New law in Wisconsin makes cycling a little safe and easier.

Cyclists will know, understand and appreciate the new law. The job is to educate motorists.

The Bicycle Tune-up Bill, B265 has several provisions to help keep cyclists safe.

·         That it is now legal for people who ride bicycles to signal turns with either the right or the left hand

·         Allow vehicle operators to pass slow moving vehicles across a solid yellow line when it is safe to do so.

There are also several provisions to just clean up cycling laws and make them current.

·         To use red rear lights in place of rear reflectors.

·         Allow the use of a red rear light in lieu of a rear reflector.

·         Adding handcycles to the definition of bicycles

·         Allow the use of studded tires. (It is Wisconsin!)

·         Allow municipalities to regulate moped parking.

Good job Wisconsin Cyclist!

See Governor Signs Bicycle “Tune-up” Bill for more about the bill and the efforts to get it passed.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2542

Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2542

Daniel Angland and Daniel Wheeler, Co-Administrators of the Estate of Robert E. Angland, and Charles Johnson, IV, Administrator of the estate of Nancy Angland, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation, Defendant-Respondent, and William Tucker Brownlee, Defendant-Appellant. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff/Respondent, v. William Tucker Brownlee, Third-Party Defendant.

Docket No. A-3100-10T4

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division

2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2542

May 31, 2011, Argued

October 7, 2011, Decided

Notice: not for publication without the approval of the appellate division.

Please consult New Jersey rule 1:36-3 for citation of unpublished opinions.

Prior history: [*1]

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Sussex County, Docket No. L-0474-08.

CORE TERMS: skier, decedent, ski, collision, phantom, trail, Ski Act, summary judgment, skiing, common law, ski area, standard of care, slope, front, bridge, patrol, leave to appeal, order to avoid, knowingly, negotiate, sliding, speed, written statement, snowboarding, unidentified, deposition, snowboard, collided, minute, skis

COUNSEL: John Burke argued the cause for appellant (Burke & Potenza, attorneys; Mr. Burke, of counsel and on the brief).

Phillip C. Wiskow argued the cause for respondents the Administrators of the Estate of Robert E. Angland and Nancy Angland (Gelman, Gelman, Wiskow & McCarthy, attorneys; Mr. Wiskow, of counsel and on the brief).

Hueston McNulty, attorneys for respondent Mountain Creek Resort, Inc. (Samuel J. McNulty and John F. Gaffney, of counsel and on the brief).

JUDGES: Before Judges A.A. Rodríguez and C.L. Miniman.

OPINION

PER CURIAM

William Tucker Brownlee moved for leave to appeal from the August 31, 2010 interlocutory order denying his motion for summary judgment against plaintiffs, the Administrators of the Estate of Robert E. Angland and Nancy Angland, and Mountain Creek Resort, Inc. (Mountain Creek). We initially denied the motion. Angland v. Mountain Creek, et al., No. M-403-10 (App. Div. October 14, 2010). However, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and summarily remanded to us to consider the merits on February 15, 2011.

These are the facts presented to the summary judgment judge. On Friday, [*2] January 19, 2007, shortly before noon, plaintiff’s decedent, Robert Angland, suffered injuries resulting in his death while skiing at a ski area operated by defendant Mountain Creek. The facts are sharply disputed. However, all parties agree that just before the accident, defendant William Tucker Brownlee was snowboarding at Mountain Creek on the same slope as decedent. Brownlee and Angland made contact.

Besides these two points, the parties’ versions of the facts diverge. According to Brownlee, as he was snowboarding on the far right side of the trail, an unidentified skier wearing a brown puffy jacket came from his left and cut directly in front of him. In order to avoid the unidentified skier, Brownlee turned quickly to his left. In doing so, Brownlee’s snowboard and the decedent’s skis became entangled. The two men collided, fell, and slid downhill. Decedent ultimately impacted a concrete bridge headfirst. He died as a result. Brownlee stopped sliding. He stood up and went to Angland’s assistance. The ski patrol arrived and took decedent for medical assistance.

