Definitions
Posted: April 6, 2011 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a commentAn ongoing project
I’m going to try and put legal definitions for the outdoor recreation and adventure travel industry online. I want to accomplish a couple of goals. The first will be to provide a place to quickly find an answer if you do not understand a term I’m using in an article. The second is to start to clarify some of the different terms that are used in our industry.
This is a work in progress and this is a very small start. Hopefully it can grow and expand to provide a benefit to all.
DEFINITIONS
A
ACCIDENT: That occurrence in a sequence of events which usually produces unintended injury, death or property damage.
ACCREDITATION: Accreditation is sought after by educational institutions to prove academic of ability to educate. Accrediting organizations are themselves subject to ranking criteria. Harvard is accredited by a different organization then a small community college. Accreditation reviews the qualifications of the instructors, physical plant, instructor/student ration, number of books in the library and numerous other criteria.
Title or paperwork given to a program or company, which states the program or company on the date of the accreditation, meets the levels of performance required by the organization, paid to supply the accreditation.
Accreditation is not a defense in and of itself. Accreditation is evidence the defendant knew and operated above the standard of care.
ACT OF GOD: Hail, Lighting, Wind, Tornadoes, Hurricanes, and in some cases floods are acts of God. If the plaintiff injury was due to an “Act of God”, the Defendant still pays, because most juries believe someone here on earth must be financially liable for the acts of God.
An act occasioned by an unanticipated grave natural disaster.
ADVENTURE TRAVEL: An activity that takes place in a distinctive, remote or exotic location, mostly outdoors, generally including a high degree of participation by those involved (Kim Swanton, Carlson Marketing Group, 1990).
ALLOCATION OF RISK: A written document that shifts the burden of damages and or insurance from one party to another party. Allocation of Risk documents includes Releases, Waivers, Covenant’s Not to Sue, etc.
APPELLATE COURTS: Courts above the trial court that only look at the record of the trial court to determine if the law was broken or that the jury’s decision was so out of line that it made absolutely no sense. (Note: New York uses a different terminology for its courts.)
ARBITRATION: The process for resolution of dispute by one or more private, unofficial (non-governmental) persons whose selection is agreed to by the parties to the dispute, or appointed by a neutral party, which is outside of the judiciary processes (the courts). As used in this book, and as typically used, the word implies the use of the rules and regulations of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).
Arbitration is similar to a court proceeding. However, the rules and requirements are not as strict and involve a shorter time. Arbitration clauses in contracts should be considered carefully. They can be an effective and inexpensive way to end litigation. Arbitration may also defer some lawsuits because the possibility of high damages is removed.
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK: Assumption of Risk by a person shall be considered by the trier of fact in apportioning negligence pursuant to section Colorado Revised Statutes 13-21-111. A person assumes the risk of injury or damage if he voluntarily or unreasonably exposes himself to injury or damage with knowledge or appreciation of the danger and risk involved. In any trial to a jury in which the defense of assumption of risk is an issue for determination by the jury, the court shall instruct the jury on the elements as described in this section.
Assumption of Risk is a defense when the injured party has sufficient knowledge to understand and appreciate the risks he undertook. As such the injured party will be denied a recover for damages by the fact finder.
Defense to a charge of negligence, where the one injured is held to assume the risk of injury from a known and appreciated danger by proceeding anyway.
Assumption of Risk is the only defense that can be used against an action by a minor.
Assumptions of Risk documents are the only documents that can be used by concessionaires or permitees on National Park Service or Forest Service lands.
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE: Landowner liability to children if a child is attracted to the land, a structure or the land. Applies to lakes, playgrounds, and fun things. Liability may not attach until the landowner knows of the attractive nature of the thing, but once known the liability is there.
(1) The place where the condition is found must be on land which the owner knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass; (2) the condition must be one which the occupier, (landowner or tenant), should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of harm to children; (3) the child, because of immaturity, either does not discover the condition or does not in fact appreciate the danger involved; and (4) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition must be slight as compared with the risk to the children involved.
Examples would be climbing walls, ropes courses or fitness courses. Because they look fun, and kids are attracted to them.
B
BREACH: An intentional or unintentional violation of an obligation, contract, or promise.
Failure to perform a duty, promises or warranty.
C
CASE LAW: Law based on decisions of the Appellate, Federal, and Supreme Courts. You often hear about cases that are frightening, however lawyers ignore them because they are not case law. A lower court or trial court made the decision and that does not hold any weight or affect by any other court. It is only after an Appellate Court or the case has been appealed once that the decision has any weight or bearing.
CERTIFICATION: Title or paperwork given to an individual, that states the individual has completed training or has skills to a level required by the organization providing the certification. “Certification” given by an organization or business without legal authority has no value in a defense of a lawsuit except as proof of education.
COMMON LAW: Law developed from customs, traditions, religion, and the king. Not laws created by legislature.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE: The negligence of all of the parties is apportioned to all parties. If the Plaintiff is 40% liable and the Defendant is 60% liable and the Plaintiff is awarded $100,000.00 in damages. The damages are reduced by 40% to $60,000.00.
If the Plaintiff is 75% liable and the Defendant is 25% liable, the Defendant wins the trial.
The risk assumed by the Plaintiff is a major factor in determining the Plaintiff’s degree of negligence and reward.
COMPARATIVE RISK: An expression of the risks associated with two (or more) actions leading to the same goal; may be expressed quantitatively (a ratio of 1.5) or qualitatively (one risk greater than another risk).
Any comparison among the risks of two or more hazards with respect to a common scale. [S. L. Brown]
CONSENT: Informed consent of an adult is required before any medical care can be performed. Informed consent means the patient is advised of the problem and the proposed treatment, possibly what to expect if no treatment is given. Implied consent is recognized in emergency situations where the patient if conscious and sensible would have given their consent. Informed consent is presumed from the parent if the patient is a minor and the parent is unavailable.
CONSIDERATION: Any benefit given to one by another as an inducement to enter into a contract. Consideration does not have to be money, but money is the consideration in most contracts.
CONTRACT: An agreement between two or more parties involving a promise or promises, which the law will enforce. Requires consideration and a meeting of the minds.
CORPORATION: An artificial entity created or recognized by a state, acknowledging an association of one or more people, which is separate and distinct from those people. Generally, individual shareholders enjoy the protection of limited liability in that each is liable and “at risk” only to the extent of his investment to purchase the stock of the corporation.
D
DAMAGE: Damage is the severity of injury or the physical, functional, or monetary loss that could result if control of a hazard is lost.
DAMAGES: Monetary compensation paid to a person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury to his person, property, or rights through an act or omission of another.
A dollar amount assigned to the injury of the Plaintiff.
Compensation for loss or injury suffered.
The common denominator that has been deemed the solution to all problems.
DANGER: Expresses a relative exposure to a hazard. A hazard may be present, but there may be little danger because of the precautions taken.
DE MINIMIS RISK: From the legal maxim “de minimis non curat lex” or “the law is not concerned with trifles.”
DEATH FROM ACCIDENT: A death which occurs within one year of the accident.
DECEDENT: A dead person.
DEFENDANTS: You.
DEPONENT: A person who gives testimony under oath, which is then, typically, put in writing. (See also Affiant).
DEPOSITION: The laying down or precipitation of mineral matter that may eventually form rocks or that creates secondary land forms such as deltas and sand dunes.
The transfer of substances in air to surfaces, including soil, vegetation, surface water, or indoor surfaces, by dry or wet processes. [S. L. Brown]
DISABLING INJURY: An injury causing death, permanent disability, or any degree of temporary total disability beyond the day of the accident.
DONEE: A person who receives a gift from another.
DONOR: A person who makes a gift to another.
DUE CARE: Prudent course that should be taken by a reasonable individual or business to avoid the chance of injury to another.
DUTY OF CARE: A legal duty you owe to someone. In most states, you owe a duty to the public to clean your sidewalk of snow. You breach that duty if you do not clean your sidewalks of snow.
In most states, there is no duty of care to rescue another person unless you are the reason the person is in peril. Once you respond or start to give care you cannot stop.
Persons in your care or paying you a fee for care creates a Duty of Care in you.
DUTY: A Moral obligation, action or conduct that required by one’s profession or position to do or not do something or some act.
E
ECOTOURISM: Purposeful travel to natural areas to understand the cultural and natural history of the environment taking care not to alter the integrity of the ecosystem, while producing economic opportunities that make the conservation of natural resources beneficial to local peoples (The Ecotourism Society, 1990).
ENCUMBRANCE: A claim, charge, lien or interest in property, especially real estate.
The connected set of environmental media through which a potentially harmful substance travels from source to receptor. [S. L. Brown]
ESTOPPEL: A legal doctrine which holds that one should be stopped from denying, disavowing or repudiating one’s own statements or acts.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES: Damages assessed to punish the defendant, to make an example of them so others will not follow his example. Same as Punitive Damages
EXPECTED LOSS: The quantity obtained by multiplying the magnitude of health or environmental effect loss by the probability (or risk) of that loss and adding the products. The expected loss is the average loss over a large number of trials; one must reflect on the appropriateness of its use in cases for which there will be only one, or a few, trials.
EXPOSURE: The time integral of the concentration of a toxicant which is in the immediate vicinity of various ports of entry (such as lung, GI tract and skin).
Qualitatively, contact between a potentially harmful agent and a receptor (e.g., a human or other organism) that could be affected. [S. L. Brown]
EXPRESS WARRANTY: Arises from written or oral statements asserting the quality of goods is for a particular purpose
F
FACT FINDER: In a jury trial, the jury is the fact finder. In a trial to the court, the judge is the fact finder. The fact finder determines who is telling the truth, who is lying, what evidence to believe and what to ignore, after it has been allowed in by law.
FORCE MAJEURE: A force, event or occurrence, which is beyond the control of the parties to a contract, such as a fire or strike.
FORESEEABILITY: If the actions of the Plaintiff should have been or were known as something that would or could happen, the acts of the Plaintiff were foreseeable to the Defendant. The defendant is held to have knowledge of the Plaintiff’s foreseeable acts.
Foreseeability is foresight (not hindsight, which is proximate cause,)
Example: Little kids run to playgrounds. (To prove this call McDonald’s.)
A Defendant can be held liable for an injury of the thing that caused the injury was foreseeable, even thought the Defendant knew of the thing.
Insurance, third party or risk management consultants are beneficial in examining a business and identifying “foreseeable” risks.
G
GOOD SAMARITAN LAW: To encourage rescue, most states have laws that say if you stop and give assistance you can not be held liable for the assistance you provide. The protection extends to simple carelessness. There is no Good Samaritan protection for gross negligence. The care must be voluntary and performed at an emergency.
Example: Colorado Good Samaritan Law: Colorado Revised Statute 13-21-108. Persons rendering emergency assistance exempt from civil liability.
(1) Any person licensed as a physician and surgeon under the laws of the state of Colorado, or any other person, who in good faith renders emergency care or emergency assistance to a person not presently his patient without compensation at the place of an emergency or accident, including a health care institution as defined in section 13-64-202 (3), shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions made in good faith as a result of the rendering of such emergency care or emergency assistance during the emergency, unless the acts or omissions were grossly negligent or willful and wanton. This section shall not apply to any person who renders such emergency care or emergency assistance to a patient he is otherwise obligated to cover.
(2) Any person while acting as a volunteer member of a rescue unit, as defined in section 25-3.5-103 (11), Colorado Revised Statutes, notwithstanding the fact that such organization may recover actual costs incurred in the rendering of emergency care or assistance to a person, who in good faith renders emergency care or assistance without compensation at the place of an emergency or accident shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions in good faith.
(3) Any person, including a licensed physician, surgeon, or other medical personnel, while acting as a volunteer member of a ski patrol or ski area rescue unit, notwithstanding the fact that such person may receive free skiing privileges or other benefits as a result of his volunteer status, who in good faith renders emergency care or assistance without other compensation at the place of an emergency or accident shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions in good faith.
GROSS NEGLIGENCE: An act or omission purposely committed by a person knowing the conduct was dangerous and whose conduct was done heedlessly and recklessly, either without regard to the consequences, or without regard to the rights or safety of others. C.J.I. 3d, Civ. 9:32
H
HOLD HARMLESS: An agreement between two or more parties where one party agrees to cover all of the losses, damages and costs of the other party for any damages they may incur. Very similar to an insurance policy.
Example: The school district signs a hold harmless agreement with your operation so that any parent who sues you for injuries to their child will be covered by the School District. The school district covers the cost of defending the litigation and paying any damages.
See Indemnify.
I
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS: The product will do what it was represented to do. If you create equipment, products or goods used or sold to the public you are creating this warranty.
in loco parentis: The individual stands in the shoes of the parents. The individual or agency is charged with the parent’s rights, duties, and responsibilities. The individual and or agency must act as the “reasonably prudent parent” would from dangers, self-injury, and irresponsibilities.
INCUMBRANCE: See Encumbrance.
INDEMNIFICATION: An agreement where one party agrees to pay you for any damages or losses you may incur based on the contract. Similar to insurance contracts.
INDEMNIFY: The act of holding another not responsible for loss or damage. Also, the agreement to reimburse another for loss or damage from a third person’s act or refusal to act.
INHERENTLY DANGEROUS: An activity is inherently dangerous if there is (a) an existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person; (2)likelihood that any harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of commons usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. (Restatement, Torts 2d § 519(1))
INTENTIONAL TORT: Intentional conduct resulting injury. (Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979)
An act which proximately causes an injury, the intent to injure and an injury
IRREVOCABLE: That which cannot be withdrawn, repealed, canceled, annulled or changed.
J
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY: Each defendant, no matter what there contribution to the injury or the cause is liable for the full amount of the damages. A defendant that pays the damages may have a cause against his co-defendant for contribution. Plaintiff can recover 100% of his damages from the rich person or deep pocket.
JOINT VENTURE: A voluntary agreement between two or more people to conduct business for profit in a specific business situation and for a limited or fixed period of time. Typically, a Joint Venture is managed by a “Venture Manager” or “General Partner” who is liable for losses, and one or more other investing partners, referred to as “Limited Partners,” each of whom is liable for losses only to the extent of his respective capital contribution to the Joint Venture.
JUDGMENT: The final decision of a court, which determines the rights and claims of the parties to a lawsuit.
JURISDICTION: In the legal sense, the authority by which courts hear and decide cases and exercise their legal authority. The term also is used to refer to the sphere of territorial range of authority (usually divided along political boundaries such as towns, cities, or states).
K
L
LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: If the Plaintiff puts himself in danger from which he cannot extract himself and the defendant seeing the plaintiff’s problem, and having the opportunity to save the plaintiff, fails to exercise ordinary care and extract the plaintiff, the defendant is liable for failing to exercise the “Last Clear Chance” to save the Plaintiff.
LIABILITY: comprehensives term referring to any and every hazard or responsibility.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES: An agreed upon amount of damages (money) an injured party will be entitled to receive upon default or breach of an agreement by the other party, so that the injured party does not have to establish the exact amount of his actual damages in any subsequent lawsuit.
LITIGANT: A party to a lawsuit.
LOSS: an unplanned decrease in a property or other value which can be measured in dollars.
LOST DAY CASE: Injury severe enough the participant lost a day of the activity.
M
MALFEASANCE: The commission of some act which is positively unlawful
MISFEASANCE: Duty to conduct an activity with due regard for the rights of others, failure to do so is misfeasance.
There is a distinction between “nonfeasance” and “misfeasance” or “malfeasance.” This distinction is often of great importance in determining an agent’s liability to third persons. “Nonfeasance” means the total omission or failure of an agent to enter upon the performance of some distinct duty or undertaking which he has agreed with his principal to do; “Misfeasance” means the improper doing of an act which the agent might lawfully do, or, in other words, it is the performing of his duty to his principal in such a manner as to infringe upon the rights and privileges of third persons. “Malfeasance” is doing of an act which he ought not to do at all. (Desmarais v. Wachusett Regional School Dist., 360 Mass 591, 276 N.E. 2d 691, 693)
N
NEAR MISS INCIDENTS: Less than a reportable injury but could have easily been one; a close call; potentially dangerous situation were safety was compromised but did not result in injury; unplanned or unforeseen event; situation which involves an expression or relief whenever.
NEGLIGENCE PER SE: Negligence that violates the statute. There is no defense and liability is absolute. Negligence per se can also be applied to activities by statute.
NEGLIGENCE: The omission or failure to do something or to perform some act which a “reasonable man,” guided by ordinary considerations, would do in the same or similar circumstances.
Failure to exercise the standard of care which a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would exercise, and which causes an injury and damages.
A legal duty, a breach of that duty, injuries that are proximately caused by the Breach of the duty.
The failure to do an act which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of an act which a reasonably careful person would not do under same or similar circumstances. (C.J.I. 3d Civ. 9:4, Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1038 (1954))
NONFEASANCE: Neglect of a duty. Nonperformance of some act which ought to be performed, omission to perform a required duty at all, or total neglect of duty.
O
OBLIGEE: The person in whose favor some act or obligation must be performed by an Obligor.
OBLIGOR: One who is required to perform some act or obligation.
P
PARTNER: One who has formed a partnership with one or more others.
PARTNERSHIP: A voluntary agreement between two or more people or companies to conduct business for profit on a continuing basis as co-owners do. Profits as well as losses are to be shared proportionally and each partner (and his assets) is liable and “at risk” for any losses incurred by the partnership.
PARTY: A person or entity in a transaction, matter or proceeding who is obligated, as in a party to a contract, or is directly influenced by its outcome, as in a party (plaintiff or defendant) to a law suit.
PERSONAL PROPERTY: That which can be moved, as distinguished from real property, which is land.
PLAINTIFF: The injured party, the party filing a lawsuit.
PREMATURE DEATH: A death that occurs before statistical expectation, usually attributable to a specific cause, and usually referring to deaths statistically estimated in a population rather than to individuals.
PRIVILEGE: A legal principal where one party talking to a specific other party cannot disclose the substance or any of the conversation. A client has privilege with his attorney. The attorney can only reveal the substance of the conversation after receiving the client’s permission. The privilege is waived if another party hears the conversation. Privilege also can exist between documents exchanged with the lawyer and his client.
