despite being a private contract between two persons without significant public implications).
Some states use statutes to make anticipatory releases from liability for negligence void as against public policy as to businesses providing recreational activities to the public. NY Gen Oblig Law § 5-326 (every contract between recreational business owner and user of facility, pursuant to which owner receives payment for use of facilities, that exempts owner from liability for damages resulting from owner’s negligence “shall be deemed void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable”); Haw Rev Stat § 663-1.54(a) (“Any person who owns or operates a business providing recreational activities to the public * * * shall be liable for damages resulting from negligent acts or omissions of the person which cause injury.”).
Other states have enacted more narrowly crafted statutes that deal with specific [*25] recreational activities, including skiing. For example, an Alaska statute specifically prohibits ski area operators from requiring skiers to enter into agreements releasing them from liability in exchange for the use of the facilities. Alaska Stat Ann § 05.45.120. In North Carolina, a statute imposes a duty on ski area operators “[n]ot to engage willfully or negligently in any type of conduct that contributes to or causes injury to another person or his properties.” NC Gen Stat § 99C-2(c)(7); NC Gen Statute § 9C-3 (violation of duties of ski area operator that causes injury or damage shall constitute negligence); see also Strawbridge v. Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc., 320 F Supp 2d 425, 433 (WD NC 2004) (in light of statutory duty imposed on ski area operators not to negligently engage in conduct that causes injury, exculpatory clause on back of lift ticket was unenforceable).
Still other states have statutes that pertain specifically to skiing and, although not addressing releases, prescribe ski area operator duties and provide that operators will be liable for a violation of those duties. Colo Rev Stat § 33-44-104(1) (violation of duties of ski area operator constitutes negligence to extent such violation causes injury to any person or damage to property); see also Anderson v. Vail Corp., 251 P3d 1125, 1129-30 (Colo App 2010) (if ski area operator violated statutory duties, exculpatory agreement would not release operator from [*26] liability); Idaho Code § 6-1107 (“Any ski area operator shall be liable for loss or damages caused by its failure to follow the duties set forth in [other sections of the Idaho Code pertaining to duties of ski area operators], where the violation of duty is causally related to the loss or damage suffered.”); NM Stat Ann § 24-15-11 (to same effect); ND Cent Code § 53-09-07 (same); W Va Code § 20-3A-6 (same); Utah Code Ann § 78B-4-401(public policy of Utah Inherent Risks of Skiing Act is to make ski area operators better able to insure themselves against the risk of loss occasioned by their negligence); see also Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 175 P3d 560, 564 (Utah 2007) (by extracting a pre-injury release from plaintiff for liability due to ski resort’s negligent acts, resort breached public policy underlying Utah Inherent Risks of Skiing Act).
Frequently, however, the argument that a contract term is sufficiently unfair or oppressive as to be unenforceable is grounded in one or more factors that are not expressly codified; in such circumstances, the common law has a significant role to play. As the commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains:
“Only infrequently does legislation, on grounds of public policy, provide that a term is unenforceable. When a court reaches that conclusion, it usually does so on the basis of a public policy [*27] derived either from its own perception of the need to protect some aspect of the public welfare or from legislation that is relevant to the policy although it says nothing explicitly about enforceability.”
Restatement § 178 comment b.
This court has considered whether enforcement of an anticipatory release would violate an uncodified public policy in only a few cases. Although, in those cases, this court has not expressly analyzed the issue through the lens of unconscionability, it has followed an approach that is generally consistent with the application of that doctrine. That is, the court has not declared such releases to be per se invalid, but neither has it concluded that they are always enforceable. Instead, the court has followed a multi-factor approach:
“Agreements to exonerate a party from liability or to limit the extent of the party’s liability for tortious conduct are not favorites of the courts but neither are they automatically voided. The treatment courts accord such agreements depends upon the subject and terms of the agreement and the relationship of the parties.”
K-Lines v. Roberts Motor Co., 273 Or 242, 248, 541 P2d 1378 (1975).
In K-Lines, this court upheld a limitation of liability contained in a commercial sales agreement. The court held that the [*28] fact
“[t]hat one party may possess greater financial resources than the other is not proof that such a disparity of bargaining power exists that a limitation of liability provisions should be voided.
“When the parties are business concerns dealing in a commercial setting and entering into an unambiguous agreement with terms commonly used in commercial transactions, the contract will not be deemed a contract of adhesion in the absence of evidence of unusual circumstances.”
Id. at 252-53. The court also noted that, in an earlier decision, it had stated: Cite as 356 Or 543 (2014) 559
“‘There is nothing inherently bad about a contract provision which exempts one of the parties from liability. The parties are free to contract as they please, unless to permit them to do so would contravene the public interest.'”
Id. at 248 (quoting Irish & Swartz Stores v. First Nat’l Bk., 220 Or 362, 375, 349 P2d 814 (1960), overruled on other grounds by Real Good Food v First National Bank, 276 Or 1057, 557 P2d 654 (1976)).10
10 In K-Lines, which, as noted, involved a commercial transaction, the court distinguished between releases from liability for ordinary negligence and releases involving more serious misconduct, concluding that the latter violate public policy, but that the former are not necessarily unenforceable. K-Lines, 273 Or at 249.
Soon after deciding K-Lines, this court, in Real Good Food, held that a bank-serving [*29] as a bailee for depositors-could not limit its liability for the negligence of its employees. Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court held:
“Where the defendant is a common carrier, an innkeeper, a public warehouseman, a public utility, or is otherwise charged with a duty of public service, and the agreement to assume the risk relates to the defendant’s performance of any part of that duty, it is well settled that it will not be given effect. Having undertaken the duty to the public, which includes the obligation of reasonable care, such defendants are not free to rid themselves of their public obligation by contract, or by any other agreement.”
Id. at 1061 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B comment g (1965)).11 The court in Real Good Food concluded that “[b]anks, like common carriers and utility companies, perform an important public service,” and the release therefore violated public policy and was unenforceable. 276 Or at 1061.
11 Restatement (Second)of Torts § 496B provides:
“A plaintiff who by contract or otherwise expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant’s negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy.”
According [*30] to the comments to that section, an exculpatory agreement should be upheld if it is freely and fairly made, if it is between parties who are in an equal bargaining position, and if there is no societal interest with which it interferes. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B comment b. Comments e-j set out a non-exclusive list of situations in which releases may interfere with societal interests, insofar as they are contrary to public policy. Among other things, in addition to situations like those described in the passage quoted above, the Restatement refuses to give effect to express liability releases where there is a substantial disparity in bargaining power. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B comment j.
Finally, this court has held that another factor for determining whether an anticipatory release may be unenforceable is the possibility of a harsh or inequitable result for the releasing party. Commerce & Industry Ins. v. Orth, 254 Or 226, 231-32, 458 P2d 926 (1969) (so stating); Estey v. MacKenzie Engineering Inc., 324 Or 372, 376-77, 927 P2d 86 (1996) (court’s inquiry into intent of parties to immunize against negligence “focuse[s] not only on the language of the contract, but also on the possibility of a harsh or inequitable result that would fall on one party by immunizing the other party from the consequences of his or her own negligence”).
We glean from those [*31] decisions that relevant procedural factors in the determination of whether enforcement of an anticipatory release would violate public policy or be unconscionable include whether the release was conspicuous and unambiguous; whether there was a substantial disparity in the parties’ bargaining power; whether the contract was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; and whether the contract involved a consumer transaction. Relevant substantive considerations include whether enforcement of the release would cause a harsh or inequitable result to befall the releasing party; whether the releasee serves an important public interest or function; and whether the release purported to disclaim liability for more serious misconduct than ordinary negligence. Nothing in our previous decisions suggests that any single factor takes precedence over the others or that the listed factors are exclusive. Rather, they indicate that a determination whether enforcement of an anticipatory release would violate public policy or be unconscionable must be based on the totality of the circumstances of a particular transaction. The analysis in that regard is guided, but not limited, by the factors that this court [*32] previously has identified; it is also informed by any other considerations that may be relevant, including societal expectations.12
12 Justice Peterson eloquently described the role of societal expectations in informing the development of both the common law and legislation:
“The beauty and strength of the common-law system is its infinite adaptability to societal change. Recent decisions of this court are illustrative. In Heino v. Harper, 306 Or 347, 349-50, 759 P2d 253 (1988), the court abolished interspousal immunity, holding ‘that the common-law rule of interspousal immunity is no longer available in this state to bar negligence actions between spouses.’ In Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or 718, 734, 681 P2d 776 (1984), the court abolished parental tort immunity for negligent injury to minor children. Nineteen years earlier, in Wights v. Staff Jennings, 241 Or 301, 310, 405 P2d 624 (1965), stating that ‘it is the function of the judiciary to modify the law of torts to fit the changing needs of society,’ the court held that a seller of a product may be held strictly liable for injuries to a plaintiff not in privity with the seller.
“The development of the common law occurs in an environment in which tensions abound. On occasion, the Legislative Assembly passes laws in response to decisions of this court. Products liability decisions of this court led to the enactment [*33] of a series of products liability statutes now found in ORS 30.900 to 30.927. A decision of this court involving an injury to a skier, Blair v. Mt. Hood Meadows Development Corp., 291 Or 293, 630 P2d 827, modified, 291 Or 703, 634 P2d 241 (1981), led to the enactment of statutes concerning skiing activities, ORS 30.970 to 30.990.
“On the other hand, this court, in deciding common-law issues presented to it, has ascertained public policy by looking to legislative enactments. The legislature is incapable of passing laws that govern every conceivable situation that might arise, however. The common-law court is the institution charged with the formulation and application of rules of governing law in situations not covered by constitution, legislation, or rules.”
Buchler v. Oregon Corrections Div., 316 Or 499, 518-19, 853 P2d 798 (1993) (Peterson, J., concurring).
With those principles in mind, we first consider the factors that usually are described as procedural, viz., those pertaining to the formation of the agreement. Plaintiff does not contend that the release was inconspicuous or ambiguous; that is, plaintiff does not contend that he was surprised by its terms. Thus, that factor weighs in favor of enforcement. Other procedural factors, however, point in a different direction. This was not an agreement between equals. Only one party to the contract-defendant-was a commercial enterprise, and that [*34] party exercised its superior bargaining strength by requiring its patrons, including plaintiff, to sign an anticipatory release on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as a condition of using its facilities. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 496B, explains, a release may not be enforced
“where there is such a disparity in bargaining power between the parties that the agreement does not represent a free choice on the part of the plaintiff. The basis for such a result is the policy of the law which relieves the party who is at such a disadvantage from harsh, inequitable, and unfair contracts which he is forced to accept by the necessities of his situation. The disparity in bargaining power may arise from the defendant’s monopoly of a particular field of service, from the generality of use of contract clauses insisting upon assumption of risk by those engaged in such a field, so that the plaintiff has no alternative possibility of obtaining the service without the clause; or it may arise from the exigencies of the needs of the plaintiff himself, which leave him no reasonable alternative to the acceptance of the offered terms.”
Id. comment j (emphasis added).
Also, plaintiff had no opportunity in this [*35] case to negotiate for different terms or pay an additional fee for protection against defendant’s negligence. What makes the substantial disparity in the parties’ bargaining positions even more significant in this circumstance is the limited number of ski areas that provide downhill skiing and snow-boarding opportunities in Oregon, and the generality of the use of similar releases among that limited commercial cohort.13 Simply put, plaintiff had no meaningful alternative to defendant’s take-it-or-leave-it terms if he wanted to participate in downhill snowboarding. Although that factor is not, by itself, dispositive,
“[w]hen one party is in such a superior bargaining position that it totally dictates all terms of the contract and the only option presented to the other party is to take it or leave it, some quantum of procedural unconscionability is established. The party who drafts such a contract of adhesion bears the responsibility of assuring that the provisions of the contract are not so one-sided as to be unconscionable.”
Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 693 NW2d 918, 925 (ND 2005).
13 In an excerpt from the transcript of plaintiff’s deposition that was included in the summary judgment record, plaintiff testified that he had never been to a ski resort [*36] where a release such as the one at issue here was not required.
We next consider the substantive factors that are relevant to our inquiry. The parties have identified the following relevant factors: whether enforcement of the release would cause a harsh or inequitable result; whether defendant’s recreational business operation serves an important public interest or function; and whether the release purported to disclaim liability for more serious misconduct than ordinary negligence.
We begin with the question whether enforcement of the release would cause a harsh and inequitable result to befall the releasing party, in this case, plaintiff. As discussed, this court has recognized the importance of that consideration in other cases. See, e.g., Estey, 324 Or at 376. As pertinent here, we conclude that the result would be harsh because, accepting as true the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff would not have been injured if defendant had exercised reasonable care in designing, constructing, maintaining, or inspecting the jump on which he was injured. And that harsh result also would be inequitable because defendant, not its patrons, has the expertise and opportunity to foresee and control hazards [*37] of its own creation on its premises, and to guard against the negligence of its employees. Moreover, defendant alone can effectively spread the cost of guarding and insuring against such risks among its many patrons.
Those public policy considerations are embodied in the common law of business premises liability. Business owners and operators have a heightened duty of care toward patrons–invitees14–with respect to the condition of their premises that exceeds the general duty of care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to others. Hagler v. Coastal Farm Holdings, Inc., 354 Or 132, 140-41, 309 P3d 1073 (2013); Garrison v. Deschutes County, 334 Or 264, 272, 48 P3d 807 (2002) (business invitee rule is a “special duty”). As this court explained in Woolston v. Wells, 297 Or 548, 557-58, 687 P2d 144 (1984):
“In general, it is the duty of the possessor of land to make the premises reasonably safe for the invitee’s visit. The possessor must exercise the standard of care above stated to discover conditions of the premises that create an unreasonable risk of harm to the invitee. The possessor must exercise that standard of care either to eliminate the condition creating that risk or to warn any foreseeable invitee of the risk so as to enable the invitee to avoid the harm.”
Furthermore, a business operator’s obligation to make its premises reasonably safe for its invitees includes taking into account [*38] the use to which the premises are put. See, e.g., Ragnone v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 291 Or 617, 621 n 3, 633 P2d 1287 (1981) (so stating); Mickel v. Haines Enterprises, Inc., 240 Or 369, 371-72, 400 P2d 518 (1965) (owner must “take reasonable precautions to protect the invitee from dangers which are foreseeable from the arrangement or use of the premises.”).
14 An “invitee” is “[a] person who has an express or implied invitation to enter or use another’s premises, such as a business visitor or a member of the public to whom the premises are held open.” Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary 846 (8th ed 1999).
The legislature has statutorily modified those duties to some extent in the Skier Responsibility Law, ORS 30.970 to 30.990. Under ORS 30.975, skiers assume certain risks:
“In accordance with ORS 31.600 [pertaining to contributory negligence] and notwithstanding ORS 31.620 (2) [abolishing the doctrine of implied assumption of risk], an individual who engages in the sport of skiing, alpine or nordic, accepts and assumes the inherent risks of skiing insofar as they are reasonably obvious, expected or necessary.”
ORS 30.970(1) describes “inherent risks of skiing”:
“‘Inherent risks of skiing’ includes, but is not limited to, those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport, such as changing weather conditions, variations or steepness in terrain, [*39] snow or ice conditions, surface or subsurface conditions, bare spots, creeks and gullies, forest growth, rocks, stumps, lift towers and other structures and their components, collisions with other skiers and a skier’s failure to ski within the skier’s own ability.”
ORS 30.985 prescribes the duties of skiers, which generally deal with behaving safely while skiing.
By providing that a skier assumes the “inherent risks of skiing,” ORS 30.975 reduced ski area operators’ heightened common law duty to discover and guard against certain natural and inherent risks of harm. However, the Skier Responsibility Law did not abrogate the common-law principle that skiers do not assume responsibility for unreasonable conditions created by a ski area operator insofar as Cite as 356 Or 543 (2014) 565 those conditions are not inherent to the activity. See Nolan v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 317 Or 328, 336, 856 P2d 305 (1993) (Skier Responsibility Law provides that “[t]o the extent an injury is caused by an inherent risk of skiing, a skier will not recover against a ski area operator; to the extent an injury is a result of [ski area operator] negligence, comparative negligence applies”). It follows that the public policy underlying the common-law duty of a ski area operator to exercise reasonable care to avoid creating [*40] risks of harm to its business invitees remains applicable in this case.
In short, because (1) accepting as true the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff would not have been injured if defendant had exercised reasonable care in designing, constructing, maintaining, or inspecting the jump on which he was injured; and (2) defendant, not its patrons, had the expertise and opportunity–indeed, the commonlaw duty–to foresee and avoid unreasonable risks of its own creation on its business premises, we conclude that the enforcement of the release would cause a harsh and inequitable result, a factor that militates against its enforcement.
To continue our analysis, we next consider whether defendant’s business operation serves an important public interest or function. The parties sharply disagree about the importance of that factor to our resolution of this case. According to defendant, that factor is paramount here, because, as a matter of law, anticipatory releases of negligence liability are unenforceable only when a defendant provides an “essential” public service.
Although this court has not previously addressed that precise issue in the context of a release involving a recreational [*41] activity, other courts have done so. As defendant observes, courts in several jurisdictions that lack statutory prohibitions of anticipatory releases of liability for negligence have upheld such releases (at least in part) on the ground that the activity at issue did not involve an “essential” public service.15 However, courts in other jurisdictions have taken the opposite approach, concluding that, regardless of whether the release involves an essential public service, anticipatory releases that immunize a party from the consequences of its own negligence can violate public policy or be unconscionable.
15 See, e.g., Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 NW 2d 727 (Minn App 1986) (upholding an exculpatory agreement entered into between a skydiving operation and a patron); Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, 607 Pa 1, 2 A3d 1174 (2010) (skiing); Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, 179 P3d 760 (Utah 2008) (bobsledding); Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica, LLC, 104 Cal App 4th 1351, 129 Cal Rptr 2d 197 (2002) (health club); Henderson v. Quest Expeditions, Inc., 174 SW3d 730, (Tenn Ct App 2005) (whitewater rafting).
For example, in Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 164 Vt 329, 670 A2d 795 (1995), the Vermont Supreme Court rejected the argument that anticipatory releases of negligence liability necessarily are enforceable in the context of recreational activities because such activities are not essential. 670 A2d at 799. In that case, the plaintiff sustained serious injuries when he collided with a metal pole that formed part of the control maze for a ski-lift line. He brought a negligence action against the [*42] defendant ski area operator, alleging that it had negligently designed, built, and placed the maze pole. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on an anticipatory release that the plaintiff had signed absolving the defendant of liability for negligence.
