Timmer, et al., v. Shamineau Adventures, 2005 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 576

Timmer, et al., v. Shamineau Adventures, 2005 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 576

Linda Timmer, et al., Respondents, vs. Shamineau Adventures, Appellant.

A04-2458

COURT OF APPEALS OF MINNESOTA

2005 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 576

December 13, 2005, Filed

NOTICE: [*1] THIS OPINION WILL BE UNPUBLISHED AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY MINNESOTA STATUTES.

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Review denied by Timmer v. Shamineau Adventures, 2006 Minn. LEXIS 73 (2006)

Subsequent appeal at, Remanded by Timmer v. Shamineau Adventures, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 351 (2007)

PRIOR HISTORY: Morrison County District Court. File No. CX-03-261. Hon. John H. Scherer.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

COUNSEL: For Appellant: Robert G. Haugen, Jason M. Hill, Johnson & Lindberg, P.A., Minneapolis, MN.

For Respondent: Luke M. Seifert, Michael, T. Milligan, Heidi N. Thoennes, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, MN.

JUDGES: Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and Huspeni, Judge. 1

1 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

OPINION BY: RANDALL

OPINION

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

RANDALL, Judge

This is an appeal from the district court order denying a motion for JNOV but granting a new trial on damages and a conditional remittitur of the damages awarded for future pain and suffering. After respondents accepted the conditional remittitur, appellant brought this appeal contending: (a) it is entitled to a Schwartz hearing based on a juror’s allegations of misconduct in reaching the verdict; (b) it is entitled to an unconditional new trial because of juror misconduct on the face of the special [*2] verdict form; (c) it is entitled to a new trial on liability due to the erroneous admission into evidence of an unqualified expert’s opinions; and (d) the court erred in allowing respondent’s expert to testify to opinions undisclosed prior to trial and denying appellant’s request for a continuance. Respondents filed a notice of review arguing that the conditional remittitur was unsupported by the evidence. We affirm on all issues.

FACTS

This appeal stems from a tort action brought by respondents Linda Timmer and her husband Jere Timmer (collectively “respondents”) against appellant Shamineau Adventures. Appellant is one of five subdivisions that are collectively referred to as “Shamineau Ministries.” Appellant’s subdivision consists of a ropes course that includes various elements and obstacle courses. One of the elements of the ropes course is a zip line that consists of a 300-foot cable that is secured to a tower structure on a hill, traverses a valley, and ends at a tree located at a lower point on the opposite side. The cable drapes across the valley, and gradually rises as it nears the landing area in front of the tree to which it is attached. The cable is threaded through [*3] a pulley system and a lanyard rope is attached to the pulley. At the end of the lanyard is a carabiner that has a hinged gate on one side that is spring loaded. A zip line rider is specially body-harnessed by camp personnel, and connected to another carabiner clip attached to the harness. Both carabiners are equipped with screw-lock devices and spring tension hinges that prevent them from opening accidentally.

To ride the zip line, the rider’s harness carabiner is attached to the zip line carabiner. The rider then steps from the higher end platform, gliding down the cable across the valley. The rider slows as the calibrated slack in the cable and the resulting incline brings the rider to a slow landing on the gradual upslope of the lower end hill. The harness carabiner is then disconnected from the zip line by an assistant stationed at the lower end of the hill, and the pulley and lanyard assembly is walked back up to the higher end platform by the rider using a tow-rope attached to the lanyard.

In October 2001, a group of students and teachers from the Little Falls School District went to Camp Shamineau. Included in the group was Timmer, a special education teacher in the Little [*4] Falls School District. On October 11, while “roving” the ropes course and generally supervising her students, Timmer was approached by Troy Zakariasen, the ropes course director. Zakariasen asked Timmer if she would be willing to help uncouple students at the receiving end of the zip line while he briefly attended to other duties. Timmer agreed, and Matthew Stanghelle, a Shamineau staff member, showed Timmer how to unhook the zip line riders. Stanghelle spent approximately five minutes with Timmer, showing her the procedure by demonstrating on incoming zip line riders. Stanghelle then left the landing area to assist other students, teachers, and staff. Although Timmer had been to Camp Shamineau three or four times prior to October 11, she had never attended any training relative to the ropes course, which typically includes two to three weeks of training riders.

After Stanghelle left, the next rider on the zip line was 14-year old Tracie Boser. When Boser arrived at the landing area, Timmer grabbed Boser and tried to unhook her from the harness. As Timmer tried to unscrew the safety harness, Boser began drifting backwards. Timmer instinctively grabbed onto Boser to prevent her from [*5] coasting back to the sender, but Timmer was unable to maintain her footing. Boser then glided back toward the middle of the zip line with Timmer hanging onto Boser’s harness. When they reached the mid-point, approximately 25 feet above the valley, Timmer was unable to maintain her grip on the harness, and she fell to the ground, sustaining serious injuries. Timmer brought this tort action alleging negligence on the part of Shamineau Adventures. Jere Timmer filed a claim for loss of consortium.

Four days prior to the commencement of trial, respondents served upon appellant a memorandum issued by Richard Gauger, an engineer retained by respondents to serve as an expert witness. Gauger’s memorandum concluded that, in his opinion, the landing area of the zip line was unsafe, and that the landing area should involve one or more trained persons working together to assist the rider in arriving safely. Appellants moved for an order excluding Gauger’s new opinions, or, in the alternative, for a continuance due to the untimely disclosure of the new evidence. The district court denied the motion, holding that the issue of the landing area could reasonably have been anticipated in light of the [*6] nature of the case.

A jury trial was held from June 21, 2004, through June 29, 2004. At trial, Gauger testified that he has a bachelor’s degree in industrial engineering, and that he is a consulting engineer licensed as a professional engineer. Gauger also testified that his work history included assisting with design and development of construction projects, and some investigative work with regard to recreational activities. Appellant objected to Gauger’s testimony on the basis that he was unqualified as an expert witness. The district court overruled the objection, and Gauger testified in accordance with his June 17 memorandum, that the zip line was dangerous because the slope exceeded the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) standards for ramps and other standards typically used on construction projects.

The jury heard extensive testimony concerning Timmer’s injuries and her present physical condition. Dr. Joseph Nessler testified that as a result of her accident, Timmer suffered “multiple injuries, including pelvic fractures, sacral or tailbone fractures, spinal fracture, left femur fracture, left tibia fracture, and right calcaneus fracture.” Dr. Nessler, Dr. Jeffrey Gerdes, [*7] and Dr. Gregory Schlosser all testified that Timmer suffers from various permanent disabilities as a result of the accident, and all agreed she will have problems lifting, bending, stooping, twisting, and standing. Timmer testified that she is medically disabled and was forced to retire from teaching as a result of the fall.

On the verdict form, the jury determined that appellant was 60% at fault and Timmer was 40% at fault. The jury awarded appellant damages in excess of $ 4.5 million, and after applying the mathematical formula called for by the jury allocation of fault, the net verdict to respondents was $ 2,783,949. Shortly thereafter, James Albrecht, a juror in the case, sent a letter to the district court and the attorneys for both parties. Albrecht stated that the jury had made a mistake in selecting the damages. According to Albrecht, the jury had selected the damages believing that respondents would recover 20% of the damages awarded; deriving this figure by taking appellant’s 60% fault and subtracting respondent’s 40% fault. Appellant subsequently moved the district court for a Schwartz 2 hearing based on Albrecht’s letter. The district court first ruled the letter [*8] inadmissible, and then denied the motion for a Schwartz hearing.

2 See Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 258 Minn. 325, 104 N.W.2d 301 (1960).

Following the district court’s order denying the request for a Schwartz hearing, appellant moved for a new trial and JNOV. The district court denied the motion for JNOV, but granted a new trial on damages and a conditional remittitur of the damages awarded for future pain and suffering, reducing the amount of the recoverable verdict from $ 3,000,000 to $ 1,650,000. Respondents accepted the conditional remittitur. Shamineau appealed. Respondents then served and filed their own notice of review objecting to the remittitur.

DECISION

I.

Appellant argues that it is entitled to a Schwartz hearing based on Albrecht’s letter stating that the jury had made a mistake in selecting the damages. [HN1] “The standard of review for denial of a Schwartz hearing is abuse of discretion.” State v. Church, 577 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. 1998). [*9]

In Schwartz, the supreme court established a method for inquiring into allegations of juror misconduct. 258 Minn. at 328, 104 N.W.2d at 303. A Schwartz hearing may also be conducted to correct a clerical error in a jury verdict. Erickson by Erickson v. Hammermeister, 458 N.W.2d 172, 175 (1990), review denied (Minn. Sept. 20, 1990).