Privilege in some form exists between a client and his attorney, clergy, and doctor. Some states have additional privileges that may or may not standup in other states or other courts.
PROBABILITY: A probability assignment is a numerical encoding of the relative state of knowledge.
PROXIMATE CAUSE: The injury was a proximal result of the actions of the defendant. Proximate cause is hindsight, (Foreseeability is foresight).
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: Damages awarded by the finder of fact to punish the defendant in a criminal way for their acts. Damages that are beyond the damages incurred by the Plaintiff. Punitive Damages are not covered by insurance. See Exemplary Damages
Q
R
REAL PROPERTY: Land, as distinguished from personal property.
REALTY: See Real Property.
REASONABLE AND PRUDENT PROFESSIONAL: Standard of care of the reasonable and prudent professional. If you hold yourself out to be of certain training, education, skill or the like you must uphold the standard of care of the reasonable and prudent person with the same training, education, knowledge, or skill.
Example: A river guide will be judged with other river guide skills, not the general public.
The level of action or inaction that a reasonable and prudent person would exercise in the same situation.
Conduct in violation of a safety rule, if either deliberate, willful, or with reckless disregard for another’s safety (malice) is a violation of the reasonable and prudent standard.
RECREATE: The act of refreshing oneself mentally or physically.
RECREATION LAW: A body of law which is defined by the type of activity rather than the nature of the legal issues presented.
The body of law which is defined by the type of activity rather than the nature of the legal issues presented.
RELATIVE RISK: The ratio of the rate of the disease (usually incidence or mortality) among those exposed to the rate among those not exposed.
RELEASE: The giving up of a right, claim, or privilege, such as the right to sue, which one has or may in the future have against another. A “General Release” is the giving up of any and all rights, claims or privileges against another.
RELEASEE: One who pays money or gives other consideration in order to be released.
RELEASOR: One who gives a Release in exchange for money or other consideration.
RESCUE, DUTY TO: Duty to Rescue means employing all reasonable means to save someone from injury which you had no hand or responsibility in causing. Once rescue is started, however, several professions have a duty to continue until relieved under state law. Emergency Medical Technicians, Paramedics, Nurses, Doctors and some outdoor Guides have this legal responsibility. Unless required by state law, there is no duty to rescue.
There is no duty to rescue unless:
You placed the victim in the situation that places the victim in peril or caused the injury.
You owed a duty to keep the victim from the situation, such as a professional guide, schoolteacher etc.
You are required to by statute
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR: The negligence of the employee will be imputed to the employer if the employees were acting within the scope of responsibility and authority of their employment.
RISK ANALYSIS: A detailed examination including risk assessment, risk evaluation, and risk management alternatives, performed to understand the nature of unwanted, negative consequences to human life, health, property, or the environment; an analytical process to provide information regarding undesirable events; the process of quantification of the probabilities and expected consequences for identified risks.
RISK ASSESSMENT: The process of establishing information regarding acceptable levels of a risk and/or levels of risk for an individual, group, society, or the environment.
RISK ESTIMATION: The scientific determination of the characteristics of risks, usually in as quantitative a way as possible. These include the magnitude, spatial scale, duration and intensity of adverse consequences and their associated probabilities as well as a description of the cause and effect links.
RISK EVALUATION: A component of risk assessment in which judgments are made about the significance and acceptability of risk.
RISK IDENTIFICATION: Recognizing that a hazard exists and trying to define its characteristics. Often risks exist and are even measured for some time before their adverse consequences are recognized. In other cases, risk identification is a deliberate procedure to review, and it is hoped, anticipate possible hazards.
RISK: The potential for realization of unwanted, adverse consequences to human life, health, property, or the environment; estimation of risk is usually based on the expected value of the conditional probability of the event occurring times the consequence of the event given that it has occurred.
Thomas Cool provides an alternative definition of risk in the context of uncertainty.
S
SAFETY: Relative protection from adverse consequences.
SPORTS LAW: A combination of various legal disciplines including labor law issues, rules and regulations of amateur sports, constitutional issues, personal injury litigation, and even copyright law.( Robert E. Frale, University of California, Hastings College of Law, 1989)
STANDARD OF CARE: The level of action, non-action or care that the industry requires as defined by the general population, the law requires as applied to a breach of duty to an injured party.
Example: The standard of care is canoes if it capsizes and fills with water will not sink. The amount of training an employee should have to perform his job.
STANDARD: The minimum acceptable level of operation for a business.
STATUTORY LAW: Law created by a legislative body, congress.
STRICT LIABILITY: Activity which is classified as inherently dangerous which give rise to imposition of liability regardless of legal fault or moral blame. (Western Stock Center, Inc. v. Sevit, Inc., 195 Colo. 372, 578 P.2d 1045 (1978))
Examples: Wild or Dangerous Animals, Dams or man-made structures impounding water, Explosives
T
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY: An injury which does not result in death or permanent disability, but which renders the injured person unable to perform regular duties on one or more full calendar days after the day of the injury.
TERM: Length of time. When used in connection with a lease, term refers to the length or duration of permitted occupancy or possession, measured from the date of first permitted occupancy or possession (not the date of signing the lease).
TERMINATION: An end, severance or cessation of something, such as the termination of a contract.
TITLE: Ownership or a claim of right of ownership, especially of real estate; a document proving ownership.
TORT: Civil wrong
TOURISM: Travel away from home primarily for pleasure
TRAVEL AND TOURISM ADVOCACY: Relates to the legal considerations that arise from the operations of the travel industry, whether for business or pleasure.
TRIAL COURT: The court where the evidence is presented. Witnesses and Experts testify and the jury makes a decision.
U
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.C.C.): A body of uniform laws (with only slight variations) governing business, banking and commercial relationships, which have been adopted by all states (except Louisiana).
V
VIODLABLE: Where one person has the ability to make the contract void. Minors have the right to void a contract.
VOID: Having no legal force or validity; null. If a contract is void, it never was. Both parties are placed in the identical position there were before the contract.
W
WAIVE: The act of exercising a waiver (see Waiver).
WAIVER: The voluntary, intentional relinquishing or giving up of some known right.
WARRANTEE: One to whom a warranty is given.
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTIABILITY: Implicitly represents that a product is reasonably fit for a general purpose.
WARRANTY: A promise that a statement of fact is true.
WITNESS: One who signs his name to a document, not as a party to the agreement, but rather for the purpose of establishing the authenticity of the signature of a party to the agreement.
WORK INJURIES: Those which arise out of and in the course of gainful employment regardless of where the accident occurs. Excluded are work injuries to domestic servants and injuries occurring in connection with farm chores which are classified as home injuries.
WORKERS COMPENSATION: State and Federal law that insure the injuries of workers hurt on the job.
WORKERS: All persons gainfully employed, including owners, managers, other paid employees, the self-employed, and unpaid family workers, but excluding domestic servants.
X
Y
Z
What do you think? Leave a comment.
Copyright 2011 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law, Recreation.Law@Gmail.com
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Whitewater Rafting in Colorado on the Poudre River brings in money.
Posted: April 5, 2011 Filed under: Whitewater Rafting Leave a commentPoudre River whitewater rafting brought $11 million to the region in 2010.
2010 was the third best year for whitewater rafting in the last 20 years. 37,400 people rafted on the Poudre River an increase of 400 over the prior year.
Recreation can still be great, even when the economy is bad.
$4.2 million in direct money from rafting on the Poudre translates into $11 million overall.
See Rafting on the Poudre River brought $11 million to region in 2010.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Betty van der Smissen Lecture: Risk Management And Legal Liability
Posted: April 4, 2011 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a commentDescription
Date: April 22, 2011 Time:1:30pm EST
This webcast will focus on legal issues related to parks and public lands. Each presenter will focus on a legal issue for 35 minutes followed by 10 minutes of question and answer.
About the Presenters
Reb Gregg, from Houston, Texas, is a leading attorney, lecturer and writer in legal liability issues for adventure, education and recreation based outdoor programs.
Jim Moss, from Denver, Colorado, is an attorney, professor, speaker, writer and expert witness specializing in outdoor recreation law.
Background
Beginning in 1955, Dr. van der Smissen’s career in higher education defined her professional life by integrating teaching, research, service, and mentoring of both faculty and students until the final days of her life. Her expertise in risk management and legal liability made her one of the foremost authorities in the country, and she cherished working with her law colleagues and loved debating the issues of the day. In that spirit, Reb Gregg and Jim Moss, two of Betty’s esteemed colleagues, will present and debate selected legal issues in outdoor recreation in a lively, entertaining, and educational format.
Dr. van der Smissen impacted the lives of many students, faculty, and professionals in recreation and made significant contributions to the recreation profession over her lifetime. Please consider tuning in to this webcast to honor her legacy.
Registration is Free if you do not need any CEU’s.
Cost is $15.00 if you need CEU’s.
Go here to register.
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Assumption of the risk is used to defeat a claim for injuries on a ropes course.
Posted: April 4, 2011 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Challenge or Ropes Course Leave a commentThis decision describes how a ropes (challenge) course is viewed by participants.
Allison v. Charter Rivers Hospital, Inc, 334 S.C. 611; 514 S.E.2d 601; 1999 S.C. App. LEXIS 43
In this case, the plaintiff was in a treatment program for an addiction to prescription drugs. As part of the treatment program on day five she participated in a ropes course where she fell and was injured. She sued the hospital for her injuries. The defendant hospital used the defense of assumption of the risk.
In this case, the plaintiff had led an inactive lifestyle prior to entering the treatment program. When told of the ropes’ course she asked questions of the facilitator and other participants who had not participated in the ropes’ course.
The plaintiff was told that the course was designed to build trust and self-confidence. The group with the plaintiff was supposed to catch her if she fell on any part of the course. The plaintiff fell. The group did not catch her, and she suffered an injury to her knee.
The court stated under South Carolina law, to prevail on the defense of assumption of the risk, the defendant must prove the four elements of the defense:
(1) the plaintiff must have knowledge of the facts constituting a dangerous condition;
(2) the plaintiff must know the condition is dangerous;
(3) the plaintiff must appreciate the nature and extent of the danger; and
(4) the plaintiff must voluntarily expose himself to the danger.
The appellate court found the plaintiff assumed the risk of the activity which caused her injuries. She knew she could decline to participate because she had talked to two other patients who had declined. She knew the risk was of the other patients not catching her if she fell. Finally, the court found that she was the last one on the course, so she knew of the risk because she had watched other patients on the course.
This case is also doing a great job of showing how facts of an activity are interpreted by the court. Facts are told by the injured plaintiff to an attorney. The attorney investigates the claims and facts and discovers additional information from the defendant. That information along with the defendant’s version of the facts are then argued both in writing and sometimes orally in front of the court. Consequently, reviewing an appellate decision the facts stated by the court seem to have no relationship to how an activity or trip actually is run.
If you understand how a ropes, or challenge course works consider these statements by the court about the facts of the case.
A “ropes course” is an activity used to build trust and self-confidence. In the activity involved in this case, the participants walked across a rope strung between trees while holding onto an overhead wire. While one participant crosses the rope, four others follow on the ground, acting as spotters to catch the participant if he or she falls.
Katherine explained the course involved walking on a rope between three trees and that the activity would help Allison to build trust.
Katherine asked them to raise their hands and pledge to at least attempt the activity. The group warmed up with a game similar to tag.
Katherine asked her to at least try and assured her that if she fell, the group would catch her.
According to Allison, the purpose of the ropes course was to build trust and self-confidence. The object of the exercise was for the group to catch the participant as she fell, thereby building the participant’s trust in the group.
This is probably one of the best decisions I’ve ever seen where the court’s interpretation of what happened closely follows how the activity actually occurs. Nevertheless, even here you can see some discrepancies in what happens on the majority of courses every day.
So?
1. Use a release. Relying on assumption of the risk is a risky defense. It is rare that a court will rule on assumption of risk on motions. Normally, that is something left to the decision of the jury.
2. Proving assumption of the risk is difficult. However, you should make assumption of the risk part of your defense. If for any reason your release is thrown out of the case, then assumption of the risk may be your best defense.
A. Incorporate assumption of the risk language in your release. You can then use the release to prove the plaintiff knew of the risks because she, or he read and signed the release.
B. Incorporate in your release, language that requires or that your guest acknowledge reviewing your website. Information on your website can show the risks and educate your guests of the risks.
C. Fully inform your guests of the risks of the activity. Safety talks, photographs and answering your guest’s questions can all assist in achieving this goal.
D. Ask the guest if they have previous experience in your activity. They may forget that they have rafted or climbed after they are injured. However, they are eager to tell or write down their experience prior to the trip. Experience in the activity or similar activities is proof of assumption of the risk.
Always be prepared for the court not to understand what you do. This may require that you bring in a video of your activity to explain to the court and the jury exactly what your activity is and why people enjoy it. This may also show what the actual risk is, rather than the death defying act the plaintiff may portray your activity as.
So Now What?
Make sure your information, your website, your brochure help educates your guests in the risks of the activity. Always have the defense of assumption of the risk available to use if necessary.
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Jim Moss is an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the outdoor recreation community. He represents guides, guide services, outfitters both as businesses and individuals and the products they use for their business. He has defended Mt. Everest guide services, summer camps, climbing rope manufacturers; avalanche beacon manufactures and many more manufacturers and outdoor industries. Contact Jim at Jim@Rec-Law.us |
Jim is the author or co-author of six books about the legal issues in the outdoor recreation world; the latest is Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law.
To see Jim’s complete bio go here and to see his CV you can find it here. To find out the purpose of this website go here.
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Allison v. Charter Rivers Hospital, Inc, 334 S.C. 611; 514 S.E.2d 601; 1999 S.C. App. LEXIS 43
Posted: April 4, 2011 Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Legal Case, South Carolina | Tags: assumption of the risk, challenge course, Elements, Hospital, Ropes course Leave a commentTo Read an Analysis of this case see Assumption of the risk is used to defeat a claim for injuries on a ropes course.
Allison v. Charter Rivers Hospital, Inc, 334 S.C. 611; 514 S.E.2d 601; 1999 S.C. App. LEXIS 43
Margaret H. Allison, Appellant, v. Charter Rivers Hospital, Inc., Respondent.
Opinion No. 2965
Court of Appeals of South Carolina
334 S.C. 611; 514 S.E.2d 601; 1999 S.C. App. LEXIS 43
February 9, 1999, Submitted
March 15, 1999, Filed
Prior History: [***1] Appeal From Lexington County. William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge.
Disposition: Affirmed.
Counsel: Robert J. Thomas and Robert P. Wood, both of Rogers, Townsend & Thomas, of Columbia, for appellant.
Monteith P. Todd, of Sowell, Todd, Laffitte, Beard & Watson, of Columbia, for respondent.
Judges: Hearn, J. Huff and Stilwell, JJ., concur.
Opinion By: Hearn
Opinion: [*612] [**602]
Hearn, J: Margaret Allison brought this action against Charter Rivers Hospital, Inc. for injuries she allegedly sustained while participating in a ropes course n1 as part of her treatment at Charter. The trial court denied Allison’s motion to strike Charter’s defense of assumption of risk as a total bar to her recovery and presented the issue to the jury. The jury returned a [*613] general verdict in favor of Charter. Allison appeals. We affirm. n2
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – Footnotes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
n1 A “ropes course” is an activity used to build trust and self-confidence. In the activity involved in this case, the participants walked across a rope strung between trees while holding onto an overhead wire. While one participant crosses the rope, four others follow on the ground, acting as spotters to catch the participant if he or she falls. [***2]
n2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
– – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Facts
Allison entered Charter in April of 1992 for treatment of her addiction to prescriptive medication. During the years preceding her admission, she had led a very inactive lifestyle.Five days after she entered Charter, she learned she was scheduled to participate in a ropes course. Allison inquired about the ropes course from Katherine McCall, who was in charge of the activity. Katherine explained the course involved walking on a rope between three trees and that the activity would help Allison to build trust. Allison expressed to Katherine her reservations about doing anything physical because of her [**603] lack of past physical activity. Allison also asked several patients about the ropes course. A woman in her seventies and a younger girl with back problems told Allison that they chose not to participate in the course. After collecting this information, Allison decided to participate in the course.
At the beginning of the activity, Allison and the other participants circled around Katherine. Katherine asked them [***3] to raise their hands and pledge to at least attempt the activity. The group warmed up with a game similar to tag. As soon as she started to run, Allison fell on her left knee. She immediately told Katherine about her injury. Katherine instructed her to sit out the remainder of the tag game, which lasted around three or four minutes. The group then proceeded to the ropes course. While walking to the course, Allison again expressed her reservations about participating in the activity. Katherine asked her to at least try and assured her that if she fell, the group would catch her.
According to Allison, the purpose of the ropes course was to build trust and self-confidence. The object of the exercise was for the group to catch the participant as she fell, thereby building the participant’s trust in the group.
Allison explained that a participant was to walk backwards on a rope strung [*614] between trees while holding onto a wire from above. The bottom rope was approximately two and a half feet from the ground at the base trees but sagged and swayed in the middle. She stated the participants were instructed to let go of the wire from above if they fell. Four members of the group, acting as spotters, [***4] were to follow Allison to catch her if she fell.
Allison watched all the other participants and waited until last to try the tension traverse herself. She saw a male patient fall and scrape his shin. When it was her turn, the group lifted her up onto the rope, and she caught hold of the top wire. She testified she was about four feet from the tree when she fell.
The group was not able to break her fall, and she landed on her right knee.
Katherine and some of the participants tried to life her, but Allison passed out from the pain. She was taken by ambulance to the emergency room at Lexington Medical Center.
Allison filed a complaint against Charter in October of 1993. Charter asserted as defenses a general denial of negligence, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. At the close of the evidence, Allison moved to strike the defense of assumption of risk. She argued that because of the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision abolishing contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery, n3 the doctrine of assumption of risk was narrowly limited and did not apply to her case. In the alternative, she argued that if the doctrine of assumption of risk applied, there was no [***5] evidence in the record to support the defense. The trial court denied the motion. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Charter.