On appeal, the court noted that the release was conspicuous and unambiguous, but it nevertheless concluded that the release violated public policy. Id. at 797. The court began its analysis with the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B comment b, which states that an anticipatory release should be upheld if (1) it is freely and fairly made, (2) between parties who are in equal bargaining positions, and (3) there is no societal interest with which it interferes. Dalury, 670 A2d at 797. The parties’ dispute focused on the last issue. The defendant urged the court to conclude that, because skiing-like other recreational activities-is not a necessity of life, the sale of a lift ticket is a purely private transaction that implicates no public interest. The court concluded that “no single formula will reach the relevant public policy issues in every factual context.” Id. at 798. Rather, the court stated that it would consider “the totality of the circumstances [*43] of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations.” Id.
The court found a significant public policy consideration in the case in the law of premises liability; in particular, the court stated, business owners–including ski area operators–owe a duty of care to make their premises safe for patrons where their operations create a foreseeable risk of harm. Id. at 799. The court observed that
“[d]efendants, not recreational skiers, have the expertise and opportunity to foresee and control hazards, and to guard against the negligence of their agents and employees. They alone can properly maintain and inspect their premises, and train their employees in risk management. They alone can insure against risks and effectively spread the cost of insurance among their thousands of customers. Skiers, on the other hand, are not in a position to discover and correct risks of harm, and they cannot insure against the ski area’s negligence.
“If defendants were permitted to obtain broad waivers for their liability, an important incentive for ski areas to manage risk would be removed with the public bearing the cost of the resulting injuries. * * * It is illogical, in these circumstances, to undermine the [*44] public policy underlying business invitee law and allow skiers to bear risks they have no ability or right to control.”
Id.
Turning to the defendant’s argument that the release was enforceable because ski resorts do not provide an essential public service, the court stated that, “[w]hile interference with an essential public service surely affects the public interest, those services do not represent the universe of activities that implicate public concerns.” Id. The court held that, “when a facility becomes a place of public accommodation, it ‘render[s] a service which has become of public interest in the manner of the innkeepers and common carriers of old.'” Id. at 799-800 (quoting Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 279, 83 S Ct 1122, 10 L Ed 2d 338 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, the court’s analysis was informed by a statute that placed the “inherent risks” of any sport on the participant, insofar as the risks were obvious and necessary.16 The court stated that “[a] ski area’s own negligence * * * is neither an inherent risk nor an obvious and necessary one in the sport of skiing,” and, therefore, “a skier’s assumption of the inherent risks of skiing does not abrogate the ski area’s duty to warn of or correct dangers which in the exercise of reasonable prudence in [*45] the circumstances could have been foreseen and corrected.” Dalury, 670 A2d at 800 (internal quotation marks omitted).17
16 Vermont Statutes Annotated title 12, section 1037, provides:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1036 of this title, a person who takes part in any sport accepts as a matter of law the dangers that inhere therein insofar as they are obvious and necessary.”
17 For similar reasons, the Connecticut Supreme Court also has declined to enforce an anticipatory release of negligence liability in the face of the defendant’s contention that recreational activities do not implicate the public interest. Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 276 Conn 314, 885 A2d 734 (2005). Hanks was a negligence action brought by a plaintiff who was injured when his foot was caught between his snowtube and the artificial bank of a snowtubing run at a ski resort operated by the defendant. The defendant relied on an anticipatory release that the plaintiff had signed that purported to absolve the defendant from liability for its negligence. The court acknowledged that the release was conspicuous and unambiguous, but ultimately agreed with the Vermont Supreme Court that determining what constitutes the public interest required consideration of all relevant circumstances, including that the plaintiff lacked sufficient knowledge and authority to discern [*46] whether, much less ensure that, the snowtubing runs were maintained in a reasonably safe condition. Id. at 331. Thus, the court held, “it is illogical to permit snowtubers, and the public generally, to bear the costs of risks that they have no ability or right to control.” Id. at 332.
We, too, think that the fact that defendant does not provide an essential public service does not compel the conclusion that the release in this case must be enforced. As the court stated in Dalury, “[w]hile interference with an essential public service surely affects the public interest, those services do not represent the universe of activities that implicate public concerns.” 670 A2d at 799. It is true that ski areas do not provide the kind of public service typically associated with government entities or heavily regulated private enterprises such as railroads, hospitals, or banks. See Real Good Food, 276 Or at 1061 (“Banks, like common carriers and utility companies, perform an important public service, and, for that very reason, are subject to state and federal regulation.”). However, like other places of public accommodation such as inns or public warehouses, defendant’s business premises–including its terrain park–are open to the general public virtually without [*47] restriction, and large numbers of skiers and snowboarders regularly avail themselves of its facilities. To be sure, defendants’ business facilities are privately owned, but that characteristic does not overcome a number of legitimate public interests concerning their operation.18
18 Public accommodations laws that prohibit discrimination against potential users of the facility are just one example of limitations imposed by law that affect the use of defendant’s premises. See, e.g., ORS 447.220 (explaining purpose of ORS 447.210-280 to make places of public accommodation accessible to persons with disability); ORS 447.210 (defining public accommodation to include “places of recreation”); ORS 659A.403 (prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation); ORS 659A.400 (defining places of public accommodation for purposes of ORS 659A.403 to include places offering “amusements”).
The major public interests at stake are those underlying the law of business premises liability. The policy rationale is to place responsibility for negligently created conditions of business premises on those who own or control them, with the ultimate goal of mitigating the risk of injury-producing accidents. Hagler, 354 Or at 140-41; Garrison, 334 Or at 272. In that setting, where a business operator extends a general invitation [*48] to enter and engage in activities on its premises that is accepted by large numbers of the public, and those invitees are subject to risks of harm from conditions of the operator’s creation, their safety is a matter of broad societal concern. See Dalury, 670 A2d 799 (“[W]hen a substantial number of such sales take place as a result of the [operator’s] general invitation to the public to utilize the facilities and services in question, a legitimate public interest arises.”). The public interest, therefore, is affected by the performance of the operator’s private duties toward them. See, e.g., Strawbridge v. Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc., 320 F Supp 2d 425, 433-34 (WD NC 2004) (holding, under North Carolina law, that “the ski industry is sufficiently regulated and tied to the public interest” to preclude enforcement of anticipatory release, based on the principle that “a party cannot protect himself by contract[ing] against liability for negligence * * * where * * * public interest is involved, or where public interest requires the performance of a private duty”). Accordingly, we reject defendant’s argument that the fact that skiing and snowboarding are “non-essential” activities compels enforcement of the release in this case. Instead, we conclude that defendant’s business operation is sufficiently tied [*49] to the public interest as to require the performance of its private duties to its patrons.
Finally, we consider the nature of the conduct to which the release would apply in this case. Defendant makes a fair point that, although the release purports to immunize it from liability for any misconduct short of intentional conduct, plaintiff’s claim is based on ordinary negligence. Defendant notes that this court has held that an anticipatory release violates public policy where it purports to immunize the releasee from liability for gross negligence, reckless, or intentional conduct, but a release that disclaims liability only for ordinary negligence more often is enforced. K-Lines, 273 Or at 249. That statement is correct as a general comment on the validity of anticipatory releases, but, of course, whether any particular release will be enforced depends on the various factors that we discuss in this opinion. In the circumstances of this transaction, the fact that plaintiff’s claim is based on negligence rather than on more egregious conduct carries less weight than the other substantive factors that we have considered or than it would, for example, in a commercial transaction between parties of relatively [*50] equal bargaining power.19
19 Defendant does not contend that the release would be enforceable against a claim based on alleged gross negligence or reckless conduct.
SUMMARY AND APPLICATION
To summarize, our analysis leads to the conclusion that permitting defendant to exculpate itself from its own negligence would be unconscionable. As discussed, important procedural factors supporting that conclusion include the substantial disparity in the parties’ bargaining power in the particular circumstances of this consumer transaction, and the fact that the release was offered to plaintiff and defendant’s other customers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
There also are indications that the release is substantively unfair and oppressive. First, a harsh and inequitable result would follow if defendant were immunized from negligence liability, in light of (1) defendant’s superior ability to guard against the risk of harm to its patrons arising from its own negligence in designing, creating, and maintaining its runs, slopes, jumps, and other facilities; and (2) defendant’s superior ability to absorb and spread the costs associated with insuring against those risks. Second, because defendant’s business premises [*51] are open to the general public virtually without restriction, large numbers of skiers and snowboarders regularly avail themselves of its facilities, and those patrons are subject to risks of harm from conditions on the premises of defendant’s creation, the safety of those patrons is a matter of broad societal concern. The public interest, therefore, is affected by the performance of defendant’s private duties toward them under business premises liability law.
In the ultimate step of our unconscionability analysis, we consider whether those procedural and substantive considerations outweigh defendant’s interest in enforcing the release at issue here. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 comment b (“[A] decision as to enforceability is reached only after a careful balancing, in the light of all the circumstances, of the interest in the enforcement of the particular promise against the policy against the enforcement of such terms.”). Defendant argues that, in light of the inherent risks of skiing, it is neither unfair nor oppressive for a ski area operator to insist on a release from liability for its own negligence. As defendant explains,
“[W]hen the plaintiff undertook this activity, he exposed himself [*52] to a high risk of injury. Only he controlled his speed, course, angle, ‘pop’ and the difficulty of his aerial maneuver. Skiing and snowboarding requires [sic] the skier to exercise appropriate caution and good judgment. Sometimes, even despite the exercise of due care, accidents and injuries occur.”
Further, defendant contends, denying enforcement of such a release
“improperly elevates premises liability tort law above the freedom to contract, fails to take into account the countervailing policy interest of providing recreational opportunities to the public, fails to recognize that certain recreational activities are inherently dangerous and fails to consider the fact that the ski area operator has little, if any, control over the skier/snowboarder.”
Defendant’s arguments have some force. After all, skiing and snow boarding are activities whose allure and risks derive from a unique blend of factors that include natural features, artificial constructs, and human engagement. It may be difficult in such circumstances to untangle the causal forces that lead to an injury-producing accident. Moreover, defendant is correct that several relevant factors weigh in favor of enforcing the release. [*53] As discussed, the release was conspicuous and unambiguous, defendant’s alleged misconduct in this case was negligence, not more egregious conduct, and snowboarding is not a necessity of life.
That said, the release is very broad; it applies on its face to a multitude of conditions and risks, many of which (such as riding on a chairlift) leave defendant’s patrons vulnerable to risks of harm of defendant’s creation. Accepting as true the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, defendant designed, created, and maintained artificial constructs, including the jump on which plaintiff was injured.20 Even in the context of expert snowboarding in defendant’s terrain park, defendant was in a better position than its invitees to guard against risks of harm created by its own conduct.
20 We reiterate that the issues of whether defendant actually was negligent in one or more of the particulars alleged by plaintiff, whether and the extent to which plaintiff was comparatively negligent, and the extent to which either party’s negligence actually caused plaintiff’s injuries, are not before us on review.
A final point deserves mention. It is axiomatic that public policy favors the deterrence of negligent conduct. [*54] 2 Farnsworth on Contracts § 5.2, 9-12 (“[i]n precedents accumulated over centuries,” courts have relied on policy “against the commission or inducement of torts and similar wrongs”). Although that policy of deterrence has implications in any case involving the enforceability of an anticipatory release of negligence liability, here, that policy bolsters the other considerations that weigh against enforcement of the release. As the parties readily agree, the activities at issue in this case involve considerable risks to life and limb. Skiers and snowboarders have important legal inducements to exercise reasonable care for their own safety by virtue of their statutory assumption of the inherent risks of skiing. By contrast, without potential exposure to liability for their own negligence, ski area operators would lack a commensurate legal incentive to avoid creating unreasonable risks of harm to their business invitees. See Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Sumter Plywood Corp., 359 So 2d 1140, 1145 (Ala 1978) (human experience shows that exculpatory agreements induce a lack of care). Where, as here, members of the public are invited to participate without restriction in risky activities on defendant’s business premises (and many do), and where the risks of harm posed by operator negligence [*55] are appreciable, such an imbalance in legal incentives is not conducive to the public interest.
Because the factors favoring enforcement of the release are outweighed by the countervailing considerations that we have identified, we conclude that enforcement of the release at issue in this case would be unconscionable.21 And, because the release is unenforceable, genuine issues of fact exist that preclude summary judgment in defendant’s favor. It follows that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and in denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment, and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment dismissing plaintiff’s action.
21 By so concluding, we do not mean to suggest that a business owner or operator never may enforce an anticipatory release or limitation of negligence liability from its invitees. As explained, multiple factors may affect the analysis, including, among others, whether a legally significant disparity in the parties’ bargaining power existed that made the release or limitation unfairly adhesive, whether the owner/operator permitted a patron to pay additional reasonable fees to obtain protection against negligence, [*56] the extent to which the business operation is tied to the public interest, including whether the business is open to and serves large numbers of the general public without restriction, and the degree to which the personal safety of the invitee is subjected to the risk of carelessness by the owner/ operator.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
7th Annual CAIC Benefit Bash Breckenridge Riverwalk Center: You Ski, You Should Be There!
Posted: November 1, 2014 Filed under: Avalanche | Tags: avalanche, backcountry, Breckenridge, CAIC, Colorado Avalance Information Center, skiing, snowboarding Leave a commentYOU ARE INVITED!
7th Annual CAIC Benefit Bash
Presented By: Backcountry Access, Voile, Weston Snowboards, Vail Resorts Epic Promise, Arc’teryx, Black Diamond, and Freeride Systems
Saturday, November 8, 2014
5 p.m. – 10 p.m.
Breckenridge Riverwalk Center
150 West Adams Ave
Breckenridge, CO 80424
Tickets: https://itkt.choicecrm.net/templates/WALK/
More info: http://avalanche.state.co.us/about-us/events/7th-annual-caic-benefit-bash/
The Friends of the CAIC are proud to host the Seventh Annual CAIC Benefit Bash, a benefit for the Colorado Avalanche Information Center (CAIC), on Friday, Nov. 8, 2014 at the Riverwalk Center in Breckenridge. Mountain enthusiasts are invited to rally together and support CAIC in their continued efforts of avalanche forecasting and education throughout Colorado. This winter kick-off staple features live music from Shakedown Street, an array of tasty food from local restaurants and incredible beer from Colorado’s own, New Belgium Brewery. Don’t miss out on the Benefit Bash’s massive silent auction, live auction and thousands of dollars worth of door prizes and giveaways.
Also, don’t forget to book your hotel rooms. Beaver Run Resort is offering discounted rates for our attendees. Rooms can be booked by calling Beaver Run group reservations at 1-800-525-2253 and mentioning the CAIC Benefit Bash.
We are looking forward to another great event!
Rare issue this case looked at a release signed by a minor that prevented a suit for his injuries after turning age 18
Posted: May 5, 2014 Filed under: Oregon, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Age of Majority, Air Chamber, Boarder, Boarding, Disaffirm, Inc., Mt. Bachelor, Mt. Bachelor Ski and Summer Resort, Myles A. Bagley, Oregon, Release, ski area, Ski Resort, Snowboarder, snowboarding, Terrain park 2 CommentsThis decision was just overturned by the Oregon Supreme Court in Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., dba Mt. Bachelor Ski and Summer Resort, 2014 Ore. LEXIS 994 on December 18, 20014
The term is disaffirm, the minor must disaffirm the release or contract after reaching age 18 or the release or contract is valid.
Date of the Decision: September 5, 2013
Plaintiff: Myles A. Bagley, individually, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Al Bagley, individually; and Lauren Bagley, individually, Plaintiffs
Defendant: Mt. Bachelor, Inc., dba Mt. Bachelor Ski and Summer Resort
Plaintiff Claims: (1) concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bagley ratified, after reaching the age of majority, a release agreement entered into while he was a minor; (2) concluding that the release agreement was not contrary to public policy; and (3) concluding that the release agreement was neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable.
Defendant Defenses: Release
Holding: for the defendant. The minor took advantage of the benefits of the contract (release) and did not disaffirm the contract upon reaching the age of majority (18).
This is a rare review of release or contract law because the odds are against it. A contract is voidable by the minor when the minor signs the contract. However, if the contract is in effect when the minor reaches the age of majority, the minor can either disaffirm the contract which puts the parties back in the position before the contract was signed or if he or she fails to do that he or she takes advantages of the benefits of the contract and continues to use it the contract is in force.
To determine the age of majority or the age a minor becomes an adult in each state see The age that minors become adults.
The minor signed a season pass release at the defendant ski area. His father signed a minor release and indemnity agreement. Two weeks later and before the plaintiff had started snowboarding he turned 18. Once he started snowboarding, after reaching age 18, he boarded at the defendant’s resort 26 different days and his pass was scanned 119 times.
Going through the terrain park where he seemed to spend most of his time, the plaintiff was injured on a jump which resulted in permanent paralysis.
The minor and his parents sued the resort. The trial court dismissed his complaints after the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the release the minor had signed.
Summary of the case
The appellate court reviewed the facts and pointed several of the facts out repeatedly.
He was also an experienced snowboarder, had signed release agreements at other ski resorts in the past, and had purchased a season pass and signed a release agreement for each of the preceding three years that he spent snowboarding at Mt. Bachelor.
After reaching age 18 the plaintiff used the release 119 times over 26 days during a four month period. Once you affirm a contract, by using it and not disaffirming it, you cannot later disaffirm the contract. A contract is affirmed if the contract is not disaffirmed which requires an act on the part of the plaintiff. Meaning if the minor does not make an affirmative act to disaffirm the release then the release stands.
In Oregon, a former minor may disaffirm a contract within a “reasonable time” after reaching the age of majority, or, conversely, may ratify a contract after reaching the age of majority by manifesting an intent to let the contract stand, “[I]f an infant after reaching the age of majority engages in any conduct that objectively manifests an intent to regard the bargain as binding, the former minor will be held as a matter of law to have ratified the contract.”).
In this case the only disaffirmance occurred two years later when the plaintiff started his lawsuit.
The plaintiff then argued that because he had no knowledge of the power to disaffirm this release he should not be held to his failure to disaffirm. However the court shot this down with the standard statement. “However, we have previously stated that “[i]gnorance of the law is not a basis for not enforcing a contract.“”
The court then reviewed the requirements for a valid release under Oregon law. “[W]hen one party seeks to contract away liability for its own negligence in advance of any harm, the intent to do so must be ‘clearly and unequivocally expressed.”
The public policy argument was also shot down in a very common sense manner.
“[T]here are no public policy considerations that prevent a diving school from limiting liability for its own negligence. The diving school does not provide an essential public service[.]”). A ski resort, like a diving school, primarily offers “recreational activities” (with possible exceptions that do not apply here, e.g., training for search-and-rescue personnel) and does not provide an “essential public service.
The release was also found to not be unconscionable.