[HN2] Although trial courts are urged to be fairly lenient in the granting of Schwartz hearings, their purpose is to determine juror misconduct, such as outside influence improperly brought to bear on jurors. The purpose of a Schwartz hearing does not include the correction of a miscomprehension by a juror or jurors. The assertion that the jury was confused and did not understand the effect of the verdict has been rejected as a basis for a Schwartz hearing. Jurors may not impeach their verdict on the basis that they did not understand the legal effect of that verdict.

Senf v. Bolluyt, 419 N.W.2d 645, 647 (Minn. App. 1988) (quoting Frank v. Frank, 409 N.W.2d 70, 72-73 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1987)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1988).

[*10] Here, the district court reviewed the letter for purposes of the Schwartz hearing motion, and concluded that:

There has been no evidence of juror misconduct in this matter. The evidence received did not relate to actions outside of the deliberations that would constitute misconduct. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that during deliberations the jury may have misunderstood or misapplied the law as presented in the jury instructions. However, under Minnesota cases, this does not constitute juror misconduct such that a Schwartz hearing must be held.

The record supports the district court’s conclusion that there were no clerical errors and no evidence of jury misconduct. Albrecht’s letter fails to demonstrate evidence of juror misconduct, but, instead, indicates that the jury may have misapplied the law. The district court properly denied appellant’s request for a Schwartz hearing. See Senf, 419 N.W.2d at 648.

For purposes of the motion, appellant concedes that even if Albrecht is correct and that the jury misunderstood the instructions regarding comparative fault, that “misunderstanding” is not grounds for a new trial. Instead, appellant [*11] argues that the letter is evidence of a “compromise verdict,” and that a compromise verdict is grounds for a new trial. Appellant argues that because a compromise verdict constitutes juror misconduct, it is entitled to a Schwartz hearing.

[HN3] A “compromise” verdict occurs when the jury awards an amount that reflects a compromise between liability and proven damages. See Schore v. Mueller, 290 Minn. 186, 190, 186 N.W.2d 699, 702 (1971). When there is an indication that inadequate damages were awarded because the jury compromised between the right of recovery and the amount of damages, a new trial on damages is appropriate. Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 813 (Minn. 1981).

We agree with the district court that [HN4] just a claim that the jury misapplied jury instructions in apportioning damages does not equate to a compromised verdict. Case law uniformly revolves around allegations by plaintiffs that damages were compromised too low based on proven liability. See, e.g., Vermes v. American Dist. Tele. Co., 312 Minn. 33, 44, 251 N.W.2d 101, 106-07 (Minn. 1977) (holding that because the jury simply misunderstood proof of damages and gave [*12] an inadequate award, it was not a compromise verdict);Schore, 290 Minn. at 190, 186 N.W.2d at 702 (remanding for a new trial because the jury’s award of damages was not supported by the evidence in light of the plaintiff’s proven damages and represented a compromise verdict); Kloos v. Soo Line R.R., 286 Minn. 172, 177-78, 176 N.W.2d 274, 278 (1970) (ordering a new trial on the basis that the jury’s award of inadequate damages constituted a compromise verdict). This case is novel. Appellant does not argue that the damages were inadequate, but rather argues that the damages awarded were in excess of the jury’s intent. We conclude that even if the jury did not fully grasp the mathematics of comparative negligence (an unfortunate but true syndrome that goes back decades to the origins of comparative negligence), plaintiffs and defendants have understood for all those years that if even after careful argument by attorneys in their closing arguments, juries do not exactly “get” comparative negligence. It is not “misconduct” and does not call for a Schwartz hearing.

Appellant next argues that in light of Albrecht’s letter indicating that the jury made [*13] a mistake in apportioning damages, its due process rights to a fair trial were violated. Appellant argues that except for purposes of the Schwartz hearing motion, the district court held that under Minn. R. Evid. 606(b), 3 the letter was inadmissible for purposes relative to other post-trial motions, such as a motion for a new trial, remittitur, or JNOV. Appellant argues that it cannot be granted a new trial for juror misconduct without the excluded evidence, and a Schwartz hearing is only available when admissible evidence of juror misconduct is already in the record to justify the proceeding. Thus, appellant contends that the district court’s ruling of inadmissibility under Rule 606(b) denied it the opportunity to prove jury misconduct through a Schwartz hearing, thereby depriving appellant of the opportunity to develop a record supporting its right to a new trial.

3 Minn. R. Evid. 606(b) states:

[HN5] Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent or to dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention, or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or as to any threats of violence or violent acts brought to bear on jurors, from whatever source, to reach a verdict. Nor may a juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.

[*14] [HN6] The Minnesota Supreme Court set forth the rationale for the exclusion of juror testimony about a verdict or the deliberation process. See State v. Pederson, 614 N.W.2d 724, 731 (Minn. 2000). In Pederson, the supreme court explained: “The rationale for the exclusion of juror testimony about a verdict or the deliberation process is to protect juror deliberations and thought processes from governmental and public scrutiny and to ensure the finality and certainty of verdicts.” Id. The court further explained the rationale of rule 606(b) by noting the concern that jurors be protected from harassment by counsel after the verdict. Id. These are legitimate public policy concerns that support Minn. R. Evid. 606(b). The accepted fact that from time to time juries make mathematical mistakes in rendering their verdict does not rise to the constitutional level of a due process violation of a party’s right to a fair trial. In essence, this second argument of appellant is a remake of the first argument that there was a compromise verdict. Since we conclude there was not a compromise verdict, the judge properly did not order a Schwartz hearing based on either theory.

[*15] II.

Appellant argues that it is entitled to an unconditional new trial due to evidence of juror misconduct on the face of the special verdict form. Appellant argues that the special verdict form is evidence of misconduct because, appellant claims, certain listed damages are irreconcilable. Specifically, appellant points out that: (1) the jury awarded Linda Timmer $ 3,000,000 in future pain and suffering, but only $ 150,000 in past pain and suffering; and (2) Linda Timmer’s award of $ 150,000 for past pain and suffering is the same as Jere Timmer’s past loss of consortium. Appellant asserts that the only logical explanation for the jury’s irrational damages awards is that the jury carefully attempted to engineer respondents’ net recovery, which constitutes misconduct.

[HN7] Anew trial may be granted when, among other things, the verdict is not supported by the evidence, errors of law occurred at the trial, or the damages awarded are excessive. Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01. The district court has the discretion to grant a new trial and this court will not disturb its decision absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co., 454 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1990). [*16] An appellate court will uphold the denial of a motion for a new trial unless the verdict “is manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict.” ZumBerge v. N. States Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 103, 110 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 1992).

The district court did take note of the difference between future and past pain and granted appellant’s motion for a new trial on the issue of future pain and suffering if respondents declined the court’s remittitur reducing that portion of the verdict from $ 3,000,000 to $ 1,650,000. However, respondents accepted the court’s remittitur, and that benefited appellants in the amount of $ 1,350,000. As an appellate court on review, we cannot now conclude that the remaining verdict is too high as a matter of law. Appellant is not entitled to a new trial based on its allegation that jury misconduct in calculating damages denied it of its right to a fair trial.

III.

Appellant argues that under the Frye-Mack, Daubert, and Kumho standards for expert testimony, it is entitled to a new trial because the district court erroneously admitted Gauger’s expert [*17] testimony. 4 [HN8] The decision to admit expert opinion testimony is within the broad discretion of the district court. Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn. 1977). To obtain a new trial based on evidentiary error, a claimant must show not only that the ruling was erroneous, but also that it resulted in prejudice. Kroning v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Minn. 1997).

4 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999).

[HN9] Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to the Frye-Mack standard. See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813-14 (Minn. 2000). 5 Under the Frye-Mack standard, a novel scientific theory may be admitted if two requirements are satisfied. [*18] Id. at 814. But if the expert’s opinions do not relate to “novel scientific methods,” a Frye-Mack analysis is not necessary. See State v. DeShay, 645 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Minn. App. 2002) (holding that a Frye/Mack analysis was not necessary where expert testimony based on the ten-point gang-identification criteria did not constitute novel scientific evidence), aff’d 669 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. 2003).

5 The court in Goeb also refused to adopt the principals of Daubert and its progeny, and, therefore, appellant’s reliance on the Daubert is misguided. 615 N.W.2d at 814-15.

Based on the scope of Gauger’s testimony, his opinions related to the safety of the zip line landing site, not the actual zip line itself, as claimed by appellant. An expert opinion as to whether the zip line landing area was unsafe, and whether there is something in the condition of the work site that is inherently dangerous does not involve a novel scientific theory. [*19] Gauger’s expert opinion testimony did not constitute “novel scientific testimony” and a complete Frye/Mack analysis was not necessary.

Although a Frye/Mack analysis was not necessary to be admissible, Gauger’s testimony must at least meet the requirements of Minn. R. Evid. 702. This rule provides [HN10] “if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Minn. R. Evid. 702.

Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Gauger’s testimony, claiming Gauger was not qualified to be an expert witness. We affirm the district court. The district court found that: (1) Gauger is a professional engineer and has completed investigative work involving recreational facilities; (2) Gauger has reviewed hundreds of sites for safety purposes; and (3) Gauger has a background and familiarity with work sites and recreational facilities such as playgrounds and the Camp Snoopy amusement park at the Mall of America. The record [*20] reflects that Gauger visited the accident site on more than one occasion and viewed the zip line and landing area in use. The record reflects that Gauger reviewed a manual from the camp and criteria developed by the Association of Challenge Course Technology. Gauger testified extensively as to his opinion that the landing area was unsafe, and explained his reasoning. We find there was proper foundation for Gauger’s expert opinions, and the district court properly admitted his testimony.

IV.

Appellant argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the district court failed to grant appellant’s motion for a continuance after respondents’ late disclosure of Gauger’s opinion testimony. [HN11] When a district court denies a continuance at trial, this court reviews the ruling for a clear abuse of discretion. Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Minn. 1977). Denial of a continuance shall be reversed only if the decision prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Chahla v. City of St. Paul, 507 N.W.2d 29, 31-32 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 1993).

The record shows that, four days prior to the commencement of trial, respondents served [*21] upon appellant a memorandum issued by Gauger stating his opinions that the landing area was unsafe. In denying appellant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of the district court’s refusal to grant a continuance, the district court stated that “the late or new disclosures regarding Mr. Gauger’s testimony were really nothing more that a re-disclosure of what had previously been disclosed.” The court further noted that:

Previous disclosures indicated that Mr. Gauger felt that the workplace or landing site was unsafe because Linda Timmer was required to stand on a slope. This opinion did not change. The only disclosure that appeared to be at all new and different was a reference to the ADA slope percentage recommendations, and that Mr. Gauger adopted this slope percentage as a reasonable standard.

In addressing appellant’s claim that it could not respond to the new information because of the fact that its expert had already been deposed and the testimony was established, the court stated:

the fact of the matter is that [appellant's] expert simply expressed the opinion that the zip line was safe and reasonable, and that the design of the landing area was necessary for [*22] the zip line to function properly. He did not offer any opinion as to what would have been a safe grade for the landing area of the zip line. If there had been a disagreement as to the actual percentage of slope or the standard to be applied, then there may be some basis for the argument. However, that is clearly not the situation at hand. Additionally, [appellant] was aware that the slope grade of the landing area was a basis for the negligence claim prior to the deposition of its expert witness, Bart Broderson. [Appellant] had the opportunity to ask Mr. Broderson his opinion relative to the degree or percentage slope of the landing area. No inquiry was made. [Appellant] cannot later claim prejudice when the subsequent disclosure differed little from the prior disclosure.

The record supports the district court’s decision. We conclude the district court properly denied appellant’s motion for a continuance.

V.

As is their right, even though respondents agreed to the conditional remittitur, once appellant challenged the verdict, respondents cross-reviewed on the issue of the remittitur. Respondents argue that the district court abused its discretion by granting a conditional [*23] remittitur of the damages awarded for future pain and suffering. The district court did reduce the amount of recoverable damages by approximately $ 1,350,000. Respondents argue that reduction was uncalled for in light of the medical testimony.

[HN12] Generally, a district court has broad discretion in determining if damages are excessive and whether the cure is a remittitur. Hanson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R. Co., 345 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1984). When a district court has examined the jury’s verdict and outlined the reasons for its decision on a motion for remittitur, an appellate court is unlikely to tamper with that decision absent an abuse of discretion. Sorenson v. Kruse, 293 N.W.2d 56, 62-63 (Minn. 1980).

In ordering the conditional remittitur, the district court explained that:

The jury awarded $ 150,000 for past pain and suffering. Approximately 2.7 years had transpired from the date of the injury to the date of trial. Therefore, the $ 150,000 award equates to $ 55,555.56 per year for her past pain and suffering. On the other hand, the jury was advised that Linda Timmer had a 29-year life expectancy. The award of $ 3,000,000 for future [*24] pain and suffering, divided among those 29 years, would result in an annual award of damages for future pain and suffering in the amount of $ 103,448.28.

The district court addressed all the of the doctors’ expert testimony on future pain and suffering, and concluded that “although the medical testimony spoke of the need for future care or treatment, and the possibility of some degeneration, there was no specific testimony regarding future pain and suffering associated with any future surgery, care, or degeneration. Thus, the district court concluded that the drastic difference between the annual damages for past pain and suffering and future pain and suffering were not supported by the record.

In support of their claim that the remittitur was an abuse of discretion, respondents cited an exhaustive list of problems or potential problems and potential problems that Timmer will experience as a direct result of the accident. Respondents present a good argument. The record does not jump out on appellate review, as a record where a lack of a remittitur would be a miscarriage of justice. But, as noted, the decision to grant or deny a conditional remittitur is a highly discretionary [*25] decision within the purview of the district judge’s examination and weighing of the evidence. We conclude the district court’s conditional remittitur was reasoned and supported by the record.

Affirmed.

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Is your local race a fund-raiser for a charity or an event for an out of state corporation? This lawsuit might decide

Lawsuit claims that race organizer; make money from volunteers and volunteers should be paid. Entire US race and event “business” could change or disappear.

Most events that we love to participate in, attend or watch are owned by for-profit corporations. They make money for a business. Those events are dependent upon hundreds if not thousands of volunteers. Many state or imply a charity, whose name is in the title of the event is the reason for the event, and thus the volunteers are working for the charity.

This lawsuit says that is not quite so. In fact, this lawsuit says most of what I believed and probably a lot of what you believe about these events are not true.

The lawsuit on its face says that the volunteers at these events were misled and should have been paid. On its face, it’s hard to ask for money when you sign up as a volunteer. You agree to volunteer and you are a volunteer, and you don’t get paid.

However, that is not the bottom line here. Based on the article:

·         The entire operation is fraudulent.

·         The volunteers were recruited to provide community service when, in fact, they were not, they were working for a for-profit corporation, not a charity.

·         Charities pay to have their name attached to the event.

·         The more a charity pays, the more the charity is recognized by the event.

·         Teams that raise money for these events Charites, the base money goes to the event, and only the money raised over the minimum goes to the charity.

·         The event then uses the charities name to recruit volunteers for the event.

Is the plaintiff going to win the lawsuit? I have no idea, but allegations of fraud change litigation, throw out the normal defenses and generally create a different courtroom drama. It is never good to be defending someone who looks bad.

However, the major impact may have already occurred. Will people volunteer to sign up for these events as volunteers? Will charities continue to associate with these events and will those charities be linked with the fraud or for the good they do?

Without the thousands of volunteers, these events won’t happen. Entry fees will either skyrocket or go away. Charities may no longer be associated with any of these events because they are simply bad news.

However, I think this lawsuit may have a chance; the plaintiff is an associate professor at the Saint Louis University School of Law.

The damage is already done. Those races and events that have been upfront from the beginning are not going to be affected except by a few volunteers who are not paying attention or confused. However, the big events which rely on thousands of volunteers are either going to change, evolve or go away.

See Lawsuit alleges CGI exploited race volunteers and This Marathon Lawsuit May Shake Up the Running World

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Rock ’n’ Roll Marathon, Competitor Group Inc., CGI, St. Louis Rock ’n’ Roll Marathon, Yvette Joy Liebesman, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Charity, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Calera Capital, Fraud, Misrepresentation

 


Journal of Emergency Medical Services article brings back the tourniquet for major blood loss wounds.

Military experience showed that to save lives you need to use tourniquets; direct pressure was not working.

This is a somewhat complicated article for a pretty simple issue. Wounds with major blood loss or External Hemorrhage as the article refers to them, do not respond to direct pressure: Tourniquet’s work.

If you are in the outdoors or SAR, you should read the article, check with your local physician advisor and counsel and see if this is a technique (and equipment) you should include in your first-aid kit.

See New External Hemorrhage Control Evidence-Based Guideline

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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The risk of hiking over lava fields is an obvious risk; falling while hiking is also a possibility….so is suing when you do both…but you won’t win

Plaintiff signed up on a cruise ship to hike on a lava field. She was fully informed of the risks and admitted to knowing the risks in advance which is defined as assumption of the risk.

Andia, M.D., v. Full Service Travel, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88247

State: California and Hawaii, the accident occurred in Hawaii but the lawsuit was filed in California

Plaintiff: Ana Maria Andia, M.D.