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – Footnotes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
n3 The South Carolina Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence for all causes of action arising on or after July 1, 1991. Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991). This cause of action arose in 1992. In response to Allison’s motion to strike, Charter withdrew the defense of contributory negligence at the trial.
– – – – – – – – – – – – End Footnotes- – – – – – – – – – – – – –
DISCUSSION
Allison argues the defense of assumption of risk was not available to Charter as a complete defense to her action. [*615] She relies on this court’s decision in Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 325 S.C. 507, 482 S.E.2d 569 (Ct. App. 1997), aff’d as modified, 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998). In Davenport, we held “assumption of risk is no longer a complete defense to an injured person’s negligence claim. Assumption of risk is [***6] to be treated as another facet of comparative negligence rather than as an absolute bar to recovery.” Davenport, 325 S.C. at 516, 482 S.E.2d at 574. The South Carolina Supreme Court recently affirmed this holding and abolished assumption of risk as a bar to absolute recovery. Davenport, 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565 (1998). The court held “that a plaintiff is not barred from recovery by the doctrine of assumption of risk unless the degree of fault arising therefrom is greater than the negligence [**604] of the defendant.” 333 S.C. at 87, 508 S.E.2d at 573-4.
The supreme court, however, limited its ruling to apply only to Davenport and to all causes of action arising or accruing after November 8, 1998, the date of the supreme court’s opinion. The court held: “Thus, except for this case, if a cause of action arose or accrued prior to our decision today, it will be governed by the common law form of assumption of risk, if applicable, as it existed under South Carolina case law before this opinion.” Davenport, 333 S.C. at 87-88, 508 S.E.2d at 574. In view of the supreme court’s decision to limit the application of its holding in Davenport, we hold the trial judge [***7] did not err in refusing to strike the defense of assumption of risk as a complete bar to Allison’s action.
Allison next asserts there was no evidence in the record to support the defense of assumption of risk. We disagree.
The defense of assumption of risk is generally a question of fact for the jury. Baxley v. Rosenblum, 303 S.C. 340, 347, 400 S.E.2d 502, 507 (Ct. App. 1991). Allison’s motion to strike the defense of assumption of risk was essentially a motion for a directed verdict on the issue. When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Moore v. Levitre, 294 S.C. 453, 454-5, 365 S.E.2d 730, 730 (1988); Baxley, 303 S.C. at 346, 400. N.E.2d at 506. If the evidence supports more than one reasonable inference with [*616] respect to a claim or defense, the judge must deny the motion and submit the case to the jury. Moore, 294 S.C. at 455, 365 S.E.2d at 730; Baxley, 303 S.C. at 346, 400. N.E.2d at 506. This court may only reverse the denial of a motion for directed verdict when there is no evidence to support the ruling below. Creech v. South Carolina Wildlife & Marine [***8] Resources Dep’t, 328 S.C. 24, 28-9, 491 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1997).
Under prior case law, the defense of assumption of risk required four elements: “(1) the plaintiff must have knowledge of the facts constituting a dangerous condition; (2) the plaintiff must know the condition is dangerous; (3) the plaintiff must appreciate the nature and extent of the danger; and (4) the plaintiff must voluntarily expose himself to the danger.” Davenport, 333 S.C. at 78-79, 508 S.E.2d at 569; see also Senn v. Sun Printing Co., 295 S.C. 169, 173, 367 S.E.2d 456, 458 (Ct. App. 1988).
The ropes course instructor and several patients explained the ropes course to Allison. Allison was aware that two patients had elected not to participate in the course because of their physical condition. She was also aware the object of the activity was for the participants to be caught by their fellow participants as they fell. Furthermore, before attempting the tension traverse, Allison observed the other participants’ attempts, including that of a man who skinned his shin and required medical attention.
We find the record contains sufficient evidence of the elements of assumption of risk to create [***9] a jury issue.
Affirmed.
Huff and Stilwell, JJ., concur.
WHISTLER BLACKCOMB INTRODUCES GUEST HEIGHT RESTRICTION
Posted: April 2, 2011 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a commentPolicy Implemented To Accommodate High Snow Levels
WHISTLER, BC, April 1, 2011 – Whistler Blackcomb announced today a new height restriction for all skiers and riders after record breaking snow this season.
From today onwards, guests shorter than 350cm/11.5 feet, the current snow base, will be prohibited from accessing Whistler Blackcomb without the required equipment: snorkel, a shovel and point of view camera.
The policy has come into effect after 315cm (124inches) of snow fell this past month, the second snowiest March on record. To date, mountain safety teams have been able to identify individuals immersed in the snow after using specialized audio equipment to detect their cries of “woohoo” and “yeehaw.”
“Having too much powder is a big problem here at Whistler Blackcomb,” said John McGroomer, senior vice president of Lame. “When we get a big dump of snow, not only do we encounter a lot of powder frenzy, many powder hounds adopt a ‘no friends on a powder day’ attitude, skiing or riding with only a select few, only reuniting with miffed boyfriends/girlfriends at après.”
Including the record-setting March, Whistler Blackcomb has seen nearly 14 metres (46 feet) of snow so far this season, well above the average annual snowfall of 10.25 metres (33.66 feet). With over 50 days of skiing/riding remaining this season, it’s shaping up to be an amazing spring. In order to take advantage of the great conditions at the best rate, 2011-2012 season pass or EDGE Card are available online. With a purchase guests can upgrade to unlimited spring skiing this season for as little as $49. And that ain’t no April Fool’s joke.
Events happening this spring include the TELUS World Ski & Snowboard Festival April 15 – 24th, 2011. Guests can take advantage of discounts with ski and stay with packages starting from $81 per person, per night. For more information about pass and card products, current weather and snow information, events and activities at Whistler Blackcomb please visit www.whistlerblackcomb.com.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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This Saturday another Spokesmen Podcast will be up 4/2/11
Posted: April 1, 2011 Filed under: Cycling Leave a commentIf you are into cycling or just like to, tune into the Spokesmen.
The Spokesmen are a group of cycling professional, fanatics and interesting people rolled into one podcast every other weekend.
- David Bernstein
- Carlton Reid
- Tim Grahl
- Tim Jackson
- Donna Tocci
- Richard Masoner
- Jeff Helfand at VeloReviews
- Richard Kelly
- DL Byron
- Bob Roll
- Chris Smith
- VeloCast
- Neil Browne
- District Cycling
- Jim Moss, Esq.
Listen live at The Spokesmen Live at Upstream.
Or tune in one of these ways:
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Reno approves 167’ climbing wall
Posted: March 31, 2011 Filed under: Climbing Wall Leave a commentThe wall will be built on the exterior of Fitzgerald’s hotel.
The Reno City Planning commission approved a 167’ climbing wall on the exterior of Fitzgerald’s hotel. The climbing wall will overlook the Reno Arch.
Local businesses as well as climbers are excited about the idea and the possibility of revitalizing downtown Reno.
See Tallest Rock-Climbing Wall in the World? Reno Says Yes
What do you think? Leave a comment.
Copyright 2010 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law, Recreation.Law@Gmail.com
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Ski Area Fatalities -2010-11 Ski Season to date: 3/26/11
Posted: March 30, 2011 Filed under: Ski Area Leave a commentThis list is not guaranteed to be accurate. The information is found from web searches and news dispatches. If you have a source for information on any fatality please leave a comment.
Interesting Facts:
Three tree well deaths, the same as last year (2009-10) and one more than 2008-09 season
The last 45 days have all been skier deaths
You can do your own helmet analysis, however, it still appears that helmets do not help with regard to fatalities.
Most causes of death are speculation. Very few reports can be found with autopsy reports.
I can not see anything that would indicate how or why people are dying, other than hitting stationary objects (trees).
Yellow Highlighted Fatality was an employee at work
If this information is incorrect or incomplete please let me know. Thanks.
| # | Date | Resort | State | Age | Skier Ability | Ski/ Tele /Boarder | Cause of Death | Helmet |
| 1 | 11/22 | Wolf Creek Ski Area | CO | 41 | Expert | Skier | ||
| 2 | 12/2 | Snowmass | CO | 22 | Skier | Yes | ||
| 3 | 12/12 | Cannon Mountain | NH | 18 | Skier | No | ||
| 4 | 12/18 | Wolf Creek Ski Area | CO | 35 | Expert | Boarder | hyperextended his neck backward, rupturing an artery | |
| 5 | 12/19 | Cannon Mountain ski resort | NH | 31 | Boarder | |||
| 6 | 12/21 | Beaver Creek Ski Area | CO | 59 | Skier | blunt force trauma | Yes | |
| 7 | 12/24 | Hogadon Ski Area | WY | 5 | Skier | massive chest injuries | Yes | |
| 8 | 12/24 | Hogadon Ski Area | WY | 22 | Boarder | massive chest injuries | No | |
| 9 | 12/26 | Aspen Mountain | CO | 77 | Expert | Skier | suffering a broken | |
| 10 | 12/27 | Mountain High ski resort | CA | 24 | Beginner | Boarder | No | |
| 11 | 12/28 | Discovery Ski Area | MT | 21 | Expert | Skier | blunt force trauma injuries | Yes |
| 12 | 12/29 | China Peak Ski Area | CA | 29 | Boarder | asphyxiation | ||
| 13 | 12/29 | Whitefish Mountain Resort | MT | 16 | Skier | Taken off life support 1/2/11 | ||
| 14 | 1/2 | Keystone Ski Resort | CO | 38 | Boarder | blunt force trauma | Yes | |
| 15 | 1/9 | Whitefish Mountain Resort | MT | 29 | Boarder | Yes | ||
| 16 | 1/9 | Snowbowl | AZ | 22 | Boarder | |||
| 17 | 1/11 | Heavenly Mountain Resort | 57 | blunt force trauma to the left side of her chest | ||||
| 18 | 1/12 | Jackson Hole Mountain Resort | WY | 18 | Skier | Instantly upon hitting tree | ||
| 19 | 1/15 | Sugarloaf | ME | 16 | Skier | Yes | ||
| 20 | 1/16 | Windham Mountain | NY | 18 | Beginner | Skier | Extensive Head Injuries | No |
| 21 | 1/19 | Mt. Rose Resort | NV | 15 | Boarder | Head injuries | No | |
| 22 | 1/22 | Granlibakken Resort | CA | 22 | Boarder | blunt force trauma | ||
| 23 | 1/26 | Keystone Resort | CO | 22 | severe blunt force trauma | No | ||
| 24 | 1/27 | Anthony Lakes Ski Area | OR | 24 | collided with a tree and suffered head and neck injuries | |||
| 25 | 1/28 | Crystal Mountain | WA | 67 | severed his spinal cord | |||
| 26 | 1/30 | Mount Hood Meadows Ski Resort | OR | 41 | Skier | No | ||
| 27 | 2/4 | Hunt Hollow | NY | 54 | Yes | |||
| 28 | 2/4 | Hunt Hollow Ski Club | NY | 54 | Skier | Yes | ||
| 29 | 2/6 | Eldora Mountain Resort | CO | 35 | Expert | Boarder | ||
| 30 | 2/9 | Sun Valley Resort | ID | 49 | Skier | trauma to his head and chest | No | |
| 31 | 2/11 | Windham Mountain Ski Resort | NY | 69 | Novice | Skier | extensive head injuries | No |
| 32 | 2/11 | Cooper Mountain Ski Area | CO | 21 | fractured skull, a fractured right knee, a broken leg, a broken wrist, many facial fractures and lacerations to his liver and kidney | |||
| 33 | 2/12 | Snowshoe Mountain Resort | WV | 22 | ||||
| 34 | 2/16 | Sun Valley Resort | ID | |||||
| 35 | 2/17 | The Yellowstone Club | MT | 45 | ||||
| 36 | 2/18 | Spirit Mountain | WI | 12 | Skier | |||
| 37 | 2/20 | Mount Shasta | CA | 23 | ||||
| 38 | 2/23 | Arapahoe Basin | CO | 32 | Skier | blunt force trauma to the chest | No | |
| 39 | 2/27 | Northstar-at-Tahoe | CA | 30 | Boarder | impact of hitting a tree or suffocation from landing headfirst in the snow bank | No | |
| 40 | 2/28 | California’s Kirkwood Ski area | CA | 25 | Skier | internal bleeding | ||
| 41 | 3/11 | Snowmass Mtn | CO | 73 | Skier | multiple systems trauma | ||
| 42 | 3/14 | Beaver Creek Ski Area | CO | 18 | Expert | Skier | died from head trauma | Yes |
| 43 | 3/16 | Welch Village Ski Area | MN | 65 | Skier | |||
| 44 | 3/16 | Alyeska Resort | AK | 53 | Skier | |||
| 45 | 3/17 | Howelsen Hill Ski Area | CO | 19 | Skier | |||
| 46 | 3/4 | Blue Mountain Ski Resort | PA | 73 | Skier | head injury | Yes | |
| 47 | 3/22 | Eldora Mountain Resort | CO | 21 | Skier | No | ||
| 48 | 3/26 | West Mountain Ski Resort | NY | 17 | Skier | head injuries and went into cardiac arrest | No |
First Update: Ski Area Fatalities -2010-11 Ski Season
Second Update: Ski Area Fatalities -2010-11 Ski Season to date: 1/5/1
Third Update: Ski Area Fatalities -11 Ski Season to date: 1/14/11
Fourth Update: Ski Area Fatalities 2010 -11 Ski Season to date: 3/2/11
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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New Ski Area planned for Alaska
Posted: March 29, 2011 Filed under: Ski Area 1 CommentAlaska’s Manitoba Mountain could be new home to a “community” ski area.
The “Mountain Rider’s Alliance” or MRA is planning a ski area with 2500’ of vertical with three lifts. MRA whose mission is “to develop environmentally-friendly, rider-owned ski areas throughout the world” is planning the project.
The major draw of the resort will be the out of bounds slopes available from the top of the lifts through a gate.
One key of the planners is to make the resort community owned. Shares of the resort maybe available for as little as $500.00.
See MRA plans new ski area in Alaska
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Electronic Signature on release in NY upheld.
Posted: March 28, 2011 Filed under: Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) Leave a commentSign up for basketball game online included agreeing to a release.
Stephenson v. Food Bank for New York City, 2008 NY Slip Op 52322U; 21 Misc. 3d 1132A; 875 N.Y.S.2d 824; 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6704; 240 N.Y.L.J. 82
The plaintiff in this case was decked by another basketball player. The plaintiff was part of a basketball league and playing the defendant’s team. During the game, the team members were “trash talking.” After the plaintiff was fouled, he was walking to the foul line and decked. He fell to the floor suffering a broken jaw.
The plaintiff sued the league and the opposing team claiming the league and team were “negligent in its supervision, operation and control of the basketball game, its league, the referees, and the Food Bank team, and in failing to have a representative at the game to properly monitor the actions of the players”
The defendants filed the motion for summary judgment based on a release the plaintiff had signed online to register for the event and a sign in sheet he signed at the event.
The court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit stating the online release:
… the online release submitted by Stephenson expressly releases the League from injury caused by any negligence by the League and also indicates that the signer assumes the risk and accepts personal responsibility for not only his own “action, inactions or negligence but the actions, inactions or negligence of others”. Moreover, electronic signatures are valid under New York law (State Technology Law § 304 [2]).
The court held that an electronic signature was valid on a release in New York.
Another issue that is extremely important in this case that was raised by the plaintiff was the second assumption of risk form that he signed as part of the roster. The plaintiff argued that the assumption of risk form was signed after the electronic release, and therefore, it superseded the release. This can be a real issue if you have clients sign multiple releases.
Whenever there is a conflict of terms between documents, the language in the new document controls. The court found that there was no conflict between the two documents so the second document did not eliminate the first document.
So?
This case is very instructive and good news. There are hundreds of cases interpreting state electronic signature acts as well as the federal electronic signature act. However, this is the first case where an electronic signature was upheld when used for a release.
This is an important point you need to recognize. If you have a release for your program and your guests are going to sign a release or a contract, make sure the language of the documents does not conflict so that only one, usually the weaker one survives.
The releases must say that they do not cancel each other out and both work together, legally.
This is starting to become boring, I say it so often, but your release needs to be written by an attorney that understands your program and the legal issues.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Stephenson v. Food Bank for New York City, 2008 NY Slip Op 52322U; 21 Misc. 3d 1132A; 875 N.Y.S.2d 824; 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6704; 240 N.Y.L.J. 82
Posted: March 28, 2011 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a commentStephenson v. Food Bank for New York City, 2008 NY Slip Op 52322U; 21 Misc. 3d 1132A; 875 N.Y.S.2d 824; 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6704; 240 N.Y.L.J. 82
Devone Stephenson, Plaintiff, against Food Bank for New York City, FOOD FOR Submission Date SURVIVAL and LAWYERS ATHLETIC LEAGUE, INC., Defendants.
112870/2006
CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY
2008 NY Slip Op 52322U; 21 Misc. 3d 1132A; 875 N.Y.S.2d 824; 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6704; 240 N.Y.L.J. 82
October 16, 2008, Decided
NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE PRINTED OFFICIAL REPORTS.
CORE TERMS: league, team, player, basketball, guy, referees, foul, roster, inactions, online, waiver form, assumption of risk, basketball games, big man, undersigned, own action, assault, fouled, times, summary judgment, cross claims, personal responsibility, participating, covenant, signer, law firm, affiliated organizations, trash-talking, supervision, disability
HEADNOTES
[**1132A] Release–Scope of Release.
COUNSEL: [***1] For Plaintiff: Leonard Silverman, Esq., New York NY.
For Lawyers Athletic League, Defendant: Lora H. Gleicher, Esq., Wade Clark Mulcahy, New York NY.
For Food Bank for New York City and Food for Survival, Defendants: Did not appear on the motion.
JUDGES: Paul G. Feinman, J.
OPINION BY: Paul G. Feinman
OPINION
Paul G. Feinman, J.
Defendant Lawyers Athletic League, Inc. (the League), moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment in its favor. For the reasons which follow, the motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed as are any cross claims asserted against it.
Factual and Procedural Background
The League organizes and schedules basketball games for its member teams. One such team is organized by the law firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad Specthrie & Lerach 1 (the Milberg [*2] Weiss team).