[T]he doctrine of unconscionability does not relieve parties from all unfavorable terms that result from the parties’ respective bargaining positions; it relieves them from terms that are unreasonably favorable to the party with greater bargaining power. Oregon courts have been reluctant to disturb agreements between parties on the basis of unconscionability, even when those parties do not come to the bargaining table with equal power. In those rare instances in which our courts have declared contractual provisions unconscionable, there existed serious procedural and substantive unfairness
The court followed up the public policy quote with “…albeit in dictum and in the context of addressing public-policy arguments, suggested that standard-form release agreements in the context of recreational activities are not impermissibly adhesive.”
A recreational activity is not subject to public policy arguments because the signer can:
“…simply walk away without signing the release and participating in the activity, and thus the contract signed under such circumstances is not unconscionable”
“[T]he release from liability is not invalid as a contract of adhesion, because [the] plaintiff voluntarily chose to ski at Mt. Bachelor and the ski resort does not provide essential public services.”
Because it was the plaintiff’s choice to board at the defendants ski area the release did not violate public policy.
When an individual enters a ski shop to buy ski equipment, s/he does not have a need for those goods and services, merely a desire. Should the seller demand exculpation as a condition for the sale of the equipment, the purchaser is free to walk away.
The one misstatement in my opinion which the court also pointed out was language that exempted the release for intentional acts. “THE ONLY CLAIMS NOT RELEASED ARE THOSE BASED UPON INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT.” The capitalized print made this statement in the release even standout. The court, found this to be curious and probably was thinking the same way I did, why give the plaintiff’s a way out of the release.
The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the release as a defense to the claims of the plaintiff.
So Now What?
When a guest enters their date of birth in the information form indicating they are under the age of majority, this always creates a problems because minor’s cannot sign releases. However, if the minor can read the release, even the release is voided by the minor, it can still be used to prove assumption of the risk by the minor.
If the minor is turning the age of majority during the term of the release you can have the minor reaffirm the release or sign a new release after his birthday.
The court repeatedly pointed out how many times the plaintiff had used the release, how many releases at this resort and other resorts the plaintiff had signed before and the experience of the plaintiff. Keep track of this information because it will be valuable in any case showing that the release was an accepted contract for the plaintiff.
Never write in your release the ways the plaintiff can sue you. Here the statement in the release that it was not effective for intentional misconduct is the same as telling the plaintiff to write their complaint to couch the injury as an intentional act on the part of the defendant.
On the good side, the ski area had the minor sign the release, even though the release at the time was of no value. A release signed by a minor might have value later as in this case or might be able to prove assumption of the risk.
The Oregon Supreme Court has just accepted this case for review of this decision. So please learn from this article but do not rely upon it yet. (http://rec-law.us/1jaw8g2)
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Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 258 Ore. App. 390; 310 P.3d 692; 2013 Ore. App. LEXIS 1080
Posted: May 5, 2014 Filed under: Legal Case, Oregon, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Age of Majority, Air Chamber, Boarder, Boarding, Disaffirm, Inc., Mount Bachelor, Mt. Bachelor, Mt. Bachelor Ski and Summer Resort, Myles A. Bagley, Oregon, Release, ski area, Ski Resort, Snowboard, Snowboarder, snowboarding, Terrain park Leave a commentThis decision was just overturned by the Oregon Supreme Court in Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., dba Mt. Bachelor Ski and Summer Resort, 2014 Ore. LEXIS 994 on December 18, 20014
Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 258 Ore. App. 390; 310 P.3d 692; 2013 Ore. App. LEXIS 1080
Myles A. Bagley, individually, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Al Bagley, individually; and Lauren Bagley, individually, Plaintiffs, v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., dba Mt. Bachelor Ski and Summer Resort, Defendant-Respondent, and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants.
A148231
COURT OF APPEALS OF OREGON
258 Ore. App. 390; 310 P.3d 692; 2013 Ore. App. LEXIS 1080
September 6, 2012, Argued and Submitted
September 5, 2013, Filed
COUNSEL: Kathryn H. Clarke argued the cause for appellant. On the opening brief were Bryan W. Gruetter and Joseph S. Walsh. With her on the reply brief was Lisa T. Hunt.
Andrew C. Balyeat argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Balyeat & Eager, LLP.
JUDGES: Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Sercombe, Judge, and Hadlock, Judge.
OPINION BY: SERCOMBE
OPINION
[**694] [*392] SERCOMBE, J.
Plaintiff Bagley, after suffering serious injuries while snowboarding over a “jump” in defendant Mt. Bachelor, Inc.’s (Mt. Bachelor) “terrain park,” brought this action alleging negligence in the design, construction, maintenance, or inspection of that jump. 1 The trial court granted Mt. Bachelor’s motion for summary judgment, which was based on the affirmative defense of release, and denied Bagley’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment pertaining to that same issue. Bagley appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in (1) concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bagley ratified, after reaching the age of majority, a release agreement entered into while he was a minor; (2) concluding that the release agreement was not contrary [***2] to public policy; and (3) concluding that the release agreement was neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the trial court and, accordingly, affirm.
1 For ease of reading, notwithstanding additional named parties (Bagley’s parents and “John Does 1-10”), we refer throughout this opinion to plaintiff “Bagley” and defendant “Mt. Bachelor.”
[HN1] In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts, along with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party–here, Bagley on Mt. Bachelor’s motion and Mt. Bachelor on Bagley’s cross-motion. ORCP 47 C; Vaughn v. First Transit, Inc., 346 Ore. 128, 132, 206 P3d 181 (2009). On September 29, 2005, just under two weeks before his 18th birthday, Bagley purchased a “season pass” from Mt. Bachelor. Bagley was a skilled and experienced snowboarder, having purchased season passes from Mt. Bachelor for each of the preceding three years and having classified his skill level as of early 2006, immediately prior to the injury, as “advanced expert.” Upon purchasing the season pass, he executed [**695] a release agreement as required by Mt. Bachelor. That [***3] agreement read, in pertinent part:
“RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
“IN CONSIDERATION OF THE USE OF A MT. BACHELOR PASS AND/OR MT. BACHELOR’S PREMISES, I/WE AGREE TO RELEASE AND INDEMNIFY MT. BACHELOR, [*393] INC., ITS OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, OWNERS, AGENTS, LANDOWNERS, AFFILIATED COMPANIES, AND EMPLOYEES (HEREINAFTER ‘MT. BACHELOR, INC.’) FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE, INJURY, OR DEATH WHICH I/WE MAY SUFFER OR FOR WHICH I/WE MAY BE LIABLE TO OTHERS, IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH SKIING, SNOWBOARDING, OR SNOWRIDING. THIS RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT SHALL APPLY TO ANY CLAIM EVEN IF CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE. THE ONLY CLAIMS NOT RELEASED ARE THOSE BASED UPON INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT.
“* * * * *
“THE UNDERSIGNED(S) HAVE CAREFULLY READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT AND ALL OF ITS TERMS ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS DOCUMENT. THIS INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, THE DUTIES OF SKIERS, SNOWBOARDERS, OR SNOWRIDERS. THE UNDERSIGNED(S) UNDERSTAND THAT THIS DOCUMENT IS AN AGREEMENT OF RELEASE AND INDEMNITY WHICH WILL PREVENT THE UNDERSIGNED(S) OR THE UNDERSIGNEDS’ ESTATE FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES FROM MT. BACHELOR, INC. IN THE EVENT OF DEATH OR INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY. THE UNDERSIGNED(S), NEVERTHELESS, [***4] ENTER INTO THIS AGREEMENT FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY AND AGREE IT IS BINDING ON THE UNDERSIGNED(S) AND THE UNDERSIGNEDS’ HEIRS AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES.
“BY MY/OUR SIGNATURE(S) BELOW, I/WE AGREE THAT THIS RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WILL REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT AND I WILL BE BOUND BY ITS TERMS THROUGHOUT THIS SEASON AND ALL SUBSEQUENT SEASONS FOR WHICH I/WE RENEW THIS SEASON PASS.
“SEE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS SHEET * * * FOR DUTIES OF SKIERS, SNOWBOARDERS, OR SNOW RIDERS WHICH YOU MUST OBSERVE.”
(Underscoring and capitalization in original; emphases added.) The reverse side of the document detailed the “Duties of Skiers” pursuant to ORS 30.990 and ORS 30.985 and also included printed notification that “Skiers/Snowboarders/Snowriders [*394] Assume Certain Risks” under ORS 30.975–namely, the “inherent risks of skiing.” 2 In addition, because Bagley was not yet 18, his father executed a “minor release and indemnity agreement” (capitalization omitted) that read as follows:
“I HEREBY AGREE TO RELEASE AND INDEMNIFY MT. BACHELOR, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, OWNERS, AGENTS, LANDOWNERS, AFFILIATED COMPANIES, AND EMPLOYEES FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE, INJURY, OR DEATH WHICH [***5] THE MINOR(S) NAMED BELOW MAY SUFFER OR FOR WHICH HE OR SHE MAY BE LIABLE TO OTHERS, IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH SKIING, SNOWBOARDING, OR SNOWRIDING. THIS RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT SHALL APPLY TO ANY CLAIM EVEN IF CAUSED BY [**696] NEGLIGENCE. THE ONLY CLAIMS NOT RELEASED ARE THOSE BASED UPON INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT.
“BY MY SIGNATURE BELOW, I AGREE THAT THIS MINOR RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WILL REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT AND I WILL BE BOUND BY ITS TERMS THROUGHOUT THIS SEASON AND ALL SUBSEQUENT SEASONS FOR WHICH THIS SEASON PASS IS RENEWED.
“I HAVE CAREFULLY READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT AND ALL OF ITS TERMS.”
(Capitalization in original; emphasis added.)
2 Oregon has promulgated statutes specifically pertaining to skiing and ski areas. See ORS 30.970 – 30.990. Those statutes, inter alia, set forth the “duties” of skiers, require that ski area operators inform skiers of those duties, establish notice requirements and a statute of limitations pertaining specifically to injury or death while skiing, and provide that those who engage in the sport of skiing accept and assume the risks inherent in that activity.
Less than two weeks after purchasing the season pass and executing the [***6] above-quoted release agreement, Bagley reached the age of majority–turning 18 on October 12, 2005. Thereafter, on November 18, 2005, Bagley began using the pass, on which the crux of the release agreement was also printed:
[*395] “READ THIS RELEASE AGREEMENT
“IN CONSIDERATION FOR EACH LIFT RIDE, THE TICKET USER RELEASES AND AGREES TO HOLD HARMLESS AND INDEMNIFY MT. BACHELOR, INC., AND ITS EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS FROM ALL CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE, INJURY OR DEATH EVEN IF CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE. THE ONLY CLAIMS NOT RELEASED ARE THOSE BASED UPON INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT.”
(Capitalization in original; emphasis added.) Further, the following sign was posted at each of Mt. Bachelor’s ski lift terminals:
“YOUR TICKET IS A RELEASE
“The back of your ticket contains a release of all claims against Mt. Bachelor, Inc. and its employees or agents. Read the back of your ticket before you ride any lifts or use any of the facilities of Mt. Bachelor, Inc. If you purchase a ticket from someone else, you must provide this ticket release information to that person or persons.
“Skiers and lift passengers who use tickets at this resort release and agree to hold harmless and indemnify Mt. Bachelor, Inc., its employees and [***7] agents from all claims for property damage, injury or death which he/she may suffer or for which he/she may be liable to others, arising out of the use of Mt. Bachelor’s premises, whether such claims are for negligence or any other theory of recovery, except for intentional misconduct.
“If you do not agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of the sale of your ticket, please do not purchase the ticket or use the facilities at Mt. Bachelor.
“Presentation of this ticket to gain access to the premises and facilities of this area is an acknowledgment of your agreement to the terms and conditions outlined above.”
(Capitalization in original; emphases added.)
Ultimately, beginning on November 18, 2005, after his 18th birthday, Bagley used his season pass to ride Mt. Bachelor’s lifts at least 119 times over the course of 26 days spent snowboarding at the ski area. However, on February 16, 2006, while snowboarding over a manmade jump in Mt. Bachelor’s “air chamber” terrain park, Bagley sustained serious injuries resulting in permanent paralysis.
[*396] On June 16, 2006, approximately four months later, Bagley provided Mt. Bachelor with formal notice of his injury under ORS 30.980(1), which requires [***8] that “[a] ski area operator * * * be notified of any injury to a skier * * * within 180 days after the injury * * *.” Nearly two years after the injury, on February 15, 2008, Bagley brought this action–filing a complaint alleging negligence on Mt. Bachelor’s part in designing, constructing, maintaining, or inspecting the jump on which Bagley was injured. Mt. Bachelor answered, in part, by invoking the affirmative defense of release–pointing to the above-quoted release agreements signed by Bagley and his father prior to the date of injury.
Mt. Bachelor quickly moved for summary judgment on that ground, arguing before the trial court that, by failing to disaffirm the voidable release agreement within a reasonable [**697] period of time after reaching the age of majority, and by accepting the benefits of that agreement and “objectively manifest[ing] his intent to affirm” it (i.e., by riding Mt. Bachelor’s lifts 119 times over 26 days), Bagley had ratified the release and was therefore bound by it. Mt. Bachelor further noted that Bagley “admittedly understood that he [had] entered into a release agreement and was snowboarding under its terms on the date of [the] accident.” Accordingly, Mt. Bachelor [***9] argued, because Bagley had ratified a release agreement that unambiguously disclaimed liability for negligence, there was no material issue of fact as to whether that agreement barred Bagley’s action, and Mt. Bachelor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 3
3 Mt. Bachelor additionally argued, as pertinent to this appeal, that the release agreement was neither adhesionary nor contrary to public policy under Oregon law. Specifically, it argued that “skiers and snowboarders voluntarily choose to ski and snowboard and ski resorts do not provide essential public services.”
Bagley then filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to Mt. Bachelor’s affirmative defense of release, arguing that “there [was] no genuine issue of material fact [as to whether] the release [was] void and unenforceable as a matter of law.” Specifically, Bagley argued that he timely disaffirmed the release agreement by (1) notifying Mt. Bachelor of the injury pursuant to ORS 30.980(1), (2) filing his complaint for negligence within the two-year statute of limitations “for injuries to a skier” established by ORS 30.980(3), [*397] and (3) “plead[ing] infancy as a defense to [Mt. Bachelor’s] First Affirmative Defense [***10] on the release executed by [Bagley] while an infant.” Additionally, in response to Mt. Bachelor’s motion, Bagley alternatively argued that “whether [he] disaffirmed the Release within a reasonable time should be determined by the jury as a question of fact” because a material issue of fact existed as to Bagley’s knowledge of both the scope of the release (namely, whether it covered claims for negligence) and “of his right to disaffirm” it (i.e., whether it was voidable). He further argued that the release was contrary to public policy and “both substantively and procedurally unconscionable.”
The trial court agreed with Mt. Bachelor, reasoning that Bagley’s “use of the pass following his eighteenth birthday constitute[d] an affirmation of the contract and release agreement each time the pass was used, a total of 119 times over a period of 26 different days, up to February 16, 2006[,]” and noting that, “[o]nce there [was] an affirmation, [Bagley could] no longer disaffirm the contract.” The court rejected Bagley’s public policy and unconscionability arguments, reasoning that “[s]now riding is not such an essential service which requires someone such as [Bagley] to be forced to sign a [***11] release in order to obtain the service.” Accordingly, having determined that Bagley ratified the release agreement after reaching the age of majority and that “there [was] no basis by which [it could] find the release invalid[,]” the trial court granted summary judgment in Mt. Bachelor’s favor and denied Bagley’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Bagley now appeals, reprising his arguments below.
[HN2] On appeal, we review the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment to determine whether we agree “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” ORCP 47 C; see O’Dee v. Tri-County Metropolitan Trans. Dist., 212 Ore. App. 456, 460, 157 P3d 1272 (2007). [HN3] No genuine issue of material fact exists if, “based upon the record before the court viewed in a manner most favorable to the adverse party, no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary judgment.” ORCP 47 C.
[*398] In his first assignment of error, Bagley asserts that “[t]here is a genuine factual dispute as to whether [his] actions or omissions after reaching the age of majority [***12] were enough to disaffirm or affirm the contract he entered with [Mt. Bachelor] when he was a minor.” More specifically, Bagley argues that “[a] jury could reasonably infer from the facts that merely turning 18 years old and continuing to snowboard was not conclusive evidence of [his] intent to affirm the release [**698] and agree to waive all prospective claims for [Mt. Bachelor’s] negligence.” He argues that a jury “could just as easily find that he promptly disaffirmed the contract” by notifying Mt. Bachelor of the injury approximately four months after it occurred as required by ORS 30.980(1), by filing suit for negligence within the applicable statute of limitations, or by pleading infancy in response to Mt. Bachelor’s affirmative defense of release. 4
4 Bagley alternatively argues that, “even if there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the inferences arising from the facts in this case are susceptible to more than one reasonable conclusion precluding summary judgment.” However, Bagley does not identify any facts that purportedly give rise to inferences susceptible to more than one reasonable conclusion, and, ultimately, his generalized argument to that effect is not materially different [***13] from his argument in support of his first assignment of error. Accordingly, we reject that alternative argument without further discussion.
Mt. Bachelor likewise reprises its arguments below, asserting that Bagley admittedly knew that he was snowboarding under the terms of a release agreement, was aware of the inherent risks of snowboarding (particularly given his advanced, aerial style of snowboarding), and, “[u]nderstanding those risks,” made “an informed decision to execute the release agreement” and “an informed decision to honor the agreement after reaching the age of majority because he wanted to snowboard.” As noted, Mt. Bachelor points to Bagley’s use of the pass after reaching the age of majority–arguing that Bagley ratified the release agreement by riding the lifts “no less than 119 times on 26 days before the subject accident.”
[HN4] In Oregon, a former minor may disaffirm a contract within a “reasonable time” after reaching the age of majority, see Highland v. Tollisen, 75 Ore. 578, 587, 147 P 558 (1915), or, conversely, may ratify a contract after reaching the age of majority by manifesting an intent to let the contract stand, [*399] see Haldeman v. Weeks, 90 Ore. 201, 205, 175 P 445 (1918); [***14] see also Richard A. Lord, 5 Williston on Contracts § 9:17, 166-70 (4th ed 2009) (“[I]f an infant after reaching the age of majority engages in any conduct that objectively manifests an intent to regard the bargain as binding, the former minor will be held as a matter of law to have ratified the contract.”). Further, as particularly relevant here, although what constitutes a reasonable period of time after reaching the age of majority varies widely depending on the circumstances, it is well established that [HN5] ratification of a voidable contract abolishes a party’s power to later disaffirm it. See Brown et ux v. Hassenstab et ux, 212 Ore. 246, 256, 319 P2d 929 (1957) (“The two courses of action are inconsistent and the taking of one will preclude the other.”); Snyder v. Rhoads, 47 Ore. App 545, 553-54, 615 P2d 1058, rev den, 290 Ore. 157 (1980) (similar).
