New candy apple mixture hardens to concrete, creating an innocent-looking trap for little old ladies.

In this Georgia case, a family had spent the day at a theme park, and that evening went to the theme park’s concert venue. The venue held approximately 2000 in seats and more in a grassy area in front. The plaintiff testified that the venue had a few hundred people in it, while the venue stated it was full. After the concert, the family members went down front to get autographs while the grandmother walked to the exit. She walked up the aisle and then traversed another row, not the one she was sitting in, and fell down.  She did not see anything before her fall, but afterwards saw a candy apple stuck to the ground, stick in the air.

See: Daniels v. Atlanta Natl League Baseball Club, 240 Ga. App. 751; 524 S.E.2d 801; 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 4255

She sued, claiming the defendant breached its duty of ordinary care in maintaining its premises. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing Georgia’s law does not require the removal of trash or cleaning of the area while the guests exit the venue.

The Federal District Court hearing the case first looked at the definition of negligence under Georgia’s law: “duty, breach of the duty, proximate cause, and damages.” Under Georgia’s law, a landowner owes a duty to its invitees to exercise ordinary care in keeping its premises safe. That duty requires landowners to protect invitees from unreasonable risk of harm of which the landowner has superior knowledge and a duty to inspect the premises to discover possible conditions of which the landowner may not have any knowledge.

The plaintiff would have to prove that the landowner has actual or constructive knowledge of the candy apple, while the plaintiff, exercising ordinary care, lacked knowledge of the candy apple due to conditions within the landowner’s control. Meaning the plaintiff argued the venue, through its cleaning and inspection procedures, should have discovered and removed the candy apple. By failing to either have the proper procedures to discover the candy apple or to remove it, the venue is liable.

The plaintiff argued the venue should have had constructive knowledge of the candy apple. Constructive knowledge may be inferred when there is evidence that the owner lacked an inspection procedure. The burden to prove that inspection procedure rests with the landowner. Once the landowner shows there is an inspection procedure, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove the hazard existed long enough that the landowners should have discovered it. The failure by the landowner to discover the hazard after that length of time is a breach of duty of ordinary care. The actual length of time is not stated in minutes or hours, but in the process.

The plaintiff argued that length of time had occurred. The landowner should have inspected the venue after the concert ended and before the plaintiff traversed the row. However, the court found Daniels v. Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc., 240 Ga. App. 751 (1999), held there was no duty to examine a venue immediately after the event. The Georgia Appellate Court found it would be unduly burdensome to keep Atlanta Braves fans in their seats while the stadium was cleaned after a game. Nor could the inspection be accomplished while the fans were exciting the stadium. The Georgia Appellate Court also ruled that fans of a baseball game should expect to find trash in the aisles after a game.

[A] fan should reasonably expect and assume that trash will be dropped on the premises by the thousands of other fans exiting the stadium at the end of a game. The risk of a cup sitting on the aisle steps is not an ‘unreasonable risk of harm’ for one exiting a baseball stadium at the end of a game. Id

Georgia does not require a landowner to warrant the safety of all persons from all things. Only to exercise diligence in making the premises safe in a way that business customers are used to. Requiring a venue to clean or just to inspect before the fans moved from their seats exceeded the bounds of ordinary care.

The defendant argued that during an event, they empty trash containers when they become full and clean the aisles leading to the rows. They have a policy of keeping the general areas free of debris and trash. However, they did not have a policy of cleaning the rows with people in their seats because it would not be possible. (Cue Seinfeld episode leaving a theater from the middle seat, “excuse me excuse me excuse me,” then add a broom or at least the patron’s response of “sit down I can’t see!”)

Finding that the burden of inspection after an event had ended was excessive, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to prove how long the candy apple had been on the floor.

No food was sold inside the venue by the defendant. However, people were free to bring food into the venue from the outside. Candy apples were sold by the defendant at their food court area. The plaintiff admitted that the plaintiff and her family shared refreshments during the concert, which they had brought into the venue, and observed numerous people eating and drinking. The plaintiff was therefore on notice that food could be found in the rows, aisles, and floor of the venue.

The plaintiff argued the candy apple had been on the ground a long time because it had “fused” to the concrete. Removing the candy apple required an employee to pry it up with a spoon. (Makes you salivate in anticipation of your next candy apple; you can feel your teeth getting stuck now!) People responding to the scene to assist who saw the apple said it appeared to be intact and not trashed, indicating it was not on the concrete in the hot Georgia weather for long. The concert venue doors opened at 7:00 PM, and the concert ended at 10:00 PM. From 5:00 PM to when the venue opened at 7:00 PM, the venue was cleaned and washed by the defendant.

How long the candy apple had been on the floor was only subject to speculation and, as such, that estimate of the time the apple had been on the floor could not be used by the court. Since the plaintiff could not prove the candy apple had been on the floor earlier than when the venue opened, speculation was not going to be introduced into the court.

The court held for the defendant, finding the plaintiff could not produce sufficient evidence that the defendant breached its duty of care in its maintenance of the venue. Thank heavens, could you imagine the damage done to a cleaning crew as they tried to sweep rows at a football game after the game ended? Or cleaning up whatever lands on the floor after the Rolling Stones have ended their performance? (How do you deal with unconscious patrons? A trash grabber won’t work.

Originally published in Sport Facilities and the Law a Hackney Publication


Daniels v. Atlanta Natl League Baseball Club, 240 Ga. App. 751; 524 S.E.2d 801; 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 4255

Daniels v. Atlanta Natl League Baseball Club, 240 Ga. App. 751; 524 S.E.2d 801; 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 4255

New candy apple mixture hardens to concrete, creating an innocent-looking trap for little old ladies.