1 The law firm is now known as Milberg LLP.
Plaintiff Devone Stephenson alleges that on March 1, 2006 there was a basketball game between the Milberg Weiss team, of which he was a member, and a team organized by the Food Bank For New York City (the Food Bank team), that is part of the New York Corporate Athletic League (Corporate League). Stephenson had previously played Division I basketball on full scholarship in college, was 6’8″ tall [***2] and weighed 215 pounds. At Stephenson’s deposition he described the events that led up to the incident that resulted in this lawsuit as follows:
Really this whole [Food Bank] team was talking trash, and most of it was directed toward[] me because, one, I was the biggest guy on my team and, two, I was the best player, basically, on the court. But[,] I was trash-talking a little bit back and forth to, you know, some of the guys, maybe the guy the guy [who] was guarding me.
(Not. of Mot. Ex I, Stephenson EBT at p. 18, ll. 19 – 25). Stephenson contends that during the first half of the game, both he and his team captain, David Cohen, asked the referees to stop the other team from trash-talking and to “clean up the game,” however, the referees failed to do so.
The second half of the game, according to Stephenson, “was more [of] the same, a lot of trash-talk, a lot of taunting.” (Id. at p. 25, ll. 22 -24.) Stephenson explained,
The play was still very physical, but in the second half I remember, you know, I made a conscious effort to say to myself, “Listen, D, you are a much better play than these guys.” I am going to let my game do the talking. I said that to myself. I wasn’t going to engage [***3] in any more verbal communication with these guys, I said. Boom, I got the ball, drove to the basket, I got fouled, and I made my mind up I was going to the basket every time, get fouled and get these guys in foul trouble, and foul them up. It was working. I got fouled, I believe, four times consecutively. And in basketball, you know, they won’t allow you to shoot free-throws until you have been you are over a certain foul, almost.
They reached the last foul on the fourth foul, I believe, and so I went to the line actually, I walked to it’s called the top of the key. You gather yourself after you foul, then you take your time and walk.
So, as I’m walking to the foul line, I hear, “Yo, big man. Yo, big man.” I ignored for the first couple of times, but I heard it like he kept saying it, “Yo, big man. Yo, big man,” like at least seven times. So finally, I turn around, and I see one of the Food Bank players, one of the guys that was playing in the game, I don’t know his name, and I turned around and he said, “You better watch those elbows,” and I just dismissed it, turned to talk away. Next thing I knew, I was getting up from the floor.
(Id. at p. 25, l. 24 – p. 27, l. 9). A player for the [***4] Food Bank team who had signed in as “T” had punched Stephenson in the face, fracturing his jaw. Plaintiff’s injuries required treatment by oral surgeons and the wiring of his jaw. Apparently “T” was not an authorized player as he was not a Corporate League member. As a result of this incident, Steve Frenchman, the Commissioner of both leagues at issue, permanently suspended the Food Bank team and its captain Chris Dawson. (Not. of Mot., Ex. H, Frenchman EBT, p. 52).
[*3] Stephenson alleges that the League was negligent in its supervision, operation and control of the basketball game, its league, the referees, and the Food Bank team, and in failing to have a representative at the game to properly monitor the actions of the players.
According to the League, it merely arranges and schedules the basketball games between member teams and provides two referees who are certified by the International Association of Basketball Board of Officials (IABB).
The League asserts that in order to play on a team the team member must fill out a form online, including a waiver provision, which states that the undersigned:
1. Acknowledge and duly understand that each participant will be engaging in activities [***5] that involve risk of serious injury, including permanent disability and death, and severe social and economic losses which might result not only from their own action, inactions or negligence but the actions, inactions or negligence of others, the rules of play, or the condition of the premises or of any equipment used. Further, that there may be other risks not known to us or not reasonably foreseeable at this time.
***
3. Assume all the foregoing risks and accept personal responsibility for the damages following such injury, permanent disability or death.
4. Release, waive, discharge and covenant not to sue the Lawyers Athletic League, Inc., Lawyers Athletic Association, Inc., the Lawyers Basketball League, the New York City Corporate Basketball League, Lawyer Volleyball League and its related Leagues and affiliated organizations, their directors, commissioners, referees, employees, agents, facilities and sponsors from any and all liability to the undersigned, his or her heirs and next of kin for any and all claims, demands, losses or damages on account of injury, including death or damage to property, caused or alleged to be caused in whole or in part by the negligence of Lawyers Athletic [***6] League, Inc. or its related “releasees” enumerated above.
By checking this box the participants have read the above waiver & release, understand that they are giving up substantial rights by checking it and check it voluntarily.
(Lawyers Basketball League – Waiver Form, Affirmation in Support of Lora H. Gleicher, Exhibit H).
In addition, according to the League, in order to play, players must sign a roster before the game begins which states, in pertinent part:
The undersigned understands the risks inherent in playing Basketball and Volleyball and hereby assumes all risks incident to such activities and agrees to indemnify and save harmless The Lawyers Basketball and Volleyball Leagues, The New York Corporate Basketball League, The Lawyers Athletic League, The Lawyers Athletic Association, Inc. and affiliated organizations, their directors, commissioners, agents and facilities against all losses, claims actions, suits, expenses, liabilities, damages or legal fees on account of any loss or injury to persons or property incurred or caused by the acts of the undersigned.
[*4] (Roster, Gleicher Affirmation, Exh. K).
Although Stephenson states that he does not remember submitting the online form, [***7] he does not deny having submitted it, and the League submits copies of both the online waiver and the game roster signed by Stephenson. According to the League, Stephenson thereby waived any claim against the League for his injury.
Discussion
Waivers, such as that submitted to the League by Stephenson, have been found to be valid by the courts. In Bufano v National Inline Roller Hockey Ass’n. (272 A.D.2d 359, 359-360, 707 N.Y.S.2d 223 [2d Dept 2000]) where the plaintiff was injured in a fight with another player during a game, the release signed by the player was upheld as enforceable because it “expressed in clear and unequivocal language the intent to relieve the defendants of all liability for personal injuries … caused by the defendants’ negligence.” The Court also noted that by voluntarily participating in the game, the plaintiff assumed the risk of the injuries that he sustained. See also Castellanos v Nassau/Suffolk Dek Hockey, Inc., 232 AD2d 354, 648 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2d Dept 1996) (by voluntarily participating in a game, an experienced player who signed a waiver form, assumed the risk of the injury that he sustained). Here too, the online release submitted by Stephenson expressly releases the League from injury caused [***8] by any negligence by the League and also indicates that the signer assumes the risk and accepts personal responsibility for not only his own “action, inactions or negligence but the actions, inactions or negligence of others” (Affirmation in Support of Lora H. Gleicher, Exhibit H). Moreover, electronic signatures are valid under New York law (State Technology Law § 304 [2]).
Citing Long v State of New York (158 AD2d 778, 551 N.Y.S.2d 369 [3d Dept 1990]), Stephenson argues that releases for negligence will be closely scrutinized and will not be interpreted to bar claims outside the contemplation of the parties. Stephenson further contends that being hit by another player could not have been contemplated as a risk of the game. In Long, however, the defendant State of New York was not named in the Waiver and Release form. Furthermore, while the document in question stated generally that the plaintiff understood “that there may be risks of injury in connection with the event” and acknowledged that “I am voluntarily assuming any and all risk” (id. at 779), it did not expressly release from negligence even the entity that was named in the release, the Albany Medical Center. Here, in contrast, the release expressly [***9] releases and covenants not to sue the League for its negligence, and the signer also expressly assumes the risk not only of his own actions, but the actions, inactions or negligence of others. The fact that the waiver and release does not expressly mention the possibility of injury resulting from an assault by another player, even a player not properly admitted, does not render it invalid.
Citing Barnum v Millbrook Care Ltd. Partnership (850 F Supp 1227 [SD NY 1994], affd 43 F.3d 1458 [2d Cir 1994]) and Jacob Gold Realty Inc. v Sckoczylas (186 Misc 2d 612, 720 N.Y.S.2d 324 [App Term, 2d Dept 2000]), Stephenson further argues that, in any case, the roster signed by plaintiff at the time of the game, containing the assumption of risk paragraph, does not create an express assumption of risk covering the assault, but rather limits the assumption of risk to those risks that are known and apparent to the player. Plaintiff contends that because the roster was signed after the online waiver form, it supersedes the waiver form. Although it is true that where there is a conflict between the new and old terms, the new language will control (see Jacob Gold Realty Inc. v Sckoczylas, supra), here, there is no conflict [***10] between the on-line waiver and the [*5] assumption of risk and indemnification provision contained in the roster document signed by Stephenson at the time of the game. Thus, the original waiver is not superseded.
Stephenson argues that the League was negligent in its supervision of the referees, who failed to prevent the assault by the Food Bank player. Because the court finds the waiver and release to be valid, it is not necessary to reach the League’s argument that the referees were independent contractors and thus the League was not responsible for the manner in which they refereed the game.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment of defendant Lawyers Athletic League, Inc. is granted and the complaint and any and all cross claims are dismissed as to it with costs and disbursements to defendant as taxed by the Clerk of the Court upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly; and it is further
ORDERED that the remainder of the action is severed shall continue under this index number.
Dated: October 16, 2008
New York, New York J.S.C.
Study by Vermont Medical Student wants to Study Rock Climbing Injuries.
Posted: March 25, 2011 Filed under: Rock Climbing Leave a commentInjuries in Rock Climbing Survey
Information Sheet
This is an information sheet describing the survey.
Just as an FYI: If you are under 18 or have spent less than half of your climbing time climbing sport or bouldering, you won’t be able to complete this survey. I plan on coming back later and looking other climbing disciplines, but right now I’m focused mainly on sport/bouldering. I’m including this disclaimer here after some initial survey-takers were surprised to be disqualified early on in the survey. If you are 18 or older and have spent at least half your climbing time climbing sport or bouldering, read on!
Title: Survey of Chronic Injuries in Rock Climbers
Principle Investigator: Alex Folkl
Faculty Sponsor: Rodger Kessler
You are being invited to take part in a research study on the prevalence, causes, and consequences of chronic injuries in rock climbers. This study is being conducted by Alex Folkl, a fourth-year medical student at the University of Vermont College of Medicine.
You will be asked to answer 16 questions, which should take less than five minutes to complete. These include demographic questions (age, gender), and questions about climbing and injury history.
The information being collected in this survey is anonymous. We hope that study results will fill gaps in medical knowledge about injuries in climbers, and in so doing will allow you to anticipate what kinds of chronic injuries to be on guard for the longer you climb, and what kinds of lifestyle modification may be necessary to cope with those injuries.
Your participation in this study is fully voluntary and you may choose not to participate. The results of this study may be published. However, the information obtained during this study is confidential, and as we will not ask for your name or any identifying information, you will remain anonymous in any publications.
If you have any questions concerning your participation please contact Alex Folkl at
rockclimbingsurvey@gmail.com. Questions concerning your rights as a participant in this research can be directed to Nancy Stalnaker, Director of the Research Protections Office at the University of Vermont, by calling (802) 656-5040. Your consent to participate is implied upon the completion of the survey.
Thank-you.
To take the survey click here!
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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SkiCo being sued for employee hitting guest
Posted: March 24, 2011 Filed under: Ski Area Leave a commentSkiCo Lift Operator was allegedly inspecting the lift by riding the lift line?
The plaintiff was attending a ski coaching clinic at Buttermilk Ski Area in March of 2009. The group had stopped as most ski schools do when the plaintiff was hit suffering a knee injury.
It’s hard to sue lift operators because they have no money. However, if you argue the lift operator was working then you can drag their employer, the ski area into the lawsuit.
See Boston woman sues SkiCo after injury during a ski coaching clinic
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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You never know what really happened or what was really said, but still……
Posted: March 23, 2011 Filed under: Criminal Liability, Skier v. Skier Leave a commentLetter to the editor about a boarder v. skier collision at Copper Mountain Ski area creates more questions than answers..
Al Thomas wrote a letter to the editor of the Summit Daily. The Summit Daily is the local newspaper for Summit County where Copper Mountain, Keystone, Breckenridge and Arapahoe Basin are located. Skiing/boarding is big in that county. Al wrote about the issues and injuries he received when he was hit by a snowboarder while skiing at Copper Mountain. He appears to be as mad at Copper Mountain as the Snowboarder.
Mr. Thomas had stopped at a slow sign to wait on a friend when he was hit by a snowboarder. He says 10 people witnessed the accident. This paragraph is the confusing part of the letter.
A requested ski incident report was furnished to me by Copper Mountain. I met with Charles Payne “Risk and Safety.” I asked if the other party had been cited. Mr. Payne explained that unless a Copper employee was an actual eye witness to an event, it was Copper’s policy not to issue any citations. In my case the other party admitted to skiing in excess of 10 mph in a slow-ski zone and to having at least one alcoholic beverage before the incident. I wonder if this person was impaired.
First of all, Copper Mountain cannot issue a citation, ticket to anyone. Only law enforcement, in this case the Summit County Sheriff can do that. However, Copper Mountain can turn the information over to law enforcement for them to make the decision if the events rise to the level of a criminal act. If ten people watched the accident, that is a lot of witness statements. Additionally, the snowboarder admitted skiing too fast.
The statement “unless a Copper employee was an actual eye witness to an event”, if true is confusing. It is not Copper’s responsibility, and I seriously doubt Copper is only going to do something if an employee witnesses an event.
The Colorado Skier Safety Act specifically allows lawsuits between people who have collided on the slopes. (Contrary to California which says collisions are a risk of skiing.)
C.R.S. 33-44-109(1) Each skier solely has the responsibility for knowing the range of his own ability to negotiate any ski slope or trail and to ski within the limits of such ability. Each skier expressly accepts and assumes the risk of and all legal responsibility for any injury to person or property resulting from any of the inherent dangers and risks of skiing; except that a skier is not precluded under this article from suing another skier for any injury to person or property resulting from such other skier’s acts or omissions. Notwithstanding any provision of law or statute to the contrary, the risk of a skier/skier collision is neither an inherent risk nor a risk assumed by a skier in an action by one skier against another.
The statute specifically protects the ski area and places any liability on other people on the slope.
A ski area may revoke a skier’s skiing (and boarding) privileges in a careless and reckless manner.
C.R.S. 33-44-108(5) The ski area operator, upon finding a person skiing in a careless and reckless manner, may revoke that person’s skiing privileges. This subsection (5) shall not be construed to create an affirmative duty on the part of the ski area operator to protect skiers from their own or from another skier’s carelessness or recklessness.
In this case Copper Mountain could have removed the boarder who caused the collision from the slopes and taken any ski pass, daily or seasonal from him or her. That is the extent of what a Ski Area in Colorado may do. That usually can be done by any employee, definitely by the ski patrol and management and easy to do with the severity of the injuries and ten witnesses.
Whether or not criminal charges should have been pressed against the snowboarder is totally out of the control of the ski area. Copper Mountain’s ability to do anything ends with the confiscation of the ski pass.
See Al Thomas: Ski area need better safety enforcement.
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Law to make Snowboarding official sport of Vermont
Posted: March 22, 2011 Filed under: Skiing / Snow Boarding Leave a commentIt’s nice to know that some states have everything under control and don’t have anything else to do. Besides, they only snowboard there; there is no skiing, tele, backcountry, or rondenee!
See Legislation to make snowboarding Vermont’s official sport
Now I understand the issues of motivating students; in this case, 6th graders who came up with the idea. They had been researching issues and found that Vermont did not have an official state sport. However, in some cases, you can make more people madder than happy with this issue.
Besides, what happened to suing resorts? Vermont has been the first and continues to be one of the leaders in this “sport!”
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Combination of a Products Liability statute, an Expert Witness Report that was just not direct enough and odd facts holds a retailer liable as manufacture for product defect.
Posted: March 21, 2011 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a commentRecreational Equipment Incorporated, REI, the big nationwide outdoor co-op held liable for injuries of a bicycle branded as its own.
Johnson v. Recreational Equipment, Inc., 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 351
Disclaimer. I’m a member of REI for more than 40 years. (I signed up when I was 4!).
This case received a lot of press because the plaintiff died in an avalanche less than a week before the Washington Appellate Court handed down this decision. S As usual, the reports left me confused so I went searching for the decision.
I think this decision is the first product liability case where the plaintiff won on a motion for summary judgment I’ve ever read. Summary judgment is a motion granted by the court based on written motions or in some cases limited oral argument. Normally, the issues in a product liability case are too complex for this type of resolution. REI, lost before it had a chance to argue its case, to some extent.
The case stems from a front fork on a Novara bike allegedly failing. Novara is the trade name for bikes sold by REI. In this case, the bike was manufactured by Aprebic Industry Company, Ltd. Aprebic was not brought into the case. Under Washington Product Liability ACT (WPLA), the retailer is liable for product liability claims if the product is sold under the retailer’s name. Because Novara was the trademark name of REI, then REI was liable for the defects.
The WPLA differentiates between the liability of a manufacturer and that of a retailer.
The WPLA distinguishes between and imposes different standards of liability on manufacturers and product sellers for harm caused by defective products. See RCW 7.72.030, .040. As a general rule, manufacturers of defective products are held to a higher standard of liability, including strict liability where an injury is caused by a manufacturing defect or a breach of warranty. RCW 7.72.030(2). 2 In contrast, product sellers are ordinarily liable only for negligence, breach of express warranty, or intentional misrepresentation.
This difference is major. If REI was not the retailer the plaintiff would have had to prove that REI was negligent. A manufacturer can be held liable for a strict liability claim which limits the defenses available to the defendant. This difference made it easier to win the lawsuit against REI.
REI also argued that the actual manufacturer, Aprebic, should be held equally or vicariously liable for the defects and the damages. However, the court held that for this aspect of the case, whether or not Aprebic was liable did not matter. REI was liable and that was all that mattered to the court and subsequently to the plaintiff. REI and Aprebic could sue each other later to determine who owes who money.
The motion for summary judgment was based the strict liability claim. Remember in this case, although REI is only a retailer, by branding the product with its name, it is now held to the liability of a manufacturer.