Applying those principles to these facts, we agree with Mt. Bachelor and conclude that no objectively reasonable juror could find that Bagley disaffirmed the release agreement within a reasonable time after turning 18. Rather, the record gives rise to only one reasonable conclusion: By using the season pass at least 119 times over the course [***15] of 26 days between November 18, 2005 and February 16, 2006, Bagley objectively manifested his intent to let the release stand–affirmatively electing to ride the lifts and snowboard under the terms of the agreement (i.e., to accept the benefits of the agreement). His actions after the date of injury–at which time the release had already been ratified and Bagley’s power to disaffirm it thereby defeated–are immaterial. Cf. Highland, 75 Ore. at 587 (former minor’s disaffirmance held valid under circumstances where she had neither taken any affirmative action on the contract nor received any benefit from it); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 85 comment b (1981) (power of disaffirmance may be lost, inter alia, “by exercise of dominion over things received”); Lord, 5 Williston on Contracts § 9:17 at 170 ( [HN6] “[I]f the infant after attaining majority voluntarily receives performance in whole or in part from the other party to the contract, this will amount to a ratification.”). 5
5 Although existing Oregon case law on point is limited, several other states have similarly reasoned that a former minor’s acceptance of the benefits of a contract may constitute a ratification. See, e.g., Jones v. Dressel, 623 P2d 370, 372-74 (Colo 1981) [***16] (holding that a former minor, who had signed a release at age 17 in order to skydive, “ratified the contract, as a matter of law, by accepting the benefits of the contract when he used [the defendant’s] facilities” and further stating that the question whether that former minor’s subsequent actions constituted disaffirmance of the contract was “not relevant” because the former minor had already ratified the contract); Parsons ex rel Cabaniss v. American Family Insurance Co., 2007 WI App 211, 305 Wis 2d 630, 639, 740 NW2d 399, 403 (Wis Ct App 2007), rev den, 2008 WI 19, 307 Wis. 2d 294, 746 N.W.2d 811 (Wis 2008) (former minor ratified release agreement in connection with settlement by retaining funds given as consideration for that release).
[*400] [**699] In reaching that conclusion, we emphasize that Bagley was less than two weeks short of the age of majority when he signed the release agreement and did not begin snowboarding under its terms until well over a month after turning 18. He was also an experienced snowboarder, had signed release agreements at other ski resorts in the past, and had purchased a season pass and signed a release agreement for each of the preceding three years that he spent snowboarding at Mt. Bachelor. See [***17] Haldeman, 90 Ore. at 205 (considering former minor’s maturity and life experience in determining whether contract had been ratified). Moreover, the language of the release was unambiguous, as discussed further below, and that language was both heavily emphasized and omnipresent–having been reproduced on the back of the physical season pass that Bagley was required to carry at all times and in large part on signage at each of the lift terminals to which Bagley was exposed at least 119 times. Indeed, given the exculpatory language on Bagley’s pass and the signage directing his attention to it, it is not implausible that Bagley released Mt. Bachelor from liability for negligence each time that he rode one of the lifts.
Nevertheless, Bagley affirmatively chose to accept the benefits of the agreement after reaching the age of majority and, as noted, continued to do so until the date of injury notwithstanding the pass’s and signage’s continuing reminders of the existence of the agreement and provision of ample exposure to its terms. The following exchange, which occurred during Bagley’s deposition, is particularly illustrative:
“[Mt. Bachelor’s Counsel]: The reason you didn’t go to Mt. Bachelor [***18] and tell them ‘You know what, I signed this agreement when I was 17, now I’m 18, I want to void it, I don’t want to be subject to it,’ what I’m asking you to [*401] acknowledge is the reason you didn’t do that is because you wanted [to] continue [to snowboard] and did continue [to snowboard] under the terms of the season pass agreement.
“[Bagley]: Yes.”
Thus, as the trial court correctly reasoned, when Bagley used the season pass 119 times to gain access to Mt. Bachelor’s lifts, he objectively manifested his intent to regard the release agreement as binding in order to reap its benefits–thereby ratifying it.
However, although he concedes that he was “aware of the release” and “aware of the inherent risks of his sport[,]” Bagley further argues that he did not know that the agreement released Mt. Bachelor from claims related to its own negligence. Nor, he argues, did he know that he had the power to disaffirm the contract upon turning 18. We conclude that such knowledge was not a necessary prerequisite to ratification and, therefore, that Bagley’s arguments as to his subjective understanding of both the release agreement and the law do not affect our determination that “no objectively reasonable [***19] juror could [have] return[ed] a verdict for” Bagley on the issue of ratification. ORCP 47 C.
Oregon subscribes to the “objective theory of contracts.” Kabil Developments Corp. v. Mignot, 279 Ore. 151, 156-57, 566 P2d 505 (1977) (citation omitted); Newton/Boldt v. Newton, 192 Ore. App. 386, 392, 86 P3d 49, rev den, 337 Ore. 84, 93 P.3d 72 (2004), cert den, 543 U.S. 1173, 125 S. Ct. 1365, 161 L. Ed. 2d 153 (2005). Accordingly, although there is undisputed evidence in the record showing that, after reaching the age of majority, Bagley was exposed to language expressly disclaiming liability for negligence on the part of Mt. Bachelor, 6 his subjective understanding [*402] [**700] of that language and the terms of the release agreement is not relevant to the question of whether he ratified that agreement such that it could be enforced against him. See, e.g., NW Pac. Indem. v. Junction City Water Dist., 295 Ore. 553, 557 n 4, 668 P2d 1206 (1983), modified on other grounds, 296 Ore. 365, 677 P2d 671 (1984) ( [HN7] “[F]ailure to read an instrument is not a defense to enforcement.”).
6 For instance, as noted, the season pass that he was required to carry with him at all times expressly disclaimed liability for negligence and drew his attention to that language with the following [***20] heading: “READ THIS RELEASE AGREEMENT[.]” (Capitalization in original.) Further, during his deposition testimony, Bagley confirmed that he had read signage posted prominently on the mountain that stated, as pertinent here, that
“[s]kiers and lift passengers who use tickets at this resort release and agree to hold harmless and indemnify Mt. Bachelor, Inc., its employees and agents from all claims for property damage, injury or death which he/she may suffer or for which he/she may be liable to others, arising out of the use of Mt. Bachelor’s premises, whether such claims are for negligence or any other theory of recovery, except for intentional misconduct.”
(Emphasis added.)
We similarly reject Bagley’s argument regarding his lack of knowledge of the power to disaffirm the release agreement upon reaching the age of majority. In raising that issue, Bagley notes that, “[i]n some states, the former infant’s knowledge, or lack thereof, of his right to disaffirm a contract may be taken into consideration” in assessing whether there has been a ratification or disaffirmance. (Emphases added.) However, we have previously stated that [HN8] “[i]gnorance of [***21] the law is not a basis for not enforcing a contract.” Shea v. Begley, 94 Ore. App. 554, 558 n 3, 766 P2d 418 (1988), rev den, 307 Ore. 514, 770 P.2d 595 (1989) (citation omitted; emphasis added); see also Walcutt v. Inform Graphics, Inc., 109 Ore. App. 148, 152, 817 P2d 1353 (1991), rev den, 312 Ore. 589, 824 P.2d 418 (1992) (the plaintiff was not entitled to avoid contract due to her and her counsel’s “failure to take reasonable measures to inform themselves about her affairs”). Moreover, as Mt. Bachelor correctly points out, Bagley’s argument is drawn from the minority view among other jurisdictions. See Lord, 5 Williston on Contracts § 9:17 at 175-77 (former minor’s ignorance of legal defense of infancy treated as irrelevant in a majority of those jurisdictions that have considered the issue). As aptly stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
“[t]o require that one must have knowledge of a right to disaffirm in order to make an effective ratification of a voidable contract made in infancy would be inconsistent with the well-established rule that failure to disaffirm such contract within a reasonable time after coming of age terminates the privilege of disaffirmance.”
Campbell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 307 Pa 365, 371, 161 A 310, 312 (1932).
In [***22] short, both of Bagley’s ancillary arguments are inconsistent with the objective theory of contracts to which Oregon adheres; we look to the parties’ objective conduct, [*403] and, here, after reaching the age of majority, Bagley objectively manifested his intent to let the contract stand because he “wanted to snowboard[.]”
As noted, in his second assignment of error, Bagley asserts that the release agreement was void as contrary to public policy–focusing primarily on the respective bargaining power of the parties and an asserted “public interest [in] protecting a large number of business invitees, including [Bagley], from the negligence of ski area operators.” 7 (Some capitalization omitted.) [HN9] In evaluating whether a contract disclaiming liability for negligence is contrary to public policy, we assess the language of the agreement under the circumstances in order to determine whether it violates public policy “as applied” to the facts of the particular case. Harmon v. Mt. Hood Meadows Ltd., 146 Ore. App. 215, 217-18, 222-24, 932 P2d 92 (1997) (upholding release agreement disclaiming “any and all liability (including claims based upon negligence) for damage or injury” because the plaintiff’s action [***23] pertained only to ordinary negligence and therefore did not implicate the release’s potential coverage of recklessness or intentional misconduct [**701] (capitalization and boldface omitted)). Specifically, we stated in Harmon that
[HN10] “[t]he question of whether a contract provision is unenforceable as against some general, uncodified public policy must be determined on an ‘as applied’ basis. * * * [A] party seeking to avoid contractual responsibility must demonstrate that enforcement of the contractual provision as to him or her will offend public policy. That is so regardless of whether enforcement of the same contractual provision against other parties in other circumstances would violate public policy.”
Id. at 222 (emphases added); see generally Young v. Mobil Oil Corp., 85 Ore. App. 64, 69, 735 P2d 654 (1987) ( [HN11] “Oregon requires that a public policy be clear and ‘overpowering’ before a court will interfere with the parties’ freedom to contract on the ground of public policy.” (Citation omitted.)).
7 We assume without deciding that the “void as contrary to public policy” doctrine pertaining to this type of case has not been superseded by later-evolved principles concerning substantive unconscionability. [***24] See Restatement at § 208 comment a (unconscionability analysis generally “overlaps” with public-policy analysis).
[*404] Again, the release agreement provided, as pertinent here:
“RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
“IN CONSIDERATION OF THE USE OF A MT. BACHELOR PASS AND/OR MT. BACHELOR’S PREMISES, I/WE AGREE TO RELEASE AND INDEMNIFY MT. BACHELOR, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, OWNERS, AGENTS, LANDOWNERS, AFFILIATED COMPANIES, AND EMPLOYEES (HEREINAFTER ‘MT. BACHELOR, INC.’) FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE, INJURY, OR DEATH WHICH I/WE MAY SUFFER OR FOR WHICH I/WE MAY BE LIABLE TO OTHERS, IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH SKIING, SNOWBOARDING, OR SNOWRIDING. THIS RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT SHALL APPLY TO ANY CLAIM EVEN IF CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE. THE ONLY CLAIMS NOT RELEASED ARE THOSE BASED UPON INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT.”
(Underscoring and capitalization in original; emphasis added.) Although that exculpatory language expressly excludes intentional misconduct from its purview, the same cannot be said with respect to gross negligence or recklessness. However, applying Harmon, because Bagley alleges only ordinary negligence, the failure to expressly exclude gross negligence or recklessness does [***25] not render the agreement contrary to public policy “as applied” to the negligence claim in this case. 146 Ore. App at 222.
Further, in assessing the language of the agreement, our decision in Steele v. Mt. Hood Meadows Oregon, Ltd., 159 Ore. App. 272, 974 P2d 794, rev den, 329 Ore. 10, 994 P.2d 119 (1999), provides substantial guidance. There, the plaintiff in a wrongful death action brought against a ski resort argued that the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment for the ski resort in part because “the terms of the release [were] ambiguous.” Id. at 276. We concluded that the agreement was ambiguous and stated that, [HN12] “[w]hen one party seeks to contract away liability for its own negligence in advance of any harm, the intent to do so must be ‘clearly and unequivocally expressed.'” Id. (quoting Estey v. MacKenzie Engineering Inc., 324 Ore. 372, 376, 927 P2d 86 (1996)). We further elaborated:
[*405] “In determining whether a contract provision meets that standard, the court has considered both the language of the contract and the possibility of a harsh or inequitable result that would fall on one party if the other were immunized from the consequences of its own negligence. The latter inquiry turns on the [***26] nature of the parties’ obligations and the expectations under the contract.”
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
We conclude that the release agreement’s language “clearly and unequivocally” expressed Mt. Bachelor’s intent to disclaim liability for negligence. In reaching that conclusion, considering “the nature of the parties’ obligations and the expectations under the contract[,]” id., we note that Bagley admittedly understood that he was engaged in an inherently dangerous activity and that the agreement not only disclaimed liability [**702] for negligence but specifically stated that the “only” claims not released were those for intentional misconduct. Unlike the ambiguous release agreement in Steele, the above-quoted language expressly referred to negligence and was positioned prominently at the beginning of the release agreement; it was not obscured by unrelated provisions. See id. at 274-75 (exculpatory provision obscured by, inter alia, provision addressing skier’s duty to report injuries to the ski resort’s medical clinic). Indeed, we are hard-pressed to envision a more unambiguous expression of “the expectations under the contract”–namely, that in exchange [***27] for the right to use Mt. Bachelor’s facilities to participate in an inherently dangerous activity, Bagley was to release Mt. Bachelor from all claims related to anything other than intentional misconduct (including, of course, negligence).
Moreover, we have previously emphasized that [HN13] a release agreement disclaiming liability for negligence does not necessarily offend public policy where it pertains exclusively to “recreational activities,” and, most prominently, where the business seeking to relieve itself of such liability does “not provide an essential public service[.]” Mann v. Wetter, 100 Ore. App. 184, 187, 187 n 1, 785 P2d 1064, rev den, 309 Ore. 645, 789 P.2d 1387 (1990) (“[T]here are no public policy considerations that prevent a diving school from limiting liability for its own negligence. The diving school does not provide an [*406] essential public service[.]”). A ski resort, like a diving school, primarily offers “recreational activities” (with possible exceptions that do not apply here, e.g., training for search-and-rescue personnel) and does not provide an “essential public service[.]” Id.
Thus, bearing in mind the principles set forth in Mann and the recreational context of this particular case, [***28] 8 because the release agreement “clearly and unequivocally” disclaimed liability for negligence, and because Bagley’s claims relate only to ordinary negligence, under Oregon law the agreement was not contrary to public policy “as applied” to Bagley’s action. Steele, 159 Ore. App. at 276; Harmon, 146 Ore. App. at 222.
8 Regarding that recreational context, we further note that the legislature has enacted statutes indemnifying landowners from liability in connection with “use of the land for recreational purposes[.]” ORS 105.682; see ORS 105.672 – 105.696. Accordingly, we add that, as a general matter, it would be counterintuitive to hold that a contract with the same operative effect as that statutory scheme is void as contrary to public policy.
Finally, we reject Bagley’s third assignment of error, in which, as noted, he asserts that the release agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. At the outset, we emphasize the substantive rigor historically applied by Oregon courts in assessing claims of unconscionability:
[HN14] “‘[T]he doctrine of unconscionability does not relieve parties from all unfavorable terms that result from the parties’ respective bargaining positions; it [***29] relieves them from terms that are unreasonably favorable to the party with greater bargaining power. Oregon courts have been reluctant to disturb agreements between parties on the basis of unconscionability, even when those parties do not come to the bargaining table with equal power. In those rare instances in which our courts have declared contractual provisions unconscionable, there existed serious procedural and substantive unfairness.'”
Hatkoff v. Portland Adventist Medical Center, 252 Ore. App. 210, 217, 287 P3d 1113 (2012) (quoting Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 211 Ore. App. 610, 626-27, 156 P3d 156 (2007)) (emphasis in Motsinger). Further, “each case is decided on its own unique facts[,]” Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Oregon, Inc., 210 Ore. App. 553, 567, 152 P3d 940 (2007), taking into account both the terms of the contract and the circumstances existing when the contract was signed.
[HN15] [*407] In assessing Bagley’s claim of procedural unconscionability, we focus on “the conditions of contract formation” and look to “two factors: oppression and surprise.” Id. at 566-67 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). More specifically, “[o]ppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power [***30] which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful [**703] choice. Surprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the terms.” Id. at 566 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Bagley addresses only the former, advancing a generalized argument that the agreement “was a contract of adhesion and there was a disparity in bargaining power.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
As noted, we do not find the release agreement procedurally unconscionable under these circumstances. Although the parties indeed came to the bargaining table with unequal power insofar as Mt. Bachelor required that the release be signed in order to allow Bagley to purchase a season pass, we have, albeit in dictum and in the context of addressing public-policy arguments, suggested that standard-form release agreements in the context of recreational activities are not impermissibly adhesive. See Harmon, 146 Ore. App. at 219 n 4 (citing cases from other jurisdictions and noting their holdings “that exculpatory provisions in ski-related form agreements were not impermissibly adhesive”); Mann, 100 Ore. App. at 187-88 [***31] (noting that “customers have a multitude of alternatives” in dealing with providers of “non-essential service[s,]” even where such providers hold an “economic advantage”). 9 Although we limit our holding to these “unique facts,” we rely in part on those principles in addressing both “oppression” and “surprise” (as well as substantive unconscionability, as set forth below).
9 Many other states, as well as federal courts, have, as Mt. Bachelor points out, “reached the same conclusion.” See, e.g., Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L. P., 607 Pa 1, 29, 2 A3d 1174, 1191 (2010) (noting that, in the recreational context, “[t]he signer is a free agent who can simply walk away without signing the release and participating in the activity, and thus the contract signed under such circumstances is not unconscionable”); Silva v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., No CV 06-6330-AA, *2, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55942 (D Or July 21, 2008) (“[T]he release from liability is not invalid as a contract of adhesion, because [the] plaintiff voluntarily chose to ski at Mt. Bachelor and the ski resort does not provide essential public services.”); Grbac v. Reading Fair Co., Inc., 521 F Supp 1351, 1355 (WD Pa 1981), aff’d, 688 F2d 215 (3d Cir 1982) (stock-car [***32] racing company’s standard-form release provision not adhesionary).
[*408] Here, with respect to “oppression,” Bagley was free to choose not to snowboard at Mt. Bachelor, was less than two weeks short of the age of majority when he signed the agreement, was an experienced snowboarder who had previously signed release agreements required by at least two other ski resorts, had signed a release agreement in obtaining a season pass at Mt. Bachelor during each of the preceding three years, and was accompanied by his father (who, as noted, signed a nearly identical agreement disclaiming liability for negligence). Each of those facts contributes to our conclusion that, notwithstanding the parties’ unequal bargaining power, the circumstances of contract formation were not impermissibly oppressive. Bagley and his father were presented with a “meaningful choice[,]” Vasquez-Lopez, 210 Ore. App. at 566, particularly given that, as noted, snowboarding is a recreational activity and Bagley could have simply declined to sign the release without being denied access to an essential public service.