Defendant: Full Service Travel, a California corporation, Celebrity Cruises, Inc., a foreign corporation, and Arnott’s Lodge and Hike Adventures

Plaintiff Claims: (1) negligence, on grounds that Defendant breached its duty of care to Plaintiff by failing to ensure the safety of participants in their excursions, and (2) negligence, on grounds that Defendant failed to warn Plaintiff of the known dangers and risks associated with the lava hike. & (1) negligence, on grounds that defendant cruise breached its duty of care to Plaintiff by failing to offer reasonably reliable and safe excursions, and (2) negligence, on grounds that defendant cruise failed to warn Plaintiff of the dangers and risks associated with the lava hike.

Defendant Defenses: assumption of the risk

Holding: for the defendant

Year: 2007

Simple case, however, the facts are long because the defendants provided the plaintiff with a ton of information about the risks of the activity which the court reviewed.

The plaintiff signed up for a hike in the lava fields in Hawaii while on a cruise ship. The information about the hike stated the distance of the hike was always changing because of the lava flow. The hikers could return at any time; however, if they did they would return the way they came by themselves.

This information was provided to the plaintiff in a description of the hike provided by the defendant cruise line, in a brochure that plaintiff was given, in a release the plaintiff signed, and during a talk before the hike began.

Plaintiff in her deposition also admitted that she was an experienced hiker, that falling was always a possibility when hiking.

During a point in the hike, the plaintiff decided to turn around. While hiking back to the ranger station she fell breaking her foot. She sued for her injuries.

The lawsuit was started in the Federal District Court of Southern California. The defendant travel company was dismissed earlier in the case. The defendant hiking company cruise line filed motions for summit judgment.

Summary of the case

The court first looked at the claims against the defendant hiking business. (The type of entity or whether it was an entity was never identified, and the court was not sure what the hiking company was also.)

The basis of the motion from the hiking company was that the risk of “…slipping, falling and injuring oneself on uneven, natural terrain is an inherent risk of lava hiking.”

The duty of care owed by the defendant hiking company in this situation is:

…a duty to use due care and avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if they’re careless conduct injures another person. The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk is an exception to this general rule. The doctrine arises where “by virtue of the nature of the activity and the parties’ relationship to the activity; the defendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the particular risk of harm that caused the injury.”

The court then found the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk applied because:

…conditions or conduct that otherwise might be viewed as dangerous often are an integral part” of the activity itself. “The overriding consideration in the application of primary assumption of risk is to avoid imposing a duty which might chill vigorous participation in the implicated activity and thereby alter its fundamental nature.”

Summing up its own analyses of primary assumption of risk the court stated:

If the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies, a defendant is only liable for a plaintiff’s injuries if the defendant “engages in conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport or activity” or increases the inherent risk involved in the activity.

The plaintiff argued that the hiking company, Arnott’s, was guilty of gross negligence because:

Arnott’s did nothing to provide for Plaintiff’s safety on the lava hike once she determined she could not go forward; Arnott’s did nothing to warn plaintiff of the dangers of approaching too closely to the coastline; Arnott’s did not ensure plaintiff had sufficient water for her trip back to the Rangers station; Arnott’s was understaffed; Arnott’s failed to follow protocol by pressuring plaintiff to return to the ship rather than obtain treatment at the Hilo emergency room; Arnott’s offered misleading information about the trail markings; Arnott’s provided plaintiff with falsely reassuring directions back to the Rangers station; and Arnott’s permitted Plaintiff to hike in sneakers instead of boots. Plaintiff contends that this conduct constituted gross negligence, making the Agreement, which purports to exculpate Arnott’s of liability, unenforceable. Plaintiff also contends that the Agreement is an unconscionable and unenforceable contract of adhesion because it is a pre-printed form, contained multiple signatures and there was no alternative for Plaintiff but to sign it or wait at the Rangers station while the others hiked, losing a day of her cruise vacation.

However, the plaintiff’s arguments were not backed up with any facts. Arguing a point with facts that do not support your argument fails.  

The Court concludes that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies, negating Arnott’s general duty to prevent plaintiff from slipping and falling on lava rock, an inherent risk of the activity of lava hiking.

Nor did the actions of the defendant hiking company increase the risk of injury to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff knew the risks of hiking prior to the hike in question and admitted that in her deposition. The plaintiff was given information about the hike and had the risks of the hike explained to her four different ways prior to the hike. The plaintiff assumed the risk of here injuries, and the risk that plaintiff suffered causing her injury were visible to anyone hiking in the lava field.

The next issue the court reviewed with regard to the defendant hiking company was the duty to warn. “It is established law, at least in the exercise of ordinary care, that one is under no duty to warn an-other of a danger equally obvious to both.”

The court found for the hiking company on this issue based on the facts and found the plaintiff assumed the risk of her injuries because she could see the risk and continued on anyway. If you can see the risk, you cannot complain about not knowing about the risk.

The plaintiff’s claims against the cruise ship were then reviewed. A cruise ship has a different duty of care owed to its passengers. “The duty of care of the owner of an excursion ship is a matter of federal maritime law. That duty is to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.”

Here the plaintiff presented no evidence that the defendant cruise line did not exercise reasonable care to the plaintiff. The same facts when applied to the case also showed the defendant cruise ship had not breached its duty to warn to the plaintiff. The information and brochure were provided by the cruise ship to the plaintiff when she signed up for the hike.

[I]t is generally accepted that where a carrier.  . . has a continuing obligation for the care of its passengers, its duty is to warn of dangers known to the carrier in places where the passenger is invited to, or may reasonably be expected to visit.” However, “there is no duty to warn of a danger that is as obvious to the injured party as to the defendant.”

So Now What?

The case was won on two issues. The first was the risks of the activity were pointed out over and over again by the hiking company to the plaintiff. Information, brochures, safety talks all stated the risks of the activity which the plaintiff accepted when she turned around.

The second issue was the plaintiff in her deposition admitted to hiking experience. Possibly one or the other could have been enough to prove a defense for the defendants in this case; however, since both were so clear, the defense was easily proven.

Many times on hikes, we point out risk, as well as birds and beauty, to others with us. If you are guiding a hike, this requirement should concentrate your attention to these issues and your actions in pointing out risks. You can cover many of the risks of an activity such as hiking with a general talk at the beginning. “We are going to be walking on uneven surfaces. There will be many rocks and roots to trip on. Pay attention to where you are putting your feet and make sure you are on a solid surface when walking.”

As much as releases are an important defense and source of information for your guests, assumption of the risk is making a comeback in the outdoor recreation industry. If your release fails for any reason, assumption of the risk is the best and maybe the only other defense you have available.

Besides the more your gusts know and understand the risks of the activity the less likely the will be to be injured and the better the experience they will have. Leave scaring guests to fun houses at Halloween.

The one confusing issue in the case was the courts use of California law to decide a case that occurred in Hawaii. The federal courts are for situations like this when the parties are from different states. The plaintiff was from California, and the defendants were from Hawaii. However, without an agreement as to the law that should be applied to the case, Hawaiian law, I believe should be applied. Here the court used California law.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

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New Ohio law allows Camps and Schools to obtain Epinephrine in their name for kids

Smart law might save a few kids and not create criminals of the adults to care for them.

The entire law is attached below, but in short, schools as defined in the act and camps can now go to pharmacies and obtain epinephrine for their kids. There must be a plan in place on how to store and use the epinephrine and the persons administering the epinephrine must be educated in its use.

Summer Camps and Day Camps as defined by state law can also obtain epinephrine for their kids. The law provides immunity from lawsuits for camps and people who use the autoinjectors under the law.

The law is a good step forward. Every other state should adopt a similar law.

Again thanks to Danny Twilley for bringing this to my attention.

The act can be seen here: http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=130_HB_296

Here is the new law. I’ve highlighted sections that are important.

AN ACT

To amend sections 3313.713, 3313.718, 4729.51, and 4729.60 and to enact sections 3313.7110, 3313.7111, 3314.143, 3326.28, 3328.29, and 5101.76 of the Revised Code to permit schools and camps to procure and use epinephrine autoinjectors in accordance with prescribed policies, to exempt them from licensing requirements related to the possession of epinephrine autoinjectors, and to declare an emergency.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio:

SECTION 1. That sections 3313.713, 3313.718, 4729.51, and 4729.60 be amended and sections 3313.7110, 3313.7111, 3314.143, 3326.28, 3328.29, and 5101.76 of the Revised Code be enacted to read as follows:

Sec. 3313.713. (A) As used in this section:

(1) “Drug” means a drug, as defined in section 4729.01 of the Revised Code, that is to be administered pursuant to the instructions of the prescriber, whether or not required by law to be sold only upon a prescription.

(2) “Federal law” means the “Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1997,” 111 Stat. 37, 20 U.S.C. 1400, as amended.

(3) “Prescriber” has the same meaning as in section 4729.01 of the Revised Code.