Washington by statute defines the liability of a manufacturer if found liable for strict liability as:
A product manufacturer is subject to strict liability to a claimant if the claimant’s harm was proximately caused by the fact that the product was not reasonably safe in construction or not reasonably safe because it did not conform to the manufacturer’s [*9] express warranty or to the implied warranties under Title 62A RCW.
(a) A product is not reasonably safe in construction if, when the product left the control of the manufacturer, the product deviated in some material way from the design specifications or performance standards of the manufacturer, or deviated in some material way from otherwise identical units of the same product line.
The standard of manufacturing in this case was simple proof that the product was not reasonably safe. That is a very low standard to be proved by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff and defendant hired expert witnesses. The plaintiff’s expert witness opined that the front fork was not manufactured correctly. The plaintiff’s expert stated several specific issues with the fork that he found were the cause of the failure that caused the accident.
REI’s expert was not as specific in his findings from the way the Washington Appellate Court quoted him. The court quoted him using the following terms and phrases: “…there is presently insufficient information to rule,” “the nature of the fracture was not determined” and “that additional laboratory testing should be conducted.” This hesitancy or non-specific language in the defendant’s expert witness report was grasped by the court as proof the expert witness of the plaintiff was correct.
So?
If you are a retailer you should understand the strict liability laws of your state to see how you are defined for products you brand with your name. In any case, you need to make sure that all products that come into your store are manufactured correctly and are not defective. In many cases, you may not be able to do that, such as the case a carbon fiber front fork.
If you are using third parties to manufacture products for your store you may want to have an agreement outlining the liability of the parties. You should also receive indemnification for product liability claims when you have no part of the manufacturing process. This means receiving more than a certificate of insurance. Most certificates of insurance simply prove the person providing the certificate has insurance. Not that the insurance policy is going to be available to use to pay claims.
| Jim Moss is an attorney specializing in the legal issues of the outdoor recreation community. He represents guides, guide services, and outfitters both as businesses and individuals and the products they use for their business. He has defended Mt. Everest guide services, summer camps, climbing rope manufacturers, avalanche beacon manufacturers, and many more manufacturers and outdoor industries. Contact Jim at Jim@Rec-Law.us |
Jim is the author or co-author of six books about the legal issues in the outdoor recreation world; the latest is Outdoor Recreation Insurance, Risk Management and Law.
To see Jim’s complete bio go here and to see his CV you can find it here. To find out the purpose of this website go here.
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Johnson v. Recreational Equipment, Inc., 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 351
Posted: March 21, 2011 Filed under: Cycling, Legal Case, Washington | Tags: bicycle, Carbon Fiber, Cycling, Defect, Defective Product, Front Fork, Products Liability Leave a commentTo Read an Analysis of this decision see: Combination of a Products Liability statute, an Expert Witness Report that was just not direct enough and odd facts holds a retailer liable as manufacture for product defect.
Johnson v. Recreational Equipment, Inc., 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 351
Monika Johnson, Respondent, v. Recreational Equipment, Inc., Petitioner.
No. 65463-2-I
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One
2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 351
January 6, 2011, Oral Argument
February 7, 2011, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
Appeal from King County Superior Court. Docket No: 09-2-14346-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 05/10/2010. Judge signing: Honorable Steven C Gonzalez.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
SUMMARY:
WASHINGTON OFFICIAL REPORTS SUMMARY Nature of Action: Action for damages for injuries sustained while riding a bicycle. The plaintiff brought the action as a product liability claim against the seller of the bicycle. The plaintiff alleged that her injuries were caused by a defect in the carbon fiber front fork of the bicycle. Both the bicycle and the carbon fiber fork, although not manufactured by the defendant, were marketed under the defendant’s brand name.
Nature of Action: Action for damages for injuries sustained while riding a bicycle. The plaintiff brought the action as a product liability claim against the seller of the bicycle. The plaintiff alleged that her injuries were caused by a defect in the carbon fiber front fork of the bicycle. Both the bicycle and the carbon fiber fork, although not manufactured by the defendant, were marketed under the defendant’s brand name.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, No. 09-2-14346-3, Steven C. Gonzalez, J., on May 10, 2010, denied the defendant’s motion to be permitted to seek to have the jury allocate fault to the manufacturer of the carbon fiber fork and granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of strict liability.
Court of Appeals: Holding that the defendant’s statutory vicarious liability for the manufacturing defect precludes a right to have fault allocated to the manufacturer and that the factual averments in the record were sufficient for the trial court to rule on the issue of strict liability as a matter of law, the court affirms the trial court’s rulings.
HEADNOTES WASHINGTON OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES
[1] Statutes — Construction — Review — Standard of Review. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.
[2] Statutes — Construction — Legislative Intent — In General. A court’s primary duty in interpreting a statute is to implement legislative intent.
[3] Statutes — Construction — Unambiguous Language — Statutory Language — In General. The meaning of an unambiguous statute is derived from the statute’s plain language.
[4] Statutes — Construction — Superfluous Provisions. A statute must be construed so that no provision is rendered meaningless or superfluous.
[5] Products Liability — Defect — Seller Liability — Own Brand Product — Statutory Provisions — Nature of Liability — Vicarious Liability. RCW 7.72.040(2)(e) holds a product seller liable for a manufacturing defect in a product marketed under the product sellers’s own trade name or brand name even though the manufacturer necessarily is the entity that actually caused the defect. The statute creates a form of vicarious liability that enables a claimant injured by a defectively manufactured product to recover fully from the product seller where the seller branded the product as its own.
[6] Statutes — Construction — Meaningful Interpretation — In General. Because a court assumes that the legislature does not engage in meaningless acts, a statute should not be construed as if the legislature has.
[7] Statutes — Repeal — By Implication — Disfavored Status. Implied repeals of statutes are disfavored; courts have a duty to interpret statutes so as to give them effect.
[8] Products Liability — Defect — Seller Liability — Own Brand Product — Allocation of Fault — To Manufacturer — In General. A product seller that is subject to vicarious liability for a manufacturing defect in a product under RCW 7.72.040(2)(e) because the product is marketed under the product sellers’s own trade name or brand name does not have a right to an allocation of fault to the manufacturer on the same manufacturing defect claim. This rule is not inconsistent with the law of comparative fault as set forth in chapter 4.22 RCW because RCW 7.72.040(2)(e) provides that the seller’s proportionate amount of damages is the full amount of damages, in which case no apportionment of fault is necessary to ensure that the seller pays only its share of damages.
[9] Products Liability — Defect — Seller Liability — Own Brand Product — Allocation of Fault — Private Contract. The rule of RCW 7.72.040(2)(e) that a product seller can be vicariously liable for a manufacturing defect in a product marketed under the product seller’s own trade name or brand name suggests a legislative intent to leave to the marketplace the means of allocating risk between commercial entities. The Washington Product Liability Act (ch. 7.72 RCW) presupposes a contractual relationship between the product seller and the manufacturer, with or without an intermediary supplier, and, rather than legislatively imposing a means of risk allocation, assumes that sophisticated commercial parties will contract to allocate risk between themselves.
[10] Judgment — Summary Judgment — Burden on Moving Party — Absence of Factual Issue. In a summary judgment proceeding, the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
[11] Judgment — Summary Judgment — Determination — Single Conclusion From Evidence. Summary judgment is appropriate if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion from the facts submitted.
[12] Judgment — Summary Judgment — Issues of Fact — Material Fact — What Constitutes. For purposes of a summary judgment proceeding, a material fact is a fact on which the outcome of the litigation depends, in whole or in part.
[13] Judgment — Summary Judgment — Affidavits — Sufficiency — Evidentiary Facts. An affidavit submitted in response to a motion for summary judgment does not raise a genuine issue of fact unless it sets forth facts that are evidentiary in nature, i.e., information as to what took place–an act, an incident, a reality–as distinguished from supposition or opinion. Ultimate facts, conclusions of fact, and conclusory statements of fact or legal conclusions are insufficient to raise a question of fact.
[14] Products Liability — Defect — Strict Liability — Manufacturing Defect — Deviation From Manufacturer’s Specifications or Standards — Proof — Expert Testimony — Sufficiency. In a strict liability product liability action alleging that a product was not reasonably safe in construction, where the manufacturing defect is such that no conceivable performance standard would call for the product to be manufactured that way, expert testimony that such defect caused the product’s failure can be sufficient to establish that the product deviated in some material way from the manufacturer’s design specifications or performance standards, or deviated in some material way from otherwise identical units of the same product line, within the meaning of RCW 7.72.030(2)(a). Direct evidence of the manufacturer’s design specifications or performance standards is not required in this situation.
[15] Judgment — Summary Judgment — Burden on Nonmoving Party — Averment of Specific Facts — Speculation. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rely on speculation and conjecture to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
[16] Trial — Bifurcation of Issues — Review — Standard of Review. A trial court’s decision to order separate trials is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
[17] Products Liability — Defect — Seller Liability — Own Brand Product — Contribution — Third Party Action — Against Manufacturer — Bifurcation of Trial. In a product liability action alleging that a product seller is vicariously liable for a manufacturing defect in a product marketed under the product seller’s own trade name or brand name, the trial court may properly rule that any contribution claim by the seller against the product’s manufacturer must be tried separately because joining the manufacturer as a third party defendant would delay and prejudice the plaintiff’s claim against the seller. The trial court may properly bifurcate the claims despite negative consequences for the seller’s contribution rights.
COUNSEL: V.L. Woolston and Paul S. Graves (of Perkins Coie LLP), for petitioner.
Robert L. Christie, Jason M. Rosen, and Thomas P. Miller (of Christie Law Group PLLC), for respondent.
JUDGES: AUTHOR: Stephen J. Dwyer, C.J. We concur: Michael S. Spearman, J., C. Kenneth Grosse, J.
OPINION BY: Stephen J. Dwyer
OPINION
¶1 Dwyer, C.J. — [HN1] The Washington product liability act (WPLA), chapter 7.72 RCW, sets forth a statutory form of vicarious liability whereby a product seller assumes the liability of a manufacturer where a product is marketed under the seller’s brand name. Because permitting the product seller to attribute fault to the actual manufacturer would abrogate this provision of the WPLA, principles of comparative fault do not apply, notwithstanding the possibility that statutory contribution may thereby be precluded. Such a result is not in contravention of our state’s statutory comparative fault system, as commercial entities [*2] can themselves contract to allocate liability where the WPLA’s vicarious liability provision applies.
¶2 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Recreational Equipment, Inc. (REI) is not entitled to seek to allocate fault to the manufacturer of the defective product that REI branded as its own. We also conclude that the trial court erred neither by finding REI strictly liable for the injuries caused by the defective product nor by ruling that any third party claim by REI against the manufacturer would be severed for trial.
I
¶3 In November 2007, Monika Johnson was riding her bicycle along a downtown Seattle sidewalk when the front carbon fiber fork of the bicycle, which attaches the bicycle’s front wheel to its frame, “sheared from the steer tube suddenly and without warning.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 57. The fork and front wheel detached from the frame of the bicycle, and Johnson fell face first onto the sidewalk, sustaining serious injuries.
¶4 Johnson brought an action against REI pursuant to the WPLA, alleging that her injuries were caused by a defect in the carbon fiber fork. Both the bicycle and the carbon fiber fork, although not manufactured by REI, were marketed under REI’s [*3] brand name, Novara. Johnson had purchased the Novara brand bicycle from REI in 2002. In 2005, she had taken the bicycle to REI for repairs following a collision with a car door. The Novara carbon fiber fork that fractured in November 2007 was installed on the bicycle during those 2005 repairs.
¶5 Johnson did not name the manufacturer of the fork, Aprebic Industry Company, Ltd., as a defendant in the action. REI filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling that it was entitled to ask the jury to allocate fault to Aprebic pursuant to Washington’s comparative fault system, set forth in chapter 4.22 RCW, or, in the alternative, requesting leave to file a third party complaint against Aprebic. In response, Johnson filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that REI was strictly liable for her injuries.
¶6 In support of her summary judgment motion, Johnson submitted to the trial court the declaration of Gerald Zaminski, a professional engineer, who examined the bicycle and the carbon fiber fork and destructively tested the fork. He found that the section of the fork where the fracture occurred “was manufactured using a relatively small number of [carbon fiber] layers.” [*4] CP at 106. He concluded that “[t]he small number of carbon fiber layers and their orientation interface resulted in the nucleation and propagation of cracking” and that this cracking “led to the catastrophic fracture and failure of the fork.” CP at 106. According to Zaminski, the thickness of the carbon fiber layering where the fracture occurred was “just a fraction of the thickness of the carbon fiber layup elsewhere in the fork and steerer tube.” CP at 106. He stated that the carbon fiber layers also “displayed voids, gaps, separations, and kinks, which are all indicative of defective manufacturing.” CP at 106. Zaminski also observed that the carbon fiber layers at the point of the fracture were “starved of epoxy,” making them “more susceptible to failure.” CP at 107. Zaminski declared that “[t]he orientation and makeup of the carbon fiber layers can only occur during manufacturing; they are not defects that can occur after the product has been manufactured.” CP at 107.
¶7 In response, REI submitted the declaration of David Mitchell, also a professional engineer, who inspected the bicycle and carbon fiber fork. Mitchell asserted that “there is presently insufficient information to rule [*5] out the accumulation of prior damage to the front fork as the cause of ultimate fork separation.” CP at 178. He stated that “the nature of the fracture was not determined” and that additional laboratory testing should be conducted, including loading an examplar fork to determine its breaking strength. CP at 177. He also noted that the bicycle itself was “clearly a high mileage vehicle” that displayed “substantial wear and tear.” CP at 176. Mitchell further suggested that a 2006 collision involving the bicycle, in which the rear wheel was damaged, could have contributed to the fork’s fracture. He opined that “[i]f an element of that crash involved the front fork without creating visible damage, then it could be considered an initiating event for the fracture that serves as the basis for this law suit.” CP at 178.
¶8 The trial court denied REI’s motion to be permitted to seek to have the jury allocate fault to Aprebic and granted Johnson’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of strict liability. The trial court ruled that “[d]efendant REI has the liability of a ‘manufacturer’ as set forth in RCW 7.72.040(2)(e) and is strictly liable as a matter of law for all damages and injuries that [*6] plaintiff sustained.” 1 CP at 196. The trial court further determined that the fact that Aprebic is the actual manufacturer of the fork has no bearing on REI’s liability to Johnson, as “REI has the same liability as the actual manufacturer.” CP at 196. The trial court concluded that Johnson could look to REI exclusively for compensation for her injuries. Although the trial court denied REI’s request to attribute fault to Aprebic, it did grant to REI leave to join Aprebic as a third party defendant. However, the trial court noted that if REI did so, the court would “require separate trials under CR 20(b) to prevent delay and prejudice to [Johnson].” CP at 198.
1 The trial court noted that its ruling would not “preclude REI from asserting that [Johnson] was contributorily negligent if any facts to support this are developed.” CP at 196.
¶9 REI sought discretionary review of the trial court’s rulings. A commissioner of this court granted discretionary review of the trial court’s rulings on three issues: (1) whether comparative fault principles apply to Johnson’s claims, (2) whether REI is strictly liable for Johnson’s injuries, and (3) whether any third party claim brought by REI against Aprebic [*7] should be severed for trial.
II
¶10 REI first contends that the statutory comparative fault system adopted by our legislature in 1986 demands that it be permitted to ask the jury to allocate fault to Aprebic for the fork’s manufacturing defect. Because the WPLA expressly provides that REI, by selling the defective product under its own brand name, assumes the liability of the manufacturer, we disagree.
[1] ¶11 [HN2] Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Happy Bunch, LLC v. Grandview N., LLC, 142 Wn. App. 81, 88, 173 P.3d 959 (2007). Whether the WPLA permits a product seller that brands a defective product as its own to attribute fault to the actual manufacturer is a question of statutory interpretation; thus, we review the question de novo.
[2-4] ¶12 [HN3] Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is to discern and implement legislative intent. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Where a statute is unambiguous, we derive its meaning from the plain language of the statute. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 9-10. Moreover, we must construe statutes such that no provision is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996).
¶13 [HN4] In [*8] 1981, our legislature codified the law of product liability by enacting the Washington product liability act (WPLA), chapter 7.72 RCW. The WPLA distinguishes between and imposes different standards of liability on manufacturers and product sellers for harm caused by defective products. See RCW 7.72.030, .040. As a general rule, manufacturers of defective products are held to a higher standard of liability, including strict liability where injury is caused by a manufacturing defect or a breach of warranty. RCW 7.72.030(2). 2 In contrast, product sellers are ordinarily liable only for negligence, breach of express warranty, or intentional misrepresentation. RCW 7.72.040(1). In limited circumstances, however, product sellers are subject to “the liability of a manufacturer,” including where “[t]he product was marketed under a trade name or brand name of the product seller.” RCW 7.72.040(2), (2)(e). 3
2 RCW 7.72.030(2) provides, in pertinent part:
[HN5] (2) A product manufacturer is subject to strict liability to a claimant if the claimant’s harm was proximately caused by the fact that the product was not reasonably safe in construction or not reasonably safe because it did not conform to the manufacturer’s [*9] express warranty or to the implied warranties under Title 62A RCW.
(a) A product is not reasonably safe in construction if, when the product left the control of the manufacturer, the product deviated in some material way from the design specifications or performance standards of the manufacturer, or deviated in some material way from otherwise identical units of the same product line.
3 The limited circumstances in which a product seller assumes the liability of a manufacturer are set forth in RCW 7.70.040(2), which provides:
[HN6] (2) A product seller, other than a manufacturer, shall have the liability of a manufacturer to the claimant if:
(a) No solvent manufacturer who would be liable to the claimant is subject to service of process under the laws of the claimant’s domicile or the state of Washington; or
(b) The court determines that it is highly probable that the claimant would be unable to enforce a judgment against any manufacturer; or
(c) The product seller is a controlled subsidiary of a manufacturer, or the manufacturer is a controlled subsidiary of the product seller; or
(d) The product seller provided the plans or specifications for the manufacture or preparation of the product and such [*10] plans or specifications were a proximate cause of the defect in the product; or
(e) The product was marketed under a trade name or brand name of the product seller.