With respect to “surprise,” as evidenced by the unambiguous language of the release agreement, and particularly given [***33] its additional clarification after disclaiming liability for negligence (“THE ONLY CLAIMS NOT RELEASED ARE THOSE BASED UPON INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT”), this was not a situation where the “terms of the bargain [were] hidden” by Mt. Bachelor. Id. To the contrary, the above quoted paragraph pertaining to the skier’s release of claims, including claims for negligence, appeared at the beginning of the release agreement and was highlighted by a centered and underlined introductory heading drawing the skier’s attention to the fact that he or she was signing a release (“RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT”). On those facts, we find no indication of surprise and, coupled with our conclusion above as to oppression, cannot say that the release agreement was procedurally unconscionable.
In further arguing that the release agreement was substantively unconscionable, Bagley asserts that “[t]he Release term of the contract in question is unreasonably [**704] favorable to [Mt. Bachelor], the drafter of the contract and more powerful party.” Further, Bagley argues, the terms of the release “unconscionably shift[ ] the burden to protect [skiers] from [Mt. Bachelor’s] negligent behavior to the public that it invites [***34] upon its premises, including [Bagley].” [HN16] [*409] In assessing a contract for substantive unconscionability, we focus on the terms of the contract itself in light of the circumstances of its formation; ultimately, “[t]he substantive fairness of the challenged terms” is the “essential issue.” Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 203 Ore. App. 399, 423, 125 P3d 814 (2005), aff’d on other grounds, 342 Ore. 530, 157 P3d 775 (2007); see Vasquez Lopez, 210 Ore. App. at 566-69.
On these facts, the provision in the release agreement disclaiming liability for negligence was not “unreasonably” favorable to Mt. Bachelor. Carey, 203 Ore. App. at 422. Indeed, the principal Oregon case touching on the issue upheld a provision–albeit on an “as applied” basis in the context of that particular plaintiff’s public-policy argument–that not only disclaimed liability for negligence in connection with skiing but for “any and all liability” (presumably including liability related to gross negligence or intentional misconduct on the part of the ski resort). Harmon, 146 Ore. App. at 217-22 (emphasis added). Moreover, as noted, in Harmon we specifically cited cases from other jurisdictions “holding that exculpatory provisions in ski-related form [***35] agreements were not impermissibly adhesive.” Id. at 219 n 4. Returning to the overarching notion that the terms at issue must be read in light of their recreational context, in one of those cases, the New Jersey Superior Court aptly reasoned as follows:
“When an individual enters a ski shop to buy ski equipment, s/he does not have a need for those goods and services, merely a desire. Should the seller demand exculpation as a condition for the sale of the equipment, the purchaser is free to walk away. This is not so with the consumer of automobile insurance, or the individual who cannot find a place to live during a housing shortage. Unlike the skier, these individuals must face an inability to use their automobile, or the prospect of becoming homeless, if they are not willing to sign on the dotted line and exculpate the provider. The skier merely faces the prospect of a ski-less weekend.”
McBride v. Minstar, Inc., 283 NJ Super 471, 491, 662 A2d 592, 602 (NJ Super Ct Law Div 1994), aff’d sub nom McBride v. Raichle Molitor, USA, 283 NJ Super 422, 662 A2d 567 (NJ Super Ct App Div), rev den, 143 N.J. 319, 670 A.2d 1061 (1995) (emphasis in original). As noted, similar release agreements [*410] in the [***36] context of recreational activities have been upheld (including against claims of unconscionability) in a number of other jurisdictions. See Or App at n 9 (slip op at 20 n 9). Finally, [HN17] ORS 105.682 establishes a public policy in favor of indemnification of landowners where the land is used for, inter alia, recreational purposes. We fail to see how a private contract to the same effect is substantively unfair as a matter of law.
Accordingly, given existing case law and the aforementioned substantive rigor that we apply in assessing claims of unconscionability, see Hatkoff, 252 Ore. App. at 217, we conclude that the terms of Mt. Bachelor’s release were not substantively unconscionable under these circumstances. That is, the inclusion of the release provision did not constitute one of “those rare instances” where the terms of the contract were so “unreasonably favorable” to Mt. Bachelor that they were unconscionable. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Restatement at § 208 comment b (a contract has traditionally been held unconscionable only where “it was such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
In sum, we conclude [***37] that Bagley ratified the release agreement prior to the date of injury, nullifying his power to later disaffirm it (whether by notice, filing suit, or pleading infancy), and that the agreement–coupled with the language printed on the season pass and signage at the lift terminals–was sufficiently clear as to its application to claims for negligence. We further conclude that Bagley’s lack of knowledge regarding the scope of the unambiguous agreement did not preclude [**705] summary judgment, nor did his lack of knowledge of the power to disaffirm it upon reaching the age of majority. As to whether the release agreement was valid in the first instance, we conclude that, as applied, the release agreement was not contrary to public policy. Nor was the agreement substantively or procedurally unconscionable. Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Mt. Bachelor’s affirmative defense of release, and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for Mt. Bachelor and denying partial summary judgment to Bagley on that basis.
Affirmed.
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Colorado Ski Country USA brings back the 5th Grade Beginner Ski & Snowboard Lesson
Posted: December 19, 2013 Filed under: Colorado, Ski Area | Tags: skiing, snowboarding Leave a commentColorado Ski Country USA’s First Class Program Kicks off in January
Complimentary Beginner Ski or Snowboard Lesson for Never-ever 5th Graders Returns
Colorado Ski Country USA (CSCUSA) announced the return of the complimentary lesson component to its popular 5th Grade Passport program: First Class. Launched in 2010, First Class provides one free beginner ski or snowboard lesson, including rental equipment, for 5th Grade Passport holders who are new to both the sports of skiing and snowboarding. These lessons, in coordination with Learn to Ski and Snowboard Month, are provided at CSCUSA resorts during the month of January.
Detailed program information about First Class has been provided to parents of 5th graders who are currently signed up for the Colorado Ski Country 5th Grade Passport, including which of the 17 participating Colorado Ski Country USA member resorts parents can choose from for their child to have their introductory experience on snow.
“Skiing and snowboarding are Colorado’s signature sports, and we want to ensure that every child in Colorado has the opportunity to participate in our great winter pastime,” explained Melanie Mills, CSCUSA’s president and CEO. “The First Class program is so valuable for kids and parents alike because it makes that first ever day on the mountain a safe and fun experience. Proper equipment and professional instruction are paramount for a kid’s first day on the slopes, and First Class assures parents that their “never-evers” are introduced into the sport in a structured, enjoyable environment.”
The Colorado Ski Country USA 5th Grade Passport program provides three free lift tickets at each participating CSCUSA member resort to the state’s 5th graders. The 6th Grade Passport program provides four lift tickets at the same resorts for $99 to the state’s 6th graders.
More information on 2013-14 5th and 6th Grade Passports and First Class is available at http://www.coloradoski.com/passport or by calling 303-866-9707.
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Lift tickets are not contracts and rarely work as a release in most states
Posted: December 16, 2013 Filed under: Contract, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Contract, Lift Ticket, Release, ski area, skiing, snowboarding 2 CommentsNor can they be used to prove assumption of the risk. At best, a lift ticket is another sign informing someone of the risk. If you are relying upon a lift ticket to stop lawsuits, get a release.
In most states where a statute requires language on the back of a lift ticket that warns of the risk, the language is simply that, warning language.
Two decisions have held that a lift ticket is valid to stop a claim at a ski area: Oregon and North Carolina.
These decisions have upheld the use of a lift ticket to bar a claim.
Oregon: Silva v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55942
North Carolina: Strawbridge v. Sugar Mountain Resort, 320 F. Supp. 2d 425; 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14, Strawbridge, v. Sugar Mountain Resort, Incorporated, 152 Fed. Appx. 286; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23459
In most states, the lift ticket is just a warning. To create a contract, a release, the lift ticket would have been a meeting of the minds. The purchaser of the lift ticket would have to understand they are entering a contract and agree to the terms of the contract.
That means the skier or boarder would have to read the back of the lift ticket and say, yes, I agree to the terms of the contract (or “sure.”).
You can’t rely on a lift ticket or any ticket to stop a lawsuit in most states and even in those four states that have held that in these cases, I would not rely on them until additional decisions support the claims.
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Strawbridge, Jr., v. Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 2d 610; 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18644
Posted: December 16, 2013 Filed under: Legal Case, North Carolina, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Lift Ticket, Release, skiing, snowboarding Leave a commentStrawbridge, Jr., v. Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 2d 610; 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18644
Vincent F. Strawbridge, Jr., and Rebecca S. Strawbridge, Plaintiffs, vs. Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc.; B. Dale Stancil, Individually; The Sugar Mountain Irrevocable Trust; and The B. Dale Stancil Irrevocable Trust, Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 1:02CV92
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, ASHEVILLE DIVISION
328 F. Supp. 2d 610; 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18644
May 28, 2004, Decided
June 28, 2004, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: Strawbridge v. Sugar Mt. Resort, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 425, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14561 (W.D.N.C., 2004)
COUNSEL: For VINCENT F. STRAWBRIDGE, JR., REBECCA S. STRAWBRIDGE, plaintiffs: R. Hayes Hofler, Daniel B. Hill, Hayes, Hofler & Associates, P.A., Durham, NC.
For SUGAR MOUNTAIN RESORT, INC., defendant: Wyatt S. Stevens, Roberts & Stevens, P.A., Robert E. Riddle, Asheville, NC USA.
For B. DALE STANCIL, THE SUGAR MOUNTAIN IRREVOCABLE TRUST, THE B. DALE STANCIL IRREVOCABLE TRUST, defendants: James R. Fox, Jennifer I. Oakes, Bell, Davis & Pitt, P.A., Winston-Salem, NC USA.
JUDGES: LACY H. THORNBURG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
OPINION BY: LACY H. THORNBURG
OPINION
[*611] ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on motions of Defendant Sugar Mountain, Inc. (“Sugar Mountain”), and Defendants B. Dale Stancil, individually, the Sugar Mountain Irrevocable Trust, and the B. Dale Stancil Irrevocable Trust (“non-resort Defendants”) for reconsideration, the non-resort Defendants’ [**2] request for oral argument, and Plaintiff’s response to these motions.
A. Sugar Mountain’s motion.
Sugar Mountain argues that “there is a difference between contracting against liability for negligence and agreeing to assume certain inherent risks of a particular activity.” Defendant Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc.’s Motion for Reconsideration [Sugar Mountain’s Motion], filed June 9, 2004, at 2. Sugar Mountain further argues that, even if the exculpatory clause Plaintiff signed to rent his ski equipment is unenforceable, he still assumed the risk of suffering an injury caused by a bare spot on the slope. See id., at 4. To support its claim that Plaintiff assumed the risk of falling on a bare spot, Sugar Mountain relies primarily on the statement printed on the back of Plaintiff’s lift ticket warning him of bare spots and other dangers. Sugar Mountain also points to Plaintiff’s extensive skiing experience in support of its claim that he assumed the risk of the injury that he ultimately suffered. See id., at 7.
Sugar Mountain cites some persuasive and some binding authority that appears to support the distinction between agreements to assume inherent [**3] risks and contracts against liability for negligence. Cf., Alston v. Monk, 92 N.C. App 59, 373 S.E.2d 463 (1988) (analyzing the defendants’ assumption of risk claims separately from their waiver claims); Poston v. Skewes, 49 Fed.Appx. 404 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the trial court had properly interpreted Virginia law when it allowed into evidence an “assumption of risk” statement that the plaintiff had signed but redacted language that purported to “release” [*612] the defendants from liability for negligence). The Court will, therefore, assume without deciding that Sugar Mountain’s assumption of risk defense is distinct from the “release” defense the Court has already considered and rejected.
Sugar Mountain concedes that [HN1] the assumption of risk defense “extends only to those risks which are normally incident to the [activity] in which the plaintiff engages.” Sugar Mountain’s Motion, at 5 (citing McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 166, 152 S.E.2d 117,120 (1967)) (alteration added). Sugar Mountain further concedes that [HN2] “‘extraordinary risks, including additional hazards caused by the negligence of the [contracting [**4] party], or others on the [contracting party’s] premises,’ are not considered assumed risks.” Sugar Mountain’s Motion, at 5 (citing McWilliams, supra, at 166-67, 152 S.E.2d at 120) (alterations in original). [HN3] “Knowledge is the watchword of the defense of assumption of risk; knowledge of the dangers and hazards to be encountered.” Cobia v. Atlantic C.L.R. Co., 188 N.C. 487, 128 S.E. 18, 20 (1924). [HN4] “This doctrine of assumption of risk is based upon knowledge or a fair and reasonable opportunity to know, and usually this knowledge and opportunity must come in time to be of use. Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiffs allege that negligence on the part of Sugar Mountain caused their injuries. This Court has held that [HN5] a jury may find negligence from “evidence of a bare spot on a slope, evidence that defendants knew of conditions that may cause bare spots, and evidence that the bare spot was in some way concealed.” Memorandum and Order, filed May 10,2004, at 14. A corollary of that holding is that a jury may find that a concealed bare spot on a ski slope is not a risk that is normally incident to the activity [**5] of skiing when the ski slope operator knows or should have known of the offending spot and is aware of weather conditions that may cause unusual bare spots. Since this Court held that Plaintiffs have forcast evidence of each element listed above, the Court cannot decide, as a matter of law, that the assumption of risk doctrine defeats Plaintiffs’ claims. 1 Quite to the contrary, since Plaintiffs can only prevail if they prove negligence on the part of Sugar Mountain, and since a finding of negligence would mean that Plaintiffs were injured by “additional hazards caused by the negligence of [Sugar Mountain],” the assumption of risk defense cannot aid the Defendants. McWilliams, at 166-67, 152 S.E.2d at 120.
1 The Poston case illustrates this point. There, the Fourth Circuit, in finding that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of an accident, pointed out that the district court found no negligence on the part of the defendants. Poston, supra.
B. The non-resort [**6] Defendants’ motion.
1. B. Dale Stancil.
The non-resort Defendants’ memorandum advances no novel argument for summary judgment as to Stancil. Therefore, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s Memorandum and Order, the Court declines to dismiss Defendant Stancil.
2. The trust entities.
In its Memorandum and Order, the Court found that the evidence would support a finding of derivative liability, but the Court did not specifically examine whether that potential liability extended to the two irrevocable trusts. Now, the Court finds it does not.
As explained in the Memorandum and Order, Stancil and his business partner created the Sugar Mountain Irrevocable Trust in 1979 when they conveyed the land on which the ski resort sits into the trust [*613] for estate planning purposes. The Sugar Mountain Irrevocable Trust has continued to lease the land to Sugar Mountain, Inc., since 1979. The beneficiaries of the Sugar Mountain Irrevocable Trust are the Defendant B. Dale Stancil Irrevocable Trust (“Stancil Trust”), which was established for Stancil’s children, and an irrevocable trust for the children of Stancil’s business partner. Both Defendant trusts are managed by independent trustees. [**7] Memorandum and Order, at 17-18.
Although neither trustee is obligated to give Stancil access to the corpus of the trusts, the Stancil Trust does provide that the Trustee may loan funds to “the Grantor, the Grantor’s affiliated corporations or partnerships, other trusts created by the Grantor, trusts of which this trust is a beneficiary, beneficiaries of this trust or their affiliated corporations or partnerships.” Exhibit 8, B. Dale Stancil Irrevocable Trust (“Stancil Trust”), attached to Brief Opposing Summary Judgment as to Certain Defendants, at 2. The trust further provides that any such loan must be “on an arm’s length basis with good and adequate security and a fair interest rate.” Id. The trustee has, in fact, allowed Stancil to borrow money from the Stancil Trust to finance a real estate investment in Virginia and possibly to invest money in Sugar Mountain, Inc. Stancil makes interest payments to the trust in the sum of roughly $ 100,000 per year but does not make payments on the principal. Exhibit 17, Deposition of B. Dale Stancil, attached to Plaintiff’s Objections to Memorandum and Recommendation, at 44-45, 93-94, 103-04.
Plaintiffs [**8] give two theories on why liability should extend to the trust entities. The first is that, at least with respect to the Sugar Mountain Irrevocable Trust, liability is proper because the trust actually owns the premises on which Plaintiff was injured. However, it is well settled [HN6] in North Carolina that “a landlord who has neither possession nor control of the leased premises is not liable for injuries to third persons.” Vera v. Five Crow Promotions, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 645, 650, 503 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiffs state in their objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation that the Sugar Mountain Irrevocable Trust “operated the resort,” but there is no forecast of evidence to support that statement. The original lease, however, states that Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc., agrees “to operate” the resort. Lease Agreement, contained in Appendix to Moving Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 4. For that reason, the fact that Sugar Mountain Irrevocable Trust was a landlord to Sugar Mountain, Inc., does not extend the liability of Sugar Mountain, Inc., to either trust entity.
Plaintiffs’ second [**9] argument for holding the trusts liable is that Stancil and the trusts are in an agency relationship. At times, Plaintiffs assert that “Stancil is the agent or servant of the trusts,” and, at other times, Plaintiffs assert that the trusts and the trustees are paid servants of Stancil. Plaintiffs’ Brief Opposing Summary Judgment as to Certain Defendants, at 20-21; Plaintiffs’ Objections to Memorandum and Recommendation, at 57-59. However, neither trust instrument mandates any ongoing obligations between Stancil and the trusts or the trustees. Exhibit 7, Sugar Mountain Irrevocable Trust, attached to Plaintiffs’ Brief Opposing Summary Judgment as to Certain Defendants; Exhibit 8, B. Dale Stancil Irrevocable Trust, supra. Although there is evidence of at least one loan from the Stancil Trust to Stancil, there is no evidence or legal authority to support the finding of an agency relationship, and there is no evidence to support a [*614] finding that the transaction was not performed at arm’s length.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court sees no basis for extending liability to irrevocable trust entities Stancil created over 20 years ago. As such, the two trust Defendants [**10] will be dismissed from this action.
3. Request for oral argument
Because of the extensive briefs filed by the parties, the Court determines there is no need for oral argument.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant Sugar Mountain Inc.’s, motion to reconsider is hereby DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there will be no jury determination of whether Plaintiff Vincent Strawbridge assumed the risk of injury.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the non-resort Defendants’ motion to reconsider is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs’ claims against the B. Dale Stancil Irrevocable Trust and the Sugar Mountain Irrevocable Trust are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the non-resort Defendants’ request for oral argument is hereby DENIED.