Daniels v. Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club

Court of Appeals of Georgia

November 10, 1999, Decided

A99A1183.

Reporter

240 Ga. App. 751 *; 524 S.E.2d 801 **; 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 4255

DANIELS v. ATLANTA NATIONAL LEAGUE BASEBALL CLUB, INC.

Prior History:  Slip and fall. Fulton State Court. Before Judge Carnes, Senior Judge.

Disposition: Judgment affirmed.

Counsel: G. Samuel Burnette, for appellant.

Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Bradley S. Wolff, Michael H. Friedman, for appellee.

Judges: PHIPPS, Judge. Blackburn, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur.

Opinion by: PHIPPS

Opinion

[**802]   [*751]  PHIPPS, Judge.

Geraldine Daniels, a slip and fall plaintiff, has the burden of proving negligence by showing initially that the defendant, the Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. (the Atlanta Braves), had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance that caused her to fall while exiting Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium at the end of a baseball game. The trial court granted the Atlanta Braves’ motion for summary judgment because Daniels did not come forward with evidence that the Atlanta Braves had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard. Daniels appeals that order. Because we find that it would be unduly burdensome, if not impossible, for the Atlanta Braves to implement inspection procedures to address this particular situation, we affirm.

On July 8, 1994, Daniels attended an Atlanta Braves baseball game at Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium. She was an invitee of the Atlanta Braves. While exiting the stadium at the end of the game, Daniels slipped and fell on either a cup or liquid from the cup as she was walking down the stairs. Daniels contends the Atlanta Braves are liable for her injuries from the fall because they failed to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe as required by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. 1

[*752]  At deposition, Daniels testified she did not know who dropped the cup on the stairs or how long it was there before she fell. She also testified that, at the time she fell, there were no employees of the Atlanta Braves or of the stadium in the immediate area.

We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo to determine if the evidence demonstrates any genuine issue of material fact. 2 To prevail, the moving party must demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of any material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, support judgment as a matter of law. 3 “A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff’s case.” 4

To prove negligence in a slip and fall premises liability case, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance, and (2) the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from [**803]  discovering it. 5 Daniels does not claim the Atlanta Braves had actual knowledge of the hazard which caused her fall. To establish constructive knowledge, Daniels must show that (1) an employee of the Atlanta Braves was in the immediate area of the hazard and could have easily seen the substance, or (2) the foreign substance remained long enough that ordinary diligence by the Atlanta Braves should have discovered it. 6

Because no employees of the Atlanta Braves or of the stadium were in the immediate area when Daniels fell, she must use the second method of proving constructive knowledge.

Constructive knowledge may be inferred when there is evidence that the owner lacked a reasonable inspection procedure. In order to prevail at summary judgment based on lack of constructive knowledge, the owner must demonstrate not only that it had a reasonable inspection program in place, but that such program was actually carried out at the time of the incident. 7

[*753]  Generally, on a motion for summary judgment, the owner must demonstrate its inspection procedures before the plaintiff must show how long the hazard has been present. 8 But it would be unduly burdensome, if not impossible, for the Atlanta Braves to perform an inspection for trash on the stairs while tens of thousands of spectators are exiting the stadium.

While not an insurer of the invitee’s safety, the owner/occupier is required to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee from unreasonable risks of harm of which the owner/occupier has superior knowledge. The owner/occupier owes persons invited to enter the premises a duty of ordinary care to have the premises in a reasonably safe condition and not to expose the invitees to unreasonable risk or to lead them into a dangerous trap. 9

The cup on the steps was not an unexpected hazard at the end of the game. Just as a fan expects and assumes the risk of wild pitches, foul balls, and unintentionally thrown bats, a fan should reasonably expect and assume that trash will be dropped on the premises by the thousands of other fans exiting the stadium at the end of a game. The risk of a cup sitting on the aisle steps is not an “unreasonable risk of harm” for one exiting a baseball stadium at the end of a game.

Furthermore, requiring the Atlanta Braves to remove every article left by its fans, especially in the circumstances here when thousands of fans are in the aisles and on the steps, would effectively make the Atlanta Braves the insurer of the safety of all fans. And, accomplishment of this task would place too great a burden on the proprietor and the fans. Thousands of fans would be detained in their seats, long after the game was over, waiting for the aisles to be inspected.

Because we have found that inspection procedures under the specific circumstances presented here would be unduly burdensome, if not impossible, the burden now shifts to Daniels to come forward with some evidence of how long the cup and liquid were on the steps before her fall. Daniels admits that she cannot meet this burden. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Atlanta Braves.

Judgment affirmed. Blackburn, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur.

1 O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 provides that an owner or occupier of land is liable to an invitee for injuries caused by his negligent failure to keep the premises safe.

2 Howell v. Styles, 221 Ga. App. 781, 784 (4) (472 S.E.2d 548) (1996).

3 Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 S.E.2d 474) (1991).

4 (Emphasis omitted.) Id.

5 Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 736 (1) (493 S.E.2d 403) (1997).

6 Brown v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 228 Ga. App. 629, 631 (3) (b) (493 S.E.2d 196) (1997).

7 Avery v. Cleveland Avenue Motel, 239 Ga. App. 644, 645-646 (2) (521 S.E.2d 668) (1999); see Ingles Markets v. Martin, 236 Ga. App. 810, 811 (513 S.E.2d 536) (1999); Straughter v. J. H. Harvey Co., 232 Ga. App. 29, 30 (1) (500 S.E.2d 353) (1998).

8 Id.

9 (Citations omitted.) Robinson, supra at 740.