[5-9] ¶14 [HN7] The WPLA explicitly provides that “[a] product seller, other than a manufacturer, [has] the liability of a manufacturer” where “[t]he product was marketed under a trade name or brand name of the product seller.” RCW 7.72.040(2), (2)(e). Although, absent this provision, only a manufacturer could be held liable for a manufacturing defect, RCW 7.72.030(2), our legislature has chosen to hold particular product sellers liable for such acts–despite the fact that the manufacturer of the product is necessarily the entity that actually caused the defect where a product is defectively manufactured.
¶15 Thus, [HN8] by imposing liability on sellers of branded products for manufacturing defects–which, inevitably, are caused by acts of the manufacturer–our legislature created a statutory form of vicarious liability that enables the claimant injured by a defectively manufactured product to recover fully from the product seller where the seller branded the product as its own. See 16 David K. DeWolf & Keller W. Allen, Washington Practice: Tort Law & [*11] Practice, § 3.1, at 116 (3d ed. 2006) (“In contrast to direct liability, which is liability for breach of one’s own duty of care, vicarious liability is liability for the breach of someone else’s duty of care.”). Because a seller of a branded product is vicariously liable for manufacturing defects, permitting REI–the product seller liable as the manufacturer pursuant to RCW 7.72.040(2)(e)–to seek to allocate fault to Aprebic–the actual manufacturer of the defective product–would undermine the statutory scheme of the WPLA.
¶16 REI incorrectly contends that RCW 7.72.040(2)(e), rather than creating a statutory form of vicarious liability, instead merely imposes on sellers of branded products the liability standard to which manufacturers are held. Thus, according to REI, although product sellers are ordinarily liable only for negligence, breach of an express warranty, or intentional misrepresentation, pursuant to RCW 7.72.040(1), sellers of branded products may also be found liable, pursuant to RCW 7.72.040(2)(e), for design and construction defects, inadequate warnings, or breach of an implied warranty–acts for which generally only manufacturers are held liable. See RCW 7.72.030(1), (2). For [*12] this reason, REI argues that it should be permitted to attribute fault to Aprebic. This contention fails for two reasons.
¶17 First, [HN9] had our legislature merely imposed on sellers of branded products the liability standard of manufacturers, as REI contends that it did, the legislature would have engaged in a meaningless act. RCW 7.72.030(2) provides that “[a] product manufacturer is subject to strict liability to a claimant if the claimant’s harm was proximately caused by the fact that the product was not reasonably safe in construction.” The statute defines a manufacturer as “a product seller who designs, produces, makes, fabricates, constructs, or remanufactures the relevant product … before its sale to a user or consumer.” RCW 7.72.010(2). Here, REI, because it does not design, make, fabricate, construct, or remanufacture bicycle forks, could never be found by a trier of fact to have acted as an actual manufacturer. Thus, it could never be proved to have acted in such a way so as to expose it to direct liability as a manufacturer. Indeed, were it otherwise, the legislature would not have needed to enact RCW 7.72.040(2)(e)–by acting as a manufacturer, REI would be subject to direct [*13] manufacturer liability pursuant to RCW 7.72.030(2), rendering RCW 7.72.040(2)(e) superfluous. We will not assume that the legislature, by enacting RCW 7.72.040(2)(e), engaged in a meaningless act. See JJR Inc. v. City of Seattle, 126 Wn.2d 1, 10, 891 P.2d 720 (1995) (“When interpreting statutes, the court must assume that the Legislature does not engage in meaningless acts.”).
¶18 Similarly, [HN10] construing RCW 7.72.040(2)(e) such that a product seller could seek to allocate fault to a manufacturer would render the provision itself meaningless, as the product seller could always avoid the allocation of any fault to it simply by attributing fault to the actual manufacturer. See Whatcom County, 128 Wn.2d. at 546 (noting that statutes must be construed such that all language is given effect and no provision in rendered meaningless or superfluous). Certainly, as a factual matter, where a manufacturing defect is at issue, the manufacturer–not the product seller–actually caused the defect. Thus, were allocation of fault principles to apply, the manufacturer would necessarily be 100 percent responsible for the defectively manufactured product. Also necessarily, the product seller would avoid all such [*14] liability. Such a result would contravene our legislature’s clear intent that a product seller that brands a product as its own assumes the liability of the manufacturer. 4
4 The legislative history of the WPLA includes a statement that [HN11] where the nonmanufacturing product seller “adopts the product as its own, [it] has, in a sense, waived [its] right to immunity and should be subject[ed] to a manufacturer’s liability.” Senate Journal, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 625 (Wash. 1981).
¶19 [HN12] Although RCW 7.72.040(2)(e) does not permit the product seller to seek to allocate fault to the manufacturer, this provision is not inconsistent with Washington’s comparative fault system, set forth in chapter 4.22 RCW. REI argues to the contrary, contending that our legislature, by adopting comparative fault as the general rule for tort liability, endorsed the principle that “every entity responsible for committing a tort should be liable to the plaintiff based on its own individual share of the total fault, no more and no less.” Br. of Pet’r at 16. This overly broad assertion assumes that, by enacting RCW 4.22.070, our legislature eliminated vicarious liability, which it expressly did not do. Indeed, this specific [*15] statute itself explicitly retains principles of common law vicarious liability, in that it provides that “[a] party shall be responsible for the fault of another … where both were acting in concert or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.” RCW 4.22.070(1)(a). Similarly, the WPLA provision at issue here is a statutory imposition of vicarious liability wherein the seller of a branded product is held liable for the actions of the manufacturer, notwithstanding that the product seller did not actually manufacture the defective product.
¶20 Permitting REI to attribute fault to Aprebic would effectively abrogate RCW 7.72.040(2)(e), as the product seller would never assume the liability that the legislature intended the seller to bear where the seller brands the product as its own. [HN13] “Authority is legion that implied repeals of statutes are disfavored and courts have a duty to interpret statutes so as to give them effect.” Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Brazier Constr. Co., 103 Wn.2d 111, 122, 691 P.2d 178 (1984). Because the WPLA and our state’s statutory comparative fault system can be reconciled, we will not hold that our legislature intended, by passing the tort reform [*16] act of 1986, to impliedly repeal RCW 7.72.040(2)(e). See Bellevue Sch. Dist., 103 Wn.2d at 123 (“Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be found to exist where earlier and later statutes may logically stand side by side and be held valid.”). We are loathe to find a silent repeal, and we decline to do so here.
¶21 Moreover, [HN14] the fact that a product seller such as REI is not permitted to seek to allocate fault to the product manufacturer does not suggest an oversight by the legislature. Rather, it suggests a legislative intent to leave to the marketplace the means of allocating risk between commercial entities. The WPLA presupposes a contractual relationship between the product seller and the manufacturer, with or without an intermediary supplier, and, rather than legislatively imposing a means of risk allocation, assumes that sophisticated commercial parties will contract to allocate risk between themselves. Were we to hold that the WPLA permits REI to attribute fault to Aprebic, we would not only be acting in contradiction to the legislature’s clear intent–we would also be upsetting three decades of reliance on a statute that allows product sellers and manufacturers to themselves [*17] determine how best to allocate risk.
¶22 REI incorrectly asserts that Washington case law requires that it be permitted to attribute fault to Aprebic. REI cites Hiner v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 138 Wn.2d 248, 978 P.2d 505 (1999), for the proposition that comparative fault principles apply in all product liability cases. The plaintiff therein, a motorist injured in a collision, brought a product liability suit against the manufacturer of the snow tires that had been installed only on the vehicle’s front wheels. Hiner, 138 Wn.2d at 251. The snow tire manufacturer raised the affirmative defense of entity liability, “arguing that liability should be shared by the installer of the studded snow tires, the manufacturer of the Goodyear tires on the rear wheels, and the manufacturer of the Hyundai automobile.” Hiner, 138 Wn.2d at 259.
¶23 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the affirmative defense, reasoning that the comparative fault statute permitted a defendant manufacturer to apportion fault only to those entities liable to the plaintiff pursuant to the WPLA. Hiner v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 91 Wn. App. 722, 736, 959 P.2d 1158 (1998). Our Supreme Court reversed, [*18] holding that “[t]he plain language of the contributory fault statute does not limit apportioning fault only to other manufacturers and product sellers in a product liability case.” Hiner, 138 Wn.2d at 264. The court based its reasoning on the broad definition of “fault” set forth in Washington’s comparative fault statute, which states that “fault” includes “acts or omissions … that subject a person to strict tort liability or liability on a product liability claim.” RCW 4.22.015.
¶24 The Hiner decision is inapposite. In Hiner, the manufacturer of the snow tires sought to attribute fault to other entities that, if found to be at fault, would be liable pursuant to theories of liability different than the theory of liability pursuant to which the manufacturer was liable. Here, REI contends that it should be permitted to attribute fault to another entity that, if found to be at fault, would be liable pursuant to precisely the same theory of liability–“the liability of a manufacturer”–as that of REI. REI, which pursuant to the WPLA has the liability of the manufacturer, seeks to attribute fault to Aprebic based on the theory that Aprebic is the actual manufacturer. Because REI is vicariously [*19] liable for Aprebic’s acts, the basis of both entities’ alleged liability is the same. Put another way, in Hiner the fault sought to be allocated was not the same fault. In Hiner, the fault sought to be allocated resulted from different acts; here, the fault sought to be allocated arises from the same acts. Hiner is not inconsistent with the decision we reach today. 5
5 Similarly, the decision in Lundberg v. All-Pure Chemical Co., 55 Wn. App. 181, 777 P.2d 15 (1989), does not apply here. The court therein determined that the jury could be instructed on the plaintiff’s alleged comparative negligence in a product liability action, notwithstanding that the plaintiff’s claim alleged strict liability. Lundberg, 55 Wn. App. at 186-87. Finding that the legislature intended the comparative fault doctrine to apply to all actions based on fault, including strict liability and product liability claims, the court held that there is “no reason to distinguish between negligence and strict liability actions for purposes of instructing a jury on the plaintiff’s comparative fault.” Lundberg, 55 Wn. App. at 186. Johnson’s comparative fault is not at issue. Rather, the issue here is whether fault can be [*20] attributed to another entity where that entity is liable on the same basis and based on the same facts as is the defendant seeking to attribute fault and where permitting the defendant to attribute fault would contravene the purpose of the relevant statute.
¶25 Moreover, [HN15] the purpose of the comparative fault statute is “that fault be apportioned and … an entity be required to pay that entity’s proportionate share of damages only.” Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wn.2d 246, 294, 840 P.2d 860 (1992). Pursuant to RCW 7.72.040(2)(e), REI’s proportionate share of damages is the full amount of damages. Thus, unlike in Hiner, no apportionment of fault is necessary to ensure that the defendant pays only its share of damages.
¶26 Applicable case law further undermines REI’s assertion that it should be permitted to attribute fault to Aprebic. In Farmers Insurance Co. of Washington v. Waxman Industries, Inc., 132 Wn. App. 142, 148, 130 P.3d 874 (2006), we reversed vacation of a default judgment holding Waxman strictly liable as the “manufacturer” of a defective water supply line that was sold under the Waxman trade name. Waxman’s motion to vacate stated that “defects in hoses ‘often’ can be attributed [*21] to component parts of the hose manufactured by some other entity.” Waxman, 132 Wn. App. at 146. Waxman further contended that it did not manufacture the allegedly defective water supply line. Waxman, 132 Wn. App. at 146.
¶27 We held that Waxman’s evidence was insufficient to support a meritorious defense as required for vacation of a default judgment. Waxman, 132 Wn. App. at 145. Given that [HN16] a product seller that brands a product under its trade name is subject to the liability of the manufacturer pursuant to RCW 7.72.040(2)(e), we concluded that “[t]he materials submitted by Waxman do not explain how Waxman could avoid a finding of liability simply by proving that some other entity actually manufactured the supply line.” Waxman, 132 Wn. App. at 147. Furthermore, we determined that “whatever right of indemnity and contribution Waxman may be able to establish against other entities is not a defense to Waxman’s own liability.” Waxman, 132 Wn. App. at 148. The principles we set forth in Waxman support the conclusion that REI may not seek to allocate fault to Aprebic, the manufacturer, where it assumed the liability of the manufacturer.
¶28 [HN17] RCW 7.72.040(2)(e) creates a statutory form of vicarious [*22] liability whereby the seller of a branded product assumes the liability of the manufacturer. Because permitting such a product seller to seek to allocate fault to the actual manufacturer pursuant to comparative fault principles would undermine our legislature’s intent in enacting this statutory provision, the trial court did not err by concluding that REI could not seek to allocate fault to Aprebic.
III
¶29 REI next contends that the trial court erred by concluding that REI is strictly liable for Johnson’s injuries. Specifically, REI asserts that the trial court erred by resolving issues of material fact in favor of Johnson and by finding that the alleged manufacturing defects were the cause of her injuries. We disagree.
[10, 11] ¶30 [HN18] “In reviewing a summary judgment order, the appellate court evaluates the matter de novo, performing the same inquiry as the trial court.” Snohomish County v. Rugg, 115 Wn. App. 218, 224, 61 P.3d 1184 (2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and … the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any [*23] material fact. Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wn.2d 345, 349, 588 P.2d 1346 (1979). All reasonable inferences must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary judgment may be granted only if a reasonable person could reach but one conclusion. Rugg, 115 Wn. App. at 224.
[12, 13] ¶31 [HN19] A material fact ” ‘is a fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends, in whole or in part.’ ” Lamon, 91 Wn.2d at 349 (quoting Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wn.2d 491, 494-95, 519 P.2d 7 (1974)). An affidavit submitted in support of or in response to a motion for summary judgment “does not raise a genuine issue of fact unless it sets forth facts evidentiary in nature, i.e., information as to what took place, an act, an incident, a reality as distinguished from supposition or opinion.” Rugg, 115 Wn. App. at 224. “[U]ltimate facts, conclusions of fact, conclusory statements of fact or legal conclusions are insufficient to raise a question of fact.” Rugg, 115 Wn. App. at 224.
[14] ¶32 The WPLA provides that “[a] product manufacturer is subject to strict liability to a claimant if the claimant’s harm was proximately caused by the fact that the product was not reasonably safe in construction.” RCW 7.72.030(2).
A [*24] product is not reasonably safe in construction if, when the product left the control of the manufacturer, the product deviated in some material way from the design specifications or performance standards of the manufacturer, or deviated in some material way from otherwise identical units of the same product line.
RCW 7.72.030(2)(a).
¶33 REI first contends that, because the statutory definition of a manufacturing defect requires that the product deviate from the manufacturer’s design specifications or performance standards, Johnson cannot prove that the bicycle’s fork contained a manufacturing defect without submitting to the court direct evidence of Aprebic’s design specifications or performance standards. REI asserts that “there is no evidence in the record to establish that the fork at issue deviated from Aprebic’s design standards.” Br. of Pet’r at 34. To the contrary, Johnson submitted to the trial court evidence–in the form of Zaminski’s declaration–that the fork fractured due to insufficient carbon fiber layering. This evidence itself supports the conclusion that the fork “deviated in some material way from the design specifications or performance standards of the manufacturer,” RCW 7.72.030(2)(a), [*25] as no conceivable performance standard would call for the manufacture of a carbon fiber fork that fractures as Johnson’s did. Although [HN20] on summary judgment all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, Rugg, 115 Wn. App. at 224, no reasonable inference can be drawn that a carbon fiber fork that fractures in this way performed in accordance with any manufacturer’s performance standards. 6
6 Moreover, [HN21] the purpose of holding sellers of branded products vicariously liable for manufacturing defects would be undermined were we to require the claimant to conduct discovery from the manufacturer itself, particularly where the manufacturer is not a party to the action. Where such evidence is not necessary to demonstrate that the product was, indeed, defective, the trial court did not err by not requiring Johnson to produce direct evidence of Aprebic’s performance standards.
¶34 REI next contends that genuine issues of material fact regarding causation remain, thus precluding summary judgment. However, despite REI’s assertion that the bicycle displayed “substantial wear and tear,” REI does not establish how the fact that the bicycle was a “high mileage vehicle” explains the [*26] fracture of the carbon fiber fork. See CP at 176. Thus, the alleged “wear and tear” on the bicycle is not a ” ‘fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends.’ ” See Lamon, 91 Wn.2d at 349 (quoting Morris, 83 Wn.2d at 494-95).
[15] ¶35 REI further speculates that the 2006 collision, which resulted in damage to the back tire of the bicycle, may have been a contributing cause of the fracture of the fork. However, REI’s evidence does not explain how that collision could have contributed to the fracture. Moreover, REI’s evidence refutes neither Johnson’s expert’s assertion that the insufficient carbon fiber layering is a defect that can occur only during manufacture nor the same expert’s conclusion that this particular defect caused the fork to fracture. Rather, REI conjectures that “[i]f an element of that crash involved the front fork without creating visible damage, then it could be considered an initiating event for the fracture that serves as the basis for this law suit.” CP at 178. REI cannot rely on speculation and conjecture to raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Rugg, 115 Wn. App. at 224.
¶36 The trial court did not erroneously resolve issues of material fact in favor of Johnson. [*27] To the contrary, its grant of summary judgment was appropriate because REI failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact as to its liability for Johnson’s injuries.
IV
¶37 Finally, REI contends that the trial court erred by ruling that any claim brought by REI against Aprebic would be bifurcated for trial from Johnson’s claim. We disagree.
[16, 17] ¶38 [HN22] A trial court’s decision to order separate trials is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 73 Wn.2d 23, 25, 436 P.2d 186 (1968) (“The right to order separate trials is a matter of discretion vested in the trial court by the rules.”). Civil Rule 20(b) permits the trial court to order separate trials to prevent delay or prejudice where a party would be delayed or “put to expense by the inclusion of a party against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against him.” Here, the trial court acted well within its discretion in finding that permitting REI to join Aprebic as a third party defendant would delay and prejudice the adjudication of Johnson’s claim and, thus, ruling that any claim brought by REI against Aprebic should be bifurcated for trial.