THIS the 28th day of May, 2004.
LACY H. THORNBURG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Silva v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55942
Posted: December 16, 2013 Filed under: Oregon, Ski Area | Tags: Lift Ticket, ski area, skiing, snowboarding Leave a commentSilva v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55942
David J. Silva, Plaintiff, v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., an Oregon corporation, Defendant.
Civ No. 06-6330-AA
United States District Court for the District of Oregon
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55942
July 21, 2008, Decided
COUNSEL: [*1] For Plaintiffs: David Jensen, Jensen, Elmore & Stupasky, Eugene, OR.
For Defendant: Andrew C. Balyeat, Jeffrey T. Eager, Balyeat & Eager, Bend, OR.
JUDGES: Ann Aiken, United States District Judge.
OPINION BY: Ann Aiken
OPINION
OPINION AND ORDER
AIKEN, Judge:
Plaintiff filed suit alleging premises liability and negligence arising from a skiing accident. Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims, arguing that they are barred by a valid release from liability agreed to by plaintiff.
FACTS
Plaintiff is a resident of Idaho and an avid skier who has skied at numerous ski resorts throughout the United States. Plaintiff received vouchers for two days of skiing at Mt. Bachelor and two nights at the Inn of the Seventh Mountain.
On April 16, 2005, plaintiff traded his voucher for an all-day ski pass at Mt. Bachelor. At the ticket windows, Mt. Bachelor posts signs stating “YOUR TICKET IS A RELEASE” and advising skiers that their ski pass contains a release of all claims against Mt. Bachelor. The signs read:
The back of your ticket contains a release of all claims against Mt. Bachelor and its employees or agents. Read the back of your ticket before you ski or ride the lift or use any of the facilities of the area. [*2] If you purchase a ticket for someone else, you must provide this ticket release information to that person or person.
Skiers and lift passengers who use tickets at this resort release and agree to hold harmless and indemnify Mt. Bachelor, Inc., its employees and agents from all claims for property damage, injury or death which he/she may suffer or for which he/she may be liable to others, arising out of the use of Mt. Bachelor’s premises, whether such claims are for negligence or any other theory of recovery, except for intentional misconduct.
If you do not agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of the sale of your ticket, please do not purchase the ticket or use the facilities at Mt. Bachelor.
Presentation of this ticket to gain access to the premises and facilities of this area is an acknowledgment of your agreement to the terms and conditions outlined above.
Affidavit of Tom Lomax, Ex. 1.
Additionally, the back of plaintiff’s ski pass stated “READ THIS RELEASE AGREEMENT” and contained the following language:
In consideration for each lift ride, the ticket user releases and agrees to hold harmless and indemnify Mt. Bachelor, Inc., and its employees and agents from all claims for [*3] property damages, injury or death which he/she may suffer or for which he/she may be liable to others, arising out of the use of Mt. Bachelor’s premises, whether such claims are for negligence or any other theory of recovery, except for intentional misconduct.
Affidavit of Andrew C. Balyeat, Ex. 2, p. 2.
As plaintiff skied in an ungroomed area, he fell and injured his knee.
On December 27, 2006, plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to make the ski area reasonably safe and that defendant’s negligence in failing to do so caused his injuries.
STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The materiality of a fact is determined by the substantive law on the issue. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The authenticity of a dispute is determined by whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving [*4] party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
Special rules of construction apply to evaluating summary judgment motions: (1) all reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact should be resolved against the moving party; and (2) all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630.
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for summary judgment on grounds that plaintiff agreed to release defendant from all liability for damages arising from the use of its facilities. Defendant maintains that the release agreement is valid and enforceable and bars plaintiff’s claims. See Harmon v. Mt. Hood Meadows, Ltd., 146 Ore. App. 215, 932 P.2d 92 (1997); Mann v. Wetter, 100 Ore. App. 184, 785 P.2d 1064 (1990) .
Plaintiff concedes that one party [*5] may contract to limit another party’s liability for negligence. However, plaintiff disagrees that the release on the Mt. Bachelor ski pass is a valid release of liability. Plaintiff maintains that the release is not enforceable, because the parties were not negotiating at arms length in a commercial setting, the release was not make known to or signed by plaintiff, and the terms of the release are equivocal because it purports to cover all claims under any theory of recovery except intentional misconduct.
Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing. First, no Oregon court has held that a release from liability in a recreational, as opposed to commercial, context offends public policy and is unenforceable. Harmon, 146 Ore. App. at 219 n. 3, 932 P. 2d 92 (“[W]e assume, without deciding, that a release relieving a ski resort solely from the consequences of its own negligence does not offend Oregon public policy.”). Further, the release from liability is not invalid as a contract of adhesion, because plaintiff voluntarily chose to ski at Mt. Bachelor and the ski resort does not provide essential public services. Mann, 100 Ore. App. at 187-88, 785 P.2d 1064.
Second, although plaintiff testified at [*6] his deposition that he did not read the release on the back of his ski pass or the signs at the ticket window, the pass and signs clearly advise skiers of the significance of the release agreement. Further, plaintiff testified that he knew and expected that his lift ticket would contain a release, based on his extensive skiing experience. Balyeat Aff., Ex. 1, pp. 14-15. Plaintiff also admitted that he understood the terms of the release, and plaintiff cites no case that requires a recreational release agreement to be signed. Id. Ex. 1, p. 15. Therefore, I find no genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the release and its terms were made known plaintiff.
Finally, the Oregon Court of Appeals has specifically held that a plaintiff must establish overbreadth of a release agreement as applied to the specific claim alleged:
Most simply, the party must show that, as applied, the contractual term is unenforceable on grounds of public policy. Here, plaintiff does not contend that Oregon public policy precludes a ski resort from limiting its liability for negligence; thus, regardless of whether defendants’ release might be unenforceable as to other plaintiffs asserting other claims, it is [*7] not unenforceable as applied to plaintiff.
Harmon, 146 Ore. App. at 221-22 (emphasis in original).
Here, plaintiff asserts negligence claims against defendant and concedes that a defendant may limit its liability for negligence. Therefore, the fact that the release agreement purports to cover other theories of liability does not preclude enforcement of the release in this case. As such, plaintiff’s claims are barred.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 13) is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 21 day of July, 2008.
/s/ Ann Aiken
Ann Aiken
United States District Judge
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State Ski Safe Acts
Posted: November 6, 2013 Filed under: Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: ski area, Ski Law, Ski Safety Act, skiing, snowboarding, statute, Winter Sports Act Leave a comment30 States have created statutes that affect regulate skiing. Two states have recreational statutes that apply to skiing.
Those state statutes are listed below along with significant portions of the act.
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State |
Statute |
Ski Area Defined |
Lists Inherent Risks of Skiing |
Misc. |
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AK |
Alaska Ski Safety Act of 1994, Alaska Stat. §§ 05.45.010 et seq. |
“ski area” means all downhill ski slopes or trails and other places under the control of a downhill ski area operator; “ski area” does not include a cross-country ski trail; |
changing weather conditions; snow conditions as they exist or may change, including ice, hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow, and machine-made snow; surface or subsurface conditions including bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streams, streambeds, and trees, or other natural objects, and collisions with natural objects; impact with lift towers, signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, water pipes, other man-made structures, and their components; variations in steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or grooming operations, including roads and catwalks or other terrain modifications; collision with other skiers; and the failure of skiers to ski within their own abilities |
Sec. 05.45.120. Use of liability releases Releases are void A ski area operator shall prepare a plan of operation for each ski season and shall implement the plan throughout the ski season. A plan of operation must include written provisions for ski patrol, avalanche control, avalanche rescue, grooming procedures, tramway evacuation, hazard marking, missing person procedures, and first aid. |
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AZ |
“Ski area” means all ski slopes and trails or other places within the boundary of a ski area operator’s property, administered as a single enterprise in this state. |
(a) Changing weather conditions. (b) Existing and changing snow surface conditions, such as ice, hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up and machine-made snow. (c) Surface or subsurface conditions, whether marked or unmarked, such as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds, trees or other natural objects. (d) Impacts with lift towers, signs, posts, fences or other enclosures, hydrants, water pipes or other man-made structures and their components, whether marked or unmarked. (e) Variations in steepness or terrain, including roads, catwalks and other terrain modifications, whether natural or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or grooming operations. (f) Collisions with other skiers. (g) The failure of skiers to ski within their own abilities. |
§ 5-706. Release of liability In any action brought by a skier against a ski area operator, if the ski area operator proves that the skier signed a valid release, the ski area operator’s liability shall be determined by the terms of the release. |
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CO |
“Ski area” means all ski slopes or trails and all other places within the ski area boundary, marked in accordance with section 33-44-107 (6), under the control of a ski area operator and administered as a single enterprise within this state. |
“Inherent dangers and risks of skiing” means those dangers or conditions that are part of the sport of skiing, including changing weather conditions; snow conditions as they exist or may change, such as ice, hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow, and machine-made snow; surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds, cliffs, extreme terrain, and trees, or other natural objects, and collisions with such natural objects; impact with lift towers, signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, water pipes, or other man-made structures and their components; variations in steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or grooming operations, including but not limited to roads, freestyle terrain, jumps, and catwalks or other terrain modifications; collisions with other skiers; and the failure of skiers to ski within their own abilities. |
Notwithstanding any provision of law or statute to the contrary, the risk of a skier/skier collision is neither an inherent risk nor a risk assumed by a skier in an action by one skier against another. |
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CT |
“Ski area operator” means a person who owns or controls the operation of a ski area and such person’s agents and employees. |
(1) Variations in the terrain of the trail or slope which is marked in accordance with subdivision (3) of section 29-211 or variations in surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions, except that no skier assumes the risk of variations which are caused by the ski area operator unless such variations are caused by snow making, snow grooming or rescue operations; (2) bare spots which do not require the closing of the trail or slope; (3) conspicuously placed or, if not so placed, conspicuously marked lift towers; (4) trees or other objects not within the confines of the trail or slope; (5) loading, unloading or otherwise using a passenger tramway without prior knowledge of proper loading and unloading procedures or without reading instructions concerning loading and unloading posted at the base of such passenger tramway or without asking for such instructions; and (6) collisions with any other person by any skier while skiing, except that collisions with on-duty employees of the ski area operator who are skiing and are within the scope of their employment at the time of the collision shall not be a hazard inherent in the sport of skiing. |
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GA |
(7) “Ski area” means all snow ski slopes or trails and other places under the control of a ski area operator at a defined business location within this state. (8) “Ski area operator” means an individual, partnership, corporation, or other commercial entity who owns, manages, or otherwise directs or has operational responsibility for any ski area. (9) “Ski slopes or trails” means those areas open to the skiing public and designated by the ski area operator to be used by a skier. The designation may be generally set forth on trail maps and further designated by signage posted to indicate to the skiing public the intent that the areas be used by the skier for the purpose of skiing. Nothing in this paragraph implies that ski slopes or trails may not be restricted for use at the discretion of the ski area operator. |
(A) Changing weather conditions; (B) Surface and subsurface snow or ice conditions as they may exist or change from time to time, including variable conditions such as hard packed powder, packed powder, wind-blown snow, wind-packed snow, corn snow, crust slush, snow modified by skier use, or cut up snow; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions as they exist or may change as the result of weather changes or skier use; snow created by or resulting from snow making or snow grooming operations; or collisions or falls resulting from such conditions; (C) Surface or subsurface conditions other than those specified in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, including dirt, grass, rocks, trees, stumps, other forms of forest or vegetative growth, stream beds, or other natural objects or debris; or collisions or falls resulting from such conditions; (D) Collisions with: lift towers; components of lift towers; signs, posts, fences, mazes, or other enclosure devices; hydrants, pipes, or any other portions of snow making or snow delivery systems; snow grooming equipment or other over-snow vehicles marked or lighted as required by this chapter; or collisions with or falls resulting from any such structures or any other manmade structures or their components; (E) Variations in surface, contour, or steepness of terrain, including, but not limited to, moguls, ski jumps, roads, depressions, water bars, and cat walks; other terrain changes or modifications which occur naturally or result from slope design or construction, snow making, snow grooming, maintenance operations, or skier use; or collisions with or falls resulting from such variations; and (F) Collisions with other skiers unless such collisions are caused by the failure on the part of other skiers to conduct themselves in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. |
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ID |
(3) “Ski area” means the property owned or leased and under the control of the ski area operator within the state of Idaho. (4) “Ski area operator” means any person, partnership, corporation or other commercial entity and their agents, officers, employees or representatives, who has operational responsibility for any ski area or aerial passenger tramway. (5) “Skiing area” means all designated slopes and trails but excludes any aerial passenger tramway. |
variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots, rocks, trees, other forms of forest growth or debris, lift towers and components thereof; utility poles, and snowmaking and snowgrooming equipment which is plainly visible or plainly marked in accordance with the provisions of section 6-1103, Idaho Code. |
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ME |
§ 15202. Definitions 15. SKI AREA. “Ski area” means the ski slopes and trails, adjoining skiable terrain, areas designated by the ski area operator to be used for skiing as defined by section 15217, subsection 1, paragraph B and passenger tramways administered or operated as a single enterprise within this State. |
§ 15217. (1)(A)…existing and changing weather conditions; existing and changing snow conditions, such as ice, hardpack, powder, packed powder, slush and granular, corn, crust, cut-up and machine-made snow; surface or subsurface conditions, such as dirt, grass, bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, trees and other natural objects and collisions with or falls resulting from such natural objects; lift towers, lights, signs, posts, fences, mazes or enclosures, hydrants, water or air pipes, snowmaking and snow-grooming equipment, marked or lit trail maintenance vehicles and snowmobiles, and other man-made structures or objects and their components, and collisions with or falls resulting from such man-made objects; variations in steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design; snowmaking or snow-grooming operations, including, but not limited to, freestyle terrain, jumps, roads and catwalks or other terrain modifications; the presence of and collisions with other skiers; and the failure of skiers to ski safely, in control or within their own abilities. |
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MA |
“Ski area”, all of the slopes and trails under the control of the ski area operator, including cross-country ski areas, slopes and trails, and any recreational tramway in operation on any such slopes or trails administered or operated as a single enterprise but shall not include base lodges, motor vehicle parking lots and other portions of ski areas used by skiers when not actually engaged in the sport of skiing. |
…know of the existence of certain unavoidable risks inherent in the sport of skiing, which shall include, but not be limited to, variations in terrain, surface or subsurface snow, ice conditions or bare spots |
No action shall be maintained against a ski area operator for injury to a skier unless as a condition precedent thereof the person so injured shall, within ninety days of the incident, give to such ski area operator notice, by registered mail, of the name and address of the person injured, the time, place and cause of the injury. |
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MI |
Ski Area Safety Act of 1962, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 408.321 to 408.344 |
“Ski area” means an area used for skiing and served by 1 or more ski lifts. |
…terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment. |
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MT |
“Ski slopes and trails” means those areas designated by the ski area operator to be used by skiers for skiing. |
(2) “Inherent dangers and risks of skiing” means those dangers or conditions that are part of the sport of skiing, including: (a) changing weather conditions; (b) snow conditions as they exist or as they may change, including ice, hardpack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn snow, crust, slush, cut-up snow, and machine-made snow; (c) avalanches, except on open, designated ski trails; (d) collisions with natural surface or subsurface conditions, such as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds, cliffs, trees, and other natural objects; (e) collisions with lift towers, signs, posts, fences, enclosures, hydrants, water pipes, or other artificial structures and their components; (f) variations in steepness or terrain, whether natural or the result of slope design, snowmaking, or snow grooming operations, including but not limited to roads, freestyle terrain, ski jumps, catwalks, and other terrain modifications; (g) collisions with clearly visible or plainly marked equipment, including but not limited to lift equipment, snowmaking equipment, snow grooming equipment, trail maintenance equipment, and snowmobiles, whether or not the equipment is moving; (h) collisions with other skiers; (i) the failure of a skier to ski within that skier’s ability; (j) skiing in a closed area or skiing outside the ski area boundary as designated on the ski area trail map; and (k) restricted visibility caused by snow, wind, fog, sun, or darkness. |
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NC |
All winter sports slopes, alpine and Nordic ski trails, freestyle terrain and passenger tramways, that are administered or operated as a ski area enterprise within this State. |
variations in terrain, snow, or ice conditions, bare spots and rocks, trees and other forms of forest growth or forest debris; |
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ND |
Skiing Responsibility Act N.D. Cent. Code §§ 53-09-01 to 53-09-10 |
3. “Ski area” means property owned or leased and under the control of the ski area operator and administered as a single enterprise within the state of North Dakota. |
Each skier expressly assumes the risk of and legal responsibility for any injury to person or property which results from participation in the sport of skiing including any injury caused by the following: variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots, rocks, trees, or other forms of forest growth or debris, lift towers and components thereof; pole lines; and snowmaking equipment which are plainly visible or are plainly marked in accordance with the provisions of section 53-09-03. |
53-09-10. Effect of modified comparative fault. Notwithstanding section 32-03.2-02, any person is, consistent with the provisions of this chapter, barred from recovery for loss or damage resulting from a risk inherent in the sport of skiing and like-wise is so barred when it is established that a person has knowingly exposed oneself to the real or po-tential hazards of a situation. |
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NH |
“Ski areas” means all passenger tramways and all designated alpine and nordic trails, slopes, freestyle terrain, tubing terrain, and nordic ski jumps under the control of the alpine and nordic ski area operator and any other areas under the operator’s control open to the public for winter sports recreation or competition. |
variations in terrain, surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, stumps and other forms of forest growth or debris; terrain, lift towers, and components thereof (all of the foregoing whether above or below snow surface); pole lines and plainly marked or visible snow making equipment; collisions with other skiers or other persons or with any of the categories included in this paragraph. |
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NJ |
“Ski area” includes all of the real and personal property, under the control of the operator or on the premises of the operator which are being occupied, by license, lease, fee simple or otherwise, including but not limited to all passenger tramways, designated trails, slopes and other areas utilized for skiing, operating toboggans, sleds, or similar vehicles during the skiing season. |
A skier is deemed to have knowledge of and to assume the inherent risks of skiing, operating toboggans, sleds or similar vehicles created by weather conditions, conditions of snow, trails, slopes, other skiers, and all other inherent conditions. |
As a precondition to bringing any suit in connection with a skiing injury against an operator, a skier shall report in writing to the ski area operator all the details of any accident as soon as possible, but in no event longer than 90 days from the time of the incident giving rise to the suit. |
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NM |
“ski area” means the property owned, permitted, leased or under the control of the ski area operator and administered as a single enterprise within the state; |
variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees or other forms of forest growth or debris; lift towers and components thereof, pole lines and snow-making equipment which are plainly visible or are plainly marked in accordance with the provisions of Section 24-15-7 |
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NV |