(B) The board of education of each city, local, exempted village, and joint vocational school district shall, not later than one hundred twenty days after September 20, 1984, adopt a policy on the authority of its employees, when acting in situations other than those governed by sections 2305.23, 2305.231, and 3313.712, and 3313.7110 of the Revised Code, to administer drugs prescribed to students enrolled in the schools of the district. The policy shall provide either that:

(1) Except as otherwise required by federal law, no person employed by the board shall, in the course of such employment, administer any drug prescribed to any student enrolled in the schools of the district.

(2) Designated persons employed by the board are authorized to administer to a student a drug prescribed for the student. Effective July 1, 2011, only employees of the board who are licensed health professionals, or who have completed a drug administration training program conducted by a licensed health professional and considered appropriate by the board, may administer to a student a drug prescribed for the student. Except as otherwise provided by federal law, the board’s policy may provide that certain drugs or types of drugs shall not be administered or that no employee shall use certain procedures, such as injection, to administer a drug to a student.

(C) No drug prescribed for a student shall be administered pursuant to federal law or a policy adopted under division (B) of this section until the following occur:

(1) The board, or a person designated by the board, receives a written request, signed by the parent, guardian, or other person having care or charge of the student, that the drug be administered to the student.

(2) The board, or a person designated by the board, receives a statement, signed by the prescriber, that includes all of the following information:

(a) The name and address of the student;

(b) The school and class in which the student is enrolled;

(c) The name of the drug and the dosage to be administered;

(d) The times or intervals at which each dosage of the drug is to be administered;

(e) The date the administration of the drug is to begin;

(f) The date the administration of the drug is to cease;

(g) Any severe adverse reactions that should be reported to the prescriber and one or more phone numbers at which the prescriber can be reached in an emergency;

(h) Special instructions for administration of the drug, including sterile conditions and storage.

(3) The parent, guardian, or other person having care or charge of the student agrees to submit a revised statement signed by the prescriber to the board or a person designated by the board if any of the information provided by the prescriber pursuant to division (C)(2) of this section changes.

(4) The person authorized by the board to administer the drug receives a copy of the statement required by division (C)(2) or (3) of this section.

(5) The drug is received by the person authorized to administer the drug to the student for whom the drug is prescribed in the container in which it was dispensed by the prescriber or a licensed pharmacist.

(6) Any other procedures required by the board are followed.

(D) If a drug is administered to a student, the board of education shall acquire and retain copies of the written requests required by division (C)(1) and the statements required by divisions (C)(2) and (3) of this section and shall ensure that by the next school day following the receipt of any such statement a copy is given to the person authorized to administer drugs to the student for whom the statement has been received. The board, or a person designated by the board, shall establish a location in each school building for the storage of drugs to be administered under this section and federal law. All such drugs shall be stored in that location in a locked storage place, except that drugs that require refrigeration may be kept in a refrigerator in a place not commonly used by students.

(E) No person who has been authorized by a board of education to administer a drug and has a copy of the most recent statement required by division (C)(2) or (3) of this section given to the person in accordance with division (D) of this section prior to administering the drug is liable in civil damages for administering or failing to administer the drug, unless such person acts in a manner that constitutes gross negligence or wanton or reckless misconduct.

(F) A board of education may designate a person or persons to perform any function or functions in connection with a drug policy adopted under this section either by name or by position, training, qualifications, or similar distinguishing factors.

(G) A policy adopted by a board of education pursuant to this section may be changed, modified, or revised by action of the board.

(H) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a person employed by a board of education to administer a drug to a student unless the board’s policy adopted in compliance with this section establishes such a requirement. A board shall not require an employee to administer a drug to a student if the employee objects, on the basis of religious convictions, to administering the drug.

Nothing in this section affects the application of section 2305.23, 2305.231, or 3313.712, or 3313.7110 of the Revised Code to the administration of emergency care or treatment to a student.

Nothing in this section affects the ability of a public or nonpublic school to participate in a school-based fluoride mouth rinse program established by the director of health pursuant to section 3701.136 of the Revised Code. Nothing in this section affects the ability of a person who is employed by, or who volunteers for, a school that participates in such a program to administer fluoride mouth rinse to a student in accordance with section 3701.136 of the Revised Code and any rules adopted by the director under that section.

Sec. 3313.718. (A) As used in this section, “prescriber” has the same meaning as in section 4729.01 of the Revised Code.

(B) Notwithstanding section 3313.713 of the Revised Code or any policy adopted under that section, a student of a school operated by a city, local, exempted village, or joint vocational school district or a student of a chartered nonpublic school may possess and use an epinephrine autoinjector to treat anaphylaxis, if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The student has the written approval of the prescriber of the autoinjector and, if the student is a minor, the written approval of the parent, guardian, or other person having care or charge of the student. The prescriber’s written approval shall include at least all of the following information:

(a) The student’s name and address;

(b) The names and dose of the medication contained in the autoinjector;

(c) The date the administration of the medication is to begin;

(d) The date, if known, that the administration of the medication is to cease;

(e) Acknowledgment that the prescriber has determined that the student is capable of possessing and using the autoinjector appropriately and has provided the student with training in the proper use of the autoinjector;

(f) Circumstances in which the autoinjector should be used;

(g) Written instructions that outline procedures school employees should follow in the event that the student is unable to administer the anaphylaxis medication or the medication does not produce the expected relief from the student’s anaphylaxis;

(h) Any severe adverse reactions that may occur to the child using the autoinjector that should be reported to the prescriber;

(i) Any severe adverse reactions that may occur to another child, for whom the autoinjector is not prescribed, should such a child receive a dose of the medication;

(j) At least one emergency telephone number for contacting the prescriber in an emergency;

(k) At least one emergency telephone number for contacting the parent, guardian, or other person having care or charge of the student in an emergency;

(l) Any other special instructions from the prescriber.

(2) The school principal and, if a school nurse is assigned to the student’s school building, the school nurse has received copies of the written approvals required by division (B)(1) of this section.

(3) The school principal or, if a school nurse is assigned to the student’s school building, the school nurse has received a backup dose of the anaphylaxis medication from the parent, guardian, or other person having care or charge of the student or, if the student is not a minor, from the student.

If these conditions are satisfied, the student may possess and use the autoinjector at school or at any activity, event, or program sponsored by or in which the student’s school is a participant.

(C) Whenever a student uses an autoinjector at school or at any activity, event, or program sponsored by or in which the student’s school is a participant or whenever a school employee administers anaphylaxis medication to a student at such times that was possessed by the student pursuant to the written approvals described in division (B)(1) of this section, a school employee shall immediately request assistance from an emergency medical service provider.

(D)(1) A school district, member of a school district board of education, or school district employee is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly arising from a district employee’s prohibiting a student from using an autoinjector because of the employee’s good faith belief that the conditions of division (B) of this section had not been satisfied. A school district, member of a school district board of education, or school district employee is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly arising from a district employee’s permitting a student to use an autoinjector because of the employee’s good faith belief that the conditions of division (B) of this section had been satisfied. Furthermore, when a school district is required by this section to permit a student to possess and use an autoinjector because the conditions of division (B) of this section have been satisfied, the school district, any member of the school district board of education, or any school district employee is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly arising from the use of the autoinjector by a student for whom it was not prescribed.

This section does not eliminate, limit, or reduce any other immunity or defense that a school district, member of a school district board of education, or school district employee may be entitled to under Chapter 2744. or any other provision of the Revised Code or under the common law of this state.

(2) A chartered nonpublic school or any officer, director, or employee of the school is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly arising from a school employee’s prohibiting a student from using an autoinjector because of the employee’s good faith belief that the conditions of division (B) of this section had not been satisfied. A chartered nonpublic school or any officer, director, or employee of the school is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly arising from a school employee’s permitting a student to use an autoinjector because of the employee’s good faith belief that the conditions of division (B) of this section had been satisfied. Furthermore, when a chartered nonpublic school is required by this section to permit a student to possess and use an autoinjector because the conditions of division (B) of this section have been satisfied, the chartered nonpublic school or any officer, director, or employee of the school is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly arising from the use of the autoinjector by a student for whom it was not prescribed.

Sec. 3313.7110. (A) The board of education of each city, local, exempted village, or joint vocational school district may procure epinephrine autoinjectors for each school operated by the district to have on the school premises for use in emergency situations identified under division (C)(5) of this section. A district board that elects to procure epinephrine autoinjectors under this section is encouraged to maintain, at all times, at least two epinephrine injectors at each school operated by the district.

(B) A district board that elects to procure epinephrine autoinjectors under this section shall require the district’s superintendent to adopt a policy governing their maintenance and use. Before adopting the policy, the superintendent shall consult with a licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs, as defined in section 4729.01 of the Revised Code.