¶39 Notwithstanding that the trial court acted within its discretion [*28] pursuant to CR 20(b), REI contends that the trial court’s bifurcation ruling was erroneous because the court “appeared to be unaware of the impact such bifurcation would have on the viability of REI’s contribution claim.” Br. of Pet’r at 41-42. REI and Aprebic cannot be jointly and severally liable for Johnson’s injuries, as required to establish a statutory right to contribution, unless a judgment is entered against both parties in Johnson’s suit. See [HN23] RCW 4.22.040 (noting that a right to contribution exists where the parties are jointly and severally liable); RCW 4.22.070(1)(b) (providing that only those defendants against whom judgment is entered may be jointly and severally liable for the claimant’s injuries). Thus, REI contends that the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the law in issuing a ruling that would compromise REI’s right to seek contribution from Aprebic.
¶40 However, notwithstanding that REI may be precluded from seeking statutory contribution from Aprebic, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by misapplying the law. Indeed, [HN24] this is not the first time that a court has upheld a proper application of the law despite negative consequences for a party’s [*29] contribution rights. In Kottler v. State, 136 Wn.2d 437, 439, 963 P.2d 834 (1998), our Supreme Court held that a settling party in a civil tort action is not entitled to seek contribution from another alleged tortfeasor where joint and several liability did not arise pursuant to the exceptions set forth in RCW 4.22.070. Because no judgment had been entered against the settling defendant, and, thus, joint and several liability did not arise, RCW 4.22.040 precluded the settling party from seeking contribution. See Kottler, 136 Wn.2d at 439; RCW 4.22.040 (“A right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who are jointly and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same injury.”).
¶41 Justice Talmadge wrote separately “to urge legislative attention toward the anomalous result this case requires.” Kottler, 136 Wn.2d at 450 (Talmadge, J., concurring). Although he “agree[d] with the majority’s resolution because the statutory language and our case law compel its result,” Kottler, 136 Wn.2d at 450, Justice Talmadge remarked that it appeared that proper application of the 1981 and 1986 tort reform acts effected a result that contradicted the legislature’s intent [*30] in enacting those very statutes. Kottler, 136 Wn.2d at 450. Thus, “[t]o more effectively execute [the legislature’s] intent,” Justice Talmadge implored the legislature to “address[ ] and correct[ ] this unfortunate situation in the tort law.” Kottler, 136 Wn.2d at 453. Notwithstanding Justice Talmadge’s appeal to the legislature, it has amended neither the 1981 nor the 1986 act to address this “anomalous result.”
¶42 Here, as in Kottler, a result dictated by proper application of the law leads to an “anomalous result” in that REI’s contribution rights are compromised. Here, also as in Kottler, the existence of such an anomaly suggests neither a misunderstanding nor a misapplication of the law. Rather, the trial court here properly understood and applied the law, notwithstanding that REI’s right to seek contribution may have been thereby compromised.
¶43 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that any claim by REI against Aprebic would be bifurcated for trial from Johnson’s claim. 7
7 REI additionally contends that the trial court erred by denying REI’s request to conduct additional discovery prior to the summary judgment ruling. Because discretionary review was not granted on this [*31] issue, we will not reach it. City of Bothell v. Barnhart, 156 Wn. App. 531, 538 n.2, 234 P.3d 264 (2010) (noting that, [HN25] pursuant to RAP 2.3(e), the appellate court may specify the issue or issues as to which discretionary review is granted), review granted, No. 84907-2 (Wash. Nov. 3, 2010).
¶44 Affirmed.
Grosse and Spearman, JJ., cncur.
Five New Professional Cycling Teams Confirmed to Compete in the 2011 Quiznos Pro Challenge
Posted: March 19, 2011 Filed under: Cycling Leave a comment10 International Cycling Teams Set their Sights on America’s Most Demanding Professional Bike Race
March 15, 2011, Denver – The Quiznos Pro Challenge™ today announced five new teams confirmed to compete in the inaugural 2011 competition, including Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) Pro Team Leopard Trek (Luxembourg), and UCI Professional Continental teams UnitedHealthcare Pro Cycling Team (USA), Team Type 1-sanofi aventis (USA), Skil-Shimano (Netherlands) and Team Spidertech Powered By C10 (Canada). These teams will join previously announced Team RadioShack (USA), HTC-Highroad (USA), Team Garmin-Cervélo (USA), BMC Racing Team (USA), and Liquigas-Cannondale (Italy) at the starting line in August.
“We are excited to have secured commitments from such world-class teams in the competition’s first year,” said Shawn Hunter, co-chairman of the Quiznos Pro Challenge. “We’ve set high goals for this race and the addition of these teams shows great promise for our future and cycling in the United States.”
The newly announced teams include some of the most exciting riders in the world, including Olympic gold medalist Fabian Cancellara (Switzerland), seasoned veteran Stuart O’Grady (Australia), and 2008 World Cycling Championships silver medalist Svein Tuft (Canada). In total, the Quiznos Pro Challenge will host as many as 128 professional cyclists from 16 teams for the 2011 competition. The specific riders who will participate in the Quiznos Pro Challenge will be named in the coming months.
Leopard Trek (Luxembourg) Leopard Trek is a new team led by Luxembourgish brothers Andy Schleck and Fränk Schleck, with Brian Nygaard as team manager. There are 11 nations represented on the roster, drawing fans from every region of the world. Olympic Gold Medalist Fabian Cancellara (Switzerland), 2010 Mountains Classification Tour Down Under winner Thomas Rohregger (Austria), and veteran Stuart O’Grady (Australia) highlight this diverse group.
UnitedHealthcare Pro Cycling Team (USA) The UnitedHealthcare Pro Cycling Team is owned and operated by Calif.-based Momentum Sports Group, which is led by Directeur Sportif Mike Tamayo, President Thierry Attias, and Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Greg Raifman. UnitedHealthcare’s prominent past includes becoming the number one team in North America in its second year, then defending the title for five consecutive years. In 2005, the team produced the single greatest season in North American cycling history, winning half of all National Racing Calendar (NRC) competitions, capturing 68 podium places in 63 individual NRC race days; sweeping the U.S. PRO, Philadelphia series, California series, and the New York Grand Prix. The Team’s 17 riders represent seven countries, with six riders hailing from the United States.
Team Type 1-sanofi aventis (USA)Team Type 1 is the world’s only professional cycling team with a roster that includes riders who have Type 1 diabetes. In 2009, Team Type 1 won 55 races, finished fourth in the NRC standings and captured the King of the Mountains title at five races, including the Tour of Missouri. In two seasons, the squad has registered 100 victories and 219 podium (top three) finishes.
Six of Team Type 1’s professional cyclists have type 1 diabetes: Martijn Verschoor (Netherlands), Fabio Calabria (Australia), Javier Megias (Spain), Joe Eldridge (USA), Alex Bowden (USA) and Olaf Kerkhof (Netherlands). In addition to several Americans, the team has many international riders hailing from Italy, Russia, Slovenia and the Ukraine.
Skil-Shimano (Netherlands) Skil-Shimano is managed and owned by Iwan Spekenbrink, with sports team managers Rudi Kemna, Christian Guiberteau, Merijn Zeeman, and Piet Hoekstra. Based in Holland, the team features Koen de Kort (Holland), who finished ninth overall in the 2010 Tour of Britain; 2010 Tour de Normandie champion Ronan van Zandbeek (Holland); 2009 German road race champion Martin Reimer (Germany); 2008 Olympic silver medal winner at the Omnium Roger Kluge (Germany), multiple Tour de France participant and third in the Tour de France’s youngster classification (2006) Matthieu Sprick (France); German (2009 and 2010) and European (2009) U23 time trial champion and U23 bronze winner at the 2010 World Championships time trial Marcel Kittel; and Yukihiro Doi (Japan), who finished ninth overall in the 2010 Tour of Hainan.
Team Spidertech Powered By C10 (Canada) Co-founded by Steve Bauer in 2007, Team SpiderTech powered by C10 is Canada’s first Continental Professional Cycling Team. The 2011 roster boasts 19 world-class riders including 2010 Canadian Road Champion Will Routley (Canada), 2008 World Cycling Championships silver medalist and 2010 Eneco Tour prologue winner Svein Tuft (Canada), and Lucas Euser (USA).
About the Quiznos Pro Challenge The Quiznos Pro Challenge is the most demanding professional bike race ever held in America, with racers experiencing breathless altitudes and nearly 600 mountain miles, for seven straight days. The inaugural 2011 Quiznos Pro Challenge will take place August 22-28, and it is expected to be the largest spectator event ever held in Colorado. The race travels through some of the world’s most famous and beautiful destinations, including Aspen, Vail, Avon, Steamboat Springs and Breckenridge. 128 of the world’s best professional cyclists from 16 teams, including Team RadioShack, HTC-Highroad, Team Garmin-Cervélo, BMC Racing Team, Liquigas-Cannondale, Team Leopard Trek, UnitedHealthcare Pro Cycling Team, Team Type 1-sanofi aventis, Skil-Shimano, and Team Spidertech Powered By C10 will be put to the test like never before.
The competition, destined to become the most coveted prize in cycling, brings the high speeds, danger and adrenaline of professional cycling to heights more than two miles in elevation, across some of the most picturesque terrain in the world—the Colorado Rocky Mountains. In the months leading up to the race, and throughout the live event, fans worldwide will be able to track their favorite cyclists like never before with the most advanced, interactive online, smartphone and broadcast television experience presented to date in professional cycling.
To keep in touch with the latest news and updates on the Quiznos Pro Challenge, visit www.quiznosprochallenge.com and follow the race on Twitter @qprochallenge or on Facebook.
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Indiana University Department of Recreation, Park, and Tourism Studies presents the inaugural lecture series honoring the legacy of Dr. Betty van der Smissen
Posted: March 18, 2011 Filed under: Uncategorized Leave a commentFriday, April 22, 2011 at the Indiana Memorial Union on the Bloomington campus.
Press Release/Marketing Statement
March 10, 2011
Indiana University Department of Recreation, Park, and Tourism Studies presents the inaugural lecture series honoring the legacy of Dr. Betty van der Smissen (M. S. 1954, Re. D. 1955) on Friday, April 22, 2011 at the Indiana Memorial Union on the Bloomington campus.
Beginning in 1955, Dr. van der Smissen’s career in higher education defined her professional life by integrating teaching, research, service, and mentoring of both faculty and students until the final days of her life. Her expertise in risk management and legal liability made her one of the foremost authorities in the country, and she cherished working with her law colleagues and loved debating the issues of the day. In that spirit, Reb Gregg and Jim Moss, two of Betty’s esteemed colleagues, will present and debate selected legal issues in outdoor recreation in a lively, entertaining, and educational format.
Reb Gregg, from Houston, Texas, is a leading attorney, lecturer and writer in legal liability issues for adventure, education and recreation based outdoor programs. Jim Moss, from Denver, Colorado, is an attorney, professor, speaker, writer and expert witness specializing in outdoor recreation law.
Attendance at the presentations and debate are free.
Both presentations are being simultaneously web cast beginning at 1:30 p.m. (EDT) on April 22, 2011 as part of the Department’s professional learning system powered by the Eppley Institute for Parks and Public Lands. The web cast will be available to anyone interested in continuing professional training, and .1 CEUs are available for attendees with payment of a nominal fee. Interested individuals can register for this webcast at www.eppley.org in the Course Catalog under the Safety (Facility Management) category.
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Parents putting up $20,000 for designer(s) of releasable snowboard binding
Posted: March 17, 2011 Filed under: Skiing / Snow Boarding Leave a commentSon skiing at Tahoe fell into powder snow and could not get out.
Prizes of $10,000, $6,000 and $4000 are being offered to the designer of a releasable snow board binding. The Zider’s son Chris died when he fell into deep powder while snowboarding.
The problem is going to be the industry has just ignored all releasable snowboard bindings.
See Dead child’s parents solicit snowboard solution.
To see information about the snowboard binding design see Snowboard Binding Design Challenge.
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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Statutes and prospective language to allow a parent to sign away a minor’s right to sue.
Posted: March 16, 2011 Filed under: Minors, Youth, Children | Tags: Alaska, Child, Children Youth and Family, Colorado, Florida, Legal guardian, Minor, parent, Parental Responsibility, Parental Rights Leave a commentNow is the time to move a statute like this forward in your state.
Three states allow a parent to sign away a child’s right to sue by statute: Alaska, Florida and Colorado. Five (maybe 6) states allow a parent to sign away a minor’s right to sue by Supreme Court Decision. See States that allow a parent to sign away a minor’s right to sue. With more legislatures leaning to the conservative side, now is the time to introduce and get a law like these passed in your state. To assist you, at the end I have included language that I would propose for the statute.
Colorado
C.R.S. §§13-22-107. Legislative declaration – definitions – children – waiver by parent of prospective negligence claims
(1) (a) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares it is the public policy of this state that:
(I) Children of this state should have the maximum opportunity to participate in sporting, recreational, educational, and other activities where certain risks may exist;
(II) Public, private, and non-profit entities providing these essential activities to children in Colorado need a measure of protection against lawsuits, and without the measure of protection these entities may be unwilling or unable to provide the activities;
(III) Parents have a fundamental right and responsibility to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. The law has long presumed that parents act in the best interest of their children.
(IV) Parents make conscious choices every day on behalf of their children concerning the risks and benefits of participation in activities that may involve risk;
(V) These are proper parental choices on behalf of children that should not be ignored. So long as the decision is voluntary and informed, the decision should be given the same dignity as decisions regarding schooling, medical treatment, and religious education; and
(VI) It is the intent of the general assembly to encourage the affordability and availability of youth activities in this state by permitting a parent of a child to release a prospective negligence claim of the child against certain persons and entities involved in providing the opportunity to participate in the activities.
(b) The general assembly further declares that the Colorado supreme court’s holding in case number 00SC885, 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2002), has not been adopted by the general assembly and does not reflect the intent of the general assembly or the public policy of this state.
(2) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) “Child” means a person under eighteen years of age.
(b) For purposes of this section only, “parent” means a parent, as defined in section 19-1-103 (82), C.R.S., a person who has guardianship of the person, as defined in section 19-1-103 (60), C.R.S., a person who has legal custody, as defined in section 19-1-103 (73), C.R.S., a legal representative, as defined in section 19-1-103 (73.5), C.R.S., a physical custodian, as defined in section 19-1-103 (84), C.R.S., or a responsible person, as defined in section 19-1-103 (94), C.R.S.
(3) A parent of a child may, on behalf of the child, release or waive the child’s prospective claim for negligence.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit a parent acting on behalf of his or her child to waive the child’s prospective claim against a person or entity for a willful and wanton act or omission, a reckless act or omission, or a grossly negligent act or omission.
Florida Statute on Guardian right to sign away a minor’s right to sue.
Fla. Stat. § 744.301 (2010)
§ 744.301. Natural guardians
(3) In addition to the authority granted in subsection (2), natural guardians are authorized, on behalf of any of their minor children, to waive and release, in advance, any claim or cause of action against a commercial activity provider, or its owners, affiliates, employees, or agents, which would accrue to a minor child for personal injury, including death, and property damage resulting from an inherent risk in the activity.
(a) As used in this subsection, the term “inherent risk” means those dangers or conditions, known or unknown, which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of the activity and which are not eliminated even if the activity provider acts with due care in a reasonably prudent manner. The term includes, but is not limited to:
1. The failure by the activity provider to warn the natural guardian or minor child of an inherent risk; and
2. The risk that the minor child or another participant in the activity may act in a negligent or intentional manner and contribute to the injury or death of the minor child. A participant does not include the activity provider or its owners, affiliates, employees, or agents.
(b) To be enforceable, a waiver or release executed under this subsection must, at a minimum, include the following statement in uppercase type that is at least 5 points larger than, and clearly distinguishable from, the rest of the text of the waiver or release:
Alaska
Alaska Stat. § 09.65.292 (2011)
Sec. 09.65.292. Parental waiver of child’s negligence claim against provider of sports or recreational activity
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section, a parent may, on behalf of the parent’s child, release or waive the child’s prospective claim for negligence against the provider of a sports or recreational activity in which the child participates to the extent that the activities to which the waiver applies are clearly and conspicuously set out in the written waiver and to the extent the waiver is otherwise valid. The release or waiver must be in writing and shall be signed by the child’s parent.
(b) A parent may not release or waive a child’s prospective claim against a provider of a sports or recreational activity for reckless or intentional misconduct.
(c) In this section,
(1) “child” means a minor who is not emancipated;
(2) “parent” means
(A) the child’s natural or adoptive parent;
(B) the child’s guardian or other person appointed by the court to act on behalf of the child;
(C) a representative of the Department of Health and Social Services if the child is in the legal custody of the state;
(D) a person who has a valid power of attorney concerning the child; or
(E) for a child not living with the child’s natural or adoptive parent, the child’s grandparent, aunt, uncle, sister, or brother who has reached the age of majority and with whom the child lives;
(3) “provider” has the meaning given in AS 09.65.290;
(4) “sports or recreational activity” has the meaning given in AS 09.65.290.
My suggestion on how the law should read.
Legislative declaration – definitions – minor children – waiver by parent or guardian of prospective negligence claims
(1) (a) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares it is the public policy of this state that:
(I) Children of this state should have the maximum opportunity to participate in sporting, recreational, educational, and other activities where certain risks may exist;
(II) Public, private, and non-profit entities providing these essential activities to children in _____________ (state) need a measure of protection against lawsuits, and without the measure of protection these entities may be unwilling or unable to provide the activities;
(III) Parents have a legal and fundamental right and responsibility to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their minor children. The law has long presumed that parents act in the best interest of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57; 120 S. Ct. 2054; 147 L. Ed. 2d 49; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3767; 68 U.S.L.W. 4458; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4345; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 5831; 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3199; 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 365 (Troxel is a US Supreme Court decision that allows a parent to sign away a child’s right to sue. See Courtney Love in Outdoor Recreation Law.)
(IV) Parents make conscious choices every day on behalf of their children concerning the risks and benefits of participation in activities that may involve risk;
(V) These are proper parental choices on behalf of children that should not be ignored. So long as the decision is voluntary and informed, the decision should be given the same dignity as decisions regarding schooling, medical treatment, and religious education; and
(VI) It is the intent of the general assembly to encourage the affordability and availability of youth activities in this state by permitting a parent of a child to release a prospective negligence claim of the child against certain persons and entities involved in providing the opportunity to participate in the activities.