According to plaintiffs, there were almost no skiers on the trail at the time of the collision between Brownlee and decedent. [*3] Plaintiffs allege that Brownlee’s “phantom skier” scenario is impeached by other evidence. Brownlee’s version is that the phantom skier went in front of him and to his left. At Brownlee’s deposition, he testified the phantom skier was at “eleven o’clock” to his position, and that the phantom skier cut to his right and decreased his speed. As a result, Brownlee cut to his left. Before Brownlee’s snowboard went over one of decedent’s skis and under the other, Brownlee acknowledged that he was out of control.

Immediately after the accident, Greg Pack, Vice President and Managing Director of Mountain Creek, skied over to Brownlee, who was approximately fifteen feet from Angland and the bridge. According to Pack, less than one minute after the accident, Brownlee stated that he was cut-off and involved in a collision.

Within thirty minutes of the accident, Brownlee told his close high school friend, Keith Eilerstan, who accompanied him to Mountain Creek that day, that a lady fell in front of him, and as a result, he steered off to his right and collided with decedent. Brownlee also gave a written statement to Mountain Creek’s ski patrol and spoke to the Vernon Police Department on the day [*4] of the accident.

In not one of Brownlee’s statements to Pack, Eilerstan, Mountain Creek’s ski patrol or the Vernon police on the day of the accident did he identify the phantom skier by way of age, sex or clothing.

In a written statement, and in certified answers to interrogatories provided months later, Brownlee indicated that decedent fell and slid down the hill after the collision. Yet, he testified at his deposition soon after that he did not see decedent fall or slide.

Plaintiffs also note that Mountain Creek’s accident reconstruction expert has prepared a report stating that the collision between Brownlee and Angland most likely occurred approximately one hundred feet from the bridge. It is also likely that Angland’s multiple facial fractures were caused by the collision between the two men, as opposed to by contact with the bridge.

Plaintiffs’ liability expert, Irving S. Scher, Ph.D., a Biomechanical Engineer, has opined that Brownlee violated the standard of care set by N.J.S.A. 5:13-1 to -11 (Ski Act), the New Jersey statute that defines the duties involved in skiing. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 5:13-4 provides the duties of a skier. According to the report, the deviation from the [*5] statutory standard occurred when Brownlee failed to keep a proper lookout, made a panic stop, and turned to his left in front of decedent.

Plaintiffs sued Mountain Creek and Brownlee. After a period of discovery, Mountain Creek and Brownlee moved for summary judgment. Judge William J. McGovern, III, denied Brownlee’s motion for summary judgment, and granted Mountain Creek’s motion. In a written opinion, dated August 31, 2010, the judge concluded that, in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Brownlee, as required by Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 666 A.2d 146 (1995), Mountain Creek was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of the Ski Act providing a standard of care. The judge acknowledged that the purpose of the Ski Act was announced by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 5:13-1(b). This section of the Ski Act provides that “the purpose of this law is to make explicit a policy of this State which clearly defines the responsibility of ski area operators and skiers.” N.J.S.A. 5:13-1(b). The judge noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that the Ski Act completely replaces the common law with respect to the activities and persons it covers.

[T]he analysis of liability [*6] under the Ski Statute and the analysis under the common law of negligence have significant parallels.

That fact, coupled with the Legislature’s statements of intent, lead us to conclude that where the Ski Statute properly applies, the Legislature intended completely to displace the common law with regard to the statutorily defined parties. The Ski Statute was intended to “clearly define[] the responsibility of ski area operators.” N.J.S.A. 5:13-1(b). The legislative committee statement stated as a primary concern the uncertainty over operator liability following Vermont’s Sunday¹ case. That interest would have been poorly served had the Ski Statute merely supplemented the common law. By codifying, as modified, fundamental principles of negligence as they apply to skiers and ski-area operators, the Legislature provided certainty by occupying the entire field.

[Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, 144 N.J. 479, 502, 677 A.2d 705 (1996) (internal citations omitted).]

1 Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 136 Vt. 293, 390 A.2d 398 (Vt. 1978).

On appeal, Brownlee contends that the judge “committed error in holding that New Jersey’s ski statute sets forth the standard of care applicable to claims between skiers.” We disagree and concur [*7] with Judge McGovern that this argument is without merit. We concur with the judge’s analysis and note that although the main legislative intent was to define the responsibilities of skier and ski area operations towards each other, the Legislature also intended to create a standard of conduct for skiers towards other skiers. N.J.S.A. 5:13-4 provides in pertinent part:

Duties of skiers

a. Skiers shall conduct themselves within the limits of their individual ability and shall not act in a manner that may contribute to the injury of themselves or any other person.

b. No skier shall:

….