(C) A component of a policy adopted by a superintendent under division (B) of this section shall be a prescriber-issued protocol specifying definitive orders for epinephrine autoinjectors and the dosages of epinephrine to be administered through them. The policy also shall do all of the following:

(1) Identify the one or more locations in each school operated by the district in which an epinephrine autoinjector must be stored;

(2) Specify the conditions under which an epinephrine autoinjector must be stored, replaced, and disposed;

(3) Specify the individuals employed by or under contract with the district board, in addition to a school nurse licensed under section 3319.221 of the Revised Code or an athletic trainer licensed under Chapter 4755. of the Revised Code, who may access and use an epinephrine autoinjector to provide a dosage of epinephrine to an individual in an emergency situation identified under division (C)(5) of this section;

(4) Specify any training that employees or contractors specified under division (C)(3) of this section, other than a school nurse or athletic trainer, must complete before being authorized to access and use an epinephrine autoinjector;

(5) Identify the emergency situations, including when an individual exhibits signs and symptoms of anaphylaxis, in which a school nurse, athletic trainer, or other employees or contractors specified under division (C)(3) of this section may access and use an epinephrine autoinjector;

(6) Specify that assistance from an emergency medical service provider must be requested immediately after an epinephrine autoinjector is used;

(7) Specify the individuals, in addition to students, school employees or contractors, and school visitors, to whom a dosage of epinephrine may be administered through an epinephrine autoinjector in an emergency situation specified under division (C)(5) of this section.

(D) A school or school district, a member of a district board of education, or a district or school employee or contractor is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property that allegedly arises from an act or omission associated with procuring, maintaining, accessing, or using an epinephrine autoinjector under this section, unless the act or omission constitutes willful or wanton misconduct.

This section does not eliminate, limit, or reduce any other immunity or defense that a school or school district, member of a district board of education, or district or school employee or contractor may be entitled to under Chapter 2744. or any other provision of the Revised Code or under the common law of this state.

(E) A school district board of education may accept donations of epinephrine autoinjectors from a wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs or a manufacturer of dangerous drugs, as defined in section 4729.01 of the Revised Code, and may accept donations of money from any person to purchase epinephrine autoinjectors.

(F) A district board that elects to procure epinephrine autoinjectors under this section shall report to the department of education each procurement and occurrence in which an epinephrine autoinjector is used from a school’s supply of epinephrine autoinjectors.

Sec. 3313.7111. (A) With the approval of its governing authority, a chartered or nonchartered nonpublic school may procure epinephrine autoinjectors in the manner prescribed by section 3313.7110 of the Revised Code. A chartered or nonchartered nonpublic school that elects to do so shall comply with all provisions of that section as if it were a school district.

(B) A chartered or nonchartered nonpublic school, a member of a chartered or nonchartered nonpublic school governing authority, or an employee or contractor of the school is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property that allegedly arises from an act or omission associated with procuring, maintaining, accessing, or using an epinephrine autoinjector under this section, unless the act or omission constitutes willful or wanton misconduct.

(C) A chartered or nonchartered nonpublic school may accept donations of epinephrine autoinjectors from a wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs or a manufacturer of dangerous drugs, as defined in section 4729.01 of the Revised Code, and may accept donations of money from any person to purchase epinephrine autoinjectors.

(D) A chartered or nonchartered nonpublic school that elects to procure epinephrine autoinjectors under this section shall report to the department of education each procurement and occurrence in which an epinephrine autoinjector is used from the school’s supply of epinephrine autoinjectors.

Sec. 3314.143. (A) With the approval of its governing authority, a community school established under this chapter may procure epinephrine autoinjectors in the manner prescribed by section 3313.7110 of the Revised Code. A community school that elects to do so shall comply with all provisions of that section as if it were a school district.

(B) A community school, a member of a community school governing authority, or a community school employee or contractor is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property that allegedly arises from an act or omission associated with procuring, maintaining, accessing, or using an epinephrine autoinjector under this section, unless the act or omission constitutes willful or wanton misconduct.

This division does not eliminate, limit, or reduce any other immunity or defense that a community school or governing authority, member of a community school governing authority, or community school employee or contractor may be entitled to under Chapter 2744. or any other provision of the Revised Code or under the common law of this state.

(C) A community school may accept donations of epinephrine autoinjectors from a wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs or a manufacturer of dangerous drugs, as defined in section 4729.01 of the Revised Code, and may accept donations of money from any person to purchase epinephrine autoinjectors.

(D) A community school that elects to procure epinephrine autoinjectors under this section shall report to the department of education each procurement and occurrence in which an epinephrine autoinjector is used from the school’s supply of epinephrine autoinjectors.

Sec. 3326.28. (A) With the approval of its governing body, a STEM school established under this chapter may procure epinephrine autoinjectors in the manner prescribed by section 3313.7110 of the Revised Code. A STEM school that elects to do so shall comply with all provisions of that section as if it were a school district.

(B) A STEM school, a member of a STEM school governing body, or a STEM school employee or contractor is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property that allegedly arises from an act or omission associated with procuring, maintaining, accessing, or using an epinephrine autoinjector under this section, unless the act or omission constitutes willful or wanton misconduct.

This division does not eliminate, limit, or reduce any other immunity or defense that a STEM school or governing body, member of a STEM school governing body, or STEM school employee or contractor may be entitled to under Chapter 2744. or any other provision of the Revised Code or under the common law of this state.

(C) A STEM school may accept donations of epinephrine autoinjectors from a wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs or a manufacturer of dangerous drugs, as defined in section 4729.01 of the Revised Code, and may accept donations of money from any person to purchase epinephrine autoinjectors.

(D) A STEM school that elects to procure epinephrine autoinjectors under this section shall report to the department of education each procurement and occurrence in which an epinephrine autoinjector is used from the school’s supply of epinephrine autoinjectors.

Sec. 3328.29. (A) With the approval of its board of trustees, a college-preparatory boarding school established under this chapter may procure epinephrine autoinjectors in the manner prescribed by section 3313.7110 of the Revised Code. A college-preparatory boarding school that elects to do so shall comply with all provisions of that section as if it were a school district.

(B) A college-preparatory boarding school, a member of a college-preparatory boarding school board of trustees, or a college-preparatory boarding school employee or contractor is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property that allegedly arises from an act or omission associated with procuring, maintaining, accessing, or using an epinephrine autoinjector under this section, unless the act or omission constitutes willful or wanton misconduct.

This division does not eliminate, limit, or reduce any other immunity or defense that a college-preparatory boarding school or board of trustees, member of a college-preparatory boarding school board of trustees, or college-preparatory boarding school employee or contractor may be entitled to under Chapter 2744. or any other provision of the Revised Code or under the common law of this state.

(C) A college-preparatory boarding school may accept donations of epinephrine autoinjectors from a wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs or a manufacturer of dangerous drugs, as defined in section 4729.01 of the Revised Code, and may accept donations of money from any person to purchase epinephrine autoinjectors.

(D) A college-preparatory boarding school that elects to procure epinephrine autoinjectors under this section shall report to the department of education each procurement and occurrence in which an epinephrine autoinjector is used from a school’s supply of epinephrine autoinjectors.

Sec. 4729.51. (A) No (1) Except as provided in division (A)(2) of this section, no person other than a registered wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs shall possess for sale, sell, distribute, or deliver, at wholesale, dangerous drugs, except as follows:

(1)(a) A pharmacist who is a licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs or who is employed by a licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs may make occasional sales of dangerous drugs at wholesale;

(2)(b) A licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs having more than one establishment or place may transfer or deliver dangerous drugs from one establishment or place for which a license has been issued to the terminal distributor to another establishment or place for which a license has been issued to the terminal distributor if the license issued for each establishment or place is in effect at the time of the transfer or delivery.

(2) A manufacturer of dangerous drugs may donate epinephrine autoinjectors to any of the following:

(a) The board of education of a city, local, exempted village, or joint vocational school district;

(b) A community school established under Chapter 3314. of the Revised Code;

(c) A STEM school established under Chapter 3326. of the Revised Code;

(d) A college-preparatory boarding school established under Chapter 3328. of the Revised Code;

(e) A chartered or nonchartered nonpublic school.