Ski Safety Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 455A.060 to 455A.190 |
“Snow recreation area” means the slopes, trails, runs and other areas under the control of an operator that are intended to be used for skiing, snowboarding or for the observation of the sports. |
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28-2-702 Contracts that violate policy of law — exemption from responsibility. |
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NY |
4. “Ski area” means all ski slopes, ski trails and passenger tramways administered as a single enterprise within this state. |
(1) that downhill skiing, like many other sports, contains inherent risks including, but not limited to, the risks of personal injury or death or property damage, which may be caused by variations in terrain or weather conditions; surface or subsurface snow, ice, bare spots or areas of thin cover, moguls, ruts, bumps; other persons using the facilities; and rocks, forest growth, debris, branches, trees, roots, stumps or other natural objects or man-made objects that are incidental to the provision or maintenance of a ski facility in New York state; |
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OH |
(D) “Ski area” means all the ski slopes, ski trails, and passenger tramways that are administered or operated as a single enterprise within this state. |
(A) (1) The general assembly recognizes that skiing as a recreational sport is hazardous to skiers regardless of all feasible safety measures that can be taken. It further recognizes that a skier expressly assumes the risk of and legal responsibility for injury, death, or loss to person or property that results from the inherent risks of skiing, which include, but are not limited to, injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by changing weather conditions; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow, and machine-made snow; bare spots, rocks, trees, stumps, and other forms of forest growth or debris; lift towers or other forms of towers and their components, either above or below the snow surface; variations in steepness or terrain, whether natural or as the result of snowmaking, slope design, freestyle terrain, jumps, catwalks, or other terrain modifi-cations; any other objects and structures, including, but not limited to, passenger tramways and related structures and equipment, competition equipment, utility poles, fences, posts, ski equipment, slalom poles, ropes, out-of-bounds barriers and their supports, signs, ski racks, walls, buildings, and sheds; and plainly marked or otherwise visible snowmaking and snow-grooming equipment, snowmobiles, snow cats, and over-snow vehicles. |
(5) If the skier is utilizing a tubing park, to assume the risk of collision with others on the course. |
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OR |
(4) “Ski area” means any area designated and maintained by a ski area operator for skiing. |
“Inherent risks of skiing” includes, but is not limited to, those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport, such as changing weather conditions, variations or steepness in terrain, snow or ice conditions, surface or subsurface conditions, bare spots, creeks and gullies, forest growth, rocks, stumps, lift towers and other structures and their components, collisions with other skiers and a skier’s failure to ski within the skier’s own ability. |
(1) A ski area operator shall be notified of any injury to a skier by registered or certified mail within 180 days after the injury or within 180 days after the skier discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, such injury. |
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PA |
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RI |
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TN |
Ski Area Safety & Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-114-101 et seq. |
(4) “Ski area” means all the ski slopes and ski trails and passenger tramways administered or op-erated as a single enterprise within this state; |
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, each skier or passenger is deemed to have assumed the risk of and legal responsibility for any injury to the skier’s or passenger’s person or property arising out of the skier’s or passenger’s participation in Alpine or downhill skiing or the use of any passenger tramways associated with Alpine or downhill skiing. |
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UT |
Utah Inherent Risks of Skiing Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-51 to 78-27-54 |
(4) “Ski area” means any area designated by a ski area operator to be used for skiing, nordic, free-style, or other type of ski jumping, and snowboarding. |
…certain risks are inherent in that sport, and to provide that, as a matter of public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski operator for injuries resulting from those inherent risks. (1) “Inherent risks of skiing” means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport of recreational, competitive, or professional skiing, including, but not limited to: (a) changing weather conditions; (b) snow or ice conditions as they exist or may change, such as hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow, or machine-made snow; (c) surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds, cliffs, trees, and other natural objects; (d) variations or steepness in terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or grooming operations, and other terrain modifications such as terrain parks, and terrain features such as jumps, rails, fun boxes, and all other constructed and natural features such as half pipes, quarter pipes, or freestyle-bump terrain; (e) impact with lift towers and other structures and their components such as signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, or water pipes; (f) collisions with other skiers; (g) participation in, or practicing or training for, competitions or special events; and (h) the failure of a skier to ski within the skier’s own ability. |
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VA |
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.11 (2013) |
“Winter sports area” means all the real and personal property under control of the operator or on the premises of such property that is being occupied by the operator by fee simple, lease, license, easement, permission, or otherwise, including but not limited to any and all trails, freestyle terrain, competition terrain, passenger tramways, or other areas of real property. “Winter sports area” does not include a tubing park except for any passenger tramway serving a tubing park and the immediate vicinity of such a passenger tramway in which individuals embark upon or disembark from the passenger tramway. |
1. Existing and changing weather conditions and visibility; 2. Hazards associated with varying surface or subsurface conditions on a single trail or from one trail to another, including but not limited to hazards such as participant use, snow in any condition and changing snow conditions, man-made snow, synthetic snow, ice, synthetic ice, snow or ice falling from a tree or natural or man-made structure, crust, slush, soft spots, ridges, rollers, knobs, holes, grooves, tracks from winter sports area vehicles, bare spots, rocks, boulders, stumps, logs, and brush or other forest growth or debris, or piles thereof; 3. Variations in difficulty of terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope use, slope design, or both; 4. Trails that have, or fall away or drop off toward, natural or man-made obstacles or hazards, including but not limited to sharp corners, ridges, jumps, bumps, rollers, moguls, valleys, dips, compressions, cliffs, ravines, drop-offs, streams, rivers, ponds, lakes, stream beds, open water or water with thin ice, holes, steep, flat, and uphill sections, and all variants and combinations thereof; 5. The potential for collision with other participants or other individuals, including with winter sports area personnel, whether or not those personnel are on duty or off duty; with wild or domestic animals; or with equipment or objects such as winter sports area infrastructure, snowmaking equipment, buildings and posts, and stationary and moving lit or flagged winter sports area vehicles; 6. The potential for a participant to act in a negligent or reckless manner that may cause or contribute to the injury or death of the participant or other individuals or damage to property; 7. The location, construction, design, layout, configuration, and condition of trails, freestyle terrain, and competition terrain; 8. The fact that use of trails, freestyle terrain, and competition terrain and participation in or being near races or other competitions or events, including but not limited to as a participant, employee at a winter sports area, spectator, or observer, involves the risk of serious injury or death or damage to property; 9. The fact that a helmet may not afford protection in all instances and that failure to wear a helmet that is properly sized, fitted, and secured may increase the risk of injury or death or the risk of more severe injury; and 10. The fact that the use of passenger tramways may be hazardous to passengers, including but not limited to risks resulting from loading or unloading a tramway and the potential for a passenger to fall from a tramway. |
Each operator, upon request, shall provide to a participant a trail map of all trails located in the operator’s winter sports area. The maps shall be available at each ticket sales office and at other locations at the winter sports area such that the maps are easily accessible to participants. All trail maps shall indicate the skill-level designation for each trail at the winter sports area as designated in subsection C of § 8.01-227.12. Each winter sports participant, or the parent or legal guardian of, or adult acting in a supervisory position over, a participant under the age of 18, shall be responsible for determining whether the participant will wear a helmet and whether the helmet is sufficiently protective and properly sized, fitted, and secured. Nothing herein shall prevent a participant or passenger from offering evidence that he did not know the particular inherent risk of winter sports that proximately caused the injury or death or damage to property at issue, did not fully appreciate the nature and extent of such risk, or did not voluntarily expose himself to such risk. |
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VT |
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Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1036 of this title, a person who takes part in any sport accepts as a matter of law the dangers that inhere therein insofar as they are obvious and necessary. |
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WA |
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WV |
Skiing Responsibility Act, W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-3A-1 to 20-3A-8 |
“Ski area” means any property owned or leased and under the control of the ski area operator or operators within West Virginia. |
Variations in terrain including freestyle terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots, rocks, trees, other forms of forest growth or debris; collisions with pole lines, lift towers or any component thereof; or, collisions with snowmaking equipment which is marked by a visible sign or other warning implement in compliance with section three [§ 20-3A-3] of this article. |
When no certified ambulance service is available in the vicinity, have on duty at or near the skiing area, during all times that skiing areas are open for skiing, at least one trained and currently certified emergency medical technician. |
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WY |
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Recreational Statutes that Include Skiing
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State |
Statute |
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WI |
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.525 |
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WY |
Recreation Safety Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-1-121 to 1-1-123 |
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Always contact local legal counsel to determine the latest version of any state statute affecting your business.
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Virginia Ski Statutes
Posted: October 29, 2013 Filed under: Skiing / Snow Boarding, Virginia | Tags: Ski statute, skiing, snowboarding, VA, Virginia, Winter Sports Act Leave a commentTITLE 8.01. CIVIL REMEDIES AND PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 3. ACTIONS
ARTICLE 25. WINTER SPORTS SAFETY ACT.
GO TO CODE OF VIRGINIA ARCHIVE DIRECTORY
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-227.11 (2013)
§ 8.01-227.11. Definitions
As used in this article, unless the context requires a different meaning:
“ANSI Ski Lift Code” means the American National Standard (B77.1-2006): Passenger Ropeways — Aerial Tramways, Aerial Lifts, Surface Lifts, Tows and Conveyors — Safety Requirements, as published by the American National Standards Institute, including any supplements thereto or revisions thereof.
“Competition” means any contest or event operated by a winter sports area operator or any other party authorized by the operator at a winter sports area involving comparison of skills, including, but not limited to, a ski race, mogul contest, jumping event, freestyle event, snowcross contest, or other similar contest or event. “Competition” includes training sessions or practice for a contest or event.
“Competition terrain” means any part of a winter sports area in which an operator has authorized a competition to take place.
“Competitor” means a winter sports participant who actually is engaged in a competition in any portion of a winter sports area made available by the winter sports area operator.
“Designated trail” means a winter sports area trail on which a participant is permitted by the operator to participate in a winter sport.
“Freestyle terrain” and “freestyle terrain park” means any portion of a winter sports area that has been designated as such by the operator for freestyle skiing, freestyle snowboarding, or similar freestyle winter sports and includes, but is not limited to, the terrain park itself and features such as rails, boxes, jumps, hits, jibs, tabletops, spines, ramps, banks, pipes, half-pipes, quarter-pipes, tables, logs, or other man-made features such as buses and other vehicles, propane tanks, and tractor tires; snowcross terrain and features; and other constructed or natural features, but does not include moguls, bumps, or rollers or jumps not built by the operator, unless they are within a designated freestyle terrain park.
“Freestyler” means a winter sports participant utilizing freestyle terrain or a freestyle terrain park.
“Helmet” means a type of molded headgear equipped with a neck or chin strap specifically designed by the manufacturer to be used while engaged in the winter sport of alpine skiing or snowboarding.
“Inherent risks of winter sports” or “inherent risks of the winter sport” include:
1. Existing and changing weather conditions and visibility;
2. Hazards associated with varying surface or subsurface conditions on a single trail or from one trail to another, including but not limited to hazards such as participant use, snow in any condition and changing snow conditions, man-made snow, synthetic snow, ice, synthetic ice, snow or ice falling from a tree or natural or man-made structure, crust, slush, soft spots, ridges, rollers, knobs, holes, grooves, tracks from winter sports area vehicles, bare spots, rocks, boulders, stumps, logs, and brush or other forest growth or debris, or piles thereof;
3. Variations in difficulty of terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope use, slope design, or both;
4. Trails that have, or fall away or drop off toward, natural or man-made obstacles or hazards, including but not limited to sharp corners, ridges, jumps, bumps, rollers, moguls, valleys, dips, compressions, cliffs, ravines, drop-offs, streams, rivers, ponds, lakes, stream beds, open water or water with thin ice, holes, steep, flat, and uphill sections, and all variants and combinations thereof;
5. The potential for collision with other participants or other individuals, including with winter sports area personnel, whether or not those personnel are on duty or off duty; with wild or domestic animals; or with equipment or objects such as winter sports area infrastructure, snowmaking equipment, buildings and posts, and stationary and moving lit or flagged winter sports area vehicles;
6. The potential for a participant to act in a negligent or reckless manner that may cause or contribute to the injury or death of the participant or other individuals or damage to property;
7. The location, construction, design, layout, configuration, and condition of trails, freestyle terrain, and competition terrain;
8. The fact that use of trails, freestyle terrain, and competition terrain and participation in or being near races or other competitions or events, including but not limited to as a participant, employee at a winter sports area, spectator, or observer, involves the risk of serious injury or death or damage to property;
9. The fact that a helmet may not afford protection in all instances and that failure to wear a helmet that is properly sized, fitted, and secured may increase the risk of injury or death or the risk of more severe injury; and
10. The fact that the use of passenger tramways may be hazardous to passengers, including but not limited to risks resulting from loading or unloading a tramway and the potential for a passenger to fall from a tramway.
“Operator” or “winter sports area operator” means any person who has responsibility for the operations of a winter sports area, including its officers, directors, and employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment.
“Participant” or “winter sports participant” means an individual of any age or physical or mental ability who is an amateur or professional invitee of the operator or a trespasser and who participates in a winter sport at the winter sports area, whether or not consideration is paid to participate in the winter sport and whether or not the participant holds a valid admission ticket for all or a portion of the winter sports area, and any employee of the operator who participates in a winter sport either as part of his employment duties or as recreation.
“Participates in a winter sport” or “participating in a winter sport” means:
1. Using a trail or other terrain at a winter sports area to engage in a winter sport;
2. Participating in training or lessons for a winter sport as either an instructor or a student;
3. Being a spectator, observer, bystander, or pedestrian of or to any activity on a trail or other terrain at or near a winter sports area; or
4. Being a passenger on a passenger tramway.
“Passenger” means any individual, including a winter sports participant, while being transported or conveyed by a passenger tramway, while waiting in the immediate vicinity for such transportation or conveyance, while moving away from the disembarkation or unloading point of a passenger tramway to clear the way for the following passengers, or while boarding or embarking upon or unloading or disembarking from a passenger tramway.
“Passenger tramway” means any ski lift, chairlift, gondola, tramway, cable car, or other aerial lift and any rope tow, conveyor, t-bar, j-bar, handle tow, or other surface lift used by an operator to transport participants, spectators, observers, or pedestrians at a winter sports area, and any associated components including, but not limited to, lift towers, concrete tower foundations, tower bolts, tower ladders, lift terminals, chairs, gondolas, t-bars, j-bars, conveyors, and other structures relating to passenger tramways.
“Person” means any individual, corporation, partnership, association, cooperative, limited liability company, trust, joint venture, government, political subdivision, or any other legal or commercial entity and any successor, representative, agent, agency, or instrumentality thereof.
“Snowmaking equipment” means any machine used to make snow, including but not limited to snow guns and any associated towers, components, pipe, hydrant, hose, or other structures or equipment, including electrical equipment.
“Trail” or “winter sports area trail” means any slope, trail, run, freestyle terrain, or competition terrain located in a winter sports area. “Trail” includes edges and transition areas to other terrain, but does not include a tubing park.
“Tubing” means sliding on inflatable tubes, minibobs, sleds, toboggans, or any other comparable devices down a prepared course or lanes at a winter sports area.
“Tubing park” means an area designated by an operator for tubing.
“Winter sport” means a recreational or sporting activity, including sliding, jumping, walking, or traveling on a winter sports area trail for alpine skiing; Nordic skiing; telemark skiing; freestyle skiing; snowboarding; freestyle snowboarding; snowshoeing; tobogganing; sledding; or use of a snowmobile, minibob, snowbike, or comparable device; or any similar activity or use of a device that takes place at any time of the year on natural snow, man-made snow, ice, synthetic snow, synthetic ice, or any other synthetic surface, including a competition or the use of any device by a disabled or adaptive participant for a winter sport. “Winter sport” does not include ice skating or tubing.
“Winter sports area” means all the real and personal property under control of the operator or on the premises of such property that is being occupied by the operator by fee simple, lease, license, easement, permission, or otherwise, including but not limited to any and all trails, freestyle terrain, competition terrain, passenger tramways, or other areas of real property. “Winter sports area” does not include a tubing park except for any passenger tramway serving a tubing park and the immediate vicinity of such a passenger tramway in which individuals embark upon or disembark from the passenger tramway.
“Winter sports area infrastructure” means:
1. Passenger tramways;
2. Snowmaking equipment;
3. Towers, buildings, shacks, fixtures, furniture, and other structures, including utility infrastructure, located on the winter sports area property; and
4. Signs, fences, ropes, flags, posts, poles, and any other materials or structures used for posting signs or to manage or direct winter sports participants, spectators, observers, or pedestrians or any combination thereof.
“Winter sports area vehicle” means a vehicle used on a winter sports area trail in the operation and maintenance of winter sports areas and competitions and includes, but is not limited to, snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, and any other similarly sized vehicles as well as larger maintenance vehicles such as snow grooming equipment.
§ 8.01-227.12. Warnings and other winter sports area operator requirements
A. Each winter sports area operator shall include the following warning on each ticket, season pass, and written contract for professional services, instruction, or the rental of equipment to a winter sports participant and on each sign required by this subsection:
“WARNING: Under Virginia law, a ski area operator or other winter sports area operator is not liable for an injury to or death of a winter sports participant in a winter sport conducted at this location, or for damage to property, if such injury, death, or damage results from the inherent risks of the winter sport or from the participant’s own negligence. The inherent risks of a winter sport include, among others, risks associated with the land, equipment, other participants, and animals, as well as the potential for you or another participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to the injury, death, or damage. You are assuming the inherent risks of participating in a winter sport at this location. Complete copies of the applicable Virginia law and the participant responsibility code published by the National Ski Areas Association are available for review at each ticket sales office of this winter sports area and online at [insert website for winter sports area].”
Every ticket, season pass, and written contract for professional services, instruction, or the rental of equipment to a participant shall contain the warning required by this subsection in clearly readable print. Every sign required by this section shall contain the warning required by this subsection in black letters, with each letter to be a minimum of one inch in height. An operator also may print on a ticket; season pass; written contract for professional services, instruction, or rental of equipment to a participant; or any sign required by this section any additional warning it deems appropriate. The warning required by this section does not constitute a preinjury contractual release and nothing in this section alters the common law of Virginia with regard to preinjury contractual releases.
B. Each operator shall install and maintain a sign containing the warning set forth in subsection A (i) at each designated ticketing office, (ii) at each front desk at each building or facility at which guests check in, (iii) at or near each ticket sales office of the winter sports area, and (iv) at, near, or en route to the loading area of each passenger tramway.