(4) Knowingly engage in any act or activity by his skiing or frolicking which injures other skiers while such other skiers are either descending any trail, or standing or congregating in a reasonable manner, and due diligence shall be exercised in order to avoid hitting, colliding with or injuring any other skier or invitee.

….

d. A skier shall be the sole judge of his ability to negotiate any trail, slope, or uphill track and shall not attempt to ski or otherwise traverse any trail, slope or other area which is beyond the skier’s ability to negotiate.

….

g. No person on foot or on any type of sliding device [*8] shall knowingly operate said device so as to cause injury to himself or others, whether such injury results from a collision with another person or with an object.

[Ibid. (emphasis added).]

Moreover, N.J.S.A. 5:13-5 provides:

Assumption of risk of skier

A skier is deemed to have knowledge of and to assume the inherent risks of skiing, operating toboggans, sleds or similar vehicles created by weather conditions, conditions of snow, trails, slopes, other skiers, and all other inherent conditions. Each skier is assumed to know the range of his ability, and it shall be the duty of each skier to conduct himself within the limits of such ability, to maintain control of his speed and course at all times while skiing, to heed all posted warnings and to refrain from acting in a manner which may cause or contribute to the injury of himself or others.

[Ibid.; L.1979, c. 29, § 5, eff. Feb.22, 1979.]

Brownlee also contends that “there is no evidence that Brownlee breached the heightened standard of care.” There are material facts in dispute regarding Brownlee’s conduct. Disputes exist as to the presence of a phantom skier, and as to how and where decedent was injured. These factual disputes must be decided [*9] by the jury and summary judgment is precluded. Brill supra, 142 N.J. at 537.

Affirmed.

New Jersey Ski Statute

New Jersey

TITLE 5. AMUSEMENTS, PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS AND MEETINGS

CHAPTER 13. SKIING

GO TO THE NEW JERSEY ANNOTATED STATUTES ARCHIVE DIRECTORY

§ 5:13-1. Legislative findings; purpose of law

a. The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large number of citizens of this State and also attracts to this State large numbers of nonresidents, significantly contributing to the economy of this State and, therefore, the allocation of the risks and costs of skiing are an important matter of public policy.

b. The purpose of this law is to make explicit a policy of this State which clearly defines the responsibility of ski area operators and skiers, recognizing that the sport of skiing and other ski area activities involve risks which must be borne by those who engage in such activities and which are essentially impractical or impossible for the ski area operator to eliminate. It is, therefore, the purpose of this act to state those risks which the skier voluntarily assumes for which there can be no recovery.

§ 5:13-2. Definitions

As used in this act

a. “Operator” means a person or entity who owns, manages, controls or directs the operation of an area where individuals come to ski, whether alpine, touring or otherwise, or operate skimobiles, toboggans, sleds or similar vehicles and pay money or tender other valuable consideration for the privilege of participating in said activities, and includes an agency of this State, political subdivisions thereof or instrumentality of said entities, or any individual or entity acting on behalf of an operator for all or part of such activities.

b. “Ski area” includes all of the real and personal property, under the control of the operator or on the premises of the operator which are being occupied, by license, lease, fee simple or otherwise, including but not limited to all passenger tramways, designated trails, slopes and other areas utilized for skiing, operating toboggans, sleds, or similar vehicles during the skiing season.

c. “Skier” means a person utilizing the ski area for recreational purposes such as skiing or operating toboggans, sleds or similar vehicles, and including anyone accompanying the person. Skier also includes any person in such ski area who is an invitee, whether or not said person pays consideration.

d. “Slopes and trails” means those areas designated as such by the operator.

§ 5:13-3. Responsibility of operator

a. It shall be the responsibility of the operator to the extent practicable, to:

(1) Establish and post a system generally identifying slopes and trails and designating relative degrees of difficulty thereof; and to make generally available to skiers information in the form of trail maps or trail reports.

(2) Make generally available either by oral or written report or otherwise, information concerning the daily conditions of the slopes and trails.