(B)(1) No registered wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs shall possess for sale, or sell, at wholesale, dangerous drugs to any person other than the following:

(a) Except as provided in division (B)(2)(a) of this section, a licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs;

(b) An optometrist licensed under Chapter 4725. of the Revised Code who holds a topical ocular pharmaceutical agents certificate;

(c) A registered wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs;

(d) A manufacturer of dangerous drugs;

(e) Subject to division (B)(3) of this section, a licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs;

(f) Carriers or warehouses for the purpose of carriage or storage;

(g) Terminal or wholesale distributors of dangerous drugs who are not engaged in the sale of dangerous drugs within this state;

(h) An individual who holds a current license, certificate, or registration issued under Title 47 XLVII of the Revised Code and has been certified to conduct diabetes education by a national certifying body specified in rules adopted by the state board of pharmacy under section 4729.68 of the Revised Code, but only with respect to insulin that will be used for the purpose of diabetes education and only if diabetes education is within the individual’s scope of practice under statutes and rules regulating the individual’s profession;

(i) An individual who holds a valid certificate issued by a nationally recognized S.C.U.B.A. diving certifying organization approved by the state board of pharmacy in rule, but only with respect to medical oxygen that will be used for the purpose of emergency care or treatment at the scene of a diving emergency;

(j) Except as provided in division (B)(2)(b) of this section, a business entity that is a corporation formed under division (B) of section 1701.03 of the Revised Code, a limited liability company formed under Chapter 1705. of the Revised Code, or a professional association formed under Chapter 1785. of the Revised Code if the entity has a sole shareholder who is a licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs and is authorized to provide the professional services being offered by the entity;

(k) Except as provided in division (B)(2)(c) of this section, a business entity that is a corporation formed under division (B) of section 1701.03 of the Revised Code, a limited liability company formed under Chapter 1705. of the Revised Code, a partnership or a limited liability partnership formed under Chapter 1775. of the Revised Code, or a professional association formed under Chapter 1785. of the Revised Code, if, to be a shareholder, member, or partner, an individual is required to be licensed, certified, or otherwise legally authorized under Title XLVII of the Revised Code to perform the professional service provided by the entity and each such individual is a licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs;

(l) With respect to epinephrine autoinjectors that may be possessed under section 3313.7110, 3313.7111, 3314.143, 3326.28, or 3328.29 of the Revised Code, any of the following: the board of education of a city, local, exempted village, or joint vocational school district; a chartered or nonchartered nonpublic school; a community school established under Chapter 3314. of the Revised Code; a STEM school established under Chapter 3326. of the Revised Code; or a college-preparatory boarding school established under Chapter 3328. of the Revised Code;

(m) With respect to epinephrine autoinjectors that may be possessed under section 5101.76 of the Revised Code, any of the following: a residential camp, as defined in section 2151.011 of the Revised Code; a child day camp, as defined in section 5104.01 of the Revised Code; or a child day camp operated by any county, township, municipal corporation, township park district created under section 511.18 of the Revised Code, park district created under section 1545.04 of the Revised Code, or joint recreation district established under section 755.14 of the Revised Code.

(2) No registered wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs shall possess for sale, or sell, at wholesale, dangerous drugs to any of the following:

(a) A prescriber who is employed by a pain management clinic that is not licensed as a terminal distributor of dangerous drugs with a pain management clinic classification issued under section 4729.552 of the Revised Code;

(b) A business entity described in division (B)(1)(j) of this section that is, or is operating, a pain management clinic without a license as a terminal distributor of dangerous drugs with a pain management clinic classification issued under section 4729.552 of the Revised Code;

(c) A business entity described in division (B)(1)(k) of this section that is, or is operating, a pain management clinic without a license as a terminal distributor of dangerous drugs with a pain management clinic classification issued under section 4729.552 of the Revised Code.

(3) No registered wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs shall possess dangerous drugs for sale at wholesale, or sell such drugs at wholesale, to a licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs, except as follows:

(a) In the case of a terminal distributor with a category I license, only dangerous drugs described in category I, as defined in division (A)(1) of section 4729.54 of the Revised Code;

(b) In the case of a terminal distributor with a category II license, only dangerous drugs described in category I and category II, as defined in divisions (A)(1) and (2) of section 4729.54 of the Revised Code;

(c) In the case of a terminal distributor with a category III license, dangerous drugs described in category I, category II, and category III, as defined in divisions (A)(1), (2), and (3) of section 4729.54 of the Revised Code;

(d) In the case of a terminal distributor with a limited category I, II, or III license, only the dangerous drugs specified in the certificate furnished by the terminal distributor in accordance with section 4729.60 of the Revised Code.

(C)(1) Except as provided in division (C)(4) of this section, no person shall sell, at retail, dangerous drugs.

(2) Except as provided in division (C)(4) of this section, no person shall possess for sale, at retail, dangerous drugs.

(3) Except as provided in division (C)(4) of this section, no person shall possess dangerous drugs.

(4) Divisions (C)(1), (2), and (3) of this section do not apply to a registered wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs, a licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs, or a person who possesses, or possesses for sale or sells, at retail, a dangerous drug in accordance with Chapters 3719., 4715., 4723., 4725., 4729., 4730., 4731., and 4741. of the Revised Code.

Divisions (C)(1), (2), and (3) of this section do not apply to an individual who holds a current license, certificate, or registration issued under Title XLVII of the Revised Code and has been certified to conduct diabetes education by a national certifying body specified in rules adopted by the state board of pharmacy under section 4729.68 of the Revised Code, but only to the extent that the individual possesses insulin or personally supplies insulin solely for the purpose of diabetes education and only if diabetes education is within the individual’s scope of practice under statutes and rules regulating the individual’s profession.

Divisions (C)(1), (2), and (3) of this section do not apply to an individual who holds a valid certificate issued by a nationally recognized S.C.U.B.A. diving certifying organization approved by the state board of pharmacy in rule, but only to the extent that the individual possesses medical oxygen or personally supplies medical oxygen for the purpose of emergency care or treatment at the scene of a diving emergency.

Division (C)(3) of this section does not apply to the board of education of a city, local, exempted village, or joint vocational school district, a school building operated by a school district board of education, a chartered or nonchartered nonpublic school, a community school, a STEM school, or a college-preparatory boarding school for the purpose of possessing epinephrine autoinjectors under section 3313.7110, 3313.7111, 3314.143, 3326.28, or 3328.29 of the Revised Code.

Division (C)(3) of this section does not apply to a residential camp, as defined in section 2151.011 of the Revised Code, a child day camp, as defined in section 5104.01 of the Revised Code, or a child day camp operated by any county, township, municipal corporation, township park district created under section 511.18 of the Revised Code, park district created under section 1545.04 of the Revised Code, or joint recreation district established under section 755.14 of the Revised Code for the purpose of possessing epinephrine autoinjectors under section 5101.76 of the Revised Code.

(D) No licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs shall purchase for the purpose of resale dangerous drugs from any person other than a registered wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs, except as follows:

(1) A licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs may make occasional purchases of dangerous drugs for resale from a pharmacist who is a licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs or who is employed by a licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs;

(2) A licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs having more than one establishment or place may transfer or receive dangerous drugs from one establishment or place for which a license has been issued to the terminal distributor to another establishment or place for which a license has been issued to the terminal distributor if the license issued for each establishment or place is in effect at the time of the transfer or receipt.

(E) No licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs shall engage in the sale or other distribution of dangerous drugs at retail or maintain possession, custody, or control of dangerous drugs for any purpose other than the distributor’s personal use or consumption, at any establishment or place other than that or those described in the license issued by the state board of pharmacy to such terminal distributor.

(F) Nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere with the performance of official duties by any law enforcement official authorized by municipal, county, state, or federal law to collect samples of any drug, regardless of its nature or in whose possession it may be.

(G) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this section, the board of education of a city, local, exempted village, or joint vocational school district may deliver epinephrine autoinjectors to a school under its control for the purpose of possessing epinephrine autoinjectors under section 3313.7110 of the Revised Code.

Sec. 4729.60. (A) Before a registered wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs may sell dangerous drugs at wholesale to any person, other than the persons specified in divisions (B)(1)(a) to (d) and (B)(1), (f) to (h), (l), and (m) of section 4729.51 of the Revised Code, such wholesale distributor shall obtain from the purchaser and the purchaser shall furnish to the wholesale distributor a certificate indicating that the purchaser is a licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs. The certificate shall be in the form that the state board of pharmacy shall prescribe, and shall set forth the name of the licensee, the number of the license, a description of the place or establishment or each place or establishment for which the license was issued, the category of licensure, and, if the license is a limited category I, II, or III license, the dangerous drugs that the licensee is authorized to possess, have custody or control of, and distribute.

If no certificate is obtained or furnished before a sale is made, it shall be presumed that the sale of dangerous drugs by the wholesale distributor is in violation of division (B) of section 4729.51 of the Revised Code and the purchase of dangerous drugs by the purchaser is in violation of division (C) of section 4729.51 of the Revised Code. If a registered wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs obtains or is furnished a certificate from a terminal distributor of dangerous drugs and relies on the certificate in selling dangerous drugs at wholesale to the terminal distributor of dangerous drugs, the wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs shall be deemed not to have violated division (B) of section 4729.51 of the Revised Code in making the sale.