C. Each operator shall install and maintain at or near the beginning of each designated trail a sign that contains the name of the trail and any of the applicable difficulty-level words and emblems contained in this subsection, as determined by the operator. Directional arrows may be included on any sign, but shall be included if the sign is located at such a distance or position relative to the beginning of a trail that it would not be understandable by a reasonably prudent participant without directional arrows. As applicable, the signs shall indicate: (i) “Easiest” and include a green circle emblem, (ii) “More Difficult” and include a blue square emblem, (iii) “Most Difficult” and include a black diamond emblem, (iv) “Expert” or “Extreme Terrain” and include a two black diamond emblem, (v) “Freestyle Terrain” and include an orange oval emblem, or (vi) “Closed” and include a border around a black figure in the shape of a skier inside with a band running diagonally across the sign.
D. Each operator shall install and maintain at, near, or en route to the loading area for each passenger tramway that does not service trails that are designated by the operator as “Easiest” a sign that includes the following warning:
“WARNING. This lift does not service any trails that are designated Easiest (green circle emblem). All of the trails serviced by this lift are designated [as applicable, More Difficult (blue square emblem), Most Difficult (black diamond emblem), Expert (two black diamond emblem), or Freestyle Terrain (orange oval emblem)].”
E. Each operator shall install and maintain at, near, or en route to the entrance to each trail containing freestyle terrain a sign that indicates the location of the freestyle terrain. Each sign shall be denoted by an orange oval emblem, a stop sign emblem, and the statements “Freestyle skills required” and “Helmets are recommended.” Each sign also may include any other freestyle warning the operator deems appropriate.
F. Whenever trail grooming or snowmaking operations are being undertaken, or trail grooming equipment is being operated, on a trail that is at that time open to the public, the operator shall place or cause to be placed a sign to that effect at the top or beginning of the trail.
G. An operator may vary from the specific location requirements required by this section provided that the location is substantially the same as the location required by this section and that the sign is plainly visible to a reasonably prudent winter sports participant abiding by all of the participant’s duties and responsibilities.
H. Each operator shall make available, by oral or written report or otherwise, information concerning the daily conditions of its trails.
I. Each operator that offers a winter sport at nighttime shall meet the lighting standards for that winter sport provided by Illuminating Engineering Society of North America RP-6-01, Sports and Recreational Area Lighting § 6.24, including any supplements thereto or revisions thereof.
J. Each operator shall, upon request, provide (i) a freestyler who holds a valid admission ticket to the winter sports area’s freestyle terrain a reasonable opportunity to view the freestyle terrain and (ii) a competitor who has properly registered for the competition a reasonable opportunity to visually inspect the portion of the winter sports area designated by the operator for the competition.
K. Each operator shall provide a ski patrol and first-aid services.
L. Each operator shall make available on the winter sports area’s website and at each ticket sales office of the winter sports area for review by any winter sports participant, upon request, a copy of the participant responsibility code posted and available at each winter sports area and a copy of this article.
§ 8.01-227.13. Winter sports area trail maps
Each operator, upon request, shall provide to a participant a trail map of all trails located in the operator’s winter sports area. The maps shall be available at each ticket sales office and at other locations at the winter sports area such that the maps are easily accessible to participants. All trail maps shall indicate the skill-level designation for each trail at the winter sports area as designated in subsection C of § 8.01-227.12.
§ 8.01-227.14. Freestyle terrain
In addition to providing the signage and warnings set forth in subsections C and E of § 8.01-227.12, an operator shall construct a barricade through use of fencing, flagging, or similar means at the entrance to any trail containing freestyle terrain. The barricade shall contain an entrance opening not wider than 30 feet.
§ 8.01-227.15. Winter sports area vehicles
An operator shall install and maintain on or near the top of each winter sports area vehicle that is present on any designated trail of a winter sports area during the operating hours of any passenger tramway serving that trail a flashing or rotating light that flashes or rotates whenever the vehicle is on any such trail. An operator also shall install and maintain on any snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or any other similarly sized vehicle that is present on any designated trail during the operating hours of any passenger tramway serving that trail a red or orange flag that is at least 40 square inches in size and is mounted at least five feet from the bottom of the vehicle’s tracks or tires.
§ 8.01-227.16. Passenger tramways
A. Each operator shall be responsible for the safe operation and maintenance of each passenger tramway in its winter sports area whenever the tramway is in use, and for the safe construction of any passenger tramway that the operator constructed. At least once during each calendar year, each operator shall have all passenger tramways within the operator’s winter sports area inspected by an individual who is qualified pursuant to Virginia law to inspect passenger tramways for compliance with the requirements of the ANSI Ski Lift Code and shall not operate a passenger tramway that is not in compliance until that passenger tramway is certified by such an individual as being in compliance. An operator’s compliance with this inspection requirement does not by itself preclude potential liability on the part of the operator for any failure to operate or maintain a passenger tramway safely.
B. If a participant or a passenger using a passenger tramway at a winter sports area with the permission of the operator is unfamiliar with the use of a passenger tramway and asks for instruction on its use, the operator shall provide a reasonable opportunity for such instruction. In addition to the signs required by subsections A, B, and D of § 8.01-227.12, an operator shall install and maintain at or near the loading area for each passenger tramway in the winter sports area a sign stating that if a participant or other passenger is unfamiliar with the use of the passenger tramway and asks for instruction for its use, the operator will provide a reasonable opportunity for such instruction.
§ 8.01-227.17. Duties and responsibilities of winter sports participants and certain other individuals
A. A winter sports participant has a duty and responsibility to:
1. Exercise reasonable care in engaging in winter sports at the winter sports area, including, but not limited to, the exercise of reasonable care in:
a. Participating in a winter sport at a winter sports area only on designated trails that are not marked “closed” and refraining from participating in a winter sport in any portion of a winter sports area that is not a designated trail or is marked “closed”;
b. Knowing the range of his ability to participate in the winter sport in which he is participating and acting within the limits of that ability;
c. Being the sole judge of his knowledge of and ability to successfully negotiate any trail or passenger tramway and refraining from negotiating any trail or passenger tramway until obtaining sufficient knowledge and ability to do so;
d. Heeding and obeying all warnings, notices, and signs provided by an operator and not altering, defacing, removing, or destroying any such warning, notice, or sign;
e. Maintaining control of his speed and course at all times and maintaining a proper lookout so as to be able to avoid other participants and objects;
f. Staying clear of any winter sports area vehicle or infrastructure, other than when embarking on or disembarking from a passenger tramway or when present at or in a residential building or other building that is open to the public;
g. Wearing retention straps, ski brakes, or other devices to prevent runaway equipment;
h. Making a visual inspection of any winter sports area competition terrain and viewing any freestyle terrain the participant intends to use;
i. Acting in a safe manner that will avoid contributing to the injury or death of himself or others or the damage to property, including refraining from participating in a winter sport when the participant’s ability to do so safely is impaired by the consumption of alcohol or by the use of any narcotic or other drug or while under the influence of alcohol or any narcotic or other drug, or placing, fabricating, or shaping any object in a trail;
j. Embarking on a passenger tramway only with the authority of the operator;
k. Boarding or dismounting from a passenger tramway only at a designated area;
l. Acting in a manner while riding a passenger tramway that is consistent with posted rules and that will not interfere with the proper and safe operation of the passenger tramway;
m. Refraining from throwing or expelling any object while riding on a passenger tramway, and from placing an object on or about the uphill track, the entry area, or the exit area of any passenger tramway;
n. Crossing the uphill track of a passenger tramway only at designated locations; and
o. When involved in a winter sports collision or other accident involving another individual who the participant knows or reasonably should know is in need of medical or other assistance, obtaining assistance for that individual, notifying the proper authorities, and not leaving the scene of the collision or accident without giving the participant’s personal identification, including his name and local and permanent address, to an employee or representative of the operator or to someone providing assistance to the individual, except for the purpose of obtaining assistance for the individual, in which case the participant shall give his personal identification to an employee or representative of the operator or to someone providing assistance to the individual after obtaining such assistance; and
2. When requested, provide his personal identification to an employee or representative of the winter sports area or operator.
B. Each passenger using a passenger tramway with the permission of an operator shall abide by and fulfill each duty and responsibility set forth in subsection A that is applicable to use of a passenger tramway.
C. Each participant, and each passenger using a passenger tramway with the permission of an operator, shall be deemed as a matter of law to have seen and understood all postings, signs, and other warnings provided by the winter sports area operator as required by this article.
D. An operator is entitled to assume that each passenger who boards a passenger tramway has sufficient knowledge, ability, and physical dexterity to embark upon, disembark from, and negotiate the passenger tramway. Any passenger who is unfamiliar with the use of a passenger tramway or who believes he does not have sufficient knowledge to embark upon, disembark from, and negotiate a passenger tramway shall ask the operator for instruction on such use or to provide such knowledge. Nothing in this article shall be construed to extend liability to an operator for injury to or death of a participant or other individual or damage to property resulting from a passenger who is unfamiliar with the use of a passenger tramway or believes he does not have sufficient knowledge to embark, disembark from, or negotiate a passenger tramway and does not ask the operator for instruction on such use or to provide such knowledge, or who does not have the ability or physical dexterity to embark upon, disembark from, or negotiate a passenger tramway.
E. Any individual who is not authorized by the operator to use or be present at the winter sports area shall be deemed a trespasser.
§ 8.01-227.18. Helmets
Each winter sports participant, or the parent or legal guardian of, or adult acting in a supervisory position over, a participant under the age of 18, shall be responsible for determining whether the participant will wear a helmet and whether the helmet is sufficiently protective and properly sized, fitted, and secured.
Nothing in this article shall be construed to extend liability to an operator for injury to or death of a participant or other individual or damage to property resulting from a participant not wearing a helmet while participating in a winter sport.
§ 8.01-227.19. Assumption of risks
A. A winter sports participant shall be presumed to have known the inherent risks of the winter sport in which he participates, to have fully appreciated the nature and extent of such risks, and to have voluntarily exposed himself to such risks, even if a particular risk was not specifically presented or stated to the participant by the operator. A passenger who uses a passenger tramway with the permission of an operator shall be presumed to have known the risks of winter sports that are applicable to the use of passenger tramways, to have fully appreciated the nature and extent of such risks, and to have voluntarily exposed himself to such risks, even if a particular risk was not specifically presented or stated to the individual by the operator. Such presumption may be rebutted by the participant or passenger by proving that the participant or passenger did not know the particular inherent risk of winter sports that proximately caused the injury or death or damage to property at issue, did not fully appreciate the nature and extent of such risk, or did not voluntarily expose himself to such risk.
B. An operator’s negligence is not an inherent risk of winter sports, and a participant or passenger is not presumed to have accepted the risk of such negligence and the injuries proximately caused therefrom.
C. In determining if the presumption set forth in subsection A applies in a particular case, whether a particular circumstance or set of circumstances constitutes an inherent risk of winter sports shall be a question of law, and whether the participant or passenger assumed the particular inherent risk of winter sports shall be a question of fact.
D. Nothing herein shall prevent a participant or passenger from offering evidence that he did not know the particular inherent risk of winter sports that proximately caused the injury or death or damage to property at issue, did not fully appreciate the nature and extent of such risk, or did not voluntarily expose himself to such risk.
§ 8.01-227.20. Liability of winter sports area operator
A. A winter sports area operator shall be liable if the operator does any of the following:
1. Commits an act or omission related to a winter sport that constitutes negligence or gross negligence regarding the safety of an individual, or of property, and that act or omission proximately causes injury to or the death of the individual or damage to property; or
2. Recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally commits an act or omission related to a winter sport that proximately causes injury to or the death of a winter sports participant or other individual or damage to property.
B. No operator shall be liable and no individual or individual’s representative may recover from an operator under subdivision A 1 or subsection C if the individual is found to have assumed the risk of his injury or death, or damage to property, pursuant to § 8.01-227.19 or if a proximate cause of the injury, death, or damage was his own negligence, provided that in any action for damages against an operator pursuant to subdivision A 1 or subsection C, the operator shall plead, as appropriate, the affirmative defense of (i) assumption of the risk by the individual, (ii) contributory negligence by the individual, or (iii) both assumption of the risk and contributory negligence.
C. A winter sports area operator shall not be considered a common carrier under Virginia law but shall be liable for any injury to or death of an individual or damage to property caused by the operator’s failure to operate a passenger tramway in a reasonable manner or to comply with any mandatory provision of the ANSI Ski Lift Code.
D. The liability of a winter sports area operator to another individual who is not authorized by the operator to use or be present at the winter sports area shall be only the liability for the duty owed under Virginia law to a trespasser.
§ 8.01-227.21. Common law regarding minors
Nothing in this article shall abrogate Virginia common law regarding either (i) the capacity of a minor to be contributorily negligent or to assume a risk or (ii) the standard for measuring the conduct of a minor.
§ 8.01-227.22. Failure to fulfill duty or responsibility not negligence per se
An operator’s or participant’s failure to abide by or fulfill a duty or responsibility under this article shall not constitute negligence per se.
§ 8.01-227.23. Applicability of article
Any liabilities and presumptions pursuant to this article apply only with regard to actions or potential actions between an operator and a participant or passenger. This article has no applicability to actions between a participant or passenger and any other person.
Court writes clear decision a jump in a terrain park is an open and obvious risk
Posted: October 28, 2013 Filed under: Michigan, Ski Area, Skiing / Snow Boarding | Tags: Features, Half Pipe, Jump, MI, Michigan, Rails, Ramps, skiing, Snowboard, snowboarding, Terrain park Leave a commentIf you practice law in this area, you should hold on to this decision because of its statements on the risks of a terrain park.
Anderson v Boyne USA, Inc., 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 1725
Plaintiff: Patrick N. Anderson
Defendant: Boyne USA, Inc.,
Plaintiff Claims: Negligence
Defendant Defenses: Michigan Ski Area Safety Act
Holding: for the defendant
This is a pretty simple Michigan case applying the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act (SASA) to an injury in a terrain park.
The plaintiff was paralyzed after go off a jump at a terrain park. The plaintiff sued, and the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act. The motion was granted the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court upheld the trial court decision.
The plaintiff went off the jump the previous day. On the second day of skiing, when he was injured, he had not inspected the jump. The plaintiff knew that the features of the park would change over time, including overnight.
Summary of the case
What is striking and great about this case is the court’s frankness in describing the terrain park and its risks. The Michigan Ski Area Safety Act, MCL 408.342 provides:
(1) While in a ski area, each skier shall do all of the following:
(a) Maintain reasonable control of his or her speed and course at all times.
(b) Stay clear of snow-grooming vehicles and equipment in the ski area.
(c) Heed all posted signs and warnings.
(d) Ski only in ski areas which are marked as open for skiing on the trail board described in section 6a(e).
(2) Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snowmaking or snow-grooming equipment.
As long as the risks or hazards of skiing are open and obvious to the sport, then the statute provides immunity to the ski area from suit.
Based on the statute, the Michigan Supreme court in another case (of the same name Anderson) found there were two types of inherent dangers in skiing: natural and unnatural hazards. The court then applied a legal principle, ejusdem generis which states: “general terms include those “of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated.” Application of this principal provided a greater number of risks, more than those just listed in the statute.
Once hazards fall within the covered category, only if they are unnecessary or not obvious is the ski operator liable.” Id. The Court stated that the Legislature enacted the statute to remove these matters “from the common-law arena” and to grant immunity to ski-area operators. Id. Therefore, the reasonableness of the placement of the shack was not a consideration for the fact-finder.
The court found the jump in the terrain park was a hazard of skiing, even if created by the ski area; it was still a “variation in the terrain that a snowboarder would expect to see if he or she entered a terrain park. The court continued with this great statement.
Even if the jump were not inside the terrain park, it would still be a danger inherent in the sport of skiing; a snowboarder accepts the risks associated with snowboarding, regardless of whether he is snowboarding down a slope or performing tricks in a terrain park.
The court then went further and stated:
While it is true one can snowboard without jumps, a snowboarder enters a terrain park expecting to use jumps, rails, and boxes. Without those features, there would not be a terrain park. If a snowboarder did not want to use those features, he or she would not enter a terrain park. Instead, the snowboarder would simply propel down a ski hill. Therefore, a jump is a necessary feature of a terrain park.
There were signs posted at the entrance of the terrain park stating that skiers were responsible for familiarizing themselves with the terrain throughout its use, especially because the features change constantly due to snow conditions, weather, and usage. The jump was not a hidden feature of the park, and plaintiff would have seen it had he heeded all posted signs and warnings, as required by the statute.
The court looked at the plaintiff’s final argument that the jump was not obvious because the plaintiff was not aware of the dangerous it created by being improperly constructed. The plaintiff had an expert witness who opined that the jump could have been constructed in a “safer way.”
The court stated whether there was a safer way to make the jump was irrelevant. The statute removed this issue from litigation.
So Now What?
There are two statements by the court that you need to remember, and hopefully apply in your state. The first is:
Even if the jump were not inside the terrain park, it would still be a danger inherent in the sport of skiing; a snowboarder accepts the risks associated with snowboarding, regardless of whether he is snowboarding down a slope or performing tricks in a terrain park.
The creation of the terrain park or creating features in the terrain park does nothing to change the risks of skiing. The fact the feature is in a terrain park provides greater notice and ability to see and understand the risks to a skier or boarder. However, a jump, in or out of a terrain park, is still a risk to be assumed by someone on the slope.
The second is:
Without those features, there would not be a terrain park. If a snowboarder did not want to use those features, he or she would not enter a terrain park. Instead, the snowboarder would simply propel down a ski hill. Therefore, a jump is a necessary feature of a terrain park.
A terrain park is a hill without jumps, ramps, rails, half-pipes and other features. Without those features there is no terrain park. If you enter a terrain park there are going to be jumps, ramps, rails, half-pipes and other features.
Both of these would require that the language of your states Ski Area Statute is written similarly to Michigan’s. However both create great legal language for arguing that when you enter the terrain park you assume the risks of everything in the terrain park, even if you don’t understand or fail to inspect the features in it. But for the signs and ropes, a terrain park is no different from any other part of the ski slope.
This court put in an appeal the things many people have been saying for years.
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Jim Moss is an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the outdoor recreation community. He represents guides, guide services, outfitters both as businesses and individuals and the products they use for their business. He has defended Mt. Everest guide services, summer camps, climbing rope manufacturers; avalanche beacon manufactures and many more manufacturers and outdoor industries. Contact Jim at Jim@Rec-Law.us |
Jim is the author or co-author of six books about the legal issues in the outdoor recreation world; the latest is Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law.
To see Jim’s complete bio go here and to see his CV you can find it here. To find out the purpose of this website go here.
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Facebook Page: Outdoor Recreation & Adventure Travel Law
Email: Jim@Rec-Law.US
By Recreation Law Rec-law@recreation-law.com James H. Moss
@2023 Summit Magic Publishing, LLC
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