(3) Remove as soon as practicable obvious, man-made hazards.

b. No operator shall be responsible to any skier or other person because of its failure to comply with any provisions of subsection 3.a. if such failure was caused by:

(1) Abrupt changes in weather conditions;

(2) Hazards normally associated with the varying conditions of snow or undercover, including skier use; or

(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection 3.a.(3), the location of man-made facilities and equipment necessary for the ordinary operation of the ski area, such as transportation or grooming vehicles, which are marked by flashing lights or other suitable sight or sound devices towers, fencing of any type, racing poles, or any other object or piece of equipment utilized in connection with the maintenance of trails, buildings or other facilities used in connection with skiing.

c. Grooming shall be at the discretion of the operator.

d. No operator shall be liable to any skier unless said operator has knowledge of the failure to comply with the duty imposed by this section or unless said operator should have reasonably known of such condition and having such knowledge has had a reasonable time in which to correct any condition or comply with any duty set forth in this section.

e. Nothing contained in this act shall be construed as limiting or otherwise affecting the liability and responsibilities of a ski area operator under the “Ski Lift Safety Act” (P.L.1975, c. 226, C. 34:4A-1 et seq.), or shall prevent the maintenance of an action against a ski area operator for negligent construction, maintenance or operation of a passenger tramway.

§ 5:13-4. Duties of skiers

a. Skiers shall conduct themselves within the limits of their individual ability and shall not act in a manner that may contribute to the injury of themselves or any other person.

b. No skier shall:

(1) Board or dismount from a ski lift except at a designated area;

(2) Throw or expel any object from any tramway, ski lift, commercial skimobile, or other similar device while riding on the device;

(3) Act in any manner contrary to posted rules while riding on a rope tow, wire rope tow, j-bar, t-bar, ski lift, or similar device that may interfere with the proper or safe operation of the lift or tow;

(4) Knowingly engage in any act or activity by his skiing or frolicking which injures other skiers while such other skiers are either descending any trail, or standing or congregating in a reasonable manner, and due diligence shall be exercised in order to avoid hitting, colliding with or injuring any other skier or invitee.

(5) Knowingly engage in any type of conduct which may injure any person, or place any object in the uphill ski track which may cause another to fall, while traveling uphill on a ski lift;

(6) Cross the uphill track of a j-bar, t-bar, rope tow, wire rope tow, or other similar device except at designated locations.

c. Every skier shall maintain control of his speed and course at all times, and shall stay clear of any snow grooming equipment, any vehicle, any lift tower, and any other equipment on the mountain.

d. A skier shall be the sole judge of his ability to negotiate any trail, slope, or uphill track and shall not attempt to ski or otherwise traverse any trail, slope or other area which is beyond the skier’s ability to negotiate.

e. No skier shall board a rope tow, wire rope tow, j-bar, t-bar, ski lift, or other similar device unless he has sufficient knowledge and ability to use the lift. If the skier does not have such knowledge or ability, he shall ask for and receive, or follow any posted, written or oral instructions prior to using such device.

f. No person shall ski on other than designated trails or slopes.

g. No person on foot or on any type of sliding device shall knowingly operate said device so as to cause injury to himself or others, whether such injury results from a collision with another person or with an object.

h. A person embarking on a lift or tow without authority, or failing to pay appropriate consideration for its use shall be considered to be a trespasser.

§ 5:13-5. Assumption of risk of skier

A skier is deemed to have knowledge of and to assume the inherent risks of skiing, operating toboggans, sleds or similar vehicles created by weather conditions, conditions of snow, trails, slopes, other skiers, and all other inherent conditions. Each skier is assumed to know the range of his ability, and it shall be the duty of each skier to conduct himself within the limits of such ability, to maintain control of his speed and course at all times while skiing, to heed all posted warnings and to refrain from acting in a manner which may cause or contribute to the injury of himself or others.

§ 5:13-6. Application of law on comparative negligence

The assumption of risk set forth in section 5 shall be a complete bar of suit and shall serve as a complete defense to a suit against an operator by a skier for injuries resulting from the assumed risks, notwithstanding the provisions of P.L.1973, c. 146 (C. 2A:15-5.1 et seq.), relating to comparative negligence, unless an operator has violated his duties or responsibilities under this act, in which case the provisions of P.L.1973, c. 146 shall apply. Failure to adhere to the duties set out in sections 4 and 5 shall bar suit against an operator to compensate for injuries resulting from skiing activities, where such failure is found to be a contributory factor in the resulting injury, unless the operator has violated his duties or responsibilities under the act, in which case the provisions of P.L.1973, c. 146 shall apply.