(a) “Child” means a person under eighteen years of age at the time of incident, loss, injury or accident.
(b) For purposes of this section only, “parent” means a parent, a person who has guardianship of the person, a person who has legal custody, a legal representative, a physical custodian or a responsible person, in temporary custody and control of the minor Child.
(3) A Parent of a Child may, on behalf of the Child, release and waive, in advance, any claim or cause of action against a private, commercial, governmental or non-profit, activity provider, business, program or activity, or its owners, affiliates, employees, volunteers or agents, which would accrue to a minor child for personal injury, including death, and property damage resulting from the risk or an inherent risk in the activity or the Child’s prospective claim for negligence.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit a parent acting on behalf of his or her child to waive the child’s prospective claim against a person or entity for a willful and wanton act or omission, a reckless act or omission, or a grossly negligent act or omission.
To work you will need to round up everyone who deals with kids. Little League and other youth sports groups, day care centers, youth programs like Scouts, commercial programs like camps, day camps and anyone serving youth as well as major organizations that may be in your state like NOLS and Outward Bound.
Your statutory language may vary based on current state laws and court interpretations, but go for it. You can only lose time and get a civics lesson.
This won’t save you money on your insurance that never happens. However, it may help keep your insurance from going up and keep you out of court.
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Worker’s compensation is not enough, but then stupid is as stupid does.
Posted: March 15, 2011 Filed under: Ski Area Leave a commentReporter suing for injuries she received while reporting about a Zorb at a ski area.
A Zorb is a giant ball that rolls down the hill. The reporter was at Lost Valley ski area when she tried the Zorb for a story. The basis of the suit is the ski area said the Zorb was reasonable safe. Supposedly, the Zorb left the course and rolled over a barrier. Her complaint goes on to say. The ski area…
“failed to undertake basic and reasonable safety precautions, follow industry guidelines, seek governmental approval and/or use reasonable common sense in researching, acquiring, installing, testing and/or offering ‘zorbing’ at” the ski area.
Of course every business should immediately go out and ask the government, state local and federal, for approval for everything they may do. My favorite, they ski industry failed to follow industry guidelines. What industry, there is one company make Zorb’s.
After the wild ride, she drove back to the newspaper office then was taken to Central Maine Medical Center in Lewiston where she was later admitted.
At the same time, this suit may not be connected to the reporter’s desire for compensation. This may be due to one of two different things.
1. Worker’s compensation in Maine maybe so bad that the woman needs additional money to pay her medical bills; or,
2. The suit is based on the subrogation clause in the worker’s compensation policy and is actually started by the insurance company. The suit is in the woman’s name because she has the claim, but most of the money will go to the insurance company.
I hope a release was signed.
Before climbing in, you can’t figure out the risk? I’m getting into a plastic ball to roll down the hill in front of me, and I’m not worried!
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Wrong release for the activity almost sinks YMCA
Posted: March 14, 2011 Filed under: California, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Summer Camp | Tags: Adventure travel, Baseball Bat, Child, Day Camp, James H. Moss, JimMoss, Minor, Outdoor recreation, Parental Responsibility, Parental Rights, Rock climbing, YMCA 1 CommentA release must apply to the activity and the person who you want to make sure cannot sue you.
McGowan et al v. West End YMCA, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3018
In this case, a mother signed her son up to attend a day camp sponsored by the YMCA. While attending the day camp, the child was accidentally hit in the head by another child with a baseball bat. The mother sued for the child’s injuries.
The YMCA argued that the mother had signed a release, and therefore, the YMCA should be dismissed. The mother argued that the release only applied to her, not her child because the release was unclear as to who was being released in the document. (The mother argued the release was required for her to walk around the YMCA to sign her son up for the camp.)
In this case, the YMCA used its general release for people on the premises of the YMCA as a fitness facility, for its day camp. The release did not indicate a parent would be signing for the child nor did the release look to the issues the child would encounter, only an adult using the YMCA or any other gym.
The mother argued because the release did not identify her son, the injured party, as who the release applied to the release only applied to her while she was on the premises. Nothing in the document indicated that the mother was signing a release on behalf of her son.
Like most releases used in gyms and fitness centers it is written for the adult signing up to use the gym.
Under the law, “An agreement exculpating the drafter from liability for his or her own future negligence must clearly and explicitly express that this is the intent of the parties.”
What saved the YMCA was a technicality in the language of the release. To go to the day camp, the child attending must be a member of the YMCA. The mother of the injured child was not a member of the YMCA. However, her son was. Because the release referred to the YMCA member as the person giving up their right to sue, the court held the release applied to the child not the mother. This language allowed the court to find for the YMCA.
So?
Releases are not documents you can merely find on the internet or put together based on language that sounds good. Think about the contract you used to purchase your house. It was a 10 to 20 page document used to buy something of value greater than $100,000 or so.
If someone is suing you for several million dollars do you want to rely on a document that you put together or worse stole from the business down the street.
Here again you have to make sure your release is properly written. You may have several different releases for different parties or activities. I commonly suggest that people use different paper to print the different release forms. Here the YMCA should have had a general release for use of its fitness and other facilities and a release for its day camp. One could have been printed on white paper and the other on green. Even better, put the release online and save paper.
Your release must identify who is protected by the release and who the release is going to stop from suing. In many cases, one parent will sign on behalf of a child. However, in some states, unless the language is clear, that parent may not be preventing the other parent from suing. Identify every person who can sue in the release as well as every person who cannot be sued. When in doubt, have both parents sign the release.
For information on other states where a parent can sign away a minor’s right to sue see: States that allow a parent to sign away a minor’s right to sue–Updated 2011
What do you think? Leave a comment.
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McGowan et al v. West End YMCA, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3018
Posted: March 14, 2011 Filed under: California, Legal Case, Minors, Youth, Children, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue), Summer Camp Leave a commentMcGowan et al v. West End YMCA, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3018
Denitra McGowan et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. West End YMCA, Defendant and Respondent.
E029450
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO
2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3018
March 15, 2002, Filed
NOTICE: [*1] NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 977(a), PROHIBITS COURTS AND PARTIES FROM CITING OR RELYING ON OPINIONS NOT CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED, EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BY RULE 977(B). THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED FOR PURPOSES OF RULE 977.
PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Super.Ct.No. RCV 42286. Ben T. Kayashima, Judge.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
CORE TERMS: summary judgment, extrinsic evidence, ambiguous, uncontradicted, matter of law, undersigned, parol evidence, inadvertently omitted, membership, executing, daycare, lawsuit, notice, physical injuries, financial assistance, indemnity agreement, unenforceable, unambiguous, negligently, undisputed, enrollment, pertained, signature, enrolling, absurdity, enrolled, construe, supplied, pertain, signing
COUNSEL: Ritchie, Klinkert & McCallion, James E. Klinkert, James McCallion and Ralph Harrison for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Allie & Schuster, James P. Allie and Coreen R. Walson for Defendant and Respondent.
JUDGES: Gaut, J. We concur: Ramirez, P.J., Hollenhorst, J.
OPINION BY: Gaut
OPINION
1. Introduction
Plaintiffs Denitra McGowan and Deshon McGowan, a minor, (plaintiffs) appeal judgment entered against them following summary judgment entered in favor of defendant West End YMCA (the YMCA).
Denitra McGowan enrolled her son, Deshon McGowan, in the YMCA’s summer camp daycare program. In the process of doing so, she signed various documents, including a release of liability. Deshon was injured while participating [*2] in the program. Plaintiffs filed a personal injury lawsuit against the YMCA. The trial court granted the YMCA’s motion for summary judgment on the ground plaintiffs’ lawsuit was barred by the release.
Ms. McGowan contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the release only applied to physical injuries she sustained while on the YMCA premises, and did not pertain to Deshon since the release makes no reference to him and does not state that she signed the release on his behalf. She further argues that the trial court should not have considered parol evidence in determining the release applied to Deshon because the release was unambiguous. Even if it was ambiguous, plaintiffs argue, the court should have denied summary judgment because there was a triable issue as to whether the parties to the release intended it to apply to Deshon and an ambiguous release is unenforceable.
We conclude the trial court properly granted summary judgment. The release indicated it pertained to YMCA members. Since Ms. McGowan was not a YMCA member, but signed the release, it was unclear as to whom the release affected. The court appropriately considered parol evidence to [*3] determine this matter. Uncontradicted extrinsic evidence established that Deshon was the subject of the release and Ms. McGowan executed the release on his behalf. Accordingly, we affirm summary judgment in favor of the YMCA.
2. Facts and Procedural Background
The following facts are undisputed. Ms. McGowan submitted an application for YMCA financial assistance to assist her in paying for Deshon to attend the summer daycare program. In May 1998, the YMCA notified Ms. McGowan that it had approved her request for financial assistance.
On June 10, 1998, Ms. McGowan filled out and signed various YMCA forms, including a membership application for Deshon to become a member and a registration form for summer day camp. When Ms. McGowan returned the completed forms on June 12, 1998, a staff member requested Ms. McGowan to execute two additional forms, which included a general policies statement regarding YMCA members and a form release and waiver of liability and indemnity agreement. Ms. McGowan signed and returned the two forms.
On August 19, 1998, while Deshon was at summer day camp, another child accidentally struck Deshon in the head with a baseball bat. In their lawsuit, [*4] plaintiffs alleged the YMCA negligently operated the daycare center and negligently supervised Deshon and the other children enrolled in the program.
Ms. McGowan acknowledged during her deposition that her signature was on the release, but claimed she did not remember signing it. She admitted that she was not a YMCA member. Ms. McGowan further stated that she was aware she was enrolling Deshon as a YMCA member and this was done for the purpose of having Deshon attend the program while she worked.
The YMCA filed a summary judgment motion based on the theory plaintiffs’ action was barred by the release of liability. Plaintiffs filed opposition arguing that the release did not pertain to Deshon since the release did not state it applied to Deshon or that is was signed on his behalf.
The trial court granted the YMCA’s summary judgment motion on the ground it was undisputed Ms. McGowan signed the release on behalf of Deshon and therefore plaintiffs’ action was barred.
3. Discussion
Plaintiffs argue the release did not bar their action because the release does not state that Ms. McGowan signed the release on Deshon’s behalf. The release states that “THE UNDERSIGNED [*5] HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES AND COVENANTS NOT TO SUE the YMCA.” Plaintiffs claim that the release was limited to a waiver of liability as to physical injuries sustained by Ms. McGowan while on the YMCA premises.
The goal of contractual interpretation is “to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting . . . .” 1 When, as here, “a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible . . . .” 2 Accordingly, if the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous, and is not reasonably susceptible of a different meaning, no extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that the parties intended a different interpretation. 3 Under those circumstances, the proper interpretation is purely a matter of law, 4 which may be resolved by summary judgment. 5
1 Civil Code section 1636. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Civil Code.
2 Section 1639.
3 Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37-40, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641.
[*6]
4 Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865, 44 Cal. Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839.
5 Niederer v. Ferreira (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1499, 234 Cal. Rptr. 779.
On the other hand, extrinsic evidence may be admitted and considered if the contract is ambiguous. 6 If extrinsic evidence is admitted but is not in conflict, then the issue remains one of law, even though the uncontradicted extrinsic evidence may give rise to conflicting inferences. 7
6 Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co., supra, 69 Cal.2d at page 40; Niederer v. Ferreira, supra, 189 Cal. App. 3d at pages 1499-1500.
7 Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1984) 36 Cal.3d 426, 439, 204 Cal. Rptr. 435, 682 P.2d 1100; Parsons v. Bristol Development Co., supra, 62 Cal.2d at page 866, footnote 2.
[*7] “When a contract is in any of its terms or provisions ambiguous or uncertain, ‘it is primarily the duty of the trial court to construe it after a full opportunity afforded all the parties in the case to produce evidence of the facts, circumstances and conditions surrounding its execution and the conduct of the parties relative thereto.'” 8
8 Walsh v. Walsh (1941) 18 Cal.2d 439, 443, 116 P.2d 62, quoting Barlow v. Frink (1915) 171 Cal. 165, 172-173, 152 P. 290.
“‘An agreement exculpating the drafter from liability for his or her own future negligence must clearly and explicitly express that this is the intent of the parties.’ [Citation.] But ‘to be effective, a release need not achieve perfection; only on Draftsman’s Olympus is it feasible to combine the elegance of a trust indenture with the brevity of a stop sign.’ [Citation].” 9 Whether a release is ambiguous is a question of law which we review de novo. 10
9 Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 162.
[*8]
10 Baker Pacific Corp. v. Suttles (1990) 220 Cal. App. 3d 1148, 1153, 269 Cal. Rptr. 709.
We first consider whether the release is ambiguous. We conclude the release language is clear and explicit as to its terms 11 but unclear as to whose right to sue was waived since Ms. McGowan was not a YMCA member and the release stated it pertained to members.
11 Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at page 163.
The first paragraph of the release is entitled “CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP,” and states, among other things, that members must present their membership cards when using the YMCA’s facilities and “As a member of the YMCA you are agreeing to follow the policies, procedures and appropriate behaviors for the safety and comfort of all members and guests.” 12 The release further states, under the heading, “RELEASE AND WAIVER [*9] OF LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT,” that, as a condition of the “undersigned’s” use of the YMCA facilities or equipment or participation in any way, that the undersigned release the YMCA from all liability in the event the undersigned is physically injured while using the YMCA facilities or equipment. Such language clearly is directed toward members. Therefore the release did not apply to Ms. McGowan.
12 Italics added.
Since the release does not state who was the member affected by the release, we look to the extrinsic evidence. “It has been held repeatedly, that it is not a violation of the parol evidence rule to prove by extrinsic evidence the identity of the parties to an agreement.” 13 “‘Parol evidence is competent to show whom the parties intended should be bound or benefited.'” 14 The uncontradicted extrinsic evidence in this case establishes that the release applied to Deshon.
13 Maulhardt v. Cal. Director of Public Works (1959) 168 Cal. App. 2d 723, 735, 336 P.2d 631; Branch v. Bekins Van and Storage Company (1930) 106 Cal.App. 623, 635, 290 P. 146.
[*10]
14 Maulhardt v. Cal. Director of Public Works, supra, 168 Cal. App. 2d at page 735, quoting Escondido Oil etc. Co. v. Glaser (1904) 144 Cal. 494, 499, 77 P. 1040; Branch Bekins Van and Storage Company, supra, 106 Cal.App. at page 635.
Section 1638 states that “The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.” Construing the release as applied to Ms. McGowan rather than Deshon involves an absurdity since Ms. McGowan was not a YMCA member, whereas Deshon was, and Ms. McGowan executed the other enrollment documents at the same time she was either returning or executing other documents on Deshon’s behalf for the purpose of enrolling him in day camp. Since Ms. McGowan was not a YMCA member and the other YMCA enrollment documents indicated they were signed on Deshon’s behalf, it would be absurd to construe the release as applying to Ms. McGowan rather than Deshon.
Thus, while in Hohe v. San Diego Unified School District 15 the court [*11] held the issue of the parties’ intent in executing an ambiguous release was a jury question, here the uncontradicted extrinsic evidence established as a matter of law that the release was executed by Ms. McGowan on Deshon’s behalf and applied to him. It should be obvious to all reasonable persons that language indicating Ms. McGowan was executing the release on Deshon’s behalf was inadvertently omitted from the signature line. 16 “Were we to adopt respondent’s strict interpretation of words we would be subverting the only reasonable interpretation of the instrument as a whole.” 17
15 Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist. (1990) 224 Cal. App. 3d 1559, 274 Cal. Rptr. 647.
16 Heidlebaugh v. Miller (1954) 126 Cal. App. 2d 35, 40, 271 P.2d 557.
17 Heidlebaugh v. Miller, supra, 126 Cal. App. 2d at page 40.
In Heidlebaugh v. Miller, 18 the contract in question contained the phrase, “seller may, if [*12] he so desires, but shall not be obliged so to do, sell said property at public or private sale, with or with notice to Purchaser . . . .” 19 The court upheld nonsuit on the ground no notice of the sale was required. 20 The Heidlebaugh court concluded as a matter of law that the parties intended that the contract state “with or without notice,” and that the word, “out,” had been inadvertently omitted from the contract. 21
18 Heidlebaugh v. Miller, supra, 126 Cal. App. 2d 35.
19 Heidlebaugh v. Miller, supra, 126 Cal. App. 2d at page 36.
20 Heidlebaugh v. Miller, supra, 126 Cal. App. 2d at page 41.
21 Heidlebaugh v. Miller, supra, 126 Cal. App. 2d at page 40.
The Heidlebaugh court stated that, “‘Where, by inadvertence, words are plainly omitted from a contract, they may be supplied by construction if the context indicates what they are.'” 22 Such [*13] alteration of the contract is permitted because, “‘The court will if possible give effect to all parts of the instrument and an interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning to all its provisions will be preferred to one which leaves a portion of the writing useless or inexplicable; and if this is impossible an interpretation which gives effect to the main apparent purpose of the contract will be favored. Indeed, in giving effect to the general meaning of a writing, particular words are sometimes wholly disregarded, or supplied, or transposed. . . .'” 23
22 Heidlebaugh v. Miller, supra, 126 Cal. App. 2d at page 38.
23 Heidlebaugh v. Miller, supra, 126 Cal. App. 2d at page 38.
Here, uncontradicted evidence establishes that words indicating Ms. McGowan was signing the release on Deshon’s behalf were inadvertently omitted from the release. “A contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and the matter [*14] to which it relates.” 24 Accordingly, we conclude as a matter of law the release barred plaintiffs’ action against the YMCA.
24 Section 1647.
Plaintiffs also argue the release is unenforceable because it affects public policy. Plaintiffs did not raise this argument in the trial court and thus it is waived on appeal. 25
25 In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846.
4. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. The YMCA is awarded its costs on appeal.
Gaut, J.
We concur:
Ramirez, P.J.
Hollenhorst, J.