(B) Before a licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs may purchase dangerous drugs at wholesale, the terminal distributor shall obtain from the seller and the seller shall furnish to the terminal distributor the number of the seller’s registration certificate to engage in the sale of dangerous drugs at wholesale.

If no registration number is obtained or furnished before a purchase is made, it shall be presumed that the purchase of dangerous drugs by the terminal distributor is in violation of division (D) of section 4729.51 of the Revised Code and the sale of dangerous drugs by the seller is in violation of division (A) of section 4729.51 of the Revised Code. If a licensed terminal distributor of dangerous drugs obtains or is furnished a registration number from a wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs and relies on the registration number in purchasing dangerous drugs at wholesale from the wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs, the terminal distributor shall be deemed not to have violated division (D) of section 4729.51 of the Revised Code in making the purchase.

Sec. 5101.76. (A) A residential camp, as defined in section 2151.011 of the Revised Code, a child day camp, as defined in section 5104.01 of the Revised Code, or a child day camp operated by any county, township, municipal corporation, township park district created under section 511.18 of the Revised Code, park district created under section 1545.04 of the Revised Code, or joint recreation district established under section 755.14 of the Revised Code may procure epinephrine autoinjectors for use in emergency situations identified under division (C)(5) of this section. A camp that elects to procure epinephrine autoinjectors under this section is encouraged to maintain at least two epinephrine autoinjectors at all times.

(B) A camp that elects to procure epinephrine autoinjectors under this section shall adopt a policy governing their maintenance and use. Before adopting the policy, the camp shall consult with a licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs, as defined in section 4729.01 of the Revised Code.

(C) A component of a policy adopted by a camp under division (B) of this section shall be a prescriber-issued protocol specifying definitive orders for epinephrine autoinjectors and the dosages of epinephrine to be administered through them. The policy also shall do all of the following:

(1) Identify the one or more locations in which an epinephrine autoinjector must be stored;

(2) Specify the conditions under which an epinephrine autoinjector must be stored, replaced, and disposed;

(3) Specify the individuals employed by or under contract with the camp who may access and use an epinephrine autoinjector to provide a dosage of epinephrine to an individual in an emergency situation identified under division (C)(5) of this section;

(4) Specify any training that employees or contractors specified under division (C)(3) of this section must complete before being authorized to access and use an epinephrine autoinjector;

(5) Identify the emergency situations, including when an individual exhibits signs and symptoms of anaphylaxis, in which employees or contractors specified under division (C)(3) of this section may access and use an epinephrine autoinjector;

(6) Specify that assistance from an emergency medical service provider must be requested immediately after an epinephrine autoinjector is used;

(7) Specify the individuals to whom a dosage of epinephrine may be administered through an epinephrine autoinjector in an emergency situation specified under division (C)(5) of this section.

(D) A camp or camp employee or contractor is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property that allegedly arises from an act or omission associated with procuring, maintaining, accessing, or using an epinephrine autoinjector under this section, unless the act or omission constitutes willful or wanton misconduct.

This section does not eliminate, limit, or reduce any other immunity or defense that a camp or camp employee or contractor may be entitled to under Chapter 2744. or any other provision of the Revised Code or under the common law of this state.

(E) A camp may accept donations of epinephrine autoinjectors from a wholesale distributor of dangerous drugs, as defined in section 4729.01 of the Revised Code, and may accept donations of money from any person to purchase epinephrine autoinjectors.

(F) A camp that elects to procure epinephrine autoinjectors under this section shall report to the department of job and family services each procurement and occurrence in which an epinephrine autoinjector is used from a camp’s supply of epinephrine autoinjectors.

SECTION 2. That existing sections 3313.713, 3313.718, 4729.51, and 4729.60 of the Revised Code are hereby repealed.

Section 3. This act is hereby declared to be an emergency measure necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. The reason for such necessity is that allergic reactions can be life-threatening and Ohio schools and camps presently lack authorization to procure epinephrine autoinjectors to treat emergency anaphylaxis. Because anaphylaxis can lead to death or permanent damage within minutes, authorization to procure and timely administer epinephrine is critical. Therefore, this act shall go into immediate effect.

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#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, Epinephrine, Autoinjector, Summer Camp, Day Camp,

 


ASTM standard I abstained on is a guaranteed lawsuit starter

I’m hurt because you did not check the weather correctly!

So this is the new standard that I was asked to vote on recently.

Withdraw With Replacement to F2993-2013 Guide for Monitoring Weather Conditions for Safe Parasail Operation WK47376 PDF (8.0K)

(SEE VOLUME 15.7)(CONCURRENT WITH .6500)

TECHNICAL CONTACT: Matt Dvorak

daytonaparasailing@hotmail.com

(386) 547-6067

When I don’t fully understand the issues or have not seen the actual standard (yes it is a little crazy trying to read what you are voting on sometimes) I abstain. I did so on this standard also.

Besides voting against a standard requires you to articulate the reasons why you are voting no on the standard. “This is stupid,” is not a good reason according to the ASTM. Nor is “this is going to help plaintiff’s win lawsuits” a valid reason for voting no.

However, can’t you see this doing nothing but creating legal nightmares.

“You said you checked the weather, and you said to launch, but the wind changed because a front moved/truck came by/that is what the wind does, and I crashed. You owed me a duty to check the weather; that duty is in writing, and you agreed to it by becoming a member of the ASTM and agreeing to the standard (or not agreeing to the standard; you are still held to the standard), and my injuries are a result of you not following the standard.”

Duh

Somewhere, the ASTM, there is an idea that the creation of standards stops lawsuits, but even the ASTM can’t show any proof of that.

What do you think? Leave a comment.

If you like this let your friends know or post it on FB, Twitter or LinkedIn

Copyright 2013 Recreation Law (720) Edit Law

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#AdventureTourism, #AdventureTravelLaw, #AdventureTravelLawyer, #AttorneyatLaw, #Backpacking, #BicyclingLaw, #Camps, #ChallengeCourse, #ChallengeCourseLaw, #ChallengeCourseLawyer, #CyclingLaw, #FitnessLaw, #FitnessLawyer, #Hiking, #HumanPowered, #HumanPoweredRecreation, #IceClimbing, #JamesHMoss, #JimMoss, #Law, #Mountaineering, #Negligence, #OutdoorLaw, #OutdoorRecreationLaw, #OutsideLaw, #OutsideLawyer, #RecLaw, #Rec-Law, #RecLawBlog, #Rec-LawBlog, #RecLawyer, #RecreationalLawyer, #RecreationLaw, #RecreationLawBlog, #RecreationLawcom, #Recreation-Lawcom, #Recreation-Law.com, #RiskManagement, #RockClimbing, #RockClimbingLawyer, #RopesCourse, #RopesCourseLawyer, #SkiAreas, #Skiing, #SkiLaw, #Snowboarding, #SummerCamp, #Tourism, #TravelLaw, #YouthCamps, #ZipLineLawyer, ASTM, American Society of Testing & Material, Parasailing, Paragliding, Hangliding, weather,

 


Last Chance to get a Great Copy of Roads Were Not Built for Cars

Roads Were Not Built For Cars email banner

Roads Were Not Built For Cars availability information

The iPad version of Roads Were Not Built For Cars has just gone live. It contains the full 170,000 words of the print book plus ten short videos, two audio files, a 3D object to play with, and 580+ illustrations, most of which zoom to full screen. Access it via an iPad on iBookstore.

Now, good news for those who wanted a print version of the book – a few have become available. Softbacks only. When they’re gone, they’re gone.

The Kindle versions have been available for a while. All Kickstarter backers should now have their print books, even those in the Antipodes. Of those who pre-ordered I still have 150 to mail out – if you’re one of those folks, I’m sorry for the delay. I underestimated how long it would take to sign, pack and mail 1000 books.

The iPad version of the book costs £14.99 on iBookstore. I set it at £18 but Apple automatically dropped me down a tier. I will work on fixing this for version 1.1. Those who pre-ordered and paid £18 for their iPad versions were sent download info yesterday (pre-orderers who want three quid refunds should get in touch, supplying their PayPal order no so I can trace them).

The website is where the notes live (I need to work on those, too) and there are sporadic stories on the blog, too. For instance, earlier today I posted a story about a dodgy claim on cycle safety from a 1902 car mag which has been debunked by a modern automotive tester.

I’ll also be rolling out the book’s promotional campaign, including talks, book reviews and guest postings. There’s an article on motoring.co.uk, which went live today, and is headlined Why motorists owe EVERYTHING to cyclists (it’s not my headline, but I like it).

Thanks.

Carlton

PS
The Kickstarter Kindle special is available only on Gumroad.com, as is the ePub version. The standard Kindle version is available on Gumroad and on Amazon (Amazon takes a far bigger cut than Gumroad).

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