§ 5:13-7. Report of injury; precondition to suit; limitation on time

As a precondition to bringing any suit in connection with a skiing injury against an operator, a skier shall report in writing to the ski area operator all the details of any accident as soon as possible, but in no event longer than 90 days from the time of the incident giving rise to the suit.

The report shall include at least the following: name, address, brief description of incident, location, alleged cause, others involved and witnesses, if any. If it is not practicable to give the report because of severe physical disability resulting from a skiing accident or incident, the report shall be given as soon as practicable. This section is not applicable with respect to a ski area unless the operator conspicuously posts notice to skiers of the requirements of the section.

A skier who fails to give the report within 90 days from the time of the accident or incident may be permitted to give the report at any time within 1 year after the accident or incident, in the discretion of a judge of the superior court, if the ski area operator is not substantially prejudiced thereby. Application to the court for permission to give a late report shall be made upon motion based upon affidavits showing sufficient reasons for the skier’s failure to give the report within 90 days from the time of the accident or incident.

§ 5:13-8. Limitation of action

Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5, and any other law notwithstanding, an action for injury or death against a ski area operator, ski area or its employees or owner, whether based upon tort or breach of contract or otherwise arising out of skiing, operating toboggans, sleds or similar vehicles shall be commenced no later than 2 years after the occurrence of the incident or earliest of incidents giving rise to the cause of action.

§ 5:13-9. Minors; tolling of limitations

If a skiing accident or incident, or an action based upon a skiing accident or incident, involves a minor, the time limits set forth in sections 7 and 8 shall not begin to run against the minor until he reaches the age of majority.

§ 5:13-10. Provisions of act cumulative with defenses under Tort Claims Act

The provisions of this act are cumulative with the defenses available to a public entity or public employee under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (P.L.1972, c. 45, C. 59:1-1 et seq.).

§ 5:13-11. Severability

The provisions of this act shall be deemed to be severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this act is declared to be unconstitutional or the applicability thereof to any person is held invalid, the remainder of this act shall not thereby be deemed to be unconstitutional or invalid.

Ski.com Photo Contest

From: SKIING Magazine [mailto:magazine@email.skiingmag.com]
Sent: Thursday, December 29, 2011 5:01 PM
To: ski.law@gmail.com
Subject: Ski.com Photo Contest

	Simply submit your best on-snow photo and then get your friends to vote starting January 18. Ski.com and the editors of SKI and Skiing magazines will choose a winner from the top 20 vote getters.
	The winner will enjoy a 5-day getaway in Whistler, B.C. along with:
	4-nights lodging at the Coast Blackcomb Suites	3-day lift ticket and rentals from Whistler Blackcomb
	Vancouver Airport transfers	$100 gift certificate to the Brewhouse
	Pair of Rossignol’s Experience skis

Publication of Environmental Assessments for High Flow Experiment Protocol and Non-native Fish Control

The Department of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Reclamation, is proposing to develop and implement a protocol for high-flow experimental releases from Glen Canyon Dam to better determine whether and how sand conservation can be improved in the Colorado River corridor downstream from Glen Canyon Dam, and is also proposing to conduct research, monitoring and specific actions to control non-native fish in the Colorado River downstream from Glen Canyon Dam in an effort to help conserve endangered fish.

Two environmental assessments (EA) have been prepared to analyze and disclose the environmental effects of the proposed actions. The EAs are available on our website at the links below. Printed copies of the EAs are also available at the Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Colorado Regional Office, 125 South State Street, Room 7218, Salt Lake City, Utah 84138.

We have also included several related documents, including: the Biological Opinion recently received from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which covers both proposed actions; Science Plans for both actions prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey; and our determinations of eligibility and adverse effect for National Historic Preservation Act 106 compliance for both actions. All of these documents are provided at the link below.

http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/12feb22/index.html

Thanks.

Beverley C. Heffernan

Manager, Environmental Resources Division

Upper Colorado Region, UC-700

Bureau of Reclamation

bheffernan

(801) 524-3712

Happy Thanksgiving

May you be with loved ones this day or may you love the people you are with.

Have a very Happy Thanksgiving.